

to the political background, this part discusses the development of the governmental bureaucracy. Particularly, there were two major reforms: the financial reform led by Arthur Millspaugh (Treasure General 1922–1927) and the judicial reform that ‘Alī Akbar Dāvar (Minister of Justice 1922–29) strongly pressed forward. ‘Alī Dashtī (1894–1982), the proposer of the *Act of Tir 22, 1306*, and the members of the parliament (MPs) who did not have bureaucratic careers were cautious about these developments. This is because they thought that government officials who gained more power by the bureaucratic reform became their formidable competitors in the elections. Therefore, these MPs tried to expel government officials from elections. With regard to the theoretical background, the discussions on a free election of the day are mentioned in this part. Pro-Reza newspapers, such as *Mīhan* and *Eṭṭelā‘āt*, as well as anti-Reza media claimed to limit government officials and landlords in their eligibility for election, for they could affect the voting behavior of others. Furthermore, Moḥammad‘alī Forūghī (Minister of War 1926–27) and Moṣaddeq proposed depriving illiterate peasants of the right to vote, because they did not have much information for selecting a candidate.

The fourth part examines the parliamentary deliberations on the *Act of Tir 22, 1306*. Some MPs who had bureaucratic careers were against this bill. Among them, Aḥmad Sharīatzāde (1883/84–1968/69) and ‘Alīrezā Eḥteshāmzāde (b. 1894/95) claimed it as unfair that only government officials were limited in their eligibility for election because of their influence, as this was also applicable to landlords. Abū Ṭāleb Shīrvānī (b. 1890/91) rebutted this argument and disputed that the influence of government officials on elections was illegal, because this influence was derived from public authority. In the deliberations of this bill, Mīrzā Moḥammad‘alī Khān Bāmdād (1884/85–1951/52) also proposed an additional amendment concerning deprivation of illiterates’ right to vote. However, Seyyed Ya‘qūb Anvār Shīrāzī (1876/77–1955/56) did not support this idea and insisted on defending the principle of universal suffrage. Eventually, this bill was passed roughly in its original form. Rezā Shāh and other high officials did not intervene in this legislation at least tangibly. This is because the *Act of Tir 22, 1306* only assumed the situation that government officials individually abused their powers for their own election. Thus, this act could not prevent Rezā Shāh’s election rigging, which was organizational and government-wide.

Finally, this presentation concludes that the *Act of Tir 22, 1306* and other amendments on suffrage were the MPs’ reactions to the development of governmental bureaucracy. These amendments limited government officials’ eligibility for elections; however, they did not disadvantage the landlords who held the majority in the National Assembly. In other words, MPs tried to secure their opportunity for re-election by excluding government officials from elections. On the other hand, they did not dare obstruct Rezā Shāh’s election rigging.

The discussions around the Article 1 of *Act of Tir 22, 1306* show the difficulty of ensuring effective elections. During the Qajar-Pahlavi transition period, most Iranians lived in the countryside as illiterate peasants and they were economically and politically dependent on landlords and village headmen. Therefore, the peasants’ right to vote was confined to these rural elites, whether Rezā Shāh rigged elections or not. In these political circumstances, universal suffrage was maintained for the benefit of pro-Shah rural elites.

Comments

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At the outset, I would like to say that it is beyond my ability to make a valuable comment on the two presentations dealing with different topics and periods in two states, the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Therefore, I would like to elucidate

my viewpoints in relation to the symposium, “Structural Changes in the Modern Middle East.”

Structural changes are driven by some causes in general. In this sense, one of them for the states analyzed by Dr. Dundar and Mr. Tokunaga is undoubtedly European penetration and its colonial rule and influence. For example, the Ottoman Empire was repeatedly defeated in wars against Europe since the end of the seventeenth century. As a result, the empire not only lost its peripheral territories one by one, but was also forced to become a subordinate to Europe politically and economically. Consequently, the empire had to take the path toward reform policy. Initially seen in the Tulip Period (1718–1730), which focused on cultural dimension, the reform policy finally became wide-spread and rudimentary reforms (called “Tanzimat”) of the ruling system came into existence from 1839 through 1876.

Iran under the Qajar dynasty also met with a similar fate in the nineteenth century. Defeats in two wars against Russia resulted in Iran losing a part of the northern territory and concluded in unequal treaties with Russia. Moreover, the state also launched similar attempts to reform. In particular, Prince Abbas Mirza and Taqi Khan Amir-e Kabir were well-known leaders who undertook reform policies. However, these “top-down” attempts in both states were frustrated due to opposition from the reactionary king and the sultan, respectively. In addition, their despotic rule followed for several decades in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Such historical developments in both states reveal that the topics of the two presentations are commonly positioned on the extension of their subordination caused by European rule and its influence. It is worth noting that such a political legacy for reform under European influence never vanished from society with ease. The “Young Turks” revolution put an end to the sultan’s despotic rule and the CUP revolutionary government revived the constitution drawn by Midhad Pasha thirty-two years earlier. As for Iran, Nasir al-Din Shah, who had sold various national concessions to Britain and Russia for his personal benefits, was assassinated in 1896. Moreover, a decade later, the Constitutional Revolution occurred, paving the way for the launch of the national Parliament (Majles-e Shoura-ye Melli) and the establishment of the constitution (Qanun-e Asasi). Thus, both states tried to set up a progressive and modern state-system not only to replace the despotic and corrupt rule, but also to confront European colonialism.

