

author holds that Kāriyān dates back only to a 9th century temporary refuge for the fire, not the perpetual one determined at the beginning of the Sāsānian dynasty.

Therefore, the author sets out to resolve this problem by collecting information about the fire from descriptions given by Muslim geographers between the 10th and 13th centuries, and reconstructing them into an integrated, consistent picture. The research to date on the descriptions has not been able to decipher the system by which Muslim geographers rendered unfamiliar Zoroastrian names into Arabic. The author's decipherment has led to the conclusion that the fire was installed in 224 by Ardaxšīr-ī Pābagān at Ardaxšīr Xwarrah, which corresponds to Ādur Farrōbay.

In addition, the author collected and integrated information about the fire temple at Ardaxšīr Xwarrah, and concludes that there were actually two huge fire temples located in the center of the imperial capital. One of them may be the site of Ardaxšīr's Imperial fire, and the other for sure the site of Ādur Farrōbay. Since the Sāsānian dynasty was founded on the strength of the military activities of Zoroastrian priest Ardaxšīr-ī Pābagān, Ādur Farrōbay was no doubt worshipped next to his imperial fire at the center of his first capital.

The Kazakh khanate between the Russian and Qing Empires:
Mainly on the relations of Kazakh sultans with
the Qing Dynasty

by NODA Jin

This paper examines the diplomatic relations between the Kazakh Khanate and the Qing and Russian Empires. After the collapse of the Jungar Khanate in the middle of the 18th century, the Kazakh nomads desired to move into Chinese pastoral territory. The Qing Dynasty tried to defend its boundaries by way of the "tribute system" and taxation upon the Kazakhs crossing them,

while the Kazakhs honored the "tribute system" and retained their interests and safety. On the other hand, Russia considered the border outposts (*karun*) in Xinjiang as the Khanate's border with China and interpreted Kazakh "tribute" as the Khanate's submission to China. These different interpretations of "boundary" by the three parties shows the ambiguity of Kazakh "subjection" on the part of the two empires.

"Tribute," on which diplomatic relations between the Khanate and China were based, was important for the Kazakh *sultans* (*töre*, khans' sons) to guarantee profits from trade and maintain authority within the Khanate. Russia did not attempt to intervene in Kazakh-China relations at first, giving the *sultans* an opportunity to develop "bilateral diplomacy" towards the two empires. However, as Russian influence on the Kazakhs grew stronger up to the first half of the 19th century, we can observe changes taking place in Kazakh relations with China, but they continued to negotiate on such practical matters as trade, horse tribute and taxation. In particular, when Russia became strongly interested in trading with northwest China during the first half of the 19th century, it would be forced to make use of the Kazakh *sultans* as mediators. By appointing Russian merchants as caravan chiefs (*aqalaqchi*), the *sultans* were able to profit from their mediation.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that it was the conceptual differences of "boundary" among the three parties in the 18th century that enabled the Kazakh *sultans* to maintain "bilateral diplomacy" with China and Russia until the mid-19th century, despite the changes taking place in Central Asia.