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Counterfeit Currencies and Counterfeiter Organization at the Dawn of
the Former Han Dynasty

KAKINUMA Yohei

This article first focuses on the “*Qianliu*” inscribed on bamboo documents and recently unearthed from Han Tomb 247 at *Zhangjiashan*, which includes prohibitions against counterfeiting currency in the form of bronze coins. Despite such legislation, other sources show also that there were still many counterfeiters active during the early years of the Former Han Dynasty, in spite of a portion of whom were in fact prosecuted under the articles of the “*Qianliu*.” What this means is that the “*Qianliu*” was the way in which the Dynasty attempted to classify and analyze these counterfeiters, and thus provides us with an actual mirror directly reflecting how such counterfeiters operated.

Secondly, the author explains how the materials for counterfeiting, like ore, firewood, molds and bellows, were prepared, arguing that they all could be purchased legally in local markets, with the exception of the molds, which had to be acquired through illicit means.

Next, the human resource elements, the counterfeiters themselves, are discussed revealing groups of organized criminals in cahoots with corrupt bureaucrats, one of the most notorious of the latter group being Liubi 劉沸, King of Wu 吳, due to the fact that he seems to have formally organized a gang of counterfeiters to illegally mint currency in his own realm.

In conclusion, the author attempts to integrate the institutional history of currency to its social history in ancient China. That is to say, it is necessary to consider not only the juridical structure encompassing currency minted during the Former Han Dynasty, but also the substantive relationships formed

between the private and public sectors through the custom of counterfeiting.

Tang China's Northern Frontier Policy during the Collapse of the
Uighur Kehanate

MURAI Kyoko

This article discusses the Tang Dynasty's management of its “frontier,” especially its policy on the northern periphery through an examination of its response to the movement south by the Uighur people. Even before the Uighur began to migrate south, the Dynasty's control over the chieftainships on the northern periphery had been weakening, as both troop strength was declining and the supply of horses waning. These are the factors which determined how Tang China first responded to the southern migration of the Uighurs with a policy of appeasement (AD 840-847.7), during which the Tang Dynasty emphasized “friendly” relations with the Uighurs in its dealings with the chieftainships on the northern periphery, while treating them with tolerance as well. It was a time during which military engagement was avoided in the north for the purpose of re-militarization.

Then there began a period marked by a Tang military campaign to punish Öge Kehan 烏介可汗 (842.8-843.1), who had invaded large portions of the northern periphery in migration south. The insufficiencies in military wherewithal in terms of troops and horses were supplied from the chieftainships on the northern periphery. However, not all the chieftainships choose to cooperate. The Tang Dynasty responded accordingly by treating the anti-Uighur chieftainships of Hedong 河東 with tolerance and leeway, while adopting repressive measures towards the northeastern chieftainships which maintained deep ties with the Uighurs.

During that time, the information necessary for the Tang Dynasty to determine and implement such policies was provided by imperial couriers (*zhongshi* 中使) and local reporters (*zoushiguan* 奏事官) providing the link between the north and the Tang capital. The Dynasty's directives reached to the troops in the north were also transmitted to the northern chieftainships. These intelligence agents were also charged with surveying the rural conditions of each