

The “Historical Recognition Problem” and Hui-Muslim Elites in the Restoration of the Honor of the “Yunnan Muslim Uprising”: The “Islamic New Cultural Movement” and the Search for Model Minority Status during the Republican Era

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Introduction: China’s Ethnic Minority Issues in Fragmentation and Continuity —A Case of Islam

In the 160 years of history from the mid-19th century to the present (2021), Islam and China’s Muslims—called Hui-Muslims (*Hui*, *Huihui*, *Huimin*, *Huizu*, Sino-Muslims, hereafter Muslims or Hui-Muslims)—have been in a vulnerable position within China due to the minority status of the religion, and group, in the region due to Han prejudice and chauvinism. In the mid-19th century, both the Yunnan Muslim Uprising (1856–1873) and the Northwest Muslim Uprising (1862–1873) led to great turmoil throughout the region. In Yunnan and the Northwest, Hui-Muslims became the “targets of extermination” by the authorities, with the Muslim population subsequently having been greatly reduced, leaving communities on the verge of destruction. In response to these incidents, the Islamic New Cultural Movement emerged across China during the Republican period (1920s–1940s), with a recognition emerging that the destroyers and slaughter-men were the Qing authorities; as such, a consciousness grew that ethnic (racial) extermination—what we now call “genocide”—based on the prejudice against Muslims had taken place. This was the dawn of the Hui-Muslims’ political and cultural movement that demanded: the revocation of the stigma of “rebellion”, a political reevaluation, and representative seats for the Hui-Muslims in the new nation-state of China.

In this essay, I will look at the reevaluation of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising and the movement for “the restoration of honor” mainly in the Yunnan Muslim magazines of *Qingzhen Yuebao* (hereafter, *Qingzhen Monthly*) (1915), *Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao* (1929–1931), *Duobao* (1932–1934), and *Qingzhen Duobao* (1940–1948). First, I will consider how Hui-Muslim intellectuals in Yunnan in the 1930s and 1940s attempted: to define, retell, and reevaluate the

Yunnan Muslim Uprising some 90 years earlier; to resolve the trauma of the massacres; to mourn; and to restore the dignity of the ethnicity. At a time when the concept of minorities' human rights and human dignity had not yet taken root, how did Yunnan Hui-Muslims try to restore honor and survive the structural problem of absolute minorities vulnerable to pressure/violence?

Second, I will present an argument as to how Hui-Muslims submitted to majority rule, renewed their self-recognition as exemplary citizens, and hoped to be recognized socially and politically as a unique entity—examples of such efforts include winning representative seats to the National Congress on the basis of their participation in the Anti-Japanese War and their contribution to China's history.

However, their hopes and ideas of “equality of all the ethnicities”, “anti-discrimination”, and “anti-racism” were neutralized amidst the political turmoil in 1948—driven by the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD: the Nationalist Party of China)—and as they failed to persuade the majority to adopt ideas of “anti-discrimination” and “anti-racism” via policy. This paper will discuss the rise in the self-esteem of Yunnan Hui-Muslims in the 1930s and 1940s, along with their subsequent failure at ameliorating attitudes towards them in the wake of the GMD's “defeat”.

1. Problem Assumption

1-1. A Short Zigzag History: The Oppression of Hui-Muslims and the Restoration of Their Honor

Hui-Muslims are an ethnic minority with a current population of about 10.5 million (2010 census). As a religious ethnicity, their religious language is that of Arabic or Persian, while their everyday language is Chinese mandarin/dialects. They live scattered throughout China, but until the Qing Dynasty, Yunnan and Northwest had the largest populations of Hui-Muslims. Yunnan was involved in China in the Mongolian era and Muslim governors who had immigrated from Bukhara in the Central Asia ruled the area. During the Mongolian Yuan era (1271–1368), almost all the population in the area was either indigenous people, Hui-Muslims, or Mongolians. During the Ming and the Qing era, a lot of Han migrants settled down in Yunnan for the development of mining and tea plantation. The northwest was also inhabited by Muslim migrants.

Muslim uprisings in Yunnan and the northwest (Shaanxi and Gansu) in

the mid-19th century were suppressed and thoroughly eradicated by the Qing authorities. The mosques (*qingzhensi*), bastions of the Islamic faith and Hui-Muslim ethnicity, were thoroughly destroyed, with any surviving Muslims forced to emigrate or dislocate.

During the Republican era (1912–1949), the Hui-Muslim population and mosques were slowly recovering as a result of their survival efforts, and the so-called Islamic New Cultural Movement arose in Yunnan. The restoration of honor also progressed gradually.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic, however, everything changed. In particular, in the years after 1958, the religious reforms of the democratic movement, as sparked by the Tibetan “uprising”, was initiated and all religions across China were severely suppressed. This was replicated throughout the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which resulted in significant vandalism of buildings of worship, destruction of relics and religious texts, and the widespread killing of religious devotees. The charges applied against such religious groups and peoples were beliefs in feudal superstitions and the violation of the principle of atheism.

After the end of the Cultural Revolution, religious leaders and students who had been purged or prosecuted had their honor restored in the 1980s, and for the following 30 years, religious and cultural activities were revived, research studies on religions in China was deepened, and international academic exchanges were promoted. However, since 2015, President Xi Jinping has imposed a renewed clampdown on religious freedom (via “the Sinicization of Religions”), and the freedom of religion, which was tolerated to some extent during the Reform and Open period, and which remains restricted to this day (2021).

Thus, for 160 years, modern and contemporary China has been repeating a cycle whereby Islam is forced underground, reappears, and regains its honor, depending on the policy of the regime. In terms of the modern definition of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),¹⁾ the killing of group members, and grave physical and psychological harm (rape, cultural destruction, relocation, etc.), have been inflicted on Hui-Muslims, who account for only 0.7% of China’s total population (1,411.78 million, as per the 2020 census).

1-2. Patterns of Oppression and Restoration of Honor

The pattern of the above can be described as follows.

(1) In mediating the exchange of violence related to prejudice, acts and

conflicts arose based on prejudice, hatred, and ethnic discrimination. Those in power who were in favor of the majority ethnic group identified ethnic minorities as dissidents (enemies) and instigated discrimination against ethnic minorities (by the majority), even to the point of extermination. As a result, there was widespread killing, destruction (especially of Hui-Muslim spiritual pillars—including the mosques, scriptures, and religious cultures), and insults, including sexual abuse, the massive confiscation of family properties, and forced migration to other regions. In other words, and in today's parlance, "genocide" was carried out, denying a certain ethnic group's cultural identity and physical survival. Through divide-and-rule tactics orchestrated by authorities, some members of the Hui-Muslim minority group joined the regime and took part in the atrocities of slaughtering people of the same faith as themselves.

(2) Racist language by those in power and their followers continued to circulate, even after the end of the uprising, and public and private harassment of Muslims was rampant. No excuses or explanations were provided to Muslims throughout this time. As a result, the act of faith itself was forced underground, and some Hui-Muslims fled the mountainous area for neighboring countries—such as Burma and Thailand. In other words, the structural violence that endorsed and perpetuated ethnic discrimination and harassment was preserved without hesitation.

(3) When the onslaught of killings and insults passed by (due to a change in regime), a movement for the reconstruction and restoration of honor erupted out of the minority Muslim population, and Muslim self-esteem was expressed once again. In the midst of this resurgence, the bitter collective memory of the past was reflected upon, and the records of the oppression, discrimination, and resistance against them were discovered and preserved in historical narratives for lessons and the restoration of human and ethnic dignity.

In order to prevent the recurrence of the discrimination and mass-killing, the leaders of the minority Hui-Muslims encouraged the spiritual assimilation of their people with the majority via discipline and "voluntary obedience" to the authorities. However, the majority, which was complicit in the oppression of such minorities, did not actively move toward attitudes and policies of anti-discrimination. In principle, each regime advocated "ethnic equality" for the completion of national integration, but did not admonish the majority for their discriminating behavior (as evidenced by the lack of penalties against such actions).

(4) At the same time, both leaders of Hui-Muslims and ordinary Hui-

Muslims themselves contributed money needed to rebuild mosques, establish Islamic educational institutions (*madāris*), and foster religious leaders so that Muslim children could learn about Islam and that their own culture would persist. At the same time, they learnt about the tragic history of the discrimination and “genocide” experienced by their ancestors. As windows to the other Islamic world opened up—in light of the development of transportation and the open-door policy—“new” Islamic doctrines, knowledge, and systems were “imported” from the outside world, and the Islamic community in China became “internationalized” and “standardized”, particularly after the introduction of the *Ikhwān* school in the beginning of the 20th century.

(5) After the turmoil and the mobility of the majority, Hui-Muslims were subjected to mass harassment once again, with some being detained as an example, and their thoughts were modified to conform to the ideology of the regime, while some went underground as others were forced to assimilate “voluntarily” and extrinsically.

The escalation of prejudice, acts based on prejudice, discrimination, and violence is a path leading towards genocide of minority groups. Discrimination, violence, and genocide are, in particular, prohibited by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination after World War II (1965, entry into force 1969)²⁾ [Ryang 2020: 93]. However, the above-explored phenomena—(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5)—have been repeated in China after 1949, and which acceded to the convention in 1981. (1) was the religious democratic reform movement (1958) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), whereas (2) and (5) are considered to be the Sinicization of Religions (2015–) [Murakami 2018; Vermander 2019; Matsumoto 2020]. In other words, modern Chinese politics and society have repeatedly followed this pattern in its actions toward Islam and Hui-Muslims. Additionally, this phenomenon can be traced back to the Qing Dynasty. In this sense, the Yunnan Muslim Uprising was the beginning of this phenomenon. In this paper, I discuss this issue more precisely.

2. A Research History

2-1. Previous Researches

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Association of Chinese Historians, along with other researchers, have referred to the 19th century Yunnan Muslim Uprising and the Northwest Muslim Uprising with

the general term “Muslim uprising” (*Huimin qi yi*). The uprising was evaluated as “revolutionary” movements of poor low-class farmers and craftsmen via Marxist historiography.³⁾ This uprising also attracted the attention of the imperialist powers of the time, and the account of western visitors’ observations has been used as a historical document. Many contemporary researchers also wrote outstanding papers and books on the uprising.⁴⁾ In this paper, I will leave the details of the incident to previous studies. I will, instead, discuss how the incident was described and debated in the Islamic New Cultural Movement in modern Yunnan.⁵⁾

2-2. Historical Classification of Research Histories

Prof. Yao Jide of Yunnan University divides these research histories into the following periods.

