

workers and peasants could fulfill the task of the anti-Chiang, anti-Japanese struggle. The author's view is that so far as the Communists insisted on the above-mentioned ideas, the tie between the Communists and the Revolutionary Government would not be able to develop further than the preliminary agreement level. In conclusion, the alliance between them which came into existence through signing the Preliminary Agreement as a form of united front had not yet turned into an anti-Japanese national united front.

The Price of Korean Prisoners of War in Ch'ing China

by Yasu MORIOKA

As a result of the Sino-Korean war of 1636 and 1637 (the fourteenth and fifteenth years of Im-jo), Korea was defeated and subjugated by Ch'ing China. As one of the conditions of surrender, Korea was permitted to buy back its captured prisoners of war if they so desired. At that time the price of redemption was measured in units of silver; but as seen after the first invasion of Korea by Manchurian armies in 1627, such commodities as rice, cloth, paper, and so forth were also used in addition to silver, so we can say that in actuality captives were redeemed by payments of both silver and commodities.

Redemption could be carried out at any time within a period of ten years. However, due to political disturbances, the Ch'ing government reduced the actual period of redemption to less than eight years. As for the Korean side, redemption of its war captives after five years totaled a mere 1 percent, because of unchecked inflation in the price of captives.

In this paper the author divides the process of increasing inflation in price into two stages according to the pricing of captives. The first stage is characterized by both the free sale of captives and the sale of captives at the redemption market at Shên-yang under internationally determined regulations and supervision. During the second stage, redemption was handled exclusively within the confines of the Korean embassy at the Shên-yang kuan-so and is characterized by the Ch'ing government using coercive sales techniques to compel the Korean

government to buy back captives and strong-arm tactics against the embassy to exact unpaid redemption fees.

Though source materials are scarce, the author attempts to reveal quantitatively the ever-escalating conditions over time, only briefly touching upon the first stage and emphasizing the second.

The distortion of Chinese historical sources in Tibetan history

by Zuihō YAMAGUCHI

The utilization of Chinese historical sources by Tibetan historians in their accounts of early Tibetan history has resulted in no little confusion and error. Buddhist historians made no attempt to rectify these errors; rather, they give the impression of having devoted their efforts to producing tales thought useful for the propagation of Buddhism on the basis of these erroneous accounts.

For example, the *Hu-lan-deb-ther*, the first work in which Chinese materials are utilized, states that the Chinese army occupied Lhasa around 670. In the *rGyal-rabs-gSal-ba'i-me-long* the Chinese invasion is described as if it had been undertaken for the purpose of carrying off to China the gilt bronze image of Śākyamuni enshrined in 'Phrul-snang Temple. Yet in Bu-ston's *History of Buddhism*, composed a little earlier than the above two works but dating from the same 14th century and uninfluenced by Chinese materials, there is no reference whatsoever to this important event.

A re-examination of the Chinese materials, corroborated by the *T'u-fan Chronicles* 吐蕃編年紀 from Tun-huang, reveals that the T'u-fan army defeated the Chinese forces at the Ta-fei River 大非川, and that the Chinese had in this same year given up all hopes for a restoration of T'u-yü-hun 吐谷渾. Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of the Chinese having invaded Lhasa. There is also, of course, no reason why they should have mobilized a large army simply for the sake of acquiring a single Buddhist image.

It seems probable that Princess Wên-ch'êng 文成 had brought this gilt