

Introduction

World History and Suzerainty

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The World Today and the Nation-State

The modern world is plagued by incessant conflict. Even by just casting our minds back to incidents that have taken place in the Middle East and Africa over the course of recent years, we soon find ourselves overwhelmed by their sheer number. Japan and East Asia are by no means an exception, the Senkaku Islands dispute being a prime illustration. These incidents are tangible manifestations of the internal and external strains and contradictions that each country bears as a nation-state.

One could say that the vast majority of the world has yet to attain nation-state status in the true sense of the term. Or, perhaps it would be more apt to assert that the entity that is the nation-state is afflicted by a set of problems that are of a structural nature. Either way, it is some time since the incomplete entity that is the nation-state, or indeed its progenitor, modernity, came under scrutiny for their inherent limitations, and a rallying cry was made for their transcension. Nevertheless, we still find ourselves in a situation today in which we are unable to break free from the shackles which these concepts impose upon us, and conflicts continue to be waged.

The root causes of such a situation are, of course, both complex and wide-ranging. However, one key element lies at the very heart of the problem: namely, that we ourselves are not fully cognizant of what constitutes modernity and the nation-state.

It is somewhat of a truism to say that the concept of “nation” is predicated on the fact that another form of polity or order preceded it. Indeed, if nothing but the nation existed, there would be no particular need to name or distinguish it with such nomenclature in the first place.¹ If such is the case, then, in order to grasp what constitutes the nation-state, a need exists for us both to probe the forms that these other polities and orders took, and to analyze their relationship and contrasting elements *vis-à-vis* the nation-state. However, until now, to what extent have such attempts been made?

A Reconsideration of Our Conceptual Apparatus and a Note on the Position of This Book

The nation took form in Western Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, and, at the time, existed only within that geographical space. However, in the world today, hardly any polities exist which take a form other than that of the nation. Indeed, since then, all other forms of polity that had previously existed have been wiped out and replaced with the nation-state. Therefore, as a corollary of the task set out above, a detailed analysis of the nation-state's global expansion is required.

One must be careful to pay attention to the fact that all other conceptual apparatus used within contemporary scholarship were almost exclusively created within the confines of Western modernity, that is, within the process of the conquest of the world by the "nation". And so, when we attempt to look at forms of government other than the nation-state, a conceptual bias engendered by Eurocentrism and the nation concept continuously clouds our understanding. As all contemporary scholarship is a product of modernity, regardless of whether we like it or not, such a state of affairs is unavoidable.

The confusion surrounding various concepts that feature within theories of "empire", or indeed the ways in which such theories are used in attempts to cut through this confusion typify this Eurocentric conceptual bias. If the forms of government that commanded vast swathes of land before the inception of the nation, such as the Roman and Mongol Empires, are "empires", then nations such as Great Britain and Japan, which expanded through the capturing of colonial possessions, too, are "empires". Therefore, this also means that the supersize multi-ethnic nation-states of recent years such as the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, too, are "empires". This

¹ We have made the conscious decision to use the term "nation" in isolation here in order to emphasize the fact that it conveys the existence of both a ruling agent (i.e. a government) and a ruled subject (i.e. the people). Conversely, the standalone Chinese words for "the people" (*kokumin/guomin* 國民) and "the state" (*kokka/guojia* 國家) do not sufficiently convey the concept of "nation". This is a good example of the historical problem surrounding translated concepts that is dealt with later in this book.

² The frequent use of the translated Chinese word *teikoku/cheguk/diguo* 帝國 in East Asia has resulted in confusion on theories of "empire". This stems from the fact that 帝國 was originally translated from the phrase "Roman Empire/Imperium Romanus", despite not possessing any elements of *Romanitas* any more by this point. The phrase was also used in the late 19th century as *Dai-Nippon teikoku* 大日本帝国 (the Great Japanese Empire), or *Tae-Han cheguk* 大韓帝國 (the Great Korean Empire) to negate the existing Sino-centric world order. See [Yoshimura 2003]. After that, China also adopted the title of *diguo* 帝國 to refer to herself as the *Da-Qing* Empire 大清帝國 from 1908 to 1911, and the Empire of China 中華帝國 in 1916. When used in this book, the term "empire" is used strictly to refer to the sphere of order integrated through *Romanitas* and its translation.

simple adumbration demonstrates the complexities of the issue at hand.²

The reasons which underlie the use of the term “empire” to describe each of the above entities are understandable. Moreover, its use by no means undermines the quality of research or analysis being carried out on each. However, at the same time, it is also true that we lack rigid definitions and analyses of each. This stems from the fact that we have often not been prudent enough to return to a given term’s point of origin or change, and from there trace its historical usages and fluctuations over time.

With this current state of research in mind, this book attempts to rewrite world history. Rather than taking concepts of Western origin that relate to polities, orders and their mutual relationships as *a priori* concepts, this book takes a holistic approach in terms of its historical scope by beginning with the formative processes that produced each of these entities, so as to thoroughly investigate the possibility that they were, in fact, bridges between the East and the West.

