

The Shift in Qing-Kazakh Relations: The Qing Western Territory in the 1770s*

ONUMA Takahiro

In the middle of the 18th century the Qing dynasty, having placed the area to the north and south of the Tianshan Mountains (Xinjiang) under its rule, came into contact with Kazakh nomads. On a previous occasion I examined Qing-Kazakh relations in the 1750s–60s with reference to Qing negotiations with Ablai Sultan (1711?–81; from 1771 known as Ablai Khan)¹⁾ of the Middle Juz of the Kazakhs. The Qing government built its relationship with Kazakhs around a Mongol-style master-servant relationship in which the Qing emperor was the *ejen* (master) and Central Asians, including Kazakhs, were regarded as his *albatu* (subject, servant) (hereafter referred to as an “*ejen-albatu* relationship”).²⁾ Further, when disputes broke out between different parties in Central Asia, the Qing emperor assumed the position of *ejen* ruling over these *albatu* and, depending on the circumstances, considered military intervention or urged the warring parties to reach some sort of accord. In the case of Qing-Kazakh relations in particular, discourse about the *ejen-albatu* relationship appears frequently in correspondence between the two parties and served as grounds for justifying their respective assertions and demands. It could be said, in other words, that the *ejen-albatu* relationship functioned as a shared tool in political negotiations between the Qing and Kazakhs (Onuma 2010a).

The discussion in my previous study, however, was limited to the initial stages of Qing-Kazakh relations. In this article, I examine how the characteristics to be observed in the 1750s–60s changed thereafter.

Roughly speaking, changes in Qing-Kazakh relations have been understood in the following manner. When they first came into contact with each other in 1755–56, there was antagonism between the Qing and Kazakhs, but after Ablai’s “reconciliation/submission” towards the Qing in 1757 they maintained a sound relationship throughout the second half of the 18th century. However, in the first half of the 19th century Russian influence on the Kazakh steppe grew, and relations between the Qing and the Kazakhs were gradually severed (Saguchi 1986: 434–5; Li 2004: 6–7; Noda 2016: 260–303).

During this period, the Qing regarded the Kazakhs as “a bulwark outside the *karun* line” (Ch. *kawai zhi fanli*) and maintained a policy of noninterference in matters outside the *karun* line (Onuma 2014: 266). This policy remained the same in the face of Russian advances and became one of the causes that incurred the alienation of Kazakh chieftains from the Qing (Noda 2005: 42–5). There was a certain difference between this stubborn stance of noninterference and the Qing’s diplomatic stance in the 1750s–60s mentioned above. In what circumstances did these changes in the Qing response become established?

When taking the above points into account, one must first take note of the confusion in Qing-Kazakh relations in the 1770s (Li 2003: 200–1). One also needs to examine the influence that the return of the Torguuds in 1771, prior to this confusion, had on subsequent Qing-Kazakh relations. In this article, I consider several issues that arose in Qing-Kazakh relations in the 1770s and clarify changes in the direction of Qing foreign policy that occurred as the Qing responded to these issues.

1. The Suspension of Kazakh Tribute Missions

From the time of Ablai’s “submission” in 1757, the Kazakhs sent an annual tribute mission to the Qing court except in 1766, when there was heavy snow damage. However, from April 1769 Kazakh tribute missions were discontinued for about four years.³⁾ This was probably due to movements by the Torguuds, who in 1770 crossed the Volga, traversed the Kazakh steppe, and reached northern Xinjiang in 1771 (Li 2003: 200). Once the Qing had accepted the Torguuds’ “submission” and the selection of pasturelands for them had been completed, Kazakh tribute missions were resumed. Tribute missions sent by Ablai arrived in 1773 and 1774.

However, the normalization of Qing-Kazakh relations did not proceed smoothly. In 1775 Ablai dispatched a tribute mission headed by Otruchi Batur, and Iletu, the Military Governor of Ili who received the mission, queried Ablai’s demand conveyed to him by Otruchi. Ablai offered to present the Qianlong emperor with “the tribute-tax of 30,000 households” in Tashkent which his family had been “collecting for eleven generations,” and towards this end he requested the loan of 1,000 soldiers.⁴⁾

This was not Ablai’s first request for military assistance from the Qing. Since 1765 the Kazakhs, aiming to advance south, had been in a state of war with the Khoqand Khanate, which was ruled over by Irdana Bi and was plotting a northward advance, and Tashkent was one of the places over which they were fighting (KRO: 685). In 1767 Ablai requested the loan of 20,000 troops and

cannons, but Agūi, the Military Governor of Ili at the time, rejected this request, and the Qianlong emperor issued an edict in his capacity as *ejen* in which he urged Ablai and Irdana, who were both his *albatu*, to reach an accord (Onuma 2010a: 118–24).

Iletu, aware of this precedent, strongly criticized Ablai for his trickery in requesting military assistance once again. Further, in view of the fact that Kirghiz also occupied pasturelands in the vicinity of Tashkent, he speculated that Ablai's request for military assistance was undoubtedly motivated by an intention to attack not only Tashkent but also the Kirghiz.⁵⁾ Iletu accordingly sent Ablai a letter, which included the following passage:

You said in your letter that you would present the land of Tashkent to the Great Ejen (Qing Emperor), which is wrong. You Kazakhs, and also the Muslims of the lands of Buruts (Kirghiz), Khoqand, and Andijan, are *albatu* who have bowed their heads and submitted to the Great Ejen. Thus, these lands belong to the Great Ejen. What do you mean by presenting the land of Tashkent once again? ... Now, *han*, you have begun to scheme again, saying with an innocent air, "I would like to present the land of Tashkent to the Great Ejen," and have dispatched people for a loan of soldiers. This was a big mistake! You Kazakhs are the *albatu* of the Great Ejen; the land of you Kazakhs is also that of the Great Ejen. Whereas the Great Ejen gave you [the land] to nomadize as hithertofore, is there any reason to present the Great Ejen with lands that you have seized in war?⁶⁾

As had been the case in the Qing response to the request for assistance in 1767, Iletu took a diplomatic stance based on an awareness of the *ejen-albatu* relationship. Refusing to accept the letter and tribute horses from Ablai, he refused to allow the Otruchi mission to enter Qing territory and sent them back.

