

Armed Associations, Christianity, Opium, and the Social Structure of the Xinghua Region in Fujian Province during the Early Republican Period, with a Focus on Huang Lian's Revolt*

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1 Introduction

From the summer of 1912 to the autumn of 1913, after the Xinhai Revolution, an armed group of men led by Huang Lian 黃濂 rose up in Xinghua Prefecture 興化府, Fujian Province (consisting of Putian 莆田 and Xianyou 仙游 Counties; see figure 1), against oppressive taxes and the prohibition against growing opium poppies, the raw material for the production of opium, and shortly thereafter attacked Christian churches and Christians. This revolt, known as Huang Lian's revolt 黃濂起義, was widely seen as the people's reaction against the government's crackdown on opium. Even foreigners at the time so viewed it, as seen in "Opium, an Unsettled Question," archived in the Morrison collection of Tōyō Bunko.¹⁾

One scholarly work that presents Huang Lian's revolt is Joyce Madancy's *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin*, a work that analyzes the crackdown on opium in Fujian Province.²⁾ This work, a valuable contribution to our overall understanding of the events surrounding the crackdown on opium in Fujian Province, devotes one chapter to the Huang Lian uprising. However, that chapter does not offer an analysis of the background of Huang Lian's revolt based on the social structure of Xinghua Prefecture. In contrast, Zheng Zhenman and Kenneth Dean do analyze the elements of Xinghua society, but they do so to study the folk religion of the area.³⁾ There is also a paper that studies the Black and White Banners 烏白旗 armed alliances.⁴⁾ With these works as my starting point, I, as my primary objective in this paper, use the local literature in the libraries of Putian University and Fujian Normal University to clarify the connections between Huang Lian's revolt and the composition of the local society.⁵⁾ I also want to focus attention on the mindset of Huang Lian and his band of rebels as they rose in rebellion.⁶⁾ And I want to elucidate and draw attention to the lived sense of community behind the



Figure 1. Xinghua Prefecture (made up of Xianyou and Putian Counties)

actions of this rebel group.

Prior research in China has adopted a mass struggle and revolutionary view of history, and through this lens has viewed the Huang Lian uprising as a mass movement against Christianity and imperialism. Research conducted from this perspective completely denies the activities of the Christian churches in the region and ignores the efforts of Huang Lian to support the growers of opium poppies.⁷⁾ But the churches, especially the US Methodist Episcopal Church 美以美會 (MEC), actively engaged in education, charity, and medical care in Xinghua Prefecture. Consequently, even in China there has of late appeared a study affirming church activities.⁸⁾ Nonetheless, one cannot deny that within the perspective of the mass struggle view of history, there exists a tendency to ignore the activities of the church, and that only occasionally do such affirmative studies appear. This tendency, one would think, would hinder a comprehensive understanding of the modern history of this region. Given this problem, I wish, as my second objective in this paper, to revisit the activities of the church in Xinghua Prefecture during this period and verify from local contexts the connections among the church, Huang Lian and his followers, and the local gentry. Accordingly, in this paper I will make use of missionary documents, Japanese and US consular reports, and the travel

journal of students at Tōa Dōbun Shoin 東亞同文書院 (the Tung Wen College) in Shanghai.⁹⁾

2 Xinghua Society's Composition and Associations

(1) The Black and White Banners

Shi Hongbao 施鴻保, who worked as a local official at various locations in Fujian Province during the Daoguang (1821–1850) and Xianfeng (1851–1861) eras of the Qing period, noted the following about the Black and White Banners:

The Black and White Banners of Xinghua Prefecture began with a feud between Yangzhai 洋寨 Village and Xili 溪里 Village. At Yangzhai there is a temple venerating Emperor Zhang, and villagers there took the black banner of the temple into battle and achieved victories. At Xili there is a temple dedicated to Mazu, and villagers took the white banner of that temple into battle and achieved victories. Hence, in feuds between the two villages, one camp carried a black banner, and the other camp carried a white banner, and neighboring small villages fell behind one banner or the other. Gradually this practice spread to Dehua 德化, Datian 大田, Putian, and Nan'an 南安, until there were more than 10,000 villagers following one banner or the other.¹⁰⁾

The outbreak of such feuds probably was connected with increases in population. Xinghua's population increased from 103,000 in 1661 to 445,000 in 1776, to 560,000 in 1829.¹¹⁾ The idea is that population pressure increases the competition for survival in the society. Among the direct causes of feuds, the literature mentions the following occurrences: disputes over rights in the marketplace or over right of way in the river, disputes over rights to occupy river pools or to reclaim land from such pools, disputes over livestock pasturing, disputes over water rights, disputes arising in folk festivals where portable shrines vie with one another to parade the local deity around the village, disputes about dragon boat races during the Dragon Boat Festival, disputes arising in connection with the pronouncements of Chinese geomancy, etc.¹²⁾ In addition, the literature also points to lax governance by local authorities as a cause leading to feuds, as the government provides no outlet to solve disputes.¹³⁾

(2) Ritual alliances

Below, I will explore how the Black Banner and White Banner alliances were connected with traditional regional associations. Kenneth Dean, a scholar of folk religions, offers the associations in the Xinghua region as an example of what he calls “ritual alliances.” Such alliances, he explains, are formed to manage common use of irrigation systems, or when small lineages (clans) band together to ward off the oppression of large lineages. When villages come together to parade statues of the local deity and perform rituals associated with folk religions, it is usually a ritual alliance that manages and coordinates the work involved. Dean asserts that the Black Banner and White Banner armed alliances were formed in connection with such ritual alliances.¹⁴⁾

Zheng Zhenman, a scholar of Ming and Qing history, focuses his attention on the ritual alliances of Putian. He states that ritual alliances of the temples of Jiangkou Township 江口鎮 resemble those of the ritual areas of Taiwan.¹⁵⁾ Another study sees Taiwan’s ritual areas as (1) having a common local deity, (2) possessing a common ritual organization, (3) including a clearly defined region, and (4) having a system of temples organized in hierarchical fashion. Zheng sees Jiangkou Township’s ritual alliance among temples of varying importance as having similar features.¹⁶⁾ He thinks that the ritual alliance of the Xinghua region, by uniting the lineages of the area, maintains the stability and order of society in the area.¹⁷⁾

Next I will present the features of society united by lineage, village ties, and folk religion, as discovered from the local materials I have examined. According to the gazetteer of Hanjiang 涵江 District (located north of Putian),¹⁸⁾ village altars of the soil 里社 are where villagers carry out local rituals and hold meetings. The god of the soil or the god of harvests is enshrined there. Such village altars can be found in natural villages, defined by geographical features and the distribution of lineages. In large villages with several village altars, there is a temple with control over the village altars. A village elder, upon recommendation, takes charge of events at village altars. The elder hosts rituals and collects expenses from each family or adult male or, in the case of important events, according to the land area owned by the household.