The first stage ranges from the beginning of the 20th century to the end of the 1940s, when Yunnan intellectuals collected folk materials on the Muslim uprising based on the memories and records of witnesses. Most were included in Bai’s *Huimin qi yi*, vols. 1 and 2 in 1952 [Bai (1952) 2000]. The first phase of these efforts was to assert the “anti-Qing uprising” characteristic of the uprising “while the memory was still fresh” and to conclude that it was a tragedy comparable to the Taiping Rebellion, further positing that the Muslims of Yunnan should remember this tragedy forever.

The second stage was the “Du Wenxiu traitor controversy”, as initiated by historians such as Fan Wenlan and Guo Moruo from the late 1950s to the 1970s, and which coincided with the period of the Anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution. Du Wenxiu (1828–1872) was accused of being a “traitor” and a “separatist” for sending a delegation to Britain at the end of his administration in Dali.

The third stage was the post-Reform and Open policy period of the 1980s, when the government tried to shake off the stigma of being a “traitor” and prove that Du was not a separatist [Yao 2012].

In general, the first stage sought to prove that the Muslim uprising acted as a “resistance” against discrimination and in support of ethnic survival. The second step was to undermine the value of Du Wenxiu’s administration via the claims of “separatism”, which was a taboo in China’s Marxist historiography at the time (and remains as such at present). The third stage was a major controversy in the historical academic world, as it sought to prove that Du’s administration was not separatist in nature and that neither Ma Rulong nor Ma Dexin (1794–1874) betrayed the movement [Ma Ping’an and

Ma Shaozhong 2007]. In both the first and third phases, historians and demographers had rough estimates of the death toll and shared the same sentiments in mourning for the innocents who were massacred—especially so for the Muslims who were killed in overwhelming numbers.

3. Methodology for “Reconciliation”: Towards Semi-assimilation with Anti-discrimination Implications

There are currently three general methods for trauma resolution and honor restoration for affected individuals and ethnicities.

The first is reconnection [Herman 2015: 156–213], a method of individual and collective trauma resolution that involves (1) establishing safety first, (2) remembrance and mourning, and (3) reconnecting with normal life. In particular, it is often difficult to reconstruct a belief system that gives meaning to the damage and suffering in stage (2) above [Nobuta 2021: 172].

The second methodology is fact-finding, reparations, the issuing of apologies by the perpetrators, and implementing measures to prevent recurrence. This method is in line with the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the “Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. This is expected to promote reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This presents a way of reconciliation via the offering of compensation to the victims of Nazi Germany and for the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II in the US. However, such a method only surfaced in the latter half of the 20th century, and not in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Third, there is a case where the concerned (victim) party confirms the facts, but no apology or compensation from the perpetrators is offered and no historical verification is guaranteed. The location of responsibility is vague, and there are no measures to prevent recurrence. Let us call the third method “the first half of the 20th century style of resolution”. In this case, reconciliation did not proceed. From the perspective of the first process above, this is a situation where safety has not been ensured. In such a case, the next generation of victims will be forced to keep silent and to assimilate to the ways of the perpetrators in order to stop harassment from the next generation of persecutors. So-called “justice”, in such a case, will not be achieved.

There are three kinds of assimilation: a) after being bullied because of one’s own ethnic traits, one feels ashamed of their ethnic characteristics and discards, forgets, or covers up, and b) the victim(s) imitate mainstream culture,

including both its good and bad aspects, in begrudging acceptance. In such a case, ethnicity is merely a signifier to distinguish oneself from others—as such, b) immediately turns into a).

The other is c) semi-assimilation with the meaning of anti-discrimination. This is attempted in an effort to “improve” and “reevaluate” one’s ethnic characteristics and morals so as to meet the needs and social conditions of the times, and to make them known to both the majority and one’s own ethnicity by following the “good” common values and laws of the majority group. By doing so, ethnicities gain pride and self-confidence in their own culture [Ma Shaojing 1990], and become model ethnic citizens and minorities who can be admired by the majority. It is neither a perfect assimilation, nor a call for secession. This approach advocates for the victimized group to become a model minority by maintaining a strong identity and morality while asking for social and economic equality in a society that respects diversity (this is also the case for Asians living in the United States). Of course, if the victimized do not assimilate, they will face physical and mental sanctions and warnings from the majority/powerful.⁶⁾

The ethnic elites were able to digest the self-centered discourse of the majority/powerful. The ethnic elites belonged to a privileged class that had been able to secure the time and financial resources to master the Chinese characters and the ideas they contained. Therefore, this group was committed to finding the basis for the survival of their ethnicity via the route proposed by c) above, while understanding the essence of the faith of their religion.

In an environment where the human rights-conscious reparations and recurrence prevention systems were either absent or non-functioning, it was c) above that the decedents of victims of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising were concerned about. Although they took the initiative in confirming the facts and verifying the falseness of the accusation in the action of labelling the uprising as a “rebellion”, they also reflected on the fact that it was not because of their own faults that they were victimized and tried to “improve the Islamic doctrine and the Muslim society” so as to find a way to survive with confidence. This privileged leader group also launched a non-violent petition campaign to change the enabling context in which the majority’s latent discrimination and prejudice appeared, publishing articles in journals and newspapers. This activity was successful to a certain extent—the “Religious Denunciation Incidents” (侮教事件) [Yakubo 2012: 248–252]. The logic behind these actions is the same as that of the “Islamic New Cultural Movement” that arose among Hui-Muslims throughout China during the Republic of China era.

4. Activities of Intellectuals for the Restoration of Honor in the Republican Era

4-1. The Movement for the Restoration of Honor: Historical Background

In general, there are various names for the Yunnan Muslim Uprising in historical documents, including (1) uprising (*fengqi* 蜂起); and (2) affairs (*shilüe* 事略), both of which are neutral expressions; (3) uprising (*qiyi* 起義); (4) revolution (*geming* 革命); and (5) movement (*yundong* 運動), which are based on a “revolutionary historical perspective”. On the other hand, terms such as (6) great disaster (*dahuo* 大禍); (7) disturbance (*bianluan* 變亂); (8) Du’s disturbance (*Duluan* 杜亂); (9) Du’s disturbance (*Duni* 杜逆); (10) Hui’s disturbance (*Huiluan* 回亂); (11) Hui’s banditry (*Huifei* 回匪); (12) rebellion (*panluan* 叛亂); (13) Hui’s insurgency (*Huini* 回逆); and (14) Hui’s calamity (*Huibian* 回變) were based on the perspective of the “oppressor” —i.e., the ones in power. The term “Du” referred especially to Du Wenxiu’s administration in western Yunnan, which refused to surrender to the Qing Dynasty and maintained its own government for 16 years. These names for the uprising were based on the idea that the Hui-Muslims, who were the “weak” and “unwelcoming people”, were responsible for the defeat and that there was nothing wrong with the oppressors—or those in power.

Under such circumstances, minorities were not able to live comfortably—even if the widespread killing and hatred were resolved and the regime was replaced. They would, nonetheless, be stigmatized as “rebels” by those around them and by the system.

Therefore, the Muslim intellectuals who understood the Chinese written language during the Republican period took the initiative to revive and restore their honor. In particular, and in the case of Yunnan, high-ranking military officers/intellectuals such as Ma Cong 馬聰 (1886–1961), hereafter the pseudonym Ma Bo’an 馬伯安, and civilian intellectuals such as Bai Liangcheng (1893–1965) and Bai Shouyi (1909–2000) played the roles of the initiators of the cultural reconstruction.

In the 1920s, the Hui-Muslim intellectuals began to revise the historical view that placed all the blame on the people who were killed and demanded the elimination of discrimination by the Republican government. This period also saw to a contextual background in which the growing authority of the Yunnan military clique was evident. In the National Protection War (1915–1916), Yunnan Governor General Cai E and Yunnan General Tang Jiyao declared Yunnan’s independence from Beijing and sent out an army to defeat Yuan Shikai (who called himself an emperor), resulting in the North-South

confrontation in China. However, the political situation calmed with the return to the republic following Yuan Shikai's death [Ma Yingsheng and Ma Desheng 2015: 29].

Those intellectuals' purpose in protecting Islam and Muslims was, firstly, to refute the documents produced by the anti-Muslim Qing Dynasty/Han political elites and intelligentsia. In China, successive generations of people in positions of power had the right to interpret history so as to produce an official narrative. In the official Qing document titled "Official historical documents to describe the control over Yunnan Hui-Muslim bandit" (欽定平定雲南回匪方略)—500,000 characters, published in 1896—and others, Muslims were described as "rebellious bandits", "Hui bandits", "rebellious Hui", and "獮". The word "獮" implies that Muslims were not human beings, but were more akin to animals which should be slaughtered. The lack of understanding of Islamic doctrine, prejudice against Muslims, hostility against rebels, and incitement by the majority were, as such, evident in official documentation. Therefore, there were demands by intellectuals that such documents should be rewritten and that the defamation should be rescinded.

Secondly, they took issue with the incompetence of the Qing bureaucracy. The bureaucrats insulted Muslims who were regarded as the inciting cause of the uprising, overlooking the fact that Han Chinese thugs (as referred in historical materials) killed all Muslims who rose up against the suppression, even going as far as to issue an order to kill all Muslims who stood up against them. The Qing Dynasty made use of imported Western cannons to suppress Du Wenxiu's Dali administration, resulting in another massacre. Du Wenxiu's Dali administration maintained its own government via the *raison d'être* of an "anti-genocide struggle" [Jing 1991: 305] amid the growing number of uprisings and an increase in turmoil. In today's parlance, Qing troops' activity was genocide based on racial prejudice—and the act of destroying a group based on religious, racial, or ethnic identity. Of course, Muslims were not the only ones who were killed during this period, and, amidst the chaos, Muslims also killed Han Chinese in retaliation. Han Chinese who participated in Du Wenxiu's administration were also killed. However, the mass killings and destruction (of houses and mosques) were specifically targeted at Muslims, and, above all, Muslims were stigmatized as "rebels" (until a later period), as the word "rebellion" indicates.