Before analyzing this possibility in detail, it will likely be useful to provide readers with a general overview of the perspective upon world history that this book ultimately arrives at. The individual points which inform this overarching historical view are contained within each of this book’s chapters. Therefore, a general overview will be likely to help readers grasp their individual significance.

East-West Universality

It is some time since scholars of Mongolian history originally put forward the proposition that “world history” originated in Mongolia.³ While the historical fact that the so-called Great Mongol Empire (*Yeke Mongol Uls*) unified the whole of Eurasia in the 13th century is of noteworthy importance, we ought to assign greater significance to the transition that occurred after unification; namely that different areas across the world continued to exhibit a tendency to interlink and unify.⁴

The global situation that followed the collapse of the Great Mongol Empire is often referred to as “post-Mongol” because the Mongols continued to occupy a great position of influence within it. A large number of the political regimes that came into being across Eurasia after the collapse of the Great Mongol Empire respected the pedigree and traditions that had ensued from Genghis Khan’s time, and thus bore many Mongol elements. This allowed for a type of universalism to develop that could be shared in common by the various groups that populated Eurasia. Moreover, this univer-

³ For example, see [Okada 1992; Sugiyama 1992].

⁴ Refer to the following articles and monographs for an overview of this from the standpoint of socio-economic history [Sugiyama and Okamoto 2006; Okamoto 2013a; Okamoto 2013b].

salism also had the function of providing a foundation upon which wide-scale politico-military unification could be executed.

That being said, even during the years of the Great Mongol Empire, this Mongolian universalism had already spawned new mutations and was by no means a ubiquitously homogeneous entity. Broadly speaking, taking the Pamirs as a rough dividing point, this universalism differed greatly between east and west. This, incidentally, provided the grounds for the division of Asia between the east and the west.

Western Mongol culture syncretized with Islam, blending together to form a larger whole. Islam, of course, had also functioned as a universalism that yielded widespread unification. Given its roots, Islam was a universalism that was entirely distinct from its Mongol counterpart. However, from the time of the Great Mongol Empire, particularly among the Persian and Turkic peoples, and with Persian as a common language, these two universalisms combined to form a “Persianate world”. Therefore, on the western side of the “post-Mongol” world, it was hard to draw a distinction between Mongolia and Islam as being two completely disparate universalisms.⁵

There was one other universalism that existed to the west of the Pamirs: Rome. The word “Rome” generally tends to conjure up images of the Greco-Roman classics and Roman law, and it is widely considered that modern Western Europe, through the Renaissance and Enlightenment, exclusively restored and inherited its legacy. However, such an understanding is tainted by a perhaps now immutable form of Eurocentrism. The reality was that the memories and representations of the Roman Empire, Rome as the “Eternal City” and *Nova Roma* [Constantinople], were inherited and shared by multiple peoples in differing regions, and functioned as tools of legitimization for politico-military rule in each. These inheritors of the Roman legacy consisted of Western Europeans, the successors to the Western Roman Empire; Eastern Europeans, the legitimate successors to the Roman Empire at large; and Muslims,⁶ who had placed a large number of former territories of the Eastern Roman Empire under their control. Broadly speaking, three differing images of Rome clashed with one another: Catholic Rome in Western Europe, Orthodox Rome in Eastern Europe, and Islamic Rome in the Middle East. Of these three, it was predominantly the third which syncretized with the Mongolian universalism.

This ends our rough sketch of the structure of the universalisms that existed in the west. In contrast, what was the situation like in the east? As is well known, in the east, Mongolia embraced syncretism with Tibetan Buddhism, coming together to effectively

⁵ For the expansion of the “Persianate world”, see [Morimoto 2009].

⁶ [Fujinami 2013]. The discussions on “Rome” and “universalisms” given in this introduction owe a great deal of debt to Fujinami Nobuyoshi 藤波伸嘉 for his assistance and advice. The author would like to use this opportunity to express his gratitude to Professor Fujinami here.

form a unified whole. This resembled the relationship that existed between the Islamic and Mongolian universalisms in the west. However, the similarities ended there.

Firstly, the Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist Sphere did not integrate with the neighboring Sino-Confucian Sphere in the slightest. Rather, it stood in confrontation with it. This stemmed from the fact that the Ming dynasty, which broke away from the Great Mongol Empire, eradicated all Mongol elements from its framework of rule, replacing them with a ruling ideology predicated on Neo-Confucianism and Sinocentrism. Under such a ruling ideology, the Ming demanded that outlying countries and groups must acquiesce and accept its primacy. While the Chosŏn and Ryukyu kingdoms acquiesced to these demands, few others did. In this regard, the Sino-Confucian Sphere differed from, for example, Rome in the west, whose legacy was shared on a wide-scale basis.

For a period of roughly 300 years, a situation existed in which neither the Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist Sphere in the north-west, nor the Sino-Confucian Sphere in the south-east, yielded to the other. The two universalisms never integrated, existing in parallel with the other. This meant that there was a clear geographic division in the characteristics of the populations in each area.

Overlapping Universalisms: the Ottoman Empire and the Qing Dynasty

Only with the above in mind can one begin to discuss the structures of the Ottoman and the Qing, who achieved integration of the largest scale in both East and West Asia in the “post-Mongol” era.