In October 1776 a tribute mission, headed again by Otruchi, arrived in Ili. Iletu had left Ili in June of this year in order to have an audience with the Qianlong emperor in Beijing, and during his absence Sonomčering was acting as Military Governor of Ili. Otruchi brought with him a letter from Ablai addressed to the Qianlong emperor, and it included the following strange passage:

Since my place is very distant, my people who were dispatched last year returned partway through their journey [to the Qing]. This year, I have dispatched [my people] to ask after your peace. I formerly presented White

Hats (*šayan mahala*) on the golden hem⁷⁾ of the Great Ejen and obeyed you. Our sutra says, “All the White Hats were driven in the direction of Mecca by the Manju.” When the White Hats take flight, the descendants of our Kazakh leaders (*taiji*) and the tribesmen of our Kazakhs will not take flight and will never leave this place as long as we have breath. Putting a corpse together with another corpse, we do not wish to part with the golden hem of the Great Ejen in eternity.⁸⁾

Although the Mongolian equivalent of “White Hat” (*čagan malay-a*) refers to Muslim settlers in Central Asia (Pelliot 1948: 130–2), it is not clear what it means in this letter.⁹⁾ At any rate, the expulsion of “White Hats” here suggests the expulsion of Kazakhs and Kirghiz by the Qing. Sonomčering asked Otruchi what this meant. According to Otruchi, Ablai’s tribute mission had been refused entry the previous year, and he had also heard a prophecy from a Kazakh *ākhund* (Islamic religious leader) that the Kazakhs and Kirghiz would be driven away by the Manjus, as a result of which he was extremely apprehensive. Sonomčering explained that this would not happen, authorized their entry, and sent them on their way to Beijing.

In Hami, en route to Beijing, the Otruchi mission encountered Iletu, on his way back to Ili, and Otruchi conveyed Ablai’s misgivings to him too. Iletu explained that the Qing had no intention of expelling the Kazakhs. On this occasion Dosun Sultan, the son of the *taiji*-title holder Khanbaba and one of the members of the mission, stated that the mission had no objective apart from having an audience with the Qianlong emperor.¹⁰⁾ However, on arriving in Beijing, Otruchi attempted to submit to the emperor a letter concerning Tashkent that he had brought with him clandestinely. Learning of this, the Qianlong emperor openly showed his distrust of Ablai and personally reprimanded Otruchi during his audience with him. He further instructed Iletu, who had returned to his post of Military Governor of Ili, to take greater care when dealing with Ablai in the future. Having been apprised of the facts of the matter, Iletu concluded that Ablai had taken advantage of his absence from Ili to send a tribute mission.¹¹⁾ Consequently, the Qing once again suspended Kazakh tribute missions, although this was partly because it also coincided with the period of mourning for the Grand Empress Dowager, who had died in February 1777.¹²⁾

About two years later, in June 1779, Iletu gathered information so as to gain a better grasp of the current state of the Kazakhs. What attracted particular attention was the testimony of Baba Khoja, a merchant from Tashkent who was visiting Ili. When he had been in Tashkent two years earlier, Otruchi had

been sent by Ablai to Tashkent, and on this occasion he had told the people of Tashkent that the Qing emperor had “issued an edict for the tribute-tax of Tashkent to be given to Ablai” and had shown them a document written on yellow paper and affixed with a red seal. Khojam Batashan, the *beg* of Tashkent, saw through Ablai’s ploy and, after having sent Otruchi back, killed his son who had remained behind.¹³⁾

Although the truth of this testimony is unclear, Ablai’s attitude of ignoring Qing wishes and aiming for control of Tashkent, and his fabrication of an imperial edict (or his misrepresentation of its contents) were unpardonable. Iletu decided that, should Ablai send any more envoys as part of a stratagem for gaining possession of Tashkent, they would be promptly sent back.¹⁴⁾ In the summer of the same year Ablai sent his son-in-law Dair Sultan to Ili and applied for permission to send a separate tribute mission during the same year; however, Iletu rejected this request.¹⁵⁾

Shortly afterwards, at the start of 1780, a mission headed by Ablai’s son Sedek arrived in Ili. According to Sedek, he had set out on Ablai’s orders and had met Dair en route to Ili, but had decided to continue to Ili all the same. Taking into account the fact that it was the middle of winter and many livestock would die if the mission was turned back, and also that Sedek was only sixteen years old, Iletu decided to allow them to stay in Ili over the winter and then send them on their way to Beijing.¹⁶⁾ However, in Ablai’s letter that Sedek had with him it was stated that Ablai wished to borrow 500–600 Qing troops to attack Beg Bolot of the Qara-kesek tribe who had attacked Ablai in the summer of the previous year.¹⁷⁾ Iletu told Sedek that he could not comply with this request for the loan of troops since it was an internal matter among the Kazakhs.¹⁸⁾ The Qianlong emperor judged Iletu’s decision to have been appropriate and said that even if Sedek made the same request after his arrival in Beijing, it should be rejected in line with the policy that had already been decided on.¹⁹⁾ The Qing government no longer concerned itself about Kazakh requests for military assistance and showed no signs of becoming involved in the internal affairs of the Kazakhs on the grounds of an *ejen-albatu* relationship.

In this manner, in the 1770s Kazakh tribute missions were frequently suspended on account of the return of the Torguuds, repeated requests for military assistance, and the fabrication of an imperial edict, and relations between the Qing and Kazakhs deteriorated. When Ablai died in 1781, a struggle for succession to the position of *khan* broke out between his eldest son Wali and his son-in-law Dair (Altanochir and Wu 1998; Noda 2010: 140–2). Although, in the end, Wali succeeded to the position of *khan* and the title of *han*, the frequency of tribute missions did not return to one each year, and

relations with the Qing grew more distant by the year.

2. The Situation in the Southern Kazakh Steppe in the 1770s and the Qing Response

2.1. The Conflict between the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz

The prime reason for the rejection of Kazakh tribute missions was Ablai's requests for military assistance. What lay behind these requests? After the fall of the Junghars, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz intensified efforts to recover the pasturelands that had been seized by the Junghars. As a result of the southward advance of the Kazakhs and the northward advance of the Kirghiz, disputes over pasturelands occurred with some frequency on the southern Kazakh steppe, where the two sides came into contact with each other, and news of these disputes also began to reach Qing administrators in Ili and Tarbaghatai. In 1774, news reached Ili that the Kazakhs had suffered damage as a result of an attack by the Kirghiz. On receiving a report from Iletu, the Qianlong emperor declared that, in the event of a request for assistance from Ablai and Abulfeiz (?–1783), the second son of Abulmanbet Khan of the Middle Juz and the *wang*-title holder, the Qing would support neither the Kazakhs nor the Kirghiz, "who were both *albatu* of the Great Ejen," and stated that they should be dissuaded from retaliating against the repeated attacks.²⁰⁾ In other words, as he had done on the occasion of the conflict between the Kazakhs and Khoqand in 1767, from his position as their *ejen* the Qianlong emperor urged his *albatu* to reach an accord. However, not long afterwards news arrived that this time the Kazakhs had attacked the Kirghiz and taken more than 1,000 people captive.²¹⁾

In 1775 Abulfeiz sent his third son Bopu to Tarbaghatai. When the Councilor (Ma. *hebei amban*, Ch. *canzan dachen*) Kinggui (Ch. *Qinggui* 慶桂) asked him about the present situation regarding Kazakhs and Kirghiz, Bopu replied, "Currently both Ablai and Abulfeiz are in their respective pasturelands. They are also on very good terms with the Buruts."²²⁾ In addition, the circumstances surrounding the conflict since the previous year were explained in a letter written in Turkic that Bopu had brought with him from Abulfeiz.

