

to its treaty negotiations with China in the light of other diplomatic negotiations and of the domestic political situation of the time. Previous research has failed to supply an answer to the question of why it took more than a year for the treaty to be signed after China adjusted its hardline stance.

Reevaluating the treaty negotiation process in the context of Japanese diplomatic history, this presentation will focus on two points to which the Fukuda Takeo administration attached particular importance during the treaty signing process.

The first point concerns the balance between the Soviet-Japanese negotiations and the Sino-Japanese negotiations. As demonstrated through Fukuda's choice of placing ex-Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro's eldest son, Hatoyama Iichiro, in the position of Foreign Minister, Fukuda placed great importance on the development of relations with the Soviet Union. Because of this, the treaty negotiations with China were carried out based on an anticipation of developments in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations over fishery. As evinced in the mantra of "omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy", expanding Japan's diplomatic orbit to include Communist states constituted part of Fukuda's diplomatic philosophy. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to maintain a balance between relations with both China and the Soviet Union, so there were no fundamental discrepancies with Fukuda's philosophy. Making use of new documents released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this presentation will elucidate how Prime Minister Fukuda and the executive officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the Soviet factor as it proceeded with negotiations with China.

The second point concerns the mutual linkage between domestic politics and diplomacy. During the treaty negotiation process with China, the Fukuda administration above all paid the utmost attention to internal movements within the Liberal Democratic Party. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China achieved by Tanaka Kakuei and Ohira Masayoshi was a bitter memory for Fukuda. While Fukuda recognized the value of the normalization process in that it paved the way for a new chapter in Sino-Japanese relations, he realized that because it was an act of hasty diplomacy which failed to reach a consensus within the party, it had led to serious conflict within the Liberal Democratic Party. This presentation demonstrates that, in contrast to the negotiations between China and Japan in 1972, Fukuda placed a great deal of importance on achieving internal consensus with the Liberal Democratic Party, while pushing forward with negotiations over the treaty's clauses with great care. Furthermore, the presentation will also pay attention to Fukuda's leadership and resolve the question of how Fukuda prevented Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, a member of the pro-treaty faction, from acting arbitrarily, and how, after consolidating domestic consensus, he brought the signing of the treaty to a conclusion.

Previous research has utilized the memoirs and meeting minutes of those parties involved in the negotiations. In addition to these materials, this presentation also makes use of newly released documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which were disclosed due to the Freedom of Information Act and also private documents such as the diary of Bou Hideo. By using such materials, this presentation will elucidate the negotiation strategy of the Fukuda administration which resulted in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.

A New Starting Point in China-North Korean Relations: Research on the August Faction Incident and Its Outcome as Seen from Russian and Chinese Archival Materials

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The starting point of the relationship between China and North Korea in modern times can be traced back to 1950, when China dispatched its troops to the Korean Peninsula. Contrary to the common perception, however,

over the course of the Korean War the two countries' relationship was exceedingly strained. Even after the fighting drew to a close, in spite of a period of sustained and substantial Chinese economic aid to North Korea, the two countries continued to adopt an abnormally aloof attitude towards one another, and this situation continued through until 1956.

In 1956, the internal power-struggle within the Workers' Party of North Korea intensified. This led to the August Faction Incident, in which Kim Il Sung squelched the internal opposition faction. At first, China maintained an aloof stance towards the whole affair, but after a mass influx of opposition faction cadres into China (particularly to Yan'an), Mao Zedong became infuriated. The Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties adopted a policy of interfering with the internal affairs of the Workers' Party of Korea, and compelled Kim to acknowledge the errors in his policy. Initially, the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties adopted a stance of assisting Kim in amending his errors, thereby simultaneously eradicating the root cause of internal crisis within the Workers' Party of Korea and stabilizing the frontline of socialism in the East.

Much to Mao's dissatisfaction, Kim only paid lip service to these endeavors, and in reality was opposed to them. At the end of 1956, the Chinese Communist Party adopted hardline measures towards North Korea, much resembling the manner in which the Soviet Union settled the Hungarian Crisis. Recognizing this, the Chinese Communist Party sought the opinion of the Soviet Union in dealing with the situation. Owing to the fact that the Chinese Communist Party failed to gain the support of the Soviet Union in this regard, and furthermore because both the Chinese Communist Party and Soviet Union were busy dealing with the Polish and Hungarian crises, Kim seized this opportunity to his advantage, and once again carried out an internal purge. The opposition faction cadres were completely eradicated, and by this point China had no means of directly interfering in North Korean affairs. In spring 1957, China began to adjust its policy vis-à-vis North Korea. On one hand, China criticized its "ideology and practice of great-nation chauvinism", whilst on the other, bolstered its level of economic aid to the country. In November 1957, Mao met with Kim in Moscow, where of his own accord admitted that it was a mistake for China to meddle in the affairs of North Korea. Furthermore, he proposed the idea of ordering the 400,000 troops of the Chinese People's Volunteers who were stationed in North Korea at the time to withdraw, and also sent Peng Dehuai to meet with Kim personally and offer him an apology.

In 1958, the Chinese Army withdrew completely from North Korea, and China gave Kim her full recognition and support for his mandate of absolute dictatorship over North Korea. Kim then began to study China comprehensively, thereby opening up a new chapter in the China-North Korea bilateral relationship. From hereon and up until the death of Mao, the China-North Korea relationship demonstrated a certain peculiarity; namely that it bore a striking resemblance to the old suzerain-vassal relationship that defined Chinese antiquity, albeit within a socialist context. One could even perhaps call this relationship the last manifestation of "Celestial Empire" (*tianchao* 天朝), albeit tinged with the colors of revolutionary, rather than Confucian, ideology.