As both a sultan and caliph, the Ottoman monarch served as the leader of the Muslims. Furthermore, with the names of Khaan and Padişah/Pādshāh, the Ottoman monarch also commanded a royal authority that was equipped with a Persian/Mongol kingship. But that was not all. As the successor to the Eastern Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire was also an entity which embodied representations of Rome. More concretely speaking, the merged universalisms of Islamic Rome and Mongolia also merged with Orthodox Rome in the Balkans and further east. The Ottoman Empire was thus an entity comprised of several overlapping universalisms: the Mongolian, Islamic and Roman universalisms. It was this structure that allowed it to exercise rule over such vast swathes of territory.

In contrast to this, if we apply the same conceptual apparatus to articulate the structural composition of the Qing regime in the east, one can say that the Qing was comprised of an overlap of Mongolian, Tibetan Buddhist and Sino-Confucian universalisms. In more concrete terms, the Manchu Khaan, who possessed a Mongol kingship authorized by Tibetan Buddhism, also ruled over the Chinese-language world as the

Celestial Monarch of China.

By amalgamating several pre-existing universalisms, the Ottoman Empire and the Qing dynasty were able to realize large-scale integration over the entirety of West and East Asia. While the two were similar in that their structures were comprised of several overlapping universalisms, there were subtle structural distinctions in their multi-layered compositions.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, its “overlaps” were of a syncretic or hybrid nature. The Ottoman monarch did not adopt different universalisms for different people. His identity was pluralistic, and was perceived by all his subjects, including both Muslims and Orthodox Christians, to simultaneously serve as the Sultan, the Khaan and the Roman Emperor.

A number of factors gave rise to such a situation. From a legal perspective, Islam allowed for members of other religions to come under its aegis. Therefore, when governing over Christians, it did not necessarily require a new set of attributes to justify or legitimize the rule of non-Muslim subjects. Furthermore, the various communities among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire did not practice self-segregation based on religion, ethnicity or other factors; indeed, living cheek by jowl with other communities was largely the norm. As such, governing through the application of specific universalisms for specific groups of people would have been difficult to implement.

Alongside this, in the Ottoman Empire, where the image of a Great Khaan was continually projected upon its monarchs right up until its demise, some even assumed that the Genghis and Ottoman families were related by blood or had kinship ties. Furthermore, a widespread notion existed that should the house of Ottoman produce no male heirs, the Crimean Khanate should serve as its successor. Indeed, the social standing of the Crimean Khaan, Genghis Khan’s legitimate successor, remained high throughout the course of the Ottoman Empire, and he was treated as a guest rather than as a subject. It was in this way that this sense of Mongolian legitimacy, which had intertwined with Islam, penetrated the Ottoman Empire.

Of course, these overlapping universalisms by no means remained in a permanent stasis in each part of the Ottoman Empire over the course of its 600-year history. Naturally, the emphasis placed on specific universalisms fluctuated across time. The question of to what extent the ruler, who embodied these universalisms, took actions with these universalisms in mind is, however, a question which needs to be considered elsewhere.

It is likely that discrepancies existed between the Empire’s various subjects regarding the universalism with which they felt most at home. Orthodox Christians, for example, were most likely to find themselves identifying with the Muslim Emperor after the demise of the Christian Roman Empire. Istanbulite Muslims likely projected the visage of an Islamic Sultan or Caliph upon the monarch, whereas an image of a Turkish or Mongolian ruler might have come across more prominently for some nomadic peo-

ples in the east.

Standing in contrast to this in East Asia, the Qing dynasty succeeded in unifying all of its people through the invoking of differing universalisms for different peoples. This contrasted with the syncretism or blending of universalisms that could be observed in the Ottoman Empire. Over the north of the Great Wall and to the west of Gansu and Sichuan, the Qing dynasty ruled through nomadic traditions whose roots lay in Mongolia but which had fused with Tibetan Buddhism. These areas had not been penetrated by Confucianism, nor by the Han-Chinese language.

However, in the Chinese-language world to the south of the Great Wall, the opposite was the case. The Qing dynasty retained the Confucian Sinocentric world order that existed under the Ming, administering both China proper and its outlying regions as a traditional Chinese autocracy. Chinese therefore operated as the *lingua franca* in these regions.

The Qing, whilst explicitly invoking differing principles and languages to govern the north-western and south-eastern regions of East Asia, integrated these areas through one overarching ruler. These characteristics are what set the Qing dynasty's "overlapping universalisms" apart from those which existed under the Ottomans in the Middle East.

As such was the case, it was essential that the Qing government, from within the Sino-Confucian Sphere, both denounce and amend the Ming form of Sinocentrism which held the Han Chinese in high regard and looked down on other ethnic groups such as the Manchus, Mongols and Tibetans as inferior peoples. The so-called literary inquisitions which took place during the Qing period were a by-product of such endeavors. Furthermore, it could be said that in order for the Qing dynasty to achieve a smooth "overlapping" of universalisms, these inquisitions were to some extent unavoidable.