When I was in my father's pastureland (*yurt*),²³⁾ the Kirghiz plundered the [Kazakh] tribesmen on the periphery. Khan Khoja Tura and Barak Batur went with 4,000 men to attack [the Kirghiz] in reprisal. The Kirghiz said, "We surrender and return the captives." [However,] they kept the [4,000] Kazakhs there for seventeen days and then captured them again. Moreover,

they came again to plunder the tribesmen known as Jafrashi.²⁴⁾ After that, Ablai Khan and I, leading 20,000 men, rescued the 4,000 men. An envoy [from the Kirghiz] came and said, “We surrender and return the captives,” and “Each of us, Kirghiz and Kazakhs, is the *albatu* of the Ejen Khan (Qing Emperor); let us live in harmony.” We repatriated [the captives] after pledging to return the captives to each other. [However,] the Kirghiz still have not returned [to us all] the captives since then. There are those who have returned and those who have not yet returned.²⁵⁾

While this presents the Kazakh view, it would seem that initially the Kirghiz had launched an attack, to which the Kazakhs retaliated, and this was later followed by the mutual repatriation of captives and a suspension of hostilities. In his reply to Abulfeiz, Iletu expressed a high appreciation of the reconciliation between the Kazakhs and Kirghiz and the repatriation of captives.²⁶⁾

However, November of the same year, about four months after Bopu’s return, Abulfeiz’s second son Jochi arrived in Ili and delivered to Iletu two Turkic letters in Abulfeiz’s name (hereafter referred to as Letter A²⁷⁾ and Letter B²⁸⁾). There follows first a translation of Letter A.

For many years, I have prayed for the well-being of the supreme Bogda Ejen Khan. I, Abulfeiz *wang*, greet the Military Governor and Agents at the military camp of Ili, who are carrying out duties for the Bogda Ejen Khan. After greeting them, the matters of business are as follows. I sent a letter to the Bogda Ejen Khan. Please inform the Khan of the contents of this letter with your words of good intent. I also inform you that you should receive an edict from the Khan and give it [to me]. When I sent a courteous letter to inform the Khan that, in the Ox year (1769), my father, Abulmanbet Khan, passed away, [the Bogda Ejen Khan] dispatched Oba²⁹⁾ *amban*, and I received favors; I have been rejoicing ever since. [However,] the relationship with the Tashkentis is not very peaceful. Thus, I will send a letter to the Bogda Ejen Khan. If you dispatch an envoy to [our] *yurt*, the reward will be extended to the unenlightened people of [our] *yurt*. In addition, the request from [our] *yurt* to the Military Governor and Agents is as follows. Although we are at peace with the Kirghiz, they do not desist from stealing and lying. I will thus establish a *karun* (*qarāwul*) between the two *yurts*. This *karun* will be established on this side of Qaratal. I inform you that I would like to establish the *karun* after your person has come. Because the land beyond Ayaguz is yours, I ask you for an imperial edict. I wrote this letter on the 6th day of the scorpion month (i.e., the 8th

month). Abulfeiz *wang* [presented] one tribute horse and Jochi *gong* [presented] one tribute horse.

In the latter part of this letter, while stating that relations with the Kirghiz are amicable, Abulfeiz asks the Qing to establish a *karun*, or guard-post, as a measure to prevent any future harm. Although this was felt to be somewhat unexpected, in the course of his investigations Iletu discovered that on the occasion of an earlier tribute mission headed by Jochi (in either January 1769 or February 1773) there had been issued on the basis of a proposal by Fulungga (Ch. *Fulong'an* 福隆安), Grand Minister Controlling the Imperial Guards (Ch. *ling shiwei nei dachen*), an edict urging the establishment of a *karun* on the border between the Kazakhs and Kirghiz so as to prevent any clashes between them.³⁰⁾

Because of the existence of this edict, the Qing authorities were in a quandary about how to deal with the situation. In the end, while considering it understandable that the Kazakhs had requested the establishment of a *karun*, Iletu gave only a vague reply in which he failed to touch on the dispatch of personnel from the Qing and left the establishment of the *karun* and its location to the discretion of the Kazakhs.³¹⁾ Thereafter, perhaps because of the above-mentioned question of Tashkent's offering to the Qing emperor and the Kazakh violations of the *karun* line to be discussed in the next section, discussion of the establishment of *karuns* petered out.

2.2. The Dispute over Turkistan

Next, I wish to examine Letter B. The greater part of its contents concerned Turkistan (formerly known as Yas), which had also been touched on in Letter A.

For many years, I have prayed for the well-being of the supreme Bogda Ejen Khan. My great father passed away. Henceforth, when reporting any matter of justice, we will inform the Bogda Ejen Khan of it. Through Eshim Khan, Janggir Khan, Tauke Khan, Bolat Khan, and my father Abulmanbet Khan, over [a period of] several ancestors, [my clan] has been the *khan* of the *yurt* known as Turkistan. [However,] in our generation, on the other hand, our brothers are attempting to take over the *yurt* (i.e., Turkistan) to share among themselves. People formerly unrelated to the *yurt* are now attempting to take it over! If my father formerly [ruled] by himself, the district should be ours. If our brothers or others oppose us, I hope that the petition will first reach [the presence of] God and then our

justice. I am not always able to deliver my words to the Emperor (*pādshāh*). I hope that you, the Military Governor, will deliver this request to the supreme Bogda Ejen Khan, receive an imperial edict for us, and then deliver it to us. I wrote this letter on the 6th day of the Scorpion month.

According to this letter, after Abulmanbet's death there were moves by rival forces to seize control of Turkistan. Abulfeiz outlined the history of rule of Turkistan by successive *khans* down to Abulmanbet and asserted the legitimacy of his own clan's rule. He probably hoped to gain the stamp of approval with an edict from the Qianlong emperor.

Turkistan was often regarded as the "capital" of the Kazakh Khanate. Being the burial place of the renowned Sufi Ahmad Yasawi (d. 1166/7), it was regarded as sacred, and the mausolea of successive Kazakh *khans* were also erected here (Noda 2007). However, in the 17th to 18th centuries the *khans'* power gradually contracted as a result of division among the Kazakhs, invasion by the Junghars, and the northward advance of the Uzbeks. Although it is true that Abulmanbet had lived in Turkistan, he had no influence over the politics of each Juz, and even in the Middle Juz powerful *sultāns* such as Ablai and Abulfeiz each acted independently (Gurevich 1979: 62).

In response to Iletu's questions about the contents of Letter B, Jochi also stated that the tribute-tax from Turkistan had in fact been shared between Abulmanbet Khan and his uncle Semeke Khan, and that Abulmanbet had not exercised exclusive rule over Turkistan.³²⁾ He further revealed that the place of contention was rather the small town of Karnak to the north of Turkistan and that his real objective on this occasion was to ask for assistance in this regard. Having ascertained that their opponent Esem was a close relative of Abulmanbet's clan, Iletu addressed Jochi as follows:

If Esem is an allegiant member of your clan, it is an internal affair on your side. Because I do not know the original circumstances, it will not work if we handle it in your place. How can I possibly memorialize it to the Great Ejen and send you our envoy? You should address this matter among yourselves. Otherwise, you should consult with Ablai to address it.³³⁾

Jochi replied that Ablai was aware of the circumstances and he too had his sights on Turkistan. Iletu analyzed as follows the request for assistance and intervention from Abulfeiz, which had followed on from a similar request by Ablai.

