

TOYO BUNKO RESEARCH LIBRARY 4

Selected Works on the
Political History of Modern China

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ETŌ Shinkichi

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PREFACE

When I made up my mind to pursue a career as a scholar, Professor YAMAMOTO Tatsurō 山本達郎 (then Professor of Oriental History, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo 東京大學) told me, “The study of Oriental history within Japan is ignored by the world scholarly community to a surprising extent. It is an unfortunate reality that you will have to acquire the ability to publish your research in foreign languages while you are young.” I was later urged to follow the same advice by Professor John K. Fairbank (Harvard University) and Professor BANNO Masataka 坂野正高 (Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo). So, I belatedly started to make an effort to write scholarly papers in English. A part of this effort is represented by this volume. Therefore, this book is not a grand dissertation which integrates works on an overarching theme. It is rather a compilation of studies which were carried out in response to the demand of academic associations or because they were needed for international joint studies, and were written up in English. However, in terms of theme, these articles can be classified into two categories: those which are focused on the changes in Chinese domestic politics, and those which analyzed factors that greatly affected Chinese foreign relations. That is why this book is divided into two parts. The articles in Part I are my attempts to criticize or present alternative theories to what were common understandings in the Japanese academic community. The articles in Part II are analyses of Chinese foreign relations.

The editorial work for this volume was carried out by my former students, Professors HIRANO Ken'ichirō 平野健一郎 (Waseda University 早稻田大學), TAKAGI Seiichirō 高木誠一郎 (Aoyama Gakuin University 青山學院大學), FURUTA Kazuko 古田和子 (Keio University 慶應義塾大學), YUNG Yingyue 容應萸 (Asia University 亞細亞大學), and KISHIMA Takako 喜志麻孝子 (Kyoto University 京都大學). I would like to thank them for their work. I would also like to thank the Toyo Bunko 東洋文庫 for realizing this publication. I am especially grateful to the editorial team on the Toyo Bunko side, whose members carried out a great number of tedious tasks in preparation for publication.

ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤藩吉
March 6, 2004

PART 1 CHINA'S DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

Chapter I WAVE RHYTHMS IN CHINESE POLITICS

Introduction

To begin with, various phenomena of the human society are all interwoven of non-historical laws and historical changes, just as cloth is woven of horizontal and vertical threads. When the composition of human being is analyzed, the observation that the bulk of human body is water is a non-historical fact. However, a historical change is, for example, the fact that resulting from the expansion of productivity since the modern age the number of individuals—population—rapidly increased, or the fact that because of the introduction of machines in man's daily life in advanced industrial countries recently the human sinews have grown weaker, or the fact that due to improvements in hygienic facilities and enrichment of nutrition man's life span has extended.

In the world of politics, too, men seeking power with such unsatisfiable greed as Thomas Hobbes has described often appear in great numbers, and therefore struggle for power prevails everywhere in the human society. In other words, that these people or groups of people always seek to maintain and enlarge their present power and influence is non-historical and can be found in any period. Furthermore, it is also possible that a certain power in the course of time undergoes changes in accordance with its own internal laws: it expands, reaches its full maturity, degenerates, grows weaker, and is replaced by a new power. This process may be seen as a repetitive political rhythm. The fact that previously Japanese China scholars from NAKA Michiyo 那珂通世 to ICHIMURA Sanjirō 市村瓊次郎 regarded Chinese history as a history of dynastic alternations was certainly due to the fact that attention was con-

* This is a revised English version of my Japanese paper, "Chūgoku seiji ni okeru hadō-rizumu 中國政治における波動リズム" in ETŌ Shinkichi, ed., *Gendai Chūgoku seiji no kōzō* 現代中國政治の構造 (The Structure of Contemporary Chinese Politics) (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūjo 日本國際問題研究所, 1983). It was originally published in *Aoyama kokusai seikei ronshū* 青山國際政經論集 (Aoyama Journal of International Politics, Economics and Business) 3 (June 1985). In this essay, I tried to argue that the pendulum-like phenomenon in politics and the resultant spiral development lead to the creation of a new society in a rhythmic way. The prevalent theory among Japanese specialists in oriental history was that in Chinese history there was only an alternation of dynasties and China was basically stagnant. On the other hand, the Marxian interpretation of Chinese history somewhat unreasonably emphasized the continued development. I took the middle road.

centrated on this phenomenon of political history called dynastic alternation.

On the other hand NAITŌ Konan 内藤湖南 and some others already quite long ago paid attention to the existence of important socio-economic developments within Chinese history, pointing out the big transformation of the Chinese society during the period of the Five dynasties (*Wu-dai* 五代) and the early Song 宋, and putting forward a new periodization of history.¹ Furthermore, mainly after the Pacific War, scholars of Chinese history in the Tokyo region in particular have attempted to trace the course of the Chinese history by paying attention to land tenure system and class relations related to it; analyzing relations of land ownership and relations of production.² The author is not unwilling to give due regard to these achievements in social and economic history as such. As far as the present essay is concerned, however, instead of discussing periodization he would like to survey only political phenomena. If one does so, then, while a certain rhythm is repeating itself again and again, one can also discern a political process which is developing gradually and historically.

In other words, when viewing the three millenia of recorded Chinese history from a broad perspective, the phenomena that draw one's attention as the most conspicuous are—despite all the criticisms from the part of researchers of socio-economic history—nevertheless the dynastic alternations. That rhythm leaves an impression which could be described as something like a spiral: the pendulum of politics swinging from one extreme to the other according to non-historical laws, and yet at the same time developing historically as well. An American sociologist Pitrim Sorokin advocated the existence of rhythm in all social phenomena.³ The present essay is an attempt to review China's political history while keeping Sorokin's thesis in mind and, beginning with dynastic changes, to discern several dynamic rhythms and to apply such political rhythms to contemporary China.

¹ NAITŌ Torajirō 内藤虎次郎, "Shina kinsei shi 支那近世史 (A History of Early Modern China)," in *Naitō Konan zenshū* 内藤湖南全集 (The Collected Works of Naitō Konan), 14 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō 筑摩書房, 1969), 10:347 ff.

² The post-war development of socio-economic research on China has been remarkable. An outline of it is included in "Kaiko to tenbō 回顧と展望," an article published annually in the May issue of *Shigaku zasshi* 史學雜誌. The fact that the periodization of this "Kaiko to tenbō" happens to follow dynastic alternations is probably not purposeful but at least it shows that dynastic alternations cannot be neglected.

³ Cf. Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Company, 1937). From a completely different viewpoint cyclical rhythms of politics have been discussed by employing the concept of political business cycles. As an example of such research is the paper "Political Business Cycles: Toward a Reconceptualization" read by INOBUCHI Takashi 猪口孝 at the 1980 convention of the American Political Science Association.

1. Alternation of Power

A. *Dynastic Change*

Looking at Chinese history from the surface, the rises and falls of dynasties certainly seem to take place in an almost orderly fashion. Using only these dynastic changes to analyze Chinese history would be far too superficial; at the same time, however, if the rhythm of dynastic alternation is neglected, an important element of Chinese politics is missed. Basically speaking, the power emerges, gains control of the state as the ruling power, creates in due course the legitimacy of its own, and reaches the age of stability and maturity. When stability has continued for some time, the authority inevitably corrupts in accordance with the law of power degeneration. That is, laxity and disintegration of power take place, and counter elites emerge from among disheartened people. While most of those counter elites are suppressed, the existing power will gradually be undermined and the surviving counter elite will finally destroy the existing power in a power struggle, and become the new ruling power itself. From the basic non-historical viewpoint, this process repeats itself again and again. In the course of that process, cases where the counter elites fail to gain power far exceed the number of cases where they succeed in doing so. In China's dynastic histories, those failures to capture power are called rebellions, whereas in the cases of success the counter elites are referred to as the founding fathers of new dynasties.

B. *The Rulers and the Ruled*

According to one view, as an ancient poem, "Toiling during daylight, resting after sunset, what does imperial power have to do with me?" suggests, ordinary people serenely continue their life regardless of changes in power holders. As a matter of fact, however, through the taxation mechanism the power of rulers had a firm grip on the daily life of the ruled, who therefore certainly could feel the rulers' power in their skin. Moreover, different from the tradition of the Three Sovereigns and the Five Emperors 三皇五帝, in China the actual rulers, in order to make it sure that their authority reached the masses, forced them to adopt such customs as wearing a queue or growing long hair, and in order to attend their interests as rulers there must have been such acts as described in Bai Letian 白樂天's poem "The Army of the Holy Plan" (*Shencejun* 神策軍).⁴

In the morning I climbed the Peak Tzu-ko [delete Zige] 紫閣峰,
 In the evening I lodged in the village under the hill.
 The Elder of the village was pleased that I had come
 And in my honour opened a jar of wine.

⁴ Tr. by Arthur Waley in his *The Life and Times of Po Chü-i* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), 58.

We raised our cups, but before we began to drink
 Some rough soldiers pushed in at the gate,
 Dressed in brown, carrying knife and axe,
 Ten or more, hustling into the room.
 They helped themselves to the wine we were going to drink,
 They snatched away the food we were going to eat.
 My host made way and stood at the back of the room
 With his hands in his sleeves, as though they were honoured guests.
 In the yard was a tree that the old man had planted
 Thirty years ago with his own hand.
 They said it must go, and he did not dare refuse;
 They took their axes, they felled it at the root.
 They said they had come to collect wood for building
 And were workers attached to the Army of the Holy Plan.
 'You'd better be careful; the less you say the better;
 Our Eunuch General stands in high favour.'

Among Du Fu 杜甫's poems there is one titled "The Bailiff of Shih-hao [Shihao]" (*Shihao li* 石壕吏)⁵:

I came to Shih-hao village and stayed that eve.
 A bailiff came for press-gang in the night.
 The old man, hearing this, climbed o'er the wall,
 And the old woman saw the bailiff at the door.
 Oh, Why was the bailiff's voice so terrible,
 And why the woman's plaint so soft and low?
 "I have three sons all at the Nich-cheng 鄴城 [i.e. Yecheng] post.
 And one just wrote a letter home to say
 The other two had just in battle died.
 Let those who live live on as best they can,
 For those who've died are dead for evermore.
 Now in the house there's only grandson left;
 For him his mother still remains—without
 A decent petticoat to go about.
 Although my strength is ebbing weak and low,
 I'll go with you, bailiff, in the front to serve.
 For I can cook congee for the army, and
 To-morrow I'll march and hurry to the Ho-yang 河陽 [i.e. Heyang] front."

⁵ Tr. by Lin Yutang 林語堂 in *Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 66 (1935): 40.

—So spake the woman, and in the night, the voice
 Became so low it broke into a whimper.
 And in the morning with the army she went;
 Alone she said good-bye to her old man.

Even in the era of the ancient dynasties the ruled were not ignoring their rulers and simply spending serene life. The rulers had a firm grasp of the lives of the ruled. Indeed since this was the reality, it on the other hand became possible to outline an ideal government, dreaming then “what does the imperial power have to do with me!” There may have been various differences in the character of power, for example, the power over grass-root level emanating directly from the central government or coming immediately from local officials, or from village landlords and chiefs. In any case, however, there was no doubt that the masses were ruled by some power.⁶

The most sensitive to these movements of power were perhaps the gentry who included also literati. How to treat the gentry was therefore a matter of great importance to power holders. The first emperor of the Qin 秦 dynasty Shihuang 始皇帝 tried to eradicate criticism against government by burying alive some 460-odd Confucian scholars, but that might rather have seemed a sign of despotism in the eyes of the subjects, despite all the political achievements of Qin Shihuang. Therefore the Han 漢 dynasty, in order to win scholars over to the side of the government, treated them well, becoming in due time the patron of Confucian learning.

Likewise the Qing 清 dynasty, which was ruled by the Manchus, in order to avoid criticism from the intellectuals, resorted to a thorough-going policy of appeasement. A well-known fact is that the gentry received privileges in many respects.⁷ Also the employment of a great number of scholars in such projects as the compilations of the Ming 明 history or *Siku Quanshu* 四庫全書 (“Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature”) sealed off anti-government activity.

If the policy of appeasement is not followed and if those whose interests are deprived of by the new rulers are many, the ruled become full of deadly grudge. On their side discontent with the power holders accumulates. Moreover, if the rule which hoards up discontent on the side of the subjects, that is ‘evil government’, continues, then on the side of the ruling class, too, criticism and discontent with the present government accumulate. As Lenin said, for a revolution to succeed for sure, discontent of the ruled is not enough, it is also necessary that the ruling class itself becomes dissatisfied.⁸ Using a Chinese way of expression, Mandate of Heaven is removed and entrusted to a new ruling house.

⁶ Cf. note 12.

⁷ Cf. Chang Chung-li 張仲禮, *The Chinese Gentry* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), 32 ff.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, “‘Left-wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” in *id.*, *Collected Works*, 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), 31:100–101.

2. Means of Rule

A. Military Troops

It is well-known that during China's imperial period the social position of the warrior was low. For example during the Tang 唐 dynasty, when someone was spoken ill of, he was called "imperial bodyguard" (*shiguan* 侍官).⁹ Also there is a time-honored common saying that "good iron is not cast nails, and good men are not made soldiers." In his autobiographical novel *The Border Town* (*Biancheng* 邊城) Shen Congwen 沈從文 vividly records his own bitter experiences as a mercenary soldier in his young days.¹⁰ One day when he was walking on the city wall in a military uniform, he happened to meet three beautifully dressed girls. The smallest of them, upon noticing the soldiers, called the others, "Sisters, hey, sisters!" "Soldiers, soldiers!" It meant that they should go back. As far as the social position of soldiers is concerned, there seems to be no doubt that since ancient times the prestige of imperial troops and the soldiers' families was low. Whenever laxity of power took place, such events as described in Bai Letian's "Army of the Holy Plan" took place, with the result that soldiers were commonly disliked. What came to their political role, however, it was still another thing.

Founders of dynasties in China without exception conquered the country on horseback. Even after the establishment of the Chinese Republic, without a victory in the civil war one could not control the country—a principle which has applied until the victory of the Communist Party without exception. After conquering the country on horseback, if the new power becomes consolidated, then the traditional power structure (*Herrschaftsstruktur*) functions as described by Weber, and therefore even without using one's actual power it is to a certain extent possible to govern with the mere traditional, customary prestige. However, until one's power is consolidated, it is the military power that is ultimately decisive. Even in the struggle of imperial succession that could occur in the middle of a dynasty, the final solution was based on military power. As can be seen from the examples of the Yongle 永樂 emperor, the 1861 coup d'état by prince Gong (Gong Qin Wang 恭親王), the 1898 coup by the empress dowager Cixi 慈禧 and Yuan Shikai 袁世凱, and so on, there was almost no exception. Regardless of whether direct military force was employed or not, all the solutions were necessarily based on military power.

Thus although it can be said that generally throughout the Chinese history soldiers' social position was low, it does not mean that the political role of troops should

⁹ KUWABARA Jitsuzō 桑原鷺藏, "Shinajin no bunjaku to hoshu 支那人の文弱と保守 (The "Effeminacy" and "Conservatism" of the Chinese)," in *Kuwabara Jitsuzō zenshū* 桑原鷺藏全集 (The Collected Works of Kuwabara Jitsuzō), 5 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店, 1968), 1:475.

¹⁰ Shen Congwen 沈從文, "Jyūbun jiden 從文自傳 (An Autobiography of Congwen)," tr. by TATSUMA Shōsuke 立間祥介 in *Gendai Chūgoku bungaku zenshū* 現代中國文學全集 (Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature), 15 vols. (Tokyo: Kawade shobō 河出書房, 1955), 8:285.

be underestimated. For example, by comparing any period in Chinese history with the Nara 奈良 and Heian 平安 periods in Japanese history, one can say that in China the role of the military in politics was on the whole greater. In that sense the following famous passage by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 applies not only to revolutionary era but to any period in Chinese history, regardless of whether one stands at the Marxist viewpoint or not.¹¹ “According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. Some people ridicule us as advocates of the ‘omnipotence of war’. Yes we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist.”

Of course it cannot be denied that there were periods in Chinese history when the role of the army was relatively important, and periods when it was not. As a general rule, in an era of internal disturbance and foreign intervention, the need for the army is grave, and therefore its political role is also important; at the time politics and society are stabilized, the role of the military also considerably decreases. For example during the strife of the late Tang and the Five dynasties the role of mercenary troops was decisive. From the fact that the rulers of the Five dynasties were all of mercenary origin, and from the fact that even Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 [who became the first Song emperor] himself had been a professional soldier, one can easily surmise that the political role of the army was by all means great.

In the late Qing dynasty, since the great White Lotus Rebellion, the military forces gradually gained more and more importance. Especially at the time of the Taiping Rebellion, while both Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 and Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 were themselves civil officials, it was the victories achieved by their armies that made it possible for them to hold a real strong political power. Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 had become a *juren* 舉人 at the age of twenty, but after that he failed in the metropolitan examinations three times, and finally returned in despair to his home town. When he was already over forty, he through the recommendation of Hu Linyi 胡林翼 joined the staff of Zhang Gongliang 張公亮, the military governor of Hunan 湖南, and soon after that he became the chief assistant of Luo Bingzhang 駱秉章 who had succeeded Zhang Gongliang as the military governor. In this capacity he confronted the Taiping rebellion. By playing an active role in the struggle against the Taiping armies he made his first steps of success in the world. He distinguished himself by participating in Zeng Guofan's Hunanese army 湘軍; his activities after that are well-known. Towards the end of the Qing dynasty, when not only the central authority was weak but also the rule of provincial officials slackened local military forces gained strength forming a kind of self-government organizations. It has been explained that pirates of the coastal areas of Fujian 福建 and Guangdong 廣東 as well

¹¹ Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, “Problems of War and Strategy,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 2:225.

as mounted robbers of North China (Huabei 華北) and the Three Northeastern Provinces 東北三省 had the aspects of being both robbers and local self-government organizations. Also in the internal strifes that followed one after another from the late Qing to the Republican period military power came to hold a decisive sway over political power, leading unavoidably to the emergence of warlordism. On the other hand, at the time when internal strife and external intervention were relatively non-existent, the role of military power in politics was small, increasing sooner or later again as a result of deepening political crisis.

One may venture to say that after the establishment of the People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國 in 1949 political efforts should have been directed mainly toward expansion of productivity and consolidation of the social system. However, after the start of the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 in 1966 the slogan "Political power grows from the barrel of the gun" was raised and the young people were instigated with the slogan "Rebelling is justified" (*zao fan you li* 造反有理): it can be said that here lay the anachronism of the Cultural Revolution.

B. Slaying the lackeys (after they have outlived their usefulness)

It follows from the above-described dynamism of the military's political role that the Gaozu 高祖 emperor [i.e. Liu Bang 劉邦] of the Han dynasty had to turn a cold shoulder to such a distinguished and pre-eminent military commander as Han Xin 韓信 when the time of pacification and consolidation came. Of course even if one takes into account the strong distrust and other characteristics that are reported to have belonged to Liu Bang's personality, together with some other conditions, there nonetheless exists a non-historical law—applicable to any period—that the military commander who conquers the empire on horseback has to establish government organs and assign experts well versed in civil affairs to important positions as his administrative staff.

Thus the fact that Feng Dao 馮道 could hold the position of Prime Minister throughout the period of the Five dynasties is due to his administrative talents and the bureaucracy supporting him. Due to the same law Genghis Khan also soon entrusted Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材 with an important position, and the Manchus similarly gave Hong Chengchou 洪承疇 many responsibilities. Administrative experts of their like continued to be relied on in organizing the administrative set-up, despite alternation of power holders. Even the era of warlordism proved to be no exception, as can be seen from the careers of such conspicuous foreign relations experts as Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 and Gu Weijun 顧維鈞.