4-2. The Beginning of the Activities of Hui-Muslim Intellectuals in Restoring Honor

The Yunnan Muslim intellectuals’ activities during the Republican era began to show a consensus in their approach by attempting to clarify the legitimacy of the Muslim uprising that resulted in the unprecedented massacre in historical records. Moreover, they began to question the responsibility of the regime for escalating the discrimination, to exonerate their ancestors who were massacred, to illuminate justice, and to restore their honor.⁷⁾

After the abolition of the Imperial Examination (*keju* 科举) in 1905, some of the Yunnan intellectuals of the time went to Japan to gain new knowledge, and subsequently becoming revolutionaries (many of these intellectuals were also officers). After returning home, these individuals started the modernization and militarization of Yunnan in the era of the Republic of China. Those who did not go abroad were also preoccupied with questions of how to adapt to the new social system and the processes of modernization implemented under the new nation-state system, and how to criticize the misrule of the past.⁸⁾ At the same time, it was the “responsibility” of the few intellectuals to stabilize the lives and the faith of the ordinal Hui-Muslim population who remained in poverty.⁹⁾

At the very least, the intellectuals had to earn and contribute money, publish and reprint Islamic books, build schools (*madāris*), and construct mosques where poor and rich could gather. In addition, they wanted to raise religious leaders (*ahong* 阿訇; i.e., clerics) to teach the masses what they should do in their lives as proud Muslims, and to build tenets of a theology to find the junction between social stability and Islam. In addition, they tried to restore their honor as descendants of the “rebels” via the empirical historical analysis of the past genocide and the discrimination faced by the preceding three generations.

The Hui-Muslims who could read and write the Chinese language were comprised of a small number of men who were able to communicate with the Han literati and who had economic power. At the beginning of the uprising during the Qing era, the number of Hui-Muslims who could read and write Chinese was very small. Because of their poor ability to write in Chinese, Hui-Muslims were, in general, at a disadvantage in terms of appealing to “the authorities” over issues concerning their misery and massacre. They believed that the lack of Chinese literacy caused the unequal and unfair judgment delivered by authorities, and which paved the way for the massacre of Muslims.

What the Yunnan Muslim intellectuals of the civilian and military aspects

in the Republican era developed and celebrated under the new nation-state system was, fundamentally, a system-adaptive ideology. Since they were originally preparing to take the Imperial Examination, their linguistic worlds and ideologies were system-compliant. For example, after the collapse of Du Wenxiu's administration, Muslims in western Yunnan were sanctioned with a ban on taking the Imperial Examination. However, there were some Hui-Muslims who changed their surnames—and even their family origins—in order to take the examination. From the viewpoint of Muslims, the reality was that only those who had passed the examination and those who had prepared for it could become the guardians of the fragile Muslim community in China.

The first step in restoring honor was, thus, self-promotion and self-examination.

4.3. *Qingzhen Monthly (Qingzhen Yuebao)*

The first attempt was made via the publication of the *Qingzhen Monthly (Qingzhen Yuebao)* in 1915. This was just before the National Protection War and Yuan Shikai's declaration of the rebuilding of the imperial system. It can be seen that the imperial state was overthrown, and that the Hui-Muslims were determined to consolidate their position as indispensable members of the "Chinese people" in the new nation-state of the Republic of China, a "republic of five peoples" (五族共和) [Xie 1915a]. There was momentum to reverse the deep-rooted discrimination against Hui-Muslims by Han Chinese [Xie 1915b] and recover the lack of Islamic knowledge about food taboos, ablution, and prayer among Muslims, who were forced to forget religious knowledge [Re 1915]. The *Qingzhen Monthly* was funded by the Xingyihe 興義和, a rich family-run commercial conglomerate in Yuxi 玉溪, Yunnan; however, it was soon forced to disband, and the journal was forced to cease publication.

4.4. Islamic New Cultural Movement in Yunnan

The Islamic New Cultural Movement, which spread among Hui-Muslims throughout Republican China, took the following characteristics and directions: "nationalism to foster loyalty to the Chinese state and national consciousness", "the promotion of Islamic culture", "the promotion of a new-style education in . . . Chinese and Arabic", "from the backward to . . . progress", and "the elimination of foolishness and poverty" [Matsumoto 2003; 2006; 2010; 2016]. In other words, they put stress upon the idea of accepting "the new ideology of nationalism and modernization", and the belief that

“Muslims will improve [their] thoughts and actions for . . . self-examination after the genocide decades [prior]”. They further also focused on the tactics of the physical survival of individual Hui-Muslims by becoming good ethnic and patriotic people, thus reviving Islam while avoiding the gaze of discrimination from the majority Han (who had displayed tendencies of a sense of superiority via acts of othering—such as by connecting Muslims to pigs).

The food taboo was the biggest contradiction between Hui-Muslims and the Han, who often believed that Muslims did not eat pork because they were descended from pigs. The harassment of Muslims by the Han with pig lard in their food and wells was rampant. For instance, in the 1930s, movements against the insulting of Islam arose among Muslims in China, resisting Han prejudice regarding the linkage between Muslims’ pig taboo and Muslims’ ancestors. Petitions to the Executive Yuan were sent in an attempt to ban on such discrimination and introduce a punishment for the publisher of such insults.¹⁰ They believed that the Legislative Yuan should respond to their demands by implementing anti-discrimination legislation in the future, further believing that contempt toward Muslims should be punished according to the law and that the authority should listen to these petitions calling for legislation.

On the other hand, in order to avoid such prejudice and harassment, Muslims began “voluntary ideological transformations”, which included religious reinterpretations and the promotion of modern education to adapt to the modern nation-state system. Within this context, Hui-Muslims believed that people who used dehumanizing and religion-specific insults (such as those linking Muslims to pigs) deviated from the democratic and modern order.

In the harsh historical environment facing China’s Muslim minorities, “voluntary submission to the majority/perpetrator regime” was the only way to survive. They were even forced to replace the word “Allah” with a Chinese phrase —“True Lord” (眞主)—as far back as the Ming era. If the Arabic word “Allah” came out of their mouth unintentionally, they could be persecuted for not understanding Chinese culture and for being observant and obedient to another, alien culture. Because there were no penalties for discrimination, no anti-discrimination ideology was fostered upon the majority-dominated society. In other words, the idea of cross-cultural understanding was lacking among the Han Chinese because of the ethno-centric idea of Chinese cultural supremacy over other cultures.

Hui-Muslims were always aware (and perturbed) by the dilemma that, if they did not assimilate as much as possible to the ideology of their discriminators, discrimination would not cease, and may even potentially

worsen. In this context, however, they could not abandon their own religious faith—especially their ideals of peace and coexistence. To assimilate perfectly into the discriminatory ideology of the majority was to condone the violence of the discriminatory ideology, because violence and harassment are both counter to the teachings of Islam.

Ironically, through subordination to the regime, Hui-Muslims sought to become self-reliant as an ethnic group. Traditionally, what Hui-Muslim intellectuals strategically had done was to find the common good, ethical, and nonviolent points in Confucian thought; those points which were consistent with teachings of Islam. Furthermore, by admiring it as “common ground” and living as exemplary citizens, they also accepted the newly-introduced modern thought imported from beyond China so as to avoid difficulties. Muslim intellectuals, either via Arabic scriptures or Chinese writing [Ben-Dor Benite 2005: 106–111; Matsumoto 2016], shared only one purpose in regard to the continuity of the Muslim community: the peaceful survival and the perpetuation of their fellow Muslims on earth.

Those Muslim intellectuals in Yunnan belonged to the generation who had heard from their parents and grandparents about the failure of the uprising and the cunning of the Qing Dynasty’s divide and rule—“*Yi Hui zhi Hui*” 以回制回—scheme. They also had heard about the legitimacy of the act of an uprising as a form of resistance against hate speech/discrimination and the terrible annihilation, the horror and anger against the ruling regime, the harshness of life for the survivors, the severe discrimination, the tenacious stigma of being labeled as “rebels” after the uprising, the confiscation of family property (which was distributed to the military commanders on the side of the Qing as spoils of war), and the diaspora’s separation from their homelands.

They also remembered the horrifying military suppression and the restoration of public security by Muslim compatriots. There were Muslim strongmen (*wuju* 武拳; i.e., higher military officer)—such as Ma Rulong—who once surrendered to the Qing army and then brought the Du Wenxiu administration to a standstill via the use of Western artillery [Lin 2006: 312–313], and which resulted in numerous deaths. Ma Rulong’s use of force led to the creation of ethnic divisions and, to complicate matters, because of “traitors” like him, the social security was restored, killings were stopped, a certain number of Muslims survived, and their religion was preserved. Commerce and foreign trade by Muslims became possible, and some became rich. The mosques, the core of the religious community, were also rebuilt with their funds [Ma Lianyuan (1932) 1985; Wang Z. 2014: 26].

This structure was similar to that of the Ma Warlords, descendants of a

Muslim—Ma Zhan’ao 馬占鰲—who was responsible for the suppression of the Muslim uprising in the northwest, and who, backed by his military forces, exercised power as the maintainer of security in the northwest region throughout the Republican period while simultaneously promoting Islam [Lipman 1997: 127, 176].

As the beneficiaries of the restoration of order by the military force, Hui-Muslim commanders participated in the National Protection War (the Third Revolution, 1915) while endorsing the military’s successful (violent) maintenance of public order. Their activities led to a subsequent move to promote Islam and to redeem the honor of their Muslim ancestors. The fact that the entire Republican era was buttressed by military force, with warlords occupying various regions and uniting them, opened up opportunities for military forces and personnel to play authoritarian and paternalistic roles. This meant that non-military intellectuals and ordinary people also engaged in the practice of “voluntary subordination” in regard to the military regime as well.

For example, during the Qing Dynasty, the *mihṛāb* of the mosques were embellished by a “divine tile” proclaiming the statement “Long Live Emperor”, and which was worshiped by Hui-Muslims [Broomhall 1910: 228]. After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Grand President Yuan Shikai’s supporters replaced it with the phrase “Long Live Grand President” to make Hui-Muslims into orderly people under heaven [Zi 1915]. Of course, after the fall of Yuan Shikai, this practice stopped happening, and the object of allegiance was replaced by the “Republic of China”.