The Significance of Western Modernity

However, two regions existed on the eastern and western peripheries of Asia that did not belong to either the Qing or Ottoman's spheres of influence: Japan and Western Europe.⁷ Let us deal with these chronologically, beginning with Western Europe.

As is well known, Western Europe's origins lie in Charlemagne's revival of the Western Roman Empire and the Catholic Church's accumulation of independent power. Western Europe was similar to Eastern Europe, the Middle East and, by extension, the

⁷ Monographs which have previously dealt with this phenomenon from a Japanese perspective or from the standpoint of "*bunmei*" are [Umesao 1974; Kawakatsu 1997].

Ottoman Empire in that they all shared a sense of the Roman legacy. However, the similarities began and ended there. Within the confines of the narrow area of land that constituted Charlemagne's Catholic empire, various lords and churches became independent and faced off against one another. It was through such events that Western History began to develop.

Following the Crusades, Renaissance and Reformation, Western Europe eventually produced the sovereign state system. This system, which is often referred to as the "Westphalian system", was nothing more than a reorganization within the Catholic world of the ancient practices and traditions that had long determined the nature of mutual relationships between various lords from the time of the Western Roman Empire. This development occurred after the secular authority wielded by the monarch came to surpass that of religion; the catalyst for this sea change being the emergence of Protestantism. The sovereign state system, in other words, functioned as a norm that regulated regional relationships between the monarchs of Western Europe. However, one must be careful to bear in mind that the term "sovereignty" encompassed both the concept of the monarch, the abstract notion of a monarch's authority and, furthermore, the authority of the state.

Louis XIV once famously proclaimed that he, as monarch, *was* the state. The sovereign state system, which came into existence in this period when the monarch was equivalent to the state, did not fall into obsolescence in the 19th century when the nation-state ruled supreme. Rather, the system was further refined. As a norm which existed exclusively within the confines of the Western European Christian World, the system was arbitrarily defined within the West as constituting Roman-esque "civilisation". Furthermore, "droit des gens", or the "law of nations", a concept of Roman origin, was deemed appropriate for use as a universal legal system, and all tangible action that adhered to its tenets was referred to as "diplomatie". Such concepts, legal systems and behavioral patterns originally only held water within the exceedingly confined geographical space that was Western Europe. However, in the modern era, under the sway of Western Europe's overwhelming military force, their usage expanded to become norms which functioned on a global basis.

The term "imperialism" is used to refer to that process of expansion. The term "empire" originates from the term "imperium", which was originally used to refer to the Romans' authority to issue mandates. It then gradually came to refer to the vast expanse of land over which such authority reigned supreme. As such, in the original sense of the term, "imperialism" meant to uniformly and coercively spread "Roman" (i.e. Western European) "civilization" to the vast areas it had yet to penetrate. However, after Hobson and Lenin redefined the term in connection with capitalism, its uniformal and coercive aspects were emphasized, and the Roman legacy with which the concept had once been inextricably linked came to be largely forgotten.

It is in this context that Western Europe's relationship with the neighboring sphere of overlapping universalisms, the Ottoman Empire, becomes problematic. From the time of the Crusades, the West had long seen Islam as its nemesis. The West has long assumed that Rome's legacy was inherent only in its own traditions. Indeed, it even refused to recognize the existence of the Roman legacy within the Eastern Roman Empire, using the terms "Greek" and "Byzantine" when alluding to it. Attitudes towards the Ottomans in Western modernity thus developed in line with such ideas.

Western European "civilization", or, in other words, the sovereign state system, was a unitary universalism that strictly speaking did not exist within the structure of overlapping universalisms embodied by the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the two entities were similar in that they both shared a sense of the Roman legacy. However, as Western Europe regarded itself as the true successor of Rome and sought to monopolize its cultural legacy, stripping the Muslim Ottomans of their *Romanitas* became a necessary task. In that sense, it was inevitable that the expansion of modern Western Europe would be accompanied by an "imperialist" invasion of the Ottoman Empire.

The exact process by which this was realized, however, is somewhat complex. After the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire, the Habsburgs, who occupied the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, long stood at the forefront of the confrontations with the Ottomans. The origins of the self-conscious notion that equated "Rome" to "Western Europe" was in a large part rooted in this confrontation [Arai 2002]. As the rivalry between the Ottomans and House of Habsburg wore on in the 18th century, a new power which was achieving increasing levels of influence came to challenge the Ottomans for the Roman legacy: the Russians in the north-east.

After the Russians managed to gain ascendancy, the Orthodox region of East Europe began to slip from the grasp of the Ottomans. The problems which erupted over Wallachia and Moldavia typified this situation (see Chapter 1).

The sovereign state system of Western European Roman origin interposed itself in such events. Eventually, the Western European powers themselves began proactive intervention. Concurrent with such events, what has come to be referred to from the perspective of Western modernity as the "Eastern Question" began to take shape: the Ottoman Empire was refined into an Islamic state, and later the Turkish nation. These events represented a purging of the Ottomans' *Romanitas* and "civility" and the "Asianization" of its identity (see Chapter 2).

From the perspective of the ethnic groups that inhabited the Balkans, as the inheritors of the Roman/Byzantine Empire, another process took place in parallel with the negation of Islamic Rome. Namely, as a means by which to recapture their ancient lands from "Turkey", which had since been stripped of its *Romanitas*, each ethnic group established representations of themselves within their own ethnohistorical contexts (see Chapter 10).⁸ From amongst all of this, the concept of "suzerainty" was born as a way of

articulating from a legal perspective the relationships between these various political entities that had broken away from the Ottoman monarch.

The term suzerainty was initially used in medieval Europe to articulate one form of the relationship that existed between a lord and his vassals. However, for the most part, this form of relationship had ceased to exist in Western Europe after the Peace of Westphalia. In other words, in Western Europe at the time, the term suzerainty encompassed an image of the past that was devoid of any sense of reality. Conversely, it was precisely for these reasons that it was used to express the Ottoman's enigmatic relationship with the areas that supposedly fell under its authority and, furthermore, was appropriated as a method to articulate the relationships that existed between would-be sovereign states and their overlords. As such, the term suzerainty, which had no fixed definition and which brimmed with ambiguity and arbitrariness, bore the hallmarks of being used in situations that reconciled the antagonisms between the sovereign state system and those entities which consisted of overlapping universalisms.

Suzerainty's Expansion to the East

In time, Western Europe's sovereign state system (and the power structure that existed between that system and the Ottoman Empire), eventually spread to East Asia. There, it came into contact with the Qing's very own system of overlapping universalisms.

Sandwiched between the East and West was the Russian Empire. However, Russia never directly challenged the East's system of overlapping universalisms.

In geographical terms, the regions gained by Russia's easterly and westerly expansion encompassed the area which had once constituted Western Mongolia. Russia's bilateral relationship with the Ottoman Empire (which was mediated through the Crimean Khanate), and its "Mongolian" approach to relationship-building with the Qing, were both a distinct demonstration of its "Post-Mongol" character, and also an indication that Central Asia, the heir of the Perso-Mongol tradition, had come under its annexation. In this sense, one can also objectively view the "Great Game" that Russia played out with Britain as a process by which the two competed for, and gradually extinguished, the Mongolian universalism. This is because the Great Game was a contest between the Russian Empire, which controlled the Chagatai-Turkic Sphere, and the British Indian

⁸ The practicing Muslims of the Ottoman Empire also called for the establishment of a new universalism that could replace the *Romanitas* which was being gradually stripped away from them. Movements such as Wahhabism and Salafism, which advocated a return to "real" Islam, and furthermore Pan-Turkism, which sought a return to the past lands of Central Asia, are some pertinent examples of this.

Empire, which succeeded the Timur-Mughals.⁹

However, the extent to which Russia's actions were based on an awareness of such a universalism is another issue altogether. In the case of the East, until the 18th century it was not Russia but the Dzungar Khanate who fought with the Qing over Mongolian legitimacy. Furthermore, throughout the course of Russia's eastern expansion in the 19th century, it gave no indication that it was actively seeking to recapture and monopolize the Mongol legacy. It wasn't just the Mongol legacy: neither the issue of *Romanitas* nor the sovereign state system became points of contention during its expansion. Rather, the question of how the East perceived Russia's expansion was far more important for later historical developments (see Chapter 4).

The Western-led power structures embedded in the Middle East were taken eastwards not by Russia, but by the other Western powers. However, from the Western perspective, East Asia was wholly removed from the Middle East. Furthermore, of the universalisms that comprised the much closer-to-home Ottoman Empire, Islam was an enemy, while Rome very much belonged to its own tradition. Because of this, the West took a deep interest in the Ottoman Empire and the two became inextricably linked. However, when the model that resulted from the West's relationship with the Ottoman Empire came into contact with the enigmatic universalisms of East Asia, conflict ensued.

The Western powers, as proponents of the sovereign state system, came into contact with East Asia via the sea. As such, the first of the East Asian universalisms that the West came into contact with was the Sino-Confucian Sphere. The significance of this was twofold.

Firstly, the West's penetration of the Sino-Confucian Sphere began in the south-east. As such, its penetration of the Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist Sphere in the north-west came much later and, furthermore, occurred through the medium of the Chinese language. This lag in contact stemmed from the fact that despite co-existing under the Qing, the Sino-Confucian and Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist Spheres nevertheless functioned as disparate entities. Furthermore, given the area's geopolitical position, it is also important to bear in mind that the developments in these interactions were closely interlinked with the Great Game that was being played out between Britain and Russia.

The second point concerns the lack of proximity between the West and East Asia. As the term "the Far East" suggests, East Asia was an exceedingly long way away from the West. Neither the comfort that was Rome, nor the adversary that was Islam, could be

⁹ The Qājār dynasty is an example of an entity which was stripped of the Perso-Mongol universalism and was forced into becoming a nation-state as a result of the Great Game. The fact that this outcome was partly brought about by modern Western science (i.e. Rawlinson's deciphering of cuneiform script) is exceedingly symbolic. For more on this, refer to [Morikawa 2007; Morikawa 2010].

found there. From a Western perspective, the Chinese language and Confucianism were far removed from the realm of comprehension, and proved much harder to fathom than the Islamic and Buddhist traditions. This situation was not exclusive to the 19th century. Indeed, it still very much persists today. This relative lack of familiarity exhibited by the West was of great significance as it played a major role in deciding the fate of East and West Asia.

As a consequence of this unfamiliarity, westerners possessed an exceedingly superficial understanding of the Qing and East Asia that was laden with misconceptions. Upon such rocky foundations, westerners attempted to build and develop relationships with the Qing and other parts of East Asia. The West's misconceptions, together with its eminent military strength and formidable influence, became powerful forces that moved the very course of history.

One specific example of this is its frequent invocation of suzerainty. In the Sino-Confucian Sphere, Confucian notions relating to ritual, status and hierarchy governed the relationship between the Celestial Monarch of China and the outer barbarians. For the Western powers, the highly ambiguous and arbitrary concept of suzerainty proved to be a convenient way for understanding these relationships. This was because their own world view discriminated between countries based on their level of "progress" in imbibing the West's sovereign state system and its "civilization". Of course, such an understanding was riddled with misconceptions. Nevertheless, these misconceptions became a powerful driving force for change in the Sino-Confucian sphere.

The publication of a Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* (*Wanguo gongfa/Bankoku kōhō*) is a prime example (see Chapter 3). It provided the impetus for Japan's modernization and gave rise to a series of Japanese neologisms that were later absorbed into the Chinese lexicon. This series of events resulted in a restructuring of East Asia's universalisms, and became the driving force that dismantled and negated their overlapping structures.

The Transformation of Modern Japan and the Sino-Confucian Sphere

With the above in mind, we will now move on to addressing the significance of Japan's position and role. While it is true that Japan, in terms of its written script and language, was positioned within the Sino-Confucian Sphere, it nevertheless did not belong to the system of overlapping universalisms that was embodied by the Qing dynasty. Neither Confucianism nor Neo-Confucianism functioned as socio-political ideologies that regulated Japan's day-to-day life, its institutions or its foreign relations, and Japan was not subsumed into the Sinocentric world order. Moreover, Japan was completely detached from the nomads who adhered to Mongolian traditions, and it did not subscribe to Tibet-

an Buddhism. Japan did, however, engage in prolonged exchange with the Sinocentric world on economic and cultural fronts.

In this regard, Japan's position more closely resembled that of the Western powers which marched eastwards into East Asia. Furthermore, through the Meiji Restoration, Japan began to take the road to modernization much earlier than any of its East Asian neighbors, making it resemble the West all the more. The key components of Japan's so-called modernization process were the ideology of "enrich the state and strengthen the military" (*fukoku kyōhei* 富国強兵), and the upheaval of the political system. In other words, Japan's modernization process was an attempt to acquire perfect mastery of Western military strength and the sovereign state system. While Japan succeeded in achieving these goals, it also found itself coming into confrontation with the Sino-Confucian Sphere. It was in this way that the modern Japanese concept of *gaikō* 外交 (foreign relations/diplomacy) came into being (see Chapter 5).

Whilst having many parallels with the West, Japan employed Chinese characters as a component of its written script just like the rest of the Sino-Confucian Sphere. When East Asia was prompted to enact a reorganization of its pre-existing structures and universalisms, this unique position enabled Japan to provide East Asia with a crucial set of conditions that would allow for such an upheaval. Through the use of Chinese characters, Japan was able to articulate its knowledge of the sovereign state system through translation, and furthermore, by applying it to the neighboring Sino-Confucian Sphere, was able to reorganize the pre-existing order on both linguistic and conceptual levels. One example of this is the Japanese neologism for "sovereignty" (*sōshuken/zongzhuquan* 宗主權), which came into existence during the process of "Japanese diplomacy", in which the Sino-Japanese War served as a major watershed (see Chapter 6).

The construction of this neologism was inextricably linked with the formation processes of the concepts for "territory" (*lingtu* 領土) and "sovereignty" (*zhuquan* 主權) within China (see Chapter 9). Concurrent with this, the Japanese term for "civilization" (*bunmei* 文明) came to be used as a concept which referred to the Western sovereign state system, and replaced the pre-existing normative order in the Sino-Confucian Sphere that had traditionally taken the concept of *zhonghua* 中華 as its central ideological component. The contest over the ultimate arbiter of "*bunmei*" in East Asia defined the nature of the Sino-Japanese relationship in the 20th century, and is most likely still at play today.

This ends our overview of the transformations that occurred in the pre-existing universalisms of the Sino-Confucian Sphere. However, the transformations by no means ended there. Imbibing military technologies and the sovereign state system from the West, the heavily populated Sino-Confucian Sphere became increasingly robust. In time, the concepts of the nation-state and the sovereign state became the dominant paradigm, and the East's *sui generis* system of overlapping universalisms fell out of favor. This

phenomenon resembled the way in which the West did not allow the Ottomans to continue with their system of overlapping universalisms. For that reason, the Ottomans continued to be viewed as a representation of the “non-civilized” or the “barbaric” in not just the West, but in East Asia as well.¹⁰

Even within the East itself, these attitudes became manifest in concrete actions. The target of such actions was the Tibeto-Mongol Buddhist universalism in the north-west. Seeking the ubiquitous dissemination of “*bunmei*”, or “*wenming*”, the Sino-Confucian Sphere of the south-east crushed the autonomous universalism of the north-west, stripping it of its traditions and forcing it to assimilate to a new Sino-Western universalism.

The Qing had once ruled over the Mongols in the position of Great Khaan. Furthermore, it had also once served as the guardian of Tibetan Buddhism. It was precisely for these very reasons that multiple universalisms could co-exist and overlap within Qing territory. However, by no later than the 20th century, that very same Qing dynasty was enveloped by a new Sino-Western universalism that became one with the Sino-Confucian Sphere. As such, arguably, it was inevitable that the Qing would eventually meet the fate of being superseded by a Han-led “China”.

In the early 20th century, the Mongolians and the Tibetans protested against the eradication of their universalisms in a movement which called for independence. During this struggle, the concept of “suzerainty” once again reared its head and became a significant point of contention. The fact that its application as a translated concept became a point of contention was no coincidence; Mongolia and Tibet differed both in their distance from Beijing, and in their level of familiarity with the Chinese language. While the Mongolian government (see Chapter 7) understood the Chinese word for “suzerainty”, it also inspired fear in them. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama-led government in Tibet failed to develop an adequate translation for the term (see Chapter 8). This divergence in understanding led to the two regions meeting with very different fates; fates which continue to define the regions in the world today.

Japanese imperialism was by no means completely removed from such events. Japan established both the *Man-Mō* 滿蒙 (Manchuria-Mongolia) region and Manchukuo as a way of resisting the universalism that the Sino-Confucian Sphere, or “China”,

¹⁰ A typical example of this is when the phrase “the sick man of Europe” (which was used to refer to the Ottomans) was adapted into Chinese and used as a self-depreciative term to describe China and its “cumulative weakness” as “the sick man of Asia” (*dongya bingfu* 東亞病夫). It is an irrefutable truth that as the concept of “civilization” began to take root in East Asia, so did a shared sense of “orientalism”. Such attitudes continue to govern our perceptions of the world, and serve not only as a groundless form of discrimination towards the Ottomans and the Middle East, but also as a way of creating further antagonisms within East Asia.

attempted to impose. Furthermore, such events should be understood within the context of the aforementioned competition for the ultimate arbiter of “*bunmei*”, or “*wenming*”.¹¹

Reconsidering East and West Asia

Viewed in this way, the one-sided nature of discourse that features within theories of “empire” becomes all too clear. Such discourse suggests that while that the Ottoman Empire’s nation-building initiatives failed, China’s did not. Furthermore, it suggests that while the territory of the former was partitioned and broken up into individual nation-states contingent upon ethnicity such as Turkey and Greece, the latter was able to inherit the majority of the territory which had once constituted the Qing dynasty. This begs the question: what factors have led to such skewed understandings? Firstly, adequate attention has not been paid to Asia’s universalisms and their multi-layered structures. Secondly, such discussions are also linked to the continuous reproduction of scholarly works that only offer appraisals of the deftness in response to the West or the contemporaneous international climate on a country-by-country basis.¹²

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the continuation of China was predicated on a number of factors. First and foremost, the character of Asia’s overlapping universalisms differed from east to west, particularly with regards to whether or not Rome occupied a position as one of the universalisms immanent in their structures, and whether or not Islam, the official religion of the Ottoman Empire, was regarded as an “enemy”. Here, it is worth noting that the Western perception of China almost completely lacked any elements relating to Islam. Secondly, in relation to this, depending on the presence or absence of Rome and Islam, the West’s approach to each system differed greatly. Furthermore, when these multi-layered structures began to break down in the 19th century, each process of dissolution naturally produced different historical outcomes.

Japan’s involvement, or lack of it, was one determining factor that led to these alternative outcomes. Despite only possessing a very minimal level of commonality with Rome, the West professed that it was Rome’s true successor and encroached upon the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over the areas which had once served as the Roman Empire’s heartlands: Eastern Europe and the Middle East. This relationship resembled Japan’s position with regard to China, in that it aimed at usurping its position as the one true civilization despite not sharing any common universalisms with it.¹³ Through the

¹¹ For more on this, refer to [Yamamuro 2006; Nakami 2013].

¹² E.g. [Kasaba 1993; Horowitz 2004; Savage 2011].

¹³ E.g. [Watanabe 1997].

means of imperialism, the West managed to achieve expansion on a global scale. When this imperialism reached Eastern shores, Japan became its translator and injected notions relating to the sovereign state system into the Sino-Confucian Sphere. Furthermore, as both the vanguard and the model student of Western imperialism, Japan precipitated East Asia into disintegrating and restructuring its system of overlapping universalisms.

In this way, the difference in roles played by local-level interlopers determined the fate of both the Ottoman Empire and the Qing dynasty. In other words, in East Asia, the interloper that was Japan took on the role of the translator of Western modernity, and became a model of success. In contrast to this, in West Asia, there was no local translating agent. Rather, the interlopers that operated here were the very agents of the world-sweeping phenomenon that was “modernity”. This simple yet important fact functioned as a crucial point of divergence between East and West Asia.