3. The Rhythm of Power Alternation

A. Inauguration—Maintenance—Degeneration

In the three millenia of Chinese history, regardless of gradual development in the productive capacity of society and changes in relations of production, rulers called themselves emperors and established dynasties, at the inauguration of the dynasty widely employing military power and at the time of the maintenance of the dynasty commanding a huge bureaucracy, gaining the active or passive consent of officials and local power holders—this pattern of construction continued with hardly any change. These intermediate layers of rulers [i.e. officials and the gentry], in the sense that they were at the bottom of the ruling class, belonged to the ruled; however, at the same time, they were the direct rulers over the subjects of the ultimate grass-root level, and had quite a thorough-going authority over the region. In that sense a system of seemingly complete centralization of power in China had a form similar to the absolutist monarchy in European history.¹² In the Qing period, however, it was from the beginning of the dynasty perhaps only to the Kangxi 康熙 and Yongzheng 雍正 reigns that central authority reached the lowest layer of subjects. It is in fact doubtful if it did so even during the Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns and if the intentions of the highest power holders reached the grass-root level. This should be a topic for future research.

Once the system had slackened in the late Qianlong 乾隆 period, for local bureaucrats it was very important to follow ancient practices and usages and to continue to keep the system secure and peaceful: what they were most afraid of was trouble and turmoil. Under normal circumstances the central authority was sleeping. Therefore for local officials it was more important than anything else to pay assigned tax quotas to the central government in accordance with traditional practices, and to keep the appearance that the rule went on without trouble.

The central authority, once awoke from sleep, attacked local officialdom like a wild tiger. For that reason local officials were greatly concerned about how to keep the central authority asleep. Whenever a disorder took place which might draw the

¹² The modern Europeans, who saw the seemingly orderly traditional Chinese dynastic form of government and its organization, regarded it as corresponding to Western absolutist system. However, the true nature of them were quite different, and when the Europeans' understanding of China deepened, they came to find aspects differing from Western absolutism. Concerning this process see BANNO Masataka 坂野正高, "Chūgoku wo Eikoku no gaikōkan wa dono yōni mite ita ka: McCartney shisetsudan no haken kara shingai kakumei made 中國を英國の外交官はどのように見ていたか—マカートニー使節團の派遣から辛亥革命まで (How Did the British Foreign Officer View China?: From the McCartney Mission until the 1911 Revolution)," in BANNO Masataka and ETŌ Shinkichi, eds., *Chūgoku wo meguru kokusai seiji: Eizō to genjitsu* 中國をめぐる國際政治—映像と現實 (International Relations and China: Image and Reality) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1968), 3 ff.

attention of the government, for local officials more important than suppressing it was to push it quietly out of one's sphere of jurisdiction: this was an art of wisdom and self-protection.¹³

Although in details the structure of rule varied somewhat from one dynasty to another, generally speaking, the following kind of rhythm of politics was common to all dynasties. Namely the new dynasty, which just usurped power, permeates its relative authority down to the bottom in the early period of its rule, and once a certain period of stability has continued, the system slackens. Before long the local, intermediate-level power holders one by one start their own activities, and the dynasty goes toward collapse. In this case the ruling power should be considered as relative. Even if extortions from the masses may be in the extreme, if the military power is strong and the government organization solid, rule may continue. Moreover, although military power may grow relatively weak, if the bureaucracy is well-organized and the provincial officialdom continues to support the government, then the dynasty may be able to sustain itself. Regardless of how stable the rule of a dynasty is and how its economic power is progressing and how affluent its society is becoming, if a militarily superior enemy appears, the dynasty can be crushed at one blow. The strength of the rule must always be discussed by comparing it to rival powers.

Thus the rhythm of politics itself is very irregular depending on the relative strength or weakness of the power of the authority. Great differences in the life spans of dynasties and the variation in the rises and falls of dynasties should be explained on the basis of the relativity of ruling power.

B. After 1949?

This rhythm of dynastic alternation does not apply to China after 1949 any longer, does it? The author thinks that it does. Although the manners and appearance of authority were completely different in the cases of imperial power and one-party despotism, the vigorous ascetic character of the initial phase soon turns to a period of maintaining prosperity; before long, however, the system starts slackening. This law seems to apply well to contemporary China. For the fear that the system would slacken, the Cultural Revolution certainly had the aim of returning to the starting point and creating an ascetic man, it was an attempt to change human nature: all were aspects which we cannot neglect. In other words, according to the subjective judgment of those who launched the Cultural Revolution, the first half of the 1960's was already regarded as a period of prosperity and degeneration of the Chinese society. After that laxity of the system came, and in order to avoid this laxity it was necessary to return once again to the starting point of the revolution. One of its objectives was to reform humanity itself, including leaders.

¹³ ETŌ Shinkichi, *Kindai Chūgoku seijishi kenkyū* 近代中國政治史研究 (Research on the History of Modern Chinese Politics) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1968), 6, 173, 180.

From an objective viewpoint, of course, China's prosperity belongs to a future stage. Within the world community, China is even now a developing country, and its productive capacity still needs to be expanded. One of the great disasters brought about by the Cultural Revolution was that by aiming at the reform of human nature, productive capacity was sacrificed. But how could slackening of the system be stopped while expanding productivity at the same time? It seems that contemporary China is actually facing the same problem as the dynasties of the past.

4. Territorial Rhythm

A. *China's Classical World View*

The Han people who first appeared at the middle courses of the Yellow River 黄河 at an early stage settled down to cultivate land, developing a productive capacity far higher than that of the neighboring nomad, gatherer and hunter societies. Due to the increase of population, the sphere of influence of the Han expanded to the lower stream of the Yellow River, to North and Central China, and also to the Jiangnan 江南 area. Based on the high productive capacity of agricultural society, the military strength of the Han people was generally superior: especially after they learned to produce iron weapons during the late Warring States period 戰國時代, they became stronger than neighboring states.

The Han people regarded themselves as the origin of civilization, as the source of justice, faith and morality, demanding these from subjugated peoples. Those who could not be subjugated were looked down upon as people outside civilization. That system was extremely hierarchic, relations with the periphery were all judged in terms of rank. The dynasty—the centre of civilization—was regarded as the protector of civilization, whereas the neighboring alien states and tribes expressed their submission to the system by dispatching, regularly or irregularly, missions which brought special local products as tributes. This was the tributary system.

Usually the Middle Kingdom returned the tributary mission presents of artistic craftsmanship, the value of which far exceeded the value of those brought by the mission.¹⁴ Therefore the peripheral kingdoms were often so willing to participate in

¹⁴ The Doctrine of the Mean 中庸 tells about the ideal state of tribute relations:

To escort them on their departure and meet them on their coming; to commend the good among them, and show compassion to the incompetent:—this is the way to treat indulgently men from a distance. To restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and to revive States that have been extinguished; to reduce to order states that are in confusion, and to support those which are in peril; to have fixed times for their own reception at court, and the reception of their envoys; to send them away after liberal treatment, and welcome their coming with small contributions:—this is the way to cherish the princes of the states." (James Legge, "The Doctrine of the Mean," in *id.*, *Chinese Classics*, 5 vols. (Hong Kong: London

tributary missions that they competed for it. When the Middle Kingdom was militarily strong, this hierarchic system functioned smoothly. When it was weak, the system was ruined, or the relationship between the neighboring kingdoms and the Middle Kingdom turned upside down so that the former was rather the uncle and the latter the nephew. Since usually the Middle Kingdom was stronger than the periphery, this system became accepted as the official classical world view of the Chinese. Their ethnocentrism—sinocentrism—was very difficult to eradicate, and when faced with adoption of Western culture in the modern era, it manifested itself in severe friction, resistance, and agony.

This classical China-centered world view may be outlined in the following way. First, the Middle Kingdom possessed the most advanced civilization. Second, with neighboring states it formed a hierarchic system based on rank. Third, its relations were tributary relations. Fourth, on the basis of personal jurisdiction, alien nationalities were in principle granted rights for autonomy based on their various customs and habits.

A most clear and confident pronouncement of this hierarchy within the sphere of Chinese civilization can be seen in the following first passage of the edict from the Qianlong emperor to George McCartney.¹⁵ “The King of Your Country from far away admired my name and influence, and reverently sent an envoy to bring tribute. Seeing that your country is respectful and truly in submission, I present The King of Your Country precious objects as a means to show kindness... The Heavenly Kingdom tenders to the Four Seas 四海 [i.e. the world], sparing no efforts to make them prosperous, handling government affairs...”

This document beautifully expresses the official view of an all-embracing Chinese empire ruling the whole world by virtue.¹⁶ There, in the system of the Qing dynasty, England, France, Holland and other countries trading with the Qing were officially regarded as tributary states in every respect. The Chinese characters denoting the names of those countries were written with an attached mouth radical, which implied that those countries were outside civilization. It was considered that China

Missionary Society, 1861), 1:274–275.)

While the above is the official view, it is in fact true that the tribute missions received much more articles from the central government than they brought in as the tribute. For the Middle Kingdom it was necessary to have actual power to back its tribute system. Concerning this point, see the source of note 12, 167 ff., and INOBUCHI Takashi, “Dentōteki higashi ajia sekai chitsujō shiron: 18 seikimatsu no Chūgoku no Betonamu kanshō wo chūshin toshite 傳統的東アジア世界秩序試論—18世紀末の中國のベトナム干渉を中心として (A Reconsideration of the Historical East Asian World Order: With Special Reference to the Chinese Intervention in Vietnam in the late Eighteenth Century),” *Kokusai hō gaikō zasshi* 國際法外交雜誌 (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) 73/5 (Feb. 1975).

¹⁵ *Da Qing Gaozong Chun huangdi shilu* 大清高宗純皇帝實錄, 30 vols. (Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng ch'u-pan 新文豐出版, 1978), 1:1435.

¹⁶ INABA Iwakichi 稻葉岩吉, *Shina kinsei shi kōwa* 支那近世史講話 (A Lecture on Early Modern Chinese History) (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha 日本評論社, 1938), 4–12.

was "rich in all things," whereas other countries were in trouble because of lack of things, therefore the Heavenly Kingdom was greatly "benefiting far-away people, bringing up the Four Barbarians 四夷." This was the official view, which, however, should be seen against considerations of military power.

B. North-South Contention

Looking back to China's three millenia of history, perhaps history before the Opium War can be characterized primarily as the history of North-South contention. From the viewpoint of neighboring peoples, the society, economy and culture of the Han were far more advanced than theirs. The area of the Han was densely populated and seemed materially rich. Its social life was orderly, its towns and fortresses, irrigation facilities, scholarship and arts all seemed superior from the perspective of the peripheral states.

The soil of the peripheral states, on the other hand, especially those in the North-Western region, was barren desert or dry plateau not suitable for agriculture, a severe natural environment. Therefore, when late autumn arrived, nomadic peoples invaded the more affluent areas settled by the Han people and plundered provisions. This simple pattern can actually be regarded as one basic rhythm in the three millenia of Chinese history.¹⁷ During the stable periods of the Han, Tang, and Ming dynasties China had an affluency of goods. That alien tribute missions were blessed with this affluency was perhaps not only the official view but also a historical fact. Although as an agricultural people the Han population spread in all directions, a conspicuous pattern of migration in its formative history was the migration toward the south under the pressure of alien peoples of the North West in particular, and expansion toward the North-West when the pressure weakened.

C. China's Territory

Already during the Zhou 周 dynasty the Han settlement had expanded as far as to Hebei 河北 in the North, Shanxi 陝西 in the West, Fujian and Zhejiang 浙江 in the South. As the first huge centralized empire in East Asian history, China under the Emperor Qin Shihuang spread its rule in all directions with its military power. During the Han dynasty, Chinese settlement reached Liaodong Peninsula 遼東半島 in the East; Jiuquan 酒泉, Dunhuang 敦煌, and the states of Ba 巴 and Shu 蜀 [both in present Sichuan 四川] in the West; states of Yue 粵 [Guangdong] and Gui 桂 [Guangxi 廣西] in the South; thus the Han population had expanded to the most part of the present China proper. From the Former and Later Han dynasties to the era of the Northern and Southern dynasties 南北朝 the Chinese authority extended at one time

¹⁷ SUZUKI Chūsei 鈴木中正, *Shin chō chūki shi kenkyū* 清朝中期史研究 (Mid-Ch'ing Dynasty Historical Research) (Toyohashi: Aichi daigaku kokusai mondai kenkyūjo 愛知大學國際問題研究所, 1952), 8.

even reaching the Mongols in the North, the city states of the Takla Makan desert in the West, and Vietnam in the South. All these were reached with military power, not with virtue.

Thus when the military power of the Middle Kingdom weakened, due to pressure from the North its territory shrank and the Han migration to the Jiangnan area greatly increased. As can be seen especially from the rises and falls of the sixteen barbarian kingdoms during the Northern and Southern dynasties period, when the pressure from the North strengthened, the mixing of blood in Jiangbei 江北 increased, and emigration to Jiangnan grew. During Sui 隋 and Tang the area of China greatly expanded: in the North it reached the Korean Peninsula and the course of the Liao River 遼河 as well as the Southern half of Mongolia; in the West the Chinese military force reached the Congling Mountains 蔥嶺 by subjugating the oasis city states of Takla Makan; and in the South its authority stretched to the Eastern side of the Annam Mountains, to the present South Vietnam. During the Xuanzong 玄宗 [A.D. 712-755] reign [general] Gao Xianzhi 高仙芝 even invaded Kashmir through Kashgar 喀什. Thus from the Han through the Tang, when their authority was spread over a vast area, the Han Chinese controlled east-west trading routes, and their empire could boast of extreme prosperity. What supported this prosperity was undoubtedly a superior military power.

In the late Tang and early Five dynasties period, military pressure from the North tightened. Like during the sixteen barbarian kingdoms period, now alien dynasties emerged in China proper one after another, and the Han population moved further and further to the south. Even when finally the Song managed to preserve the system of the Middle Kingdom, due to the confines of its military strength it could not expand its territory, and it was frequently pressed by the Qidan 契丹 and the Nüzhen 女真 in the north, with the result that finally the Song court was forced to move to the south. Due to the mere military weakness, it first lost the sixteen frontier provinces and then the northern half of the China proper without being able to recover them. Regardless of this decrease in the size of territory, from the late Tang through the Five dynasties to the Song dynasty, social and economic developments took place, and therefore the progress of the Han civilization itself did not stop. Well-known are the numerous brilliant works and achievements made in the fields of literature, art, and philosophy. However, this very splendor was possible because a certain amount of territory could be maintained with the help of military power: even when the Song dynasty was weak, without the prop and stay of the military strength supporting the dynasty, the splendor could hardly have been possible.

The Mongol Yuan 元 dynasty which was a huge world empire was established on the basis of military superiority. After that the Ming dynasty wielded power in an area which in the north reached Heilongjiang 黑龍江, in the west Gansu 甘肅, in the south Yunnan 雲南 and Guizhou 貴州, and in the east Taiwan 臺灣. Furthermore the fact that Zheng He 鄭和 sailed seven times to the South Sea adding Surabaya, Timor,

Java, Malacca, etc. to the “tributary states,” had a great impact on the intercourse between those regions and the Chinese civilization, and on the penetration of Chinese culture there.

As can be seen from the above, the main axis of history was actually armed contention between the North and the South. Therefore in Chinese literature the battlefield was literally “sandfield” (*shachang* 沙場),¹⁸ autumn was the season for fighting, and the martial attire was literally “barbarian mantle” (*rongyi* 戎衣). Ensuing from the ebb and flow in military strength, the territory of the Middle Kingdom expanded or shrunk in a repeating rhythmic movement.

D. The Qing Territory

The Qing dynasty itself was established by the Manchu people who inhabited the area from Northern Manchuria to the bank of the Amur River (Heilongjiang). Since the beginning of their dynasty they invaded the Korean Peninsula, allied with the Mongols, and opposed the Ming. After entering China proper, with a mere 500,000 troops they not only conquered China's 400-odd prefectures but also extended their authority in the north from the northern bank of the Amur to Tangnu Wulianghai 唐努烏梁海. During the Qianlong reign, an expeditionary army was sent to Tibet and Lhasa was occupied. The Muslims of Xinjiang 新疆 were subjugated after repeated fights, and the control of the western regions acquired as far as to the Congling Mountains. In the south expeditionary troops were sent to Vietnam and Burma, and even if these countries could not actually be conquered, tributes were received from them. With the exception of the height of the Mongol rule, the authority of the Qing dynasty expanded in a degree unprecedented in the history of the dynasties of all ages, covering an area even larger than that of the People's Republic of China. This all followed from military superiority.

Far away in the West, Ivan III, the Grand Duke of Moscow, suppressed the Kipchak Khanate, and soon after that Ivan IV, having formally crowned himself as tsar, unified the main part of the present Russia proper. The Cossack leader Timofeevich Ermak crossed the Ural Mountains, conquered Sibir Khanate submitting it under Ivan IV. This tiny Sibir Khanate soon gave its name to the whole Siberia. In this way the Slavs, hunting Siberian fur animals, moved from the west toward the east, crossed the Yabulonoi Mountains, colliding with the Qing power in the course of the Amur. Upon collision fighting started. The fighting was overwhelmingly in favor of the Qing, and in the subsequent treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 the Russo-Chinese border was agreed along the Argun River and the Yabulonoi Mountains. Because Russian advance to the Amur basin was obstructed due to the Nerchinsk treaty, it sought to expand toward such distant northern areas as

¹⁸ Zhang Mingcheng 張明澄, *Goyaku—guyaku* 誤譯·愚譯 (Mistaken Translation-Idiotic Translations) (Tokyo: Kubo shoten 久保書店, 1967), 32-33.

Kamchatka, the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. As long as the military superiority of the Qing dynasty continued, China's territory remained stable.

In the mid-19th century Russian influence gradually expanded to the south, and the lower stream of the Amur was occupied. In the 1850's the Qing troops were defeated by the Russians, and the treaty of Aigun 愛琿條約 was signed in 1858, with which the area north of the Amur was ceded to Russia and the Maritime Province 沿海州 in the east of the Ussuri River was laid under common supervision by both countries. Subsequently in the 1860 treaty of Peking the Maritime Province was ceded to Russia. The territory of the present People's Republic of China is almost identical with the territory at the time of the Peking treaty, or to put it more precisely, identical with the Qing domain of 1860 if Outer Mongolia and the Tangnu Wulianghai region are excluded.

Before this, in the beginning of the 19th century, Western military power overwhelmed the Qing, and from the Opium War onward it was repeatedly humiliated in a series of wars. In the 1894–1895 war it was even defeated by Japan, which from the Meiji Restoration 明治維新 onward, imitating the West, aimed at making the country rich and strengthening its army. To the set-up of North-South contention was now added the confrontation with a new enemy which came from the east beyond the sea.

E. The Tendency for Territorial Stability in the Contemporary Era

The three millenia old rhythm of North-South contention was thus broken since the Opium War and the confrontation with the eastern enemy had taken place. Had the axis of North-South rivalry in the eastern part of the Asian Continent then already lost its importance? No. It seems that following the replenishment of the military power of Russia and then the Soviet Union in East Asia, the axis of North-South contention there was revived again, the ebb and flow of military strength directly bringing about territorial changes.

Attention, however, has to be paid to the completely new circumstances in the international community since the World War II. As a result of progress of the international community, borders have gradually become clearly drawn, and the international customs of respecting border lines and territories have gradually become consolidated. In other words, when previously extortion of territory with military force was regarded as a common practice of the international community, after World War II it has become remarkably difficult to start a war on the grounds of border dispute or territorial dispute. Therefore although a limited-scale Sino-Soviet dispute did take place, one can no longer compare the northern peoples who in late autumn moved toward the south seeking provisions with the modern Soviet Union.

Therefore the set-up of the North-South rivalry does not directly cause armed collision, but is only confined to a certain amount of political tension. In that sense it should be accepted that the rhythm of North-South contention has indeed in a cer-

tain degree broken by today.

5. External Pressure and Nationalism

A. The Established Order of the Celestial Empire and the West

As it has been discussed in the preceding section, North-South rivalry, which had been the core axis of politics for several millenia in the Chinese mainland, underwent great transformation in the nineteenth century. A new challenger appeared from beyond the sea. Originally the "Celestial Empire"—the political order in the sphere of Chinese civilization—had been supported by its military superiority, as has already been explained. Therefore as long as that superiority prevailed, McCartney's efforts to persuade the Chinese to negotiations were useless, and even if Earl Amherst arrived all the way to visit Peking, the British were forced to withdraw with bare hands. The foreigners had first to accept the established order of the Celestial Empire. Only then the foreign trade in Canton started to develop smoothly. However, following the degeneration of the military power which supported the established order of the Celestial Empire, discontent on the side of foreign traders came to the surface. The British East India Company and other Westerners had once thought that the Celestial order could not be altered. But now they started pondering the overthrow of that system. In this way, in the 1830's, the discrepancy between the established order of the Celestial Empire and the Western nation-state system erupted in the form of numerous disputes, leading toward the Opium War.

