

Jaina Doctrines Transmitted by Tibetan Buddhists*

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1. Introduction

The two religions, Buddhism and Jainism, both of which were established in ancient India at around the same time in the sixth or fifth century BC, had much in common. Both Buddhists and Jainas did not accept the authority of the scriptures (Vedas) that Brahmanism, being the dominant religion in India at that period, relied on; both took an opposing attitude to the caste system with the Brahmans at the top; they stood in an atheistic position that did not see god as a unique creator of the universe, and they advocated respect for life with the philosophy and practice of *ahimsā* or non-violence. They also emphasized logical thinking, rationality, and neutrality in cognizing and understanding things or phenomena, and later constructed advanced systems of logic and epistemology. The source of both religions' emphasis on rationality and logic may be traced back to the doctrine of "dependent origination" (*pratītyasamutpāda*) preached by Gautama Buddha and that of "modal predication" (*syādvāda*) preached by Mahāvīra, respectively.

In my previous paper (Shiga 2005), I discussed aspects of the polemic between the Buddhists and Jainas concerning the system of logic from the perspective of "Buddhism viewed from Jainism." In contrast, in this paper, I will observe the Jaina thoughts transmitted in Tibet from the perspective of "Jainism viewed from Buddhism." As might be expected, there remains neither a definite record that some Tibetan Buddhists and Jainas conducted debates somewhere in person, nor a report that certain Jaina works were directly translated into Tibetan language. Therefore, we can safely say that Tibetan Buddhists collected and compiled certain Jaina doctrines by extracting views that could be regarded as "Jaina ones" from pieces of Buddhist literature written in India, which were translated into Tibetan.

The main purpose of this paper is to clarify what kind of works Tibetan Buddhists used or referred to and how they constructed "the Jaina views" as a whole. We focus on the seventh chapter of the *Blo gsal grub mtha*¹⁾ (henceforth BSGT) dealing with Jaina views, which was authored by dBu pa blo gsal (14th century), a master of the bKa' gdams pa school.²⁾ First, I will present a synopsis

of the seventh chapter of the BSGT for the purpose of overviewing the whole chapter. Then, we will check what kind of works and texts dBu pa blo gsal quotes or refers to. Based on those observations, we will examine various topics and subjects that are introduced as Jaina views in the BSGT and the Buddhists' criticisms against them. Furthermore, I would like to identify texts cited or referred to as Jaina views in the BSGT with those in Jaina literature to the extent possible.

2. A synopsis of the Jaina chapter in the BSGT

The writing style of the Jaina chapter is the same as those of other chapters in the BSGT, which is to say, dBu pa blo gsal employs a mixed form of verses and auto-commentary. The Jaina chapter can be roughly divided into two parts: (1) Jaina views (*pūrvapakṣa*) and (2) the Buddhists' criticisms and assertions (*uttarapakṣa*). In what follows, I present a synopsis of the Jaina chapter.

1. Jaina views [49b6–51a1]
 - 1.1. Nine principles or categories to be known (*shes bya'i tshig gi don*; **padārtha*) [49b6–50a2 on v. 1]
 - 1.1.1. Enumeration of nine principles [48b6–49a1 on v. 1ab]
 - 1.1.2. Synonyms of the soul (*srog*; **jīva*) [49a2 on v. 1cd]
 - 1.1.3. Two natures of the soul (*srog*; **jīva*) and means of cognition for them [49a2–5 on v. 1cd]
 - 1.1.4. Nine groups of those having the soul and numbers of their sense-faculties [49a5–b2 on v. 2ab]
 - 1.1.5. Definitions and explanations of four out of the nine principles: the inflow (*zag pa*; **āsrava*), the shut-off (*sdom pa*; **saṃvara*), the eradication (*nges par rga(rga)' ba*; **nirjarā*), and the bondage (*'ching ba*; **bandha* or *bandhana*) [49b2–b3 on v. 1ab]
 - 1.1.6. 363 opponents [49b3–5]
 - 1.1.7. Definitions and explanations of four out of the nine principles: the action (*las*; **karman*), the vicious (*sdig pa*; **pāpa*), the virtuous (*bsod nams*; **puṇya*), and the liberation (*thar pa*; **mokṣa*) [49b5–50a2 on v. 1ab]
 - 1.2. Inference that trees are sentient beings [50a2–b3 on v. 2cd]
 - 1.2.1. Logical formulation of that inference [50a2–3 on v. 2cd]
 - 1.2.2. Plants that have sense-faculties [50a3–6]
 - 1.2.3. Mercilessness of those who make gardens, etc. [50a6–b2]
 - 1.3. Negation of the Buddha's omniscience and its 15 types of evidence [50b2–

- 51a1 on v. 3]
2. Buddhists' replies and criticisms [51a1–53a5]
- 2.1. [Criticism against v. 1cd]: A fallacy of contradiction between impermanent modes (*rnam grangs*; **paryāya*) and permanent substance (*rdzas*; **dravya*) [51a1–b2 on v. 4]
- 2.2. Criticism against the shut-off of karmic inflow (*sdom pa*; **saṃvara*) and ascetic practices (*dka' thub*; **tapas*) [51b2–4 on v. 5ab]
- 2.3. The liberation in which karma would disappear is inappropriate for wise persons [51b4–5 on v. 5cd]
- 2.4. Negation of the inference that trees are sentient beings [51b5–52a6 on v. 6ab]
- 2.4.1. The logical reason “dying” is unestablished [51b5–52a1]
- 2.4.2. Other logical reasons are deviant [52a1–5]
- 2.4.3. Impossibility of the liberation in the case when trees are sentient beings [52a5–6]
- 2.5. Reasons and purposes for the Buddha's silence [52a6–b6 on v. 6cd]
- 2.5.1. *ātman* as a basis of entities is unestablished [52a6–b1 on v. 6cd]
- 2.5.2. Buddha's deep teachings are not to be preached to those who have no capacities for understanding them [52b1–2 on v. 6cd]
- 2.5.3. [A reply to 1.3.]: The Buddha's judgement following worldly truth [52b2–6 on v. 6cd]
- 2.6. Summary of the Jaina views and refutation of Buddhist insiders' different opinions [52b6–53a4 on v. 7]
- 2.6.1. Re-explanation of Jaina views [52b6–53a1 on v. 7]
- 2.6.2. A fallacy of contradiction with what is acknowledged by the Jainas themselves [53a1–3]
- 2.6.3. Refutations of Buddhist insiders' different opinions by denying the Jaina views [53a3–4]
- 2.7. Conclusion [v. 8]

3. A list of works quoted or secondarily used in the seventh chapter of the BSGT

3.1. Works explicitly quoted as sources of the BSGT in the part of Jaina views (*pūrvapakṣa*)

Tattvasaṃgraha 311 [= BSGT 49a4]

Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti 104,2–5 (= TS 1746) [= BSGT 49a4f.], 104,6–9 (= TS 1744) [= BSGT 49a5]

*Viśeṣastavaṭikā*³⁾ 51A–B [= BSGT 50b1f.]

Viśeṣastava 51ab [= BSGT 50b2]

3.2. Works explicitly quoted as sources of the BSGT in the part of Buddhist replies (*uttarapakṣa*)

Tattvasamgraha 312 [= BSGT 51a5], 322 [= BSGT 51b1f.]

Pramāṇavārttika 2.221cd [= BSGT 51b3], 2.274ab [= BSGT 51b3f.]

Madhyamakahrdaya 9.145 [= BSGT 52a3], 9.147 [= BSGT 52a3f.], 9.140 [= BSGT 52a4f.], 10.1 [= BSGT 52b4f.], 10.14 (cf. TJ D324a6f; P372b7f.) [= BSGT 52b5f.]

Ratnāvalī 1.73cd–74 [= BSGT 52b1f.]

**Ārya-lokānusamānāvātāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtra* (聖世間隨共入大乘經) P307b1f. [= BSGT 52b4]

3.3. Works secondarily used in the auto-commentary of the BSGT

In what follows, I will enumerate texts that are considered to be used or referred to in the auto-commentary of the seventh chapter of the BSGT, but are not explicitly marked as being “quotations” by the author himself. I classified the texts into two categories: (1) those that are almost identical to the BSGT’s texts, and (2) those that are considered to be secondarily used with redactional changes. Here, I do not make a distinction between the texts in the *pūrvapakṣa*-part and those in the *uttarapakṣa*-part. When we see the texts mentioned above and below, it becomes clear that almost all the passages, except for verses and direct commentaries on them, have their sources in the Buddhist works written in India.

3.3.1. The texts almost identical to the BSGT

Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti-tarkajvālā D90a7–b2; P97a4ff. [= BSGT 49b2f.], D90b2ff.; P97a6ff. [= BSGT 49b5–50a1],⁴⁾ D320b5–321a2; P367b6–368a4 [= BSGT 50b3–51a1]

Pramāṇaviniścaya 3. 92,2 [= BSGT 50a2]

Tattvasamgrahaṭṭhikā 151,6f. [= BSGT 51a3], 151,9f. [= BSGT 51a3f.], 153,24f. [= BSGT 51a6], 153,25f. [= BSGT 51a6–b1]

Prajñāpradīpāṭikā D (wa) 110a7f.; P (wa) 128a5 [= BSGT 53a1f.], D (wa) 110b2; P (wa) 128a7 [= BSGT 53a2]

3.3.2. The texts considered to be secondarily used with redactional changes

Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti-tarkajvālā D90a3f.; P96b6f. [≈ BSGT 49a1], D90a4–7; P96b7–97a4 [≈ BSGT 49a6–b2], D278a5–279a3; P314a8–315b1 [≈ BSGT 49b4f.], D311a4; P354b5f. [≈ BSGT 50a2f.], D311a5–b1; P354b7–355a4 [≈

BSGT 50a3ff.], D311b1–3; P355a4–7 [≈ BSGT 50a5f.], D311b4; P355b1 [≈ BSGT 52a1], D314a2f.; P358b4f. [≈ BSGT 52a2], D311b5; P355b2f. [≈ BSGT 52a2], D312b7; P357a3 [≈ BSGT 52a2], D322b6; P370b5 [≈ BSGT 52b2f.]

Tattvasamgrahapañjikā 150,17–19 [≈ BSGT 49a2f.], 150,23f. [≈ BSGT 51a1f.], 151,5f. [≈ BSGT 51a2], 150,24 [≈ BSGT 51a3]

Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā D (za) 257a1f.; P (za) 305b4f. [≈ BSGT 49b6f.]