This was based on what Hui-Muslim philosopher Liu Zhi 劉智 claimed as “dual loyalty theory”, which presented the notion that the obedience to the True Lord (Allah), the creator of all things, was the same as loyalty to the ruler/powerful ruler (the emperor) on earth and the filial obedience to one’s parents [Qin 1995: 117–118], which was also consistent with Confucian ethics [Ben-Dor Benite 2005: 221–213]. The ruler of the earth is Allah’s creation, and which forms the order of this world and guarantees the peace of Muslims. The interpretation was that, without peace on earth, there was no way to do the “good things” that Allah demanded from mankind, and that there was no way to attain eternal life after death. This was also the basis for the idea that Hui-Muslims should have a “patriotic spirit” in order to promote their religion in the new-born modern nation-state [Xie 1915d].

They specifically implemented measures to revive and promote Islam. They wanted to “clarify doctrines”, “renew education”, “improve the lives of Muslims”, “correct inaccurate customs and manners”, “inspire the religious

spirit”, and “bear the heavy responsibility of the nation together” [He T., Ma Cong, and Zhao Z. 1929]. They also believed that there would be no oppression if they advocated patriotism and the idea that “Loyalty to the state is equivalent to the obedience to Islam” (愛國愛教), as per the newly introduced *Hadīth*, “*Ḥubb al-waṭan min al-īmān*” [Matsumoto 2006].

In addition, Muslim intellectuals built and operated Zhenxue 振學 School and Mingde 明德 Junior High School (1929–) to promote Islam and foster clerics and scholars. They also published various journals—such as *Qingzhen Monthly* (1915), *Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao* (1929–1931), *Duobao* (1932–1934), *Qingzhen Duobao* (1940–1948), and *Qingzhen Duobao Fukan* (1945–1947).

5. Toward the Restoration of Ethnic Honor: An Examination of Articles from *Qingzhen Duobao*

5-1. Articles since 1929

The first issue of *Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao* was published in 1929. The core member of the magazine was Ma Bo’an, a Hui-Muslim commander, and a local strongman from Kunming. Like other Chinese Islamic journals in China at that time, it printed works in Chinese on Islamic doctrine and ethics, comparisons with other religions, and translations from Arabic or English journals. It also strongly advocated the need for modern education. Like other Islamic journals in China, it also began to include many articles on historical research. One of the characteristics of *Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao* was that it began to include articles on the Yunnan Muslim Uprising [Ma Bo’an 1929]. One of the reasons for this appeared to be the struggle between the new school (*Ikhwān*) and the old school (*Qadīm*), which had divided the Islamic community in Yunnan since the beginning of the Republican era, had reached a settlement as a result of Muslim intellectuals’ efforts.¹¹⁾

As a result of this settlement, a historical summary and aftermath of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising appeared. The contents claimed that a humiliation and massacre of Muslims took place, relating the memory of

“... the destruction of the rice field and industries, ruins of houses, misery of heart and mind with trauma, and the obligation of keeping silence”.

The reason for this misery was attributed to the Qing authorities, with opinion maintaining that “[t]he authorities are not benevolent, but . . . are fierce in dealing [with] troubles”. However, at the same time, a number of

intellectuals also blamed their Muslim ancestors, stating that

“ . . . when they were provoked and humiliated, Muslims did not have enough patience, and did not put up with the provocations . . . [and that they] lacked deep considerations”.

In order to prevent this kind of annihilation from happening again, it was necessary to

“ . . . clarify the many aspects of the social situation not only in China but also in the outside world, change our way of thinking, change our temperament, harmonize with other peoples than Muslims, help each other without saying what we like and dislike, enjoy a world of peace and happiness, and avoid the miserable history of massacre forever” [(Ma) Pinsan 1929].

In this way, Muslim intellectuals repeated the importance of becoming exemplary citizens within China so as to make it impossible for the majority Han society to feel compelled to discriminate against Muslims. This notion was based on the optimism that people displaying the right actions and thoughts should be respected, and not ridiculed. In order to do so, they (Hui-Muslims) must “reflect on various erroneous ideas [of their] religion and recover ideal ideas” [Xiao 1929]. The ideal was for Hui-Muslims to be self-reflective and to live self-controlled lives without causing disturbances.

5-2. How Do Hui-Muslims Clarify Historical Facts?

As Nobuta claims [Nobuta 2021], it is difficult to establish a belief system that gives meaning to the damage and suffering experienced in order to resolve collective trauma. In this meaning-making practice, the belief that “it was not our [the victims of these atrocities] fault” must be revealed through accurate historical analysis, not through emotion and subjective inference. In doing so, Yunnan Muslims aimed to construct the perspective that Muslims were not only “innocent victims” but also “subjects of history”.

Ma Guanzheng’s 馬觀政 “Xiantong Dianyuan shisinin dahuoji” (咸同滇垣十四年大禍記) (A historical monograph on the 14 year turmoil in Yunnan during the era of Xiantong) was written in 1886, just after the cessation of the uprising, but was first published in 1930 [Ma Guanzheng 1930]. Ma Guanzheng, who was 93 years old in 1930, and was considered the oldest of the Yunnan Muslim economic powers and intellectuals. He wrote

about the uprising he had experienced in the year of 1886, when he was 49 years old. His hand-written manuscript was sent to the printer after more than 40 years and Muslims were finally informed of the existence of the document.

The significant delay in the publication seems to have been caused by a rift among Yunnan Muslims over political positions and sectarianism. In 1915, the *Qingzhen Monthly* group, which suppressed the publication of this document, relentlessly wrote articles about Ma Guanzheng in attempts to slander his person and work. The reason for this seems to have been that Ma Guanzheng was supported by Ma Rulong, who suppressed Du Wenxiu's administration and rebuilt the mosques in Kunming. Ma Guanzheng was also an intellectual who had worked for Governor Cai E as a counselor of the Yunnan military government after the Chongjiu Uprising in 1911 (a part of the Xinhai Revolution). On the contrary, the *Qingzhen Monthly* was controlled by a faction—a conglomerate called Xingyihe of Yuxi—that had once capitulated to Yuan Shikai's imperial rule [Ma Yunhe and Ma Boliang 1986].

The *Qingzhen Monthly* faction desperately tried to hide the historical facts of the previous century, stating that “history should not be rehashed, or it would damage the stability of the present”. As such, it was increasingly difficult for Hui-Muslims to explain the twisted relationship between Du Wenxiu and the suppressor Ma Rulong (who bore the same faith as themselves). It was also difficult to give meaning to the survival of Hui-Muslims after the Qing's entire suppression facilitated by Ma Rulong, the maintenance of security, and the gradual Islamic revival after the ceasefire with the support of Ma Rulong, who grew to become a strongman in the area.

The opposing faction, Ma Guanzheng's faction of a conglomerate Xingshunhe, took over the position after regaining power in the aftermath of the National Protection War and tried to clarify the historical facts previously misrepresented. In the end, the rift that divided the Yunnan Muslim community into sects and factions was mended by the aforementioned reconciliation between the old and new schools of Islam after the end of their dispute in 1928. As a result, the writings of Ma Guanzheng, who belonged to the older generation, came to the fore. The following summarizes what he wrote as historical fact:

First, Hui-Muslims were innocent victims. The Han people “killed all the Hui people, either good or bad”, and the Muslims asked for protection from the Qing authorities. However, these requests were suppressed. The Qing bureaucrats ignored Hui-Muslim pleas and stood on the side of the Han so as to protect the majority group, even though most of the Han Chinese were new migrants from adjacent provinces to Yunnan in search of work in the mining

industry. Due to the massive influx of migrants, the Han population overwhelmed the ethnic minorities in the area. In the eyes of Muslims, it looked like the authorities were “favoring” the majority who came later, abandoning their legitimate judgment.

Some of the Hui-Muslim soldiers also used force to kill Han Chinese in retaliation. Then, the Qing troops killed all Muslims—young and old, men and women—and raped a large number of women, saying that the “Hui people are rebellious”, and that “killing Muslims is not a crime” (各殺無論), that “Qing troops are allowed to exterminate Muslims and destroy their villages in a 800 *li* (520 km) radius” (橫直掃滅八百里), and that “based on racial prejudice, the authority wished to exterminate all the Hui-Muslims (橫生種族之見、大逞殺戮之欲)”, etc. The rulers “tribalized” and dehumanized Hui-Muslims and committed genocide against them based on tenets of racist beliefs.

Ma Guanzheng also described how Du Wenxiu had risen up in resistance against such atrocities. The final defeat of Du Wenxiu’s administration caused further massacres of Muslims by Qing troops. Ma Guanzheng further described that Muslims’ family property was confiscated—being labeled as a “rebel’s property”—and that a few surviving Muslims were humiliated and were forced to flee.

Hui-Muslims were always dehumanized via insults likening them to the “offspring of pigs” (回子趕猪公領孫), and, after the fighting had ceased, Muslims’ houses were destroyed. The authorities in this period did nothing to stop this behavior, with only Muslims being killed unilaterally [Bai (1952) 2000, 1: 2]. At the beginning of the uprising in 1856, only Muslims were killed—no Han people were harmed [Ma Ruiqi (n.d.) 2004]. It was shown that so-called hate speech triggered all the troubles and killings, and that the ethnocide of Muslims was purposely executed.

Second, as for the Hui-Muslims’ own view of history, there was a discourse that praised Du Wenxiu as a hero because he did not surrender to the end, that his administration did not discriminate against ethnic/racial groups, and because he had maintained peaceful order throughout his regime’s reign.

In other words, by revealing that Hui-Muslim ancestors were not only innocent victims, but also subjects of history, they believed that they were able to exonerate the shame experienced by their ancestors while also praising their ethnic survival and the continuity of the peaceful belief in Islam. By revealing historical facts, Ma Guanzheng implied that Muslims were superior to the Han majority in terms of their ethical attitudes concerning a peaceful coexistence. Revealing hidden documents from the victimized side was also a way to create a belief system that would give meaning to one’s own mental

suffering and trauma. This was also related to what Herman calls “remembrance and mourning”.