In this process the Western side resorting to the use of military power enforced upon China a free trade system which it firmly believed to be fair. China, while vehemently adhering to the established order of the Celestial Empire, had to make concessions one after another. The history of the nineteenth century China was the history of Western intrusion into China, the history of the fall of the established order of the Celestial Empire—the fall of the international order of the sphere of Chinese civilization—and the history of China's entry into Western nation-state system.

B. The Road to National Salvation

How to deal with the above-described western impact was naturally a big political issue for the Chinese. A group of Westernizers had attempted to defend China by strengthening the Qing government through introduction of Western technology while leaving the Qing system itself untouched. Condemning these Westernizers in a wholesale manner as traitors is not fair. They possessed a dual character, it was nationalism of their fashion. Also the 1898 reformers tried to strengthen the Qing dynasty through institutional reforms while the emperor-based system of the Qing itself was left unaltered. For this reason they were later not inappropriately called emperor-protectors, but they, too, had a dual character: in their own fashion they,

too, were groping the road to national salvation. Also the colorful warlords and popular heroes of the Republican era had their two sides: on one side they, holding self-styled sway over Central Plains, tried to fulfil their quest for power, on the other side they cherished the ambition of themselves becoming heroes who rescue China making it strong and powerful.¹⁹ Wu Peifu 吳佩孚, who has been called the running dog of the British, had his own style of nationalism. Zhang Zuolin 張作霖, too, freed himself from the Japanese yoke in his late years, and started to oppose Japan. Branding Wu and Zhang as running dogs of imperialism is just one side of the assessment concerning them.

C. The Chinese Renaissance

The early Republican period was, following Yuan Shikai's dictatorship, an era of tangled warfare by warlords, and from the political viewpoint an era of really frightening chaos. However, even in the midst of this chaos a certain amount of political stability did exist, and therefore intellectuals could search with fervent passion for ideas how to save the country. The Manchester school of economy, Darwin's theory on evolution, anarchism, Marxism, even state socialism poured into China like a torrent. In the middle of these turbulent times flowers of thought and literature were blooming as if to vie with each other in beauty, which would have been quite unthinkable during the Qing period.

In Italy, absorbed by political trickery and internal strife, flowers of the Renaissance could bloom because in the city states and in the territory of some petty rulers there was still some social stability. Likewise in China, flowers of thought and literature could compete in blooming during the political chaos of the early Republican period. Many of these flowers had their background in unbearable resentment.

A section in Lin Yutang's *Moment in Peking* tells how a Chinese Youth who was a heavy opium-smoker was beaten without reason by a Japanese in the street with the result that his anger woke his nationalist feelings and he gave up opium.²⁰ Tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands young people must have undergone similar experiences, through which their nationalism was aroused and they pursued all kinds of paths to save their country. Without the impulse of nationalism, the culture movement of the time would not have exalted in the degree it did.

Among these paths the socialist one attracted the young whose minds were filled with a strong sense of justice. This was because at that time imperialist powers

¹⁹ BANNO Masataka, "Dai ichiji taisen kara go sanjū made: Kokuken kaifuku undō shi oboegaki 第一次大戦から五・卅まで：國權回復運動史覺書 (Notes on the Movement to Regain Sovereignty from World War I to the 1925 "May 30th" Movement)," in UEDA Toshio 植田捷雄, ed., *Gendai Chūgoku wo meguru sekai no gaikō* 現代中國を繞る世界の外交 (Modern China in International Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Nomura shoten 野村書店, 1951), 41 ff.

²⁰ Lin Yutang, *Moment in Peking* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1939), 713.

were products of capitalism based on the principle of private ownership of property. Moreover in China itself, because of this private ownership, the landlord system produced a great number of miserable tenant farmers, and under the name of freedom of contract the wages of workers in cities were pressed to an extremely low level. Looking at the situation of the time, it is not difficult to assume that many of those young people judged "this is wrong, after all capitalist production is anarchy, it is planning that brings fairness into the society!" Moreover, many other young people likewise yearned after western parliamentary democracy, thinking that it was the government for the people, by the people and of the people and thinking that weaknesses of the capitalist form of production should be corrected through state socialism.

A great number of young people ran to socialism, especially toward Marx-Leninism which had for the first time become the ruling ideology in the Soviet Union, and in the same way many youths leaned toward parliamentary democracy and state socialism. The former concentrated in the Chinese Communist Party, the latter in the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 國民黨). Not even a century had passed since the era of the established order of the Celestial Empire, when the rhythm of Chinese politics became greatly disturbed, and when some kind of system based on European political thought was about to be established.

6. The Pendulum of Politics in The People's China

A. *Intersecting Goals of Revolution*

Political goals embraced by the counter elite just before the revolution are various. In the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate 德川幕府, the patriots who aimed at its overthrow dreamed about establishing theocratic government based on restored imperial rule or about a Western representative system, dreams which represented the extremes of all kinds of ideas emerging in great numbers. Likewise, the counter elites of the late Qing knew no bounds in their dreams which varied from the maintenance of the imperial system—an idea advocated by the Westernizers and the 1898 reformers—to anarchism. The character of the revolution is determined by the idea whose dreamers assume the leadership of the revolutionary regime. As a general rule concerning revolutionary regimes, there is a tendency of the new regime becoming veiled by idealism, and therefore the regime easily resorts to severe criticism of the old order, and its policies tend to get a radical coloring.

One of the few exceptions to the above was the Meiji Restoration. As can be seen from the phrase "Revere the Emperor, overthrow the Shogunate," the patriots who fought the Tokugawa government still shared a core political value, the maintenance of the emperor. Here naturally a kind of tacit agreement prevailed: it was the consent about the doctrine on imperial rule based on divine authority. Also, as

can be seen from the slogan "Revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians," expelling the barbarians necessarily meant the overthrow of the Shogunate. On the other hand, once the leaders of the Meiji government had achieved the power, they in fact drastically restricted the emperor's authority, while seemingly sticking to the doctrine of imperial rule by divine authority. Moreover, once it came to restoring the powers of the imperial throne, the majority of the patriots who had called for expulsion of barbarians, suddenly turned to the road of opening the country to foreign intercourse. Those who had been confident in theocratic government, imperial rule by divine authority, and the need to expel barbarians, raged that "it should not be like this," and they were gradually excluded from positions of power. Among them were people such as SAEGUSA Shigeru 三枝 莚 who were summarily sentenced to capital punishment.

Unlike the Meiji Restoration, many revolutions go too far. Concerning that, the following words by Mao Zedong are certainly correct:

a revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.... Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted.²¹

The American, French, and Russian revolutions as well as recently the Iranian revolution, have all of a sudden rushed into an ideal world by the new revolutionary regimes.

B. The Return Sway of the Pendulum

Because of various restrictive causes of reality, however, the basis for such an authority is demolished. The ideal of the American Revolution was the Jeffersonian agricultural society. In striving for making the country affluent and strong, however, Hamiltonian policies were actually followed. Likewise, soon after the French Revolution, Marat, Danton, Robespierre rushed forward trying earnestly to realize their dreams of revolution. Because of restrictive factors the result was terrorism, and they even became targets for resentment from the part of the intelligentsia and the masses. This led to the Thermidorian reaction and to the appearance of Napoleon Bonaparte, an emperor very different from what the revolutionaries had dreamed about. The political pendulum which has swayed to an extreme position inevitably returns. Also the Russian Revolution terribly ruined the country's productive capac-

²¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 1:28-29.

ity in its phase of war-time communism. This is the reason why NEP became necessary under the strong leadership of Lenin. In the case of the Russian Revolution, since NEP gave birth to new kulaks, the new efforts to carry out socialism became directed toward the countryside. Thus the pendulum swayed sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left.

The Chinese revolution was no exception.

C. Pluralism of Political Goals

The new revolutionary regime, which in 1949 unified nearly all of the Chinese mainland, had many political objectives. First, on the basis of the ideals of Marx-Leninism, class struggle has to be continued in order to develop new productive relations of the proletarian dictatorship. Furthermore, in order to realize the prosperous society which was promised to the masses, productive capacity has to be raised. These two political objectives, however, contradict each other. When new productive relations are established, productivity falls; if productivity is emphasized too much, any radical reform of productive relations is difficult to carry out. As a problem of speed in carrying out socialism, the contradiction between these two political goals shadowed the future prospects of the new power holders.

Second, against the rule of the Nationalist Party, the Chinese Communist Party played the role of a counter elite, and therefore continued to cry for the need of democracy for the purpose of controlling power holders. But once the Communist Party itself had come to power, unlimited democracy all at once turned out to be a restriction on the party itself. Explanations such as *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* were then created, and the idea of people's democracy put forward. It remains a fact, however, that for powerholders Western-style democracy is troublesome. It is undeniable that among their political objectives, one-party dictatorship and democracy were in contradiction with one another.

Third, during the revolutionary movement the Communist Party promised the masses material wealth. But even if it came to power, the poverty of the masses could not be eliminated in one day's effort. It had to impose on the masses a life with many desires suppressed. Affluency or ascetism, approval of material incentives or rejection of them, were difficult questions the power holders faced.

Fourth, in its essence, Marx-Leninism dreams about world revolution, and therefore supporting revolutions by Marx-Leninists in other countries is a logical necessity. However, in order to survive in the middle of the international community, friendly relations with other countries can not be neglected. For this reason, the new powerholders face the dilemma of whether to strengthen friendship between countries or to support world revolution. As a result their policies oscillate to the right and to the left.

Fifth, for a new state it is necessary to associate with the international community as soon as possible. Also in order to raise productive capacity it is necessary to

carry out division of labor with foreign countries and to promote relations of interdependence. On the other hand, in order to preserve the purity of revolution, the masses have to be prevented as much as possible from being exposed to the air of foreign countries. The thicker is the wall separating the masses from foreign countries, the easier is the purity of revolution to preserve. Here emerges the question of whether the country should be closed or open toward the outside world. For the leaders of the People's China it was a big problem.

Sixth, another important goal of the revolutionary regime was to cultivate subjective activism of the masses in order to develop a new kind of socialist human character. However, seen from the objective laws concerning man and his society, human nature certainly cannot easily be reformed, and therefore social and economic principles invariably apply in the People's China as well. Whether energy should be concentrated on cultivating subjective activism or emphasis should be laid on awareness of objective laws, was a big problem for political leaders.

Burdened with problems concerning these many contradicting political goals, the Chinese Communist Party, in leading the new People's China, had to shift the emphasis among these various goals sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left.

D. Creeping vs. Rash Advance

How to combine the above-described conflicting political goals, and especially what stand to take as to class struggle, are problems which Marx-Leninists themselves have been well aware of: for instance Wang Ming 王明's essay, *Two-line Struggle*, discusses it in length. After the Chinese Communist Party came to power, its policies concerning the various contradictions came to swing like a pendulum. It is evident that inside the Communist Party controversy over policy has taken place. The doctrine of proceeding slowly along the socialist road and paying attention to the expansion of productive capacity has been criticized as "creeping," whereas the advocacy of attempting speedy execution of socialism was condemned as "rash advance."

To the above phenomenon China scholars have paid attention already. For instance, A. Eckstein,²² G. W. Skinner,²³ E. A. Winckler,²⁴ J. R. Townsend,²⁵ L. W. Pye,²⁶ and A. Nathan²⁷ attempted to analyze this pendular phenomenon. The author

²² Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

²³ G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance Succession in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., *Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1969).

²⁴ *Ibid.*; Edwin A. Winckler, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Reply," *The China Quarterly* 68 (Dec. 1976): 734-750.

²⁵ James R. Townsend, *Politics in China* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974).

²⁶ Lucian W. Pye, *China: An Introduction* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972).

²⁷ Andrew J. Nathan, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique," *The China Quarterly* 68 (Dec. 1976): 720-733.

himself wrote in 1967 an essay titled “Chūgoku kakumei ni okeru onpo to kyūshin 中國革命における穏歩と急進” (Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution).²⁸ The content of the essay can be summarized as follows. Marx-Leninist political leaders strive to carry out socialism. In so doing their own strong leadership becomes necessary, so does the control of ideas, and in order to bring up the “proletarian man”, vehement political education is necessary as well. Moreover, in order to avoid undesirable foreign influences, a tendency toward self-imposed national seclusion grows. Human nature, however, cannot be transformed at will, and when planned production is carried out, regardless of how much political guidance or political education is made, the human willingness to work wanes, and in the course of a few months or a few years the fervor of the mass mobilization loses its attraction. As a result, the masses who at one time were mobilized through a strong political guidance, get finally tired out, and while still shouting slogans they are in fact reluctant to work. This leads to decline in productivity, and the political leadership, unable to stand this strain, cannot but slacken the regulations. If radical policies are nevertheless stubbornly adhered to and continue to be enforced in length, the leaders will, like Robespierre, be ousted from power. Then, according to the law of human nature, terms of competition have to be introduced and private initiatives accepted. At the same time when regulations are relaxed, elements of capitalism emerge, as seen from the viewpoint of Marx-Leninists. To them these are signs of revisionist or capitalist decay which have to be eradicated through radical policies. Repetition of this formed the pendular movement between moderation and radicalism during the thirty years of rule by the Chinese Communist Party. That was the author’s analysis.

E. A Bird’s-eye View on Moderation and Radicalism

Some revision is necessary of that essay which was written more than a decade ago. Therefore the author would like to draw a bird’s-eye view on moderation and radicalism here. Please refer to the table below. Of course this bird’s-eye view only expresses the author’s own frame of reference. In China, the policy framework at a certain period is usually shown in important documents published at that time. Therefore those published political documents can be regarded as marking policy changes in China. How policies were implemented is not, however, analyzed to the author’s regret.

In 1945 when the essay “On Coalition Government” was written, it was recognized that the Chinese Communist Party was still weak, and therefore a united front was formed in order to isolate the right wing of the Nationalist Party. For that reason,

²⁸ ETŌ Shinkichi and OKABE Tatsumi 岡部達味, “Chūgoku kakumei ni okeru onpo to kyūshin 中國革命における穏歩と急進 (Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution),” *Chūō kōron* 中央公論 82/7 (July 1967), repr. in *id.*, *Sekai no naka no Chūgoku* 世界の中の中國 (China in the World) (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha 讀賣新聞社, 1969).

Table I-1 A Bird's-eye View on Moderation and Radicalism

Events and Policies	
“On Coalition Government” (1945)	CCP weak, policy to isolate rightists, moderation in carrying out socialism
Dictatorship of People's Democracy (1949)	CCP strong, solidarity with Asian Com. parties, radicalism in carrying out socialism
Address on June 15, 1949	CCP weak, appeal to national bourgeoisie, moderation in carrying out socialism
San-fan and Wu-fan Movements	National crisis, eradication of Guomintang elements, radicalism
The Eighth National Congress of the CCP (1956)	National construction, moderation
[Rash advance vs. creeping	
The Second Session of the Eighth National Congress (1958)	Great Leap Forward radicalism
Liu's Congratulatory Address of 40th Anniv. of the CCP	National Construction, bright prospects
Cultural Revolution	Elimination of revisionism, puritanism, radicalism
[The February Countercurrent 二月逆流, Wuhan Incident 武漢事件, Lin Biao Incident 林彪事件, Mov. to criticize Lin Biao and Confusius 批林批孔運動	
Post-the Gang of Four	“Four Modernizations 四化,” moderation
Third Session of the Central Committee of the 11th Congress of the CCP (Dec. 1978)	Revision of the econ. plan, against Cultural Revolution, moderation
The Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (1980)	Revision of the economic plan (?), against Cultural Revolution, moderation

the speed of putting socialism into practice was very slow. This was because it was recognized that in order to form a united front, the cooperation of the proletariat with other social classes, including the national bourgeoisie, was necessary. However, in 1949 the situation turned somewhat complex. In early June of that year the doctrine of people's democratic dictatorship emphasized the ideological aspect of Marx-Leninism from a fairly long-range perspective. Taking the viewpoint that the Chinese Communist Party is strong, solidarity with other Asian Communist parties was advocated, complete reliance on the Soviet Union preached, and calls for serious procession along the road of socialism made. On the other hand, the address of June 15, 1949 can be seen as an appeal aimed primarily at bourgeoisie, technical experts and intellectuals who were about to leave the country, advocating that since the Chinese

production relations vs. productivity	friendship vs. support for revolutions	democracy vs. dictatorship	closed door vs. open door policy
productivity	friendship	democracy	open door
production relations	support for revolutions	dictatorship	closed door
productivity	friendship	democracy	open door
production relations	support for revolutions	dictatorship	closed door
productivity	friendship	democracy	open door
]
production relations	support for revolutions	dictatorship	closed door
productivity	friendship	democracy	open door
production relations	support for revolutions	dictatorship	closed door
]
productivity	friendship	democracy ?	open door
productivity	friendship	democracy ?	open door
productivity	friendship	tightening	a slight revision of the track

Communist Party was still weak, cooperation with the national bourgeoisie was badly needed. Thus the speed of carrying out socialism was very slow. However, when in June 1950 the Korean War started and in November of that year Chinese volunteer troops took part in it, nation-wide *San-fan* and *Wu-fan movements* 三反五反運動²⁹ were launched. That was a national crisis. By appealing to that crisis the masses were mobilized, and by purging remnants of the Guomindang and capitalist production, radical policy was followed in order to carry out socialism. Once Stalin died in 1953 and armistice was reached in the Korean War, the Chinese Communist

²⁹ *San-fan Movement* aimed at eliminating “three evils”: corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. *Wu-fan Movement* was against the “five evils” of bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing of economic information.

Party began paying attention to productive capacity. National construction was advocated, moderation in realizing socialism declared. Since then, generally speaking, moderate policies were followed, although within the central leadership of the Communist Party a controversy developed, when Mao Zedong and his associates advocated more radical policies and criticized the moderates for creeping. As a result rather radical policies were adopted concerning the land question and productive relations in the countryside. It is for this reason that in the bird's-eye view diagram it is in the fifth row.

In 1958 the slogans of the Three Red Banners 三面紅旗—the Great Leap Forward 大躍進, the People's Communes 人民公社, and the General Line for Socialist Construction 社會主義建設總路線—were raised, and the policies turned toward radicalism. As a result productive capacity sank rapidly. Opposition within the political leadership intensified, and while the Great Leap and the People's Communes continued to be propagated, from 1959 on policies gradually changed toward moderation. In 1961 Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇's "Congratulatory Address on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Party" laid an emphasis on productivity outlining vistas of bright future.

In 1966 the Great Cultural Revolution started. Puritanism of an unprecedented degree was emphasized, radical realization of socialism was sung aloud, and the elimination of revisionism was advocated. After the February Countercurrent, the Wuhan 武漢 Incident, the Lin Biao Incident, the Movement to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius 批林批孔運動, and several other shifts and turns, the year 1976 arrived. In that year Zhou Enlai 周恩來 died and the [First] Tian An Men Incident [第一次] 天安門事件 occurred, then Mao Zedong died and soon after that the Gang of Four 四人幫 were arrested. It was a year of immense political struggle, a year of unusual movement of the pendulum. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, the slogans of the "Four Modernizations" were emphasized, restoration of productivity, which had dropped during the era of the Cultural Revolution, was advocated, and audacious policies to make the country prosperous and militarily strong were adopted. The above is the bird's-eye view of the traces left by the political pendulum, outlined along the moderation-radicalism axis.

Summary

In this essay the author, outlining Chinese political history, has tried to distinguish four different wave rhythms. The first of them is the wave rhythm of alternation of power, the second is that of North-South contention. The third is the wave rhythm of nationalism, and the fourth that of moderation and radicalism under socialism.