This book attempts to elucidate the specifics of this historical process from a variety of angles. As has been touched upon in various points throughout this introduction, when the nation-state and the international system which emerged from Western modernity came into contact with the inherent “overlapping universalisms” of East and West Asia, the term “suzerainty” was always brought into play. In other words, from the position of the sovereign state system and imperialism, “suzerainty” was the most appropriate term for both expressing the inherent power structures that existed in the Ottoman Empire and the Qing dynasty, and furthermore for transforming them. Indeed, as a concept, “suzerainty” occupies a pivotal position in the historical processes that this book deals with. The overuse of the concept of “empire” too, is a phenomenon that is inextricably linked to the emergence of “suzerainty”.

Therefore, if we analyze the inherent character of suzerainty and its development over time, in addition to being able to conduct a comparison of the Ottoman Empire and the Qing dynasty, we will be able both to elucidate and compare the relationships between the nation-state and entities consisting of overlapping universalisms, and explore their respective characters. Through this process, we may well be able to unearth new insights that will allow us to cure ourselves of our chronic malady of analyzing history through the *a priori* nation-state framework and a Eurocentric lens.

Of course, attempts have been made to use “suzerainty” as a means by which to consider history’s macro-scale political orders. In the fields of law and political science, research on the definition and concept of the now almost extinct concept of “suzerainty” began when the term was still in common use.¹⁴ Furthermore, in the field of history, particularly within the context of East Asia, there are a number of books which have

¹⁴ E.g. [Hall 1880: 24–5; Stubbs 1882; Gairal 1896: 112–13; Oppenheim 1905: vol. 1, pp. 170–1; Dickinson 1920: 236–40].

probed suzerainty's relationship with the so-called Tributary System, as does this book.¹⁵

However, the existing body of research within the fields of law and political science is predicated on the frameworks of the nation-state and international society, and assumes that sovereignty and suzerainty were different legal concepts from the outset. Furthermore, it neglects the actual relationship and dynamic contexts within which the two terms were used. Meanwhile, research conducted within the field of history has taken a myopic approach in that it only places East Asia in its field of view, lacks analysis based on actual historical facts, and has failed to analyze the concept down to its roots. In this sense, this book's stance and its method of attempting to reconsider East and West Asia through a thorough historical evaluation of the concept of "suzerainty" could be considered something of a rarity.

The Structure of This Book

Part I traces the transformation of the Ottoman Empire's power structures and its relationship with the West, and considers the inception of the concept of "suzerainty", its actuality, and the significance of the modern Ottoman transformation. Specifically, by examining the international politics surrounding the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, it traces the process by which the concept of "suzerainty" emerged, and offers an overview of the shift in the politics and diplomacy of the modern Ottoman Empire through the notion of "privileges"; a notion which is intimately linked with the concepts of sovereignty and suzerainty.

Part II builds upon the content of Part I by analyzing descriptions of suzerainty in international law texts. It also analyzes issues revolving around how to translate "suzerainty" into Chinese, so as to trace the concept's spread to East Asia. Part II also discusses the influence on East Asia of Russia's expansion and how Japan and the Qing dealt with that influence differently. Furthermore, an examination is also offered on the turning point which led to East Asia and the Chinese-language world's shift to a new power structure in the 19th century.

Part III focuses on modern Japan. It focuses first on the discourse and translation activities of Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉. After confirming that the conceptual shift in Japan's diplomacy began with the Korean Question, it elucidates the development of Japan's actual diplomacy in the context of East Asia and the Sino-Korean relationship around the beginning of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, it also probes the diplomatic and ideological premises which underlay the creation and regular use of the word for "suzerainty" in the East Asian context.

¹⁵ E.g. [Nakami 1997: 271–5; Hamashita 1996; Hamashita 1997].

In Part IV, whilst taking the Japanese neologism of *sōshuken* 宗主權 (suzerainty) as the focal point, the process by which Japanese-translated concepts introduced in the previous section prompted change in East Asia is evaluated. Specifically, taking China's respective relationships with Mongolia and Tibet in the early 20th century as its subject matter, this section will analyze the international status of Mongolia and Tibet in their attempts to break away from the Republic of China. There, we will see that while the issue of translated Westerns concepts such as *zongzhuquan* 宗主權, *zizhi* 自治 and *duli* 獨立 became particularly problematic, they also offer us a lens through which we can understand Mongolia and Tibet's respective positions.

Part V functions as the book's conclusion by offering an analysis of the eventual outcome of Asia's "overlapping universalisms" which came to be negated through the introduction of "suzerainty". This analysis is comprised of two sections. In the first section, the process by which the Japanese neologism *ryōdo* 領土 (*lingtu*) was introduced in China and took root in the Chinese lexicon is analyzed alongside its impact. In the second section, an analysis is offered regarding the fate of the Ottoman-esque Orthodox Church from the perspective of the institutional frameworks inherent in international and ecclesiastical law surrounding the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Using this analysis as a basis, we will end the book by making reference to the relationships between regional universalisms and international power structures and their transitions up to the present day.

—Translated by Thomas P. Barrett