5-3. Remembrance and Mourning: Subtle but Important Differences between Arabic and Chinese Inscriptions

It was not until 1934, 78 years after the end of the uprising, that mourning became possible. Ma Bo’an, as the president of the Yunnan Huijiao Jujinhui 雲南回教俱進會 (the Yunnan Islamic Promotion Association), together with Ma Guanzheng and others, hired people, collected the remains of those who were killed, buried them together, and built a tomb for the victims of the Yunnan Muslims killed in 1856 in the suburbs of Kunming. Until then, the remains of the victims were not allowed to be mourned over and were scattered across the region. In Kunming, and as a means to commemorate the massacre of 20,000 people in Kunming in 1856, the 16th, 17th, and 18th days of the fourth lunar month were set aside as the “Deceased Muslims’ Day” for mourning the deceased. This was also further evidence corroborating the idea that Ma Bo’an and others had succeeded in creating a stable social situation in which Muslim intellectuals were responsible for formal mourning.

Ma Guanzheng’s description and the oral traditions of the elderly were combined and carved on the inscription of the “Tomb for the Victims”. The inscription described the slaughter committed by Qing troops, as well as the killing and rape of women and girls that took place. It continued with the phrase: “the innocence of Hui-Muslims should be proved”.¹²⁾ It then goes on to opine that Hui-Muslims should hand down these historical facts to their descendants as a legacy [Ma Ziyin 1988; Ma Yingsheng and Ma Desheng 2015: 129–131, 221–222].

At the top of this inscription, phrases in Arabic were carved, and which differed slightly from the content as it was written in Chinese. This included the expression stating that Muslims were killed by the infidels (*al-kuffār*),¹³⁾ with a citation from Qur’anic Surah 40:60 engraved above the inscription, proclaiming

“Do not forget to pray especially for them, for Allah has said: ‘Pray to Me, and I will pray for you. And I will respond to you’”.

The Chinese descriptions, meanwhile, only said

“Survivors of virtues (offspring) will remember the suffering of the innocent Muslims,

*and carry the memory on to the next generations, forever. This is the incense for which we offer our prayers”.*¹⁴⁾

In the Arabic inscription, the wording declared the killers as “infidels” of Islam—including Han Chinese and Muslims who didn’t follow the right way of Allah. However, in Chinese, no description of who were considered as criminals was made.

On the other hand, the Arabic text states that “A Muslim prays to Allah and Allah responds”, whereas the Chinese text conveys the Confucian meaning of “Men of virtue (filial offspring) pray to their ancestors”. This indicates that prayer in the Chinese context was based on the filial piety of ancestor worship, which was understandable to the majority Han who were literate in Chinese (but not Arabic). This contradiction between the two languages is also explained by the dual loyalty theory of Islam in China. Even though they used Confucian texts and concepts, Muslims in China who are literate in Arabic would recognized the Islamic meanings being conveyed.

5-4. Zigzagging toward the Reevaluation of Du Wenxiu’s Administration

In this context, there was a movement for the reevaluation of Du Wenxiu as a “hero” among the Hui-Muslim community at the private level.

Qingzhen Duobao was reissued in June 1940 after a several-year interval and after the commencement of the “Anti-Japanese War”. The GMD demanded that Yunnan Muslims would work as members of the Yunnan Branch of the China Islamic National Salvation Association (中國回教救國協會雲南分會) as led by General Bai Chongxi. The association shared a practical policy of loyalty to the nation, nationalism, the repelling of foreign enemies (Japan), and the minimization of sacrifices [Ma Bo’an 1940a]. In such a situation, prior to 1940, Muslims across the country had already started a constitutional movement advocating for Hui-Muslim representatives to be sent to the National Congress and that the number should correspond to the population of Muslims, which was said to be 40 million at the time [Zhongguo Huijiao Qingnian Xuehui 1932; Shandong Jiningxian Huijiao Jujinhui 1933; Yakubo 2015]. Yunnan Muslims were no exception. They aimed to develop laws and create an environment in which the powerful Han majority were not able to enact aggression upon minority groups. At the same time, Yunnan Muslim intellectuals started to clarify the historical facts of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising and whether Du Wenxiu was a “national hero” or not [Ma Bo’an 1940b]. Local Muslim intellectuals believed that Du Wenxiu stood up in

righteous indignation against the persecution experienced by Yunnan people [Ma Ruitu 1940]. However, the road to recognize him as a hero was not smooth.

The first example was Ma Bo'an's petition to the Nationalist government in July 1940, and which sought recognition of Du Wenxiu as a national hero. Na Ziyi, a Muslim representative of the whole Yunnan province, flew to Chongqing to meet Chiang Kai-shek. The contents of the petition were, in summation, a call "to glorify the King Xianyang (Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Dīn, the founder and the governor Yunnan during the Yuan period)", "to recognize Du Wenxiu as a national revolutionary hero", and "to support and develop Islamic education" [Na Ziyi 1941].¹⁵ However, the petition went unheeded, except for the right to gain general education of Muslims; the matter of Du Wenxiu was withdrawn in the midst of the confusion of the Anti-Japanese War, and partly due to bureaucratic negligence [Ma Yingsheng and Ma Desheng 2015: 136].

The second example came about in the form of He Huiqing's publication of *18 Years of Du Wenxiu's Regime* (杜文秀建國十八年之始末), published in October 1940 [He H. 1940]. It was published via a resolution of the Yunnan Branch of the China Islamic National Salvation Association at the initiative of Ma Bo'an, with the costs paid for by the association. Ma Bo'an claimed that he "want[ed] to deflect the false accusations [levied against] Du Wenxiu".¹⁶ A compact book aimed at understanding the history of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising was very rare for the era. At the same time, however, Bai Shouyi—a famous historian from Beijing Normal University, and who stayed in Yunnan during his exile at the time—also pointed out the problems of the contents of the book. Aside from the inaccuracy of the contents, Bai also asserted that, if the actions of Du Wenxiu were termed as "revolutionary", the "founding [of] a state", or as a "national hero", Muslims would become too arrogant, potentially destroying the national unity present throughout the Anti-Japanese War in which the Han and Muslims fought together [Bai 1940]. At this time, by 1939, the Yunnan-Burma Highway had already been constructed, providing a transportation route for the aid of the Nationalist government in Chongqing. Yunnan, as a strategic point, became an important stepping stone for achieving victory in the Anti-Japanese War, and Hui-Muslims provided great cooperation in the transportation of wartime goods and provision of logistics as Muslim caravan trekkers were in charge of cross-border trade in the mountainous area between Burma and Yunnan [Zhao H. 2007].

However, despite this contribution in achieving victory, prejudice against Hui-Muslims was not easily dispelled. For example, in 1943, Shen Chang 沈




Figure 1. The cover page of He Huiqing's *18 Years of Du Wenxiu's Regime*
(From the copy owned by Matsumoto Masumi)

昌—a new security commander for the GMD for the Yunnan-Vietnam Railroad—made a radio broadcast insulting the Muslim uprising led by Du Wenxiu. In response, Muslims protested strong, arguing that the radio broadcast was an attempt to provoke ethnic tensions again, and that insulting Du Wenxiu would discourage Muslims from being in support of anti-Japanese war efforts. Shen Chang made a public apology at the Justice Road Mosque in Kunming, but the Muslims’ anger did not subside, resulting in Shen Chang leaving Yunnan [Na Zhongming and Ma Yunda 1987: 113; Na Zhongming and Li 1991: 133].

In 1945, the “4.17” Deceased Memorial Day Ceremony was held on May 28, the 17th day of the fourth lunar month. It was held to commemorate the martyrdom of the proponents of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising. Attended by 1,000 people, the event was organized by Ma Bo’an. However, only Ma Rulong and Ma Guanzheng were mentioned as pioneers of loyalty toward the Chinese nation. It was too early to publicly honor Du Wenxiu as a hero, as the Anti-Japanese War had not yet ended.

5-5. The Linkage between the Restoration of Du Wenxiu's Honor and the Restoration of the Honor of Hui-Muslims

By May 1946, after Chinese forces experienced victory in the Anti-Japanese War, the social context and timing seemed to be apt, given that it was also the 90th anniversary of the uprising in 1856. In May 1946, a special issue was published in *Qingzhen Duobao*.

At this point in time, Muslims in Yunnan had just participated in the war against Japanese aggression, helping the GMD forces on the border of Yunnan and Burma by providing transportation and logistics, thereby helping to win the war “jointly with each ethnic group” [Zhao H. 2007; Matsumoto 2010]. This wartime contribution, as well as the Muslims’ historical contribution to China’s history from the Yuan era, was (most likely) the main reason as to why Hui-Muslims wished to improve their status as a “nationality” (*minzu* 民族) within the Chinese nation. The timing was also significant in that there was an increase in momentum for the election of Muslim representatives to the National Congress, after having been shelved for some time because of the war [Chen 2010]. Muslim intellectual representatives from other regions in China also met Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), demanding the allocation of Muslim representatives in the National Congress [He Guoguang 1946].

This movement coincided with the chance to grieve for the deceased 90 years on from the incident. Hui-Muslims who had gained confidence in China’s political arena were able to mourn the deceased of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising without worrying about who was watching and condemning.

Ma Bo’an, a president of the Yunnan Branch of the China Islamic Association, again attributed the killing of thousands of Muslims in Kunming on May 19, 1856 (new calendar), to the Qing’s divide and rule policy, and called for the equality of “nationalities” (ethnicities), the elimination of distinctions between Hui and Han, and the prohibition of discrimination to prevent the recurrence of the massacre/genocide and ethnic/racial divisions [Ma Bo’an 1946]. This also implied that Han society still maintained either visible or invisible racist structures that discriminate against ethnic minorities, and that the elimination of racism was believed to be the way to construct a democratic and multi-national state (as wished for by the late President Sun Yat-sen). They also wished for social and economic equality with the Han majority.

In the same issue, Bai Shouyi wrote

“Du Wenxiu was an outstanding revolutionary leader of ethnic minorities in modern

history in China. He was a hero of the tragic and fierce resistance struggle, and we should highly praise the historical fact that Du Wenxiu’s administration did not divide people according to race or religion and did not have any ethnic/racial discrimination”.