How do these four wave rhythms fit to contemporary China? From the viewpoint of the first wave rhythm, alternation of power, China has now certainly shifted

from the phase of regime creation to that of regime maintenance. The leadership of Mao Zedong—the hero of the creation period—no longer exists and the old party members are gradually exploiting their status as power holders to pursue their own private interests. Certainly signs of the full maturity and the subsequent degeneration have already appeared. Therefore, as seen from the viewpoint of this rhythm, the task facing the Chinese leadership today is to work for making the country affluent and militarily strong, while eradicating elements of the full maturity and degeneration. In that sense, new political education is necessary, and a moral self-denial movement has to be enforced through the use of political power; therefore a certain kind of radical policy is required. Yet it has to be kept within such limits that it does not obstruct the growth of productivity. Thus it can be said that China has entered a period when policies have to be formulated maintaining at the same time this extremely difficult balance.

As it has already been explained, the rhythm of North-South contention exists even now in the form of Sino-Soviet antagonism. As far as one can judge from the past geopolitical and historical experience, the axis of North-South contention will not easily vanish, but guessing the future on the basis of historical past is not enough to understand whether China's political leadership will continue to face a powerful enemy. The wave of nationalism reached its high tide in the Anti-Japanese War, and now after many turns and twists, friendly relations between countries are being emphasized. Nationalism is becoming the spiritual prop and stay of the Chinese policy to make the country rich and militarily powerful, and it probably will continue to burn with a bright flame. As long as stability in the international environment prevails, this flame hardly flares up into a raging fire. Even concerning relations with the Soviet Union, as long as both China and the Soviet Union maintain stable tension, China's anti-Soviet detestation is hardly enough to lead to a strife between the two countries. However, from the viewpoint of the Peking government it is not desirable that nationalism, the spiritual prop of the policy to make the country wealthy and powerful, would undergo attenuation. Therefore it is not desirable that it will go without an external foe. It is thinkable that maybe on the basis of this kind of calculation, China deliberately shows animosity toward the Soviet Union. However, evidence supporting this hypothesis is—naturally—not available.

With regard to the fourth wave rhythm, the moderation vs. radicalism pendulum is now showing a big swing in the direction of moderation. The pendulum, which in the era of the Cultural Revolution had sharply shifted towards radicalism, is now, with a huge political energy, swinging toward the right. Does it continue like this? From the viewpoint of dynamics of politics, it is not conceivable that it will continue like this. At present various efforts are taking place to relax restrictions on democracy and freedom of opinion and to ease regulations concerning foreign intercourse as well as to restore the honor of disgraced party leaders. In the author's own impression, the pendulum will sway back. However, what is different from the for-

mer right-left course of the pendulum is that now the political leaders desperately prepare measures to prevent the pendulum from swaying too far either to the left or to the right, and to continue along the road of the four modernizations, that is, toward making the country wealthy and militarily strong.

The four wave rhythms outlined above form a set of four equations, the solution of which is the task assigned to the present Chinese politics. Among these equations, the 2nd and the 3rd are not so difficult to solve. However, the solution for the 1st and the 4th equation is not easy to achieve. Moreover, to find a satisfactory solution to all the four equations is extremely difficult. If one is allowed to speak impudently, maybe the following could be said. Until the 1930's capitalist countries were suffering due to contradictions of the capitalist production. As a result, after the difficulties of World War II, they in the 1950's and 1960's bravely adopted strong points of socialist systems—land reforms, social welfare, public investments, and other ways to intervene in private economic activity—thus entering the road of mixed economy or modified capitalism. Likewise, from the 1980's onward socialist countries will enter the era of introducing in one way or another the advantages of capitalist production: the principle of competition, an acceptance of human nature, and so on. Dogmatic interpretation of Marx-Leninism has already become a thing of the past.

Chapter II ON THE ROLE OF THE YANG-WU-P'AI

This essay will attempt to describe the dual-sided nature of the Yang-wu-p'ai (The Yang-wu clique 洋務派) and discuss the movement's appraisal in the field of modern Chinese history.

Some late Ch'ing 清 dynasty officials were deeply impressed with the superiority of Western weapons through their experiences of the Opium and Arrow Wars and the T'ai ping Rebellion 太平天國. In order to strengthen the dynasty, these officials went to great lengths to import Western technology. This movement, aimed at "self-strengthening 自強" and modernization, was called the Yang-wu Movement 洋務運動 and the officials who led the movement were called Yang-wu bureaucrats 洋務官僚. The founders of this movement included Lin Tse-hsü 林則徐, Kung Tzu-chen 龔自珍, and Wei Yuan 魏源, and they were later joined by others such as Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩, Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠, Chang Chih-tung 張之洞, and Sheng Hsüan-huai 盛宣懷. After receiving the shock of the results of the Opium war, these officials had all been awakened to the need to study foreign affairs, and devoted themselves to importing the superior weaponry of the Western powers. The fundamental idea behind the movement was that the heart of China's traditions and values should remain unchanged while the reformers conceded the superiority of the West on the level of material culture.

Naturally, their primary consideration was how to best strengthen China's coastal defenses and repel the great powers who attacked from the sea. Having seen the impressive results of deploying Western weapons during the suppression of the T'ai ping Rebellion, the Ch'ing dynasty purchased some warships and weaponry. Before long, officials realized the benefits of producing the weapons themselves. Tseng Kuo-fan established an arsenal at An-ch'ing 安慶 in 1861, Li Hung-chang followed up the next year with a Western gun factory in Shanghai, and more factories for the manufacture of weapons followed. Among these were the Kiangnan Arsenal and Dockyards 江南機器製造總局 near Shanghai established by Li Hung-

* This is the English version of my "Yōmu-ha shōron 洋務派小論," *Rekishi kyōiku* 歷史教育 (Historical Education) 13/12 (1960) and was originally published in *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute of Eastern Culture* 12 (1967). When I wrote this essay, Chinese historians and most Japanese historians argued that the Yang-wu-p'ai were reactionaries who stifled Chinese historical development. I tried to argue that the Yang-wu-p'ai had both progressive and conservative aspects. I would like to thank Mr. Konrad Lawson, who made significant improvements to the English in the original translation.

chang in 1865, the Foochow Naval Dockyards 福州船政局 (1866), the Foochow Naval Academy 福州船政學堂 (1867), and the Lanchow Machinery Shop 蘭州機器局 (1872) established by Tso Tsung-t'ang.

These steps towards the establishment of a modern industry could not be restricted to the manufacture of weapons and ships and soon spread to other general areas of production. The China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company 輪船招商局 was founded in 1872, the Kaiping Mining Company 開平鑛務局 in 1878, the Shanghai Machinery and Weaving Company 上海機器織布局 in 1882, and the Canton Wild-silk Spinning Company 廣東繅絲局 in 1886. Chang Chih-tung founded the Hupei Rifle and Cannon Manufacturing Works 湖北槍砲廠 and an iron and steel works in 1890 which would later develop into the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company 漢冶萍製鐵公司. The theory behind all of this was described by one of its pioneer thinkers Wei Yuan, "Master the strengths of the barbarian, and with them, control the barbarians." The core and spirit of China (*t'i* 體) and the technology and advantages of the West (*yung* 用) were to be united as one (*chung-t'i hsi-yung* 中體西用). Under the leadership of the officials noted above were a number of other theorists and practitioners of the Yang-wu movement, including Kuo Sung-tao 郭嵩燾, Feng Kuei-fen 馮桂芬, Jung Hung 容闕, Hsieh Fu-ch'eng 薛福成, Wang T'ao 王韜, Ho Ch'i 何啓, Hu Li-yuan 胡禮垣 and Cheng Kuan-ying 鄭觀應.

1.

The Yang-wu and Pian-fa

The Yang-wu reformers always stuck to the "chung-t'i hsi-yung" formula. For this reason, the Westernization effort was strictly limited to the technology which could directly contribute to the policy of "self-strengthening" and never extended to Western thought, let alone the introduction of structural reform. In fact, it is precisely because there was no reform in this area that the Yang-wu bureaucrats retained their positions of power and the varied activities of the Western factories were permitted. As a result, the achievements of the Yang-wu movement were heavily stained by the traces of "Patrimonialismus" in the form of the founders' private capital throughout the industries such as Li's Merchants' Steam Navigation Company and the Lanchow Machinery workshop.

When Sir Robert Hart secured control of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs office, he introduced Westernized methods, including the introduction of a thorough and impartial examination system and a doctrine of efficiency. The Chinese employed by the Customs office displayed an admirable ability to master efficiency and the modern bureaucratic system. In contrast, the factories built by the Yang-wu officials were managed using the traditional contractual system in which relationships outweighed efficiency. Not only was open competition, which is the

incentive for efficiency, completely absent, but the supporters and managers of these companies were powerful bureaucrats. This essentially guaranteed, if not legally then in reality, the monopoly of such enterprises and the suppression of other competitive firms. A typical example of this is seen in the fact that the construction of other factories was banned anywhere near the Shanghai Machinery and Weaving Company for ten years. In these circumstances, the seemingly brilliant appearance of these firms did not change the fact that their poor quality products could hardly compete with those of the West.

The crowning achievements of the Yang-wu movement were the Southern-sea Squadron (Nan-yang-shui-shih 南洋水師) and the Northern-sea Squadron (Pei-yang-shui-shih 北洋水師). The latter of these naval fleets, commanded by Li Hung-chang, was claimed to be the most powerful in the Orient. Its actual weakness, however, was demonstrated in the Sino-French War from 1883–1885. Similarly, the Northern-sea Squadron was annihilated in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5. These disasters revealed the limits of the Yang-wu movement and we begin to hear voices suggesting that China might have to undergo structural reforms before it could become strong.

This movement proposing structural innovation was called "Pian-fa 變法." Yang-wu officials such as Cheng Kuan-ying and Jung Hung argued for such reform in their later years but it was K'ang Yu-wei 康有為 and T'ang Ssu-t'ung 譚嗣同 who were to lead the new movement. The difference between the Yang-wu and the Pian-fa movements was that, while the Yang-wu officials were content to import Western technology and would not extent reform to the social or political realms, the Pian-fa movement believed that, short of abandoning their loyalty to the Emperor, an extensive reform of the system was essential to the strengthening of China. While both of these movements retained their loyalty to the Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty, there emerged a third group which viewed the dynasty itself with hatred and despair. This group, the revolutionaries, believed that the only way to make China strong was to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty. Though it cannot be addressed here, it is well known that the revolutionaries and supporters of Pian-fa became engaged in heated debate overseas in the aftermath of the "Hundred Days Reform" (戊戌變法 the Wu-hsü Reform of 1898).

So why is it that in the case of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Yang-wu movement seemed to thrive while the Pian-fa movement would end in failure, and yet in the case of Japan, its own "Pian-fa" movement would succeed and, for better or for worse, send it running down the road towards a policy of "wealthy nation and strong military 富國強兵" ?

2.

The Single and Dual Elements

It is not difficult to see that the shock delivered by the coming of the Western powers brought about a crisis consciousness for the bureaucrats of the Ch'ing and the samurai class of Japan. In Japan's case, the feeling of crisis generated by a threat from outside of Japan fed back into the crisis consciousness brought about by the growingly apparent contradictions in the Tokugawa Shogunate's system itself. The result was massive disillusionment at the existing political authority represented by the Shogunate. When the Japanese looked around for alternative sources of authority they soon found a figure of legitimate authority in Kyoto, albeit one which lacked any political power: the Emperor. Disillusioned people who aimed for reform took two approaches. One was to enhance the legitimacy of the emperor system through publications such as RAI San'yō 賴山陽's writing of *Nihon gaishi* 日本外史 (An Unofficial History of Japan), the Mito Han's compilation of *Dai Nihon shi* 大日本史 (The Great History of Japan) and a resurgence of studies of ancient and medieval Japanese literature and thought. Another approach, begun some time afterwards, was a movement to provide this legitimate authority figure of the Emperor with real political power. This is why Japan's externally directed crisis consciousness in the form of the "expel the barbarians," or Jōi 攘夷, movement was easily tied to the domestic movement for reform under the banner of "revere the emperor" or Sonnō 尊王. As a result, the reformists were mentally fully prepared to deny everything that had to do with the Shogunate system.

However, in the case of the Ch'ing, there may have been a similar crisis consciousness, but no alternative authority to take its place. In contrast to the Japanese case, the external crisis consciousness had no choice but to motivate officials to shore up the imperial power of the Ch'ing and operate within the restrictions placed on reform by other conservative officials. That these officials had no choice but to adhere to the conservative line and leave the traditional value system in place, seeking only to introduce the technology of the West, is the primary reason that the Yang-wu-p'ai failed to become the modernizers of China.

The aforementioned distinction did not escape the notice of FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福澤諭吉. In his work *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* 文明論之概略 (An Outline of Theories of Civilization) he explains why Japan was able to modernize more quickly than its Ch'ing counterpart. First he emphasizes the fact that ever since the age of warrior rule began in Japan, the political scene was divided between the respect offered to the emperor, Shison 至尊, and the position of strength conceded to the Shogunate, Shikyō 至強.

"The Case of Japan can be likened to having two things in one's heart and allowing them to move freely. As long as they co-exist together there must be

some principal lying behind their relationship.”

As long as the Emperor, the Shogunate, and this special unifying principal were bound together, one could not act against the other. This naturally gave rise to its own kind of freedom of action. This was in stark contrast to the state of affairs in China, where an absolute monarch in the form of the Emperor was a figure of both reverence and political power. FUKUZAWA argues that this slight amount of freedom of thought, and the openings that the relationship between the Emperor and the Shogunate created were an accidental blessing for Japan. In his own words,

“China was composed of a single element, while Japan had a dual nature. If we ask which will be the first to adopt the ways of modern civilization then we must conclude that unless China were to change and become like Japan, then Japan will precede China in becoming a modern civilization.”

Mandarins and Samurai

The crisis consciousness that developed in response to the encroaching Western powers spread only slowly through the bureaucratic social stratum. After all, this was a highly literate class of officials who had faith in the traditional value system or at the very least enjoyed its benefits. Moreover, because it was an eternal fact of history that the Chinese civilization was held to be the most superior, its supporters could not readily abandon it.

The Japanese warrior class, on the other hand, were military experts of a sort. Having seen foreign ships, battles, and undergone experiences abroad, they could easily recognize the superiority of not only Western weaponry, but also its manufacturing, and military organization. Also, given Japan's mix of Confucianism, Buddhism and national literary studies in the form of Kokugaku 國學 their Westernization was comparatively rapid.

Rivalry between the Feudal Domains

In addition to the division in authority between the revered Emperor and the powerful Shogunate, there was also rivalry between the various feudal domains, or Han 藩. Whatever the contradictions there were in the system, these lords had to compete with each other for survival. It is in this context that we find a class of gifted lower ranking warriors beginning to operate, and the growing acceptance of modern weapons, tactics, and industry. It was the individuals responsible for the purchasing and production of Western technology that would become the driving force for the Meiji Restoration or at least occupy many of its important positions. Among these we find such leaders as ITŌ Hirobumi 伊藤博文, TAKASUGI Shinsaku 高杉晉作, INOUE Monta 井上聞多, and ŌKUMA Shigenobu 大隈重信.

Again, the situation in the Ch'ing dynasty China was very different. Let us

take the example of Jung Hung. After receiving an American style education at the Morrison Educational Association (located in Macao and later moved to Hong Kong), he became one of the first Chinese to travel to the United States for study. He graduated from Yale University and returned to China but could find no suitable employment waiting for him. He got by working in various jobs, including positions as interpreter at the American legation, the Supreme Court in Hong Kong, and as a clerk at the Chinese Customs House. He also visited the T'aiping rebels, but a plan he submitted with reform proposals was rejected and left him disillusioned. At this point he came into contact with Tseng Kuo-fan, and made efforts to purchase machinery for the Kiangnan Arsenal. His proposed plan to send students abroad for study almost saw fruition but was abandoned a few years later. Later he worked for Chang Chih-tung and in his final years participated in the Pian-fa reform movement. As we can see, Jung Hung had no choice but to do what he could for the Yang-wu bureaucrats and as a result, none of his ambitious plans were implemented. When we compare this to the lives of ITO, INOUE and other Meiji leaders we must conclude that it was the Chinese bureaucratic structure, with the concentration of political power in the hands of the Ch'ing Emperor, which stood in the way of reformers such as Jung Hung.

The external crisis consciousness felt in the Ch'ing, and the outrage directed at China's semi-colonization was directed at domestic reform through a strengthening of the Ch'ing dynastic rule. Only in later years did this transform into a political movement, the Hsing-chung-hui 興中會 aiming to achieve domestic reform by overthrowing Ch'ing rule.

3.

Images of the Late Ch'ing Dynasty Held by Chinese Intellectuals

Chinese culture is one of the central foundations of Asian civilization and had passed through periods of greatness such as the Han 漢 and T'ang 唐 dynasties. For Chinese intellectuals of this tradition, the tragedy of the late Ch'ing and Republican periods was difficult to bear. The proud young Chinese who had studied their history could not help but feel growingly indignant when they compared the beautifully arranged foreign settlements, the legation district, or the luxurious railroads managed by the Japanese and English to the corruption of their own officials, the greed of their warlords and the poverty of their people. China's decay started in the late Ch'ing period. Their image of the late Ch'ing was divided into three levels: 1) The great powers, 2) the Ch'ing government, and 3) the people. In their portrayal of this hierarchical system, the Chinese people bore the oppression of both their Ch'ing rulers and the great powers. This image of the late Ch'ing was already well established by the 1920s. In the first edition of Hsiao I-shan 蕭一山's

A History of the Ch'ing Dynasty 清代通史 published in 1923 we find exactly this sort of portrayal of the late Ch'ing, despite the fact that Hsiao had nothing to do with Marxist-Leninist theory and is currently in the Control Yuan 監察院 of Taiwan's Nationalist government.

For Marxist colonial theory, it was very useful to emphasize this state of affairs. Their main points about late Ch'ing can be summarized as follows:

- 1) The foreign capitalist powers invaded China.
- 2) The Ch'ing government is subordinate to the foreign capitalist powers.
- 3) The people have fought against both the oppression of the Ch'ing government and the invasion of the foreign powers.
- 4) A period of imperialism began after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 (In his work *The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party* 中國革命與中國共產黨, Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東 uses some sloppy expressions, which has led to some confusion in the academic world).
- 5) The invasion of the foreign great powers led to the destruction of China's handicraft industry and drove the people into poverty.

While Marxist-Leninist theory was obviously a means to accomplishing domestic reform, its primary value was as a theory which could save the nation by repelling the invasion of the foreign powers. Accordingly, it was firmly believed that the first step in the revolution had to be a fight against the foreign grip over China. For the Bolsheviks who led Russia's October Revolution, Marxism was embraced as a means to overthrow the Czar. To accomplish a domestic revolution it was imperative for them to seek peace. In this respect, the various concessions they made towards Germany in the Brest Litovsk Treaty reveals the difference between the cases of Russia and China.

An Appraisal of the Yang-wu Bureaucrats

In the above image of the late Ch'ing, the people of China were faced with two enemies, one being the foreign powers, and the other being the government of the Ch'ing dynasty. The Yang-wu movement was one which worked within the dynastic framework and its adoption of Western technology attempted to strengthen the empire without the slightest attempt to adapt its traditional value system. They could be seen as nothing more than an "enemy of the people" and its leaders would devote themselves to a life and death struggle against, and ultimately suppress, a people's "revolutionary" movement in the form of the T'ai-ping Rebellion. It is natural, then, that they are judged as harshly as they have been. Tseng Kuo-fan was especially targeted for abuse. In the widely disseminated work by Fan Wen-lan 范文瀾, *A History of Modern China* 中國近代史, Tseng is labeled as a "Han-chien 漢奸" (a traitor to the Han people) or "K'uai-tzu-shou 劊子手" (an executioner).

That is not to say that the Yang-wu bureaucrats all received the same sort of harsh treatment. In the same work by Fan, we find the following praise for Lin Tse-hsu, "Lin Tse-hsü is representative of the best that Chinese feudal culture had to offer. He was an important pioneer of the Manchu 滿洲 period restoration movement." (page 16) The reasons can be summarized as follows:

- 1) He supported resistance against the aggression of Britain.
- 2) He had enlightened views and often collected information on the outside world.
- 3) He was progressive and tried to resist Britain by harnessing the power of the people.

