consideration now and will be taken up in my forthcoming article.

True, it is rather difficult to positively declare why Shang Di should not be presented religious festivity; but, there are not a few cases where supreme beings are not the object of religious festivity among primitive people in ancient times. The reason is simply that supreme being used to be regarded as a spiritual existence such as 'die Uranordnung' or satisfying 'das Gesamtbedürfnis des Menschen' rather than as the object of religious worship. Some scholars like Hu Hou-xuan and Chen Meng-Jha refer to the religious festivity for a supreme being in their decoding of oracle bone writings; but probably they happened to commit wrong decoding, seeing that they have once claimed the negative theory.

Emperor Qian-long's Ruling Policy over Qalq-a Mongolia and the Qalq-a's Reaction to It

by Hiroki Oka

Just after the final solution of the Jegun-yar problem in the twenties of Qian-long, the Emperor Qian-long set about a new attempt to strengthen his rule over Qalq-a Mongols. (Until then he had carried out a compromise in his policy in order to attain their cooperation to defend his North-western border against the Jegun- ar's menace.) His key person for this new political trend was Sangajavidorji. He was born as a noble of the Tüsiyetü gan ayimay, but was brought up in the Beijing court, and so he became a person of Manchurian identity. As soon as he arrived at his post as the vice general of his ayimay (it happened in the 22nd year of Qian-long), he was confronted with the Qalq-a nobles' opposition. His opponents were represented by Erdeni-Šangjudba Süngdübdorji, who was a close relative of Tüsivetü gan. Čenggünjab of Sayin noyan ayimay, who was then the military governor of Ulivasutai. and čing wang Dasipil, the league chief of Tüsiyetü qan ayimay. They were in a secret conspiracy to oppose Sanglayidorji's political actions. Then Qian-long did not hope to rule Qalq-a Mongolia in direct bureaucratic manner but continued his former policy to rule it by the Qalq-a

nobles indirectly. It is true that Qian-long appointed ambans and sent them to Yeke Küriy-e as assistants of Sangʻayidorji but their duty was only to assist and superinted Sangʻayidorji and they were prohibited to intervene the Qalq-a's domestic problem by the Emperor himself.

Although Süngdübdorji and his co-operators intrigued to ensnare Sangjayidorji and sometimes prosecuted him to the Emperor, all of their attempts were failed by Qian-long's decisive protection for Sangjayidorji.

After that, Sangʻayidorji attacked his opponents with the support of the Emperor. In the 29th year of Qian-long, he prosecuted šangʻudba Süngdübdorji. Sangʻayidorji's most powerful opponent, who represented the Tüsiyetü qan family in Yeke Küriy-e, was dimissed and excluded.

As conclusion, the Qing policy to strengthen its rule over Qalq-a Mongol, didn't change basically after the Jegün yar war. In the beginning of twentles of Qian-long, it was submitted to the principle that Qalq-a has to be ruled in undirectical manner, through using some Qalq-a nobles who were sympathetic to Qing, as SangJayidorJi. This policy never tried to rule directly in bereaucratic way. This is the main criterion of the Qian-long's policy during this period.

The Ottoman Navy in the Late 19th Century: An analysis of the Financial Problem

by Kaori Komatsu

It is often asserted that the Ottoman Navy had experienced the Dark Ages during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876–1909). After the Russo-Turkish war (1877–1878) most of their warships had been anchored at the Golden Horn until the eve of the Greco-Turkish war (1897). It means that the Ottoman Empire left her own fleet in the port for about twenty years. While the world naval technology had made remarkable advances, the Ottoman Navy, on the contrary, became out dated.

In this paper the author has attempted to analyze the financial situation of the Ottoman Navy from 1878 to 1897. This research is