Pramāṇaviniścaya 3. 92,26 [≈ BSGT 51b5–52a1]

4. Names for the Jainas

The Jainas are named in various ways in the seventh chapter of the BSGT.

- (1) BSGT 48b6: “One who is free from bindings” (*gcer bu pa*; **nirgrantha*)⁵⁾
- (2) BSGT 48b6: “One who follows the Victor, i.e., the Jina” (*rgyal ba pa*; **jaina*)
- (3) BSGT 50b3: “A naked mendicant” (*gcer bur rgyu ba*; **nagna*)⁶⁾
- (4) BSGT 52a6: “One who does not wear cloth” (*gos med can*; **acelaka*)⁷⁾
- (5) BSGT 52b6: “One whose cloth is directions” (*phyogs kyi gos can pa*)⁸⁾; **digambara*)
- (6) BSGT 53a3: “One who has no shame” (*'dzem med pa*; **ahrika*)⁹⁾

According to the *lCang skya grub mtha'* (hereafter CKGT), the Jainas were also called: “one who extinguishes” (*zad pa ba*), because the Jainas wished to extinguish the vicious (*sdig pa*);¹⁰⁾ “one who follows the Arhat” (*mchod 'os pa*), because they regard the Arhat as their teacher;¹¹⁾ “one who has a life” (*'tsho ba pa*), because they claim that life is *ātman*;¹²⁾ “one who is covered with ashes” (*thal ba pa*), because they do not feel ashamed of being naked;¹³⁾ and “one who wanders” (*kun tu rgyu*), because they ask for alms in every direction.¹⁴⁾

5. Jaina doctrines

As it is evident from the synopsis given above, we can summarize the Jaina views presented in the BSGT roughly into three topics: (1) the nine principles or categories (*padārtha*), (2) proof of trees' sentience, and (3) negation of the Buddha's omniscience.

5.1. Nine principles

Among the three topics, the nine principles are as follows.

They (= the Jainas) maintain that (1) the soul (*srog*; **jīva*), (2) the inflow [of karma] (*zag pa*; **āsrava*), (3) the shut-off [of the karmic inflow] (*sdom pa*; **saṃvara*), (4) the eradication [of remaining karma and its causes] (*ngeṣ par rga'(rga) ba*; **nirjarā*), (5) the bondage [of the soul] (*'ching ba*; **bandha*), (6) the action or karma (*las*; **karman*), (7) the vicious (*sdig pa*; **pāpa*), (8) the virtuous (*bsod nams*; **punya*), and (9) the liberation (*thar pa*; **mokṣa*) are the nine principles (*tshig gi don*; **padārtha*) to be known.¹⁵⁾

While this passage is based on the description in the TJ,¹⁶⁾ we can further trace it back to Jaina literature. The definition of the true principles (*tattva*) in the *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (hereafter TAAS) is as follows.

The true principles are (1) the soul, (2) what does not have the soul, (3) the inflow, (4) bondage, (5) the shut-off, (6) the eradication, and (7) the liberation.¹⁷⁾

When we compare this definition in the TAAS with that of the BSGT and TJ, the latter two texts include *karman*, *pāpa*, and *punya*, which are not seen in the TAAS. On the other hand, the BSGT and TJ do not have *ajīva* which is present in the TAAS. Regarding the number of enumerated items, there was a tradition which accepted two more items, i.e., *pāpa* and *punya*, as principles in addition to the seven seen in TAAS 1.4, according to Jacobi 1906: 293 and Kanakura 1944: 100. While neither scholar indicates any specific sources,¹⁸⁾ this tradition, which counts nine items as principles, can at least be traced back to Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra* (hereafter PAKS).¹⁹⁾ The text runs as follows:

The soul and what does not have the soul are real entities,²⁰⁾ and from these two, the virtuous, the vicious, the inflow, the shut-off, the eradication, and the bondage occur. These are [nine] categories.²¹⁾

This description in the PAKS is similar to those in the TJ and BSGT. In all three texts, the nine items are called "*padārtha*" or "*artha*," but not "*tattva*." However, the TJ and BSGT have "*karman*" as one of the nine principles,²²⁾ whereas the PAKS has "*ajīva*"²³⁾ in its place. What is the reason for this difference? We can assume the following possibilities: (1) the TJ author²⁴⁾ changed one of the nine principles from the original for the sake of understanding the Jaina view simply when he introduced it, (2) the TJ author

referred to a Jaina work that is lost and currently non-existent, (3) the TJ author combined the descriptions from more than one Jaina work. Here, I would like to avoid making a conclusion and just mention these possibilities.

5.2. Description of the liberation

In this section, we focus on the description of the liberation (*mokṣa*), which is the ultimate goal of life to the Jainas. Again, the description of the liberation in the BSGT is principally based on that in the TJ. However, we cannot trace the passage regarding the liberation in the TJ to Jaina works such as the TAAS and the PAKS. If we preempt the conclusion, the description of the liberation in the TJ and BSGT reflects statements in Jaina scriptures. First, we shall take a look at the description in the BSGT.

The liberation (i.e., to liberate) is [for souls to attain a place called] ‘the assembled world (*’jig rten ’dus pa*),’ which stands on the top of the whole world, by eradicating all karma,²⁵⁾ i.e., to attain such a [place] which is a real entity because souls exist [there], and, at the same time, is not a real entity because [souls] are liberated from transmigration,^{26), 27)} as is [stated in a scripture as follows:]

It is stated by the Victor (i.e., Mahāvīra) that the liberation is like [something that has] a color of snow, *tagara* (*rgya spos*; **tagara*) blossom, milk (*ba zho*; **gokṣīra*), frost (*ba mo*; **tuṣāra*), and a pearl (*mu tig*; **hāra*), [and] like [something that has] a shape of an umbrella (*gdugs*; **chatra*)²⁸⁾ which is turned upside down.²⁹⁾

The verse quoted in the end of this citation describes the color and shape of the liberation, and indicates that it is stated by Mahāvīra as well. It is to be noted here that a passage similar to this citation is also found in the *Prajñāpradīpatīkā* (henceforth PrPT). Although the content of the PrPT’s version is a bit more detailed than that of the TJ’s version, because the verse seen in the PrPT³⁰⁾ is translated in 36 syllables (nine syllables per *pāda*), it is assumed that these two versions are the translations of one and the same original.

In Jaina literature, on the other hand, we can find two verses similar in content to the verse in question. The first one is in the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (henceforth ĀN)³¹⁾ ascribed to Bhadrabāhu, which is considered to be the most likely source of quotation.

ĀN v. 961: *nimmaladagarayavaṇṇā tusāragokhīrahārasarivannā* |

uttānāyachattayasamṭhiā ya bhāṇiyā jīṇavarehīm | |³²⁾

It was stated by the supreme Victor that [the perfected world called ‘*sītā*,’ whose previous load is very little,³³⁾] has [a pure white color,] i.e., a color of a pure spray of water, frost, milk, and a pearl, and has a shape of an umbrella that is opened and turned upward.

The second one is in the *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* (henceforth UAS).³⁴⁾

It was stated by the supreme Victor that 12 *yojanas* (about 96–108 miles) above [the place named] *Sarvārtha*[-*siddha*],³⁵⁾ there would be an umbrella-shaped [land] named ‘[a land] whose previous load is very little.’ (36.58)

It was stated by the supreme Victor that the land consists of [something like] platinum, is essentially spotless, and has a shape of [something like] an umbrella that is opened and turned upward. (36.61)

It was [also] stated that [the land] is white, spotless, and clean like a pearl, [a jewel named] *aṅka*, and *kunda* [blossom], which is [also called] ‘*sītā*,’³⁶⁾ [and that] one *yojana* (8–9 miles) [above] that [land], the end of the world (*lokānta*) exists. (36.62)³⁷⁾

There are several differences among the descriptions in the TJ, BSGT, PrPT, ĀN, and UAS. For example, in the TJ, BSGT, and PrPT, the place that a liberated soul would reach is called “the assembled world,” whereas in the ĀN and UAS, the same one is called “[the land] whose previous load is very little.” Although further investigation is necessary regarding the reason for this difference as in the case of the nine principles, we can at least state here that the descriptions in the TJ and BSGT might not only rely on Jaina literature precisely, but also reflect primal thoughts in the Jaina tradition.³⁸⁾ In any case, it is assumed that this verse is one of the statements representative of “Jaina views” to Tibetan Buddhists, because it is frequently quoted in other doxographical works written in Tibetan as well.³⁹⁾

5.3. Proof of the sentience of trees

The second topic is an argument on whether trees are sentient beings. dBu pa blo gsal presents the following logical formulation in his own commentary.

Trees are sentient beings, (1) because they die when their bark is peeled off completely, (2) because they are born in specific seasons (*dus su skye ba*; **rtuja*), (3) because they have sense-faculties, (4) because their wounds can

be cured (*nyams pa gsor rung ba*), just like a human being, etc.⁴⁰⁾

In this formulation, four reasons are adduced. Of these, the first reason “because they die when their bark is peeled off completely” is also adduced in the NB and PVin as an example of “a [reason that] is unestablished on an opponent’s side” (*prativādyasiddha*⁴¹⁾).⁴²⁾ It is clear from Dharmottara’s statement “by the Digambaras”⁴³⁾ that this logical formulation, including this reason, was ascribed to the Jainas.

The logical reasons from (2) to (4), on the other hand, are not seen in treatises on logic and epistemology such as the NB or PVin, but seen in the MH and TJ. The second reason “because they are born in specific seasons” appears in MH 9.144,⁴⁴⁾ the third one “because they have sense-faculties” in the TJ as indicated in the note of the above translation, and the fourth one “because they can be cured” in MH 9.143.⁴⁵⁾,⁴⁶⁾ Then, the question is whether these views can actually be attributed to the Jainas. The TJ author comments on the MH 9.139 as follows.

Another reason for discarding the path of three [Vedas] is stated:

It is right to discard these three [Vedas] after having seen that it is imagined and wrongly established in the three [Vedas] that there is sentience in insentient and immovable beings (= trees).