For these reasons the People's Republic of China see him first and foremost as a national hero and he is idolized in the movie *The Opium War* 鴉片戰爭. As I indicated above, their perspective for evaluating the Yang-wu bureaucrats made them emphasize the three agents: the foreign powers, the Ch'ing government, and the people. Tseng Kuo-fan never fought against the foreign powers, and instead poured his energy into the suppression of the T'aiiping rebels. In this way, he is seen as beyond redemption, while Lin Tse-hsü is seen to have been on the side of the people.

The Dual-Sided Nature of the Yang-wu Bureaucrats

However, history is not a clear path which we can easily divide into constituent areas of light and darkness. For example, Tseng Kuo-fan may have been despised as a historical figure, but upon the signing of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1871, he submitted a memorial to the emperor in which he expresses his own kind of "resistance" to Japan (see volume 80 of the *Chou-pan-i-wu-shi-mo* 籌辦夷務始末 in the T'ung-chih 同治 era). During the negotiations Japan demanded the unequal most-favored-nation and extraterritorial legal jurisdiction clauses. While Tseng had nothing against allowing Japan the same rights as Western nations for trade and residency, he argued that any extraterritorial legal rights should be mutual, and any kind of comprehensive most-favored-nation clause should be avoided at all costs. Li Hung-chang was of the same opinion (see volume 17 of the *Tsou-kao* 奏稿 in *Li-wen-chung-kung Ch'üan-shu* 李文忠公全書) and the result was that China rejected Japan's demands. The Yang-wu bureaucrats dedicated their lives to the goals of self-strengthening and "wealthy nation, strong military" while preserving the ultimate power of the Manchu emperor. If we refrain from a one-sided condemnation or praise of them and analyze the situation we can see the elements of resistance in the actions of Tseng Kuo-fan and the nationalism of the Yang-wu bureaucrats as a group.

Also, when we look closely at Lin Tse-hsü we find that he was not always for

the people. In the summer of 1850, the T'aping rebellion was launched at Chin-t'ien 金田 in Kuang-hsi 廣西 province. In September of the same year the imperial court appointed Lin Tse-hsü to the position of ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en 欽差大臣 and ordered him to suppress the rebellion. Two days before the orders reached him, he is reported to have lamented to a friend that, "The rebellion in the Canton area has not yet been stopped and is spreading. It would be for the best if the Emperor were to appoint a great general to suppress the insurrection" (page 195 of *Lin-wen-chung-kung-nien-p'u* 林文忠公年譜 compiled by Wei Ying-ch'i 魏應祺). It seems that the imperial court had great expectations for Lin and when we look at the *Ta-ch'ing-shih-lu* 大清實錄 we find numerous memorials ordering local bureaucrats to conduct a full suppression of the rebellion upon the arrival of Lin on the scene. However, Lin fell ill and died on his way to the battlefield. If he had not died, Lin would have played a big role in the suppression of the rebellion and it is not at all clear that he would be honored today as a national hero.

The same kind of thing can be said with regards to Tso Tsung-t'ang. His merciless crackdown against rebellions can give him a reputation as an enemy of the people, but he is also the figure who faced off with Russia in the negotiations that followed the Ili Incident. Thus, depending on what you emphasize, he can be seen as a tyrant or a national hero.

China Academy of Social Sciences Vice-Director of the Institute of Modern History Liu Ta-nien 劉大年, who like Fan Wen-lan, is a historian respected by the Chinese Communist Party, published an article in the first issue of *Historical Research* 歷史研究 titled "On the Masses in Modern History" but he continues the trend of explaining modern history by pitting the oppressive great powers and the Ch'ing government against the people. For Liu, China's modern history was a dark period under the rule of feudalism and imperialism. Emperors Ming Ning 旻寧 (Tao Kuang 道光) and I Chu 奕訖 (Hsien Feng 咸豐), and others such as Na-la-shih 那拉氏 (Hsi-t'ai-hou 西太后), Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱, and Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞 were seen as representatives of imperialism. The anti-imperialists were identified as Lin Tse-hsü, Teng T'ing-cheng 鄧廷楨, Seng-ko-lin-hsin 僧格林沁, P'eng Yü-lin 彭玉麟, Chang Chih-tung, Weng T'ung-ho 翁同龢, Liu K'un-i 劉坤一, Hsü T'ung 徐桐 and Kang I 剛毅 but in the very next chapter Liu accuses all but Li Hung-chang and P'eng Yü-lin in this group of refusing to stand up for the people or of currying favor with the imperialists so that even these historical figures were simply using the people when the odds were against them.

Conclusion

The dialectic movement of history cannot always be described in the binary terms of good and evil. In order to better analyze the dual nature of the Yang-wu-p'ai we

need to overcome the portrayal of a unidirectional line of oppression leading down from the foreign powers through the Ch'ing government to the people and recognize the more contradictory elements in the relations between the foreign powers and the Ch'ing. This is entirely compatible with Mao Tse-tung's own emphasis on the conflict between the imperial powers and the masses. In this way we can highlight the historical importance of the Yang-wu-p'ai without the need to divide them into patriots and han-chien traitors.

Chapter III THE 1911 CHINESE REVOLUTION: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

On October 10, 1911, an anti-Qing 清 revolutionary uprising took place in Wuchang 武昌. This set off a chain of revolts in the cities and provinces south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) 揚子(江) and within three months brought to an end two millennia of dynastic rule in China. On January 1, 1912, the Republic of China 中華民國 was formally proclaimed in Nanjing (Nanking) 南京, the newly selected capital. It was the earliest republican government in Asia, though, strictly speaking, it was preceded by the short-lived government of Democratic Taiwan 臺灣民主國, which was quickly suppressed by the Japanese army.

The pre-modern imperial system of China had been based upon an autarchical agricultural society and supported by an elaborate, patrimonial bureaucracy. The destruction of the imperial system began with indigenous economic developments and the corruption of civilian and military bureaucracies, and was reinforced by Western impact on China. The political events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shook the foundations of the empire, and the Qing gradually lost its capability to meet the overwhelming transformations: the White Lotus (Bailian jiao 白蓮教) Rebellion, the increase in opium consumption, the Opium War, the Arrow War, the Taiping Rebellion 太平天國, the Sino-French War, the First Sino-Japanese War, Russian expansion into the Amur region, Primorskij kraj (Maritime Province), and finally into Manchuria, the conclusion of various unequal treaties, and the cession of settlements and leased territories to the foreign powers.

The efforts by the Yangwu clique 洋務派 to graft Western technology and government systems onto China failed to solve the country's intrinsic problems. The political pendulum swung back toward traditional conservatism and anti-foreignism when the administrative reforms attempted by the young Guangxu Emperor 光緒帝, his advisor, Kang Youwei 康有為, and other officials induced a coup d'état by Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 (西太后) and Yuan Shikai 袁世凱. The Boxer Rebellion 義和團事件, which started as a peasant rebellion with strong religious overtones, grew quickly in North China through the support of the conservative imperial

* This is the introduction to the book, ETŌ Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin, eds., *The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive Essays* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984). The book is a compilation of essays presented to the conference on the Xinhai Revolution 辛亥革命. The conference was organized to seize the moment when a variety of new interpretations on the revolution started to emerge in China after the end of the Cultural Revolution, and opened the gate of exchanges between scholars on the Chinese mainland and those in Japan.

court and provoked the armed intervention of the eight allied powers. The Qing imperial court was forced to make further concessions to the aggressive foreign powers in terms of foreign rights and interests and was reduced to “semi-colonial status.”

It was too late for the Manchu 滿洲 government to recover the trust of the Chinese people. Their opposition to the regime sprang from various sources: some were merely anti-Manchu and wanted to restore a Han 漢 Chinese Confucian state; others were revolutionary republicans; some were socialists or anarchists, while some were mere power-hungry opportunists.

Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 was in Denver when he first learned of the revolution, and upon his return to China via Great Britain and France, he was elected provisional president of the new republic by the revolutionary delegates. Following the formal proclamation of the republic, the Qing lost the support of its generals and officials who clearly foresaw that their days were numbered, including Yuan Shikai, the de facto supreme leader of the powerful Beiyang Army 北洋軍, who had clandestine negotiations with Sun and engineered the abdication of the Manchu emperor. In return, Yuan was made the first president of the republic, but his understanding of republicanism or Western democracy was negligible, and he sought to have himself enthroned as emperor of a new dynasty. Confronted by strong and vehement opposition both at home and abroad, Yuan was unable to carry out his plans. When he died in 1916, China was thrown into still further confusion. Civil wars among warlords continued to ravage the country, and no central power could control the ubiquitous foreign intervention in domestic politics.

In retrospect, it is true that the Chinese Revolution of 1911 辛亥革命 failed to establish a strong and unified modern state. But it did terminate imperial despotism and open up new possibilities for government reforms. As a consequence, both the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) 國民黨 in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨 on the Mainland regard the 1911 Revolution positively. Assessment of historical phenomena, however, varies greatly according to political circumstances: this is particularly true of China and can be explained by three reasons. First, historical studies in China have been traditionally characterized by strong ethical and political judgments. I recall that in 1962, while still a young scholar, I had the opportunity for the first time to meet Professor YOSHIKAWA Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎, then professor of Chinese literature at Kyoto University. He asked me half-teasingly, “So you are interested in political history. All right, what is the leitmotif of Chinese literature?” In a few seconds, the name of Chinese literary figures—Tao Qian 陶潛, Li Bo 李白, Du Fu 杜甫, Lu Xun 魯迅, Shen Congwen 沈從文—quickly flashed through my mind, but I could not find a single common denominator. The prestigious professor smiled and raised another question: “Then what is the leitmotif of Japanese literature?” I still could not produce an answer. With his teasing smile he said, “In China it is politics and in Japan, love.” If this is true of Chinese literature, how much

more so of Chinese historical studies?

Second, the Chinese Communist Party relies on Marxist historiography. Marxism generally regards modern detached positivism as bourgeois objectivism: while modern positivist historians try to minimize overt political assessment in their research, Marxist historians do not hesitate to express their political views explicitly in their writings: they make clear-cut definitions of historical phenomena and unqualified distinctions between the just and the unjust. Third, the Chinese, particularly the intellectuals, are nationalists when they discuss the humiliations China suffered at the hands of foreign powers. Historians with nationalist tendencies are also guilty of loading their writings with political assessments.

These three reasons help explain why historical studies in the People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國 regard the Chinese Revolution of 1911 as a national bourgeois revolution, as defined by Lenin, to overthrow medieval despotism and to cope with foreign aggression. Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, this interpretation has remained basically unchanged. But the evaluation of the national bourgeoisie has varied according to the political climate: when the political pendulum swung toward the radical Left, the national bourgeoisie was discredited; when it swung toward moderation, it was evaluated positively. This fluctuation can be observed in the assessment of the 1911 Revolution by the People's Republic of China. In 1951, the fortieth anniversary of the revolution was totally disregarded because of the Korean War and the strict wartime policies of the Chinese Communist Party. The year 1961 was the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution: it was an era of moderation following the failure of the Great Leap Forward 大躍進 in 1958, and the anniversary was celebrated in Beijing as well as in the other major cities of China. The sixtieth anniversary came during the era of the Great Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 when the radical left wing prevailed and was hence completely ignored.

In 1981, the seventieth anniversary of the revolution was celebrated throughout the People's Republic of China. After the death of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 in 1976 and immediately following the arrest of the "Gang of Four 四人幫," the political pendulum swung back to unprecedented moderation: the national goal was "modernization": developing the domestic market, increasing foreign trade, importing Western technology and capital, promoting rapprochement with the Guomindang in Taiwan, and pursuing policies to increase economic productivity. Consequently, the bourgeoisie was now evaluated highly, as was the 1911 Revolution. In Beijing, the largest celebration was held in the main chamber of the People's Great Hall on October 9: in a lengthy address, Party Chairman Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 spoke highly of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution, and also called for collaboration with Guomindang leaders for the reunification of China. The Academic Symposium to Celebrate the Seventieth Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution was held in Wuhan 武漢 from October 12 to 17, with 81 Chinese scholars, selected from 200 candidates, and some 40 foreign scholars reading their papers.

The Guomintang regime of Taiwan has always proudly claimed to be the authentic disciples and successors of Sun and his comrades in the revolution. Celebrations are held annually on October 10, Taiwan's national day. Not to be outdone by the People's Republic, on August 23, 1981, they organized an international conference entitled "Symposium on the History of Republican China" in Taipei 臺北 with the participation of 44 foreign scholars and over 100 domestic scholars.

Sun Yat-sen spent long years of exile in Japan, and the Japanese scholars of China, in their wish to mark the anniversary with something more than a simple ceremony, organized an international scholarly conference in Tokyo. It was felt that political circumstances might allow scholars both from mainland China and Taiwan to sit together and for scholars from both South and North Korea 南北朝鮮 to participate. The organizing committee invited delegates from Taiwan and North Korea 北朝鮮 in addition to the scholars whose papers are included in this book. At first, the Guomintang considered our invitation seriously and wanted to have some scholars participate in the Tokyo conference. But two groups in Japan vehemently opposed these invitations. One, an anticommunist, pro-Guomintang group, took the position that, since they support the Guomintang and are fighting for the annihilation of Communist China, they strongly object to Guomintang scholars attending a conference together with Mainland scholars. The other group, consisting of dogmatic Maoists who had enthusiastically supported the Great Cultural Revolution, argued that "it is incorrect and impermissible to use the false name of the Republic of China in the invitations to scholars in Taiwan." In the end, the Taiwan scholars did not participate, nor did the North Koreans. Despite this unfortunate political background, the Tokyo conference, held from October 21 to 23 was well attended and resulted in intense academic discussions. The participants consisted of five Chinese scholars from mainland China, two each from the United States and the Republic of Korea 大韓民國, one each from the Soviet Union, France, Israel, and Singapore, 38 Japanese participants, and 170 observers.

In addition to the three above-mentioned international conferences two other meetings should be mentioned. The first was a Japan-Taiwan conference, held in Yokohama 橫濱 on October 28 and 29, 1981. Entitled "The Three People's Principles and China," it was attended by 11 Taiwan and over 50 Japanese scholars. The other conference on the 1911 Revolution was held in Chicago on the evening of April 2, 1982, during the three-day annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies. Papers were read before a packed audience by five scholars from mainland China, five from Taiwan, and myself. It was a remarkable gathering at which scholars from the Mainland and Taiwan sat together for the first time since 1947.

Chapter IV HAI-LU-FENG: THE FIRST CHINESE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Many of the books dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist movement have mentioned the Hai-lu-feng 海陸豐 Soviet as the earliest Soviet in China but as yet, with the exception of several Communist articles from the Chinese mainland, there is no study that deals with the details of the history of this Soviet or its relation to the development of the Communist movement in China.

In Hai-feng 海豐, in Kwangtung Province 廣東省, there originated in the early twenties a peasant movement which was led by Communist leaders and which was the first instance of Communist use of peasant discontent in China. The movement was centered in the Hai-feng *hsien* 縣 and in the adjoining Lu-feng 陸豐 *hsien* and from there expanded into several neighboring *hsiens*. It led to the establishment, in 1927 and 1928, of a Communist-led government which lasted for several months and which is popularly called the Hai-lu-feng Soviet. The following study is a description of this Hai-lu-feng Soviet and its relations to the agrarian strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨. (Maps 1 and 2.)

Hai-lu-feng and Ch'en Chiung-ming


Ch'en Chiung-ming 陳炯明's Conquest of Canton

One of the most important political leaders in Kwangtung Province in the 1920s was Ch'en Chiung-ming who in 1920, after occupying Canton, had made himself governor of the province and Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung army, and who ruled the eastern and central parts of the province for much of the time during that period. Ch'en Chiung-ming was himself born in Hai-feng in 1875 and retained a close relationship with his home district. He was one of the early members of Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙's revolutionary movement and in April 1911 participated in an abortive military attempt by Huang Hsing 黃興 and Hu Han-min 胡漢民 to capture Canton. Then, in the autumn of 1911, immediately after the Double-Tenth (Oct. 10) Uprising in Wuhan 武漢 which led to the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty 清朝, he and Hu led a revolutionary uprising in Kwangtung Province. They were successful in occu-


* This was originally published in *The China Quarterly* 8 (Oct.-Dec. 1961) and 9 (Jan.-Mar. 1962). This essay is a critique of the then popular understanding that Mao Tse-tung is the creator of the Marxian socialist regime in China. What P'eng P'ai attempted to realize at Hai-lu-feng both preceded Mao's own attempts and were more extreme.

CHAPTER IV

Map IV-1 South-East China
(Hai-lu-feng area is shaded)



Map IV-2 Hai-lu-feng area



pying Canton, and Ch'en was appointed by the revolutionary government to be Deputy Military Governor of Kwangtung Province. In the following year he was made Military Governor. After the failure of the anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱 campaign in 1913¹ he was forced to exile himself and went to Singapore, Colombo and Paris. Kwangtung Province was occupied and ruled by Lung Chi-kuang 龍濟光, who belonged to Yuan's Pei-yang 北洋 clique.

In the time of another anti-Yuan campaign in 1915² Ch'en Chiung-ming succeeded in expelling Lung from Canton with the aid of troops from Yünnan 雲南 and Kwangsi 廣西. Ch'en was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Force aiding Fukien 福建 Province. While his troops were stationed at Changchou 漳州 in Fukien Province, Canton was occupied by the troops of Lu Jung-t'ing 陸榮廷 and others who belonged to the Kwangsi clique. It was only in 1920 that Ch'en Chiung-ming, campaigning under the slogan "Kwangtung must be Ruled by Kwangtung People," was able to drive the Kwangsi clique from the province and to re-establish his government in Canton.³

*Hai-feng, under the Rule of Ch'en Chiung-ming*⁴

In comparison to Lung Chi-kuang, who collected his military funds from gambling places and opium dens, Ch'en stood out as a governor who at least tried to introduce reforms, but he did not attempt to abolish the traditional landlordism, and received some support from the landlords. As the basis of his administration he tried to main-

¹ The unsuccessful attempt by Li Lieh-chün 李烈鈞, Huang Hsing, and other groups to upset Yuan Shih-k'ai's régime, which took place in the summer of 1913 and was suppressed by Yuan's troops within a few months.

² This movement took place at the end of 1915, and forced Yuan to give up his plans to become emperor.

³ SONODA Kazuki 園田一龜, *Shina shin jin-koku-ki* 支那新入國記 (The Who's Who of Modern China, Classified by Province) (Mukden: Ōsakayagō shoten 大阪屋號書店, 1927), 257, 456-457, 480-485. Li Shui-hsien 李睡仙, "A Preliminary Study on the Relation between Ch'en Chiung-ming, Narkomindel and C.C.P." *Chung-kuo hsien-tai-shih ts'ung-kan* 中國現代史叢刊 (Memoirs on Contemporary History of China), vol. 2, ed. by Wu Hsiang-hsiang 吳相湘 (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chü 正中書局, 1960), 423 *et seq.*

⁴ The only source material available which shows the general situation of Hai-feng under Ch'en Chiung-ming is P'eng P'ai 彭湃's "Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung 海豐農民運動 (Peasant Movement in Hai-feng)." Originally this was contributed to the departmental periodical of the Peasants Department, Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party, *Chung-kuo nung-min* 中國農民 (Chinese Peasants) 1 (January 1926), 3 (March 1926), 4 (April 1926). It was revised and published in book form in October 1926, and finally a third version was reprinted in *Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i te nung-min yün-tung* 第一次國內革命戰爭時期的農民運動 (The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War) (Peking: K'o-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she 科學出版社, 1953). The argument of this section is my hypothesis based upon P'eng P'ai's own article. In the subsequent footnotes, references to this article will be based on the Jen-min ch'u-pan-she 人民出版社 version.

tain the tradition of government through personal appointees and loyalties. During this time the following were the main aspects of the situation in Hai-feng:

1. The police power in Hai-feng was of an extremely limited nature. There were approximately thirty policemen augmented by an irregular constabulary of like size, who were to maintain order in this area.⁵ No troops were located in the town of Hai-feng in 1922, but a garrison of 400 men under the command of Chung Ching-t'ang 鍾景棠,⁶ which was, of course, available for use in the event of an emergency, was stationed eighteen miles to the south at Shan-wei 汕尾.⁷ These troops could be brought in at the request of the Hai-feng *hsien* government or of the local land-lords, so that there was a tie-in between these local landlords and the military leaders. The landlords paid a tax to the military leaders for the support of the troops and the military leaders maintained order for the landlords. Yet, order could not have been maintained in this way if there had not been a traditional acceptance of authority in the villages. The very fact of the small size of the police force indicates that there was no threat to authority.
2. Several large landowners employed a group of young men. Also, the existence of such a private quasi-police of the landlords does not signify that there was any expectation of a tenant uprising. The fact that the landlords were able to maintain their control with small private forces indicates, in the author's view, a passive acceptance on the part of the tenants of the whole system. The resistance of the tenants was so weak that the few henchmen employed by the landlords could intimidate them easily at times simply by a well-placed blow. The tenants did not have sufficient consciousness of their mutual interest to organize against the landlords. There still existed the traditional clan organizations, the traditional conflict between the Hakka 客家 and the Punti 本地 and the Red Flag 紅旗 and Black Flag 黑旗 Organizations.⁸ Control of such organizations remained in the hands of the traditional leaders.