Recently, Otruchi was dispatched by Ablai for a loan of soldiers and an offer to present the land of Tashkent to the Great Ejen. It is hardly possible that Abulfeiz had not heard anything about this. Probably, without knowing about the situation in which [Otruchi] was forced to return by Your Servant, Abulfeiz suspected that Ablai might present the land of Turkistan and then dispatched his son, Jochi. Alternatively, they may actually be at variance and be competing with one another. [In any case,] there is no regulation for us to get involved in this issue. We should immediately refuse [the request].³⁴⁾

When Iletu put this view to Jochi, the latter was at a loss for an answer and merely muttered, “I had not at all heard that Ablai had sent someone.”

2.3. The Establishment of the Principle of Nonintervention

Noteworthy in the Qing response to the Kazakhs’ dispute over Turkistan is that the Qing government gave franker expression than ever before to its nonintervention in the internal affairs of the Kazakhs. This could also be discerned in its response to Ablai’s request for military assistance discussed earlier, and here I wish to confirm this in later developments concerning Turkistan.

In June 1779, rumors reached Ili that in the previous autumn Abulfeiz had gone to his older brother Bolat and had not returned. According to information gained from a Kazakh merchant who had come to Ili for the purpose of trade, after Abulmanbet’s death Esem had conspired to seize the tribute-tax that Bolat, who had succeeded to the position of *khan* and the title of *han*, was collecting from Turkistan, and so Abulfeiz had gone to his brother’s base in order to counter Esem’s scheme but had now returned to his own pasturelands.³⁵⁾ Iletu’s reaction to this news is intriguing.

Judging from the news that Esem and Abulfeiz went [to Bolat] and [Abulfeiz] has returned, I suppose that this problem has already been resolved between them. If they cannot settle the matter between themselves, Abulfeiz may again dispatch people to Ili to ask us [about a solution to the problem]. This is an affair of discord among them, which is not a hindrance to us at all but, rather, is useful [for us] in many ways. Because we need not to be involved in it, even if they dispatch people to ask us, I, Your Servant, following the precedent, will tell them to return [to their *yurt*].³⁶⁾

Not only did Iletu follow the policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of the Kazakhs, but he also judged their internal strife to be advantageous to the Qing. Since the middle of the 18th century the Qing had adopted a diplomatic stance of intervention or urging reconciliation with regard to conflicts among Central Asian parties, but this stance had now been abandoned. The Qing principle of nonintervention in foreign matters, which led to its acquiescence to Russia's swallowing up of the Kazakhs in the first half of the 19th century and incurred the alienation of Kazakh chieftains, was established in the midst of the turmoil in Qing-Kazakh relations in the 1770s.

3. The Suspension of the Policy of Incorporating Kazakhs and Its Background

After its conquest of the Junghars, the Qing not only extended the personal *ejen-albatu* relationship to Central Asians over whom it had no effective control, but also established *karuns* and introduced to Central Asia the territorial distinction between lands lying inside and outside the *karun* line. As a result, there arose a contradictory situation in which those lying inside and outside the *karun* line were all in the position of the Qing emperor's *albatu* and were in theory not differentiated. In fact, there were some Kazakhs who requested permission to migrate inside the *karun* line on the basis of their position as *albatu*, and the Qing accepted their incorporation under the direct rule. At the time, extraterritorial and intraterritorial awareness was not yet absolute in the northwestern borderlands of the Qing, and there were instances in which importance was placed on personal relationships (Onuma 2010a: 111–7).

The Qing continued thereafter to accept Kazakhs who wished to be incorporated under Qing rule. The number of those who were accepted at one time was by no means large, and it would seem that in most cases they submitted to Qing rule as individuals or in family units. However, the population of incorporated Kazakhs living in the foothills of the Barliq Mountain to the southwest of Tarbaghatai steadily increased, and in 1778 this led to the formation of a *niru* consisting chiefly of incorporated Kazakhs (Onuma 2003). However, the following year the Qing suddenly suspended its policy of incorporating Kazakhs. Zhang Yongjiang explains that the reason for this was that the problem of northern Xinjiang's sparse population ever since the conquest of the Junghars had been resolved with the return of the Torguuds in 1771 and the acceptance of Kazakhs lost its meaning (Zhang 2001: 160–1). While this may be counted as one of the main reasons, the policy of incorporation

was suspended eight years after the return of the Torguuds, and the reason for its suspension cannot be attributed to this alone. The decision to suspend the incorporation of Kazakhs was made at a time when Qing-Kazakh relations were deteriorating and the Qing principle of nonintervention in foreign matters was being established. What was the cause-and-effect relationship between these various developments?

3.1. Kazakh Violations of the *Karun* Line and the Reform of the *Karun* Management System

The Qing allocated pasturelands in northern Xinjiang and western Mongolia to the Torguuds who returned in 1771. In 1778 the makeup of the Green Standard Army (Ch. *lüying*) stationed in Ili changed from troops who had been posted to Ili without their families to troops who were accompanied by their families and lived permanently in Ili, and they were based in four walled towns called Guangren 廣仁, Zhande 瞻德, Gongchen 拱宸, and Xichun 熙春 that were newly built by the Qing (being completed in 1780). In Tarbaghatai, too, four Oyirad *niru* were transferred from Urumchi in 1777 to bolster defences.³⁷⁾ The formation of a Kazakh *niru* in 1778 also formed part of this series of moves. In addition, large numbers of Han-Chinese peasants settled in the northern foothills of the Tianshan Mountains. According to Hua Li's estimates, by 1780 the agricultural population of northern Xinjiang exceeded 110,000 (Hua 1995: 79). The 18th century was a period of explosive population growth in China proper, and northern Xinjiang was one of the safety valves for this population pressure.

In this manner, in the 1770s, especially in the second half of the decade, the Qing proceeded to expand its system of rule in northern Xinjiang.³⁸⁾ One aspect of this was the reform of the system for managing *karuns*. Hitherto jurisdiction over all of the approximately twenty *karuns* affiliated to Ili had resided solely in the Military Governor of Ili. However, because there were many of them and they lay at some distance from each other, it was impossible to respond promptly to incidents such as incursions by external enemies. Accordingly, in late 1777 Iletu submitted a proposal to assign jurisdiction of *karuns* to the Manju, Solon, Sibe, Chaqar, and Oyirad military camps under the control of the Military Governor of Ili and make the Commandants (Ma. *meyen i amban*, Ch. *lingdui dachen*) of each military camp responsible for their security, and this proposal was approved.³⁹⁾