Furthermore, Bai Shouyi revealed that the authority of the time abused its power, and that people were forced to fight against a power that intended for the unlimited expansion of its desire to rule. Additionally, he argues that

“. . . the people (as in the case of the Du Wenxiu administration) participated in a war of self-defense and resistance. Because of the experience of historical resistance, the Anti-Japanese War developed into a great coalition of Hui-Muslims, Han, and other indigenous people, and was able to achieve victory over the enemy” [Bai 1946].

After the victory over Japan, Du Wenxiu’s “revolutionary nature” and a historical memory of ethnic coalition in his regime were superimposed and recalled; at the same time, Ma Bo’an strongly appealed for the increase in seats available for the election of Hui-Muslim representatives at the upcoming National Congress. This appeal was made with the intention of controlling the abuse of power, protecting the right of Muslim minorities, and in appealing for the introduction of anti-discriminatory policies through a parliamentary democracy in which ethnic representatives were elected.

Speaking of his childhood memories of hiding his own ethnicity to prevent discrimination, Du Qing, a Muslim of Yunnan, stated within the same issue that

“The Muslim uprising was a resistance against ethnocide. The Qing troops and its minions used brutal means to annihilate the entire Muslim population, or at least to suppress it forever. In view of the inseparability of the status of Muslims and the Chinese democratic movement, Muslims must acquire the right of representation in democratic politics by sending an appropriate number of representatives to the National Congress. Then, Muslims’ social, economic, and political status will be improved, and the tragedy of history must not be repeated” [Du 1946].

Moreover, at the same time, activities to honor Du Wenxiu spread to other regions in commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the uprising, coinciding with the publications of the “Biography of Du Wenxiu” and the poet Shalei’s “Du Wenxiu, People’s Revolutionary” (2000 lines), etc. [Anonymous 1946].

6. Ma Bo'an, a Phantom "Muslim" Representative of the National Congress

In the midst of the fervor of the election of representatives to the National Congress, the demand for the reevaluation of Du Wenxiu, and the recognition that he was a "national hero", proceeded simultaneously. The desire to participate in the constitutional government was often based on the argument that Du Wenxiu's actions were revolutionary and that he should be recognized for his "spirit of perseverance" and for his "contribution to the nation and patriotism" [Zhao M. 1947]. In Yunnan, there was significant enormous momentum behind the election of Ma Bo'an as a representative of the Hui-Muslims.¹⁷⁾

However, Article 135 of the Constitution rejected the Muslims' wish to have a "*Huimin* (Hui-Muslim) Representative" [Anonymous 1947a; Anonymous 1948; *Qingzhen Duobao* Editor 1947], and that it was dedicated to representatives for the "nationals of special life styles in China proper" (内地生活特殊之國民). This implied that Hui-Muslims, as a group, were different from the groups of people from Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, who elected ethnic representatives and were guaranteed a system of autonomy (Articles 26, 119, and 120 of the Constitution). It was Sun Ke 孫科, a Vice President of the Nanjing GMD government, who said,

"No matter how the Hui-Muslim people have special rights, if the people of Catholics and other religions imitate them and demand representative quotas, the future Legislative Yuan will turn into a religious convention. We must not make the same mistake as that of the division of India" [Anonymous 1947a].

The decision caused fierce opposition from Hui-Muslims [Dawude 1947]. There was also severe opposition to the fact that the number of representatives of Muslims was only 10, which was too small in comparison with the total number of Muslim people as a proportion of the whole population: at the time, Muslims in China were said to have made up one-ninth of the nation's population. The decision further stung, given that Hui-Muslims had participated in the Anti-Japanese War, showing their patriotism [Anonymous 1947b]. In short, they argued that the name "*Huimin* Representative" was an award for participation in their victorious efforts in the war against Japan.

Ma Bo'an, who had been nominated as a "*Huimin* Representative", expressed his disappointment at the disappearance of the name of *Huimin*. He continued:

“I have worked hard for Islamic religious education, for our religion, for my fellow Hui-Muslim people, and for the local Yunnan and the Chinese state. Although I am a local representative, I indirectly represent the interests of all the people. I am not an ordinary official. My personal views are: 1. to be thoughtful in protecting the interests of the Hui-Muslim people; 2. to use the rights derived from the Constitution to assert the rights of Hui-Muslims as citizens; 3. to unite to achieve ethnic equality” [Ma Bo’an 1947].

In particular, what the Hui-Muslims, as represented by him, were seeking was “anti-discrimination” and equality of all the ethnicities in China. This was necessary to avoid the repetition of a history of discrimination and to permanently gain the rights and self-respect as an ethnic group.

On March 30 and 31, 1948, Ma Bo’an participated in the First National Congress held in Nanjing. As a result, 17 representatives of the “nationals of special life style in China proper” were sent out, and Ma’s participation in the conference called for the improvement of the status of Hui-Muslims. However, the congress was never held in the mainland again, given the oncoming attacks by Communist forces (of the People’s Liberation Army). The longed-for ban on discrimination was never included as a policy of the Republic of China during the era of Chiang Kai-shek, along with the disappearance of the name “*Huimin* Representative”.

7. After 1949

After the Communist Party’s takeover, the remaining Yunnan Muslim intellectuals living on the mainland accepted the CCP’s dominance and organized the Kunming Hui Federation in February 1950–1952. Ma Bo’an remained in charge.

Many Muslims in Yunnan followed the leadership of the CCP and the People’s Government. During the first stage of the 1950s, the CCP protected Muslims’ property, mobilized Hui people to defend the leadership of the CCP, and complied with the policies and laws of the People’s Government. Muslim intellectuals helped the Party and the People’s Government to implement policies for ethnicities (nationalities) and religions, which seemed to be acceptable to Hui-Muslims at first. The CCP admitted that the equality of nationalities and Hui-Muslims were recognized as *Huizu*, as one of the nationalities of the People’s Republic of China—a state which self-defined as a unified, multi-national entity.

At the same time, the long-desired demand for the reevaluation of the

Muslim uprisings were accepted as movements embodying “anti-imperialist and anti-feudal righteousness”. According to Marxist historiography of the CCP, various ethnic groups (nationalities) fought in a coalition and rebelled against the tyranny of the Qing. This resulted in the publication of four volumes of *Huimin qiyi*. The Yunnan Muslim Uprising became recognized as a part of the class struggle and was recognized as not being a rebellion. Bai Shouyi expressed gratitude toward the CCP and Mao Zedong for permission to publish *Huimin qiyi*, with the expectation of the new regime [Bai (1952) 2000, 1: 1]. In 1951, Ma Bo’an became a member of the Yunnan Provincial Political Consultative Committee as a representative of the Hui nation (*Huizu*) [Ma Bo’an 1951].

However, the honeymoon period between the CCP and Hui-Muslims did not last long. Even at new regime’s outset, Mao Zedong’s picture was displayed in the *mīhrāb*, despite idolatry being forbidden within Islam. Clerics were thrown out of mosques, and Islamic students were driven away from schools. There was also the confiscation of Islamic schools, mosques, mosque property, and rice fields. Disobedient Muslims were killed, and the management of Muslims’ public tombs also became troublesome [Zhongguo Zongjiaotu Lianyihui 1952].

Being criticized in the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaign in 1951–1952, Ma Bo’an was then labeled as a “rightist”, with aggressors labeling him as the head of feudalism. The accusations meant that he was forced to attend criticism meetings and was further insulted. Moreover, in the Anti-Rightist campaign, he lived under the stigma of the “Four Great Rightists of Yunnan” before dying with a broken heart [Ma Yingsheng and Ma Desheng 2015: 149–151]. As for the tragedy then awaited Hui-Muslims—not only in Yunnan but all over China—I will not discuss it here.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have described the twists and turns behind the “reevaluation” of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising. After the atrocities and the humiliation experienced during the Qing era, Muslim intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s struggled to restore ethnic honor through the collection of historical documents, along with the remembrance and the mourning of the deceased. In the 1930s, for the first time in decades, the remains of those killed in the uprising were collected, graves were built, and memorials were held in order to clarify the historical records and restore the honor of the victims, proclaiming that they were not “rebels”. They tried to prove that the Muslim

uprising was a resistance against “genocide”—they also emphasized the brutality of the Qing authorities and the innocence of the Muslim victims.

They even participated in the movement to elect Hui-Muslim representatives to the National Congress in the conviction that Hui-Muslims are good and ethnic citizens, displaying loyalty to the state and—unlike the label given to them by authorities of the past—“not rebellious”. They promoted modern school education, defended patriotism, fought in the Anti-Japanese War, and tried to build up values in accordance with those of authorities in the modern era.

In particular, they advocated in favor of the modern nation-state system, and the newly introduced *Hadith* proclaiming that “Loyalty to the state is equivalent to the obedience to Islam” was spread. This was a reworking of the traditional “dual loyalty theory” of Muslims in China.

When the Anti-Japanese War broke out, they spoke out with loud calls for a reevaluation of Du Wenxiu’s administration as a symbol—not only as a symbol of the joint struggle of Yunnan’s ethnic groups, but of all of China’s ethnicities. At the same time, the movement for reevaluation was related to the strong political demand to obtain adequate Hui-Muslim quota seats in the National Congress, demanding political, social, and economic equality with the Han majority. What Hui-Muslim intellectuals consistently appealed to was the notion that Hui-Muslims had “contributed” to the development of Chinese society by being “good people” and “model minorities” who also conformed to the ethical standards of Chinese, as it appeared in Confucius writings, and that they demanded that the Legislative Yuan had to prohibit unjustified discrimination and hate against minority groups. They believed that there was structural racism apparent throughout Chinese society, and that the way to ethnic equality was to eliminate the hierarchization of ethnic minorities through political movements. Hui intellectuals pinned their hopes for ethnic equality on the CCP regime after 1949, but also realized several years later that this was, unfortunately, an illusion.

Notes

- 1) Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, “Genocide”, United Nations website, accessed on October 8, 2021, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml>.
- 2) “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed on September 28, 2021, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cerd.aspx>.
- 3) To cite one example, the following is the translation of the former official historical

description of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising on the website of the People's Government of Yunnan ("Yunnan Huimin qiyi" 「雲南回民起義」, last modified January 4, 2012, accessed May 24, 2018. See the archive below: https://web.archive.org/web/20161031184141/http://www.yn.gov.cn/yn_yngk/yn_gmdz/201201/t20120104_2790.html).