It is claimed in the three [Vedas] that trees have minds, because they have sense-faculties, like a human being, etc.⁴⁷⁾

As evidenced by the above statement, the view that trees are sentient beings is ascribed to Brahmanism, which follows the three Vedas according to the MH and TJ.⁴⁸⁾ Although this can be understood if we take into account the fact that the ninth chapter of the MH has the purpose of criticizing the Mīmāṃsakas’ views, it turns out that this view was at least not attributed to the Jainas at the time of the MH and TJ. As Kawasaki pointed out,⁴⁹⁾ the prototypical ideas of the logical reasons (2)–(4) are also found in the *Mahābhārata*.⁵⁰⁾

Judging from these points, it becomes clear that the four logical reasons that dBu pa blo gsal refers to are the combination of those taken from the PVin and NB and those taken from the MH and TJ. It is probably due to the influence of Dharmakīrti’s and his commentators’ statements that dBu pa blo gsal attributed this view eventually to the Jainas. However, it is not clear why this view came to be regarded as that of the Jainas after the time of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, although it is ascribed to the followers of the three Vedas or

Mīmāṃsakas in the MH and TJ. If we take into account the fact that Jaina views are introduced in the ninth chapter of the TJ dealing with the Mīmāṃsakas' thoughts, and another fact that the Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas seem to have in common views on the the soul (*ātman* or *jīva*)⁵¹⁾ and modal predication (*syādvāda*)⁵²⁾ as seen in the TS and MAV, it is highly possible that Buddhists thought that both schools shared similar views concerning specific issues.⁵³⁾

Then, do the Jainas actually assert that trees have minds or mental activities? Let us take a look at relative portions in the PAKS.

Souls have sentience as their own natures, and are of two kinds: those which live in the transmigration and those which are liberated. And [souls] have mental activities (*upayoga*)⁵⁴⁾ as their characteristics. Furthermore, [there are] distinctions between those which [have] bodies and those which have no bodies. (v. 109)

Earth, water, fire, wind, and trees are bodies which are connected with souls. Indeed, [respective bodies] give [their souls] the states of complete loss of consciousness and senses of touch. They (= souls) have numerous [possibilities] with regard to them (= their bodies). (v. 110)⁵⁵⁾

According to these statements, trees are treated as equivalent to earth, water, fire, and wind, and they are first classified as “those which live in the transmigration.” Those which transmigrate are further classified into the two kinds, i.e., “those which are unmoving” and “those which are moving.” Thus, earth, water, fire, wind, and trees are classified as “those which are unmoving.”⁵⁶⁾ On the other hand, the statement in PAKS 110 that trees have senses of touch agrees with the description in the BSGT.⁵⁷⁾ In any case, from the accounts in the PAKS, we can confirm that trees are counted as one of souls' bodies that are characterized by sentience or mental activities, and assume that the Jainas indeed claimed that trees are sentient beings.

5.4. Negation of the Buddha's omniscience

The third topic is the negation of the Buddha's omniscience. The opponents denounce the Buddha's omniscience by pointing out the Buddha's ignorance, for example, the fact that Buddha kept silent with regard to 14 metaphysical questions from his disciple, and that he did not know the beginning of the transmigration, etc. This argument seen in BSGT 7.3 and its auto-commentary (50b3–51a1) is in line with the descriptions in the tenth chapter of the MH and TJ (“the instruction on the proof of the omniscience”),

and dBu pa blo gsal in fact incorporate the texts of the TJ⁵⁸⁾ with almost no textual alteration. As there is a study on the tenth chapter of the MH and TJ and the refutation of the Buddha's omniscience by Shinjō Kawasaki,⁵⁹⁾ we will not go into the details, but just check the contents of the text in question.

The 15 specific pieces of evidence that point out the Buddha's ignorance are mentioned as views of "naked mendicants" (*gcer bur rgyu ba*; **nagna*) in the BSGT and TJ as follows.

- (1) The Buddha refused to answer 14 metaphysical questions.
- (2) The Buddha did not know the very beginning of the transmigration.
- (3) The Buddha did not know that Sundarī (*Shin tu mdzes*; **Sundarī*) was killed.
- (4) The Buddha was blamed by a daughter of Brahman, Ciñcā (*mDzes ma*; **ciñcā*).
- (5) The Buddha did not predict the decline of Pātaliputra city.
- (6) The Buddha had eaten barley for three months.
- (7) The Buddha returned home from begging with his washed alms bowl empty.
- (8) A stone wheel was thrown [at the Buddha by Devadatta].
- (9) The Buddha approached a mad elephant Dhanapāla (*nor skyong*) [and asked for alms].
- (10) The Buddha let Devadatta become a mendicant.
- (11) The Buddha made Sunakṣatra (*rgyu skar bzang po*) a venerable person.
- (12) The Buddha did not know that Uddaka [Rāma putta], Ālāra [Kālāma], and five mendicants became venerable.
- (13) The Buddha preached [wrong teachings in] "a sutra like a lump of trees" (木積喻經).⁶⁰⁾
- (14) The Buddha received a fruit of his past action, thereby getting his foot pierced with a thorn in a forest of *khadira* trees.
- (15) The Buddha denounced other omniscient persons.⁶¹⁾

While the TJ author ascribes the criticism of the Buddha's omniscience represented by these 15 pieces of evidence to the Jainas as mentioned above, he adduces one sutra, *rGyas par thabs la mkhas pa'i mdo*⁶²⁾ (大方廣善巧方便經),⁶³⁾ as a direct source in another place of the TJ.⁶⁴⁾ As Kawasaki pointed out, it is not necessary to restrict the advocate of this kind of criticism only to the Jaina; rather, similar arguments were frequently repeated among Buddhist insiders.⁶⁵⁾ In fact, the criticism of the Buddha's omniscience, including 15 pieces of evidence for his ignorance, is not found in Jaina works as far as I can see.⁶⁶⁾

6. Buddhists' replies

The Jaina chapter of the BSGT not only includes the introduction of the Jaina views, but also the Buddhists' criticism against them. In what follows, we observe the replies from the Buddhists.

6.1. Criticism of substance (*dravya*) and modification (*ḥaryāya*)

It is maintained in BSGT 7.1cd and its auto-commentary, which are textually almost identical to Tibetan translations of TS 311 and TSP 150,17–19, that the soul (*jīva*), one of the nine principles, has two natures, i.e., being an impermanent mode (*rnam grangs mi rtag pa*) and being permanent substance (*rdzas rtag pa*).⁶⁷⁾ In BSGT 7.4, where the Buddhists reply to this Jaina objection, the fallacy that those two contradictory natures are simultaneously present in one and the same thing is pointed out. When you presuppose that what has consciousness, i.e., a soul, is connected to a mode such as a pleasant or unpleasant state, the soul's permanence would be lost, because it is supposed to discard the nature of a previous state. When you presuppose that a soul is permanent, on the other hand, it would remain unchanged, i.e., it would not have modes, because the soul is not supposed to discard the nature of a previous state. To be more precise, it ensues that a soul cannot have the natures of "being an impermanent mode" and "being permanent substance" simultaneously.⁶⁸⁾ It is to be noted here that the content of this portion is parallel to that in TSP 150,23–151,8 (on TS 312), and that, after this portion, TS 312 is quoted in the BSGT as its source. It is also denied that the two natures of an entity, i.e., being an impermanent mode and being permanent substance, are simultaneously established by direct perception, for the following reason: "When an [essential] body (*lus; śarīra*) [of something], which is different from its modes, is manifesting itself in [certain] cognition acknowledged as direct perception, [that body] cannot be observed as substance [itself], which is[, according to the Jainas,] followed [by more than one mode] but has one and the same nature."⁶⁹⁾

6.2. Criticism of *saṃvara* and *mokṣa*

Next, we observe how the Buddhists criticize the shut-off (*saṃvara*) and the liberation (*mokṣa*), two of the nine principles maintained by the Jainas. dBu pa blo gsal, quoting PV 2.221cd and 2.274ab, points out that the shut-off and suffering of ascetic practice are useless. Here, we take a look at the relevant part of the PV, including the verses quoted in the BSGT.

[Objection:] [Even though there is no defect in *ātman* itself, as it can be the case that] the attachment [to *ātman*] has a defect, [the attachment is to be renounced.] [Reply:] How can one renounce it (= the attachment) in that case? As long as the object (= *ātman*)⁷⁰⁾ of the [affection] is not refuted, one cannot renounce it (= attachment).⁷¹⁾

Neither can one abandon [his/her former] karma, nor can one abandon his/her body, because an opposing [supportive] measure (*vipakṣa*) [against his/her karma and body] is not possible,⁷²⁾ because [such a measure would] have no capacity [even if it were present], and because [his/her karma and body would] be regenerated as long as a thirst (*trṣṇā*) persists. And, [even] when one makes efforts to eliminate both [his/her karma and body], [particularly] the toil to eliminate karma is useless.⁷³⁾

Based on this view of Dharmakīrti, dBu pa blo gsal advocates that to shut off the inflow of karma for the purpose of not collecting new karma and to conduct ascetic practices such as fasting for the purpose of eliminating previous karma cannot be a supportive measure countering causes of mental defilements, and that the shut-off of karma and ascetic practices are of no use because mental defilements as effects are not removed as long as their causes are not eliminated.⁷⁴⁾ Moreover, dBu pa blo gsal criticizes the liberation, i.e., one of the nine principles of the Jainas, by pointing out that the liberation, where all karma are eliminated according to the Jainas, is not appropriate,⁷⁵⁾ because, as long as mental defilements do not disappear, what remains of them gathers further karma.

6.3. Buddhist criticism against the proof that trees are sentient beings

In BSGT 7.6ab and the commentary on it (BSGT 51b5–52a6), dBu pa blo gsal points out fallacies of the inference presented in the objection from the Jainas: “Trees are sentient beings, (1) because they die when their bark is peeled off completely, (2) because they are born in specific seasons, (3) because they have sense-faculties, (4) because they can be cured, just like a human beings, etc.” The first logical reason, i.e., “dying,” is criticized on the basis of the argument in the PVin. As long as “dying” is characterized by disappearances of cognition, sense-faculties, and life, it is not established in the subject to be proved, namely trees. Even though the logical reason “dying” is accepted to be established as the function of words, it is according to a speaker’s intention that words function. In addition, generally speaking, a real entity cannot be established by force of words. Furthermore, even if the

expression of the logical reason is changed from “dying” to “withering,” it is not right, because the logical reason’s connection with what is to be proved, namely sentience, is not to be proved. Therefore, the logical reason “dying” is not established in trees.⁷⁶⁾

Then, the fallacies of the logical reasons (2) to (4) are pointed out. dBu pa blo gsal considers those reasons to be deviant⁷⁷⁾ by adducing the exception “saliva (*bad kan*; **śleṣman*) and others are generated at specific times even though they are not sentient beings,⁷⁸⁾ with regard to reason (2); the exception “pictures (*ri mo*) and others can also be cured, viz. recovered, even though they are not sentient beings⁷⁹⁾ with regard to reason (4); and the exceptions “(a) a magnet draws iron even without eyes, (b) jewel and others appear when it thunders even though they have no ears, (c) poison grows bigger due to blood and its smell even though it has no nose or tongue, and hairs coil up when they touch fire even though they have no sense of touch⁸⁰⁾ with regard to reason (3).