However, their attempts failed because the CUP government did not necessarily act up to the constitution, and finally had no option except to appeal to Turkish nationalism as a survival ideology of the empire, as shown in the presentation by Dr. Dundar. I suppose the new millet system (and the elections based on it) was certainly contradictory to the democratic regime system. The rights of ethno-religious minorities are apt to be ignored at the state-administrative level due to the collective actions of the democratic system, which is sustained by numbers. I believe that the subtitle of his presentation (“Democratizing Conflicts”) clearly highlights this point.

While the Ottoman Empire was distressed by the reform to modify the Islamic old system, Iran, which is also a multi-ethnic state, faced a specific issue, namely, the decentralized rule of the Qajar dynasty, which Ervand Abrahamian named “Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran.” According to him, the army and bureaucracy as “instruments of despotism” were entirely underdeveloped during the Qajar period. In short, in the face of the Constitutional Revolution, World War I, and the political crisis following the war, how a centralized government could be built was a significant national issue for Iran under the newly founded Pahlavi dynasty. If Mr. Tokunaga had analyzed “Discussion on Suffrage during the Qajar-Pahlavi Transition Period,” I think other interesting dimensions could have been identified besides the power struggle among the members of the Parliament, bureaucrats, and the landlords, and “the difficulty of ensuring effective elections.”

Whether it was from the Islamic empire to the nation state, from decentralized rule to centralization, from despotic rule to democratized state system, a major structural change in the Modern Middle East took place after the positive

or negative efforts of minor structural ones. In addition, a series of such changes, as a whole, can be believed to have originated with European penetration or rule, followed by progressive and reactionary moves in the nineteenth century. I believe that the contents of the presentations by Dr. Dundar and Mr. Tokunaga are evidently different but both are closely related with such changing processes in the Middle East. Their presentations were very helpful for us to reconsider the differences between and similarities in structural changes in the cases of the Ottoman Empire and Iran.

In connection with the above, it appears that the millet system was one of the residues in the great structural change of the Ottoman Empire, which converted from an Islamic state into a multi-ethnic state, and finally the Turkish nation-state. Being different from the Ottoman Empire, which had already accomplished a pseudo-centralized or centralized system, Iran needed a state-building exercise based on centralization. I wonder whether the issue of electoral law highlighted by Mr. Tokunaga might have represented the evidence in the significant structural change from decentralized Qajar rule to the centralization of the Pahlavi dictatorship. Moreover, during Reza Shah's period, the task of centralization was certainly accomplished to some extent by means of modernization as well as policies against armed tribes and the Shi'ite religious forces. However, both the Turkish and Iranian cases seem to have scarcely realized structural change in relation to "Islam and Search for Democratization," which is this session's main theme.

Session 2: Islam and Politics

İlmiyye ve Siyaset, Challenges between Islam and Politics in the Discourse of the Ottoman Ulema

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As a result of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 the Hamidian government was once again transformed into a constitutional-caliphate/sultanate-parliamentary system. Although not the same as the earlier project of 1876/1293, nonetheless due to revolutionary zeal the constitutional experiment of 1908/1326 was presented as a "renewal" of the top-down constitutional project of 1876/1293 and the "national will" as the Ottoman *devlet* continued to present itself as a significant actor belonging to the political concert of "civilised nations." As the sole bastion of the Islamic world, by and large free from physical colonial occupation, as well as being a European and an Islamic state, by reintroducing "modern" political structures the Ottoman *devlet* attempted to fashion itself capable from its own Islamic traditions to be able to adapt to the modern political orders.

Predominately, narratives regarding Ottoman constitutionalism had focused on the secular-Western merits of the Ottoman constitutional efforts, paying very little attention to the Ottoman proclamations of the Islamic merits of their constitutional exertions. In particular the historiography reflected that the Constitutional Revolution of 1908/1326 initiated a political turning point that paved the way for the "natural process" of the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic. Not only that, on March 31, 1909/Rabi al-Awwal 10, 1327, a rebellion in Istanbul based on the failed promises of the new Young Turk government was categorised as a "religious" reaction to the "progressive" revolution of 1908/1326. This dichotomous representation presented the ulema (the religious Muslim scholarly class), the focus of this presentation, in opposition to the constitutional efforts of the revolutionaries of 1908/1326. Yet, it will be shown that the ulema were part of the revolutionary activities of 1908/1326, and worked with the newly established government to maintain order in 1909/1327, as they were equally, if not more invested in the new constitutional order than the revolutionaries of the Young Turks.