In the 1850s and 1870s, the Hui people in Yunnan, China, rose up against the Qing Dynasty under the influence of the Taiping Rebellion, and in 1856 (the sixth year of the Xianfeng reign), a conflict between Hui and Han people over the Shiyang silver mine in Nan'an (present-day Shuangbai) turned into an uprising when they were provoked by local officials of the Qing Dynasty. After that, the Hui people all over Yunnan unveiled their righteous banners one after another, scattering small rebel groups around Yunnan and soon forming two powerful rebel armies. One group was active in eastern and southern Yunnan, with many soldiers and horses, but the leaders of the rebellion, Ma Fuchu 馬復初 and Ma Rulong 馬如龍, were both upper class Hui and did not have the determination to fight against the Qing Dynasty. After the uprising, Du Wenxiu 杜文秀 was elected as the president of Dali and announced that he would be the commander and that he changed his hair and clothes and unite with the Han, Yi and Bai ethnic groups to establish a regime. In 1867 (the sixth year of Tongzhi), more than 200,000 rebel troops divided into four groups and went east to besiege Kunming, but the rebel forces remained in the city for a long time, so the Qing army took advantage of the opportunity to readjust their forces. In 1873, when the Qing army was in city of Dali, Du Wenxiu took poison and left the city to negotiate peace with the Qing troops, and was killed by the Qing army. The Qing commander, Cen Yuying, reneged on his promise of peace and sacked Dali, along with his troops. At this point, the 18-year insistence on the Yunnan Hui Uprising (*Yunnan Huimin qiyi*) was declared a failure.

- 4) The details of the Muslim Uprising in Yunnan can be found in various monographs and books by Wang Shuhuai [1968] of Taiwan, Ma Jianxiang [2014] of Hong Kong, Jing Dexin [1986; 1991], Ma Yisheng [1990], and Wang Jianping [1996] of the mainland, Atwill [2006] of the US, as well as in the articles by Nakada Yoshinobu [1954], Imanaga Seiji [1965], Kanbe Teruo [1970], Matsumoto Masumi [1998], and Ando Junichiro [2002]. Émile Rocher's book [1880] described how French imperial power at the time focused on the incident. On the other hand, Nara described the details of the Islamic revival in Yunnan after the initiation of the Reform and Open policy [Nara 2016].
- 5) The first-class collection of materials that the researchers have used is Bai Shouyi's *Huimin qiyi*, vols. 1 and 2 in 1952 [Bai (1952) 2000]. Bai Shouyi collected these historical materials in the 1940s, when the study of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising was in full swing. It was around this time that research on the Yunnan Muslim Uprising began in earnest. This was when the momentum for a constitutional movement was rising over the election of seats for Muslims to the National Congress, and it was nearly seventy years after the uprising had ended.

In addition, after the initiation of the Reform and Open policy (from 1979), the *Yunnan Huizu Social History Survey* (Yunnan People's Publishing House)—edited by the Yunnan Provincial Editing Group, vol. 1 in 1985, 2 in 1985, 3 in 1986, 4 in 1988

- [Yunnansheng Bianjizu 1985–1988]—and Jing Dexin’s 1986 *Historical Documents on Yunnan Muslim Uprising* were also published [Jing 1986]. The documents above include historical materials that were not available in Bai Shouyi’s *Huimin qiye*.
- 6) For example, in Japan, the movement of the “imperializing policy” (皇民化政策) toward the Ainu people (from the beginning of the Meiji period until 1945) shows the direction of a) and b) assimilation due to the shame experienced as a result of their racial characteristics and their social evolution status; meanwhile, the postwar Ainu ethnic movement for ethnic dignity, ethnic rights, anti-discrimination, and empowerment illustrates the direction of c) [Takeuchi 2020].
 - 7) In 1830, the population of Yunnan was 6,552,658. After the uprising was over, it was 2,992,583, a decrease of about half [Ma Cheng 2005: 223]. According to modern research, hundreds of thousands to one million Yunnan Muslims were exterminated [Bai 2003: 143], and the Yunnan Islamic community was nearly destroyed. More than 400 mosques were razed [Yao, Li, and Zhang 2005: 120]. Among the approximately 800 thousand Muslims living in the region before the uprising, only 100 thousand survived after the ceasefire [Yu 1996: 235]. In Dali, where Du Wenxiu remained until the end of the uprising, the Muslim population was 261,000 before 1873; but, by the 1980s, this figure was only 52,000. This means that even after 100 years, the population had only recovered 20% of the original population. In another study, after the suppression of the uprising in 1873, the Muslim population in Weishan dropped from 50,000 to 16,000 by 1980 [Ma Shouxian 1985]. Another study shows the Dali population of Muslims decreased from 127,700 to 20,700. The death/emigration rate was 84% [Ma Cheng 2012]. Even after 100 years later, the population had only recovered to 32% of its original level. It was truly a “kill-all” situation. If we apply the demographics of China as a whole, the entire population of China in the 1800s was about 380 million (according to estimates), reaching 980 million in the 1980s, and an increase of 2.6 times over about 150 years. This shows the extent of the Qing’s “killing off” of all Muslims in Yunnan at that time.
 - 8) Traditionally, there were two kinds of elites in Hui-Muslim society. The first of these were the religious elites—those who were not proficient in reading or writing Chinese, but were more fluent in Arabic and Persian. In the case of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising, this included the famous Ma Dexin 馬德新 and Ma Liangyuan 馬聯元 (1841–1901) in the post-ceasefire period. Both of these men were famous for their writings on Islamic doctrines in the Chinese language (with the assistance of bilingual co-worker scholars); these writings were referred to as *Han Kitāb*. Ma Dexin initially became one of leaders of the Yunnan Muslim Uprising, later surrendering to the Qing troops. He was used as a spiritual pillar to cut down Muslim forces. The second group was the Chinese-only literati elites, which can be further divided into three categories: (1) political/military elites, (2) business elites, and (3) Chinese writing elites. All of these men had the status and literary ability to explain the position of Muslims to the majority of literate Han by using beautiful sentences with many Confucian quotations. (1) were those who were qualified for military service in the aristocracy, who were the maintainers of the public order, and the defenders of the interests of the ordinary people and soldiers. The second category was the local elite literati who ran business. During the late Qing era and the Republican period, Muslim-majority conglomerates such as Xingshunhe 興順利 collected funds, made

large investments (in trading, the salt industry, and mining development), and collected a significant amount of money [Ma Yunhe and Ma Boliang 1986; Qiu Shusen 2012: 458]. They financially supported the revival of Islam by reprinting scriptures, rebuilding mosques, publishing magazines, building and operating Islamic schools, etc. They also developed the tea industry, which was unique to Yunnan, and advocated a “business will save the country” slogan. They were also the patrons of the third category of Muslim youths studying in al-Azhar, Egypt [Yang 1989: 238]. The third category of men became bilingual in Chinese and Arabic and became the core of Islamic revival in China. The most influential man was Ma Jian, who translated the Qur’an into Chinese.

- 9) The ordinary Muslims were forced to wander after the confiscation of their land. They engaged in the slaughtering of animals, tanning, running small restaurants, commerce, trading, and migrant work. Their extreme poverty was described in various reports of the time. However, what they wanted most was the reconstruction of mosques and the resumption of religious activities. In spite of the poverty, the humiliation, and hard work, they never abandoned their faith.
- 10) Academia Historica (國史館) restores various documents regarding the incident and pleas from Muslims in China [Zhenjiang Huijiao Hujiao Weiyuanhui 1932; Xingzheng Yuan 1932]. A total of 33 documents and files on the petitions of the anti-denouncement campaign are restored in a file of the Ministry of Education, the Republic of China. This demonstrated the formation of the unity of Muslims across China regarding the resolution of a series of incidents denouncing previous humiliations. It also showed that Hui-Muslims’ ethnic identity, in confronting Hans’ ignorance and discrimination, was strengthened through the resolution process.
- 11) Among the Yunnan Muslim strongmen, there was a mainstream faction (supporters of President Yuan Shikai) and a non-mainstream faction (opponents of Yuan Shikai and the promoters of the National Protection Movement/War). Before that, there was also infighting between the old school and the Sufi order of *Jahriyyah* [Nakanishi 2021]. Moreover, there were other conflicts between the old school and the new school over doctrine and rituals [Xie 1915c; 1915d]. It is also said that the resolution of the disputes was settled in 1925 at an open academic debate [Ma Jianzhao and Zhang S. 2015: 355; Na Lanzhen and Na Guochang 1988]. A similar event was also held in 1928 at the Nancheng Mosque in Kunming, organized by Ma Guanzheng, with an attendance of more than 100 clerics. In the end, they recorded the process in written Arabic and entrusted it to a person who was going on a pilgrimage to Makkah, and asked an Arabic *mufti* to act as an intermediary. His reply was, “[d]o not quarrel over details, do not divide, but hold fast to the rope of Allah”. This resolved the rift between the old and the new schools [Ma Yingsheng and Ma Desheng 2015: 123]. Interdenominational squabbles, conflicts, and internal divisions can weaken even the most vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the conflict between the denominations had been resolved and the different groups no longer criticized one another. As a result of this arbitration, “Regulations of [the] Yunnan Branch of the China Islamic Progress Association” was revised in August 1928. The contents of the article included: “Any confrontation or dispute between denominations should be entrusted to the authorities” (Article 10) and “Any dispute on religious doctrine shall be arbitrated by the Branch through public consultation” (Article 11) [Anonymous 1929].