⁵ P'eng P'ai, "Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung," 98.

⁶ Chung is a maternal relative of Ch'en (Li Shui-hsien, *op. cit.*, 424).

⁷ Chung I-mou 鍾貽謀, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou" 海陸豐農民的八年戰鬪 (The Eight-year Struggle of the Peasants in Hai-lu-feng)," in Chung-kuo k'o-hsüeh-yüan li-shih yen-chiu-so ti-san-so 中國科學院歷史研究所第三所, ed., *Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao* 近代史資料 (Source Materials for Modern History) (Peking, 1955), 4:186.

⁸ Ho Yang-ling 賀揚靈, *Nung-min yün-tung* 農民運動 (Peasant Movements) (Nanking: Chung-kuo kuo-ming-tang-wu hsüeh-hsiao-k'an 中國國民黨務學校刊, 1928), Chapter 4, 6-9. The only reference that I have been able to obtain up to this time about the Red Flag-Black Flag 紅旗·黑旗 organizations is P'eng's article. He says: "Formerly every village and every clan in Hai-feng belonged to either the Black Flag or the Red Flag, and sometimes the *hsieh-tou* 械鬪 resulted in terrible slaughter. One who belonged to the Red Flag would not hesitate to kill even his own father-in-law or brother-in-law if they belonged to the Black." P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 65.

The Hsieh-tou 械鬪, or armed battles,⁹ which frequently took place between these organizations, served as an outlet for the tenants' frustrations.

3. Population pressure, which elsewhere often contributed to social crisis, was mitigated in these districts by migration abroad.¹⁰
4. The low rate of income of an individual was compensated to some extent by the fact that the whole family was working. The women of the peasant families, especially the Hakka, did not practice footbinding. They could, therefore, participate in manual labor outside the home.¹¹

Thus in Hai-feng, under the rule of Ch'en Chiung-ming, the stability of the traditional social order seemed firm, but conditions existed under the rule of the landlords that could easily have led to an attack against this order if new ideas and leadership were introduced. In such a case it would have been very difficult for the small police forces to control any mass movement. The exploitation by the landlords and their use of physical violence in collecting the rent were always resented and were to become the target of an attack, once an organization with new ideas and leadership came into existence among the peasants.

At the same time in Hai-feng, as well as in other parts of South China, the peasant became more impoverished. Many land-owning farmers were reduced to the status of tenants because of the devastation of cultivated land and the increased taxation caused by civil war. "There are now," wrote P'eng P'ai 彭湃, a prominent leader of the Hai-lu-feng Soviet movement, whose activities will be discussed later, "only two or three landed farmers in the village, where twenty years ago there were ten such farmers."¹² As a rule, conscious dissatisfaction with the existing order is brought on by the impoverishment of those who possessed a relatively good standard of living rather than the simple existence of poverty.

The rapid rise and fall of warlords and the confused civil war must have caused large scale social mobility in the whole of China. While some families became impoverished, others made new fortunes. As Hai-feng was the home of Ch'en Chiung-ming, there were so many parvenues in this district that a common saying went: "There are as many commanders-in-chief as dogs, and a multitude of magistrates are walking the streets."¹³ Such rapid social change must have accelerated the decline of the social prestige of the traditional leaders. The relatives of Ch'en and other upstarts who became new landlords exploited the tenant farmers much more

⁹ *Hsieh-tou* means "armed conflict" and refers to private battles between clans or cliques in South China.

¹⁰ Statistics of migration from Hai-feng are found in P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 84.

¹¹ Nym Wales, *Red Dust* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), 199. As the Hakka women ordinarily did not bind their feet, this Hakka custom might have influenced the other peasants to give up the practice of foot-binding, if, indeed, they had ever followed this custom.

¹² P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 45.

¹³ Chung I-mou, *op. cit.*, 180.

ruthlessly than the old landlords, who had practiced paternal benevolence. This attitude naturally brought about the collapse of the traditional value system and increased the bitterness of the tenant farmers towards the landlords.

Ch'en Chiung-ming attempted to initiate some reforms. In particular he established a number of schools: Hai-feng Middle School, Lu-an Normal School, the Sericulture School, the Engineering School and several *hsien* higher primary schools.¹⁴ All these were in Hai-feng, a town with a population of only seven or eight thousand people.¹⁵ These schools, small as they were, became hotbeds of young revolutionary intellectuals. The majority of the students came from the families of landlords, wealthy merchants and traditional gentry and their curricula must have included traditional Confucian studies. But this was the time of the May Fourth Movement 五四運動 and of *Sturm und Drang* in China. It is said that the students were fond of reading the journals *Hsin-ch'ing-nien* 新青年 (The New Youth), *Hsin-ch'ao* 新潮 (The New Current) and *Ch'uang-tsao* 創造 (Creativeness) which spread the fervor for reform, even in such a remote part of the country as Hai-feng.¹⁶ The students began to transfer their loyalty from the old order to the ideal of a new society.

Ch'en Chiung-ming's Split with Sun Yat-sen

Sun Yat-sen, having established government in Canton, took office as *Fei-ch'ang Tsung-t'ung* 非常總統 (Emergency Governor-General) in May 1921 and at the same time Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had been appointed by Sun as the governor of Kwangtung Province, invaded Kwangsi Province with his army and by his success at the same time reached the height of his own power. Sun Yat-sen proclaimed the Northern Expedition from his general headquarters at Kweilin 桂林 in February 1922, but Ch'en Chiung-ming objected, probably because he did not want to be separated from his local position of power. Since Ch'en Chiung-ming refused to take part in the Expedition, making the claim of provincial autonomy as his excuse, he was deprived of the governorship of Kwangtung Province by Sun Yat-sen, who was

¹⁴ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung* 海陸豐農民運動 (Peasant Movements in Hai-lu-feng) (Canton: Kwangchou jen-min ch'u-pan-she 廣州人民出版社, 1957), 9-10.

¹⁵ We might picture the town of Hai-feng in the twenties as being much the same as the following description of it in about 1911: "This town exists as the seat of a *hsien* office. It produces peanuts, sugarcane, rice and so forth, as does Lu-feng. Although they say that the population of this town is 30,000, actually it seems to be only 7,000 or 8,000. The number of houses may be less than a thousand. The busiest street is Tung-men-chieh 東門街 (East Gate Street), which is mostly paved with stone and about a quarter of a mile long. It looks clean by Chinese standards. But commercial stores are few and the majority of people seem to be peasants." *Shina shōbetsu zenshi* 支那省別全誌 (A Description of China's Provinces), 18 vols. (Tokyo: Tōa dōbun-kai 東亞同文會, 1917), 1:246.

¹⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, *loc. cit.*

eager to press the campaign against the Northern warlords. Ch'en retired to Hui-chou 惠州. When the armies of Sun Yat-sen's Northern Expedition invaded Kiangsi 江西 province, Ch'en Chiung-ming, bitter about Sun's treatment, carried out a *coup d'état* in collusion with Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚, a northern warlord, against Sun in Canton. Sun was forced to flee to Shanghai 上海. In December 1922, however, warlords Yang Hsi-min 楊希閔 of Yünnan. and Shen Hung-ying 沈鴻榮 and Liu Chen-huan 劉震寰 of Kwangsi took up arms for Sun and defeated Ch'en Chiung-ming. Ch'en retreated to the Tung-chiang 東江 region (or Tungkiang, the Eastern River region of Kwangtung Province) and the following year Sun Yat-sen came back to Canton. Kwangtung Province thus became divided between Ch'en Chiung-ming, who continued to rule the Tung-chiang region, and Sun Yat-sen. Ch'en tried several times to recover Canton but failed. Ch'en's political prestige declined from the high point of the summer of 1921, when he had conquered Kwangsi Province, but he still remained firmly in control of Tung-chiang, which he ruled until he was defeated in 1925 by the Kuomintang 國民黨 troops during the first Eastern Expedition.

Early Activities of P'eng P'ai

A Group of Intellectual Reformers in Hai-feng

Communist movements are always started by the activities of an intellectual group. This was so in Hai-feng *hsien* where members of the new intellectual élite wanted to change the existing order. The most prominent among these young intellectuals was P'eng P'ai.

P'eng was born probably on October 22, 1896.¹⁷ His childhood name was T'ien-ch'üan 天泉, while his given name was Han-yü 漢育. He himself changed his

¹⁷ Hou Feng 侯楓, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung te ling-tao-che P'eng P'ai 海陸豐農民運動的領導者彭湃 (P'eng P'ai, the Leader of the Peasant Movement in Hai-lu-feng)," in Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she 中國青年出版社, ed., *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao* 紅旗飄飄 (Red Flags Fluttering) (Peking: Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1957), 5:32. October 22, 1896 was the sixteenth day of the ninth month, 1896 in the lunar calendar. The registration files of Waseda University in Tokyo show that he was born on "the sixteenth day of the ninth month, the twenty-eighth year of Meiji." The lunar calendar was in use in the Ch'ing Dynasty. P'eng might not have converted the lunar date into the solar date when he reported the date of his birth at Waseda University. It is nearly certain that he was born on the sixteenth day of the ninth month according to the lunar calendar. But as to the year of his birth, Mr. Hou mentions 1896, while Waseda University the twenty-eighth year of Meiji, or 1895. A third source is Gaimushō Jōhōbu 外務省情報部 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau), ed., *Kaitei gendai Shina jinmei-kan* 改訂現代支那人名鑑 (A Revised Who's Who in Modern China) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1928), 57. It says "P'eng is thirty-three years old now." Supposing that he was in his thirty-third year in 1928, he should have been born in 1896. Still another rather unreliable source gives the date also as 1895: *Who's Who*, 70, in *Shina mondai jiten* 支那問題辭典 (A Dictionary on the China Question) (Tokyo: Chūō kōron-sha 中央公論社, 1942).

first name to P'ai when he was a middle school student. His father, P'eng Shou-yin 彭壽殷, who lived in Ch'iao-tung-she 橋東社 to the east of the town of Hai-feng, was a large landlord receiving rents in rice amounting to more than a thousand *tan* 擔 per year.¹⁸ His tenant farmers together with their families amounted to over fifteen hundred people. "My family," wrote P'eng P'ai, "consists of less than thirty persons, including all the old, the young, the male and the female. Each person has fifty peasants as slaves."¹⁹

In 1912 he married Ts'ai Su-p'ing 蔡素屏. Although he did not belong to the Hakka he insisted on unbinding her feet, and the two of them walked on the streets of Hai-feng hand-in-hand, without regard for the astonishment of their fellow townsmen. His rebellious spirit thus displayed itself even in boyhood. Later, Ts'ai Su-p'ing was arrested by the Kuomintang troops and executed about one month after she gave birth to her third son.²⁰

P'eng P'ai went to Tokyo where he registered on September 30, 1918, at the College of Political Science and Economics of Waseda University 早稻田大學. He graduated from this college on July 10, 1921.²¹ These were the years when Socialist movements developed with great rapidity among Japanese students. Waseda University was an important center of one of these movements. The *Minjin dōmei-kai* 民人同盟會 (People's Alliance), the first publicly-organized Socialist association of Waseda students, held its first formal meeting on February 11, 1919. The leading students were TAKATSU Masamichi 高津正道, WADA Iwao 和田巖, ASANUMA Inejirō 淺沼稻次郎, INAMURA Ryūichi 稻村隆一 and MIYAKE Shōichi 三宅正一, who led the movement with the advice of two professors, TAKAHASHI Seigo, KITAZAWA Shinjirō 北澤新次郎, and one graduate, ŌYAMA Ikuo 大山郁夫. In October, KITAZAWA Shinjirō, WADA Iwao, ASANUMA Inejirō, INAMURA Ryūichi and MIYAKE Shōichi split off from the group and organized the *Kensetsusha dōmei* 建設者同盟 (Reformers' Alliance).²² Reportedly P'eng P'ai was converted to Socialism at this time and participated in the *Kensetsusha dōmei*, and also became close to TAKATSU Masamichi.²³ These Socialist movements at Waseda were characterized by the fact that they paid particular attention to agrarian problems and

¹⁸ *Tan* 擔 is a unit of dry measure. A *tan* in Kwangtung Province is approximately equivalent to three U.S. bushels. Tōa dōbunkai, *op. cit.*, 1216.

¹⁹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 52.

²⁰ Hou Feng, *op. cit.*, 36.

²¹ From the registration files of Waseda University.

²² KIKUKAWA Tadao 菊川忠雄, *Gakusei shakai undō-shi* 學生社會運動史 (History of Student Socialist Movements), revised ed. (Tokyo: Umiguchi Shoten 海口書店, 1947), 54, 68.

²³ KUWAJIMA Kazue 桑島主計, *Chū-nan-shi chihō kyōsantō oyobi kyōsanhi no kōdō jōkyō ni kansuru chōsa hōkoku-sho* 中南支地方共產黨及ヒ共產匪ノ行動狀況ニ關スル調査報告書 (Report of an Investigation concerning Activities of the Communist Party and Communist Bandits in Central and South China) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1930), 213. In 1958, in reply to a question from the author, Mr. Takatsu, ex-Representative of the Japanese Socialist Party in the Diet, answered "I remember his name P'eng P'ai, quite well. But I cannot identify him now, as there were so many Korean and Chinese comrades in our group."

devoted themselves to organize agricultural co-operatives and peasant unions, while the other Socialist movements gave priority to organizing urban workers. Today, there are still a number of Waseda men among the major leaders of the Japanese agrarian movement. There is no doubt that P'eng was deeply influenced by this trend.

While he was in Tokyo in 1919 the news from the Peace Conference at Versailles, where the Chinese demands concerning Shantung 山東 were rejected, provoked in China the famous May Fourth Movement. Although the Tokyo police suppressed it, the Chinese students in Tokyo also dared to organize a demonstration parade on May 7.²⁴ Twenty-three Chinese were arrested and twenty-seven wounded according to Chinese student sources.²⁵ P'eng P'ai is said to have received wounds in the scalp, arms and legs.²⁶

After his graduation P'eng returned home and contributed an article, "Appealing to My Countrymen," to the first issue of *Hsin hai-feng* 新海豐 (New Hai-feng), the organ of the General Federation of Students in Hai-feng *hsien* 海豐縣學生聯合總會, edited by Cheng Chih-yün 鄭志雲. In the article he boldly attacked the private property system from the Marxist point of view, and advocated the necessity of a social revolution to destroy the law, the government and the state which he considered were the instruments of the ruling class.²⁷ Having collected a number of books on Socialism in Japan, Shanghai and Canton, he brought them to Hai-feng and, with up-to-date information and advanced ideas, he deeply influenced the young people in his home district. He organized an intellectual group called the Association for Studying Socialism. Members of the Association such as Cheng Chih-yün, Li Lao-kung 李勞工, P'eng Yuan-chang 彭元章, Ch'en K'uei-ya 陳魁亞, Ch'en Shun-i 陳舜儀, Lin Tao-wen 林道文 and Yang Wang 楊望, as well as Li Kuo-chen 李國珍 and Lin Su 林魁 who had returned from Japan, were to become loyal comrades of Peng's Bolshevik movement.²⁸

²⁴ The Yuan Shih-k'ai government submitted to a major part of the Twenty-One Demands on May 7, 1915. From that time, the Chinese considered May 7 as one of the memorial days of national humiliation.

²⁵ Wang Kung-pi 王拱壁, "Tung-yu hui-han-lu (Hsüan-lu) 東游揮汗錄 (選錄) (A Part of the Report of Activities in Japan)," *Chün-tai-shih tzu-liao* 5 (1955): 118-123.

²⁶ Fang Hui 方回, "P'eng P'ai lieh-shih yü i-chiu-i-chiu-nien wu-yüeh ch'i-jih Chung-kuo liu-jih hsueh-sheng Tung-ching shih-wei yu-hsing yün-tung 彭湃烈士與一九一九年五月七日中國留日學生東京示威游行運動 (P'eng P'ai the Patriot and a Demonstration Parade of Chinese Students in Tokyo on May 7, 1919)," *Li-shih yen-chiu* 歷史研究 (Historical Studies) 2 (1954):84

²⁷ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 14-20.

²⁸ Chung I-mou "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 180; *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 9.

P'eng P'ai's Organization of a Peasant Movement

P'eng P'ai himself explained the story of his organization of a peasant movement as follows:

"I became the Chief of the Bureau of Education in Hai-feng *hsien* in 1921, conceiving a fanciful plan to accomplish a social revolution through education. I assembled all the students and many boys and girls of wealthy families at the town of Hai-feng, and organized a parade on May First. This had never taken place in the history of Hai-feng. With no workers and no peasants, the parade marched along the town streets: the students of the First Higher Primary School put up a red flag on which the word 'Bolshevisation' was written. How primitive! The gentry in Hai-feng spread such false rumors as that we were intending to share not only property but also wives, and attacked us. Being importuned by them, Ch'en Chiung-ming finally dismissed me. The principals and the teachers in Hai-feng, whose thoughts were relatively progressive, resigned one after another.

"Meanwhile, we had had an ideological campaign against the *Lu-an jih-pao* 陸安日報 (Lu-an Daily), the organ of Ch'en Chiung-ming. Comrade Li Ch'un-tao 李春濤 and I published several issues of *Ch'ih-hsin chou-k'an* 赤心週刊 (Sincere Mind Weekly), arguing on behalf of the defenceless workers and peasants. But actually we were backed by neither workers nor peasants, and our childish activities were not known by either urban workers or rural peasants. One day, my seventh brother was reading aloud ... our article appealing to the peasants which was published in an issue of *Ch'ih-hsin chou-k'an*. My mother happened to listen ... and as soon as he read through it ... she wept and said with tears, 'The family whose ancestor did not accumulate virtue has a son who brings bankruptcy.... If we adopt your idea, we shall become bankrupt, won't we?' I tried to soothe her anger, and finally succeeded. Meanwhile, I hit on the idea that the peasants would be pleased in their hearts if they could read our article just as my mother had deplored it. And also, I began to believe that the peasants could be organized for an uprising.... One day in May, I started to organize the peasants, and first went to a village called Ch'ih-shan-yüeh 赤山約."²⁹

All the documents concerning P'eng P'ai's peasant movement agree on 1921 as the year when he began his peasant movement, but there are some differences as to which part of 1921. Hou Feng 侯楓 says, "... some time in the early autumn of 1921."³⁰ Chung I-mou 鍾貽謀, "... the sixth month of the lunar calendar, or July."³¹

²⁹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 50-51.

³⁰ Hou Feng, *op. cit.*, 38.

³¹ Chung I-mou, "Hai-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 181.

While Hou Feng and Chung I-mou both must have read P'eng P'ai's above-cited "Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung," they did not mention the reason why they changed the date.

The present author, however, sets the date as May of 1922 for the following reasons: (1) P'eng P'ai himself showed that he began his peasant movement in May or June of 1922 in a table, which previous scholars have apparently overlooked, attached to his article "Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung 海豐農民運動," entitled "A Table Showing the Membership of Peasant Unions in the Hai-lu-feng District and Reasons for Its Increase and Decrease."³² (2) Chung I-mou cited in his book a chronology which was published in the anniversary issue of Ch'en Chiung-ming's organ, *Lu-an jih-k'an* 陸安日刊.³³ The chronology is as follows:

The tenth year of the Republic, or 1921, August 2: a group of students petitioned that P'eng P'ai should be appointed Chief of the *Ch'üan-hsüeh-so* 勸學所 (Office for Promoting Study) (The *Ch'üan-hsüeh-so* changed its name to *Chiao-yü-chü* 教育局 or the Bureau of Education).