Prior to this change, there had occurred an incident of armed conflict in Tarbaghatai between Kazakhs and Qing troops stationed at Ulan Bura *karun*,

one of the winter *karuns* that extended northeast from Tarbaghatai. In February 1778, a group of Kazakhs led by Kutusi appeared and asked to be allowed to cross inside the *karun* line to look for some horses that had run away. Oljui, an Imperial Guard (Ma. *hiya*, Ch. *shiwai*) at the *karun*, rejected this request since there were no signs of any horses having entered inside the *karun* line. Kutusi and his associates then moved to a different location and crossed the *karun* line without permission. Because they resisted the Qing troops who rushed towards them, the Qing troops fought back with bows and arrows and with firearms. The Kazakhs all fled, and Oljui captured ten of the horses that they had been riding. In the evening of the same day Kutusi's elder brother Jangtugel came to apologize for his brother's error and implored Oljui to return the ten horses and not report the incident to the Councilor of Tarbaghatai. Oljui returned eight of the horses, saying he would return the other two if Kutusi himself came to get them, and put off reporting the incident.⁴⁰⁾

However, in May the incident came to light. The Kazakh *taiji*-title holder Shaniyaz⁴¹⁾ sent Kutusi to Tarbaghatai to ask for a search to be launched for the missing horses since they were Shaniyaz's own horses and to lodge a complaint against Oljui for his handling of the incident.⁴²⁾ With regard to the request for a search for the missing horses, Kinggui sent a reply to Shaniyaz saying that they had been unable to find the horses inside the *karun* line and there were no signs of any horses having crossed it.⁴³⁾ As for Oljui, although Kinggui summoned him to Tarbaghatai, where he was questioned, he was immediately sent back to Ulan Bura *karun*, and after his return to his post Oljui returned the remaining two horses to Kutusi.⁴⁴⁾ On receiving a report of the incident, the Qianlong emperor felt that there was much about it that remained unclear, and so he ordered Iletu to go to Tarbaghatai and carry out a thorough investigation to get to the bottom of the matter.⁴⁵⁾ It was most unusual for the Military Governor of Ili to leave his post for any reason other than the suppression of an uprising.

Iletu left Ili on June 2, and he also sent the Imperial Guard Turmunke to visit Abulfeiz and Shaniyaz. Soon after Iletu's arrival in Tarbaghatai, Turmunke arrived together with Shaniyaz's son Suyuk. Although Iletu admitted that Oljui's handling and concealment of the incident had been wrong, he concluded that the fundamental cause of the incident lay with the Kazakhs.⁴⁶⁾ He also handed Suyuk a letter addressed to Abulfeiz and Shaniyaz in which it was stated that the Kazakhs would be severely punished if they made any further incursions inside the *karun* line.⁴⁷⁾ There were no further requests from the Kazakhs for searches for the missing horses.

However, not long after this issue had been resolved, a fresh incident

occurred. According to a report from Saran, who was stationed at Jimersek *karun*,⁴⁸⁾ a group of Kazakhs had trespassed inside the *karun* line and were occupying the area, and they were also showing signs of heading deeper into Qing territory. Udai (Ch. *Wudai* 伍岱), the Commandant of Tarbaghatai, immediately set out with troops to drive the Kazakhs out. Having heard of their imminent arrival, the Kazakhs all fled outside the *karun* line before Udai's arrival. Udai left Saran with eighty troops and had them search the area along the *karun* line, and he also sent a detachment to Uriyasutu *karun* to drive out other Kazakhs who had been living there clandestinely.⁴⁹⁾

What is worth noting here is that on October 12, 1778, when the memorial relating to the above events was drafted, Iletu and Kinggui submitted in their joint names another memorial proposing a reform of the system for patrolling the *karuns* north of the town of Tarbaghatai. Until then, the relocation from summer *karuns* to winter *karuns* had been carried out by the 9th month of the lunisolar calendar, on which occasion the Commandant was dispatched from the town of Tarbaghatai to patrol the *karun* line. In the event that Kazakhs then moved into the vacant land between the two *karun* lines, a detachment would once again be dispatched from the town of Tarbaghatai to collect a "horse tax" (one head of horse per every 100). Iletu and Kinggui, on the other hand, proposed that in the future a detachment to collect the horse tax should be sent out first and then the Commandant should carry out his patrol tour of the *karuns*. The aim of this proposal was to ensure that when a problem arose with the Kazakhs, the detachment would be able to respond promptly on the Commandant's instructions.⁵⁰⁾ Considering that this proposal was submitted by Iletu and Kinggui on the same day as the report on the Kazakh violation of the *karun* line, it is clear that the series of incidents that had occurred in the vicinity of the *karun* line provided the motive for the change in system. In the course of these events the *karuns* came to be regarded as even more important for the defence of the Qing borderlands, and the awareness of territorial division between the inside and outside of the *karun* line suddenly increased.

3.2. The Suspension of the Policy of Incorporating Kazakhs

From 1761 to 1778 the Qing accepted any Kazakhs who wished to submit to Qing rule and settled them in the Barliq Mountain. There was, however, a subtle change in the Qing stance following the return of the Torguuds in 1771. When they had crossed the Kazakh steppe, the Torguuds had been attacked by Kazakhs, and many of them had been killed or fallen by the wayside. In addition, some Kazakhs had slipped in among the Torguuds who had been

admitted into Qing territory. Although the Qing authorities were aware of this, they did not make an issue of it. Then in 1773 Ablai proposed an exchange of Torguuds living among the Kazakhs and Kazakhs living among the Torguuds inside Qing territory. The Qianlong emperor, judging that confusion would ensue if these two groups of people were indiscriminately exchanged, rejected this proposal.⁵¹⁾ Meanwhile, any Torguuds fleeing from the Kazakh steppe were immediately admitted by the Qing, and there were also instances in which Kazakh chieftains handed Torguuds over to the Qing authorities.⁵²⁾

In contrast to these moves, there is to be observed a tendency on the part of the Qing to become less favorably disposed towards accepting Kazakhs. In 1775 Kinggui twice drove away the Kazakh Doholok and his wife and child and, thinking that they might head towards Ili, sent a document with a description of their appearance to Ili. When they appeared in Ili under false names, their true identity was exposed and they were expelled.⁵³⁾ The Qing attitude had hardened, and it refused to admit Kazakhs who did not already have kinsmen in the Barliq Mountain and whose identity was unclear.⁵⁴⁾ This tendency manifested in more concrete form after the formation of the Kazakh *niru* in 1778.

