

The Anti-Japanese, Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement during the Fukien Rebellion

by Hisako HONJO

Since the Mukden Incident occurred in 1931, the Nineteenth Route Army (NRA) opposed Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "first pacification, then resistance" and urged armed struggle against Japan at once. The NRA put its ideas into action at the Shanghai Incident, 1932. Even after it was transferred to Fukien, the NRA's resolute will to conduct armed struggle against Japan remained unchanged. However, in order to maintain its power, the NRA had to engage itself in military operations to "exterminate the Communists" as instructed by Chiang. When the NRA was defeated seriously by the Red Army in September 1933, it was so shocked that it at once proposed a ceasefire.

The Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army accepted the proposal, since they had already declared that they were ready to co-operate with any Nationalist military power for war against Japan, provided that they accepted three conditions. On October 26 the Communists and the NRA concluded the Anti-Japanese, Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement. The Fukien Rebellion against Chiang arose on November 20 and the People's Revolutionary Government was organized with the participation of the NRA and different non-Communist groups. The Revolutionary Government took measures for the implementation of articles provided in the Preliminary Agreement. Of these measures the two related to guaranteeing the civil rights of the people and allowing the people to arm themselves were fairly inadequate. These two points were the key for the Communists to ally militarily with the Fukien rebels against Chiang and Japan. The Communists denounced repeatedly the Revolutionary Government for not fulfilling their promises. As a result no progress was made in promoting further co-operation for the united front.

To understand this situation we must realize that during this period, the Communists believed that only the revolutionary activities of

workers and peasants could fulfill the task of the anti-Chiang, anti-Japanese struggle. The author's view is that so far as the Communists insisted on the above-mentioned ideas, the tie between the Communists and the Revolutionary Government would not be able to develop further than the preliminary agreement level. In conclusion, the alliance between them which came into existence through signing the Preliminary Agreement as a form of united front had not yet turned into an anti-Japanese national united front.

The Price of Korean Prisoners of War in Ch'ing China

by Yasu MORIOKA

As a result of the Sino-Korean war of 1636 and 1637 (the fourteenth and fifteenth years of Im-jo), Korea was defeated and subjugated by Ch'ing China. As one of the conditions of surrender, Korea was permitted to buy back its captured prisoners of war if they so desired. At that time the price of redemption was measured in units of silver; but as seen after the first invasion of Korea by Manchurian armies in 1627, such commodities as rice, cloth, paper, and so forth were also used in addition to silver, so we can say that in actuality captives were redeemed by payments of both silver and commodities.

Redemption could be carried out at any time within a period of ten years. However, due to political disturbances, the Ch'ing government reduced the actual period of redemption to less than eight years. As for the Korean side, redemption of its war captives after five years totaled a mere 1 percent, because of unchecked inflation in the price of captives.

In this paper the author divides the process of increasing inflation in price into two stages according to the pricing of captives. The first stage is characterized by both the free sale of captives and the sale of captives at the redemption market at Shên-yang under internationally determined regulations and supervision. During the second stage, redemption was handled exclusively within the confines of the Korean embassy at the Shên-yang kuan-so and is characterized by the Ch'ing government using coercive sales techniques to compel the Korean