6.4. The reason for the Buddha’s silence

In BSGT 7.3, the Buddha’s omniscience is criticized on the ground of 15 concrete instances of the Buddha’s ignorance. Against this objection, dBu pa blo gsal states the reason why the Buddha kept silent in BSGT 7.6cd. He asserts that the Buddha kept silent on particular topics, because he thought that it was not appropriate to preach various deep teachings to someone who does not have a capacity to understand them.⁸¹⁾ This is based on the following statement in the *Ratnāvalī* (hereafter RĀ):

The Victor (*jina*) kept silent when he was asked whether the world has an end. The wise know that a person who knows all is an omniscient being, because [the Victor] did not preach the depth of his teaching to a person who is not a [proper] vessel [for understanding it].⁸²⁾

dBu pa blo gsal also maintains that the reasons for Buddha’s deeds and words in 15 pieces of evidence are pointed out by opponents. The Buddha dared to follow values of the mundane world, and behave in that manner only for others.⁸³⁾ The passage from the *Ārya-lokānusamānāvātāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtra* is quoted as a source of this assertion in the commentary on BSGT 7.6cd.

[The Buddha] instructs the stream of karma, even though he has completely eliminated all the vices and transcended (*mngon ’phags*) [the mundane world] through all the [accumulated] virtues. This is to follow

and enter the [mundane] world.⁸⁴⁾

Moreover, dBu pa blo gsal concludes his reply to the Jaina objection against the Buddha's omniscience by using the very same logic of criticism that the Jainas used on the basis of the quotation of MH 10.1:

While the Jainas claim with regard to the Sage (= the Buddha) that he is not an omniscient being because he does not instruct everything, [the fact that] Rṣabha and others are [omniscient beings] cannot be ascertained [by the Jainas either], because [Rṣabha and others also] stated that [certain matters] cannot be expressed.⁸⁵⁾

7. Comparison with other doxographical works in Tibet

Among Tibetan literature that is not included in the so-called Tibetan Tripiṭaka, there are a number of doxographical works (*grub mtha'*). We come across such works that include not only Buddhist doctrines, but also doctrines of other religions or traditions and criticisms against them. The works that contain views of other religions and schools are enumerated in Mimaki and Akamatsu 1985. Here, we focus on the Jaina chapter of the CKGT, which is relatively well-known as one of the doxographical works in Tibet.

The official title of this work is *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*.⁸⁶⁾ The author of this work is lCang skya II Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–1786), who belonged to the dGe lugs pa school. Here, I present a synopsis of the Jaina chapter of the CKGT with the aim of building a foothold for a study of Jaina views introduced in doxographical works, and overview the contents of this chapter.

A synopsis of the Jaina chapter of the CKGT

1. The Jainas' doctrines (*'dod pa brjod pa*) [41,20]

- 1.1. Teacher (*ston pa*) [41,21]
- 1.2. Synonyms of names for the Jainas (*ming gi rnam grangs*) [41,22]
- 1.3. Scripture (*lung*) [42,3]
- 1.4. Contents of the Jaina assertions (*'dod tshul*) [42,4]
 - 1.4.1. The nine principles (*tshig gi don dgu*) [42,4]
 - 1.4.2. Substance and mode (*rdzas dang rnam grangs*) [42,8]
 - 1.4.2.1. Characteristics of substance and mode [42,8]
 - 1.4.2.2. The soul (*srog*) [42,15]
 - 1.4.2.3. Time (*dus*) [42,18]

- 1.4.2.4. The six kinds of substance (*rdzas ni drug te*) [42,19]
- 1.4.3. Definitions of each of the nine principles and their subclasses [42,20]
 - 1.4.3.1. The nine subclasses of what has the soul (*srog can gyi sde ni dgu ste*) [42, 20]
 - 1.4.3.2. The inflow (*zag pa*) [43,3]
 - 1.4.3.3. The shut-off (*sdom pa*) [43,4]
 - 1.4.3.4. The eradication (*nges par rga ba*) [43,5]
 - 1.4.3.5. The bondage (*'ching ba*) [43,7]
 - 1.4.3.6. The action (*las*) [43,7]
 - 1.4.3.7. The vice (*sdig pa*) [43,8]
 - 1.4.3.8. The virtue (*bsod nams*) [43,8]
 - 1.4.3.9. The liberation (*thar pa*) [43,8]
- 1.4.4. Cause and effect of entities (*dnegos po rnams kyi rgyu 'bras*) [43,16]
- 1.4.5. Logical formulations presented by the Jainas (*'dod pa rnams sgrub byed kyi rigs pa*) [43,18]
 - 1.4.5.1. Formulation (1): “Trees are sentient beings.” [43,18]
 - 1.4.5.2. Formulation (2): “The Buddha is not an omniscient.” [43,22]
- 2. Criticism of Jaina doctrines (*de dgag pa*)** [44,2]
 - 2.1. Negation of the claim that an entity’s essential nature is one and the same (*rang bzhin gcig pa nyid nyams*) [44,2–7]
 - 2.2. Negation of the claim that an entity’s characteristics are different (*mtshan nyid tha dad pa nyams*) [44,12–19]
 - 2.3. Negation of the logical formulation: “Trees are sentient beings.” [44,20]
 - 2.4. Criticism of the logical formulation: “The Buddha is not an omniscient being.” [45,2]
- 3. Summary of the contents (*de dag gi don bsdu ba*)** [45,12]

The structure and contents of the Jaina chapter of the CKGT, as a whole, follows that of the *Grub mtha' chen mo* (henceforth GTCM)⁸⁷⁾ written by 'Jam dbyang bzhad pa (1648–1722) who also belonged to the the dGe lugs pa school. Like the Jaina chapter of the GTCM,⁸⁸⁾ that of the CKGT contains the three main subjects (the nine principles, proof of trees’ sentience, and negation of the Buddha’s omniscience) and some doctrines regarding substance and modes, which are also seen in the BSGT. To give an example of differences between the BSGT and CKGT, the BSGT develops an argument over whether trees are sentient beings or not by combining the two contexts: statements in the MH and TJ and those in the PVin, whereas the CKGT only adopts the contexts of the MH and TJ, but not the PVin.⁸⁹⁾ We can also say that texts of the CKGT are sometimes more faithful to the original sources (extant Tibetan

translations of works written in India) than those of the BSGT.⁹⁰⁾

8. Conclusion

The findings from the above considerations can be summarized as follows. It is likely that dBu pa blo gsal used as prime sources Jaina views recorded in the Tibetan translations of the texts, which were originally written in Sanskrit, such as the MH, TJ, TS, TSP, and MAV. He explicitly quoted many passages from those works. In addition, he frequently used or referred to the passages of the TJ in particular in his auto-commentary. While the Jaina chapter of the BSGT is divided into two parts, i.e., the introduction of Jaina doctrines and the Buddhist replies to them, the first half consists of the three main subjects: the nine principles to be known, the proof of tree's sentience, and the negation of the Buddha's omniscience.

Although those listed items as the nine principles are almost identical to those seen in Jaina literature, there are some differences in details. As a result of comparison with the descriptions in the TAAS and PAKS, it can be stated that the BSGT and TJ texts are closer to the PAKS in terms of the number and contents of items, although the descriptions in the BSGT and TJ do not completely accord with those in these two Jaina works. Regarding the nine principles, the description of the liberation in the TJ and BSGT is not found in the Jaina treatises such as the TAAS and PAKS, whereas a similar description is found in the Jaina scriptures such as the ĀN and UAS. This fact suggests the possibility that the TJ author directly or indirectly referred to the Jaina works which were written in the age of the scripture.

dBu pa blo gsal adduces four logical reasons when he introduces the proof of trees' sentience. When he re-formulates the proof ascribed to the Jainas, he seems to base himself on the statements in the MH and TJ with regard to three of the four logical reasons, and on the statements in the PVin or NB with regard to one logical reason. This shows that he probably collected pieces of information from the two different contexts, and put them together in one context. Regarding the negation of the Buddha's omniscience, it is assumed that the MH and TJ are main information sources. The 15 pieces of evidence that prove the Buddha's ignorance had been the subject of discussion for a long time not only in Jainism, but also in Buddhism.

In response to the Jainas' assertions with regard to the shut-off of the karmic inflow and the realization of the liberation, dBu pa blo gsal applied the ideas presented in PV 2.221 and 273–274ab to his discussion and rejected their assertions. He states that the shut-off and ascetic practices are useless,

because they cannot be opposing measures against causes of mental defilements. Therefore, it follows that the liberation, which is said to be attained by those ways, is not right either. Regarding the silence of the Buddha, dBu pa blo gsal gives a reply on the basis of RĀ 1.73cd–74. The Buddha remained silent on particular topics, because he thought that it was not appropriate to preach his deep teachings to someone who does not have the capacity to understand them. Even though he actually preached something about them, it was because he followed the values of the mundane world, and he did the same for others.

As a result of comparison between the Jaina chapter of the BSGT and that of CKGT, we can confirm that the CKGT also contains the arguments on the three main topics seen in the BSGT. The texts of the CKGT, inheriting the structure of the Jaina chapter in the GTCM, have a more simplified way of writing in terms of quantity and content, compared with the BSGT.

