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The Issue of Extra-Settlement Roads in Shanghai during
the Last Decades of the Qing Dynasty

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Even before the decline of the Qing Dynasty, which began at the turn of the 19th century, there were cases of the construction of access roads in and out of the former British Settlement of Shanghai; then as early as 1869 the ratepayers of the consolidated International Settlement approved the management of “extra-settlement roads” by the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC).

In 1885, with the introduction of a private subscription system, the SMC began collecting monetary dues to pay for various infrastructure projects and law enforcement services beyond the Settlement’s boundary. While this move was initially intended to provide security in this area, the SMC gradually employed the policy to expand its influence outside the Settlement. Through proposal of the special tax of water in 1906, the SMC attempted to bring its private subscription system into the new millennium, by renewing its contract with the Shanghai Waterworks and levying surcharges on existing water rates. The same method was then used in contracting telephone services.

On the other hand, the chief executive of the Qing Dynasty’s Shanghai local administration, the Taotai, was not about to recognize any encroachment of foreigner influence beyond the Settlement and thus refused to allow any SMC tax collection outside its border. At the same time, however, the Taotai was forced to recognize the utility of the Settlement’s various infrastructure projects on the periphery, thus approving water supply, while prohibiting the

collection of external taxes to pay for them. Nevertheless, these actions did not mean that the SMC's surcharges were completely eliminated, as the Taotai merely avoided mentioning their existence, resulting in Chinese subjects paying water surcharges to the SMC until 1911, when finally exempted; but the Council continued to collect from foreign residents.

However Taotai might recognize all along the fact that the surcharges were still collected even after he banned, so rather than make further action on prohibiting their collection, he no doubt preferred to concentrate on the modernization of local administration in the Chapei region adjoining the Settlement. This is why it was necessary for the Taotai to continue to stress that the northwest suburb of Paoshan prefecture along the Yangtze River was not an open port, but rather a part of the Chinese inland territory, in order to demonstrate his success in preventing the expansion of foreign influence into its inland regions.

Strengthening Governance within the Party by the Nationalist Party Propaganda Bureau in the Early Days of the Tutelage Period

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The propaganda bureau of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has the role of “induction of the public opinion,” “regulation of the public opinion,” outside the party, and “opinion agreement” to unify the opinion within the party. This paper demonstrates that the propaganda bureau of the KMT strengthened control by unifying the opinion within the party in the early days of the tutelage period.

Two methods of unifying the opinion were employed. First, the KMT created a vertical leadership system for the local party propaganda bureau by the central party, and second, the party members were instructed by the content of the propaganda to homogenize political ideas.

After the reorganization of the KMT in January 1924, the necessity of both methods was recognized; however, the system was not sufficiently estab-

lished, and the opinion was not unified. Therefore, it was extremely vulnerable as an organization. Hence, the KMT proceeded with developing the propaganda organization in 1928. First, the organizational rules of the central-local propaganda bureau were formulated, and the hierarchical relationship between the propaganda bureau of local propaganda organization was established with the central propaganda bureau at the top. An “propaganda system” based on orders and obedience was institutionalized. In addition, in the “propaganda strategy” established by the central propaganda bureau, the propaganda was divided into “inside the party” and “outside the party.” The “inside of the party” propaganda refers to unifying the intentions of the party members.

After establishing such an institutional framework, the central propaganda bureau increased its effectiveness in various ways. First, it thoroughly carried out a “propaganda work report” to the upper party bureau from the lower party bureau. The central propaganda bureau gave instructions based on these reports, rigorously assessing and evaluating the reports to control the lower party. Furthermore, to promote the unification of the content of propaganda, a national propaganda conference was held to unify the content of propaganda and to exchange people. By supplying a large amount of propaganda items throughout the region, they tried to unify the propaganda and promote the unification of the party members’ opinions.

Livestock Operations Conducted by the Taiwan Development Company on Hainan Island during the Sino-Japanese War

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This article describes the actual circumstances surrounding the provision of live hogs to the Canton region by the Taiwan Development Company (TDC) at the early stage of the Japanese occupation of Hainan Island. In the research to date, it has been argued that the TDC’s livestock operations on Hainan Island were profitable, despite the Company falling into management difficulties under the Japanese military administration. While historians have

emphasized business management difficulties within the framework of the ideals and reality of policy regarding government-sponsored colonial enterprises during the War, it has not yet been clarified how military cooperation and profit acquisition were achieved. Therefore, what actual measures were carried out on the ground to generate profits needs to be thoroughly discussed by analyzing TDC inhouse reports and other contemporary documents.

The TDC showed a very positive attitude toward its livestock operations, giving the Hainan Island endeavor the leading role among a wide variety of industries, the most successful being the live hog business. Facing competition from Mitsui & Co., the TDC continued to provide a steady flow of Hainan hogs to Canton following the occupation to meet the Canton Garrison's need for a constant source of meat. Here the TDC staff developed their operations carefully, while observing the mood of the Army, thus attaining profitability. That is to say, by raising abundant amounts of hogs on Hainan and delivering them live, it eliminated the need for meat processing plants, thus significantly reducing production costs, while at the same time targeting the popularity of pork in the Army's mess halls.

The success of the Hainan operation was largely due to the TDC's ability to overcome fierce competition by dispatching skilled experts in livestock operations in the south at the onset of the Occupation, combined with clever strategies based on proper identification of local conditions facing customers. The benefits achieved from quickly maturing, fertile hogs indicates that by showing loyalty to the army and sacrificing its own interests, the TDC was able not only to maintain but also increase profits. The author concludes that the case of the TDC's Hainan livestock operations surely presents an extremely important opportunity to examine Japanese enterprise management in occupied South China from a wide variety of perspectives.