At the start of 1779, about 100 Kazakhs of the Aq-nayman tribe led by Museb arrived in Tarbaghatai and asked to be allowed to settle in Qing territory. Because their group was of an unprecedented size, Kinggui sought a decision from the Qianlong emperor. The latter was of the view that the number of Kazakhs wishing to migrate to Qing territory, where law and order were maintained and tribute-taxes and taxes on livestock were not levied,⁵⁵⁾ was increasing because “theft and deceit” were rampant in the land of the Kazakhs.⁵⁶⁾ This view would have also taken into account the frequent violations of the *karun* line by Kazakhs in the previous year. Iletu considered the cause of the “theft and deceit” to lie in decreasing numbers of livestock due to constant fighting between the Kazakhs and Kirghiz.⁵⁷⁾ In the end the Qianlong emperor made the following decision:

All the Kazakhs, from Ablai and Abulfeiz down to commoners, are my *albatu*. There is no distinction in living inside or outside [the *karun* line]. That being said, seeing that no fewer than 100 Kazakhs, like the party led by Museb, have come to submit [to the Qing], if we accept them willingly, our land will later be occupied [by the Kazakhs]. Also, since the population [around Ili] is gradually increasing, this is not beneficial for various reasons. To begin with, we readily accept people like them (i.e., the Kazakhs led by Museb) when they come to submit; why do Ablai and

others hope for this? I think that, rather than telling Ablai and Abulfeiz from our own lips that we cannot accept the party, it is better to order Iletu to send them a letter to ask whether it is beneficial to them that we accept such people who come to submit. Ablai will then surely say in his reply that it is not beneficial to them. Later, with Ablai's words as an excuse, we have only to send back all the Kazakhs who newly come to submit without reading their faces.⁵⁸⁾

The Qianlong emperor recognized the contradiction in regarding without distinction those living inside and outside the *karun* line as *albatu*. He feared that if they continued to accept Kazakhs, the pasturelands of northern Xinjiang would be occupied by them and trouble would break out with local inhabitants. However, if a suspension of incorporation were to be announced unilaterally, further friction might arise between the Qing and the Kazakhs, with whom relations had already deteriorated. The Qianlong emperor accordingly decided to first exact a statement from Ablai and Abulfeiz and then use this as a pretext for rejecting those wishing to be admitted into Qing territory. On receiving orders to this effect, Iletu sent the following letter to Ablai and Abulfeiz:

Iletu, as Military Governor of Ili, Grand Minister Controlling the Imperial Guards, and Minister of the Board, reported [the following messages] to the Kazakh *han* Ablai and *wang* Abulfeiz. *Han* and *wang*, are you in good health? Is every pastureland of yours at peace? Recently, a letter stating that 100 Kazakhs of your Aq-nayman tribesmen, consisting of Museb, Harmas, and their family, had asked to become the *albatu* of the Great Ejen and live inside [the *karun* line] was sent from our Councilor of Tarbaghatai. You Kazakhs are the *albatu* of the Great Ejen. It is the same whether you are in your land or, after coming to submit [to the Qing], in our land inside the *karun* line. Because it is by no means impossible [to live on the inside], we have accepted everyone and have permitted them to live there if they were with one or two persons. However, seeing now that 100 persons, led by Museb, have come to submit, such people will continually and surely increase. We think that it will be not beneficial to you at all if they come to submit and the population [of Kazakhs] living in our land increases. However, because we do not know whether, after all, it is beneficial to you when they come to live in our land, in accordance with the Great Ejen's heartfelt wish to treat you kindly, I give you this letter to ascertain your intentions. You should immediately send me a letter to answer whether, after all, it is beneficial to you when they come to live in

our land. If it is not beneficial to you, we would prefer not to accept [the Kazakhs]. I have reported for this reason.⁵⁹⁾

In line with the Qianlong emperor's intentions, this letter was cleverly written in a way that did not touch on the fact that continuing to accept Kazakhs would inconvenience the Qing government and instead sought to extract from Ablai and Abulfeiz a statement to justify the banning of further incorporation of Kazakhs. In the following year, 1779, a reply arrived from Ablai, written in Turkic.⁶⁰⁾ In his letter, Ablai thanked the Qing for its approach and stated that the Kazakhs would not suffer any disadvantage if the Aq-nayman tribesmen were sent back. As intended, the Qing succeeded in obtaining a statement to justify the banning of further incorporation of Kazakhs, and in point of fact the following year some Kazakhs wishing to settle in Qing territory were expelled from Tarbaghatai on the basis of this letter.⁶¹⁾

The Qing policy of incorporating Kazakhs was thus suspended. The direct reason for this was population growth in northern Xinjiang and increasing numbers of Kazakhs wishing to settle in Qing territory. However, behind this change in policy lay the chaotic situation on the Central Asian steppes, including the deterioration in Qing-Kazakh relations and fighting between the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. The suspension of the policy of incorporating Kazakhs can be regarded as a phenomenon that was inseparably related to the Qing principle of nonintervention in Central Asian affairs which came into force around the same time.

Concluding Remarks

In the 1770s the political and social situation in northern Xinjiang underwent enormous change. Following the return of the Torguuds in 1771, the Qing proceeded to extend its rule, and the sparse population of the region gradually increased. At the same time, Qing-Kazakh relations progressively deteriorated, and the dispatch of tribute missions was repeatedly suspended because of the question of Ablai's offering of the revenue of Tashkent to the Qing emperor and his repeated requests for military assistance. In addition, a framework of both internal and external conflict developed on the Kazakh steppe at this time, the influence of which also extended to northern Xinjiang, and the Qing government found itself in a quandary about how to deal with the situation. It was in such circumstances that the Qing policy of nonintervention in Central Asian affairs was established. The Qing's acquiescence to Russia's swallowing up of the Kazakhs in the first half of the 19th century was

an extension of these developments.

Further, in 1777–78 the Qing reformed the system for managing *karuns*. As the *raison d'être* of *karuns* rose on account of violations of the *karun* line by Kazakhs, the contradictions inherent in the coexistence of a sense of territoriality that differentiated between the inside and outside of the *karun* line and a personal *ejen-albatu* relationship in which the inside and outside of the *karun* line formed a continuum became more pronounced. Ultimately, the Qing began to steer its policy in the direction of placing greater emphasis on the former in discussions about the incorporation of Kazakhs and in 1779 suspended the policy of incorporating Kazakhs. This was the moment when the Qing government's consciousness of the "territorial principle" eclipsed its conception of the "personal principle."⁶²⁾ In this manner, the northwestern borderlands of the Qing, in which ambiguity—and also flexibility—had prevailed since the conquest of the Junghars, were slowly closed off.⁶³⁾

This period around the middle of the Qianlong reign corresponded to the height of the Qing's "prosperous age." The issues examined in this article may have been trivial incidents that occurred in one small corner of the Qing empire. However, they accurately reflect, I believe, the transformation of the dynasty that had been proceeding in the background to this flourishing period known as the "Pax Manchurica."

Notes

- * This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 17K03141 and 25244025.
- 1) In this article, the traditional title *qayan/khān* used by Mongolian and Turkic leaders, especially of the Chinggisids in Central Eurasia, is rendered *khan*; *han* 汗 as a title of the peerage bestowed on Mongolian and Kazakh leaders by the Qing emperor is referred to as *han*. For the Qing system of title bestowed on the Kazakh leaders, see Noda 2010; Noda 2016: 181–212; Onuma 2018: 69–70.
- 2) This *ejen-albatu* relationship had its origins in Mongol nomadic society and was established by the Qing dynasty in its relations with Mongol nomads under its rule (Onuma 2014: 93–100).
- 3) On the dates of arrival of Kazakh tribute missions and the makeup of these missions, see Onuma 2010b: 156–9. Details will not be noted hereafter.
- 4) XMD 125: 275–6, QL40/8/20 (Sept. 14, 1775), memorial from Iletu.
- 5) XMD 125: 276.
- 6) XMD 125: 281–2.
- 7) "Golden hem" (Ma. *aisin buten*) probably corresponds to *altin/altun etäk* found in Turkic documents sent by the Kazakhs to the Qing (Noda and Onuma 2010: 41–2).
- 8) XMD 130: 263, QL41/9/19 (Oct. 30, 1776), memorial from Sonomčering.
- 9) Traditionally, many Kazakhs and Kirghiz have worn a white felt hat (*aq qalpaq*).