Notes

- * This paper is a fully revised version of my previous article in Japanese (Shiga 2006) based on new insights and findings; this study is in part supported by JSPS KAKENHI 19K00070 and 20H01401.
- 1) For the structure, style, and characteristics of the BSGT in whole, see Mimaki 1978, 1982a, and 1982b. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Emeritus Tshul khriims sKal bzang at Otani University, who gave me valuable comments and suggestions at the time of text editing and reading of the Jaina chapter of the BSGT. Any errors that remain in this paper are my own.
 - 2) For the author of the BSGT, dBu pa blo gsal, see Mimaki 1982b: 12–15.
 - 3) Schneider 1993, 218, 25–32.
 - 4) However, the passage: *srog yod pas dños po dañ 'khor ba las grol bas dños po med pa* (BSGT 49b6–50a1) is not seen in the TJ.
 - 5) *Mahāvīyūtpatti* 3550: *nirgrantho jñātīputra; gcer bu pa gnyen gyi bu*.
 - 6) See MH 9.17d.
 - 7) Cf. *Mahāvīyūtpatti* 3528: *acelaka; gos med pa*.
 - 8) Cf. CKGT 41,23: *nam mkha'i gos can*.
 - 9) See *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (ed. R. Gnoli) 89,22, 89,24, and 90,16.
 - 10) CKGT 41,23f.: *dka' thub kyis sdig pa zad par 'dod pas zad pa ba dang* | Cf. GTCM 219,17f.: *gang dag rang gi skra nyid bzhin du zad par phyis pas thar bar 'dod pa ni zad byed pa ste* |
 - 11) CKGT 42,1f.: *mchod 'os ston par 'dzin pas mchod 'os pa* |
 - 12) CKGT 42,2: *srog bdag tu smra bas 'tsho ba pa* |
 - 13) CKGT 42,2f.: *gcer bu la ngo tshar mi 'dzin pas 'dzem med pa dang thal ba pa* |
 - 14) CKGT 42,3: *phyogs su sdom bu byed pas kun du rgyu zhes grags so* ||
 - 15) BSGT 49a1: *de dag gis srog dang* | *zag pa dang* | *sdom pa dang* | *nges par rga*[TJ], CKGT;

- dga' BSGT 49b2] ba dang | 'ching ba dang | las dang | sdig pa dang | bsod nams dang | thar pa ste shes bya'i tshig gi don dgur smra'o ||*
- 16) TJ D90a3f.; P96b6f.: *gcer bu pa[ba P] dag gis yongs su btags pa'i tshig[tshigs P] gi don dgu ste | srog dang | zag pa dang | sdom pa dang | nges par rga ba dang | 'ching ba dang | las dang | [om. P] sdig pa dang | bsod nams dang | thar pa zhes bya ba dag go ||*
- 17) TAAS 1.4: *jīvājīvāsraṅbandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam.*
- 18) The view that “the virtuous” and “vicious” are to be included in the principles is introduced as follows by Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka, both of whom are commentators of the TAAS.
SAS 11,8–11: *iha puṇyapāpagrahaṇam kartavyam, nava padārthā ity anyair apy uktatvāt. na kartavyam, āsrave bandhe cāntarbhāvāt.* “[Objection:] ‘The virtuous’ and ‘the vicious’ should be mentioned here, because others stated that [the number of] principles is nine. [Answer:] These [two items] should not be mentioned, because they are [rather] included in [the contents of] the inflow and bondage.”
Cf. RV 27,30ff.: *puṇyapāpāpadārthopasaṃkhyānam iti cet, na, āsrave bandhe vāntarbhāvāt. syād etat: puṇyapāpāpadārthayor upasaṃkhyānam kartavyam anyair apy uktatvād iti. tan na, kiṃ kāraṇam, āsrave bandhe vāntarbhāvāt, yata āsravo bandhaś ca puṇyapāpātmakeḥ.*
- 19) Although his date has not been ascertained, it is assumed that he preceded at least Umāsvāti and Siddhasena. (See Fujinaga 2001: 15–21.) Chakravarti 1975: xxi, on the other hand, assumes that Kundakunda was active around the first century AD.
- 20) TP 181,21f.: *imau hi jīvājīvau pṛthagbhūtāstitvanirvṛttatvena bhinnasvabhāvabhūtau mūlapadārthau.*
- 21) PAKS 108: *jīvājīvā bhāvā puṇṇam pāvaṃ ca āsavaṃ tesim | saṃvaraṇijjarabandho mokkho ya havanti te atthā || (chāyā: jīvājīvau bhāvau puṇyaṃ pāpaṃ cāsravas tayoh | saṃvaranirjarabandhā mokṣaś ca bhavanti te arthāḥ ||)*
See also Chakravarti 1975: 108f. Cf. TP 181,18f.: *jīvaḥ, ajīvaḥ, puṇyam, pāpam, āsravaḥ, saṃvaraḥ, nirjarā, bandhaḥ, mokṣa iti navapadārthānām nāmāni.* “The soul, what does not have the soul, the virtuous, the vicious, the inflow, the shut-off, the eradication, the bondage, and the liberation are the names of the nine principles.”
- 22) “*karman*” is defined in the BSGT as follows. BSGT 49b5f.: *las ni bzhi ste phis myong bar 'gyur ba dang | ming dang | rus dang | tshe zhes bya ba dag go || (= TJ D90b2f.; P97a6)*
“Karma is of four kinds: that which is to be perceived (*vedanīya*), name (*nāman*), lineage (*gotra*), life-span (*āyuska*).”
In the TAAS, the following eight principles including the above-mentioned four are enumerated. TAAS8.5: *ādyañjñānadarśanāvaraṇavedanīyamohanīyāyuskanāmagotrāntarāyāḥ.* “The first one (= the natures of karma) is (1) [karma which obstructs] knowledge, (2) [karma] which obstructs cognition, (3) [karma] which is perceived, (4) [karma] which confuses [oneself], (5) life-span, (6) name, (7) lineage, (8) [karma] which obstructs [oneself].”
- 23) In the PAKS, the five, i.e., the space (*ākāśa*), the time (*kāla*), the matter (*puḍgala*), the medium of motion (*dharma*), and the medium of rest (*adharmā*) are enumerated as what does not have the soul (*ajīva*).
PAKS 124: *āgāsakālapuḅgaladharmādharmesu ṇatthi jīvaguṇā | tesim acedaṇattam bhaṇidaṃ jīvassa cedaṇadā || (chāyā: ākāsakālapuḅgaladharmādharmeṣu na santi jīvaguṇāḥ |*

teṣām acetanatvaṃ bhaṇitāṃ jīvasya cetanātā ||

- 24) As there are many unsolved issues regarding the date and authorship of the TJ, I provisionally refer to the author in this way. For these issues, see Ejima 1980: 3–38 and 2003: 509–520.
- 25) Cf. TAAS 10.2–3: *bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyām. kṛtsnakarmakṣayo[*vī*pramokṣo SAS, RV] mokṣaḥ*. “The liberation is that all karma is eliminated (or [the soul’s] deliverance from all karma, according to SAS and RV) on the basis of the absence of causes of the bondage and the eradication.”
- 26) Cf. TAAS 10.5: *tadanantaram ūrdhvaṃ gacchaty ā lokāntāt*. “[One who is liberated] flies upward immediately after [the liberation], and attains the end of the world.”
- 27) There is no equivalent with this portion in the TJ. It seems that dBu pa blo gsal partially incorporated the description in the PrPṬ. PrPṬ D (za) 257a2; P (za) 305b4f.: *de la srog gi tshig gi don nges par gnas pa’i phyir dngos po yang yin la ’khor ba’i sdug bsngal rgyun chad pas[bas D] dngos po[dngos po thams cad P] med pa yang yin te* | “While [that world] is a real entity because the principle ‘the soul’ certainly stays there, it is not a real entity because the stream of suffering of transmigration is cut off.” Cf. PAKS 37.
- 28) I would prefer the reading *gdugs* here. (Cf. BSGT 51b4f.: *las thams cad zad pa’i thar pa gdugs kyi dbyibs lta bu ni* ...)
- 29) BSGT 49b6–50a2: *thar pa ni las[chos TJ(P)] thams cad zad pas ’jig rten thams cad kyi steng na ’dug pa’i gnas ’jig rten ’dus pa zhes bya ba[bar TJ] na srog yod pas dngos po dang ’khor ba las grol bas dngos po med pa der ’gro ba ste* |
ji skad du |
kha ba rgya spos me tog mdog | | *ba zho ba mo mu tig mdog* | |
gdugs[gdugs TJ; gzugs BSGT] bkan[dkar TJ] bzung ba’i dbyibs ’dra ba | |
thar pa yin par rgyal bas bkad | |
ces ’byung ba yin no | |
 The corresponding part in the TJ (TJ D90b3f.; P97a7f.) is translated into Japanese in Nozawa 1972: 103 with n. 20–25 and Iida 1980: 230 with n. 90. Cf. PrPṬ D (za) 257a1–5; P (za) 305b4–306a1.
- 30) Cf. PrPṬ D (za) 257a2f.; P (za) 305b5f.:
rgyal bas gsungs pa’i thar pa ’tsho byed pa | | *rgya spos dri ma med pa’i mdog dang ni* | |
’o ma mu tig ba mo’i mdog ’dra zhing | | *dbyibs ni gdugs zlum bkan pa lta bu yin* | |
 “The liberation taught by the Jina is like [something that has] a pure [white] color of moon and *tagara* blossom, and a [white] color of milk, a pearl, and frost, and [the liberation’s] shape is like [that of] an umbrella which is round and turned upside down.”
- 31) I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tomoyuki Uno at Chikushi Jogakuen University, who kindly provided me the material related to the ĀN.
- 32) *chāyā: nirmaladakarajovarnā tuṣāragokṣīrahārasadrgvarṇā* |
uttānakachatrakasamsthitā tu bhaṇitā jinavaraiḥ | |
 Cf. *Vīṣeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (ed. D. Malvania) 3801.
- 33) See ĀN v. 960: *īṣīpabbhārāe sīāe joaṇaṃmi logaṃto* |
bārasahiṃ joaṇehiṃ siddhī savvaṭṭhasiddhāo | |
- 34) Special thanks are due to Ms. Ayako Yagi for giving me the information on the relevant passage in the UAS.
- 35) The word *sarvārthasiddha* is also seen in TAAS 4.20, 38. It seems to be a place that is