October 1: official announcement of the appointment of P'eng P'ai to be Chief of the Bureau of Education, and his inauguration.

The eleventh year of the Republic, or 1922, May 4: the students' parade of a large scale celebrating May First.³⁴

May 5: The Magistrate, Weng Kuei-ch'ing 翁桂清 accepted P'eng's resignation from the position of Chief of the Bureau of Education.³⁵

Although Chung I-mou is inclined to refute this document, it should be regarded as an important source. (3) The registration files of Waseda University dated P'eng's graduation as July 10, 1921, and recorded that he passed the final examination in self-government and in six other classes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that he was still in Tokyo, at least until the time of the graduation ceremonies. (4) If one carefully reads P'eng P'ai's article, one can find that he apparently dated only his appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Education as 1921. It does not exclude the "1922" hypothesis.

Thus we can make a chronology concerning his initial activity as follows:

July or August, 1921: P'eng returned home. Somewhere in China, en route to

³² P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 85.

³³ The *Lu-an jih-k'an* 陸安日刊 and the *Lu-an jih-pao* 陸安日報, mentioned above, must be the same paper.

³⁴ There is a confusion about this date between the May 4 demonstration and the May 1 one.

³⁵ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 124-125.

Hai-feng, he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party.³⁶ He wrote his "Appealing to My Countrymen" in these months. October 1, 1921: He was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Education. He appointed his comrades, one after another, to important teaching positions.³⁷

May 1, 1922: The May First parade.

May 9, 1922: He resigned.

May, 1922 : He started to organize the peasants.

The Development of the Peasant Union

At the beginning of his activity in the rural villages, P'eng talked to the peasants, gave speeches and tried to persuade them to organize themselves. The traditional attitude was so strong that he could get only five peasants interested in the beginning. Nevertheless, these five peasants were a bridgehead. Their demonstration of the usefulness of unity in small daily troubles brought an increase in the membership of the peasant union.

In September 1922, the peasant union of the village of Ch'ih-shan-yüeh was inaugurated with a membership of over five hundred. On January 1, 1923, the Federation of Peasant Unions in Hai-feng *hsien* 海豐總農會 was inaugurated with a membership of twenty thousand, so that P'eng estimated that, as the average family consisted of five persons, the people controlled by the unions amounted to around one hundred thousand.³⁸

As a result of the increase in membership, the unions became so powerful that they could control the food markets in the town—the potato market, the cane sugar market and many others—in spite of the opposition of those formerly in control.³⁹ They also succeeded in stopping the *Hsieh-tou* between the Red Flag and the Black

³⁶ "In 1920 or 1921, Comrade P'eng P'ai became one of the most active leaders of the Communist organization. He was active as an agitator among workers in Canton for a short while after he became a Communist." Yü Te 玉德, "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih ch'uan-lueh 彭湃同志傳略 (A Short Biography of Comrade P'eng P'ai)," in Hua Ying-shen 華應申, ed., *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang lieh-shih ch'uan* 中國共產黨烈士傳 (Biographies of Martyrs of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hongkong: Hsin-min-chu ch'u-pan-she 新民主出版社, 1949), 46. Another source indicates that he was a member of the Communist Party from 1920 on. See the editor's note in Peng-pai [sic], "Memoirs of a Chinese Communist," *The Living Age* 344/4399 (April 1933): 117. He did not go out of the Hai-lu-feng district after his return home from Japan until the fall of 1923 when he made a trip to Hong Kong. If Yü Te's description is correct, he must have become a Communist on his way from Tokyo to Hai-feng in 1921.

³⁷ Chung I-mou, *op. cit.*, 10.

³⁸ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 61-67.

³⁹ P'eng P'ai explained that these markets were formerly controlled by "gentry, local rascals and temple curates." *Ibid.*, 65.

Flag Clans, established a peasant school and tried to improve farming, develop reforestation, arbitrate judicial cases and form a medical mutual aid organization. These activities of the peasant unions naturally drew the attention of the local authorities to them. Still the peasant union was not strong enough to compete with the official administration and the private forces of the landlords. The union distinguished between those slogans used among members and those used towards the outside: the latter were "improvements in farming," "education of farmers," and "charities"; the former held out such attractions to the peasant as "reduction of rent," "abolition of miscellaneous additional rent payments," and "paying no commission-fee to the police."⁴⁰ As to the reduction of rent, they were prudent enough to conceal their plans on this point for five years.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the peasant unions could not avoid conflict with the landowners as long as they tried to protect tenant farmer interests. The first clash took place when a landowner attempted to raise his rents. The *hsien* government put into jail six tenant farmers who opposed this move. The peasant unions mobilized six thousand peasants into a demonstration and thus frightened the judges, who finally released the prisoners.

This success brought fame to the unions and raised their prestige, and their membership increased even in the adjoining *hsiens* of Tzu-chin 紫金, Wu-hua 五華 and Hui-yang 惠陽. The Federation of Peasant Unions in Hai-feng *hsien* developed into the Federation of Peasant Unions in Hui-chou Prefecture and within two months, by May 1923, it grew into the Provincial Peasant Union of Kwangtung 廣東省農會. At that time *hsien* peasant unions already were established in Hai-feng and Lu-feng, and were being organized in Tzu-chin and Hui-yang. Although not as yet organized in Hui-lai 惠來 and P'u-ning 普寧, peasants from these two *hsiens* were already participating in peasant unions.⁴²

Besides P'eng P'ai, many other intellectuals played active roles in the peasant movement. Among these were Li Yüeh-t'ing 黎樾廷, a principal of a middle school, and Yang Ssu-chen 楊嗣震, a principal of a higher primary school, who made speeches at the inauguration meeting of the Peasant Union of Ch'ih-shan-yüeh. There were at least six intellectuals, including Chairman P'eng P'ai, among the thirteen members of the Executive Committee of the Provincial Peasant Union at the time of its inauguration.⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 69. These slogans used among members clearly show that the peasant union stuck to protecting the interests of tenant farmers and did not concern itself with the interests of small landed farmers. The present author regrets being unable to find source materials which could provide answers to the questions about the union's attitude toward small local merchants and landed farmers.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 65-69.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 75-80.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 71, 79.

Such a remarkable development of the peasant movement must have caused strong feelings of uneasiness among the gentry and local officials. They hesitated, however, to suppress the union because the peasants had been careful to avoid conflicts with landlords, and because there were many students and teachers with high social prestige locally among the leaders of the peasant movement. If such a movement had been organized by the peasants themselves, their landlords would have suppressed it ruthlessly at the very beginning. In addition, the *hsien* authorities would have instructed the police to arrest the leaders before the movement grew to such a size that the relatively weak police organization could not arrest them. Regardless, however, it would have been difficult to arrest the foreign-educated P'eng P'ai, who was the son of a major landlord. It would also have been difficult to arrest the other teachers and students, most of whom came from the upper or middle classes.

At the beginning of the peasant movement, Weng Kuei-ch'ing, the Magistrate of Hai-feng *hsien*, looked on with folded arms. His successor, Lü T'ieh-ch'a 呂鐵槎 also dared not criticize the movement. The students, with the collaboration of the peasant unions, led a movement against the appointment of the succeeding Magistrate Ch'iu Ching-yün 丘景雲. They nominated an intellectual union leader as their candidate but did not get him appointed. Instead, Ch'en Chiung-ming appointed Wang Tso-hsin 王作新 as the next magistrate.⁴⁴ While the magistrates did not intervene in the early activities of the unions, P'eng P'ai and other leaders skilfully manipulated the discontented peasants and succeeded in rapidly developing the power of the peasant unions to such an extent that the small police power in the town of Hai-feng could no longer suppress it.

The August 16 (Fifth Day of the Seventh Month) Incident

In the summer of 1923 the Hai-feng district suffered from a heavy typhoon. The Peasant Union passed a resolution to claim a 70 percent reduction of rent, with a slogan "Chih to san-ch'eng chiao-na" 至多三成交納 (at most pay 30 percent rent).⁴⁵ The first effort of the movement to gain reduction of rent by taking advantage of the damage from the typhoon resulted in an attempt by the local officials to use all their power to suppress the union. As a result a certain number of intellectuals began to drop out of the movement. The Magistrate Wang Tso-hsin attempted in vain to disperse the people who assembled in the General Meeting of the Peasant Union in Hai-feng *hsien* on August 15 (the fourth day of the seventh month), 1923. Wang made this declaration: "The chief of the bandits, P'eng P'ai, is planning a revolt. The people in all the villages should not become involved in this. Do not cause suffering for yourselves because of this revolt."⁴⁶ The Magistrate ordered the police to check all

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 68, 78.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

peasants on the main streets; but the police were dispersed and Wang's declaration was ripped down by the peasants.

Shocked, the Magistrate assembled the police in the *hsien* office where they dug trenches and prepared fortifications against the coming attack of the peasants. Meanwhile, he also requested Chung Ching-t'ang in Shan-wei to reinforce the Hai-feng position.

The General Meeting gathered together over 20,000 peasants, who met with much optimism. That night Chung's troops entered the town, while at the same time the Magistrate had assembled leading "gentry," so-called, to consider ways of suppressing the peasant union. At dawn on August 16 (the fifth day of the seventh month), Chung Ching-t'ang's troops, the police and all available self-defence corps of the *hsien*, staged a surprise attack on the peasant union headquarters and arrested twenty-five leaders of the union, including the president, Yang Ch'i-shan 楊其珊.

At that time Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had been expelled from Canton by Yünnanese and Kwangsi troops, had his headquarters in Lao-lung 老隆. P'eng P'ai went to Lao-lung to petition Ch'en for the release of all those arrested, a reduction of rent and the re-establishment of the peasant union. Although Ch'en was a warlord who depended upon the landlords and more conservative elements for his support, he had been an associate of Sun Yat-sen and therefore was unable to refuse P'eng P'ai's petition categorically. He delayed making any decision as long as possible. P'eng became impatient and traveled to Swatow 汕頭, Hai-feng and Hong Kong 香港, but returned to Lao-lung and again pressed the petition on Ch'en. Ch'en still would not deal with the petition but he urged upon P'eng an appointment to his staff saying that he felt the need of such able men in his own headquarters. Soon Ch'en and his staff moved to Swatow and then to Hui-chou in order to prepare for an attack on Canton. P'eng P'ai found an excuse to stay at Swatow, where he planned and established a new peasant union.⁴⁷

While he was at Swatow, he fell in love with a student named Hsü Yü-ching 許玉慶, and a daughter was born from this illegitimate union.⁴⁸ Later, Hsü Yü-ching moved to Hai-feng and lived together with P'eng P'ai and his wife, Ts'ai Su-p'ing.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 86 *et seq.* This was a peasant union in "nothing but name," as P'eng himself indicated later. P'eng P'ai, "Kuan yü Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung te i-feng-hsin 關於海豐農民運動的一封信 (A Letter Relating to the Peasant Movement in Hai-feng)," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 嚮導週報 (Guide Weekly) 70 (Jun. 18, 1924).

⁴⁸ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 200.

⁴⁹ Su Hui 蘇惠, "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih ho t'a ling-tao te Hai-lu-feng nung-ming yün-tung 彭湃同志和他領導的海陸豐農民運動 (Comrade P'eng P'ai and the Hai-lu-feng Peasant Movement under His Leadership)," in Wu-han-shih-chi-kuan Ma-k'o-ssu-Lieh-ning-chu-i yeh-chien-hsueh-hsiao 武漢市機關馬克思列寧主義夜間學校 (Marx-Leninism Night School of the Wuhan City Departments), ed., *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang tsai chung-nan-ti-chü ling-tao ko-ming-tou-cheng te li-shih tzu-liao* 中國共產黨在中南地區領導革命鬭爭的歷史資料 (Historical Materials on the Revolutionary Struggles Led by the Chinese Communist Party in Central and South China) (Wuhan: Chung-nan Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she 中南人民出版社, 1951), 1:174.

It is reported that Hsü Yü-ching moved to a secret soviet area near Swatow after P'eng P'ai's execution.⁵⁰

The news that a new peasant union had been established and the knowledge that Ch'en Chiung-ming at Hui-chou sent telegrams to P'eng P'ai urging him to come and join his general staff, combined with other rumors, made an impression on the Magistrate and the gentry at Hai-feng. Finally, Wang Tso-hsin released the imprisoned peasant leaders. P'eng P'ai and other leaders of the peasant union were highly pleased with this result of their long drawn-out struggle.

Ch'en's attitude towards the peasant movement was soon to be tested. In March of 1924 Ch'en returned to Hai-feng. Here he was importuned by the landlords and the Magistrate, Wang Tso-hsin, to suppress the peasant union on the basis that it was dangerous, especially because of its close relation to the Kuomintang-Communist government in Canton. In the end Ch'en made up his mind to carry out the suppression, principally because of his hostility to the Canton government. Ch'en advised the landlords and officials on March 16, "All right, you may disband the peasant union but don't use armed force at first."⁵¹ The peasant union had planned a mass meeting on March 17 to celebrate their reorganization, and on the same day the Magistrate's order for their dissolution was issued.

Although Ch'en's power had decreased, the peasant union was still not strong enough to resist his opposition. The delegates of the peasants met and decided that P'eng P'ai and Li Lao-kung would leave Hai-feng while Cheng Chih-yun and P'eng Han-yuan 彭漢垣 would remain to organize an underground movement. Li, who came from Chieh-sheng 捷勝 in Hai-feng *hsien*, entered the Whampoa Military Academy 黃埔軍官學校 after he fled from Hai-feng to Canton with P'eng P'ai. Cheng had been a member of the Association for Studying Socialism and had also been the editor of the periodical, *New Hai-feng*, to which P'eng had contributed his article "Appealing to My Countrymen." P'eng Han-yuan was P'eng P'ai's elder brother.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Peasant Movement, 1921-24

Relative Indifference

The prevailing interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in the young Chinese Communist Party tended to emphasize the role of urban workers and to de-emphasize the role of rural peasants. This attitude is obvious, not only in the official Party statements,⁵² but

⁵⁰ Nym Wales, *loc. cit.*

⁵¹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 132.

⁵² MURAMATSU Yūji 村松祐次, "Shoki no Chūgoku kyōsantō to nōmin 初期の中國共產黨と農民 (The Chinese Communist Party in Its Beginning and the Peasant)," in Kazankai 霞山會, ed., *Ajia: kako to genzai* アジア: 過去と現在 (Asia: Past and Present) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1955), 158 *et seq.*

also in the articles of its organ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 嚮導週報 (Guide Weekly).

During the first year after its inception in September 1922, this journal published only three short articles by Lo Chang-lung 羅章龍 on agrarian problems.⁵³ Lo had participated in Li Ta-chao's 李大釗 group when he was a student at the National Peking University 北京大學. It was said that he was an experienced leader of urban workers' movements, but there is no evidence that he had any experience working with peasant groups. In 1931 he opposed both Li Li-san's 李立三 group and the Russian trained students' group. He organized an Emergency Central Committee in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party which was directed by the Russian-trained students, and insisted upon immediate reorganization of the Party structure. He was expelled from the Party on February 2, 1931, and arrested by the Nationalist government on April 8.⁵⁴ Therefore, there is probably no particular significance in the fact that Lo wrote concerning the agrarian problems at this period.

There seems, furthermore, to have been a major divergence of policy between the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Comintern concerning agrarian problems at this stage. The directive from the Comintern to the Third National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 concerning agrarian problems was as follows:

- "1. The national revolution in China and the creation of an anti-imperialist front will necessarily be followed by an agrarian revolution of the peasantry against the remnants of feudalism. The revolution can be victorious only if it becomes possible to draw into the movement the basic masses of the Chinese population, *i.e.*, the peasants with small landholdings.
- "2. Thus the peasant problem becomes the central point of the entire policy [of the Chinese Communist Party]....
- "3. Therefore, the Communist Party, which is the party of the working class, must aim at an alliance between the workers and the peasants. This task can

⁵³ Lo Chang-lung 羅章龍, "Shantung min-chung te ko-ming ch'ao-liu 山東民衆的革命潮流 (The Revolutionary Current of the People in Shantung)," 40 (September 16, 1923,) consisting of 11 lines; "Chianghsi Ma-chia-ts'un nung-min k'ang-shui yün-tung 江西馬家村農民抗稅運動 (A Movement to Refuse to Pay the Land Tax at Ma-chia-ts'un in Kiangsi)," 41 (September 23, 1923), about half a page; "Ch'en Chiung-ming ch'iang-tzu hsia te Hai-feng nung-min 陳炯明槍刺下的海豐農民 (The Peasants of Hai-feng under the Cruel Suppression of Ch'en Chiung-ming)," 43 (October 17, 1927), eighteen lines.

⁵⁴ Onodera kikan 小野寺機關, *Koku-kyō kōsō-shi shiryō* 國共抗爭史資料 (Source Material on the History of the Kuomintang-Communist Struggle), mimeo. (Shanghai: Onodera kikan, 1939), 180-183, 462-464. According to its introduction, this book is a complete translation of Kuomintang, Central Committee, ed, *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chih t'au-shih* 中國共產黨之透視 (A Perspective of the Chinese Communist Party). Onodera Kikan, the Organ of Onodera, was a Japanese military intelligence organization led by Colonel ONODERA Makoto 小野寺信 which operated for a short period in 1939.

be carried out only by means of continuous propaganda and by the actual application of such slogans of the agrarian revolution as: confiscation of landlords' land, confiscation of monastic and church land, and the passing of this land to the peasants without compensation; abolition of the practice of the starvation lease; abolition of the existing system of taxation, of the practice of the 'squeeze'; abolition of the customs barriers between provinces; destruction of the institution of tax-farmers [*otkupshchiki*], abolition of the mandarinates; creation of organs of peasant self-government to take charge of the confiscation of land, and so forth...."⁵⁵

In the Japanese abstract of the resolutions of the Third National Congress we find the following items concerning the interests of the peasants:

- “1. Standardization and reduction of rents.
2. Maximum rent law and the right of peasant unions to establish a justifiable rent.
3. Improvement of irrigation.
4. Improved seeds and fertilizers, and the right of the poor peasants to rent seeds and equipment from the state.
5. Minimum price laws on major agricultural products.”⁵⁶

This divergence shows that the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party did not put as much emphasis on the peasant problems as the Comintern in 1923.⁵⁷

Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 and the Peasant Movement

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the top leader and Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party in this period, had opposed in practice the radical peasant movement. In terms of abstract theory, he recognized the importance of the movement: “As the majority of the total population of China consists of peasants, naturally they are a great power to aid the national revolution. The national revolution will not be a thorough success as a people's revolution, if the peasant is not included in the force of the national rev-

⁵⁵ Xenia Jukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 344–345.

⁵⁶ HATANO Ken'ichi 波多野乾一, ed., *Shina kyōsantō-shi 支那共產黨史* (A History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Gaimushō Jōhōbu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau), 1932), 46–49.

⁵⁷ The question of how the radical reforms proposed by the Comintern were modified into such an inoffensive and mild form by the Chinese Communist Party is an important one. The author has been unable to obtain any major pertinent source material.

olution.”⁵⁸ However, in practice, in 1923, he expressed as his opinion: “The Chinese Communist Party must develop large-scale rural Communist movements and local Communist movements as its most pressing task.” A reader commented in a letter published in the party organ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* in August 1923, “The vital weaknesses of the present Socialist movement are: the excess of urban orientation; the shortage of talented men in the local movement; the cowardice of intellectuals who fear to leap into the mass of the people. This is the major cause of the stagnation of our movement.”

