

conducts an analysis using both journals and historical records of the time, one will find that many individuals describe Chiang's political manner in the following ways: concerned with cultural relics, fond of issuing personal orders, concerned with Party spirit and morality, taking the enemy as his teacher and seeing religious belief as the way to salvation. This is very clear to see in his journal. In Hu Tsung-nan's journal, Chiang is described as "conscientious in military affairs, but half-hearted in politics" (March 1942). In Chen Cheng's journal, one can find the comment that "the trash was dumped in a place which could not be seen by Chiang" (18th February 1944), satirizing the bad habits of shirking responsibility and procrastination by local authorities. Chiang was well aware of his fellow countrymen's bad habits, and attempted to care, but there was nothing he could do about them.

Thirdly, the best type of journal has the following traits: it records and narrates events over an extended time period, is comprehensive in the content it records, is unconcerned with taboos and is as brief or lengthy as the author deems necessary. In particular, those which are steeped in emotion and allow one to get a sense of the specific details of certain events, and which discuss crucial points are of utmost value. Since we are in a position of not being able to demand perfection from a journal, we should not attempt to use particulars to derive the universal, nor use the universal to derive particulars. In other words, only when one possesses a rich and broad understanding of history, can one grasp things in their entirety.

A vast quantity of journals has been published in recent years. It goes without saying that this is a great boon for all those involved in the research of modern history. However, when using journals, one must still be mindful of the author's writing style, idiosyncrasies and purpose. Journals that have been written by their authors for themselves abound with one-sided subjectivity, while those written for others are often very cryptic. Furthermore, while it goes without saying, fabricated journals must not be used. When journals are 'murdered' by the author's children or wife, we as historians can do nothing but feel powerless and full of shame. While journals are primary materials for historical research, in order to uncover historical truth, we must still carefully compare and verify their contents with other historical records and avoid falling into the trap of using just one piece of historical evidence in our research.

First Session: *International Relations and Archives in Postwar East Asia*

The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the Diplomacy of Fukuda Takeo

INOUE Masaya (Seikei University)

The purpose of this presentation is to elucidate the negotiation process which preceded the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of August 1978, using newly-disclosed historical materials. Previous literature on the subject has tended to focus upon the negotiations regarding the treaty's anti-hegemony clause. China at first took a hardline stance towards the anti-hegemony clause, but altered its stance and so paved the way for the treaty to be signed. This change in position has been attributed in previous literature to factors in Chinese domestic politics, such as the comeback of Deng Xiaoping in July 1977 and the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution. However, owing to the lack of accessible historical materials, one aspect which has gone largely under-discussed is what kind of outlook Fukuda Takeo's administration possessed with regard



to its treaty negotiations with China in the light of other diplomatic negotiations and of the domestic political situation of the time. Previous research has failed to supply an answer to the question of why it took more than a year for the treaty to be signed after China adjusted its hardline stance.

Reevaluating the treaty negotiation process in the context of Japanese diplomatic history, this presentation will focus on two points to which the Fukuda Takeo administration attached particular importance during the treaty signing process.

The first point concerns the balance between the Soviet-Japanese negotiations and the Sino-Japanese negotiations. As demonstrated through Fukuda's choice of placing ex-Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro's eldest son, Hatoyama Iichiro, in the position of Foreign Minister, Fukuda placed great importance on the development of relations with the Soviet Union. Because of this, the treaty negotiations with China were carried out based on an anticipation of developments in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations over fishery. As evinced in the mantra of "omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy", expanding Japan's diplomatic orbit to include Communist states constituted part of Fukuda's diplomatic philosophy. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to maintain a balance between relations with both China and the Soviet Union, so there were no fundamental discrepancies with Fukuda's philosophy. Making use of new documents released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this presentation will elucidate how Prime Minister Fukuda and the executive officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the Soviet factor as it proceeded with negotiations with China.

The second point concerns the mutual linkage between domestic politics and diplomacy. During the treaty negotiation process with China, the Fukuda administration above all paid the utmost attention to internal movements within the Liberal Democratic Party. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China achieved by Tanaka Kakuei and Ohira Masayoshi was a bitter memory for Fukuda. While Fukuda recognized the value of the normalization process in that it paved the way for a new chapter in Sino-Japanese relations, he realized that because it was an act of hasty diplomacy which failed to reach a consensus within the party, it had led to serious conflict within the Liberal Democratic Party. This presentation demonstrates that, in contrast to the negotiations between China and Japan in 1972, Fukuda placed a great deal of importance on achieving internal consensus with the Liberal Democratic Party, while pushing forward with negotiations over the treaty's clauses with great care. Furthermore, the presentation will also pay attention to Fukuda's leadership and resolve the question of how Fukuda prevented Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, a member of the pro-treaty faction, from acting arbitrarily, and how, after consolidating domestic consensus, he brought the signing of the treaty to a conclusion.

Previous research has utilized the memoirs and meeting minutes of those parties involved in the negotiations. In addition to these materials, this presentation also makes use of newly released documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which were disclosed due to the Freedom of Information Act and also private documents such as the diary of Bou Hideo. By using such materials, this presentation will elucidate the negotiation strategy of the Fukuda administration which resulted in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.

A New Starting Point in China-North Korean Relations: Research on the August Faction Incident and Its Outcome as Seen from Russian and Chinese Archival Materials

SHEN Zhihua (East China Normal University)

The starting point of the relationship between China and North Korea in modern times can be traced back to 1950, when China dispatched its troops to the Korean Peninsula. Contrary to the common perception, however,