- 10) XMD 131: 52–62, QL41/11/6 (Dec. 16, 1776), memorial from Iletu.
- 11) XMD 132: 88–91, QL42/3/16 (Apr. 23, 1777), memorial from Iletu.
- 12) XMD 132: 82–4, QL42/3/16 (Apr. 23, 1777), memorial from Iletu. Tribute missions from the Torguuds, Kirghiz, and Khoqand were also suspended on account of the Grand Empress Dowager's death.
- 13) XMD 140: 48–9, QL44/5/6 (June 19, 1779), memorial from Iletu; GZSL, *juan* 1084: 1a–2a, QL44/6/*guichou* (July 13, 1779).
- 14) XMD 140: 49–50.
- 15) XMD 141: 360, QL45/1/3 (Feb. 7, 1780), memorial from Iletu.
- 16) XMD 141: 360–3. Sedek's mission had an audience with the Qianlong emperor in Beijing in June 1780. See GZSL, *juan* 1106: 9b, QL45/5/*renwu* (June 6, 1780).
- 17) QMJD 14: 247, QL45/1/25 (Feb. 29, 1780).
- 18) GZSL, *juan* 1099: 7a–b, QL45/1/*jiachen* (Feb. 29, 1780).
- 19) QMJD 14: 247.
- 20) QMJD 11: 17–20, QL39/2/18 (Mar. 29, 1774); GZSL, *juan* 953: 1b–2b, QL39/2/*gengzi* (Mar. 28, 1774).
- 21) GZSL, *juan* 958: 18a–b, QL39/5/*dingmao* (June 23, 1774).
- 22) XMD 124: 207, QL40/6/2 (June 29, 1775), memorial from Kinggui.
- 23) In 1773–74 the *wang*-title holder Abulfeiz was residing in the former *yurt* of his father Abulmanbet (d. 1769), probably in the vicinity of Turkistan (Noda and Onuma 2010: 31–3).
- 24) A tribe belonging to the Senior Juz, known as Shapyrashty in modern Kazakh.
- 25) JMLZ 2636.13, 106: 1015, QL40/6/15 (July 12, 1775), attachment to memorial from Iletu. On the text of this document, see Onuma 2014: 222, n. 36.
- 26) XMD 124: 274–5, QL40/6/15 (July 12, 1775), attachment to memorial from Iletu, et al.
- 27) JMLZ 2654.20.1, 109: 973–4, QL40/10/21 (Nov. 14, 1775), attachment to memorial from Iletu. On the text of Letter A, see Onuma 2014: 223, n. 41.
- 28) JMLZ 109: 972, attachment to memorial from Iletu. On the text of Letter B, see Onuma 2014: 225, n. 44.
- 29) Although it is written “Oba” (اوبيا), this is thought to refer to Ojin (Ch. *Ejin* 鄂津), whom the Qing sent on the occasion of Abulmanbet's death. GZSL, *juan* 844: 27a–b, QL34/10/*yichou* (Nov. 4, 1769).
- 30) XMD 126: 281, QL40/10/21 (Nov. 14, 1775), memorial from Iletu.
- 31) XMD 126: 281–2.
- 32) This exchange between Jochi and Iletu is based on the account in XMD (126: 279–81).
- 33) XMD 126: 280.
- 34) XMD 126: 280.
- 35) XMD 140: 75–6, QL44/5/16 (June 29, 1779), memorial from Iletu.
- 36) XMD 140: 76–7.
- 37) TS, *juan* 1: 8b.
- 38) The Qing victory in the Jinchuan campaign in 1776 can be posited as one background factor in this. After the subjugation of Jinchuan, there were no military campaigns requiring the deployment of substantial military forces for about ten years, and it may have become possible to improve the system of rule in border regions.

- 39) XMD 134: 3–4, QL42/11/28 (Dec. 27, 1777), memorial from Iletu.
- 40) XMD 135: 234–5, QL43/6/10 (July 3, 1778), memorial from Iletu.
- 41) Shaniyaz was the son of Kuchuk, a younger brother of Barak of the Senior Juz, and a younger cousin of Khan Khoja.
- 42) XMD 135: 28–33, QL43/4/7 (May 3, 1778), memorial from Kinggui.
- 43) XMD 135: 33–9.
- 44) XMD 135: 236.
- 45) XMD 135: 234.
- 46) XMD 135: 76–7, QL43/*6/2 (June 25, 1778), memorial from Iletu.
- 47) XMD 135: 330–8, QL43/*6/1 (June 24, 1778), attachment to memorial from Iletu.
- 48) Jimersek *karun* is depicted as the second summer *karun* from Tarbaghatai in the *Da Qing yitong yutu* (Comprehensive Atlas of the Great Qing).
- 49) XMD 135: 278–80, QL43/8/22 (Oct. 12, 1778), memorial from Kinggui.
- 50) XMD 135: 276–7, QL43/8/22 (Oct. 12, 1778), memorial from Iletu, et al.
- 51) QMJD 10: 502–4, QL38/10/29 (Dec. 12, 1773); GZSL, *juan* 945: 29a–30a, QL38/10/*guichou* (Dec. 11, 1773).
- 52) XMD 124: 208–9.
- 53) XMD 125: 194–200, QL40/8/12 (Sept. 6, 1775), memorial from Kinggui, et al.
- 54) XMD 123: 213–5, QL40/3/29 (Apr. 28, 1775), memorial from Kinggui.
- 55) Kazakhs living inside Qing territory were exempted from military service and taxation (Onuma 2003: 570–1).
- 56) XMD 139: 82, QL44/2/5 (Mar. 22, 1779), memorial from Iletu, et al.
- 57) XMD 139: 84.
- 58) QMJD 14: 12–3, QL44/1/16 (Mar. 3, 1779).
- 59) XMD 139: 85–6.
- 60) JMLZ 2800.5.2, 117: 168–9, QL44/9 (Oct. 10–Nov. 7, 1779). On the text of this document, see Noda and Onuma 2010: 38–42.
- 61) XMD 140: 290–2, QL44/8/20 (Sept. 29, 1779), memorial from Kinggui.
- 62) It is to be surmised that this change was connected to the demarcation of the borders of the three western Qalq-a leagues (Oka 1988: 21–4).
- 63) This does not mean that personal relationships and their logic disappeared in Qing foreign policy, and it means only that these were premised on a distinction between inside and outside the *karun* line. The *ejen-albatu* relationship was maintained in Qing-Kazakh political negotiations in terms of discourse at least until the Jiaqing reign (Hua 2006: 187–8).