- 12) “Mosques in Yunnan have been restored after the turmoil. The mosques’ properties and commercial activities are the remnants of the spirits of victims who lost [their] lives in 1856 of the Qing era, and it is appropriate to honor their virtues. It is hereby jointly decided that, on the 16th, 17th, [and] 18th of [the] fourth month of every lunar year, each mosque sets up a prayer hall, recites [the] Qur’an; we [further] recommend Muslims . . . visit these graves [at] anytime, and [that] the Islamic Association of Yunnan will be responsible [for] protecting the tomb” (滇垣五方清真寺、兵燹後已復四。寺中常住產業、要皆前清丙辰被難諸先靈之所遺者、崇德報功、理所宜爾。現共同議決、每逢四月十六、十七、十八等日、成就各寺設壇、誦經追荐、併於春秋四季往省其墓、而隨時培護之責、由清真公會擔任之。). The same inscription is inscribed in Ma Bo’an’s “Record of the relocation of the tomb for Muslim friends who were victimized in the suburbs of Kunming in 1856” 「遷葬清咸豐丙辰年昆明五方被難回教親友碑記」 [Yu and Lei 2001: 699–701].
- 13) Arabic inscription states the following: “. . . *wa-i’lamū anna hāwālā’ al-muzlimūmīn alladhīn qatalahum al-kuffār . . . fi sanat 1272(?) min hijrat al-nabawīyah wa-mā qatalūhum illā an . . . billāh wa rasūlih*” (You should know that these oppressed people were killed by the infidels (*al-kuffār*) in the year 1272(?), even though they had not been killed after the Prophet’s Hijrah, out of the way of Allah and His Prophet).
- 14) The Chinese inscription states the following: “Fortunate survivors may recall the pitiful suffering of the innocent spirits (*rūḥ* in Arabic, *luha* 魯哈 in Chinese) of the ancestors, and praise them, so that their spirits may be infinite and forever. We Muslims will pray for them and wish them rest in peace with burning incense” (或樂善君子追懷諸先靈無辜被難之愴、更表揚而光大之、俾垂於無窮、是又同人等所馨香企祈禱者耳). The Chinese word for spirit—*ling* 靈— is *rūḥ* in Arabic. The Arabic *rūḥ* is pronounced like *luha* in Chinese. Ma Guanzheng, who survived the turmoil, always insisted on the importance of memorializing the victimized Muslims, saying thousands of *rūḥ* were asking to be rescued [Na Lanzhen and Na Guochang 1988].
- 15) Na Ziyi wrote the following: “A Dali Muslim, Du Wenxiu, from western Yunnan led the people in response to Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing’s Taiping Revolution in order to overthrow the Manchu regime. Because of the poor connection to the Taiping, he failed to achieve his goal and was framed as a rebel. After the Nationalist government moved the capital to Nanjing, it explicitly ordered to recognize Hong and Yang as national heroes and to clear the injustice. We would like to ask for assistance to expressly recognize Du’s work, which was equivalent to that of Hong and Yang, in order to comfort the loyal spirits, and avoid being forever labeled as a rebel. After the defeat of Du, almost all Muslims’ lives and property in Yunnan were sacrificed. There used to be six mosques in Dali, all of which were confiscated by the Qing and converted into shrines/temples, but which, nonetheless, remain today, and the Islamic texts are still under the eaves of the shrine/temple. When the Muslims pass by, they feel sad and cannot help but be gloomy; when the Han Chinese pass by, however, they will point and say ‘this used to be Muslim rebels’ property’. Han Chinese seem to be extremely happy to see the ruins of the six mosques in this area. It is regrettable to say that Hui and Han Chinese feelings are not completely harmonious. We would like to ask the government for permission to return these six shrines/temples to us, so as to restore the old mosques, and so that each ethnicity will

not regenerate ill feelings. Today's situation is far from harmonious. Muslims and the Han Chinese should engage in more efforts to unite in defending insult from outsiders!" (滇西大理回民杜文秀、領導民眾、響應洪楊革命、推翻滿清。因彼此連絡缺善、功敗垂成、致光榮奮鬪、竟被誣為叛逆。至國府奠都南京後、業經明令追認洪楊為民族英雄、方雪沉冤。伏思洪楊杜氏、工作無異、擬請援例明令表彰、以慰忠魂、而免永被逆名。至杜氏失敗後、所有各處回民生命財產、全部犧牲。內有大理縣城清真寺六所、被官沒收、改為廟宇、今巍然猶存、而殿角檐下、回文依然。當回民過之、觸景情傷、不禁黯然、當漢民過之、必指而告曰“此回民叛產也”。厥狀似極愉然、為此區六寺陳跡之存在、回漢感情、未克徹底融洽、不無遺憾。擬請政府特准、將此等六寺發還、使恢復清真寺舊觀、庶使彼此不致再生不良心理、而遠融洽之境、則今後回民、當愈加振奮、團結御侮、誓為前驅也!)。 According to a file of the Executive Yuan in 1941, the letter was accepted in March 1941 and was left in various archives in April, May, August, September, October, November, and December of 1941. This fact shows that the letter was passed around, not discussed, and that no answers were given to the sender [Xingzheng Yuan 1941].

16) *18 Years of Du Wenxiu's Regime*, a preface written by Ma Bo'an:

Yunnan's Incident, during the Qing era, took place more than half a century ago. Time has changed, and official records are not credible, with only a slight change having been implemented since then; this is why it is difficult to understand the history in fair and accurate ways . . . We read books to examine and measure the past, an exercise that requires one to take an objective attitude, to enlarge one's eyes, and examine the main cause of the incident. Only then the right and wrong can be understood without confusion, along with a review of the past and its criteria . . .

When we talk about the Du affairs, we are all excited to trace it back to the cause; but, whether it was a success or a failure, it was, in reality, influenced by Hong and Yang's national revolution. Since Yunnan was far from the center, it was difficult to create a connection, and have a clear true image [of a revolution]. The Yunnan incident was denounced as an insurgency, but another was recognized as revolutionary activity to allow the difference in religious beliefs. There was a difference in the suppression between the two incidents and the treatment did not result in peace, or worse than the Taiping. However, our fellow countrymen are confined to the views of historical inheritance, and they take it for granted that the king successes and the enemy defeats. These tenets will become an established theory.

Since President Sun Yat-sen advocated for the revolution, having then overthrown the imperial system and equalized all nationalities in the country, the eyes of the nation have changed, and the issues related to the political and the national revolutionary movements in the past have been re-examined and confirmed. Since then, several men have been trying to restore Du Wenxiu's honor. The moral persons who appeal for the path of justice are immortal. I have tried to find the truth and compare the praise and disparagement—but only a few relevant documents are available. I recently found this document and read it.

The book by He Huiqing, *18 Years of Du Wenxiu's Regime*, is a collection of facts that are not, by themselves, overwhelming; however, they offer a systematic narrative with an objective attitude, written in a fluent and fair manner. This is a rare historical source in recent times. The author is a non-Muslim Yunnanese, so his quotations

should be credible, but this kind of historical materials are scattered and rarely seen. As such, I am concerned that it will soon be lost in the public domain. I have contributed to the printing of this book with my fellow members so that it can be published in the public domain for people who are interested in the Yunnan Incident. These smart ones can then examine it and hope that Muslims and intellectuals will read it, filling in the gaps and correcting errors so that the incident will become a historical fact and it belonged to the national revolution. Subsequently, people will then reevaluate Du’s hope. The writing is to be published in the form of a book for this reason.

「何著杜文秀建國十八年始末記」 序文 馬伯安

雲南前清咸同之變、距今在半世紀以上、時移世易、官書記載既難徵信、社會流傳亦嫌支蔓、此所以讀史難、而讀有平允翔實之史、即尤難也。夫一事之演變不演變、於形態已著之曰、必有其主因之所在焉。吾人讀書稽古衡量、往時須以客觀之態度、放大目光、考究其主因之所在。然後是非得失乃能瞭然不惑、而得一鑑往鍼來之準則、斯則知人論世者所當深思、而明辨之也。

杜事之起、追溯原因、要皆有激、而然而其起伏成敗之關鍵、實與洪楊之民族革命桴鼓相應、殊途同歸顧、以滇居僻遠外間難、明真象乃。一則斥為變亂、一則許為革命以宗教信仰之不同、遂畛域抑揚之異、致事之不平甯、逾於此。雖然國人囿於歷史因襲之見、成王敗寇已成先例、誠無足怪自。

孫總理倡導革命、推翻帝制、國內民族一律平等、國人目光轉變一新、對過去有關政治民族革命運動諸問題、重加檢討、豫以正碁之認識、自是而為杜公文秀昭雪表章者。時有所聞於以見公道、自在人心是非不容磨滅也。顧蒐討此類記載、求一翔實、不誣平情近理比較、而有系統之文字、殊不多見。

近閱逸經文史集刊、獲讀。何君慧青所著杜文秀建國十八年始末記一書蒐集、故實不蔓不支、以客觀之態度作系統之敘述、文筆暢達、議論平允、誠為近時不可多得之史料。作者為非回教之滇人、其所引述當可徵信、惟以此種史料散見逸經、獲窺全豹者、甚鮮不佞慮其湮沒不彰、爰與分會同人、醞資翻印、成帙公諸社會、以廣流傳藉供關心滇事者、有所稽考所望同教、暨各方達人、讀是篇、而引起其研究滇事之興趣、補闕訂誤、蔚成為民族革命之史實、使杜公舉事之心獲、以大白於天下斯則區區翻印是書之微意也夫。

- 17) The Republic of China’s archives describe Ma Bo’an as follows: “Ma is straightforward and impetuous, has a strong backbone, is full of spirit, has an active interest, is enthusiastic about public affairs, has a good character, is quite knowledgeable, and has a great reputation among his fellow Muslims in the southwest (耿直狷介、有風骨、精神飽滿、志趣積極、熱心公共事務、特性淳良、頗識大體、在西南回教同胞中堪稱物望)” [Junshi Weiyuanhuizhang 1948]. As for the national representatives, see the distribution of the quota of the representatives of the National Congress [Zhongguo Huijiao Xiehui 1947a; 1947b].

References

Abbreviations for primary sources

AH: Academia Historica (*Guoshiguan* 國史館) digital collections.

QZDB: Photocopy edition of *Qingzhen Yuebao* (*Qingzhen Monthly*) 『清真月報』, *Yunnan Qingzhen Duobao* 『雲南清真鐸報』, *Duobao* 『鐸報』, *Qingzhen Duobao* 『清真鐸報』,

- and *Duobao Fukan* 〔鐸報副刊〕 published as *Qingzhen Duobao*, edited by Yao Jide 姚繼德 and Lei Xiaojing 雷曉靜, 2 vols. Kunming: Yunnan Daxue Chubanshe 雲南大學出版社, 2014.
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