

Chapter 5

From Diplomacy to *Gaikō*: Meiji Japan and Its Perceptions of “Diplomacy”

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Introduction

In the modern world, the Japanese term “*gaikō*” 外交 and the English term “diplomacy” have come to be regarded as semantic equivalents. When translated into English, “*gaikō*” will, nine times out of ten, be rendered as “diplomacy”. Similarly, “diplomacy”, when translated into Japanese, is usually rendered as “*gaikō*”. While a number of other alternatives are available to us in Japanese-English and English-Japanese dictionaries, the choice of any term which fails to follow this convention will undoubtedly be perceived as a non-literal translation.

However, the reality is that “*gaikō*” and “diplomacy” are not semantically equivalent. While they may, in certain contexts, overlap in meaning, there are times when they do not. With this in mind, let us begin this chapter with a brief overview of how this issue confronts us in translation.

A comparison with the modern Chinese word “*waijiao*” 外交 serves as a good starting point. While the term contains elements of overlap with the Japanese term “*gaikō*”, again, they are not semantically identical. With regards to the term’s relation to the English “diplomacy”, let us consult the 1931 edition of R.H. Matthews’ *A Chinese-English Dictionary* [Mathews 1931]. There, one finds that the term “*waijiao*” is translated as “foreign relations or intercourse”, and no mention of the term “diplomacy” can be found. The 1979 edition of the *Zhong-Ying cidian* 中英辭典 [Beijing waiguoyu xueyuan *Zhong-Ying cidian* bianji weiyuanhui 1979] offers a differing perspective in its list of the translations of “diplomacy” and “foreign affairs”. While “diplomacy” is given here as one possible translation, it also appears that the term conveys a strong sense of the notion of “foreign affairs”. For further clarification, let us consult a Japanese dictionary. In the fourth edition of the *Kenkyūsha shin Wa-Ei daijiten* 研究社新和英大辞典 [Masuda 1974], “diplomacy”, “international politics”, “foreign policy”, and “diplomatic intercourse” are all listed as translations of “*gaikō*”. In the fifth edition of the same dictionary [Watanabe T., et al. 2003], in addition to the translations given above, the additional translations of “diplomatic relations” and “(door-to-door) sales” are also listed.

While such a simple adumbration does not do this matter sufficient justice, from the examples set out above one can observe that in Chinese, “*waijiao*”, in addition to encompassing the notion of “diplomacy”, also betrays a strong sense of the notions of “foreign relations” and “foreign affairs”. In Japanese, however, while “*gaikō*” is primarily used to convey the notion of “diplomacy”, instances can be found where it is also used to signify “foreign policy”. However, unlike its Chinese counterpart, “*gaikō*” cannot be translated as “foreign relations” or “foreign affairs”.

These differences in the Japanese and Chinese contexts become particularly palpable when we compare the two country’s naming practices for their foreign affairs organs. In Japan, the arm of the government that deals with foreign affairs is called the *gaimu shō* 外務省, while its Chinese counterpart is called the *waijiao bu* 外交部. Interestingly, in English, both are rendered as the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. In other words, the Japanese term “*gaimu*” 外務 and the Chinese term “*waijiao*” 外交, despite being different words, are both used to convey the idea of “foreign affairs”. It also bears mentioning that in Korea, another country which once used classical Chinese (Kr. *hanmun*; Jp. *kanbun*; Ch. *hanwen* 漢文) as its primary form of written language, from 1948 to 1998 the term “*oemu bu*” (외무부/外務部) was used to refer to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1998, however, “*oegyo bu*” (외교부/外交部) has been used. By comparison, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is called the “*Bộ Ngoại giao*” 外交部.

While transliterated forms of the term “diplomacy” have long since become obsolete in the countries which constituted the erstwhile Chinese-language sphere, in a number of other non-Western countries that employ the Roman alphabet for their written scripts, transliterated forms of the term appear to remain in common usage. Examples include the Mongolian “*dêplomati*”, the Malay “*diplomasi*”, and Swahili “*diplomasia*”. That being said, in the case of Mongolian, the term which sits best with native speakers appears to be “*GadaGadu bodulGa*” (foreign policy). We also find a number of other phrases offered under the “diplomacy” heading in Malay and Swahili dictionaries. For example, in a Malay dictionary one can find “*urusan luar negeri*” (foreign country affairs), and in a Swahili dictionary one can find the terms “*kigeni*” (foreign affairs) and “*nchi za nje*” (foreign country affairs). In a Thai dictionary (a language which does not employ the Roman alphabet), one can also note the term “*การทูต*” (affairs relating to a diplomatic mission), which, again, is not a transliterated form of the term “diplomacy”.

As we have seen, the way in which the English term “diplomacy” or Japanese term “*gaikō*” is rendered in other languages varies. However, understanding how usages vary from language to language is not the aim of this chapter. Rather, by employing a historical approach, this chapter seeks to understand the process by which “diplomacy” came to be expressed as “*gaikō*” in Japanese. It will also probe the question of what other kind of meanings the term “*gaikō*” has come to encompass outside of “diplomacy”. Through this analysis, we will come to understand the way in which the term “*gaikō*” was per-

ceived in the early Meiji period, and furthermore the term’s significance within world history as a whole.¹

1. The Etymology of “*Gaikō*” and Its Transformations across History

1. 1. Classical Chinese

Let us begin with an overview of the etymology of “*gaikō*”. While the term can be found in the classical Chinese lexicon (its Chinese reading being *waijiao*), its connotation slightly differs from that of the contemporary Japanese word.

According to the *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* 大漢和辭典 [Morohashi 1955–60: vol. 3], the term was used in classical Chinese to indicate the following:

*(1) Interactions between countries; relations between countries. ... (2) Personal interactions with a foreigner; interaction with a foreigner, or the very act of doing so. ... (3) Interactions with other people.*²

While the first definition exhibits similarities to the way in which the term is used in contemporary Japanese, it is much closer semantically to “foreign relations” than it is to “diplomacy”. The second, if interpreted negatively, equates to “betrayal” or “illicit intercourse”. The third definition is a reference to the interpersonal relations that exist between individuals.

The *Dai Kan-Wa jiten*’s definitions for “*waijiao*” draw upon a body of examples of the term in use in classical Chinese texts which serve to make clear that the ambiguous Chinese term of “*waijiao*” was not initially an appropriate choice for translating the English “diplomacy”. In 1864, when W. A. P. Martin undertook the task of translating Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law* (*Wanguo gongfa* 萬國公法), the sec-

¹ A number of excellent Japanese studies on the concept of diplomacy exist, the most famous of which is perhaps Uchiyama Masakuma’s 内山正熊 work [Uchiyama 1972]. On the English concept of “diplomacy”, Kōsaka Masataka’s 高坂正堯 work makes for essential reading [Kōsaka 2012]. As for research on the Japanese term “*gaikō*”, the points made by Kamikawa Nobuhiko 神川信彦 in *Shakai kagaku daijiten* 社会科学大辭典 (*Comprehensive Dictionary of the Social Sciences*) were particularly significant (see “*Gaikō*” in [Shakai kagaku daijiten henshū iinkai 1968–71: vol. 3]). Watanabe Akio’s 渡邊昭夫 work, which expanded upon Kamikawa’s ideas, also makes for essential reading [Watanabe A. 1993].

² The ellipses in this quotation indicate the omissions of quotes of the term used in context within classical Chinese texts. Incidentally, the definition which features the most number of quotes from classical texts is the second.

tion titled “diplomatic history” in the source text is translated as “a study of [past] discourse between ministers/envoys” (*zhuchi gonglun zhi xue* 主持公論之學).³ Furthermore, in Lobscheid’s *An English and Chinese Dictionary* (*Dingzeng Yinghua cidian* 訂增英華字典) [Lobscheid 1884], the following definition is given as the translation for “diplomacy”.

general cases of an imperial nature, rules and regulations pertaining to governmental affairs, imperial bodies, skill in national affairs (*qinchai zongli, yizheng guili, chaoting qinchai deng, jing yu guozheng* 欽差總例、議政規例、朝廷欽差等、精於國政).

As we can see, the term “*waijiao*” does not make an appearance here.

1. 2. “*Gaikō*” as a Japanese Neologism

As is commonly known, Japan often used Chinese morphemes to coin their own neologisms specific to the Japanese context. In this section, we will analyse how “*gaikō*”, as a modern Japanese word, came into use in Japan.

Let us begin our analysis with the entries contained under the “diplomacy” section (*gaikō bu* 外交部) of the *Koji ruien* 古事類苑, or *Classic Encyclopaedia* [Jingū shichō 1931–36: vols. 27–28]. The items contained under each section of this encyclopaedia are sourced from a vast range of texts which date from Japanese antiquity through to the Meiji period. The “diplomacy” section alone spans 1800 pages. Yet, excluding the section’s explanatory notes, not even a single instance of “*gaikō*” can be found. Instead, we only find such terms as “*tsūkō*” (通交, interchange), “*tsūshin*” (通信, correspondence), “*kōeki*” (交易, commerce), “*ōsetsu*” (応接, the reception of guests), and “*danpan*” (談判, a conference). Indeed, no evidence appears to exist which suggests that the term “*gaikō*” entered into the Japanese language from mainland Chinese usage before the end of the Edo period.⁴

³ See [Wheaton 1876: vol. 3, chap. 2, sec. 19]. Differences can be observed in alternative versions of the text, with some not even including this section on diplomatic history in the first place.

⁴ The author wishes to make clear that is only a provisional conclusion. Indeed, a comprehensive analysis of texts and private documents which date from antiquity may reveal that this conclusion requires revising. For example, the use of “*gaikō*” can be observed within Yuasa Jōzan’s 湯浅常山 *Bunkai zakki* 文会雜記 (Miscellany of Literary Encounters) [*Nihon zuihitsu taisai* henshūbu 1973–: first season, vol. 14]. However, in this instance the term is used in the context of reprimanding retainers (*hanshi* 藩士) who interacted with people who were affiliated with ex-

Moving on, let us next consider the history of naming conventions for the Japanese arm of government which dealt with foreign affairs [Gaimushō hyakunenshi hensan iinkai 1969: vol. 1, part 1]. In the Meiji period, this agency was initially referred to as the “*gaikoku jimu gakari*” (外国事務掛, Office of Foreign Business). While its name was subject to a series of revisions over the years, it ultimately came to be known as the “*gaimu shō*” (外務省, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The *gaimu shō* thus came to be the organ responsible for the business of foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai jimu* 外国交際事務), while a “*gaikō kan*” 外交官 was a foreign relations official (*gaikoku kōsai kan* 外国交際官). The term “*gaimu*” 外務, as a shorthand for “*gaikoku (kōsai) jimu*” 外国 (交際) 事務 came into use alongside the term “*gaimu shō*” 外務省 in 1869. “*Gaikō*” 外交, as a shorthand of “*gaikoku kōsai*” 外国交際 (foreign relations), however, did not come into frequent use. As for the term “*gaikō kan*” 外交官, based on evidence of its initial usage, the term likely came into use somewhere between 1890 and 1893.

Dictionaries contemporaneous with the appearance of “*gaimu shō*” also demonstrate that “*gaikō*” had, at this point in the time, yet to be invoked as the default choice for conveying the notion of “diplomacy”. As this section ultimately concludes, while “diplomacy” was initially understood from the Japanese perspective to bear some relation to the concept of an “envoy” (*shisetsu* 使節), in the 1870s the translation of the “art of relations” (*kōsai hō* 交際法) came into common usage. While this translation would ultimately become displaced by “*gaikō*”, in addition to the notions of an “envoy” and the “art of relations”, “*gaikō*” also became imbued with a sense of “Machiavellianism”, or, more literally “maneuvering and scheming” (*kenbō jussū* 權謀術数).

Let us now move on to analyze this process in greater depth, beginning with the period in which “*shisetsu*” (envoy) and a number of associative ideas operated as the primary means of translation for “diplomacy” into Japanese. Given the points laid out above, it will come as no surprise to the reader that “diplomacy” did not feature in the earliest English-Japanese dictionary, the *Angeria gorin taisei* (諳厄利亞語林大成, *Compilation of Anglian Words*), published in 1814 [Motoki 1976]. Several decades later in 1862, the *Ei-Wa taiyaku shūchin jisho* (英和対訳袖珍辞書, *A Pocket Dictionary of the English and Japanese Languages*) made its appearance, with a definition of “diplomacy” in tow. This dictionary was developed using English-Dutch dictionaries under the guidance of Hori Tatsunosuke 堀達之助 of the *Yōsho shirabesho* (洋書調所, the Research Institute for Foreign Books), and, owing to its provenance, came to be popularly referred to as the “*Yōsho shirabesho* dictionary”. As briefly mentioned above, this is the earliest published dictionary that offers us a glimpse of contemporaneous Japanese un-

traneous feudal clans (*han* 藩) (i.e. the definitions that feature in example (2) in the above quoted excerpt from Morohashi’s *Dai Kan-Wa jiten*), and has no direct relation with this chapter’s analysis on diplomacy.

derstandings of “diplomacy”. Inside we find the definition of “the art of learning how to conduct one’s duties as an envoy”. While rather verbose and not particularly refined, this definition nevertheless demonstrates that, at the time, no suitable Japanese term existed for translating “diplomacy”. The 1867 edition of Hepburn’s *Japanese-English Dictionary* is not much more helpful, offering no definition whatsoever [Hepburn 1867]. However, in the *Wayaku Eijisho* (和訳英辞書, *English-Japanese Dictionary*; also known as the *Satsuma jisho* 薩摩辞書, or *Satsuma Dictionary*), published in 1869, we find “diplomacy” defined as “the way one works as an envoy” [Takahashi and Maeda 1869].⁵ In the second edition of Hepburn’s dictionary, entitled the *Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary* [Hepburn 1872], “diplomacy” is defined in Japanese as “dealing with state affairs” and “the way one works as an envoy”. Furthermore, in the *Ei-Wa taiyaku jisho* (英和对訳辞書, *English and Japanese Dictionary*), popularly known as, again due its provenance, the “Hokkaidō Development Agency (*kaitakushi* 開拓使) dictionary” [Arai 1872], “diplomacy” is once again defined as “the way one works as an envoy”. Interestingly, in the same dictionary’s entry for “diplomat, diplomate”, the sense that a “diplomat” is an envoy who has “mastered” his art is put forward, giving a definition of “a person who has mastered the way in which he works as an envoy”. The definition given for “diplomats” is perhaps also worth mentioning due to its similarities with the definition that crops up in the *Wayaku Eijisho*: “the study of carefully investigating how one ought to serve as plenipotentiary according to the books of antiquity”.

As the dictionaries introduced above collectively demonstrate, the concept of “diplomacy” was initially tied to the notion of an envoy. However, in 1873, with the publication of the *Ei-Wa jii: fuon sōzu* (英和字彙: 附音插图, *An English and Japanese Dictionary. Explanatory, Pronouncing [sic], and Etymological, Containing All English Words in Present Use, with an Appendix*), a dictionary compiled by English specialists Shibata Masakichi 柴田昌吉 and Koyasu Takashi 子安峻 of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we find the first instance of the term being defined in relation to the notion of “relations” (*kōsai* 交際) [Shibata and Koyasu 1873]. The *Ei-Wa jii: fuon sōzu* offers several translations of “diplomacy”, and it is clear that Shibata and Koyasu strived to offer these translations in the simplest terms possible. The definitions given are as follows: “the official system of organization for ministers”; “the art of relations”; “[a term given as the collective name for] the various [serving] ministers”; and “a person proficient in handling relations”. As these definitions demonstrate, not only had the notion of “relations” become an integral component of that which constituted “diplomacy”,

⁵ It is perhaps worth noting that the same dictionary gives the correct, albeit somewhat stiff translation of “the scholarly discipline of carefully investigating how one ought to serve as a plenipotentiary according to the books of antiquity” (古書ニ依テ全權ノ役ノ勤方ヲ吟味スル學術) as a definition for “diplomats”.

the idea of presiding over these “relations” with a high level of skill also came to be imbued in understandings of the word.

Following this in 1876 was Ernest Satow and Ishibashi Masakata’s 石橋政方 *An English-Japanese Dictionary of the Spoken Language* [Satow and Ishibashi 1970a]. There, in Roman characters, the word “kōsai-ka” 交際家 is given as the translation for “diplomat”. However, “diplomacy” is left in its English noun form and no translation is offered. Clearly, this was a period in which such nomenclature was, once again, undergoing a transition. In the second edition of the dictionary published in 1879, however, the term “kōsaihō” 交際法 was finally adopted as a translation for “diplomacy” [Satow and Ishibashi 1970b].

Let us now turn our attention to dictionaries published in the 1880s. Published in 1886, the *Ei-Wa sōkai jiten* (英和双解字典, *An English and Japanese Dictionary of the English Language*) followed translation conventions adopted by previous dictionaries in its translations for “diplomacy”: “the job of a minister”; “the art of relations” (*kōsai hō* 交際法); “[a term given as the collective name for] the various [serving] ministers”; “an envoy”; and “a person proficient in handling relations” [Nuttal 1886]. Published that same year, the *Wayaku Eibun jukugosō* (和訳英文熟語叢, *An English-Japanese Dictionary of Words and Phrases*) takes a slightly odd approach in that it records a number of idiomatic phrases relating to diplomacy [Saitō 1886]. “Diplomatic intercourse” is translated as “intercourse between various countries” (*kakkoku kōsai* 各国公際 [sic]), “diplomatic agent” as “imperial envoy” (*kinsa* 欽差), and “diplomatic body” as “an imperial envoy of the court” (*chōtei kinsa tō* 朝廷欽差等). In the English-Japanese section of the third edition of Hepburn’s *Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary* [Hepburn 1886], the translations for “diplomacy” and “diplomat” adhere to that which had been used in the previous edition of the dictionary. “The art of relations” (*kōsai hō* 交際法) and “envoy” are given for “diplomacy”, and the translation of “a man of relations” (*kōsai ka* 交際家) is given for “diplomat”. However, if we consult the Japanese-English section of the same dictionary, we find some areas of discrepancy. There, “*kōsai hō*” 交際法 is rendered as “the art or rules of an envoy; diplomacy” and “*kōsai ka*” 交際家 is rendered as “a diplomatist”.

To the best of this author’s knowledge, the use of “*gaikō*” as a translation for “diplomacy” first appeared in 1888 in Shimada Yutaka’s 島田豊 translation of Lloyd’s *An English and Japanese Lexicon: Explanatory, Pronouncing [sic], and Etymological, Containing All English Words in Present Use, with an Appendix (Fuon sōzu Wayaku Eiji)* 附音挿図和訳英字彙 [Lloyd 1888]. There, “diplomacy” is translated as “the art of *gaikō*” (*gaikō jutsu*, 外交術) and “maneuvering” (*kenbō* 權謀). Meanwhile, “diplomat, diplomate, diplomatic, diplomatist” is translated as “an official in charge of *gaikō*” (*gaikō kan* 外交官), “an individual versed in *gaikō*”, and “an individual skilled in the art of maneuvering (*kenbō* 權謀)”. As we can see from here, not only are the translations of

“*gaikō*” and “*gaikō kan*” used for “diplomacy” and “diplomat” respectively, but a sense of “maneuvering” has also been introduced in the word’s interpretation. Published in that same year, *Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, Translated into Japanese* (*Webu-sutā-shi shinkan daijisho Wayaku jii* ウェブスター氏新刊大辞書和訳字彙), gives the following for its “diplomatic, diplomatical” entry: “to receive a special permit or certificate”; “[something or someone related to] foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai* 外国交際)”; “someone who excels at *gaikō*”; “something related to *gaikō*”; and “[something related to] the study of ancient literature”. Furthermore, under the entry for “diplomatic intercourse”, we find the translation of “international relations” (*kakkoku kōsai* 各国交際)⁶ [Webster 1888]. In the following year, the *Meiji Ei-Wa jiten* (明治英和字典, An English and Japanese Dictionary for the Use of Junior Students) was published [Seki 1889]. There, “diplomacy” is translated in the following ways: “the art of handling foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai* 外国交際)”; “the study of *gaikō*”; “maneuvering and scheming”; and “[a term given as the collective name for] the various [serving] ministers”. Meanwhile, “diplomat” and “diplomatist” are translated as: “an individual versed in *gaikō*” and “a master of maneuvering”. The dictionary also offers a number of translations for “diplomatic”: “a man engaged in the practice of *gaikō*” (*gaikō ka* 外交家); “an individual versed in the ways of *gaikō*”; and “a master of maneuvering”.

The above analysis of bilingual dictionaries published up to the late 1880s demonstrates how interpretations of the term “diplomacy” evolved in the Japanese context. During the transitional phase between the late Edo and Meiji periods, “diplomacy” was understood to be a term which purely conveyed the notion of an envoy, or “*shisetsu*”. In 1873, “the art of relations”, or “*kōsai hō*” emerged as a new interpretation, and from 1888 the term “*gaikō*”, with its accompanying connotation of “maneuvering”, began to seep into common usage. These changes also adhered with shifts and developments in the structure and naming practices for the Japanese government’s foreign affairs agency. At the same time, however, the above analysis also demonstrates that no dictionary existed in this period which gave “*gaikō*” as a direct translation for “diplomacy”. Indeed, such translations as “*gaikō jutsu*” (外交術, the art of *gaikō*) and “*gaikō gaku*” (外交学, the study of *gaikō*),⁷ while close, were nevertheless slightly different.

⁶ On how the Japanese neologism of *kakkoku kōsai* 各国交際 adheres to the English notion of “international relations”, see [Morita 2016: 172–4].

⁷ The underlines were added by the author for emphasis.

2. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Japan’s Foreign Relations

2. 1. Some Examples from the Early Meiji Period

As was demonstrated in the previous section, “*gaikō*”, as a Japanese neologism, emerged as a truncated form of the phrase “*gaikoku kōsai*” (foreign relations). In Sections 2 and 3, using Fukuzawa Yukichi’s 福沢諭吉 writings on foreign policy, we will analyze the specific meanings of “*gaikoku kōsai*” and “*kōsai*” (relations).⁸

There are four reasons behind this author’s decision in using Fukuzawa’s writings to elucidate the meanings of these terms. Firstly, Fukuzawa was a pioneering translator. During our period of enquiry, Fukuzawa came under the heavy influence of imported concepts from the West. As such, his translations serve as an excellent conduit through which to pursue the process by which a number of contemporaneous Japanese neologisms developed. Secondly, Fukuzawa was a prolific writer. In addition to his translation work, Fukuzawa penned a vast array of texts in which he ruminated over a multitude of things. As such, his writings serve, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as an ideal resource for considering such questions. Thirdly, the writings he penned across his lifetime held great sway within the Japanese context. The fourth and final reason for choosing Fukuzawa is that the term “*kōsai*” features prominently in his writings. So much so, in fact, that it would be no exaggeration to label him a “philosopher of *kōsai*/relations”. Beginning with an analysis of the superficial changes in Fukuzawa’s thought, this section of the chapter will cover those writings of his produced predominantly in the 1870s. In Section 3, will we move on to cover writings of his produced predominantly in the 1880s.

One other practical consideration involved in the selection of Fukuzawa’s writings for this analysis was the fact that, at this time, there was a lack of texts which dealt specifically with issues of an international nature. Indeed, very few materials exist from this time period which allow for a thorough consideration of the topic at hand. A quick skim of the *Catalog of the Tokio Library* (*Tōkyō shosekikan shomoku* 東京書籍館書目) reveals that while a considerable number of texts dealing with political science and international law existed, there were very few which covered what has come to be referred to as “international relations” in contemporary parlance [Tōkyō shosekikan 1876: *Naikoku shinkan Wakansho no bu* 内国新刊和漢書之部, vol. 1; Tōkyō shoseki shuppan eigyōsha kumiai jimusho 1893].⁹

⁸ A wealth of scholarship on the various aspects of Fukuzawa’s career and thought exists, his musings on Japan’s foreign relations being no exception. Recent work of particular relevance to this chapter includes [Nishimura 2006; Ogawara 2011; Tokura 2013; Tsukiashi 2014].

⁹ The body of Japanese literature dealing with the topic of “diplomacy” began to grow from the

While scarce, there are nevertheless a few examples of some important texts penned by authors other than Fukuzawa in this period. Let us briefly look at two or three examples here. The first are two works of translation by Fukuchi Gen'ichirō 福地源一郎, a polymath who was active in a diverse range of fields at the time.¹⁰ The first of these was his translation of *The Rules of the Russian Foreign Affairs Bureau* (*Roshia gaikoku jimukyoku kisoku* 魯西亜外国事務局規則), which was published in 1868 as *Gaikoku jimu* (外国事務, foreign affairs) [Fukuchi 1868]. In the translation, it states that the most important role of the Foreign Affairs Bureau lies in “dealing with relations (*kōsai*) with other countries”. The second example is Fukuchi’s translation of the English edition of Martens’ *Le Guide Diplomatique* (published in Japanese in 1869 as *Gaikoku kōsai kōhō* 外国交際公法, which translates to the “art of foreign relations”) [Martens 1869]. Compared to the original French text, Fukuchi’s translation was by no means comprehensive. Indeed, it lacked the introductory chapter which discussed the very essence of diplomacy. However, what is significant about this translation is his choice of title for Chapter 59, which, while not included in his translation, is nevertheless mentioned in the chapter list for a forthcoming volume. If we take Fukuchi’s translation of “*kōsai jōno danpan*” (交際上ノ談判, negotiations [which occur when engaging] in relations) to be his rendition of “[d]es négociations diplomatiques”, this could well be the first instance where “diplomacy” was interpreted to mean “relations”.

As stated previously, when Martin translated the phrase “diplomatic history” into classical Chinese, he opted to use the translation of “*zhuchi gonglun zhi xue*”, or “a study of [past] discourse between ministers/envoys”. But how was this phrase rendered in Japanese? One example of this phrase in translation can be found within Mitsukuri Akiyoshi’s 箕作麟祥 translation of Theodore D. Woolsey’s *Introduction to the Study of International Law*, which was originally published in 1860. In the Japanese version, entitled *Kokusaihō* (国際法, international law) [Woolsey 1873–75], Mitsukuri does not offer a direct translation for “diplomacy”, instead opting to paraphrase its meaning. For example, Item 46 (“[to] be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations”) is rendered in Japanese as “*kokusaihō no teisoku to nasu*” 国際法ノ定則ト為ス, or “to regard as the established rules of international law”. Meanwhile, Item 82 (“courtesy in diplomatic intercourse”), is translated as “*kōkō no reikan*” 交好ノ礼款 or “courtesy in mutual friendship”.

1880s on. While the term “*gaikoku kōsai*” or, indeed, its truncated form of “*gaikō*” can be found in contemporaneous works on history [Watanabe S. 1880; Taguchi 1881–84] and commentary on contemporary affairs [Baba 1882; Ono A. 1885], a term worthy of being deemed the semantical equivalent of the English “diplomacy” had still yet to emerge.

¹⁰ Research on Fukuchi has seen a wave of growth in recent years. Perhaps the best of these is [Iokibe 2013].

2.2. Fukuzawa Yukichi qua Translator in the Late Edo Period

Let us now move on to our discussion of Fukuzawa Yukichi. In the translations Fukuzawa produced as an official serving under the Tokugawa shogunate, a number of phrases relating to diplomacy can be observed.¹¹ Of these, his use of “*kōsai*” as a translation for “relations” stands out in particular. Unfortunately, we find no mention of “foreign relations” in the translations he produced at this time. However, if he had made reference to Japan’s “foreign relations”, given his use of “*kōsai*”, one can surmise that he would likely have opted to translate it as “*gaikoku kōsai*”. One other example of a term relating to diplomacy invoked in Fukuzawa’s translations during this period is the Dutch word “*diplomatieke*”. However, the term is rendered as a phonetic *katakana* transliteration (*Dipuromachiki* デプロマチーキ) with no Japanese translation.

In the eyes of his late Edo period contemporaries, Fukuzawa came across as an avid proponent of opening Japan up to the Pandora’s box which was foreign interaction. Published in 1865, Fukuzawa’s *Relations with Foreigners* (*Tōjin ōrai* 唐人往来) was a work which attempted to speak to those who were still very much in favor of keeping Japan hermetically sealed off from the outside world [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1]. There, Fukuzawa uses the phrase “*tsukiai*” (附合, relations) to describe Japan’s relationship with other countries, and posited that so long as a country stringently adhered to what he dubbed as the “universal rational principle”, even if it was militarily weak, it would not find itself being needlessly humiliated by others. To support this claim, he contrasts Portugal, a small nation, and the success it had found in maintaining its independence from Spain, with Qing China, a mega state which had recently suffered defeat at the hands of the British and the French. As such, Japan should not fear opening up, and should strive to modernize and bolster its military capabilities. When later reflecting on such opinions, Fukuzawa was quick to admit that the points he made were intentionally optimistic so as to push his “opening-up” agenda. That being said, his ultimate prescription of modernization and the enhancement of military capabilities for Japan remained unchanged for the rest of his life.

Fukuzawa’s next title, the renowned *Conditions of the West* (*Seiyō jijō* 西洋事情), is what truly secured him a spot in the limelight. Comprised of an assortment of select translated passages from a variety of Western texts, *Conditions of the West* was published across several volumes from 1866 to 1869. In the first of these, one finds a section

¹¹ See “*Bakumatsu gaikō monjo yakkō*” in [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 20]. Also see: [Ono S. 2006].

entitled “*gaikoku kōsai*”, or “foreign relations”. Here, let us take a brief look at some of its content.

Although variations in customs and languages exist between Western countries, these differences in customs are of a different scale to those which exist between the West and the recently opened China and Japan. It could be said that the nature of relations between Western countries bears similarities to the way in which Japan’s erstwhile feudal domains interacted with one another. ... However, each of these Western countries is independent of one another, and there is no uniformity in their systems. As such, in order to prevent conflict, each country makes pacts with the other, which, in turn, strengthens friendly ties and helps to facilitate trade. These pacts are called treaties. Once a treaty is signed, the next step is to... [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1, p. 298]

While “*gaikō*” does not make an appearance in the above passage, we do find one instance of the phrase in use in the book’s section on America. However, there, the phrase is only used as a diminutive form of *gaikoku kōsai* (foreign relations), and holds no meaning in and of itself [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1, pp. 326–7]. “*Gaikoku kōsai*” also makes an appearance in the same volume’s section on Britain. There, he states that during the reign of Edward I, in the realm of “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*), Britain wielded “great influence” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1, p. 359]. Fukuzawa refutes the theory that Britain’s wealth and power were amassed through its vast array of foreign territories, stating that trade interests are both the same for foreign territories and independent states, and instead points out that the possession of foreign territories results in a bigger defence burden.

Britain is both wealthy and powerful, and has achieved an advanced civilization. It has come to stand out from other countries because of its geographical advantage, its vast array of produce, its large number of talented individuals, and the impartiality of its governance. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1, pp. 379–80]

As we shall see, this view of Fukuzawa’s that trade and academic excellence were more beneficial to a country than military preparedness and the capturing of territorial possessions took on greater significance in later developments in his thought.

In the later published supplementary volume (*gaihen* 外編) of *Conditions of the West*, we find a section entitled not “*gaikoku kōsai*” (foreign relations) but “*kakkoku kōsai*” (relations between countries). Interestingly, there, Fukuzawa discusses the *kōsai* (relations) between Western countries from an alternative perspective, specifically, the linkages between war and international law.

Although somewhat of an axiomatic point, in discussing these linkages Fukuzawa points out that it is each country’s military foundation which allows it to preserve its independence and maintain its territorial integrity. However, he also notes the downside to this, namely that “the state of relations between each country (*kakkoku kōsai*) has, and continues to be, no different to the way in which the primitive peoples of the past indiscriminately appealed to force in their interactions.” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 1, p. 441]. In other words, although the Western countries had become synonymous with progress, the quality of their interactions still remained primitive. However, Fukuzawa concedes that the Western countries, in their interactions with one another, strive to decrease the number of wars waged and mitigate tensions between one another. The factors he cites as enabling this are: (1) international law, (2) the balance of power, (3) the teachings of civilization, and (4) the smooth trade between countries.

Here, international law is regarded as just one cog in the machinery which constituted the “relations between each country” (*kakkoku kōsai*). In other words, the underlying factor which prompted these countries, as disparate political entities, to respect international law, was their respective relationships (*kōsai*). Furthermore, the “balance of power” between these great states served as the fulcrum in these relations. This state of affairs had nothing to do with the concept of justice; rather, it was the mutual fear of another country’s rise to prominence that allowed for the preservation of the status quo.

Rather than viewing it as the work of Fukuzawa himself, the contents of *Conditions of the West*’s supplementary volume is better understood as a collection of translations. That being said, his translations nevertheless serve as a demonstration of how he understood and perceived the world he inhabited. Indeed, as we shall see, the ideas set out above would come to serve as a long-lasting ideological backbone upon which Fukuzawa’s discourse developed.

2. 3. An Encouragement of Learning and An Outline of a Theory of Civilization

Fukuzawa’s most representative titles are without a doubt his *An Encouragement of Learning* (*Gakumon no susume* 学問のすすめ) and *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (*Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略). *An Encouragement of Learning* was published incrementally across seventeen parts from 1872 to 1876, and served as the impetus for Fukuzawa’s rapid rise in fame. While the state of human society (*jinkan kōsai* 人間交際) was the book’s principal leitmotif, this discussion was also used by Fukuzawa to underpin his ideas on foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*).

In Part 5 of the text, entitled “Speech Delivered on 1st January Meiji 7 [1874]”, Fukuzawa stressed the importance of Japan’s foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*), stating that “in the modern world, [Japan’s] relations with foreign countries have expanded

rapidly and have come to be intertwined with domestic affairs”. Fukuzawa also goes on to state that when comparing the minutiae of everyday life in Japan to that of other countries (namely, the West), one discovers that Japan lags behind in a great number of areas. For Fukuzawa, this was a sign that Japan’s independence was at risk. There, Fukuzawa also discussed his desire for the Japanese people to engage in diligent study so that they can one day rival the West in terms of resourcefulness, and equip themselves with both a spirit of independence and the drive to protect their motherland [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 2, pp. 57–62].

Although never published, in Part 12 of *An Encouragement of Learning*, we find the clearest expression of Fukuzawa’s fundamental stance on Japan and its position *vis-à-vis* the West [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 19, pp. 222–7]. Penned in 1874, in this unpublished portion of the text, he explicitly states that it is foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*), and not human society (*jinkan kōsai*), which is of the utmost importance to Japan. While the content of *An Encouragement of Learning* had, up until this point, been a hodgepodge of miscellaneous ideas, in this unpublished portion, Fukuzawa unequivocally stated that the overarching point he wished to make through the book was that “the government and people of Japan ought to come together to protect the country and maintain its independence”. Furthermore, at the end of the volume, he makes the following statement.

I wish to make one additional remark at the end of this volume. Generally speaking, maintaining a balance in mutual interactions between strong and weak countries, or big and small countries, is very difficult indeed. While there is no prescribed method for achieving this, the habits of man are a powerful thing. Once one has yielded, it is practically impossible to grow stronger. Those who are weak on the inside cannot become strong on the outside. ... However, the purpose [of such endeavors] is nothing more than this: the cultivation, in accordance with principles, of a habit of resisting those who wield great strength, so as to attain balance in one’s relations with foreign countries. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 19, p. 227]

In *An Encouragement of Learning*, Fukuzawa repeatedly extolled the virtues of achieving a spirit of independence. The reasoning behind this was that Fukuzawa believed that if people could attain agency in their everyday lives, Japan would be able to “attain balance in her foreign relations”. In other words, cultivating such a foundation would enable the Japanese people, should the need arise, to stand up to the superior West.

Published in 1875, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* is another of Fukuzawa’s famous works and shares many thematic commonalities with that of *An Encouragement of Learning*. Let us review some of the ideas he lays out in Chapter 2, entitled “Western Civilization as Our Goal” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, pp. 16–19]. There,

Fukuzawa makes reference to a commonly held belief which posited that the world ought to be understood as consisting of three regions; namely an enlightened region (i.e. the West), a half-civilized region (i.e. Asia), and a savage region (i.e. Africa and Australia). Fukuzawa saw such a view as being purely relative, and did not necessarily constitute absolute reality. To demonstrate this, he makes several points. First, despite the fact that there is no calamity worse than war, the Western countries continue to wage war against one another. Secondly, plenty of cases of banditry and murder take place in these so-called “enlightened” countries. His third and final point was that in the West group-based power struggles are the norm, and that “in their art of handling foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai no hō* 外国交際の法), maneuvering and scheming (*kenbō jussū*) is endemic.” Can countries which engage in such base acts really be described as civilized?

In making these points, Fukuzawa wanted to express that the West by no means embodied a perfect form of enlightenment. Civilization was not an “inanimate object”, but a thing which continuously progressed. However, all advancement nevertheless had to take place in strict sequence, tracing a trajectory of “savage” to “half-civilized”, “half-civilized” to “civilized”, and “civilized” to whatever higher stage of progress lay in the future. While the West still had plenty more to achieve on its path towards the ultimate form of enlightenment, Fukuzawa nevertheless posited that Japan, for the time being, was compelled to set its sights on attaining a similar level of progress to that of the West.

Another part of the book which deserves our attention is the aforementioned comment in which Fukuzawa points out that “maneuvering and scheming (*kenbō jussū*) is endemic” in the West’s “art of handling foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai no hō*).” Sadly, Fukuzawa offers us no specific examples of this. However, the fact that he makes reference to this alongside war, theft, murder, and partisan power struggles would suggest that he was not making reference to “foreign relations” in the wider sense (i.e. country-to-country relations or the strife waged between countries). Rather, his reference here was much more specific, entailing the very means by which “diplomacy”, as an *art*, was practiced by the Western countries. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* was published in 1875. In other words, it came after the publication of Shibata Masakichi and Koyasu Takashi’s *Fuon sōzu Ei-Wa jii*. As we saw above, one definition given for “diplomacy” in this dictionary was “*kōsai hō*”, or “the art of relations”. The fact that Fukuzawa’s above comments are in line with this definition was likely no coincidence. Indeed, Shibata and Koyasu were two individuals with whom Fukuzawa had personal ties. At any rate, these comments make it clear that the technical aspect of “diplomacy” (namely, the art of handling foreign relations) had now become entwined with his conceptualization of “diplomacy”.

When considering Fukuzawa’s discourse on foreign affairs, the book’s concluding chapter, Chapter 10, entitled “A Discussion of Our National Independence”, serves as a

key focal point for any researcher. There, Fukuzawa states that the difficulties which present day Japan faces are due to the recent onset of a “sudden ailment”. For Fukuzawa, this ailment had already ravaged Japan’s core. It was ineradicable, and no panacea existed that could heal it. Furthermore, Japan’s past methods of resistance were no longer of use. “One wonders what the cognoscenti will come to refer to this ailment as”, pondered Fukuzawa. “I, myself, refer to it as foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*)” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 193].

Needless to say, what Fukuzawa meant by “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*) here was unequivocally Japan’s relationship with the West. As we saw earlier, in Chapter 2 of the book, Fukuzawa singled out the West as the ultimate goal Japan ought to aspire to. For Fukuzawa, the root cause of this “ailment” was not the West itself per se, but Japan’s “foreign relations” with it, including the fact that it was necessary for Japan to emulate the West in the first place. For Fukuzawa, this was precisely the reason why this “ailment” was not something that could be overcome lightly.

Citing Britain’s domination of India, the white man’s purge of native Americans, and the West’s gradual expansion of power within Qing China, Fukuzawa refrained from taking a rose-tinted view of the West’s activities. Fukuzawa also took the view that, as the ailment Japan faced was one which afflicted each and every one of its citizens, each individual must make efforts to seek out a cure.

Discussing the nature of our foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*) in Japan is an exceedingly difficult thing to do, be it in the context of the economy, or in the context of rights. Indeed, it should be seen as a chronic ailment which has afflicted the very core of our government. This chronic ailment is one which has afflicted each and every one of our citizens; as such, the burden is on [Japan’s] citizens to seek out a cure for themselves. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 203]

Calling upon Japan’s citizens to seek out a cure for themselves was already a demanding prescription. Yet Fukuzawa even went as far as to opine that every morning before breakfast, a citizen ought to admonish his fellow patriot “not to be caught off guard [in the realm of] foreign relations”. Doing so would help prepare the nation for the potential exigencies it may one day have to face in its dealings with other countries. Fukuzawa also pointed out that, in a world where trade and war reigned supreme, achieving sufficient military preparedness was not enough, and that the country could collapse from the weight of debt if it did not balance out such endeavors with its trading activities. Indeed, it was Japan’s aggregate “civilizational” strength which he was calling into question. “Independence for the country is our ultimate goal. Our march towards enlightenment is the method by which we achieve it” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 209].

2.4. Fukuzawa and His Mistrust of “Foreign Relations”

Contained within Section 2 of the *Collected Essays of Fukuzawa* is an essay entitled “On Education” (while this collection was published in 1878, this essay first appeared in print in 1876). There, Fukuzawa put forward the opinion that the Japanese people ought to learn the language of “the country of trade”—Britain. In the essay, he also states that in order to preserve Japan’s independence, a reliance on force or the “art of relations between governments” was not enough. Rather, scholarship, and trade in particular, were the factors which would ensure that Japan maintained its independence.

What is it that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds itself in charge of? It is our foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*). What do we find when we examine the nature of our foreign relations? It is the interactions between Japanese citizens and foreigners, and the exchange of insight and goods. ... Yet, when, for example, young, unworldly scholars attempt to devise clever schemes, they do not even take a moment to reflect upon the insight of the people, nor on the varying degrees of quality that exist among the goods that they have on offer, and instead, in their foreign policy decisions, choose to follow the specious talk of government officials. ... This is what is meant by the phrase “castles in the air”. Neither force nor the art of relations (*kōsai hō*) will enhance the dignity of our country. After having undertaken a careful examination of our current circumstances, and having considered potential future developments, [I have concluded that] it is only scholarship and trade which will enable a situation in which we can entrust our desire for preserving independence to future [generations]. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, pp. 434–5]

As was the case with *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, it is safe to say that *kōsai hō* is being used to here to signify “diplomacy”. Fukuzawa believed that attempts to enhance national prestige, be they through the means of force or the art of relations (i.e. diplomacy), were meaningless without the existence of a strong foundation. As we have seen, for Fukuzawa, this “foundation” consisted of scholarship and trade. Following on from the section quoted above, Fukuzawa went on to posit that scholarship and trade were mutually contingent upon one another. If scholarship did not flourish, neither could trade. Likewise, if trade did not flourish, neither would scholarship. It is also important that we take particular note of the fact that Fukuzawa denounced the practice of resorting to makeshift tricks, which he saw as inappropriate for the development of national strength.

A milestone in Fukuzawa’s writings on foreign affairs came with the publication of his *Common Discourse on National Rights* (*Tsūzoku kokkenron* 通俗国権論) in 1878.

In the epilogue, he states that had the text been published fifteen years ago (i.e. in the late Edo period), noble-minded patriots may well have misinterpreted his words, and inadvertently triggered the outbreak of some kind of great calamity in the country's foreign relations (*gaikoku no kōsai*) [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 645]. Such comments indicate that the pessimism of *Common Discourse on National Rights* would appear to stand in stark contrast to the upbeat tone found in *Relations with Foreigners*.

In addition to serving as a critique of Japan's foreign relations, many of the views Fukuzawa puts forward in *Common Discourse on National Rights* also betray a strong sense of scepticism towards interacting with foreign countries. For example, in Chapter 2, entitled "On Taking National Rights Seriously", when discussing the attitude of Westerners in negotiations, Fukuzawa wryly states that "in our foreign relations (*gaikō*) today" (n.b. *gaikō* here is used as a shorthand for *gaikoku kōsai*), be it in transactions between the common people, or at state-level receptions, the foreigner (*gaijin* 外人; used here to mean Westerners), under the protective gaze of his home country, always raises frivolous objections. In extreme cases, over some trifling matter, he will resort to using such reckless rhetoric as "we will dispatch a warship to your shores". Whilst maintaining that the inadequacies (which stemmed from its lack of national strength) in Japan's foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*) could not be helped, Fukuzawa also pointed out that there are individuals who have acquiesced to the absurdities demanded of them by Westerners. From there, he goes on to appeal to his readers that the government and the people should consistently embrace the cause of preserving Japan's independence, and should not neglect even the smallest of rights when dealing with foreigners.

Fukuzawa's expressions of scepticism regarding Japan's foreign relations continue through to Chapter 7, where he finally begins to flesh out his thoughts under the somewhat sensationalist title of "Foreign War is Inevitable". There, he states that treaties are purely nominal concoctions, and that "in reality, relations (*kōsai*) [between states] constituted nothing more than power struggles and the coveting of [further] gains." Fukuzawa believed that the outcome of these power struggles rested on a country's military competence, and even went as far as to state that "a hundred-volume [text] on international law was no match for several cannon", and that "no matter how many peace conventions [a country signs], they are nothing compared to a fired shot". Citing the examples of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), Fukuzawa also stated that "it can be said that there are only two avenues [one can take] in international relations (*kakkoku kōsai*): to annihilate, or be annihilated". Furthermore, he opined that when Western countries attempted to "bend the Eastern countries to their will", they didn't even resort to using international law. Rather "empty threats" were their "only method" of coercion.

While Fukuzawa was very vocal about the intractability of "foreign relations" (*gaikoku kōsai*), he also made it clear that as the Western countries were purveyors of

“empty threats” they ought not “be feared” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, pp. 637–8]. While Fukuzawa accepted that the West was a powerful entity, the likelihood of it unleashing its military might in far-removed Japan was nevertheless slim. If the West was only peddling empty threats in its dealings in the East, Japan, provided it adequately prepared itself for actual combat, would be able to resist such provocations. Indeed, empty threats bereft of any substance were not worth Fukuzawa’s time.

In other words, when push comes to shove, there is only one method left in our art of handling foreign relations [i.e. diplomacy, *gaikoku kōsai hō*]: we should be ready to go to war, and when engaged in war, we should be obdurate and strong willed, should not easily seek to withdraw our troops, and strong will, and should compete in a test of dogged endurance entailing successive hardships over the course of months or years. The very act of possessing such a willingness to fight will forestall the unnecessary outbreak of war. One should be aware that empty threats will not bear fruit [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 638].

In the above passage, reference to “diplomacy” is made through the use of the phrase “the art of handling foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai hō*). While it goes without saying, Fukuzawa does not include the option of going to war in it. The point he seeks to make is this: so long as a country continues to fear the very act of going to war, negotiations cannot be instigated. By reading the next part of the passage, the trajectory of Fukuzawa’s logic begins to become clearer: “when two countries are engaged in foreign relations (*gaikoku no kōsai*), neither party rejoices when some kind of dispute occurs. Who finds joy in the outbreak of war?” Even if dissatisfaction in some aspect of the negotiation process lingers, for Fukuzawa, finding compromise so as to ensure a peaceful outcome was the obvious solution.

A country establishes a Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purposes of maintaining peace. Individuals involved in foreign affairs express their goodwill through clear stipulations expressed in treaties, and do everything in their power for the [successful execution of the] negotiation process. That being said, even if these individuals are willing to exert a high level of dedication to the negotiation process, without the strong foundation of the people to fall back upon, such efforts will be rendered futile. The difficulty that [people involved in] foreign affairs face is in this area and this area alone. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 4, p. 639]

In this passage, Fukuzawa emphasizes that a backbone is required for maintaining peace through diplomatic negotiations. Put differently, while the maintenance of peace is an obvious goal for any foreign affairs bureau, the success of such endeavors is contingent

upon the support of a strong-willed people who will not acquiesce when faced with unjust foreign pressure. Fukuzawa goes on to conclude that “[Japan] should be willing to make overtures of war but should not necessarily advocate it; furthermore, while we may not advocate war, we should not forget that it is nevertheless open as an option to us.”

From the analysis outlined above, we begin to get a clearer understanding of Fukuzawa’s position on foreign affairs in the 1870s. While he believed that preparation for war was an essential task, at the same time, trade was the main battlefield on which he believed Japan ought to exert itself. Furthermore, he didn’t see the mere augmentation of military capacity as the solution to Japan’s deficiencies; rather, he believed that Japan needed to bolster its power across a diverse range of areas. It is also important to note that Fukuzawa’s conceptualization of “foreign relations” specifically concerned the trying, confrontational relationship between Japan and the Western countries. Put differently, for Fukuzawa, Japan’s relationships with such powers as Qing China and Korea, who had also found themselves exposed to the West, were of secondary importance to its relationships with the Western countries, which he perceived to be Japan’s main rival.

2. 5. *A Shift in Perspective?: Japan and Its Relations with Neighboring Countries*

When the Japanese dispatched a punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1874, the bulk of Fukuzawa’s opinions and ideas continued to revolve around the threat of the West. In “An Address on the Process by Which a Peaceful Outcome Was Obtained Following the Taiwan Incident”, published in *Meiroke zasshi* (明六雜誌, *the Meiroke Journal*) [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 19, pp. 539–42], Fukuzawa astutely observed that while the “incident concerned only Japan and China, others were also affected by its outcome”. By “others”, of course, he was referring to the Western powers. Fukuzawa stated that while the Western powers may not have had any direct involvement in bilateral relations between Japan and the Qing, they nevertheless continued to profit from the two countries through the peddling of outdated cannons and war vessels.

The problems that we currently face are found in the domain of our foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*). The West is our hidden enemy. However, it is not a military threat, but a trade threat. The outcome of this battle of wits ultimately hinges upon the course our fellow countrymen take in their studies. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 19, p. 542]

From the same theoretical standpoint, Fukuzawa also contributed a piece to the *Yūbin hōchi shimbun* (郵便報知新聞, *Postal Report Newspaper*), in which he offered an un-

equivocal critique of the then fervently debated question of whether Japan ought to launch an invasion of Korea or not [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 20, pp. 145–50]. In the piece, entitled “A War with an Asian Country Does Not Have Any Bearing on Our Honor or Disgrace”, Fukuzawa does not even begin to weigh up the pros and cons of invading Korea. Instead, he explicitly states that the problem Japan faced was its relations with Western powers, and that its relations with Asian nations were a trivial matter.

What will become of our country’s independence ... is contingent not upon Asia but on Europe. ... We ought not speak in general terms about the problems our country faces in its foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*). Rather, we ought to be specific: it is in our relations with the Western powers that our difficulty lies.

Fukuzawa then goes on to make his point in a clear-cut, unequivocal statement.

Our country, Japan, is confronted by the [threat that is the] Western powers. Unless we find a means by which to restrain the Western powers, we, as a country, cannot be said to be truly independent. As for our relationship with Korea, even if we were able to achieve that which we desire, it will do nothing to contribute to our position as an independent state.

However, as we shall see in the next part of our discussion, in the 1880s, the Korea factor led to growing hostilities between Japan and the Qing. What’s more, when these hostilities began to draw ever closer to armed confrontation, Fukuzawa came under pressure to re-evaluate Japan’s relations with its neighboring countries.

3. The Korean Question and Shifts in Perception of *Gaikō*

3. 1. *Fukuzawa Yukichi in the 1880s*

Dispute is a perennial bugbear in the international relations of both Western and non-Western countries alike. Needless to say, Japan in the 19th century was no exception; confrontation with its neighbors was a given. By the time Fukuzawa founded the *Jiji shinpō* (時事新報, *Current Events*) newspaper, the Korean Question had already come to the fore of public consciousness. As we have seen, up until this point, Fukuzawa’s primary concern had been Japan’s “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*) with the Western powers. However, the Korean Question would demonstrate to Fukuzawa that Japan’s “relations” (*kōsai*) with its neighboring countries could present just as much of a problem as that of the West.

From the perspective of Fukuzawa, the nature of the problems presented by Japan's relations with the West and its relations with neighboring countries were of a slightly different character. The Western powers were a formidable adversary that Japan ought to stand up against through a collective pooling of resources, and, in turn, aim to one day stand side by side with as equals. In contrast, Qing China and Korea, for him, could not be placed under the same rubric; they were neither Japan's enemies, nor were they its allies. When they were weak, they were plagued by domestic insurrections and became footholds for Western encroachment. When they were strong, they became a cause for concern, as was the case with the Qing when it began to exert an overbearing influence on Korea. For Fukuzawa, Japan's relations (*kōsai*) with its neighboring countries in the late 19th century engendered a qualitative shift in what constituted its "foreign relations" (*gaikoku kōsai*) from a long-term enlightenment project to a more tangible issue which manifested itself in the domain of policy and negotiations.

Continuing on from our earlier discussion of *Common Discourse on National Rights*, the next of Fukuzawa's works which merits our attention is his *Commentary on Japan's Current Problems* (*Jiji shōgen* 時事小言), published in 1881. This book elaborates upon his reasons for his distrust of "foreign relations" (*gaikoku kōsai*).

In the book, Fukuzawa states that there are two aspects to "universal relations" (*bankoku kōsai* 万国交際). The first is its superficial sugar coating, and the second, the less rosy reality. He saw the first aspect of "universal relations" as nominally propounding the idea that the world's citizens, as brothers in arms, ought to rectify each other's imbalances through the means of trade, and also introduced the idea that these "universal relations" would one day lead to the elimination of war. However, for him, such grand notions did not accord with reality, i.e. the second aspect of "universal relations". For example, if a country chose to arbitrarily break agreements set out and codified in a treaty, no court existed to pass judgement on the validity of that decision. Furthermore, the validity of any infractions of an agreement were not affirmed by the guiding compass of morality; rather, they were affirmed by the balance of power predicated upon a country's level of wealth and military capacity. Fukuzawa also predicted that the Western countries would continue both to develop new weaponry and to augment their military might, and that wars, far from becoming an irrelevant form of conflict resolution, would only continue to be waged. Whilst accepting the parochial nature of the claim, Fukuzawa stated that if other countries continued to augment their military capabilities, Japan had no choice but to respond accordingly and prepare itself too. In other words, if the Western countries continued to follow the path of "maneuvering and scheming" (*kenbō jussū*), Japan had no choice but to do the same.

In the book, Fukuzawa also highlights a problem in the relationship between the West and the East. While the two sides did not view each other as unsophisticated savages, Fukuzawa felt that a paucity of empathy existed between the two. Indeed, by dis-

tinguishing themselves as Christian countries, the West peddled a form of exceptionalism. Furthermore, despite pushing a “universal law of nations” upon the world, this form of “universal” jurisprudence was in fact specious, and was only really adhered to in interactions between Christian nations. Citing the atrocious nature of Britain’s domination of India as an example of this, Fukuzawa stated that such acts were “not worthy of being called a form of relations (*kōsai*)”. While some may have pointed to this as an inevitable product of India’s weakness, Fukuzawa refuted this idea by noting that even the weak Western states had not had to endure such hardships. While the “balance of power” may have been applied amongst Western states, Fukuzawa believed that the same could not be said for Western interactions with Eastern countries [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 184].

In addition to harboring scepticism towards whether or not international law was being justly applied to non-Western states, Fukuzawa was also concerned about a potential shift in the way in which the balance of power operated. In preparing for such an occurrence, one solution was enacting a form of mutual cooperation between Eastern states. However, for Fukuzawa, such a solution was not acceptable. Persia and Korea could not be relied upon, and Asia’s greatest power, the Qing, was no better. The reasons for Fukuzawa’s distrust in the Qing stemmed from the fact that despite having now interacted with Britain for nearly 100 years, the country had come nowhere close to achieving the levels of modernization that Japan had in just twenty years.¹² As such, he felt that the responsibility for becoming the East’s pioneer and standing up to the West lay with the Japanese.

The reason why Japan supports the other Eastern countries with its military might is not purely for the benefit of those other countries. Rather, it should be known that it is also for the sake of itself. We must protect the other countries with our military might and guide them in their studies, so that they, too, can follow our example and join the league of modern, civilized nations. If necessary, we must compel them down the path of progress. ... The key point of my message is that, regardless of what means we chose to employ, we must guide these countries so that they achieve a level of strength that is on par with us, so that we can all, one day, work together [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 187].

When the Korean Question came to the fore, such ideas were very much at the forefront of Fukuzawa’s mind. And, as we shall see, he gradually began to invoke these ideas in

¹² [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 185]. Fukuzawa had also stated prior to this that if the Qing failed to modernize it would lose its grip on the country; and that, conversely, if it did succeed, the government would find itself being overthrown [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 114].

his commentaries on the affairs of the time.

3. 2. *Fukuzawa's Jiji Shinpō Editorials*¹³

Fukuzawa's newspaper, the *Jiji shinpō* (時事新報, *Current Events*), first came into print on 1 March 1882. While the newspaper featured few editorials on foreign affairs, 1882 came to be an extremely important year for Japan's foreign affairs, and its relations with Korea in particular came to occupy the minds of many Japanese. The catalyst for this newfound interest in Korea came about as a result of the outbreak of the Imo Mutiny (Imo Kullan 壬午軍亂) in July of that same year; the Mutiny itself being a product of the shifting nature of the Japan-Korea relationship since the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity in 1876.

The first article regarding foreign affairs that the *Jiji shinpō's* editorial featured concerned Japan's so-called "treaty revisions" with the West on 7 March 1882 [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 20–2]. In the article, the author seeks to warn against placing any hasty expectations on the negotiation process. While one cannot be completely sure whether or not the article was penned by Fukuzawa himself, let us take a brief look at its content.

In this savage world, it is no understatement to say that the most fundamental aspect of a given country's development rests on its military strength. Seeking an outcome before adequately developing this most fundamental of areas, and instead attempting to find success by leaving the task in the hands of those officials who have been charged with handling foreign affairs, is not a realistic approach. As a foreign affairs official (*gaimu kan* 外務官), in order to carry out one's role, one must toe the line with political authority and also be flanked at the rear with adequate national strength. Only when an official has access to such areas, and can thus use them to his advantage, can he truly be said to be able to perform his function. Ultimately, success hinges not on the prowess of the official, but on the comprehensive strength of a nation.

Here, taking a pragmatic stance towards Japan's relations with the West, it is claimed

¹³ As Hirayama Yō's 平山洋 research [Hirayama 2004] has demonstrated, the editorials featured in the *Jiji shinpō* cannot all be attributed to the authorship of Fukuzawa. Those introduced in this chapter have been deemed by the author to have likely been written by Fukuzawa. Other small excerpts that feature in the chapter that have likely not been penned by Fukuzawa are indicated by using the *Jiji shinpō* as the subject instead of Fukuzawa.

that success in negotiations hinges not upon the work of a foreign affairs official (*gaimu kan*), but upon Japan’s strength across-the-board. This line of argument is very much in keeping with Fukuzawa’s past assertions (it is also important to note the use of the term “*gaimu kan*” here to indicate foreign affairs officials).

In a piece published on 11 March entitled “On Korea’s Relations”, Fukuzawa addressed Japan’s relationship with Korea. There, he opined that the reason why Japan and Korea had yet to establish a close relationship was due to Korea’s continued status as a weak and undeveloped country. While some of Fukuzawa’s contemporaries believed that Korea ought to be left to its own devices when it came to the issue of its development, Fukuzawa very much occupied a position in the opposite camp. His reasoning for this was that, (a) Japan, as the country which paved the way to opening up Korea to friendly trading relationships with the rest of the world, had “unfinished business” to achieve there; and, (b) that Japan had a responsibility to prevent the encroachment of the West within Asia (so as to prevent the overjustification of Japan’s intervention in Korean affairs based on such logic, Fukuzawa said that this was “an inevitability for the sake of Japan’s future”).

Today, China is ruled by the Chinese and Korea is ruled by the Koreans. As such, I feel no sense of deep anxiety. However, should these countries one day find themselves being utterly swallowed up by the West, what ought we do? ... That Japan is anxious about the state of affairs in China, and involves itself in Korea’s governance, is not because it willingly seeks out strife. It is so that the flames of any fires that catch light next door do not spread to its own house. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 30–1]

3. 3. *The Impact of the Imo Mutiny*

After the outbreak of the Imo Mutiny in July 1882, Fukuzawa penned an editorial titled “Policy Remarks towards Korea”, which was published in four parts from 5 August 1882 [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 275–84]. As the word “remarks” suggests, this four-part editorial did not cover the minutiae of the incident itself. Instead, the piece offered a detailed, non-partisan explanation of Fukuzawa’s own information about the Korea situation obtained from a variety of sources. Due to his limited knowledge, Fukuzawa refrained from making any direct assertions about how he personally perceived Korea at the time. On an individual level, Fukuzawa was full of praise for the Korean people, stating that unlike the Japanese, “the people of Korea are in good health, and are physically strong due to their hearty appetite” and that seeing this made him feel “envious”. However, the piece nevertheless implicitly betrayed an overarching message that

the country was, on an administrative level, institutionalizing dissolution and corruption.

Following on from this, Fukuzawa went on to pen a series of editorials which dealt with how the Imo Mutiny ought to be responded to. These included “Fear of Tactless Frankness” (14 August 1882), “On Taewōngun’s 大院君 policies” (15–16 August 1882), “On the Necessity of Expedition” (18 August 1882), “Discussion on Newspaper Reports Concerning Korean Affairs” (19 August 1882), and “Power and Swiftness Make a Good Strategy” (26 August 1882).

Fukuzawa perceived Korea as a country which, contrary to Japanese hopes, was incapable of enacting reform and opening itself to the world. Furthermore, the intercession of the Qing, which possessed the “delusion of looking upon Korea as a dependency”, would only bring about a nebulous settlement to the issue, and lead to an impasse in negotiations. Fukuzawa believed that Japan ought to send an expeditionary force to the country, not for the sake of protecting the negotiators or Japanese citizens stationed in Korea, but in order to occupy points of strategic significance so as to exert pressure on the negotiations. According to Fukuzawa, such a strategy was “the norm in international relations”. Fukuzawa also believed that a large expeditionary force ought to be deployed to the country. His reasoning for this was neither due to a fear of Korea’s military capabilities nor was it an excuse to rob the Korean people of their “barren land”. Rather, it was because he believed that the Koreans, as a primitive people out of touch with information, had yet to become adequately acquainted with Japan. As such, if Japan dispatched mere garrison men, Korea would make light of Japan, thus leading to a delay in achieving peace (as an example of how occupying land can speed-up the negotiation process, Fukuzawa cites the actions of the British during the Anglo-Satsuma War) [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 285–292; vol. 20, pp. 240–3].

From September to October 1882, Fukuzawa published a series of eighteen editorials in the *Jiji shinpō* in which he summarized his thoughts on military prowess. These editorials were later collected together and published as a book entitled *On Armament* (*Heiron* 兵論) [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, pp. 295–348]. Despite Fukuzawa’s insistence that Japan deploy a large expeditionary force to Korea during the Imo Mutiny, it was in fact not Japan, but the Qing who ended up doing as such. A large army was dispatched to the country, and the Qing forces succeeded both in abducting Taewōngun and in bringing a close to the negotiations. This tour de force on the part of the Qing very much came as a surprise to Fukuzawa. He saw the Qing response as a sign that the Japanese government and its people ought to further focus their attention on augmenting the country’s military capabilities.

Across this series of articles, Fukuzawa stated that reform of Japan’s military system, even if begun tomorrow, would reap results which were immediately palpable. As for the Qing’s military capacity, Fukuzawa warned readers that while Li Hongzhang’s 李鴻章 westernized forces only accounted for a small portion of the Qing military situa-

tion, Li’s forces nevertheless possessed sufficient might to rival that of Japan’s forces. What’s more, the Qing already possessed twice the number of battleships that Japan did. From Fukuzawa’s perspective, in the realm of foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*), there was no such thing as perpetual amity: a friendly power could become an enemy power at the drop of a hat [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 311].

Fukuzawa also claimed that the Chinese people possessed a physical aptitude which was on par with, or perhaps even exceeded that of the Japanese. While they may appear weak on the exterior, this was only because the development of their military system continued to be a work-in-progress. If they continued to push forward with the development of their own military system, they would soon become a colossal elephant equipped with the claws and fangs of a lion.

Citing the Imo Mutiny as an example, Fukuzawa also stated in one of these editorials that “the Chinese government had neither openly stated to Japan that “Korea was a Chinese dependency”, nor had they explicitly interfered in the Korean government’s foreign relations (*gaikō*). However, if one analyzes the nature of the bilateral relationship between China and Korea, the fact that the two countries are not equals becomes palpably clear.” For Fukuzawa, who had understood “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*) to hinge not only upon objective factors but also upon perceptions of one country *vis-à-vis* another (in Japan’s case, the country had long struggled with Western perceptions of it), the Qing’s assertion that “Korea is a Chinese dependency” was not to be taken lightly. Indeed, the Qing believed that their “protection” of Korea justified military action. Furthermore, the fact that they had the audacity to abduct the country’s leader without hesitation demonstrated their conviction that Korea was a dependency of theirs.

With this in mind, Fukuzawa stated that from here on, Qing “policy” ought to be seen as troublesome. As Korea had signed treaties with the Western powers,

[China’s] assertion that “Korea is a Chinese dependency” will soon become an issue. The Japanese government must be sure to not overlook this point as the Chinese government will likely assume a position akin to that of a master when making reference to it. When responding to such claims, Japan must either choose to seek an abolishment of this dependency narrative or allow it to continue. Either way, any negotiations with China will likely be highly cumbersome.

Fukuzawa believed that Japan would not try to turn the Qing into its adversary, and that the Qing likely never harbored antagonistic feelings towards Japan from the outset. Nevertheless, for Fukuzawa, there was a clear need for Japan to be able to demonstrate that it possessed adequate military capabilities when engaging in any negotiations.

In foreign relations (*gaikoku no kōsai*), countries veil their hostilities by donning

cloaks of friendship. Even an uninformed individual realizes that the presence of military might is a necessary backdrop upon which success can be attained in negotiations. Troops are not only necessary in times of war, they are also necessary in times of peace. In feudal times, a samurai would always keep one hand on his sword, be it when he engaged in friendly exchange with a close friend, or when deepening bonds with relatives. We must follow this precedent [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, pp. 313–14].

Through his analysis of the Korean Question, Fukuzawa’s musings on foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*) took on a new level of significance. The reason for this lies in the fact that his analysis moved from an ambiguous prescription for foreign policy to something more tangible: Japan ought to make efforts to fully grasp the situation at hand, consider how the parties involved would react and, only then, decide upon a suitable course of action. However, it should also be mentioned that, for all these developments in his thought, when arguing for augmenting military capacity in peacetime, it was not Japan’s neighboring countries but the Western powers who first came to mind for Fukuzawa.

Be it in its interactions with Western countries, or with the neighboring countries of China or Korea, it is patently clear that Japan, when handling its foreign relations (*gaikoku kōsai*), must always have access to military force. [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 5, p. 315]

As we have seen, the impact of the Imo Mutiny prompted Fukuzawa into deliberating upon a number of newer issues. Ultimately, he came to the conclusion that the problems Japan faced ought to be dealt with pragmatically. However, this conclusion also converged with a desire to see Japan assist its neighboring countries on the road to enlightenment.¹⁴ Such a desire can be interpreted as demonstrating that his eyes nevertheless continued to be firmly fixed upon Japan’s position relative to the West. Before long, Fukuzawa would pen another series of editorials under the heading of “On Opening the Country” [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 541–54]. There, he made the following bold statement.

¹⁴ [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 8, pp. 497–506]. This was not purely empty rhetoric on the part of Fukuzawa. Indeed, he became directly involved with Korea’s “enlightenment” process. In a letter dated 21 January 1883 to Inoue Kakugorō 井上角五郎 (“Letter to Inoue Kakugorō”, 21 January 1883 in [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 17, p. 603]), Fukuzawa stated that “it would appear to me that Korea is becoming increasingly developed. The port of Inchōn, too, will likely continue to prosper to even greater degrees. I pray that the country succeeds without hitch in its development.” Perhaps one reason why Fukuzawa waxed lyrical about Korea’s development at this stage was that he accepted some Korean students at Keiō Gijuku 慶應義塾.

I desire that we will one day reconfigure our nation to become a new and authentic Western-style state, which will utilize its literary and military prowess to crush the Western-style states of yesteryear.

3. 4. *The Crises Which Followed in the Wake of the Kapsin Coup*

As to the developments in the period which spanned the outbreak of the Kapsin Coup (Kapsin Chōnbyōn 甲申政變) in December 1884 through until the signing of the Tianjin Convention between Japan and the Qing in April 1885, Fukuzawa was critical of the Japanese government, at least on a personal level.¹⁵ In a letter to Tanaka Fujimaro 田中不二磨, Fukuzawa stated that while he was pleased that the Tianjin Convention had brought a close to the sequence of unfortunate events that had begun with the Kapsin Coup, he was nevertheless highly critical of the fact that Japan had allowed the coup to go ahead in the first place. However, he goes on to say that “peacefully preserving face after this recent incident will be difficult”. As such, Japan had “no option but to resort to force to conceal its transgressions”. Interestingly, it was also at this point that he made the statement that “the *Jiji shinpō*, too, advocates war”.

In relation to this point, an editorial penned by Fukuzawa and published in the *Jiji shinpō* on 9 March 1885 entitled “the Principles of Country-to-Country Relations Differ from Those Which Are Expounded by Moral Theory” gives us an important insight into Fukuzawa’s perception of “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*) at this time [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 10, pp. 234–8]. There, Fukuzawa stated that, while an ideal for civilization and enlightenment exists, neither the individual nor the state could be considered as perfect. Furthermore, while individuals were capable of living moral lives, the state could not.

The reason he gives for this is that “people’s patriotism” only allows for the consideration of the happiness of one’s own country, and fails to consider the interests of others. Furthermore, he saw this patriotism as, in its worst form, damaging the interests of other states to the benefit of one’s own. Morally speaking, this patriotism was nothing more than a manifestation of self-interest on the part of the people in a given state.

The world we humans inhabit today is incomplete. While ethics has only paved the way forward for the moral development of the individual, at this juncture in time, one cannot find traces of ethics in country-to-country relations (*kuni kōsai* 国交際).

¹⁵ See: “Letter to Tanaka Fujimaro”, 28 April 1885, In [Fukuzawa kenkyū sentā 2006: 252–3].

Unfortunately, there is nothing we can do about this quandary we find ourselves in.

Up until this point, Fukuzawa's conceptualization of "foreign relations" (*gaikoku kōsai*) rested primarily upon the notion of engaging in personal relationships or, at times, friendships with foreigners. However, it appears that by using the term "country-to-country relations" (*kuni kōsai*), Fukuzawa sought to emphasize a type of logic which would only exist in state-to-state interactions which differed from interactions on a person-to-person basis. While the letter to Tanaka Fujimaro introduced above was written just under two months after the publication of this editorial, when Fukuzawa stated that Japan had "no option but to resort to force to conceal its transgressions" it was unlikely that the contents of this particular editorial did not cross his mind.

Korean affairs took on an increasing level of complexity at this time due to the British occupation of Kōmundo 巨文島 (commonly referred to as the Port Hamilton Incident) and, at the behest of Korea, Russia's agreement to sign a secret pact that pledged support for Korea (the Russo-Korean Secret Agreement). Three years prior to this, Fukuzawa had expressed his anxiety over the potential that these countries could "one day find themselves being utterly swallowed up by the West". The situation did not bode well. With the encroachment of Britain and Russia on Korea's northern and southern frontiers, Fukuzawa perceived Korea's independence as hanging in the balance. At this time, Fukuzawa daringly titled one editorial he penned for the *Jiji shinpō* as "Celebrating the Downfall of Korea as a Victory for the Korean People" [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 10, pp. 379–82]. In the article itself, Fukuzawa stated that Korea's downfall was an inevitability due to its corrupt and despotic government, and that if it came to be ruled by Britain, surely that would be a good thing. However, Fukuzawa's fears did not become a reality; Korea did not meet its demise at this point in time.

Following the publication of this editorial, Fukuzawa went on to pen another entitled "Korea Will Inevitably Meet Its Demise" [Fukuzawa 1958–71: vol. 10, pp. 382–7]. However, as the Meiji Government enacted a temporary suspension of the *Jiji shinpō* at this time, the editorial was never actually featured in the paper. In this unpublished editorial, Fukuzawa stated that "when a country finds itself on the verge of ruin, in most cases, it has already passed the point of no return". What is his reasoning?

The notion of the survival of the fittest is by no means just armchair theory; it is an undeniable truth that is observable in the world today. In recent years, European countries in particular have utilized modern forms of transportation in an attempt to feast upon the bounties of Eastern countries. Consequently, feeble countries such as Korea don't stand a chance in maintaining their facade of independence. I am happy to wage a bet on this.

Fukuzawa had long pointed out the fact that the notion of the “balance of power” existed in country-to-country (*kuni kōsai* 国交際) relations, and that this “balance between the great powers” gave rise to a space in which smaller countries could pursue independence. However, from Fukuzawa’s perspective, in East Asia, which was far removed from the European context, such structures did not apply. The great European powers had no compassion for the people of the East. They discovered that snatching land from the region was a profitable enterprise, and they boasted the military capacity to push through with such endeavors. Furthermore, they realized that splitting this profitable enterprise amongst themselves was the wisest course of action. For these reasons, the feebler of the East Asian countries were inexorably led down the path of demise. In other words, Fukuzawa predicted that in the East Asian context, the balance of power would only result in a scramble for land between the Western countries.¹⁶

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, “*gaikō*”, as a Japanese neologism, was first used as a diminutive form of the phrase “*gaikoku kōsai*”, a term which carried the meaning of “foreign relations”. However, it also came to possess a second meaning: “the art of (foreign) relations”. This was due to the later abbreviation of the phrase “(*gaikoku*) *kōsai hō*” (i.e. the art of (foreign) relations) to “*gaikō*”. In other words, two terms, with differing meanings, were subsumed under “*gaikō*”. As such, the term became a catchall which referred to the following: (a) foreign relations, in terms of the physical spaces in which they are conducted in and the relationships they embody; and (b) the very practice or art of “diplomacy”.

Several decades after the events described in this chapter took place, Harold Nicolson, in referencing the way in which the English term “diplomacy” had been used, drew our attention towards the discrepancies which existed between “diplomatic negotiations” and “foreign policy”. This delineation of his has since become a fundamental principle that all students of international relations encounter [Nicolson 1950]. Nicolson’s delineation of the differing meanings extant in the notion of the English “diplomacy” makes for an interesting contrast with the Japanese term “*gaikō*”, which, as we saw above, possessed its own dual set of meanings. Furthermore, Fukuzawa’s writings could be said to be an embodiment of the semantic duality present in “*gaikō*”. Indeed, in his writings, the discrepancies between “foreign relations” (“*gaikoku kōsai*”) and “the art of

¹⁶ In order to limit the scope encompassed by “*gaikoku kōsai*” 外国交際, Fukuzawa would, after this, on several occasions opt to use the phrase “*kuni kōsai*” 国交際.

relations” (*kōsai hō*), despite ultimately being subsumed under the all-encompassing phrase of “*gaikō*”, are very clear-cut. In his perceptions of “foreign relations”, we saw a passive, yet fundamental resistance towards the global order. Whereas in his perceptions of “the art of relations”, a sense of utilizing this global order for one’s own benefit, coupled with a sense of actively applying “maneuvering and scheming” as a means by which to achieve these ends, comes through.

The 1870s and 1880s constituted the period in which Fukuzawa’s ideas on foreign relations began to take form. However, the period was significant for another reason. It was the turning point in which the groundwork was laid for the later emergence of the term “*gaikō*”. As Fukuzawa feared, Japan would eventually be confronted by the issue of how to deal with Qing China and Korea’s suzerain-vassal relationship, a relationship which did not accord to the tenets of “foreign relations” (*gaikoku kōsai*) that Japan, in its dealings with the West, had become accustomed to. As such, friction and collision awaited.

—Translated by Thomas P. Barrett