Abbreviations

- GZSL: Qinggui 慶桂, et al., comp. 1807. *Da Qing Gaozong Chun huangdi shilu* 大清高宗純皇帝實錄. 1500 *juan*. Repr., 30 vols. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964.
- JMLZ: *Junjichu manwen lufu zouzhe* 軍機處滿文錄副奏折, Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 (First Historical Archives of China), Beijing.
- KRO: Kireev, F. N., ed. 1961. *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh: sbornik dokumentov i materialov*. Alma-Ata: Nauka.
- QMJD: Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, ed. 2011. *Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian* 乾

- 隆朝满文寄信档译编 [Compilation of translations of Manchu correspondence during the Qianlong reign]. 24 vols. Changsha: Yuelu shushe.
- TS: Yongbao 永保 and Xingzhao 興肇, eds. 1805. *Ta'erbahatai shiyi* 塔爾巴哈台事宜. Repr., Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969.
- XMD: Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin 中国边疆史地研究中心, eds. 2012. *Qingdai Xinjiang manwen dang'an huibian* 清代新疆满文档案汇编 [Compilation of Manchu documents on Qing-period Xinjiang]. 283 vols. Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe.

Bibliography

- Alatengaoqi'er 阿拉腾奥其尔 (Altanochir) and Wu Yuanfeng 吴元丰. 1998. "Qingting cefeng Wali Suletan wei Hasake Zhongzhang han shimo: jianshu Wali Han mu E ji qi yuanyou" 清廷册封瓦里苏勒坦为哈萨克中帐汗始末: 兼述瓦里汗睦俄及其缘由 [A full account of the Qing court's investiture of Wali Sultan as the Kazakh khan: with reference to Wali Khan's rapprochement with Russia and the reasons for it]. *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 中国边疆史地研究 3 (1998): 52–58.
- Gurevich, B. P. 1979. *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v.* Moskva: Nauka.
- Hua Li 华立. 1995. *Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi* 清代新疆农业开发史 [The history of agricultural development in Qing-period Xinjiang]. Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe.
- . 2006. "Jiaqing si-wu nian Hasake wangwei chengxi wenti yu Qingting de duiying fangzhen" 嘉庆四–五年哈萨克王位承袭问题与清廷的对应方针 [The question of the Kazakh king's succession in Jiaqing 4–5 and the policy of the Qing court]. In Gugong bowuyuan 故宫博物院 and Guojia Qingshi bianzuan weiyuanhui 国家清史编纂委员会, eds., *Gugong bowuyuan bashi huadan ji guoji Qingshi xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* 故宫博物院八十华诞暨国际清史学术研讨会论文集 [Collection of papers published on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Palace Museum and the international academic conference on Qing history], 181–192. Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe.
- Li Sheng 厉声. 2003. "Qing wangchao dui xibei fanshu Hasake zhili zhengce yanjiu" 清王朝对西北藩属哈萨克治理政策研究 [A study of the Qing dynasty's administrative policy towards Kazakh vassals in the northwestern region]. In *Xibei minzu luncong* 西北民族论丛 2. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe: 185–213.
- . 2004. *Hasakesitan ji qi yu Zhongguo Xinjiang de guanxi: 15 shiji – 20 shiji zhongqi* 哈萨克斯坦及其与中国新疆的关系 (15世纪–20世纪中期) [Kazakhstan and its relationship with Xinjiang (15th–mid-20th century)]. Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe.
- Noda Jin 野田仁. 2005. "Ro-Shin no hazama no Kazafu hankoku: surutan to Shinchō no kankei o chūshin ni" 露清の狭間のカザフ・ハーン国：スルタンと清朝の関係を中心に [The Kazakh khanate between the Russian and Qing empires: with a focus on the relations of Kazakh sultans with the Qing dynasty]. *Tōyō gakuho* 東洋学報 87.2: 29–59.
- . 2007. "Kazafu hankoku to Torukisutan: yūbokumin no kunshu maisō to bobyō sūhai kara no kōsatsu" カザフ・ハン国とトルキスタン：遊牧民の君主埋葬と墓廟崇拜からの考察 [The Qazaq Khanate and Turkistan (Yasi): from the khans'

- burials and the Qazaq nomads' worship of the shrine]. *Isuramu sekai* イスラム世界 68: 1–24.
- . 2010. “An essay on the title of Kazakh sultans in the Qing archival documents.” In Noda and Onuma 2010: 126–151.
- . 2016. *The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian international relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries*. Leiden: Brill.
- and Onuma Takahiro. 2010. *A collection of documents from the Kazakh sultans to the Qing Dynasty (TIAS Central Eurasian Research Series, Special Issue 1)*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo.
- Oka Hiroki 岡洋樹. 1988. “Haruha Mongoru ni okeru Shinchō no meikisei shihai no seiritsu katei: bokuchi no mondai o chūshin to shite” ハルハ・モンゴルにおける清朝の盟旗制支配の成立過程：牧地の問題を中心として [The realization of the Ciyulyan-Qosiyu system in Qalq-a Mongolia: with special reference to the pasturelands of Qosiyu and Ciyulyan]. *Shigaku zasshi* 史学雑誌 97.2: 1–32.
- Onuma Takahiro 小沼孝博. 2003. “Lun Qingdai weiyi de Hasake niulu zhi bianshe ji qi yiyi” 论清代唯一的哈萨克牛录之编设及其意义 [A study of the formation of the only Kazakh *niru* in the Qing period and its significance]. In Zhu Chengru 朱诚如, ed., *Qingshi lunji: qinghe Wang Zhonghan jiaoshou jiushi huadan xueshu lunwenji* 清史论集: 庆贺王钟翰教授九十华诞学术论文集 [Studies on Qing history: Collection of essays published on the occasion of Prof. Wang Zhonghan's 90th birthday], 568–575. Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe.
- . 2010a. “Political relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh nomads in the mid-18th century: Promotion of the ‘Ejen-albatu relationship’ in Central Asia.” In Noda and Onuma 2010: 86–125.
- . 2010b. “Kazakh missions to the Qing court.” In Noda and Onuma 2010: 152–159.
- . 2014. *Shin to Chūō Ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* 清と中央アジア草原：遊牧民の世界から帝国の辺境へ [The Qing and the Central Asian steppe: from world of nomads to imperial borderlands]. Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai.
- . 2018. “Dispatch of the Nusan Mission: the negotiations between Qing and Ablay in 1757.” *GLOBAL-Turk* 1/2: 55–74.
- Pelliot, Paul. 1948. “Le Hōja et le Sayyid Hūsain de l'histoire des Ming.” *T'oung Pao* 38, no. 2–5: 81–292.
- Saguchi Tōru 佐口透. 1986. *Shinkyō minzoku shi kenkyū* 新疆民族史研究 [Studies of the history of the peoples of Xinjiang]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.
- Zhang Yongjiang 张永江. 2001. *Qingdai fanbu yanjiu: yi zhengzhi bianqian wei zhongxin* 清代藩部研究: 以政治变迁为中心 [A study of frontier regions in the Qing period: focusing on political developments]. Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe.