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Foreign Conquest and Birth of Late Premodern States

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I. Topic of Discussion and Outline

1. Up Through "Postwar" Historical Science

The topic to be discussed in this article is the meaning and significance of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 豊臣秀吉 invasion of the Korean Peninsula in 1597 from the standpoint of the formation of the late premodern state, viewed within the scope of the region of East Asia. The research on the invasion dating back to the 17th century has cited such reasons for the invasion as a quest for prestige (one of several of Hideyoshi's ego trips), desire for territorial expansion and demand for the revival of the "tally trade" (Kangō Bōeki 勘合貿易) that had been instituted with the Ming 明 Dynasty in 1404, but had all but disappeared since 1550s. On the other hand, during the period just before the Second World War, the invasion was linked positively to Japan's imperialist aims of overseas expansion, and, of course, its connection to the formation of the late premodern state was of little interest to the historians. After Japan's defeat in the War, the invasion came to be discussed along the lines of "the history of foreign invasion and resistance to it," and little attention was paid to its importance in the whole historical process, including its ramifications for the late premodern state.

This research trend was tied to various methodological issues characterizing "postwar" historical science in Japan, which became grounded in Marxian concepts related to social formations and the history of their stages of development, while at the same time considering social formations in terms of single states, thus giving international relations a secondary role in their development. For the period in question here, the Japanese state was being evaluated in terms of the formation and firm establishment of feudalism, focused on the development of the landholding and taxation system formed by the comprehensive cadastral surveys (*kenchi* 検地) conducted under Hideyoshi in the 1580s.

This fundamentally Marxian approach also colored how the invasion of Korea was to be studied. For example, during the 1960s, a leading historian of the late premodern period Sasaki Junnosuke 佐々木潤之介, an advocate of the concept of a "*baku-han* 幕藩 state" (consisting of the Tokugawa Bakufu 徳川幕府 [est. 1603] and the feudal domains of its vassals, or *daimyō*s 大名), inquired into the prior Toyotomi Hideyoshi regime with the question, "Why was it necessary for the unfolding of the various indicators of the formation of feudalism to be intimately connected to the invasion of Korea?" "To get at the root of this problem," Sasaki replied, "it would be insufficient to merely cite factors of diplomacy and the personal idiosyncrasies of Toyotomi Hideyoshi as the de facto ruler of Japan... for in the process of the invasion itself, the so-called 'unification policy' within Japan was developing at full speed" [Sasaki 1965]. Similarly, Asao Naohiro 朝尾直弘, another leading scholar of late premodern Japanese history, standing before an annual conference of Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai (歴史学研究会: Historical Science Society of Japan), argued, "[The Toyotomi regime] conducted this state-sponsored enterprise to invade a foreign state as a premise for military mobilization... The deployment of troops to Korea... was utilized by the Toyotomi regime to leverage the mobilization [activation] of military obligations" [Asao 1964].

2. Enter the Discourse on East Asian International Relations

This emphasis on domestic affairs driving the invasion began to change in the 1970s with the introduction of viewpoints related to the state of international relations in East Asia during the 16th century. For Sasaki, it was now necessary to push research into the direction of "viewpoints concerning in what manner was the continuing break-up of the existing East Asian international order determining social change in Japan and how social change in Japan was contributing to the breaking up of the international order," offering an explanation of Hideyoshi's "continental invasion" as "a resistance against the existing East Asian order" [Sasaki 1971]. Asao adopted a similar stance by tracing the break-up of the East Asian international order accompanying the decline of the Ming Dynasty during the 16th century, exemplified in part by the situation surrounding the civil strife of Japan's Warring State Era (Sengoku Jidai 戦国時代), and placed the formation of national unification regimes and the invasion of Korea within the context of reorganizing the state based on new ideals and the process of reconstructing a new East Asian order. In addition, the fact of both Oda Nobunaga 織田信長 and Hideyoshi taking the sole initiative "to unify their worlds" without the help of outside forces formed the basis for the birth of a "Japanese-style Han-Barbarian dichotomy" view of the world based on autonomy and national sovereignty, devoid of any clear perception of foreign affairs—and in the case of Hideyoshi, bent on foreign invasion stemming from his sense of superiority over the "country of the people with long-sleeves" (Chōshū no kuni 長袖国) where bureaucrats decides the affairs of state.

Further developing this international trend as we entered the 1980s was Arano Yasunori's 荒野泰典 research centered around the concept of "maritime restrictions" (*kaikin* 海禁). Characterizing the various phenomena that arose in the transportation network that developed throughout East and Southeast Asia between the mid-16th and late 17th century as "freebooter-style conditions" (Wakō-teki jōkyō 倭寇的状況), Arano cited as examples the continuing civil strife in China proper causing the decline of the Ming Dynasty, the intensification of activity among the northern nomadic peoples, the emergence of the Jurchen, the civil unrest of the Warring State Era and the formation of unification regimes in Japan as well as escalating activity on the part of the Ainu people of Hokkaidō 北海道. On the other hand, Arano also placed such phenomena as "internal chaos aggravated by the Ryukyu Islands' active involvement in the entrepôt trade in the seas off the China coast and political struggles in Korea" as links in a chain of the changing East Asian international scene during that same time. Arano summed up the situation as "the decline of the *ancien régime* in the face of the emergence of new forces," stating that Hideyoshi's Korean expedition constituted behavior on the part of a unification regime for the purpose of reaping its benefits [Arano 1987]. Whereas the Tokugawa Bakufu regime would ultimately adopt a foreign policy nominally closing the country to foreign trade (Sakoku 鎖国), Arano argued that "the way in which the Japanese foreign relations were conducted was not necessarily Japan's own creation... but rather formed according to traditional international customs of the region... in 18th century East Asia, Japan, China and Korea all set up their own political versions of the 'Han-Barbarian dichotomy' in an atmosphere of mutual compromise aimed at stable international relations, while at the same time minimizing the risk of international disputes by enacting their respective 'maritime restrictions'" [Arano 1988]. In other words, what emerged from this kind of research was an emphasis on the similarities in the reactions by the various forces in the region to the turbulent conditions in which the East Asian international order found itself during the 16th and 17th centuries, thus deepening the "history of Japan as a part of Asia" approach to late premodern times.

Recently, this approach has taken on a more and more concrete and clear-cut character. For example, Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒, who specializes in the history of the Ming and Qing 清 Dynasty periods, has come to

the conclusion that "East and Southeast Asia from the mid-16th to the mid-17th century experienced both the dissolution of the international trade system centered on the Ming Dynasty and a feverish commercial boom, in the midst of which new forms of commerce combined with militarism rapidly expanded, creating an epoch of confrontation and collision in which the very survival of the actors was at stake." It was a situation in which new military forces emerged to form states built on economic bases financed by the profits from foreign trade in East and Southeast Asia amidst a weakening Ming Dynasty-centered international order and the enormous commercial boom taking place on "the periphery," driven by a military crisis on China's northern borders and an explosive increase in silver bullion being mined in Japan. As for Japan, Kishimoto includes the Oda and Toyotomi unification regimes within these "newly emerging military forces," arguing that their national unification movements were encouraged and motivated by "the flourishing of Japanese foreign trade whose major commodity was silver." Based on such developments, she characterizes Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea as an attempt to bring both Korea and China under Japanese rule and as such called it "one of the most ambitious military operations created by the 'freebooter-style conditions' exemplifying the 16th century, during which national borders resembled the uncertainty of a boiling cauldron" [Kishimoto 1998].

Among the "emerging military forces" following the decline and fall of the Ming Dynasty was the Jurchen (Manchu) people of the continental north and the Zheng 鄭 Clan of the maritime south, whose confrontation and clash ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Qing Dynasty, which, together with Japan's heavy restrictions on foreign trade, marked the end of the previous "freebooter-style conditions" era. Japanese medieval historian Murai Shōsuke 村井章介 has characterized these events as "the Qing Dynasty reaping the harvest first sown by Hideyoshi." From a standpoint similar to that of Kishimoto, Murai has argued that "in 16th century East Asia... a new kind of state formation came into existence revolving around very high concentrations of military strength, two examples of which are the formation of unification regimes out of the civil unrest of the Warring State Era and the formation of the Jurchens into a unified state." In the case of Japan, the intensive militarization of society produced within the ruling classes a kind of confidence bolstered by military might, which brought about a change in Japan's self-consciousness in international society, leading to its aggressive behavior towards Korea and Ming China. Murai concludes that "it is not at all surprising that a figure like Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who had emerged as the victor in Japan's Warring States Era, would look upon international society with extreme confidence and a sense of personal grandeur" [Murai 2005].

3. Where We Stand Today

It is in this way that the relationship between Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea and the formation of the late premodern state has been located within the general history of East Asia during the 16th and 17th centuries. Generally speaking, given the fact that one of the state's important functions is to provide its people with territorial security, world history tell us that the way in which such security is to be provided is closely related to the international environment. In particular, rising international tension is often very effective in promoting increased integration and centralization on the national level. In the course of Japan's history, there is no doubt that the impact of the West encouraged the formation of the modern Meiji 明治 state, and in the development of its ancient state, which culminated in a polity organized under a Chinese-style rule of law, the *ritsuryō* 律令 (Ch. *lüling*) codes, international affairs, including Japan's relation with Korea, were clearly at work. Therefore, merely indicating that international affairs were also at work within the historical process spanning an era beginning with the invasion of Korea and ending with the adoption of a trade policy closing every foreign trade port but four and

imposing harsh restrictions on trading partners would be merely begging the question. Something more is needed as this point in the research.

The pioneering postwar political historian Ishimoda Shō 石母田正, who was one of the first historians of ancient and medieval Japan to stress the importance of international developments in the process of state formation, was quick to add that "conquest and war are effective in promoting the formation of the state only in the case where the internal class relations among the peoples involved have reached a specific stage of development" [Ishimoda 1989]. Whereas such a proviso is critical of any absolute argument that conquest and war constitute the foundation of state formation and seems to emphasize the need for taking notice of critical internal social moments, in elucidating the problem at hand, it points out the importance of tracing Japan's Warring States and Oda-Toyotomi regime eras. In particular, concerning Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea, rather than being a response to rising international tension, it is important to note that this action was put into motion due to social developments internal to Japan, and itself was the cause of growing tension throughout East Asia. What is needed here, as also pointed out by Ishimoda, is a clarification of "the interrelationship and inseparability of one moment in international relations being transformed into the internal politics of one nation, or vice versa" [Ishimoda 1971]. Therefore, while keeping in mind similarity in what was happening throughout East Asia at the time, we must also take account of the unique character of historical development within Japan.

There are a number of studies that have focused on this point. For example, in the work of Miki Seiichirō 三鬼清一郎, we see an attempt to clarify the way in which military obligation under the *kokudaka* 石高 tax allocation system was organized through mobilization for the invasion of Korea, concluding that the historical importance of the invasion cannot be found "without shedding light on the way in which national unification was accompanied by preparations for troop deployment to Korea and tying together the concepts underlying Hideyoshi's land cadasters and the logic behind the invasion of Korea" [Miki 1974]. Incidentally, it was Miki who also discussed the Toyotomi regime's failure to impose the *kokudaka* system in the captured territory of Korea [ibid.]. Then there is the work of Fujiki Hisashi 藤木久志 on "Hideyoshi's Pacification Directives," in which Fujiki tried to "discover the characteristic features of the Toyotomi regime's invasion of Korea as part of the comprehensive series of domestic unification policies that were hatched and coercively implemented." That is to say, Hideyoshi's order for Korea to submit was merely an extension of Sōbujirei 惣無事令 (Universal Cessation of Hostilities Directive), which outlawed military action to settle territorial disputes and ordered compliance with settlements of those disputes issued by the Toyotomi regime, in that the invasion was perceived as a "punitive action" against those who had disregarded the Directive. Fujiki concludes that "there was probably no perception of foreign invasion for a Japanese side that was intent on expanding the scope of one of its national unification policies; and as to its defeat and troop withdrawal, rather than a sense of having lost a war, there was instead the exhilaration of having crossed the sea to duly punish the offenders" [Fujiki 1985]. While such analysis of the intentions of the Toyotomi regime evaluates its invasion of Korea at an extension of domestic politics, what is also important in this respect is the reason behind the regime's implementation of policies completely insensitive to national and ethnic differences and to what extent such chauvinistic insensitivity influenced the formation of the state in late premodern Japan.

II. The case of the Jurchen (Manchu) People

1. The Similarities and Differences of National Unification

Fortunately, we have been presented with a very useful comparative case for examining the various issues discussed in the previous section. There is the process of state formation characteristic of the unification of the Jurchens and the eventual establishment of the Qing Dynasty, which Murai Shōsuke offered as a unification regime newly formed within the huge military buildup that was occurring in East Asia during the 16th century. In this respect, we can ask the question why Hideyoshi failed in his invasion of Korea, while the Jurchen succeeded in conquering China. To borrow a phrase from Murai, Why was "the Qing Dynasty able to reap the harvest that Hideyoshi had sown?"

Kishimoto Mio has indicated not only similarities but also differences between the Jurchen and Toyotomi regimes as "newly emerging militaristic polities." While the Jurchens built an financial base with the profits accrued from long distance commerce on the Chinese empire's periphery and established their rule amidst disputes over those profits, Hideyoshi's regime was financially dependent on land and agricultural production. Also, while the Jurchens were active in a culturally diverse milieu, embracing multiple ethnicities within their sphere of governance, forcing them to cultivate open-minded strategies geared towards affiliation with "the others" whenever necessary, the Toyotomi regime was unfamiliar with ethnic diversity and in fact feared the development of a multi-cultural situation in the process of unification [Kishimoto 1998]. With these indications in mind, let us review the history of the Jurchen regime.

2. Nurhaci's Integration of the Jurchen People

After the fall of the Jin 金 Dynasty in 1134, the Jurchens wound up scattered throughout northeastern China in tribal units; then at the beginning of the 15th century, each tribal unit was subsumed under the Ming Dynasty as, from west to east, the Jianzhou 建州 Jurchens, Haixi 海西 Jurchens and Wild (Yaren 野人) Jurchens. Each of the tribal units were organized along the lines of the Chinese Weisuo 衛所 Garrison System with the chieftains of each group appointed garrison (*wei* 衛) commanders and confirmed with edicts and official seals. The edicts were also permits allowing each of three tribal units to trade in specific areas, thereby implementing a policy of divide and rule. During that time, the Jurchens resided in settlements, engaged in a rudimentary form of cultivation, while trapping ermine for pelts and gathering ginseng for herbal medicine to trade with the Chinese [Hosoya 1990].

Around the middle of the 16th century, after the Ming Dynasty made peace with belligerent Mongol nomadic peoples on its northern borders (Beilu 北虜), the extravagance and huge amount of military expenditure for northern border defense during the reign of Emperor Wanli 万暦 (1573–1620) ushered in an era of enormous prosperity for the Jurchen tribes, who began to squabble among themselves over the proceeds from such activities, after forming, then breaking, fragile alliances through marriage and the like. In the midst of such turbulence, stood Nurhaci, a member of the Aisin Gioro tribe, who strengthened his alliance with Li Chenliang 李成梁 (father of Li Rusong 李如松 who had led a Ming Army expedition into Korea), the Regional Commander of Liaodong 遼東, who appointed Nurhaci commander in chief of the Left Garrison of the Jianzhou Jurchens, conferring him with the power to distribute thirty commercial trade edicts in an attempt to integrate the Aisin Gioro under under his command. Then in 1606, the five Mongol tribes of Khalkha conferred Nurhaci with the title of Kundulun Khan (恭敬汗), recognizing him as the king of Jianzhou.

Nurhaci's efforts to integrate the Jurchens continued as he turned to the Haixi Jurchen, which was divided

into four districts, and through hostage and marriage alliances overcame all opposition to annex them into his "kingdom." Of course, such activities by no means went unnoticed at the Ming Court, which took steps to check Nurhaci's successes. The situation turned critical in 1608, when Li Chenliang was relieved of command after failing to control the situation, and the Court formed an alliance of opposing forces to confront the Aisin Gioro. In 1619 Nurhaci was able to bring the whole Liaodong front under his control by virtue of a resounding victory over a combined Ming-Korean force at Mt. Sarhu east of Fushun 撫順, thus unifying the entire Jurchen people. In the events leading up to the victory, the year 1616 marked the establishment of the Later Jin 後金 Dynasty, with Nurhaci holding the title Genggiyen Han (英明汗) or Aisin Gurun Han (金国汗), thus becoming the *han* of a newly established Jurchen state (Jusen Gurun).

The rivalry with the Ming Dynasty necessitated a unique mythology of state formation to legitimize a mandate to govern which did not depend on an official title from its rival. The resulting legend held that Nurhaci's ancestor had been born from an akebia fruit that had been delivered by a magpie sent to the Earth by a heavenly maiden, a motif influenced by the Puyo 夫余 people's state formation legend that originated in the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryo 高句麗. To this was added the fact that the heavenly maiden was a reincarnation of Buddha and that the ancestor, Bukuri, was a reincarnation of the disciple Mañjuśrī, who had been dispatched to pacify the civil unrest plaguing the empire. Based on this legend the Aisin Gioro and their region of Jianzhou were renamed the "Manju" (Manchu) People and the "Kingdom of Manju" (Manju Gurun), respectively. The microcosm in which this legend plays out has been depicted as "the world of Manchu shamanism in the guise of Lamaism" [Mitamura 1965], and thus attests to the strong influence of Tibetan Buddhism on the Jurchens and their close connections with the world of the Mongols.

3. The Characteristic Features of the Formation and Governance Style of the Qing Dynasty

After his death in 1626, Nurhaci was succeeded by Hong Taiji, who inherited a rivalry with both the Ming Dynasty and the Chahar Mongols, led by Ligdan Khan, whom Hong Taiji countered through an alliance with the eastern Mongols to overthrow the Ming Dynasty, leading to formation of the Eight Banners (Baqi 八旗) comprised of both Han Chinese and Mongolian peoples, which combined the political, economic and military strength of the Han Chinese with the sophisticated mobility of the Mongol horse-mounted forces. However, the Manchu *han* remained as just one Jurchen prince (*beile*) among other tribal alliance leaders. What changed this state of affairs was the formation of Daicin Gurun in 1636, in which Hong Taiji was enthroned as its emperor with support not only from his own Manchu People, but also from the other Mongol princes and Han Chinese commanders. Through this move, Hong Taiji was able to clearly distinguish his status from the other *beile*s, leading to the events of 1644, beginning with Hong Taiji receiving a request from Ming general Wu Sangui 呉三桂 to enter China proper through Shanhaiguan 山海関 to pacify the rebellion of Li Zicheng 李自成, after which Hong marched his forces into Beijing and set up the Qing Dynasty [Ishibashi 1997].

The above course of events is indicative of the fact that from its initial stages, the Jurchen regime was replete with cultural and ethnic diversity, a characteristic which was maintained after the establishment of the Qing Dynasty in its structure of governance. For example, at the same time that the Qing Dynasty's imperial authority was firmly established during the reign of Yongzheng 雍正 (1723–1735), his authority of *han* over the Eight Banners was also rearranged. That is to say, imperial authority within the Qing Dynasty was one and the same as the authority of *han*, and in addition to their relations to the Chinese court, the Qing emperors as *han*s also firmly established their right to kingship as the paramount household head (*ejen*) of the Eight Banner "family."

Within the organization of the Eight Banner system, there was a pecking order of the original four banners formed at the Manju Gurun stage, followed by the eight banners formed at the stage of the Jusen Gurun, then the eight banners organized on the basis of ethnicity (Manchu, Mongol and Han Chinese) at the stage of the Qing Dynasty, all of whom regardless of ethnicity were ranked above the Han Chinese of the Central Plain (Zhongyuan 中原). With respect to territory and location, distinctions were made between the above-mentioned banners, three federatories (*fan* 藩) of Mongol, Tibetan and Hui 回 (Muslim) and Han Chinese of China proper, each ruled from different palaces—Fengtian Xinggong 奉天行宮 in Shengjing 盛京 (Shenyang 瀋陽), Bishu Shanzhuang 避暑山荘 in Rehe 熱河 and Zijincheng 紫禁城 (Forbidden City) in Beijing, respectively—each built in their own cultural styles: Shiwangting 十王亭 (Ten Royal Pavilions), Weibamiao 外八廟 (Eight Outer Temples) and the Forbidden City [Ishibashi 1997].

III. The Leadup to Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea

1. The First Hints

The first indication that Hideyoshi intended to invade China was made during the 9th month of Tenshō 天正 13 (1585), just after he had been appointed Kampaku 関白 regent and forced the surrender of two powerful warlords, Chōsokabe Motochika 長宗我部元親 in Shikoku 四国 and Sassa Narimasa 佐々成政 in Etchū 越中. Angered by Katō Mitsuyasu's 加藤光泰 employing too many vassals and diverting to them rice which he was charged with managing at Ōgaki 大垣 Castle for the Hashiba 羽柴 family and its retinue (*kurairimai* 蔵入米), Hideyoshi wrote in a letter to one of his own vassals, for those like Katō who have too many retainers and not enough rice to feed them, "asking Japan to foot the bill isn't going to be enough; we'll have to get China to contribute, too" [*Iyo Komatsu Hitotsuyanagike Monjo* 伊予小松一柳家文書]. This was Hideyoshi's way, now that his hegemony over Japan was almost complete, of egging his military further on to an "adventure on the Continent" (Kara-iri 唐入り) with the promise of territorial expansion. Again the following year, in a document sent to Mōri Terumoto 毛利輝元, leading the vanguard in the conquest of the island of Kyūshū 九州, concerning troop provisions and fortifications, we find a section dealing with "the sea crossing to Korea" [*Mōrike Monjo* 毛利家文書]. Although what that particular venture was to entail is not clear, given the timing, its purpose certainly must have concerned prospects for further territorial expansion and how to achieve it. It was at that same time that Hideyoshi was said to have told a Jesuit missionary his intention to leave Japan to his younger brother Hidenaga 豊臣秀長 after achieving hegemony, and he himself concentrating on the conquest of Korea and China [Letter from Luis Frois to Alessandro Valignano, *Carta annua de Iapão*, Volume II].

The next step towards the invasion of Korea was the conquest of Kyūshū, when during the 6th month of Tenshō 15 (1587) the island was apportioned into fiefs at Hakozaki 箱崎 in Chikuzen 筑前 Province. That day was marked by a huge portion of the land going into the possession of the Hashiba family and its retinue, while allotments were added to feudal holdings of major Toyotomi vassals (*daimyō*), like Kobayakawa Takakage 小早川隆景, Kuroda Yoshitaka 黒田孝高 and Sassa Narimasa. According to Hideyoshi, the division of Kyūshū was motivated by the hope of "taking command as far as the continental and South Seas barbarians" [*Kobayakawake Monjo* 小早川家文書]. A few days after the partition of Kyūshū, Hideyoshi toured the city of Hakata 博多, the gateway to the East Asia trade, urging the reconstruction of his new possession from the ruins of war into a base of logistics not only to take control of commerce, but also to launch an attack on Korea. Five days later he

welcomed a contingent of the Sō 宗 Clan from the island of Tsushima 対馬 seeking reconfirmation of its feudal territory. Hideyoshi issued an order for the Sōs to carry to the king of Korea to come to Kyoto and pay tribute, and if the prince refused, he would cross the sea and punish Korea in the same way he had Kyūshū [*Sōke Monjo* 宗家文書]. It seems that Hideyoshi was under the mistaken impression that the king of Korea was a vassal of the Sō Clan [Kitajima 1982].

2. The Legitimization of the Invasion: The Concepts of "Descendant of the Sun" and the "Pacific" Ocean

One more notable event leading up to the realization of the invasion into Korea was the expulsion of the Portuguese missionaries (padres) from Japan a week or so after the partition of Kyūshū. There is no doubt that the expulsion order was promulgated as one solution to the donation by the Christian *daimyō* Ōmura 大村 Clan of the extremely profitable town of Nagasaki 長崎 to the Society of Jesus; but what is important here is the statement that "given the fact that Japan is a divinely ordained and protected realm, the very idea of exposing it to heretical doctrine from Christian lands is completely preposterous" [*Matsumae Monjo* 松前文書]; that is, the identification of the Japanese state as a "holy land" (Shinkoku 神国). However, it should be pointed out that the meaning of the term "Shinkoku" for Hideyoshi was much different from the way it was used in state ideology leading up to the Asia-Pacific War as a land ruled by divine right since antiquity by a single line of emperors who were descendants of the Sun god Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神. Rather, for Hideyoshi the Jesuit padres were threatening to destroy the Buddhist dharma in Japan, which had syncretized native gods (*kami*) into Buddhism as bodhisattvas.

Later on in peace negotiations with the Ming Dynasty, the "Articles to Be Announced to the Imperial Ming Delegation" which Hideyoshi gave to Japanese representatives led by Ishida Mitsunari 石田三成 would contain the statement, "The great land of Japan is a holy land. Its god is the Creator. The Creator is its god." Hideyoshi himself claimed that when he was born, his mother had a dream that she was carrying the Sun in her womb. In other words, it was an auspicious sign that the child whom she had given birth to would throughout his life "radiate virtue and rule the four seas" [*Zoku Zenrin Kokuhōki* 続善隣国宝記]. This article was of course not Hideyoshi's idea but rather proposed by such diplomatic advisors as Zen monk Saishō Jōtai 西笑承兌, for Japan's Warring States Era was marked by the spread of religious syncretism incorporating Confucian ideas and Shinto beliefs into the framework of the Dharma. For example, the Sun god, being the syncretization of Shinto's Amaterasu, the Confucian emperor of Heaven Tiandi 天帝 (also Śakra, the ruler of Heaven in Hindu and Buddhist cosmology), and the ubiquitous, ever-present Buddha Mahāvairocana, is the metaphysically universal divine being of East Asian spirituality. The miracle of feeling the Sun gestating in the womb is widely observed throughout East Asia in the birth legends of the founders of the dynasties of conquest and its universality formed the logic for legitimizing an expedition to conquer the Ming Dynasty [Kitajima 1990].

The next stage was marked by the promulgation of the Cessation of Piracy Ordinance (Kaizoku Teishirei 海賊停止令) during the 7th month of Tenshō 16 (1588), which was accompanied by the Confiscation of Weapons Ordinance (Katanagarirei 刀狩令) designed to disarm the peasantry. The former ordinance, which prohibited piracy, aimed at making regional rulers hold maritime traders under their control [*Kobayakawake Monjo*]. However, just prior to the enactment of the ordinance, Fukabori Sumikata 深堀純賢, a land proprietor of Hizen 肥前 Province (Kyūshū) had been arrested and punished for confiscating tribute goods from "Ming Dynasty, South Seas and other various cargo ships;" and the Matsura 松浦 Clan of Hirado 平戸 (Kyūshū) had been ordered to take measures to stop the ships captained by one mainlander Tetsukuwai てつくわい for attacking trade vessels bound from China for Japan [Fujiki 1985]. The ordinance was thus also aimed at the foreign trade routes into the East

China Sea. In fact, in the above-mentioned "Articles," Hideyoshi claimed that the Ming Dynasty owed him credit for personally taking action against Japanese pirate ships and thus "pacifying the sea lanes, ridding them all of obstacles to trade."

3. Preparations both Foreign and Domestic

Now having formed the logic that would legitimize his conquest of East Asia, Hideyoshi turned his sights on foreign countries other than Korea, by issuing demands that they pledge allegiance and pay tribute to his regime. During the month after the enactment of the anti-piracy ordinance, he demanded through the mediation of the Shimazu 島津 Clan of southern Kyūshū that the Kingdom of the Ryukyus (present day Okinawa Prefecture) come and pay tribute. The order was a high pressure tactic to scold the Ryukyus for having the audacity not to pay tribute to the Shimazus, who had been strengthening their hold over the Kingdom since the Ayabune Incident (Ayabune Ikken 紋船一件), in the consequence of which ships not carrying permits issued by the Shimazu Clan were strictly prohibited from the trade [*Shimazuke Monjo* 島津家文書]. Hideyoshi's "born to rule" legend was also cited as the basis for ordering the politically unrelated Spanish Viceroy at Luzon (Philippines) four times beginning in 1591 and the Kingdom of Kōzankoku 高山国 (Taiwan) in 1593 to submit to Japanese suzerainty, pay tribute and assist in the invasion of the Continent [Kitajima 1990].

Whereas Luzon and Kōzankoku refused to comply with the order, the king of the Ryukyus sent delegations to the celebration of the "unification of the world" under Hideyoshi's Kampaku regency in 1589. Assuming Japan's suzerainty over the Ryukyus, in 1591 Hideyoshi ordered its court to contribute troop provisions in preparation for the invasion of Korea and corvée labor for the construction of Nagoya 名護屋 Castle, which was generally obeyed. Meanwhile, during the first month of 1593, the Kakizaki 蠣崎 Clan based in Matsumae 松前 (southwest Hokkaidō), which was gaining hegemony over Ezo 蝦夷 land, sent troops to Nagoya for the Korean campaign and were rewarded with the right to collect tariffs from foreign ships trading with the Ainu people at Matsumae. The invasion of Korea represented an important moment in the "foreign" rule exercised by Hideyoshi's unification regime.

The military mobilization conducted for the invasion provided leverage for organizing the regime's system of rule within Japan. We have already seen the Toyotomi regime's reorganization of Japan's warrior class through the introduction of the *kokudaka* system of vassalage and military obligation; now that system would be put into full effect during the process of the invasion of Korea. It was for this purpose that the Mōri Clan domain was subject to a cadastral survey and was ordered to provide four soldiers for every 100 *koku* 石 (about 510 bushels) of rice accounted for. The order of battle (*jindate-sho* 陣立書) was drafted for the initial invasion in 1592, and in order to provide reinforcements for the second invasion cadastral surveys of the Shimazu, Satake 佐竹 and Uesugi 上杉 domains were conducted [Ike 1999]. In addition, in the eighth month of 1591, in order to secure warrior class personnel to serve in the invasion force, a caste system was initiated forbidding members of the warrior class to change their status to "peasant" (*hyakushō* 百姓), "townsfolk" (*chōnin* 町人) or "indentured servant" (*hōkōnin* 奉公人).

4. The Appearance of an Objectivity-Subjectivity Gap: The Absence of International Consciousness

Preparations for the invasion of Korea went forward through the building of a logic of legitimization, along with the organization of a governance structure for Japan, a process that was fraught with problems. There is no doubt that objectively speaking, it was a response to and a contextualization of the national and international

issue of the resolution of the "freebooter-style conditions" plaguing East Asia. As Hideyoshi himself claimed, his Cessation of Piracy Ordinance was significant in this situation; however, its meaning changes drastically according to how it is placed within the context of subjective intent, or military strategy. For Hideyoshi, it was for all intents and purposes merely a pretext of the invasion of the Continent. Therefore, between the restoration of maritime security and the direction taken in the invasion of the Continent existed a wide gap in the perception of reality in East Asia at the time.

The first problem was a lack of international consciousness. This lack is exemplified best by Hideyoshi's diplomatic relations with Korea through the Sō Clan. Despite Hideyoshi's mistaken impression about the relationship between the Sōs and the Korean Court, his demanding that Korea pay tribute to Japan while the former was already under the suzerainty of Ming China was out of the question. To resolve this situation, the Sōs dispatched a faux embassy of the "king of Japan," and deflected Hideyoshi's demand into a request to send a delegation to celebrate the enthronement of the "new king." Because the Korean Court had demanded as a condition that the freebooters (*wakō*) who had ravaged their country be extradited, the Sōs handed over to them criminals and prisoners of war and finally got Korea to send a delegation. Although Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長, the Toyotomi regime's naval functionary, was involved in the arrest of the freebooters, there is strong evidence that Hideyoshi was not informed of the fact that the perpetrators were extradited to Korea [Yonetani 2003]. It was in this way that a Korean delegation finally arrived in Kyoto during the 7th month of Tenshō 18 (1590), and Hideyoshi, who had just returned from a punitive expedition to the northern part of Japan's mainland (Ōshū 奥州), was misinformed that it was a tributary mission. It was not until the 11th month that he got around to granting the Korean delegates an audience, and when he for some unknown reason became convinced that the delegation was a tributary mission, he wrote a response ordering them to collaborate in the invasion of the Continent. The ambassador protested, but to no avail. After the mission's return to Korea, monk/diplomat Keitetsu Genso 景轍玄蘇, representing the opinion of the Sōs, conducted further negotiations with Korea by attempting to spin the demand to lead the invasion of the Continent (Seimin kyōdō 征明嚮導) into a request for Korea to provide reconnaissance and logistics assistance in the invasion and conquest of China (Kato nyūmin 仮途入明) [Kitajima 1982], but had no hope of succeeding. Despite the fact that the Sō Clan and the monk/diplomats were fully knowledgeable of the actual international situation in East Asia, Saishō Jōtai's reluctance to speak the truth to power went as far as penning a personal appeal to Hideyoshi, assuring him that "punishing a fledgling kingdom like the Ming Dynasty should be no more difficult than a mountain crushing an egg" [*Mōrike Monjo*; Kitajima 1982].

IV. The Failure of the Invasion

1. From Occupation Planning to Peace Conditions

As the invasion of the Continent got underway, Japan's departure from the reality of international relations grew more and more remote. In the mid-4th month of Tenshō 12/Bunroku 文禄 1 (1592), the first battalions under Sō Yoshitoshi 宗義智 and Konishi Yukinaga landed on the Korean Peninsula at Busan 釜山; and after one more request for logistic support to infiltrate China and one more denial, the Japanese forces laid siege to Busan Castle and captured it in a matter of two hours. Due in part to a slow response from the Korean side, Japanese made their way to the capital of Hanseong 漢城 (present day Seoul) and captured it early the following month. As soon as he received the news of the victories, Hideyoshi made public his plans for the occupation and rule of East Asia,

in which present Emperor Goyōzei 後陽成 and his court would be relocated to Beijing and granted ten provinces. His nephew Toyotomi Hidetsugu 豊臣秀次 would be appointed the "Grand Kampaku Regent of China" governing 100 provinces, the throne of Korea would be taken by either Hidetsugu's younger brother Hidekatsu 羽柴秀勝 or adopted son Ukita Hideie 宇喜多秀家, the imperial throne of Japan would be occupied by either Goyōzei's son Prince Katahito 良仁 or his younger brother Prince Toshihito 智仁, and the post of Kampaku regent would go to either Hidetsugu's younger brother Hideyasu 羽柴秀保 or Ukita Hideie. Hideyoshi himself would take up residence in the port town of Ningbo 寧波, "where the Japanese fleet would land" to take him onto the conquest of India [*Kumiya Monjo* 組屋文書]. In spite of the choice of Ningpo reflecting the objective conditions of maritime East Asia, the division of China and Korea amounts to no more than the existing feudalization-based governance system existing in Japan at the time, replete with kind of *kokudaka* cadasters and cessation of hostilities that had been planned for Korea. (See above Section 1.)

However, three months later the Japanese forces suffered a resounding defeat in the waters off Gojedo 巨済島 island, as a Korean volunteer army rose up with reinforcements from the Ming Dynasty. The initial Japanese surge quickly abated, preventing Hideyoshi from his awaited voyage to the front lines and beyond. Then during the 4th month of the following year, the Japanese forces withdrew from Hanseong and sued for peace with the Ming Dynasty. As previously mentioned, while the "Articles," which had designated an envoy led by Ishida Mitsunari to conduct peace talks, had outlined the logic behind those negotiations, what was actually offered as "conditions for peace between China and Japan" [*Zoku Zenrin Kokuhōki*], could never have been taken seriously by the Ming Court.

To wit,

1. As a guarantee that peace would be maintained, a daughter of the Ming emperor would become the consort of the emperor of Japan.
2. The tally trade would be revived with the coming and going of both ships of state and commercial vessels.
3. The top bureaucrats of both countries would exchange written pledges that friendly relations between them would continue.
4. The Eight Provinces of Korea would be divided up with the Ming Dynasty returning four in addition to Hanseong to the king of Korea.
5. Korean royal princes and ministers of state would come to Japan to serve as hostages.
6. The top bureaucrats of the Korean Court would swear never to rebel again.

2. Lack of International Consciousness Exposed

While it goes without saying that the late 16th century marked a definite precariousness for the Ming Dynasty in its position as the center of the East Asian international order, the above six conditions for peace, which ignored that position, and attempted to create a relationship of equality with China, while placing Korea in a position of inferiority, were not going to be accepted. Conditions 1, 3 and 6 were attempts to apply to East Asia the same procedures by which the warlords of the late Muromachi 室町 period had divided up the territory; moreover, the idea of marrying a Ming princess to the emperor of Japan would have created an issue that would infuriate Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 and any other self-abiding national learning scholars of the Tokugawa period [Miki 1987]. Condition 2 has been cited as proof that Hideyoshi had launched the invasion in order to revive the "tally trade;" however, since there was no desire to reestablish tributary relations with China, the tally trade, which required such relations, was out of the question. Instead, the demand was merely for mutual agreement on the resumption

of exchange involving both official and commercial ships, with no expectation that China would accept. Even after reopening maritime trade in general, the Ming Dynasty would continue to ban direct trade with Japan. As a matter of fact, China was completely bewildered by the act of presenting "conditions of peace" in itself, putting such questions to chief Japanese negotiator Konishi, as "why have you violated a territory like Korea which owes its allegiance to China?" "what has happened to the descendents of Muromachi Bakufu's 室町幕府 Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満 (r. 1368–94) who paid tribute to China during the reign of Emperor Yongle 永楽 as the king of Japan?" and "who exactly are the emperor and king of Japan, anyway?"