Early in the Daoguang era (1821–1850), Chen Shengshao 陳盛韶, magistrate 知縣 of Xianyou County, described the customs of the area over which he governed as follows: “In the lunar First Month, the villagers bear on their shoulders a portable shrine containing a likeness of the temple god and parade about here and there.” Again, “The people of Xianyou, by custom, love singing and dancing. They always perform at village festivals in the spring and

autumn, at rituals for the gods, and at weddings and funerals held in the villages or on the streets.”¹⁹⁾ Through these rituals, villages fostered in villagers a sense of affinity and belonging. The Thirty-Six-Village Alliance 三十六鄉, located in the foothills of Mt. Hugong 壺公山, Huang Lian’s hometown and the base for the revolt he led, also formed a ritual alliance.²⁰⁾ On Mt. Hugong can be found Lingyun Temple 凌雲殿, a temple dedicated to the Jade Emperor 玉皇大帝. This temple is the most important temple for common religious rituals among the villages belonging to the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance. From the Qing period (1644–1912) on, the people of the alliance have made up the governing board of the temple and have managed the temple.²¹⁾ A stele explains, “Over the years we have received donations from village altars of the soil when the temple has fallen into disrepair.” At the end of the inscription appear the date of the inscription and the names of elders of the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance connected with the donations from the village altars.²²⁾ I also conducted interviews at a village belonging to the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance. According to my interviewees, the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance followed the Black Banner, the neighboring Twenty-Eight-Village Alliance 二十八鄉 followed the White Banner, and feuds between the two banners were terribly fierce affairs.²³⁾ It is worth noting that the reports of my interviewees accord with the distributions of the Black Banner and the White Banner given in Dean and Zheng’s study.²⁴⁾ That is, the local ties behind lineages, villages, and ritual alliances were closely tied to the Black Banner and White Banner armed alliances.

(3) Religious associations and secret societies

Guanmenjiao 關門教, a local religion that spread in the Xinghua region during the Qing period, taught that if you obey its commandments, after death you will avoid suffering forever. This religion worshipped the goddess Wusheng Laomu 無生老母, as well as the Guanyin Bodhisattva 觀音菩薩, the Three Great Emperor-Officials 三官大帝, and the God of the Soil (various Chinese names). According to Chen Songqing, this sect spread to many places along the southern coast of Putian County.²⁵⁾ And according to Dean and Zheng, Guanmenjiao did not exclude worship of local gods at village altars; villagers could participate in the activities of both religions.²⁶⁾

Members of Huang Lian’s family were believers of Guanmenjiao for generations, and during his childhood he followed its teachings and practiced vegetarianism. In this sect, temple leaders were called “uncle,” and since Huang Lian was the sixteenth elder of the same generation 排行 in his lineage,

he was called “uncle sixteen” 十六叔. After Huang Lian began his uprising, the enemy, satirizing this practice, called him “the Sixteenth Emperor” 十六皇帝. Moreover, key members of Huang Lian’s army were Guanmenjiao believers.²⁷⁾

Huang Lian was also the head of the Gun and Sword Society 槍刀會. This society consisted of members who came from any of a number of villages, who excelled in the martial arts, and who, it is thought, were outstanding members of either the Black or White Banner alliances.²⁸⁾ Huang Lian also had 118 sworn brothers.²⁹⁾ These men probably were not from Huang Lian’s own village, but rather were heads of armed associations of other villages with whom he formed alliances.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Elder Brothers Society 哥老會, a secret society, grew powerful in the Xinghua region as well. According to Lian Lichang, a historian of Fujian’s secret societies, Peng Yuelin 彭月霖 of Hunan, a master of the martial arts, along with others, formed the first chapter of the Elder Brothers Society in 1903 and called themselves the Loyalty Hall of Xinglongshan 興龍山忠義堂. Thereafter, all chapters of the society formed in Putian had “loyalty hall” as part of their names. And when Huang Lian rose up in rebellion, the name of his association was Black Tiger Loyalty Hall of Hushan 壺山黑虎忠義堂. Hence, the rebels that Huang Lian led in revolt were likely members of the Elder Brothers Society.³⁰⁾ Moreover, there is evidence that Huang Lian himself joined the Elder Brothers Society at the suggestion of Wan Guofa 萬國發 (a member of society and a military man from Hunan, sent to Putian by Sun Daoren 孫道仁, military governor 都督 of Fujian).³¹⁾ According to one oral report, men of ability became leaders of the society, and they not only protected society members, but also reconciled the Black Banner and White Banner alliances and brought them together to form the Black and White Banners focused on a common enemy.³²⁾

We thus see that in the Xinghua region late in the Qing period, the Black Banner and White Banner came together amid the competing interests of lineages, villages, and the ritual alliances of folk religions. In addition, its leaders joined the secret Elder Brothers Society in an effort to further unite the region. We can perhaps understand this flurry of activity as an effort by people to expand, and add more layers to, the unity of the region in order to meet the challenges of a turbulent time. Christianity also brought people together. In the next section, we will explore the activities of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

3 Methodist Episcopal Church in Xinghua

(1) The church's proselytizing in the Xinghua region

The Methodist Episcopal Church's first convert, and later first Chinese minister, in the Xinghua region was Lin Zhenzhen 林振珍 of Nanri Island 南日島. Lin, prior to his conversion, was a master of martial arts and made his living as a pharmacist selling Chinese medicine. In 1863 on a trip to Fuzhou, he listened to a minister preaching the gospel and became a convert. Later in his hometown he established a church.³³⁾ Later still, in 1895, antimissionary riots occurred in Gutian 古田 County, Fujian Province, in which the family of a British missionary was slaughtered. But after the British government interfered and resolved the incident, people in the coastal counties of Fuqing 福清, Putian, and Xianyou started seeking backing from the church, and within a short period of time Christian converts dramatically increased.³⁴⁾

(2) Rev. William Brewster's activities

After the Methodist Episcopal Church developed and became established in Xinghua, the Rev. William Brewster, who took up his duties in 1890, made significant contributions. In addition to spreading the gospel, he also earnestly engaged in social work.³⁵⁾ He took a passionate interest not only in education, charity, medical care, and publishing, but also in such practical businesses as weaving factories, flour mills, and steamship companies.³⁶⁾

It is important to note that Christian churches used Western medicine as a means to spread their religion to those afflicted with illness. The Church Missionary Society 聖公會 established St. Luke's Hospital in Putian City as early as 1896. For the same purpose, the MEC in 1912 established Xingren Hospital 興仁醫院 in Hanjiang 涵江, a commercial district of Putian, and in 1903 established a women's hospital in Xianyou City.³⁷⁾ Fujian Province would sometimes have outbreaks of the plague, and the harm caused would be especially great in Putian County.³⁸⁾ To aid children who lost their parents to the plague, the MEC, even prior to founding hospitals, made efforts to place such children in an orphanage.³⁹⁾

Sometimes if church members were involved in lawsuits, the church would become entangled in local disputes. To keep the MEC from getting involved in disputes, Rev. Brewster strictly forbade church ministers from representing church members. In addition, if a church member initiated a lawsuit, Rev. Brewster also forbade the church member to call himself a

Christian.⁴⁰⁾

On the church's activities in Xinghua, we also have the report of students at Tōa Dōbun Shoin. They wrote,

We visited a missionary, an American named Brewster. He was about 50 or so and very lively. We in our group were very impressed with how, in this remote place, he was carrying out various grand plans. . . . There were a total of 18 foreigners, and it was really surprising how earnest they were about spreading the gospel. Brewster has already been in this area for 25 years. He speaks the local dialect like a native. That's really impressive! They told us that in this area there were about 500 to 600 converts in total.⁴¹⁾

The above historical sources favorably describe the MEC's development of its Xinghua parish. In addition, the Putian County Gazetteer, compiled by Zhang Qin, a man of local standing, also conveys a favorable impression of Rev. Brewster, saying that he mingled with members of the local gentry and developed friendly relationships with them.⁴²⁾

(3) Friction between the church and local society

One cannot, of course, deny that there was friction in Xinghua between Christian converts and ordinary local residents. According to Song ZL, when the village gathered donations for traditional plays, the Christians were loath to contribute.⁴³⁾ There was even a case where one Christian convert, after becoming a Christian, could no longer live among the locals and let the church arrange for him to move to Southeast Asia.⁴⁴⁾

The antimissionary riots in Fujian Province are covered in the synoptic work by Lin Wenhui.⁴⁵⁾ This book covers five outbreaks of riots in Xinghua between 1863 and 1896. In one case, a Christian convert was suspected of a crime, but a Chinese minister shielded him. Another case involved a dispute over a real estate contract between a local resident and the church. And so on. Yet it is important to note that prior to the Xinhai Revolution (1911), there were no disputes involving loss of life, and that the MEC strove to contribute to the local society, as mentioned above, and to avoid friction.

4 The Opium Problem in Xinghua and the MEC's Efforts

Opium was a huge problem for China in the nineteenth century. In the

twentieth century, the prohibition of opium exports to China became a topic of dispute, and in 1906 the British Parliament considered whether to allow exports of Indian opium to China.⁴⁶⁾ Then in September of 1906, the Qing court issued a decree prohibiting the consumption of opium, and it opened negotiations with Britain about stopping the opium trade. The result of these negotiations was that Britain promised to stop exports of opium to China within ten years if China strictly cracked down on the smoking of opium.⁴⁷⁾ Because Huang Lian's revolt is tied up with the control of opium poppy cultivation, I want first to clarify the opium situation in Xinghua.

After the introduction of poppy cultivation in the south of Xinghua Prefecture, cultivation rapidly spread.⁴⁸⁾ Around this time, Song Shou 松壽, viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces 閩浙總督, said that all the counties in the prefectures of Fuzhou, Xinghua, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou "generate large profits from poppy cultivation, and there are many poppy fields."⁴⁹⁾ Even after the Qing government issued its decree prohibiting the cultivation of poppies, it was not strictly enforced, and taxes continued to be collected on its cultivation.⁵⁰⁾ According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Finance in Beijing, many peasants cultivated several *mu* (1 *mu* = 666.7 square meters) of poppies, but after the government's edict, acreage devoted to poppy cultivation dropped about 80 percent from the past in Xianyou County, meaning that 20 percent of the poppy fields still remained.⁵¹⁾ Even in the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance, where Huang Lian was from, "Around the time of the Xinhai Revolution, virtually all of the peasants made a living from poppy cultivation."⁵²⁾

I have been unable to find any reliable statistics on the number of people in Xinghua who smoked opium. Jiang Chunlin 江春霖, the imperial censor 監察御史 toward the end of the Qing dynasty and a man from Putian County, said, "In the cities, it is difficult to find three palanquin bearers not intoxicated on opium."⁵³⁾ Nevertheless, in 1907 officials began to clamp down on the opium dens, and six den managers were pilloried.⁵⁴⁾ Later, after a change in magistrates, the county government's clampdown became less strict, but the local elite continued to be serious about suppressing opium use.⁵⁵⁾ Rev. Brewster too severely criticized opium use.⁵⁶⁾ The MEC in Xinghua as well did as much as it could to stop the scourge of opium. From 1909 it collected donations and used the funds to provide medical treatment for addicts at St. Luke's Hospital, run by the Church Missionary Society. It also established the Anti-opium Society of Hinghwa, primarily for converts, and over a ten-month period successfully treated 397 addicts.⁵⁷⁾

Then, after the establishment of the Anti-opium Bureau 禁煙局 in 1911, Chen Qiao 陳樵, a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, became

its deputy general director. Chen searched many opium houses and severely punished those found in violation. But in reaction to the strict police crackdown, riots broke out.⁵⁸⁾ Later after the Xinhai Revolution, the central government's control of local regions weakened, and the clampdown on opium in Fujian Province became lax.⁵⁹⁾

5 The Course of Huang Lian's Revolt

(1) The political and economic situation in the late Qing and early Republican period

In Fujian Province, some students of church schools such as the Fuzhou Anglo-Chinese School 福州英華中學 participated in the Xinhai Revolution.⁶⁰⁾ The deciding factor in the revolution was the strength of the New Army. At the time, the Fujian army consisted of Manchu Banner armies 八旗兵, Hunanese soldiers who earlier followed Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, viceroy of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, and in one part of the army, Fujian soldiers. Worth noting is that the secret Elder Brothers Society had infiltrated this army as soldiers. After the Wuchang Uprising 武昌起義, which marked the beginning of the Xinhai Revolution, the revolutionaries in Fuzhou, on November 8, 1911, also rose up in revolt, and once the New Army established itself, the leader of the army, Sun Daoren from Hunan, assumed the post of military governor. The new provincial government became a gathering place for New Army soldiers, new intellectuals, and members of the Elder Brothers Society.⁶¹⁾

During this time, Peng Shousong 彭壽松 from Hunan exerted considerable influence in local Fujian politics by convincing fellow members of the Elder Brothers Society to fall in behind the revolution. Peng concurrently held important posts in the Fujian provincial government, the police force, and the anti-opium task force. However, with his partisanship and forceful political tactics, he aroused the anger of local Fujianese. After various confrontations, some influential people of Fujian decided to send a representative to Beijing to seek an investigation of Peng. At just this time Huang Lian's revolt broke out, and the central government decided to dispatch Cen Chunxuan 岑春煊, a man living in Shanghai who had served in several senior regional positions toward the end of the Qing period, to Fuzhou to act as special envoy for pacification 鎮撫使.⁶²⁾ Thus, after the Xinhai Revolution the political situation in Fujian Province was chaotic as a result of conflicts between outside Hunanese and local Fujianese, and this political situation

formed the background for Huang Lian's uprising.

Next I would like to describe the economic situation around the time of the Xinhai Revolution. In Xinghua after the Boxer Rebellion, taxes on ordinary people were increased to pay reparations to foreigners. In addition, the New Policies 新政 of the late Qing government led to new taxes earmarked for railroad construction.⁶³⁾ Amid these developments, the imperial censor Jiang Chunlin twice pleaded with the imperial court that because the tax burden in Putian was greater than in other counties, it is not fair.⁶⁴⁾ For his part, Huang Lian from 1902 to 1903 led peasants in opposition to taxes. As a result, he was thrown in prison for resisting taxes, but his family bribed his jailer, and he was able to escape.⁶⁵⁾

On the eve of the Xinhai Revolution, prices all over China dramatically rose, and society became unsettled.⁶⁶⁾ In Xinghua, the price of rice rose 50 percent in 1909.⁶⁷⁾ At the same time, a plague and drought also struck the region.⁶⁸⁾ But Xinghua was not uniformly poor. In Hanjiang, in the northern part of Putian County, there were thriving commercial shops, and in the central part of the county on the Putian plain, replete with irrigation ditches, rice farming was prevalent. In contrast, in the southern part of the county and on the peninsula, the soil was poor, and as a result the area became a major source of labors emigrating abroad. Moreover, in the early-Qing Great Clearance edicts 遷界令, an evacuation of coastal regions near Taiwan meant to counter Ming dynasty loyalists there, the coastal area of Putian County was placed outside the borderline 界外 to which the policy applied.⁶⁹⁾ One can thus see the low regard that the authorities had for the coastal area of Putian. Some of the villages in the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance were also outside the borderline.⁷⁰⁾ It is from their base in southern Putian that Huang Lian and his fellow rebels rose up in revolt.