- located at the top of the worlds where deities live. See also Jacobi 1906: 321, 324.
- 36) The original meaning of *sītā* is “a ridge, a cultivated land, a ridged land.”
- 37) UAS 36.58: *bārasahiṃ joyanehiṃ savvaṭṭhassuvarīṃ bhavē |*
īsīpabbhāranāmā puḍhavi chattasamṭhiyā | |
 UAS 36.61–62: *ajjunasuvanagamāī sā puḍhavi nimmalā sahāveṇa |*
uttānagachattagasamṭhiyā ya bhaniyā jinavarehiṃ | |
saṃkhamkukundasamkāsā paṇḍarā nimmalā suhā |
sīyāe joyane tatto loyanto u viyāhio | |
 See also Jacobi 1895: 211f.
- 38) At this point, I refrain from concluding that the TJ author quoted this verse directly from the ĀN. I would like to leave this issue (including the relationship between Jaina literature and the TJ, the TJ’s authorship, and the TJ author’s date) for future examination.
- 39) For example, GTCM 228,18ff., CKGT 43,15f., and GTRCP 74,7–10.
- 40) BSGT 50a2f.: *shing rnamṣ ni sems pa can yin te shun pa thams cad bshus na ’chi ba’i phyir dang |*
dus su skye ba’i phyir dang | dbang po dang ldan pa’i phyir dang | nyams pa gsor rung ba’i
phyir mi la sogs pa bzhin no ...
 PVin 3. 92,2: *cetanās taravaḥ sarvatvagapaharaṇe maraṇād iti ...* (Tib.) D215b4; P313a8:
shing rnamṣ ni sems pa can yin te | shun pa thams cad bshus na[nas P] ’chi ba’i phyir ro | |
 Cf. NB 3.59: *cetanās tarava iti sādhye sarvatvagapaharaṇe maraṇam ...* and NBT 92,7: *yathā*
cetanās taravaḥ svāpād iti ...
 Cf. TJ D311a4; P354b5f.: *ljon shing rnamṣ ni sems dang bcas pa yin te | dbang po yod pa’i*
phyir mi la sogs pa bzhin no[no | | P] zhes bya ba ni gsum po de las ’dod pa yin no | |
- 41) NB 3.59: *prativādyasiddham*; PVin 3. 92,2: *prativādyanabhhyupagataḥ*.
- 42) See also Schmithausen 1991: 85f.
- 43) NBT 190,11: *tasyā apaharaṇe sati maraṇam digambarair upanyastam prativādino*
bauddhasyāsiddham.
- 44) *samānaprasavād vṛddher dohadāc ca sacittakāḥ |*
rtujatvāt tathā svāpāc cāpiṣṭās turagādivat | |*
 * *rtujatvāt tathā svāpāc cāpiṣṭās* Schmithausen 1991: 86, n. 490; *rtujanāt tathā svāpān*
nāpiṣṭās Kawasaki 1992: 462, Lindtner 2001a: 108, and 2001b: 48.
 (Tib.) *mithun pa las skyes ’phel ’gyur dang | | sdang sems dus ldan skye ba’i phyir | |*
de bzhin gnyid log smyo ba’i phyir | | sems yod rta sogs bzhin du ’dod | | (See also Kawasaki
 1992: 462.)
- 45) *cikitsyatvān na taravo yuyante hi sacittakāḥ |*
vinastasyāpi madyādeḥ pratyāpattēs ca saṃśayah | |
 (Tib.) *gso ba yod pas shing rnamṣ ni | | sems dang bcas par mi ’grub ste | |*
chang la sogs pa nyams pa dag | | ldog pa yod par the tshom ’gyur | | (See also Kawasaki 1992:
 462.)
 The expression “because they can be cured” (*cikitsyatvāt; gso ba yod pas*) in the MH is slightly different from that in the BSGT (“because their wounds can be cured” [*nyams pa gsor rung ba’i phyir*]).
- 46) See also Schmithausen 1991: 86–91.
- 47) TJ D311a3f.; P354b4ff.: *lam gsum po[om. P] de spangs pa’i rgyu gzhan yang smras pa |*
sems med pa yi brtan pa la’ang | | sems ni yod par rtogs byed pa’i | | (= MH 9.139)
nyes bstan gsum la[las TJ(P)] mthong bas na | | gsum po ’di ni spang ba’i rigs | |

- (Skt. of MH 9.139: *acetaneṣu cāitanyaṃ sthāvaṣu prakalpitam | dṛṣṭvā* durvīhitam trayyām** yuktam yat tyajyate trayī | |*
 * *dṛṣṭvā* Lindtner 2001a: 107 and 2001b: 47; *dṛṣṭyā* Kawasaki 1992: 461 ** *trayyām* Lindtner 2001a: 107 and 2001b: 47; *trayyā* Kawasaki 1992: 461.)
zhes bya ba ste | ljon shing rnamṣ ni sems dang bcas pa yin te | dbang po yod pa'i phyir mi la sogs pa bzhin no[no | | P] zhes bya ba ni gsum po de las 'dod pa yin no | |
 See also Kawasaki 1992: 223, 461, Schmithausen 1991: n. 468, and Lindtner 2001b: 47.
- 48) See also Schmithausen 1991: 83f.
- 49) See Kawasaki 1992: 233, n. 11, 17.
- 50) For the logical reason (2), “being born in specific seasons,” see *Mahābhārata* (ed. Vishnu S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar) 12.174.12; for the logical reason (3), “having sense-faculties,” see *Mahābhārata* 12.177.10–18 (see also Findly 2002: 255); for the logical reason (4), “being cured,” see *Mahābhārata* 12.177.15.
- 51) TS 311: *jaiminīyā iva prāhur jainās cillakṣaṇaṃ naram | dravyaparyāyarūpeṇa vyāvṛtṭyanugamātmakam | |*
 (Tib.) *rgyal dpog pa bzhin rgyal ba pa | | rdzas dang rnam grangs ngo bo yis | |*
ldog dang rjes 'jug bdag nyid can | | skyes bu shes pa'i mtshan nyid smra | |
 “As is the case with the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas state that an individual (i.e., the soul), which has the exclusion and concomitance as its natures in terms of having the [two] aspects of being substance and modes, is characterized by [having] consciousness.” (This verse is also quoted in BSGT 49a4.)
- 52) MAV 104,2–5 (≈ BSGT 49a4f):
du ma'i ngo bo dngos po la[las BSGT] | | brjod par 'dod pa ngo bor 'dod | |
cig[gcig BSGT] cha'am[car BSGT] rims gyis[rims kyi BSGT] tshul gnyis las | | tshig gi bya ba gzhan med do | |
 = TS 1746: *vastuno 'nekarūpasya rūpam iṣṭam vivakṣayā | yugapatkramavṛttibhyāṃ nānyo 'sti vacasāṃ vidhīḥ | |*
 (Tib.) D64a1f.; P77b1: *dngos po du ma'i ngo bo la | | brjod par 'dod pa ngo bor 'dod | |*
rim dang cig car 'jug pa yis | | tshig rnamṣ rnam pa gzhan yod min | |
 “One nature of an entity having more than one nature is wished [and established] according to [a cognizer’s] intention [either at the same time or at different times]. There is no way of expressing [those natures] other than [the ways of expressing them] at the same time and at different times.”
 MAV 104,6–9 (≈ BSGT 49a5):
dper na khra bo'i kha dog las[la BSGT] | | ji ltar 'dod bzhin kha dog 'dzin | |
de bzhin dngos la sna tshogs phyir | | tha dad tha dad min par rtog[nges 'dzin BSGT] | |
 = TS 1744: *yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanīgrahaḥ[J; rūpanīgrahaḥ S] | citratvād vastuno 'py evaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇā[J; avadhāraṇe S] | |* (≈ ŚV [ākṛti] 57cd–58ab)
 (Tib.) D63b7–64a1; P77a7f.: *ji bzhin kha dog khra bo la | | ji ltar 'dod pa'i kha dog 'dzin | |*
sna tshogs nyid phyir dngos de bzhin | | tha dad tha mi dad par nges | |
 “Just as one color of something having a variety of colors is seized [by a person] arbitrarily, difference and non-difference [of an entity] is determined in the same way (arbitrarily), because [such] an entity also has manifold [natures].”
- 53) See also Shiga 2017 and 2019: 30–41.
- 54) TP 182,10: *cetanāpariṇāmalakṣaṇenopayogena lakṣaṇīyāḥ.*

- 55) PAKS 109f.: *jīvā saṃsāratthā nīrvādā cedanappagā duvihā | uvaogalakakhaṇā vi ya dehādehappavicārā | |* (v. 109)
(chāyā: jīvāḥ saṃsārasthā nirvyttās cetanātmakā dvividhāḥ | upayogalakakṣaṇā api ca dehādehappavicārāḥ[em. -pravīcārāḥ Text] | |) Cf. UAS 36.69.
puḍhavi ya udagamaganī vāvanapphadijīvasamsidā kāyā | demti khalu mohabahulaṃ phāsaṃ bahugā vi te teṃsi | | (v. 110)
(chāyā: pṛthivī codakam agnir vāyur vanaspatih jīvasaṃsritāḥ kāyāḥ | dadati khalu mohabahulaṃ spāsaṃ bahukā api te teṣāṃ | |) Cf. UAS 36.70.
- 56) See Chakravarti 1975: 97. Cf. TAAS 2.10–14: *saṃsāriṇo muktās ca samanaskāmanaskāḥ. saṃsāriṇas trasasthāvarāḥ. pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ. tejovāyū dvīndriyādayas ca trasāḥ.* “[The souls are classified into two kinds:] those which transmigrate and those which are liberated. [The former] have consciousness, and [the latter] do not have consciousness. Those which transmigrate are [further classified into two kinds:] those which move and those which do not move. Earth, water, trees are those which do not move. And fire, wind, and what have two sense-faculties are those that move.”
 In the TAAS 2.13–14 extant in the SAS and RĀ: *pṛthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ. dvīndriyādayas trasāḥ*, which belongs to the Digambara tradition, fire and wind are classified into the category of those that do not move.
- 57) BSGT 49a6: *sa dang | chu dang | shing dang | me dang | rlung dang | srin bu dang | grog ma dang | bung ba dang | mi rnam ni srog can gyi sde tshan dgu'o | | de la dang po lnga ni reg pa'i dbang po gcig pu dang ldan no | |* (Cf. TJ D90a4f.; P96b7ff.) “Earth, water, a tree, fire, wind, a worm [and so forth], an ant [and so forth], a bee [and so forth], and a human being [and so forth] are nine groups that have the souls. Among them, the first five [groups] (= earth, water, a tree, fire, wind) have only one sense-faculty, i.e., a sense of touch.”
- 58) TJ D320b5–321a2; P367b6–368a4.
- 59) Kawasaki 1992: 123–136, 192–209 and 2000.
- 60) Taisho 26(5), vol. 1, 425a–427a. See also Kawasaki 1992: 208, n. (17).
- 61) BSGT 50b3–6: *lung du ma bstan pa'i dngos po bcu bzhi lung ma bstan pa dang | 'khor ba'i thog ma'i mtha' ma shes pa dang | sin tu mdzes ma bsad pa ma rig pa dang | bram ze'i bu mo mdzes mas skur pa btob pa dang | grong khyer pa ta la pu tra[TJ; ja BSGT] nyams par 'gyur ba lung ma bstan pa dang | zla ba gsum du nas zos pa[TJ; ba BSGT] dang | lung bzed bkru pa bzhin du log ba dang | rdo'i 'khrul 'khor 'phangs pa dang | nor skyong drung du 'ongs pa dang | lhas byin rab tu 'byin par byed pa dang | rgyu skar bzang po bsnyen bkur bar 'jog pa dang | lhag spyod dang lwa ba can dang lnga sde bsnyen bkur byed pa ma shes pa dang | shing gi phung po'i mdo sde ston pa dang | seng ldeng gi tshal pa zug pa'i las kyi rnam par smin pa myong ba dang | thams cad mkhyen pa la sun 'byin pa la sogs pa thams cad ma bstan pa'i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa ma yin te |* (=TJ D320b5–321a1; P367b7–368a4) For the contents and source with regard to each piece of evidence or episode, see Kawasaki 1992: 124f. with n. (2)–(8) and 2000.
- 62) *'Phags pa thabs mkhas pa shes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, *Āryopāyakaūsalya-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra, P927, vol. 36, shu 298b3–327a6. Cf. *'Phags pa sangs rgyas thams cad gsang chen thabs la mkhas pa byang chub sems dpa'ye shes dam pas shus pa'i le'u shes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, P760(38), vol. 24, 'i 4b6–52b5. See also Kawasaki 1992: 209, n. (19).
- 63) Taisho 346, vol. 12, 166a–178b.
- 64) TJ D325a7; P374a8.

- 65) See Kawasaki 1992: 193f. and 2000: 247. The **Dasabhūmikavibhāśāsāstra* (十住毘婆沙論, Taisho 1521, vol. 26, 75b–79a), the **Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* or **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (大智度論, Taisho 1509, vol. 25, 73b, 259a), *Milindapañha* (ed. V. Treckner) 107,27–113,8, 155,4–8, 179,7–181,24, 207,23–209,21 can be enumerated as sources other than the *rGyas par thabs la mkhas pa'i mdo* (大方廣善巧方便經). For the details, see Kawasaki 1992: 123–136 and 2000.
- 66) Cf. Fujinaga 2001: 48–51.
- 67) BSGT 49a1–3: *bdag ni sems kyi mtshan nyid de || tshul gnyis mngon sum gyis grub lo ||* (7.1cd)
bdag dang srog dang skyes bu la sogs pa ni rnam grangs so || des na rgyal dpog pa ltar bdag ni sems kyi mtshan nyid kho na yin la | de yang rnam grangs mi rtag pa'i ngo bos tha dad pa'i phyir ldog pa'i bdag nyid dang | rnam grangs can rdzas rtag pa'i ngo bos tha mi dad pa'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba'i bdag nyid kyi tshul gnyis ni mngon sum gyis grub pa'i phyir tshad ma gzhan gyis bsgrub par mi bya'o zhes 'dod par grags te |
 “It is reported that the soul is characterized by [having] consciousness, and that [its] two aspects are established by means of direct perception. (7.1cd)
 [The Jains] are reported to accept soul (*bdag*), life (*srog*), and human being (*skye bu*), etc., which are [all] synonyms. Therefore, as is the case with [the views of] the Mīmāṃsakas, the soul is precisely characterized by [having] consciousness. And, it (= the soul) has the exclusion (*ldog pa; vyāvṛtti*) as its essential nature, because it is different [from others] in terms of having impermanent modes as its natures. [On the other hand, the soul] has the concomitance (*rjes su 'gro ba; anugama*) as its essential nature, because it is not different [from others] in terms of having permanent substance as its nature. These two essential natures are not to be proved by any other means of cognition [than direct perception], because they are established [only] by means of direct perception.”
- 68) BSGT 51a1–4: *bde ba la sogs pa rnam grangs dang 'brel pa'i sems pa can ni sngar gyi ngo bo dor ba yin na rtag pa nyid nyams par 'gyur te | res 'ga' ba yin pa'i phyir ro || gang res 'ga' ba yin pa de ni rtag pa nyid nyams par 'gyur ba yin te bum pa bzhin no || sems pa can yang res 'ga' ba yin no zhes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa yin no || ci ste sngar yod pa'i ngo bo ma dor ba yin na sems pa can bde ba la sogs pa'i ngo bor yongs su 'gyur bar mi 'gyur te | snga ma dang phyi ma'i gnas skabs thams cad du khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || gang gnas skabs thams cad du khyad par med pa de ni yongs su 'gyur bar mi 'gyur te nam mkha' bzhin no || sems pa can yang gnas skabs thams cad du khyad par med pa yin no zhes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa'o ||*
- 69) BSGT 51a6–b1: *mngon sum du 'dod pa'i shes pa la rnam grangs las tha dad pa'i lus so sor snang ba rjes su 'jug pa ro gcig pa'i rdzas mi snang ba'i phyir te |* (= TSP 153,25f.: *na hi paryāvyatiricyamāna- śarīrah kvacid api vijñāne pratyakṣasammate pratibhāsamāno 'nugataikarūpo dravyātmā lakṣyate.*)
- 70) PVV 66,17: *adūṣite 'sya viśaya ātmani.*
- 71) PV 2.221: *snehaḥ sadoṣa iti cet tataḥ kiṃ tasya varjanam | adūṣite 'sya viśaye na śakyam tasya varjanam ||*
 See also Vetter 1990: 121.
- 72) According to Manorathanandin, the content of PV 2.273ab is Dharmakīrti's reply to an opponent's objection, “The liberation [is realized] on the basis of elimination of karma.” (PVV 78,28: *pare cāhuḥ: karmaṣyān muktir iti.*) This view of the opponent

agrees with that of the Jainas.

- 73) PV 2.273–274ab: *asambhavād vipakṣasya na hāniḥ karmadehayoh | aśakyatvāc ca tṛṣṇāyām sthitāyām punar udbhavāt | | dvayakṣayārtham yatne ca vyarthah karmakṣaye śramah |*
See also Vetter 1990: 164.
- 74) BSGT 51b2f.: *las sar pa mi sog pa'i ched du sdom pas bsdoms pa dang | sngar gyi las 'dzad pa'i ched du zas mi za ba la sogs pa'i dka' thub kyi gdung ba yang don med pa yin te | nyon mongs pa'i rgyu dang mi 'gal ba'i phyir dang rgyu ma zad na 'bras bu mi ldog pa'i phyir te |*
- 75) BSGT 51b4f.: *rgyu ma zad na 'bras bu mi ldog pa de'i phyir nyon mongs pa ma spangs na de nyid kyis las sog par 'gyur bas las thams cad zad pa'i thar pa gdugs kyi dbyibs lta bu ni mkhas pa rnams la rung ba ma yin no | |*
- 76) BSGT 51b5–52a1: *rnam par shes pa dang dbang po dang tshe 'gag pa 'chi ba'i mtshan nyid yin na de ni shing dag la ma grub bo | | ci ste 'chi ba'i sgra 'jug par grub pas yin na sgra ni 'dod pas 'jug pas de'i dbang gis dngos po rnam par gnas pa ma yin no | | gang yang skam pa la sogs pa 'chi ba'i sgrar brjod pa de yang sems pa can dang 'brel pa ma grub pa'i phyir mi rung la | dang po dang ldan pa shing la grub pa ma yin no | |*
Cf. PVin 3. 92,2–6: *vijñānendriyāurnirodhalakṣaṇatvān maraṇasya. ... maraṇasabdapravrtteḥ siddham eveti cet, ichhātāḥ śabdāḥ pravartante. na tadvaśād vastuṣṭhitiḥ, atiprasaṅgāt. tasmāc choṣam ayaṃ taruṣu maraṇam āha. na cedṣaṃ prāṇimaraṇam iti nedam taruṣu sidhyati.*
(Tib.) D215b4–6; P313a8–b2: *rnam par shes pa dang dbang po dang tshe 'gags pa[om. P] 'chi ba'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro | | ... 'chi ba'i sgra 'jug pa grub pa nyid do zhe na | sgra ni 'dod pas 'jug pas[jug pas om. P] de'i dbang gis dngos po rnam par gnas pa ma yin te | ha cang thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | | de'i phyir 'di[di'i P] skam pa[skams D] la 'chi bar brjod pa bzhin no | | srog chags ky[kyis P] 'chi ba ni de lta bu ma yin te | des na 'di ni shing dag la ma grub po | |*
Cf. Schmithausen 1991: 85f.
- 77) dBu pa blo gsal quotes MH 9.140 in his auto-commentary to indicate that there are other reasons why trees are not sentient beings.
MH 9.140: *sacittakā hi taravo na caturyonasamgrahāt | madhyacchede 'pi vāspandāj jaḍatve* sati loṣṭavat | |*
* *jaḍatve* Schmithausen 1991: 524, Lindtner 2001a: 107, and 2001b: 47; *jā[dy]atve* Kawasaki 1992: 461.
(Tib.) *ljon shing sems dang bcas pa min | | skye gnas bzhir[bzhi TJ(D)] ni ma bsdus phyir | | dkyil du bcad kyang bzod pa'i phyir | | phag dum bzhin du bem[bems D, TJ] po yin | | (= BSGT 52a4f.)*
“Trees do not have minds, because they are not included in the four [kinds of] wombs, or because they do not tremble even if they are cut in the middle. [Trees] are senseless (*jaḍa*) like a lump of clay.” See also Lindtner 2001b: 47.
- 78) BSGT 52a1: *bad kan la sogs pa sems med kyang dus su skye ba dang |*
- 79) BSGT 52a1: *ri mo la sogs pa yang nyams pa gsor rung ba dang |*
Another exception “alcohol (*madya*; *chang*)” is given in MH 9.143.
- 80) BSGT 52a1f.: *mig med kyang khab len gyis lcags rnyed pa dang | rna ba'i dbang po med kyang rin po che gser gyi myu gu chu 'dzin gyi sgra sgrogs pa na skye ba dang | sna dang lce med kyang dug khrag dang dri'i rjes su rgyas par 'gyur ba dang | lus kyi dbang po med kyang skra la mes reg na 'khum pa'i phyir ... Cf. TJ D311b4; P355b1, D314a2f.; P358b4f., D311b5; P355b2f., D312b7; P357a3. See also Schmithausen 1991: 88–91.*
- 81) BSGT 52a6–b1: *lung du ma bstan pa'i dngos po rnams kyi gzhi gang zag gi bdag ma grub pa'i*

- phyir khyad par gyi chos la dpyod pa mi 'thad pa dang | chos zab mo rnams snod ma yin pa la
bstan par mi rigs pas ma bstan pa yin te |*
- 82) RĀ 1.73cd–74:
*antavān iti lokaś ca pṛṣṭas tūṣṇīm jino 'bhavat ||
sarovajña iti sarvajaño budhais tenaiva gamyate |
yenaitad dharmagāmbhīryaṃ novācābhājanē jane ||*
(Tib.) Hahn 1982: 31 (≈ BSGT 52b1f.):
'jig rten mtha' dang ldan nam zhes || zhus na rgyal ba mi gsung phyir ||
de ltar zab mo '[zab pa'i P] chos rnams ni** || snod min 'gro la mi gsung ba ||
de nyid phyir na mkhas rnams kyis || kun mkhyen thams cad mkhyen par shes ||*
* *phyir* RĀ; *bzhugs* BSGT.
** *de ltar zab mo'i chos rnams ni* RĀ; *gang phyir de ltar zab pa'i chos* BSGT.
- 83) BSGT 52b3: *de bzhin du mdzes ma bsad pa ma bstan pa dang lhung bzed stong par log pa la
sogs pa'ang 'jig rten dang mthun par bstan pa dang gzhan gyi don kho nar gzigs nas de ltar mdzad
de |*
- 84) BSGT 52b4 (= LAAS P307b1–2):
*sdig pa thams cad yongs zad de || bsod nams kun gyis mngon 'phags kyang ||
las kyī rgyud ni ston mdzad pa || 'di ni 'jig rten mthun[thun LAAS] 'jug yin ||*
- 85) BSGT 52b4f. (= MH 10.1) (Kawasaki 1992: 468):
*gcer bur rgyu bas thub pa la || kun ma bstan pas kun mkhyen min ||
zhes smras khyu mechog sogs ma nges || brjod du med par brjod pa'i phyir ||*
- 86) See Mimaki and Akamatsu 1985: 747, n. 8.
- 87) For the synopsis of the Jaina chapter of the GTCM, see Hopkins 2003: xiv–xvi.
- 88) In addition to the three main subjects, i.e., the nine principles, proof of trees' sentience, and negation of the Buddha's omniscience, the GTCM contains topics such as the enumeration of Jaina masters' names [219,6–219,16], a number of synonyms for the Jainas (see also chapter 4 of this paper) [219,16–220,12], two divisions of the Jainas due to having different views [220,12f.], the three kinds of valid means of cognition, i.e., direct perception, inference, and scripture [221,20–223,2], and a view that time is to be understood as substance [226,5f.], all of which are not seen in the BSGT.
- 89) CKGT 43,18–21: *ljon shing chos can | sems yod de | mthun pa las skye ba'i phyir | dper na rta
las rta skye ba bzhin dang | dus su ldan pa las skye ba'i phyir | dper na rta sogs dpyid dus dang
khyi sogs ston ka skye ba bzhin dang | dgun dus gnyid log cing dbyar dus smyo ba'i phyir | rkyang
la sogs pa bzhin |*
“Trees (i.e., the subject [to be proved]) have minds, (1) because of the propagation from the homogeneous, as [in the case that] a horse is born from a horse, (2) because they are born in specific seasons as [in the case that] a horse and others are born in spring season and a dog and others are born in autumn season, and (3) because they sleep in winter season and are intoxicated in summer season, like an ass and others.” The logical reasons (1)–(3) are all seen in the MH.
MH 9.144: *samānaprasavād vṛddher dohadāc ca sacittakāh |
ṛtūjatvāt tathā svāpāc cāpīṣṭās* turagādivat ||*
* *ṛtūjatvāt tathā svāpāc cāpīṣṭās* Schmithausen 1991: 86, n. 490; (*r*)*tujanāt tathā svāpān
nāpīṣṭās* Kawasaki 1992: 462.
(Tib.) *mthun pa las skyes 'phel 'gyur dang || sdang sems dus ldan skye ba'i phyir ||
de bzhin gnyid log smyo ba'i phyir || sems yod rta sogs bzhin du 'dod ||*

“[The Jainas] accept that, because of the propagation from the homogeneous [= (1)], because they grow, because they have specific longings, because they are born in specific seasons [= (2)], and, similarly, because they sleep and are intoxicated [= (3)], they have minds, like a horse and others.” (I translated this verse from the Tibetan translation. See also Schmithausen 1991: 86ff. with n. 490ff.)

90) This would become clearer if we compare the following three passages.

TJ D90a6; P97a2: *grog ma dang | srin gyi me la sogs pa ni dbang po gsum pa ste | reg pa dang | ro dang | sna'i dbang po dang[dang | P] ldan pa'i phyir ro | |*

BSGT 49b1: *grog ma dang srin gyi me[me TJ; mi Text] la sogs pa ni reg pa dang ro dang sna'i dbang po gsum dang ldan no | |*

CKGT 42,24f.: *grog ma dang srin gyi me la sogs pa ni dbang po gsum ldan te | reg pa dang ro dang sna'i dbang po dang ldan pa'i phyir |*

Bibliography and Abbreviations

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ĀN: *Āvaśyakaniryukti: Śrīmad-Haribhadrasūri-viracita-ṭikālamkṛtā Catur daśāpūrvadhara Sūri-puraṃdara-Śrīmad-Bhadrabāhusvāmi-sugrathitā Āvaśyakaniryuktiḥ*, 4 vols. (Āgamodayasamiti Granthoddhāra, Granthāṅkaḥ 1–4), Mahesana 1916.

BSGT: *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (dBu pa blo gsal): see Mimaki 1982b.

CKGT: *lCang skya grub mtha'* (lCang skya II Rol pa'i rdo rje): 'Jigs med bsam grub (ed.), *Grub mtha' thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, Qinghai 1989.

D: sDe dge version of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka

GTCM: *Grub mtha' chen mo* ('Jam dbyangs bzhad pa): 'Brug rgyal mkhar (ed.), *Grub mtha' rnam bshad kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma*, Lanzhou 1992.

GTRCP: *Grub mtha' rnam bzhag rin chen phreng ba* (dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po): see Mimaki 1977.

LAAS: **Ārya-lokānusamānāvātāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtra*, (Tib.) 'Phags pa 'jig rten gyi rjes su 'thun par 'jug pa shes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (聖世間隨共入大乘經), P866, vol. 34, mu 304b2–309a6.

Mahābhārata: Vishnu S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar (ed.), *The Mahābhārata*, 19 vols., Poona 1933–1966.

MAV: *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* (Śāntarakṣita): Masamichi Ichigō (ed.), *Chūkan sōgon ron no kenkyū: Shāntarakṣita no shisō [Madhyamakālamkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla]*, 2 vols., Kyoto 1985.

MH: *Madhyamakahrdaya* (Bhāviveka): see Lindtner 2001a, 2001b, and Kawasaki 1992.

Milindapañha: V. Treckner (ed.), *The Milindapañha, Being Dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist Sage Nāgasena*, London 1880.

NB: *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti): Dalsukh Malvania (ed.), *Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa: Being a Sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*, Patna 1955; (Tib.) D4212 ce 231b1–238a6; P5711 ce 329b1–337a8.

- NBT: *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara): see NB.
- P: Peking version of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka
- PAKS: *Pañcāstikāyāsāra* (Kundakunda): Chakravarti Nayanar (ed.), *Ācārya Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāyāsāra (The Building of the Cosmos). Prakrit Text, Sanskrit Cāyā, English Commentary etc. along with Philosophical and Historical Introductions* and A. N. Upadhye (ed.), *The Prakrit Text, Cāyā of the Same along with the Sanskrit Commentary of Amṛtacandra and Various Readings, Edited in the Present Form*, New Delhi 1975 (repr. in New Delhi 2002).
- PrPT: *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (Avalokitavrata): (Tib.) *Shes rab sgron ma rgya cher 'grel pa*, D3859 dBu ma vol. 5–6, wa 1b1–za 341a7; P5259, vol. 96–97, wa 1a1–za 406a8.
- PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): see PVV and Vetter 1990.
- PVin: *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 3 (Dharmakīrti): Pascale Hugon and Tōru Tomabechi (eds.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapter 3*, Beijing and Vienna 2011; (Tib.) D4211 ce 152b1–230a7, P5710 ce 250b6–329b1.
- PVSV: *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The 1st Chapter with the Autocommentary; Text and Critical Notes*, Rome 1960.
- PVV: *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri (ed.), *Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Āchārya Manorathanandin*, Varanasi 1968 (repr. 1994).
- RĀ: *Ratnāvalī* (Nāgārjuna): see Hahn 1982.
- RV: *Tattvārthavārttika* or *Rājavārttika* (Akalaṅka): Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), *Tattvārthavārttika [Rājavārttika] of Śrī Akalaṅkadeva*, 2 vols., Varanasi 1953, 1957 (repr. in New Delhi 2001).
- SAS: *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Pūjyapāda): Pt. Phoolchandra Shastri (ed.), *Āchārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi: The Commentary on Āchārya Griddhapiccha's Tattvārthasūtra*, Varanasi 1944, 1971 (repr. in Delhi 2003).
- ŚV: *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila): R. Tailaṅga (ed.), *The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathimīśra*, Varanasi 1898.
- TAAS: *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (Umāsvāti): see Jacobi 1906. Cf. SAS.
- TJ: *Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti-tarkajvālā* (Bhavya): (Tib.) *Dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtoḡ ge 'bar ba*, D3856, dBu ma, vol. 3, dza 40b7–329b4; P5256, vol. 96, dza 43b7–380a7.
- TP: *Tattvapradīpikā* (Amṛtacandra): see PAKS.
- TS: *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Swami Dwarikadas Shastri (ed.), *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamashīla*, 2 vols., Varanasi 1968 (= S); Jaisalmer manuscript (= J); (Tib.) D4266 ze 1–133a6, P5746 'e 1–159a5.
- TSP: *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): see TS.
- UAS: *Uttarādhyanasūtra*: Jarl Charpentier (ed.), *The Uttarādhyanasūtra, Being the First Mūlasūtra of the Śvetāmbara Jains, Edited with an Introduction, Critical Notes and a Commentary*, Uppsala 1922.
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