Konishi could do nothing else but name one of his vassals, Naitō Joan 内藤如安, as the Japanese ambassador, forge his own "Kampaku regent's memorial of surrender" and head for Beijing. In response, the Ming Dynasty decided to dispatch a tributary envoy on the conditions that Japanese forces evacuate Korea and reestablish relations of amity. The envoy appeared before Hideyoshi at Ōsaka 大坂 Castle during the 9th month of Keichō 慶長 1 (1596). Hideyoshi, who was in no mood to accept tributary vassalage to China, instead launched another invasion during the 1st month of the following year, barely establishing a foothold on a base of operations in southern Korea. The troops withdrew upon Hideyoshi's death in the 8th month of Keichō 3 (1598).

V. The Invasion of Korea and the Formation of the Late Premodern State

1. The Characteristic Features of and Reasons for Japan's Response to International Relations

The close relationship between the Korean invasion and the formation of a national unification government regime (the late premodern state) in Japan is exemplified by 1) the origin of the invasion as an attempt to mobilize the warrior class land proprietors in a war effort for national unification and 2) preparation of an institutional structure geared to foreign invasion, including the *kokudaka*-based vassalage/military obligation system and ordinances dividing the country into specific castes, also providing the leverage for the state integration of Japanese society.

That being said, the invasion itself failed and threatened to bring down the whole Toyotomi regime with it. The most important factor in the defeat was Hideyoshi's crackpot realism regarding international relations. The first step may have been the issuance of the Cessation of Piracy Ordinance, which put an end to the "freebooter-style conditions" plaguing East Asia and ushered in a new international order. However, there was no plan for the occupation and governance of foreign peoples in order to create this new order; rather, the hegemonic tendencies stemmed from a perception of Japan as "a country of fiercely battling warlords" (Yumiya kibishiki kuni 弓箭きびしき国) as opposed to the "long-sleeved people of the Great Ming," a pride in superior "military might" [*Mōrike Monjo*]. Historically speaking, this perception was strongly reinforced by the idea of the civil unrest of the Warring States Era leading to one victor over all, meaning that for both the long-sleeved Koreans and Ming Chinese, Japan was no different from the freebooters who had ravaged their seacoasts.

One of the underlying reasons for all this was no doubt Hideyoshi's personality and loss of good judgement in his old age; however, more important than individual idiosyncrasies was probably the rift created in Sino-Japanese relations by the "freebooter-style conditions" that characterized East Asia during the early 16th century. Although this situation in itself is one of the international moments fomenting the whole state of civil unrest in Japan, influencing both the pursuit of land proprietorship by heavily armed belligerent *daimyō*s and the unfolding of Oda and Toyotomi national unification regimes, the fundamentally determining factors were exclusively

internal to Japanese society [Ike 2006]. As discussed in Section 3, it was at a specific stage in this civil war and unification process that foreign invasion became a reality, and thus the process itself cannot be linked directly to how international relations would unfold. This is a characteristic feature in Japan's history that differs from other internationally determined events like the formation of the ancient state modeled after Tang China's *lüling* legal codes and the formation of the modern Meiji state in the mid-19th century. Also, as discussed in Section 2, Japan's late premodern state differs from the national integration achieved during the same time by the Jurchen people, characterized by an expansion of forces enjoying close relations with the Ming Dynasty through trade and alliances formed by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji with Dynasty bureaucrats and military leaders. While being touted as responses to the breakup of the East Asian tribute system during this same 16th century, late premodern state formations differed each other in style depending on the historical conditions of each region. For example Korea, whose connection to the international trade boom of the era was more passive and indirect than either Japan or the Ming Dynasty [Kishimoto 1998], continued its total dependence on tributary relations with China. Regarding the reasons behind the occurrence of such unique Japanese characteristics, one argument raises the "fundamental issues of the rise of the warrior class in Japan and the establishment of national unification regimes by that same warrior class" [Miyajima 2006]. This topic has been raised in connection with questions surrounding "peace" during modern and contemporary times, in a discussion of the warriors class' promotion of the "late premodernization" process refusing the ideals of neo-Confucianism and lending a militaristic character to the state in Japan from then on, a position similar to that of Irumada Nobuo's 入間田宣夫 evaluation of warrior-led regimes taken over twenty years ago [Irumada 1984]. There is no doubt that from medieval times the fact of the warrior class in Japan ensconcing itself within the system of land proprietorship and taking the lead in moving state politics forward represents a style totally different from state politics in either China or Korea during that same period from the 12th through the 16th century [Ike 2007]. Such a historical premise would certainly determine responses to how international relations were unfolding and the character of a late premodern state formed according to that response.

While there is no doubt that Japan's warrior class was strongly drawn towards foreign invasion based on a hunger for territory, to conclude that the invasion of Korea took place because Japan was ruled by a warrior class would oversimplify the issue at hand of the relationship of the invasion to state formation. All one has to do is to open the pages of history to discover that warrior/land proprietor classes do not hold a monopoly over decisions to invade foreign lands. Moreover, it is impossible to conclude that once a warrior always a predator aiming to invade wherever possible. Within the "freebooter-style conditions," the warrior class of western Japan, beginning with the Sō Clan of Tsushima, attempted to develop "peaceful" trade and diplomatic relations with Korean and China, while maintaining their affiliations with the elements of piracy [Yonetani 2003]. Furthermore, there was no historical necessity behind the Toyotomi regime's hegemony over the Japanese archipelago, for there were several possible forms that the political reintegration of the late premodern Japanese society could have taken, for example, a decentralized state with large autonomous feudal domains. Similarly, Japan's response to the international situation could have also take several different forms.

2. The Formation of the "Japanese-Style Han-Barbarian Dichotomy" as the Basis of the Pax Tokugawa Order

In terms of reality, whereas the Tokugawa Bakufu regime that succeeded the Toyotomi regime in 1603 did want to carry on diplomacy with its neighbors in East Asia, due to the damage done by its predecessor's invasion of the Continent, its foreign relations policy would have to be more inward looking, and such introspection would

produce a unique Japanese order based on dynastic China's traditional dichotomy.

The peace negotiations with Korea, which got underway through the Sō Clan after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but still demanded to be conducted from a position of "military might," began with a Japanese demand for Korea to dispatch an envoy, thus confirming Korea's surrender, for the party in any conflict to first dispatch envoys and documents of state was considered to have been at the mercy of the other party. Korea obviously refused to comply, as before the invasion, until the Sō negotiators forged Japanese documents of state and provided Japanese prisoners of war, which allowed Korea to dispatch in Keichō 12 (1607) an envoy for the purpose of replying to the documents and return the "captives" to their homes, and eventually enabled a treaty of peace between the two countries. It was in this way that inside Japan a fiction was established that it was Korea who had capitulated. Japan then requested that Korea intercede in negotiating peace with the Ming Dynasty, but knowing full well that the Chinese would never accept such an arrangement, Korea did nothing. The fact of the Sō Clan's forgery of the documents of state was discovered in Kan'ei 寛永 10 (1633) in the wake of suits filed with the Bakufu by the Sō Clan as lords of Tsushima and a disgruntled vassal, the Yanagawa 柳川 family, prompting a change in the title addressed in Korean state documents to "Nipponkoku Taikun 日本国大君" (ruler of Japan) and in the signature of Japanese state documents to "Nipponkoku Minamoto Nanigashi 日本国源某" (Minamoto [name of present shogun] of Japan). This unique "Sakoku" approach to foreign relations not only distanced Japan from the Ming-centered international order, but also clearly placed it in a position superior to Korea.

Concerning the Kingdom of the Ryukyus, the Shimazu Clan was permitted to launch an expedition to the Islands, but even after their subjugation in 1609, the Islands continued to be designated as a Kingdom, which would send to the Bakufu congratulatory delegations on the occasion of the succession of a new shogun (Keigashi 慶賀使) and testimonial delegations in response to Bakufu acknowledgement of enthronements of new Ryukyuan kings (Shaonshi 謝恩使). Meanwhile, the Ryukyus maintained their tributary relationship with the Ming Dynasty and were requested by Japan to petition the Ming Dynasty to revive the "tally trade" in order to open a diplomatic route to China, but the Ming Court never responded.

Windows to the outside world were opened by Japan's late premodern state during the first half of the 17th century at Nagasaki (to the Netherlands and China), Tsushima (to Korea), Satsuma 薩摩 (to the Ryukyus) and Matsumae (to the Ainu People). In the case of Matsumae, where the Kakizaki (renamed Matsumae) Clan had been authorized as the sole traders with the Ainu People, the Bakufu sent an inspection team in 1633 to divide Hokkaidō into Ezochi 蝦夷地 for the Ainu and Wajinchi 和人地 for the Japanese, prohibiting unauthorized travel between the two territories and establishing regularly scheduled ceremony called *uimamu* between Ainu traders and the inspectors. As for the Netherlands, as the result of a complaint by Japanese vermillion seal ship captain Hamada Yahyōe 浜田弥兵衛 over the imposition of a 10% tariff by the Dutch East India Company at the port of Fort Zeelandia in Taiwan, the Bakufu closed the Kyūshū port of Hirado in 1628, cutting off Dutch traders from Japan. Relations were renewed in 1633, when the Dutch factor was allowed to appear before the shogun in Edo. Later, on the occasion of the prohibition of Portuguese ships from Nagasaki, the Dutch factor was moved from Hirado in 1641 and confined to the island of Dejima 出島.

3. The Japanese Late Premodern State Turns Inward

It was in this way the "Sakoku" policy was implemented; however, it was characterized not only by a state monopoly over foreign relations and "maritime restrictions" as to entering and leaving Japan, but also by a refutation of the "multi-ethnic residential communities" that had existed in the world of "freebooter-style

conditions," confining individuals to spaces devoid of international contact and creating by command from above a "nation of Japanese." Under the closed country policy, the entry of all foreign vessels other than those allowed to trade at the four specified ports was forbidden, while at Nagasaki, the Dutch factory was shut up on the island of Dejima and Chinese traders confined to quarters in their Tōjin Yashiki 唐人屋敷. Meanwhile, all "Japanese" were forbidden from leaving the country, and "Japanese" who attempted to return home from abroad was to be executed. In order to enforce this national ban on foreign travel, it was necessary to determine just what being "Japanese" entailed. One way was to register the population according to their membership in Buddhist sects in ledgers called "Shūmon Ninbetsu Aratamechō" 宗門人別改帳. At the port of Hirado, which represented the epitome of a "multi-ethnic residential community," the year 1641 was marked by the compilation of a ledger registering persons in the town according to their places of birth (Hiradomachi Ninbetsu Seisho Tadashi 平戸町人別生所糺) [Nakamura 1981]. Thought to have been compiled for the purpose of identifying former Christians who had been forced to convert to Buddhism, the sources reveal many persons, either born of "Korean" (Kōrai 高麗) or "Chinese" (Tōjin 唐人) parents, or born in Korea. Among this latter group, we find prisoners of war captured during Hideyoshi's invasion, as well as individuals who had migrated from the Continent and had been nationalized by virtue of marrying "Japanese." They were recorded with such Japanese sounding names as Sukeemon-no-jō 助右衛門尉 and Magoemon-no-jō 孫右衛門尉, and it is also assumed that their clothing and hairstyles were also of Japanese fashion [Arano 1987]. Whereas we know that the Qing Dynasty required all subjects to adopt the single braided queue (*bianfa* 辮髪) Manchu hairstyle, it is unclear if the Tokugawa regime implemented similar hairstyle restrictions. We do know, however, that the Japanese way of closing a country was the complete opposite of how the Chinese went about the task.

It was in 1644 that the whole region of East Asia was plunged into an era of turbulent change with the fall of the Ming and rise of the Qing Dynasties. The maritime forces under the leadership of Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 decided to support the successor dynasties of Ming against the Manchus and sought military assistance from the Tokugawa Bakufu in the form of troop deployment (Nihon Kisshi 日本乞師). Although the Tokugawa regime was from Shōhō 正保 1 (1644) avidly gathering information to begin the compilation of a comprehensive work on the history of the Ming-Qing transition entitled *Kai Hentai* 華夷変態, sympathetic to the Ming cause, it did not get as far as to dispatch troops in solidarity. It was this kind of an isolationism-based Japanese conceptualization of the "Han-Barbarian dichotomy," that would waver, then fall apart in the wake of the advance by the forces of modern Europe into East Asia, as its great departure from the traditional international order centered upon China would make possible a rapid adaptation to modern European-style diplomacy. That being said, such elements in this same conceptualization as ethnic and cultural chauvinism regarding other regions, beginning with the Korean peninsula, would also form the starting point for modern Japan's imperialist aggression towards the Continent.

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