After the Xinhai Revolution, the finances of Fujian Province were in dire straits, and taxes in the province "were as common as the hairs on an ox," according to an expression of the time. In Xinghua they were especially burdensome.⁷¹⁾ Around this time, Yu Wenzao 余文藻, from Hunan, was appointed magistrate, but his methods of governing proved unpopular. Things got so bad that later Huang Lian petitioned Cen Chunxuan, special envoy for pacification, as detailed below. During the Qing period, there was no office to which people could appeal for relief from oppression. With the coming of the Republic of China and its republican form of government, people hoped that the old evils of governance would be swept away, but Yu Wenzao proved cruel and unjust—worse than officials of the Qing dynasty. Peng Shousong acquired a vast amount of power in Fujian, was accountable to no one, and proceeded

to carry out depredations in the province. Yu Wenzao, his subordinate, likewise carried out depredations in Xinghua, and Huang Lian, in his petition, accused him of greatly harming the prefecture.⁷²⁾

(2) Huang Lian's revolt

Harboring such discontents, Huang Lian and his followers rose up in rebellion on June 19, 1912, on Mt. Hugong, home of the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance. June 19 corresponds to the 5th of the Fifth Month in the lunar calendar, the date of the Dragon Boat Festival.⁷³⁾ It was also right before a festival held at the Linyun Temple on the 16th of the lunar Fifth Month. Around this time, if many people gathered at the temple, the government would most likely not think it amiss. Before rallying the people to action, Huang Lian stood before the Jade Emperor and the crowd and engaged in *poē* divination. He cast two ceramic *poē* and incanted, "If we will succeed, may these two *poē* not break," to divine the outcome of his enterprise. Sure enough, the *poē* remained unbroken and assumed a favorable configuration.⁷⁴⁾ In this way the crowd collectively converged on a course of action, to revolt, by relying on such folk customs as a festival and divination—practices grounded in the collective folk mindset. Then, to follow through, he issued the following manifesto and made the decision to revolt public.

In the Xinhai Revolution, Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchu government, established a republic, and brought the promise of long-term benefits to the people. Unexpectedly, a few short months after founding of the new state, Sun Yat-sen resigned, and Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 appeared on the scene. Taxes were supposed to be forgiven, but they are still collected. Government decrees can change in the course of a single day. Punishments were supposed to be lighter, but instead they are more severe. The people are on the verge of death. The government employs scoundrels to press for taxes, causing even the chickens and dogs to be unsettled, and it lets the evil gentry mistreat the people worse than jackals and wolves would. *The people, as always, fear officials, and officials for their part fear Western might. The church has spread throughout the villages, and the Methodist Episcopal Church in particular is especially aggressive.* Nominally, the state is a republic, but in fact it is no different from the former imperial court. Our polity is called Republican, but its catastrophes are worse than those of despotism.⁷⁵⁾ (My italics.)

This manifesto finds fault with the fact that though China is a republic, it continues to be poorly governed. But what I want to draw attention to is the italicized portion of the text. This text is evidence that Huang Lian, from the beginning, led his revolt under the anti-Christian, anti-imperial banner, and as such, it is often cited in Chinese research. The original source of this text is the Putian political gazetteer, published in 1966.⁷⁶⁾ This text also appears in Zhang Zhongshu's *Minor History of the Sixteenth Emperor*, but the italicized portion of the text is missing, and the whole text varies somewhat from the text cited above.⁷⁷⁾ Song Humin, an editor of *Putian wenshi ziliao*, also noted these discrepancies and thinks that Zhang, because he is a Christian, deleted passages that he found inconvenient. But this explanation is odd, for emphasizing the rebels' hostility toward the church and showing the planned nature of attacks on the church helps Zhang to stress the damage that the church received in Huang Lian's revolt. Hence he had no reason to delete the passage in question. Moreover, the italicized passage is also missing in "A Notification by Provisional Generalissimo Huang Lian."⁷⁸⁾ If we take all of this evidence together, we begin to suspect that someone intentionally added the italicized passage in order to stress the anti-Christian, anti-imperialist nature of his revolt. To further explore this issue, I will give additional reasons for this view below.

In August 1912, the Shanghai newspaper *Shen bao* reported, "Outside the border in Xinghua, the bandits of the Gun and Sword Society secretly mobilized and advocated promoting Fujian and destroying Hunan 興閩滅楚.⁷⁹⁾ Somewhat later, another Shanghai newspaper, *Shibao*, reported, "The Black Banner and White Banner have united, with Huang Lian as its military governor, and Peng Shousong has been declared guilty of ten serious crimes."⁸⁰⁾ Both newspapers reported that local Fujianese resented that Hunanese had taken control of the provincial Fujian government, yet neither paper mentioned any anti-Christian statements or actions. Neither the July 1 report of the US consul in Xiamen relaying news of the riot in Xinghua nor the letter of a medical missionary of the Church Missionary Society who witnessed Huang Lian's attack make mention of anything anti-Christian.⁸¹⁾ On this matter, the Japanese consul in Fuzhou, on August 13, reported as follows:

Since the revolution, ordinary peasants have been afflicted with recession. In addition, taxes of all sorts have steadily become more onerous. . . . Stories of Peng Shousong's misrule are gradually being spread about, with the result that the people are increasingly alienated or resentful of the new government. Some people are yearning for a return of the Qing

or Ming government. Some people even let thieves plunder and pillage at will, and as a consequence there are breakdowns in social order in a number of places, and gangs of thieves increasingly rule the roost.⁸²⁾

This Japanese diplomatic message, while touching on people's discontent about onerous taxes and the desire of some to revive dynasties of the past, fails to mention anything about an anti-Christian movement.

We also have the record left by Japanese students of Tōa Dōbun Shoin who happened to visit Xinghua on September 1, 1912, while on a study tour:

A gang of thieves, about 1,000 of them, have their lair at Mt. Hugong, about 11.5 kilometers south of Putian City. It is said that they oppose the ban on opium. Their leader has the surname Huang and is also called the Sixteenth Emperor. He is a total rascal. Two or three days prior, I heard, he fought a battle with the Hunan soldiers of the area.⁸³⁾

These Tōa Dōbun Shoin students who happened to pass through the Xinghua region mentioned that Huang Lian opposed the ban on opium, but he said nothing about opposition to Christianity. However, later in February 1913, an armed unit under Huang Lian intentionally attacked a Christian church and a number of Christians. To anticipate my conclusion, on the basis of this event, we can perhaps reach the following judgment: Huang Lian and his followers sought to continue cultivating opium, and the MEC's strong advocacy against opium incurred their rage. Hence, in the midst of their rebellion, anti-Christian forces came to the fore. That is to say, Huang Lian's original primary objective was not to foment a movement against Christianity. Below I would like to offer further evidence for this idea while laying out the course of Huang Lian's revolt.

Well, then, what about numbers? The Tōa Dōbun Shoin students placed the number of rebels at about 1,000, but another source places the number between 3,000 and 4,000.⁸⁴⁾ In any case, after Huang Lian issued his manifesto, in August of 1912, Yu Wenzao, magistrate of Xinghua, headed to Mt. Hugong to put down the rebels. However, owing to a sudden deterioration in the weather and other factors, his army was repelled by Huang Lian's. The sudden rainstorm was seen by Huang Lian's troops as Heaven's aiding their side.⁸⁵⁾ Here too we can see the mindset among his men, who believed in Heaven as a force controlling men's lives. Next, the provincial government sent Sun Baorong, a general in the regular army. Sun was guided by the White Banner alliance against the Black Banner alliance, which was backed by the Thirty-

Six-Village Alliance. He attacked the Huang Lian army, but exercised caution rather than relentlessly pursuing the enemy. For its part, the Huang Lian army attacked Putian City, but was counterattacked and routed. This back and forth dance between the two sides lasted until October of 1912.⁸⁶⁾

Then in October 1912, Yuan Shikai designated Cen Chunxuan as special envoy for the pacification of Fujian. As a result, Peng Shousong, whose political situation became untenable, left Fuzhou for Hong Kong. To deal with the rebels, Cen appealed to Jiang Chunlin, former imperial censor now retired in the Hanjiang District of Putian, his hometown, asking for help. He sought to probe the possibility of offering the rebels amnesty and enlistment in the regular army.⁸⁷⁾ At this time, Huang Lian, in response to Cen Chunxuan, gave the speech quoted above denouncing Yu Wenzao's misgovernment. Having lost his political backing and being thus accused, Yu was dismissed from his post as magistrate.⁸⁸⁾

Jiang Zhongquan 蔣忠銓, the new magistrate of Xinghua, and Jiang Chunlin called together the local elite to decide what to do about the uprising, and most of those present advocated putting down the rebellion by force. In response, Jiang Chunlin, following through on Cen's proposal, advocated negotiating a conclusion to the rebellion. But while Huang Lian hesitated about submitting to the government, the government troops began its attack on the rebels, and negotiations broke down.⁸⁹⁾ Because Jiang and Huang conducted their negotiations in a conciliatory manner, there were, it is important to note, widely circulating rumors that they were colluding.⁹⁰⁾ Also, since Cen Chunxuan exiled Peng Shousong and made an offer of amnesty and enlistment in the regular army to the rebels, he regarded his mission as special envoy for the pacification of Fujian completed and tendered his resignation a mere one month after his appointment. He probably sought to avoid getting too deeply involved in local Fujian politics.⁹¹⁾ But this was not the end of Huang Lian and his role in history.

Huang Lian and his band of rebels went in hiding for a while, but his reputation in the region remained great. At the time, opium poppies were cultivated in the eastern portion of Xianyou County, and opposition to the government's ban on cultivation was strong. Lin Gao 林高 of Yangwei 洋尾 Village, a man of chivalrous spirit with the nickname Prince Gao and thought to be a member of the Elder Brothers Society, was recommended for office by locals, and so off he proceeded to Putian. He requested, it is said, that Huang enter Xianyou with his army. Moreover, a representative of another village also asked Huang for support. After conducting divination at Lingyun Temple, Huang decided to move his forces to these villages, and at that time, each of

the alliance villages pledged to offer troops.⁹²⁾ Huang Lian decided whether to deploy troops by using divination, and he held a meeting at a temple. Here too we can discern the mindset of Huang and his followers.

Later, Huang Lian and his fellow rebels, taking advantage of Xianyou City's weak defenses, captured the city. *Shen bao* reported that a village near Xianyou helped Huang Lian and his followers to take Xianyou.⁹³⁾ Huang Lian had many sympathizers not only in Putian but also in Xianyou.

(3) The MEC's appeal to the US consulate and the government in Beijing

From around the end of 1912, Rev. Stanley Carson of the MEC told the world that hundreds of thousands of square meters of opium poppies were cultivated in Xinghua.⁹⁴⁾ This news induced the central government in Beijing to do something about the matter, and that was, it is thought, to get the newspapers *Shen bao* and *Minli bao* to publish an article on January 13, 1913, asserting that 200,000 *mu* (133 square kilometers) of land were devoted to opium cultivation, that the peasants cultivating this opium were protected by the rebels, that the provincial government was powerless to deal with the matter, and that since the harvest season had not yet arrived, the central government should quickly devise a way to uproot the opium.⁹⁵⁾ A short while prior, in October and December 1912, the North China Herald as well published two articles in which it noted that the central government supervises local governments, and wondered whether it can faithfully fulfill the commitment that it made to Britain to control opium.⁹⁶⁾

In this environment, Yuan Shikai issued a presidential order in which he strictly prohibited planting poppy seeds and ordered local government officials to report the local situation to the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁹⁷⁾ Under these circumstances, Sun Daoren, the military governor of Fujian Province, appointed General Huang Peisong 黃培松 as special commissioner for the anti-opium campaign 禁煙特辦 and ordered the uprooting of opium poppies by force.⁹⁸⁾ The Yuan Shikai administration no doubt was mindful of the watchful eye of the British and American governments.

At this time, in January 1913, the MEC leader in Xinghua parish, Rev. Brewster, took a sabbatical and returned to the United States with his wife.⁹⁹⁾ This is evidence, it seems, that he did not do much to stop Huang Lian and his followers from seriously attacking the church. However, the ensuing critically deteriorating situation placed a heavy burden on Rev. Carson, who

was placed in charge in Rev. Brewster's stead. Rev. Carson frequently asked the US consulate in Fuzhou for help, but his doing so further angered Huang Lian and his fellow rebels against the church. In 1914, after the conclusion of Huang Lian's uprising, Rev. Carson recalled the revolt as follows:

The movement was not, at first, anti-Christian, but later developed into it. The main causes of this turn of events were: (1) Our Christians were naturally friendly toward the new regime and willing to help it in any way they could. This brought them into opposition to the group of Gentry who were enemies of the new Government. (2) The anti-opium campaign carried on by the church, brought it into opposition to the bandits who had, for a certain assessment per mow [*mu*], pledged protection to poppy growers. (3) This campaign resulted in the central Government issuing such stringent orders that the provincial and local officials were forced into action and destroyed about 90% of the growing poppies. It is difficult to think that the farmers were the only ones that suffered loss. Angered at thus being forced to destroy large prospects of profits, is a possible explanation of the determination with which the Provincial officials have opposed all efforts to bring either the Gentry or the bandits to justice.¹⁰⁰⁾

That is, Rev. Carson was saying that the real reason that the MEC incurred an attack is that the church aligned itself in opposition to the profits of local powers.

(4) The battle of Huang Lian's army in the south of Putian County and its attack on the MEC church and Christians

In 1913 Huang Lian's army fought with the government's army, intent on uprooting the opium poppies in the southern part of Putian County, in the neighborhood of the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance, in such places as Wushi 芎石 and Zhongmen 忠門. As part of this action, it attacked the MEC church and some Christians. Under strict orders to uproot the opium poppies, the government's army realized that to carry out its mandate, it first had to clear the southern portion of Putian County of rebels, since this area was their base of operations.¹⁰¹⁾

Apart from the conflict over the opium ban, there was longstanding friction in Wushi, an important trading township in southern Putian County, between powerful newcomers from Huian 惠安 County in Quanzhou Prefecture and locals who became Christians. Accordingly, people from Huian

intentionally formed an alliance with rebels to attack local Christians, their enemies.¹⁰²⁾

In February 1913 Rev. Carson reported to the US consulate, “One of our preachers and two church members have been captured by the rebels and are being held for ransom.”¹⁰³⁾ Rev. Carson also sent a telegram to the Anti-opium Conference held in Beijing at this time by the International Reform Bureau. In his telegram he wrote, “Soldiers and rebels are engaged in fierce fighting, and the outcome has yet to be determined. Some opium seedlings have been uprooted, but several villages have joined the rebels and are resisting the government soldiers.”¹⁰⁴⁾ On the rebel army’s support and the view of Xinghua residents toward it, Rev. Carson wrote, “Many of the literati and the coolie class even here in the city [Putian] are in sympathy with the rebels but the merchant and business class are not, as the present situation seriously affects their trade.”¹⁰⁵⁾

We can thus see that the views of Xinghua residents toward the rebel army were complicated. Some people who traditionally had hostile relations with certain groups in the rebel army cooperated with the government’s army in its military operations.¹⁰⁶⁾ The government’s army made use of preexisting hostility between groups in society, and particular local groups in society made use of the government’s army to retaliate for past grudges.

Toward the end of March 1913, Sun Daoren reported to Yuan Shikai that he had uprooted the opium poppies in Xinghua by means of force.¹⁰⁷⁾ In fact, destroying opium poppies continued at least until late April in Xinghua Prefecture, including Xianyou County, but excluding the eastern portion of Putian County and neighboring Zhuzhai 朱寨.¹⁰⁸⁾ Villages like Zhuzhai and Dongsha 東沙 had a long tradition of being an antigovernmental area delinquent in paying taxes. By gaining the support of such villages as these, Huang Lian and his fellow rebels were able to sustain their uprising for a longer period of time.¹⁰⁹⁾

About the situation in the first half of 1913, Rev. Carson recollected, “In February one of our finest village chapels was burned, and marks a beginning of the anti-Christian phase, or to be more accurate, anti-Methodist, since other missions have not been molested. . . . The culmination of the bandit outbreaks occurred in June when in a week 19 Christian homes were plundered, 11 persons captured—a preacher was shot, and the remaining 10 held for ransom.”¹¹⁰⁾ Expressing a sense of crisis, he wrote, “I am sending you a translation of a proclamation recently issued by Ng Liang [Huang Lian], the leader of the rebellion that is taking place in this section of the country. It shows plainly the determination to destroy the church. The church is

designated as the class of people who are destroying the idols and ancestors.”¹¹¹⁾ Though at this time attacks on the church and church members intensified, the government army’s suppression of opium became more lax. Consequently, the MEC was very likely highly concerned about the government forces’ probe of the possibility of offering the rebels amnesty and enlistment in the regular army.¹¹²⁾

I surmise that the government army’s suppression of opium became more lax owing to the political situation surrounding the Second Revolution 第二革命. Let me explain. In May 1913, local officials who favored the Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang), including Li Liejun 李烈鈞, military governor of Jiangxi Province, opposed a loan from foreign countries promoted by Yuan Shikai. In response, Yuan, in early June, dismissed these local officials, creating a situation with a good chance that civil war would break out. In Fujian Province, Xu Chongzhi 許崇智, head of the military division in control of the province and a member of the faction opposing Yuan Shikai, in late July compelled Sun Daoren to declare Fujian independent of the central government.¹¹³⁾ Around this time, Xu Chongzhi sought to draw Huang Lian’s troops over to his side, according to a report in *Shen bao*.¹¹⁴⁾ According to another source, Lin Shizhao 林師肇, a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance 中國同盟會 and member of the Provincial Consultative Council 省諮議局, asked Huang Lian to submit to the government.¹¹⁵⁾ But after the Second Revolution failed and Xu Chongzhi fled, Sun Daoren immediately canceled Fujian’s independence. Sun defended himself thus to Yuan Shikai: “I asked Huang Lian to submit to the government to bring an end to his uprising so as to protect people and Christians, not to get Huang’s troops stationed in Putian. The US consul may appear to have said that to maintain the peace, it is not a good idea to station Huang Lian and his troops in Putian. But this is unreliable hearsay.”¹¹⁶⁾ But it is difficult to deny that around the time of the Second Revolution, there were talks between the Nationalist Party of China forces and Huang Lian.

There is, of course, no clear evidence of any promise to station Huang Lian’s troops in Putian. But around the time when Fujian declared its independence, the homes of MEC church members were plundered, church members were abducted, and a preacher was violently murdered.¹¹⁷⁾ Clearly, under these circumstances, the church was afraid that a hostile force would seize power in Xinghua. Accordingly, from the summer to autumn of 1913, the MEC and the US consulate frequently urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the central government to suppress the rebels by force and to compensate the church and church members. In addition, the US ambassador, using

information supplied by the US consul in Fuzhou, supplied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a list of members of the gentry who were conspiring with the rebels—a list that included the names of Jiang Chunlin and his son.¹¹⁸⁾

(5) Jiang Chunlin's connection with the uprising

Jiang Chunlin, a member of the local gentry, in a letter to his friend Zhang Qin 張琴, a member of Parliament, complained that the suspicion directed at him was nothing but slander:

The Methodist Episcopal Church is opposed to offering the rebels amnesty and enlistment in the regular army and has telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the effect that civil and military officials and local gentry ought to be punished. Their telegrams include slander directed at me. They say that my servant Achao 阿超 is a relative of Huang Lian. They also assert that all of the rebels' activity in our area were things that I brought about by secret manipulation, and that as a result, when my son Zubao was the head of Xianyou County, no one dealt with the antichurch incidents, and the lives and property of Christians in Xinghua Prefecture were in extreme danger. . . . But it is totally impossible for any of the American church's slander to be true.¹¹⁹⁾

Jiang added that he met Huang Lian at the request of the government. In addition to Jiang's advocating that the rebels be offered amnesty and enlistment in the regular army, another reason that the MEC suspected Jiang of colluding with Huang Lian was past discord that arose between the church and Jiang.¹²⁰⁾

From the above, we can gain a glimpse of the animosity that Jiang harbored toward the MEC. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Jiang acted behind the scenes to support the Huang Lian uprising. To begin with, Jiang, as imperial censor, complained that the tax burden on Xinghua was unfair. From this fact it can be seen that he sought to maintain stability in people's lives. He also sympathized with the common folk. For instance, in the matter of the levy on villagers for the damages caused by the attack on the church, he complained, "In particular, if the compensation is excessive, the people will be unable to bear the burden, and they may even engage in dangerous behavior."¹²¹⁾ Moreover, when he was reprimanded because he had the temerity to accuse such powerful people as Yuan Shikai and Prince Qing 慶親王, he resigned his position, maintaining the posture of the upright public official. And from this

fact, we can see that he loved justice.¹²²⁾ Could such a man, even if he personally disliked Christianity, instigate an armed association to carry out a rebellion? In addition, Jiang too must have known that anti-Christian incidents often provoked foreign interference—a possibility that he undoubtedly wished to avoid. The upshot was that though Jiang was suspected of protecting the rebels, the local gentry and merchants of Putian vouched for his innocence, and he was spared any punishment.¹²³⁾

From this evidence, I think it very likely that the MEC and the US consul in Fuzhou overeagerly accused Jiang Chunlin of being the instigator of the uprising because they were highly suspicious of the local gentry.

(6) The political and social aftermath of the Huang Lian uprising

After the revolutionaries behind the Second Revolution were defeated, the possibility that the rebels would be offered amnesty and enlistment in the regular army faded away. Then in September 1913 Huang Lian fell ill and died, and the military actions of the rebels were nearly at an end. But because his family feared that the government would abuse the corpse, it hid Huang Lian's body and kept it from being discovered for a considerable period of time.¹²⁴⁾ On January 17, 1914, the *North China Herald* reported that a reward was being offered for Huang Lian dead or alive.¹²⁵⁾

In December 1913 Sun Daoren was removed from his post as military governor, and the military unit of Hunan soldiers was for the most part disbanded.¹²⁶⁾ As a replacement for Sun, Li Houji 李厚基, a military man directly under Yuan Shikai, was dispatched to Fujian, where he assumed both political and military power. Thereafter, until 1926, the year of the Northern Expedition, Fuzhou, the provincial capital, was governed by military forces under the government in Beijing.¹²⁷⁾ However, a military administration imposed from without could not take complete control of Fujian. After Yuan Shikai died in 1916, Sun Yat-sen established a revolutionary government in Guangdong, and Fujian Province became an arena of contention between the northern and southern governments. Later in Fujian, a militia 民軍, a part-army, part-bandit-gang local armed force recognized by Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary party, managed to carve out a stronghold. Some leaders in Huang Lian's band of rebels became leaders in this militia.¹²⁸⁾ In this manner, military forces developed strongholds throughout the region, and the Xinghua's peace became extremely precarious.

On the matter of opium poppy cultivation, Sun Daoren, who was still military governor of Fujian, gave the following report to the central

government in October 1913, after Huang Lian's rebellion came to an end: "In Fujian Province all the opium dens have been closed. As for the present ban on cultivating opium poppies, we have enjoined all local officials under us to thoroughly inspect and have ordered all inspectors to prohibit the cultivation of opium poppies in their respective districts."¹²⁹⁾ But after Yuan Shikai died in 1916, rivalry among competing military forces and political upheaval made it impossible to control opium in Fujian. Under these circumstances, cultivation of opium poppies revived, and the opium tax was collected from growers.¹³⁰⁾

6 In Conclusion

In Xinghua from the nineteenth century on, rivalry in society increased to such an extent that in villages, altars of the soil, and among villages, ritual alliances, gave rise to the Black Banner and White Banner armed alliances and eventually to the Black and White Banners. We also saw that the southern part of Putian County, where Huang Lian's Thirty-Six-Village Alliance was based, was poor in comparison with the northern part, where commerce thrived, and the central part, where irrigation was well developed. In this environment villagers took to Guanmenjiao, a religion that advocated a vegetarian lifestyle and following the precepts. Adherents of this religion were among Huang Lian's followers. In addition, toward the end of the Qing period and beginning of the Republican period, leading citizens of society joined the Elder Brothers Society, a secret society of the time. Thus we saw in Xinghua society of this time a greater tendency among private individuals to form alliances. We can understand this greater effort to form alliances as an effort among the people of Xinghua just to survive. This was the background behind Huang Lian's revolt from a long-term historical perspective and a social perspective. How were these challenges met? To decide on courses of action, Huang Lian and his fellow rebels resorted to performing divination at the temple on Mt. Hugong and forming alliances. In these actions we can see the mindset of people who participated in the revolt, a mindset that arose from local folk religion.

As I have documented, Huang Lian's rebellion arose from the following immediate factors:

1. Peasants suffered financial difficulties arising from increases in taxes to compensate foreigners for damages suffered from the Boxer Rebellion and increases in prices.
2. After the Xinhai Revolution, outsiders, Hunanese, seized political power in the provincial government.

3. People were disappointed in the new government for not providing relief from oppressive taxes.

4. The republican government continued the ban on opium poppy cultivation, begun in the waning years of the Qing dynasty.

5. Because ritual alliances existed prior to armed associations and formed their basis, Huang Lian was able to use these connections to foment his revolt. This paper concentrates on an analysis of factors (4) and (5). However, we cannot overlook the fact that past local conflicts prevented Huang Lian from forming a consensus among the people, as shown by the opposition of some localities to Huang Lian's uprising. The network of the Elder Brothers Society deserves to be more thoroughly examined, it goes without saying. Here, however, we have shown that deeply rooted local ties among people lay in the background of Huang Lian's popular rebellion.

Next, is it possible to understand Huang Lian's rebellion as a struggle among the masses against Christianity and imperialism? In this paper I have uncovered the following relevant facts:

- In the Xinghua region, up until the Xinhai Revolution (1911–1912), there were no large-scale, deadly antimissionary riots.
- Even after the antimissionary riots in Fujian's Gutian County in 1895 and the Boxer Rebellion in 1899 to 1901, commoners still flocked to the church seeking protection.

- The MEC, in addition to making great efforts in the areas of education, health care, and charity, also cautiously avoided getting drawn into lawsuits. For commoners living in a turbulent era, the church was probably yet another type of association from which one could receive protection. It is difficult to deny, of course, that the conservative elements of society were repelled by the idea that a foreign religion could increase its influence in society by taking in the poor. At the same time, we cannot assert that Huang Lian clearly opposed Christianity from the beginning. Rather, the MEC, through diplomatic channels, appealed against the rebels' attack on the church and continued advocating for the destruction of opium poppies, and these stances conflicted with the interests of the rebels. It was this conflict of interests that provoked the rebels' rage.

This Christian church, the MEC, supported eradication of opium from a moral point of view. In contrast, Huang Lian and his group of rebels wanted to protect cultivation of opium in order to maintain people's current means of livelihood. It was because of the church's opposition to this stance that the rebels attacked it. In short, it is not possible to explain the rebels' attack on the church as a simple stand against Christianity and imperialism. We can fully

understand the Huang Lian uprising only by keeping in mind such background features as the structure of the local society, the development of Christianity, the rebels' mindset as derived from traditional folklore, and the political upheavals occurring after the Xinhai Revolution.

Translated by Alan Thwaites

Notes

- * This essay is a revised version of Yamamoto Shin 山本眞, “Fukkenshō Kōka chiiki shakai to kessha, Kirisutokyō, ahen: Minkoku shoki no Kō Ren no ran ni chakumoku shite” 福建省興化地域社會と結社、キリスト教、阿片：民國初期の黄濂の亂に着目して [Alliances, Christianity, Opium, and the Social Structure of the Xinghua Region in Fujian Province in the Early Republican Period: Focusing on Huang Lian's Revolt], *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, vol. 78, no. 1 (2019): 105–146.
- 1) Theodore C. Taylor, “Opium, an Unsettled Question,” from *The Contemporary Review* (London), June 1913.
 - 2) Joyce A. Madancy, *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), chapter 8.
 - 3) Zheng Zhenman 郑振满, “Shenmiao jidian yu shequ fazhan moshi: Putian Jiangkou pingyuan de lizheng” 神庙祭典与社区发展模式：莆田江口平原的例证 [Temple Rituals and a Model of Community Development: A Case Study of the Putian Jiangkou Plain], in Zheng Zhenman, *Xiangzu yu guojia: Duoyuan shiye zhong de Min-Tai chuangtong shehui* 乡族与国家：多元视野中的闽台传统社会 [Local Lineages and the State: Traditional Fujian and Taiwan Society] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian 三联书店, 2009); Zheng Zhenman, “Putian pingyuan de zongzu yu zongjiao: Fujian Xinghuafu lidai beiming jixi” 莆田平原的宗族与宗教：福建兴化府历代碑铭解析 [Lineage and Religion on the Putian Plain: An Analysis Using Historical Epigraphy from Xinghau Prefecture, Fujian], in Liu Yonghua 刘永华, ed., *Zhongguo shehui wenhua shi duben* 中国社会文化史读本 [A Reader of Chinese Social and Cultural History] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe 北京大学出版社, 2011); Kenneth Dean and Zheng Zhenman, *Ritual Alliances of the Putian Plain*, vol. 1: *Historical Introduction to the Return of the Gods*; vol. 2: *A Survey of Village Temples and Ritual Activities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
 - 4) Chen Lin 陈琳, “Putian Wubaiqi shijian qianxi” 莆田乌白旗事件浅析 [An Analysis of Putian Black and White Banners], *Fujian Shida Fuqing fenxiao xuebao* 福建师大福清分校学报 2002, no. 1.
 - 5) The library of Putian University 莆田学院 contains many unpublished local materials related to the Huang Lian revolt. Of these materials, I here use those materials written around the same time as the revolt, as well as transcriptions of oral reminiscences of events taken down in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These latter materials are thought to have been created for inclusion in the Putian County Gazetteer 莆田县志.
 - 6) I use the word “mindset” here in the sense of the trend in their way of thinking and

