

considered important guardians by dramatic troupes, in the fact that when local bureaucrats began attending performances, the financial situation of troupes changes dramatically. Moreover, due to an increase in popularity of stage drama among local bureaucrats, plays that would otherwise have been performed exclusively in Beijing spread as far as Guizhou 貴州 in the south, and actresses who had been banned in the capital were allowed to perform in their fans' jurisdictions.

As to the part played by the military, it has been the conventional wisdom that local garrisons had no relationship to dramatic arts in their regions; but as a matter of fact, soldiers performed stage plays in their barracks, and professional actors were enlisted in the regiments to entertain the troops. The author also cites examples of dramatic troupes made up of military personnel active outside the garrisons: performing at festivals, and forcing professional troupes to lend them equipment and pay them money.

Russian Intervention in the Xinhai Revolution:
The Situation in Northeast China

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In the research to date done throughout the world on the Russian Empire's intervention in the Xinhai Revolution (1911), the subject of Mongolian independence has been the most widely discussed aspect. However, the impact of Russia's ambitions at that time was felt not only in Mongolia, but also in Tibet, Xinjiang Province, and northeast China (Manchuria). Especially in northeast China, the subject of this completely revised and enlarged version of an article published in *Modern Asian Studies* (Vol. 44, No. 6, Nov. 2010) based on a comprehensive survey of documents found in Russian and Japanese archives, the Russian Empire faced many difficult diplomatic issues vis-à-vis the Qing Dynasty. For example, after Russia's defeat in its war with Japan in 1905, the Qing Dynasty tried to take back the rights that were ceded to Russia during the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Both Japan and Russia saw the revolutionary chaos that arose in northeast China as an opportunity for intervention there. After the outbreak of the Revolution,

Russian and Japanese generals planned to dispatch a joint expeditionary force to the region. Russian officers stationed in the region were expecting the Japanese Army to make a preemptive deployment; however, Japan abandoned its plans, forcing the disappointed Russians to implement intervention on their own and thus draw a clear line separating them from their central government, which had taken a stand of neutrality toward the Revolution.

It was around this time that independence movements began in Inner Mongolia, supported by the Chinese Eastern Railway Guard in Hulunbuir, which had been the subject of a long-standing territorial dispute between Russia and China. Now, the independence movement offered Russia the chance to resolve the problem in its favor. Despite the success of the Inner Mongolian independence movement, the Russian government prevented efforts to unify Mongolians in Hulunbuir with Outer Mongolia, leaving the region to act as a buffer zone with China.

The author concludes that although recent research by Russian and Japanese historians have praised the Russo-Japanese "alliance" that existed from 1906 to 1916, it should not be forgotten that this "alliance" was founded upon very heavy sacrifices made by China and the other East Asian nations. It is this reminder that best exemplifies a Russian-Japanese plan to divvy up northeast China on the occasion of the Revolution and the efforts of both empires to exploit the resulting Mongolian independence movements.