- feeling.
- 7) Zhonggong Putian shiwei dangshi yanjiushi 中共莆田市委党史研究室, *Zhonggong minzhong difangshi: Xin minzhuzhuyi geming shiqi* 中共闽中地方史：新民主主义革命时期 [A Local History of the Chinese Communist Party in the Central Fujian Region: The Period of the New Democracy Revolution] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献出版社, 1999).
 - 8) Wang Fumei 王福梅, “Qing zhi minguo Meiyimeihui zai Putian de chuanbo yu tedian” 清至民国美以美会在莆田的传播与特点 [Propagation of the Faith and Special Features of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Putian from the Qing to Republican Period], *Putian Xueyuan xuebao* 莆田学院学报, vol. 11, no. 1 (2004).
 - 9) I mainly use “Missionary Files: Methodist Episcopal Church, 1912–1949 (China, Japan, Korea)” (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., microfilm). Below I abbreviate this source as *MEC Files*.
 - 10) “Wubaiqi” 烏白旗 [The Black and White Banners], in Shi Hongbao 施鴻保, *Min zaji* 閩雜記 [Miscellaneous Writings on Fujian], vol. 7 (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1985; reprint).
 - 11) Putianshi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 莆田市地方志编纂委员会, ed., *Putianshi zhi* 莆田市志 [Putian City Gazetteer] (Beijing: Fangzhi Chubanshe 方志出版社, 2001), p. 223; Cao Shuji 曹树基, *Zhongguo renkou shi* 中国人口史 [A History of Chinese Population], vol. 5 (Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe 复旦大学出版社, 2001), p. 189.
 - 12) “Wubaiqi” 烏白旗 [Black and White Banners], *Putian wenshi ziliao* 莆田文史资料, no. 5 (1983): 117–120.
 - 13) Chen Chiyang 陳池養, “Qietan” 竊嘆 [Laments], in *Shenyu shuwu shiwenji: Jiexuan* 慎余書屋詩文集：節選 [An Collection of Writings from the Shenyu Study: Excerpts], *Taiwan wenxian huikan* 台灣文獻匯刊 (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshe; Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe) 4, no. 14 (2004): 87–289.
 - 14) Dean and Zheng, *Ritual Alliances*, vol. 2, pp. 1–5, 137–139.
 - 15) For more on the ritual areas of Taiwan, see Lin Meirong 林美容, *Xiangtushi yu cunzhuangshi: Renleixuezhe kan difang* 鄉土史與村庄史：人類學者看地方 [Local History and Village History: An Anthropologist Looks at Regional Studies] (Taipei: Taiyuan Chubanshe 大原出版社, 2000).
 - 16) Zheng Zhenman, “Shenmiao jidian,” pp. 236–237.
 - 17) Zheng Zhenman, “Shenmiao jidian,” p. 233.
 - 18) Hanjiangqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 涵江区地方志编纂委员会, ed., *Hanjiangqu zhi* 涵江区志 [Hanjiang District Gazetteer] (Beijing: Fangzhi Chubanshe, 1997), p. 759.
 - 19) Chin Seishō 陳盛韶, *Monzokuroku: Fukken, Taiwan no minzoku to shakai* 問俗錄：福建・台湾の民俗と社会 [Inquiries on Manners and Customs: Folklore and Society of Fujian and Taiwan], translated by Kojima Shinji 小島晋治, Ueda Makoto 上田信, and Kurihara Jun 栗原純 (Tokyo: Heibonsha 平凡社, 1988), pp. 47–48.
 - 20) Huang Lian came from Yangmian 洋面 Village, one of the villages forming the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance. I visited this area in August 2019 and determined that many residents of this village bear the surname Huang. The ancestral hall of the Huang lineage is still in operation.
 - 21) Zhu Weigan 朱维干, “1912 nian Huang Lian lingdao de Pu-Xian nongmin qiyi” 1912

- 年黄濂领导的莆仙农民起义 [The 1912 Peasant Uprising in Putian and Xianyou Led by Huang Lian], *Putian wenshi ziliao* 莆田文史资料, no. 2 (1981): 30. I personally visited Lingyun Temple in December 2018 and got the text of “Sanshiliuxiang dongshi koubai” 三十六鄉董事叩拜 (Respectfully Presented by the Directors of the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance), an inscription hung at the entrance to the temple. This is positive proof of the connection between Lingyun Temple and the Thirty-Six-Village Alliance.
- 22) “Chongxiu Lingyundian juanzi juantian bei” 重修凌雲殿捐資捐田碑 [Revised Inscription on a Subscription for Lingyun Temple], in Zheng Zhenman and Kenneth Dean 丁荷生, eds., *Fujian zongjiao beiming huibian: Xinghua fu fence* 福建宗教碑銘彙編：興化府分冊 [Fujian Religious Inscriptions: Xinghua Fascicle] (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), p. 251.
 - 23) Interviewees were Song 宋 ZL (male, 61) and Song YS (male, 80), interviewed on July 27, 2011 at KB Village, Hushi Township, Putian County.
 - 24) Dean and Zheng, *Ritual Alliances*, vol. 2, pp. 9–10, maps 7 and 10.
 - 25) Chen Songqing 陈松青, *Fujian Jinchuangjiao yanjiu* 福建金幢教研究 [A Study of the Religion Jinchuangjiao in Fujian Province] (master’s thesis, Fujian Normal University, 2007), pp. 30–37, 79, 83.
 - 26) Dean and Zheng, *Ritual Alliances*, vol. 1, p. 167.
 - 27) Aizao dadui 砵灶大隊, *Huang Lian qi yi shi ji diaocha ji* 黄濂起义事迹调查记 [An Investigation of Huang Lian’s Uprising], April 1960, p. 8; Hezai dadui 何在大隊 and Dongfen dadui 东汾大隊, *Huang Lian qi yi shi ji diaocha ji* 黄濂起义事迹调查记 [An Investigation of Huang Lian’s Uprising], May 1960, p. 14. Both works can be found in the Putian University library. Zhu Weigan, “1912 nian Huang Lian,” p. 25.
 - 28) Zhang Zhongshu 張忠舒, *Shiliu huangdi xiaoshi* 十六皇帝小史 [Minor History of the Sixteenth Emperor] (manuscript, n.d.), p. 6. Available in the Putian University library.
 - 29) Yu Yucheng 余玉成, *Huang Lian qi yi diaocha ji* 黄濂起义調查記 [An Investigation of Huang Lian’s Uprising], 1959, p. 3. Available in the Putian University library.
 - 30) Lian Lichang 连立昌, *Fujian mimi shehui* 福建秘密社会 [The Secret Societies of Fujian] (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), p. 271.
 - 31) Zhang Qin 張琴, ed., *Minguo Putianxian zhi* 民国莆田縣志 [Putian County Gazetteer, Republican Period] (1945; Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe 上海书店出版社, 2000; reprint). See “Tongji” 通紀 [Chronology], p. 110 v.
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 - 33) Lin Qiuli 林求理, “Lin Zhenzhen mushi shengping” 林振珍牧師生平 [A Life of Rev. Lin Zhenzhen], *Weili gonghui Xinghua Nianyihui shiliao tongxun* 衛理公會興化年議會史料通訊 [Newsletter of the Xinghua Annual Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church], no. 5: 18–23. Available in the library of the Methodist Graduate School of Theology, Taipei.
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 - 35) William N. Brewster, *The Evolution of New China* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1907), pp. 288–294.
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 - 40) Chen Rixin, *Pugonglushi zhuan*, p. 47.
 - 41) Tōa Dōbun Shoin daijukkisei 東亜同文書院第十期生, *Rakushikō* 樂此行 [How We Enjoy This Trip] (Shanghai: Tōa Dōbun Shoin 東亜同文書院, 1913), p. 238.
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