“It seems to me too romantic,” Ch’en Tu-hsiu replied, “for you to insist upon a Communist movement in the rural districts, because the main force of the Communist movement must necessarily consist of industrial workers. In such a country of small farmers as China, over half the farmers are petit-bourgeois landed farmers who adhere firmly to private-property consciousness. How can they accept Communism? How can the Communist movement extend itself successfully in the mass of rural China where there are many landed farmers?”⁵⁹

The result of the August 16 incident in Hai-feng⁶⁰ and other incidents in rural districts only served to reinforce Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s conviction that the National Revolution in which the Chinese Communist Party actively collaborated with the Kuomintang and its troops, was the first step which the Party should take. In an article entitled “Peasants in Kwangtung and Peasants in Hunan,” he argued⁶¹:

“Suffering from a natural disaster the peasants in Hai-feng, Kwang-tung Province, claimed a reduction of rent. Although they did not infringe upon the laws at all, the troops of Ch’en Chiung-ming suddenly disbanded the peasant union which consisted of over 10,000 families. They arrested and imprisoned twenty-five members of the peasant union, and have not released them yet. If the troops of Sun Yat-sen could have marched to Hai-lu-feng before, such a false charge would not have occurred.

In order to lower the price of rice the peasants in Heng-shan 衡山, Hunan Province, interfered with the shipping of rice. Although they did not infringe

⁵⁸ Cited from its Japanese version, “Shina kokumin kakumei to shakai kaku kaikyū 支那國民革命と社會各階級 (The National Revolution in China and Her Social Classes),” in YAMAGUCHI Shin’ichi 山口慎一, tr., *Shina kakumei ronbun-shū* 支那革命論文集 (A Collection of Articles about the Chinese Revolution) (Tokyo: Marukusu shobō マルクス書房, 1930), 13.

⁵⁹ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 34 (August 1, 1923). Whether this opinion was Ch’en’s own, or dictated by the Comintern, is a problem which cannot be answered accurately from available sources.

⁶⁰ See above.

⁶¹ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 48 (December 12, 1923).

upon the law at all, Chao the Butcher,⁶² who himself was a big landlord, a rice merchant and also a warlord, suddenly dispersed 10,000 peasants in a meeting of the peasant union by the use of his many troops, killing, wounding and arresting many peasants, after the retreat of the T'an Yen-k'ai 譚延闓's National Revolutionary troops. If T'an's troops had not already retreated from Heng-shan such a false charge would not have occurred.

Thus we must recognize the following tactics. All labor movements, peasant movements and student movements should follow the political movements, because all movements need political freedom. For instance, democratic government will not be secured until the political power of Ts'ao K'un 曹錕 and Wu P'ei-fu collapses. Where are the Railroad Workers' Union and the Federation of Student Unions able to exist except in Canton?

In theory Ch'en accepted the potentialities of peasant revolution as expressed in the scheme of Marxism-Leninism, but in practice he believed that a radical peasant movement would only hinder the development of an integrated National Revolution. He did not believe that there was a balancing point between the moderate and radical peasant movements where the peasants could be mobilized to aid in the National Revolution. Because of his inclination to undervalue the peasant movement, he could not develop effective political tactics concerning the peasant movement to attain this goal. Since this was the attitude taken by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party itself did not take an active part in the peasant movement. While their comrade P'eng P'ai was struggling to maintain his peasant unions in the face of opposition from the landlord elements, there is no evidence that the leadership of the Party made any effort to aid him.

The Peasants' Department of the Kuomintang Central Committee

The Staff

In February 1924, soon after the Kuomintang-Communist Alliance was inaugurated at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang established the Peasants' Department.⁶³ "With no previous expe-

⁶² Chao Heng-t'i 趙恒惕, who was Governor of Hunan Province and belonged to the Wu P'ei-fu group.

⁶³ Lo Ch'i-yuan 羅綺園, ed., "Pen-pu i-nien-lai kung-tso pao-kao kai-yao 本部一年來工作報告概要 (Short Report about the Activities of Our Department for This Year)," *Chung-kuo nung-min* (Chinese Peasants) 2 (1926). A mainland Chinese source indicates that the Chinese Communist Party took the initiative in establishing the Peasants' Department in the Central Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang. Chang Yu-i 章有義, ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh-shih tzu-liao* 中國近代農業史資料 (A Documentary History of Agriculture in Modern China), 3 vols. (Peking: San-lien shu-tien 三聯書店, 1957), 1:675.

rience," its function at the beginning was merely to draw up a concrete plan on the basis of its own research.⁶⁴

The first Head of the Department was Lin Tsu-han 林祖涵, a Communist who had been associated with Sun Yat-sen and his party from the time of the Hsing-chung-hui 興中會. He resigned from the position about April as he was moving to Hankow 漢口. His successor was P'eng Su-ming 彭素民, and following him as Acting Heads of the Department were Li Chang-ta 李章達 and Huang Chü-su 黃居素. After Huang, Liao Chung-k'ai 廖仲愷, the Head of the Department of Workers and the leader of the left-wing group of the Kuomintang, assumed the position in addition to his other duties. Following Liao's assassination in August of 1925, Ch'en Kung-po 陳公博 succeeded to the post and after him Lin Tsu-han again assumed the position. During the period of the Wuhan government, T'an P'ing-shan 譚平山 became the Head of the Department.⁶⁵ Regardless of the kaleidoscopic change of Heads, the Communist core of the Department remained the same.

"After Lin Tsu-han became the Head of the Department of Farmers," says Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, "he recommended one P'eng P'ai, a Communist as secretary. Later he himself resigned in order not to attract the attention of the Party members. P'eng P'ai stayed on as secretary despite repeated changes at the top. All training classes set up for farmers were controlled by Communist elements, and the students admitted were also either Communists or members of their front organizations. Similarly, the farmers' unions and 'farmers' volunteer corps' were manipulated by the Communists."⁶⁶

Tsou Lu 鄒魯, an anti-Communist who belonged to the Hsi-shan clique 西山派, the right wing of the Kuomintang Party, says, "P'eng P'ai, the Secretary ... of the Department, was a Communist. ... P'eng P'ai boldly avowed that anyone who did not agree with him would not dare to remain as Head of the Department. Huang Chü-su became very angry upon hearing this and called upon the central Party headquarters to discharge P'eng P'ai, but in vain. Rather it was Huang Chü-su who was forced to resign, and Liao Chung-k'ai was appointed the Head in addition to his other position."⁶⁷

At the time the Peasants' Department was established, P'eng P'ai must still have been in Hai-feng devoting himself to the reorganization of the peasant union. Although it was not unusual for China to appoint members of committees or heads of departments who were not in residence at the seat of government, it would seem impossible that they should appoint a secretary of a department who would not be

⁶⁴ Lo Ch'i-yuan, *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Chiang Chung-cheng 蔣中正 (Kai-shek), *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing up at Seventy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), 31.

⁶⁷ Tsou Lu 鄒魯, *Kuo-min-tang shih-kao* 國民黨史稿 (A Draft History of the Kuomintang), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan 商務印書館, 1929), 1:386.

present to attend to his work. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that P'eng P'ai was appointed when he fled from Hai-feng to Canton after March 18, 1924.

By October of 1925, Lo Ch'i-yuan 羅綺園 was listed as secretary of the Department,⁶⁸ replacing P'eng P'ai. The major personnel of the Department of Farmers at the beginning of 1926 were⁶⁹:

Head: Ch'en Kung-po

Secretary: Lo Ch'i-yuan

Tsu-chih-kan-shih 組織幹事 (Organization Managers): Yuan Hsiao-hsien 阮嘯仙

P'eng P'ai

T'an Chih-t'ang 譚植棠

It is not clear what the duties of the Organization Managers were. In the fifth article of the regulations of the Department, the third paragraph tells us, "the Tsu-chih-yuan 組織員 (Organizer) is to organize peasant groups outside the Department, to supervise the activities of the peasant union leaders dispatched from Headquarters, to discipline the clerks and the leaders of peasant unions dispatched from Headquarters, to guide the development of peasant movements and to realize the objectives as set forth by the Peasants' Department."⁷⁰ This "Organizer" would seem to be the same as the "Organization Manager." Another source states, "Lo Ch'i-yuan was appointed the Secretary, P'eng P'ai was Manager and the Leader Dispatched from Headquarters for the Tung-chiang Region (East River Region) and Yuan Hsiao-hsien was Manager and the Leader Dispatched from Headquarters for the Hsi-chiang 西江 Region (West River Region). They were all Communists."⁷¹ We can assume that P'eng P'ai worked for several months in the office of the Department at Canton, and then moved to the position of Organization Manager where he worked actively in the vanguard of the peasant movement in organizing rural areas. There is one source that shows him to have been active in the peasant movement in Kuang-ning 廣寧 at the beginning of 1925.⁷²

Among the above-mentioned major personnel in the Department, Lo Ch'i-yuan, Yuan Hsiao-hsien and P'eng P'ai were called "the three superior leaders of the peas-

⁶⁸ Lo Ch'i-yuan, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Fan Pai-ch'uan 樊百川, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ch'eng-li ch'u-ch'i te nung-min yün-tung 中國共產黨成立初期的農民運動 (Peasant Movements during the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Party)," *Shih-hsüeh chou-k'an* 史學週刊 (Historical Studies Weekly) of *Ta-kung-pao* 大公報 (Shanghai edition) (April 3, 1952).

⁷² *Ti-i-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i te nung-min yün-tung* 第一次國內革命戰爭時期的農民運動 (The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953), 143 *et seq.*

ant movement.”⁷³ The fact that these three persons took over the leadership of the peasant movement was reported, not only by such Kuomintang sources as are quoted above, but also by Communist sources.⁷⁴

The Plan for the First Step of the Peasant Movement

After several months of inactivity, the Department of Farmers proposed the following “Plan for the First Step of the Peasant Movement,” based upon the resolution of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang:

1. A base for the peasant movement shall be established in a place which is politically and strategically important and has easy communication with Canton.
2. Twenty Leaders of peasant unions shall be dispatched to start activities in certain *hsiens*.
3. A Peasant Movement Training Institute shall be established. The term shall be one month. The graduates shall be appointed as Leaders of the peasant movement.
4. The regulations of the Peasant Movement Training Institute shall be established later.
5. The Peasant Union of All Kwangtung Province shall be inaugurated in September 1924.
6. A song of the peasants shall be composed.
7. A design for a flag of the peasants shall be selected.⁷⁵

This plan passed the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on June 30, 1924. The Department immediately started to work. They enacted the Regulations of the Peasant Union,⁷⁶ and established the Peasant Union Training Institute in July. For the peasant self-defence corps they adopted General Principles of Organization which passed the First National Congress in January 1924.

The Peasant Movement Training Institute

The Peasants' Department concentrated on the Training Institute. The major persons who devoted themselves to organizing the peasants in the rural districts and who became the core of the organization as well as the communicators between the rural peasant organizations and the central headquarters of the Kuomintang in Canton, were graduates of this Institute. The rapid development of the peasant movement from the autumn of 1924 on, in the area under Kuomintang control, was mainly due to the activity of these subleaders.

⁷³ Onodera Kikan, *op. cit.*, 369.

⁷⁴ For instance, Chang Yu-i, *op. cit.*, 1:676.

⁷⁵ Lo Ch'i-yuan, *op. cit.*

⁷⁶ Ho Yang-ling, *op. cit.*, 4, 53-71.

The Institute continued for six terms. The students of the first and second terms consisted of those who belonged to the Kuomintang and would volunteer for the peasant movement. After the third term only the members of the peasant union or of tenant families qualified as students. Not only was no tuition fee charged but the student was supplied with a uniform, shoes, stationery and three *yuan* 元 per month for pocket-money.

The first term lasted from July 3 to August 21, 1924. The Chu-*jen* 主任 (Chief Manager) of the Institute was P'eng P'ai. There were thirty-three graduates.

The second term ran from August 21 to October 30. The Chief Manager was Lo Ch'i-yuan. There were 142 graduates, all of them from Kwangtung Province.

The third term ran from January 1 to April 3, 1925. The Chief Manager was Yuan Hsiao-hsien. There were 114 graduates, all of them from Kwangtung Province.

The fourth term ran from May 1 to September 1. The Chief Manager was T'an Chih-t'ang. There were 51 graduates and auditors numbered 25, 64 from Kwangtung, 10 from Hunan and 2 from Kwangsi.

The fifth term ran from October 1 to December 8. The Chief Manager was probably Lo Ch'i-yuan.⁷⁷ There were 113 graduates, 41 from Kwangtung, 44 from Hunan 湖南, 7 from Shantung, 7 from Hupei 湖北, 6 from Kwangsi, 4 from Kiangsi, 2 from Anhwei 安徽 and 2 from Fukien.

The sixth term ran from May 3 to October 5, 1926. The So-chang 所長 (Principal)⁷⁸ was Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, and Hsiao Ch'u-nü 蕭楚女 was a full-time teacher. Among the fifteen teachers, seven were Communists: Lin Tsu-han, Chang T'ai-lei 張太雷, Hsiao Ch'u-nü, Teng Chung-hsia 鄧中夏, Kao Yü-han 高語罕, Yuan Hsiao-hsien and Lo Ch'i-yuan. There were 318 graduates, 2 from Kwangtung, 36 from Hunan, 23 from Shantung, 27 from Hupei, 40 from Kwangsi, 22 from Kiangsi, 15 from Anhwei, 16 from Fukien, 22 from Chihli 直隸, 29 from Honan 河南, 4 from Jeho 熱河, 5 from Chahar 察哈爾, 8 from Suiyuan 綏遠, 16 from Shensi 陝西, 25 from Szechwan 四川, 10 from Kiangsu 江蘇, 10 from Yünnan, 1 from Kweichow 貴州 and 2 from Fengtien 奉天 [in Manchuria].⁷⁹

It is clear that the Institute developed rapidly. Furthermore, we have to pay

⁷⁷ The present writer could not find any source material which shows this exactly.

⁷⁸ They were called "Chief Manager" until the fifth term. In the sixth term the head was called "Principal."

⁷⁹ "Nung-min-pu nung-min yün-tung wei-yüan-hui ti-i-tz'u hui-i-lu 農民部農民運動委員會第一次會議錄 (The Minutes of the First Committee for the Peasant Movement, Peasants' Department)," *Chung-kuo nung-min* 4 (1926); *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 20 et seq.

attention to the increasing diversification of the home provinces of the students, which suggests the spreading development of the peasant movement. The power of the Communists among the leaders of the Institute was overwhelming. It seems quite possible that no one except Communists was permitted to enter.⁸⁰

The Eastern Expeditions and the Peasant Movement in Hai-feng

The Peasant Organization and the Canton Government

In the area under the rule of the Canton Government, the young Kuomintang members were full of revolutionary spirit and in favor of social change. In addition to this, the graduates of the Peasant Movement Training Institute 農民運動講習所, who were disciplined in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Institute, went out to the rural areas to organize the peasants. It is easy, then, to understand why the peasant unions developed rapidly in this area. Of course, even under the Canton Government, there were some countermovements among landlords, traditional local officials and their supporters.

At times this led to bloodshed and even to the deaths of some of the leaders of the peasant movement.⁸¹ But, there was quite a different atmosphere under the rule of the Canton Government as compared with that under the warlords who actually supported the traditional landlordism. The presence of the Revolutionary Army exerted its restraining influence on the landlords and, in the cases of Kuang-ning and Kao-yao 高要, the Revolutionary Army, by threatening action, actively took the side of the peasants.⁸²

Under these circumstances, beginning in the autumn of 1924, many peasant unions were organized within the area controlled by the Canton Government and with its strong support. In this period the Canton Government raised its prestige by suppressing the Merchant Corps 商團軍, and the Peasant Movement Training Institute was operating smoothly. The peasant unions, which had been organized

⁸⁰ Tsou Lu, *op. cit.*, 1:386.

⁸¹ "Pen-pu t'e-p'ai-yüan ta-hui chih i-chüeh-an 本部特派員大會之議決案 (A Draft of the Resolutions of the General Meeting of the Specially Assigned Personnel of this Department)," *Chung-kuo nung-min* 1 (1926). *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 186.

⁸² *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 139 *et seq.* HATANO Ken'ichi, *Chūgoku kokumintō tsūshi* 中國國民黨通史 (General History of the Chinese Kuomintang) (Tokyo: Daitō-shuppan-sha 大東出版社, 1943), 289. Not all the members of the Kuomintang and the officers of the Revolutionary Army took the side of the peasants. Such persons as the magistrates, who were appointed by the Canton Government, and the officers of the Revolutionary Army were sometimes sympathetic to the traditional landlordism, as, for example, in Kuang-ning 廣寧.

from above, then became a vital support of the Kuomintang Government. The Government and the peasant union became dependent upon each other. As the area controlled by the Kuomintang Government expanded, it was rapidly incorporated into peasant unions. A typical example was the Tung-chiang Region after the First Eastern Expedition.

The First Eastern Expedition

On November 12, 1924, Sun Yat-sen, having accepted the invitation of Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞 and others, left Canton for Peking to take part in the National Convention. Soon after Sun left Canton, a divergence began to appear in the Canton Government. Hu Han-min, who had been appointed Deputy to Sun, had neither the prestige nor the personal power to integrate the cliques within the Government. Taking advantage of this situation Ch'en Chiung-ming assumed the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Troops in December, and marched westward with his troops to retake Canton. The Revolutionary Army defeated Ch'en's troops, and invaded the Tung-chiang Region, the home base of Ch'en Chiung-ming, in February of 1925, and forced Ch'en to flee to Hong Kong. This was the First Eastern Expedition.

The closer the Revolutionary Army came to Hai-feng, the more enthusiastically the people greeted them. At the town of Mei-lung 梅隴 in Hai-feng *hsien*, the people showed their enthusiasm by an organized demonstration. Liu Ping-ts'ui 劉秉粹, Chief-of-Staff of the First Regiment of the Cadet Troops described this welcoming demonstration. "The greeting by the people at this place was extraordinary. As we marched along, the streets resounded with many firecrackers."⁸³ On February 25 the Revolutionary Army took the town of Hai-feng without bloodshed. "The reception of our army by the people of Hai-feng was as extraordinary as that in Mei-lung. We have never seen such things since our expedition began."⁸⁴

There had been secret communications between P'eng P'ai and the comrades whom he had left behind in Hai-feng when he fled to Canton. The principal carriers of these messages had been coolies from Hai-feng who were working in Canton or Hong Kong. P'eng's comrades in Hai-feng organized the peasants and they harassed the fleeing soldiers of the retreating enemy. The day before the arrival of the Revolutionary Army, the town of Hai-feng was already under peasant corps control. The peasant corps co-operated with the Revolutionary Army in organizing stretcher bearers for the wounded, carriers for supplies and an intelligence service.⁸⁵ Liu Ping-

⁸³ Liu Ping-ts'ui 劉秉粹, *Ko-ming-chün ti-i-tz'u tung-cheng shih-chan-chi* 革命軍第一次東征實戰記 (The Actual Record of the First Eastern Expedition of the Revolutionary Army) (Shanghai: Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局, 1928), 205.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁸⁵ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 31-32. Anon., *Hai-lu-feng Su-wei-ai* 海陸豐蘇維埃 (The Hai-lu-feng Soviet) (China: s.n., n.d., 1928), 5.

ts'ui wrote in his diary, "People aided the army in transportation, food supply, communication and information. We received aid especially from peasants and workers some of whom were armed to aid the Party's army. The military discipline of Ch'en's troops was lax.... Therefore, once defeated, they lacked military supplies and were threatened by the people."⁸⁶

The Reconstruction of Mass Organization in Hai-feng

P'eng P'ai returned to Hai-feng on March 9, and again began to devote himself to the peasant movement. The position of the Magistrate was occupied by P'eng Han-yuan.⁸⁷ Li Lao-kung returned, too, and with Wu Chen-min 吳振民, a Communist, participated in the activity in Hai-feng. Immediately, they assembled a congress of peasants in Hai-feng which passed resolutions calling for the reconstruction of peasant unions in every village and ward within ten days, a 25 percent reduction of rent, and organization of a peasant self-defence corps under the charge of Li Lao-kung. The workers unions, although small, also were organized. (At this time there were small industries in weaving, papermaking and umbrella-making.⁸⁸ Furthermore, as in any small town in China, there must have been blacksmiths, dye workers and ship-builders.)

A Special Party Branch of the Chinese Communist Party of Hai-feng was organized with P'eng P'ai as Secretary. The so-called "illegal landlords 不法地主," "local rascals 土豪" and "oppressive gentry 劣紳" were arrested one after another. A Communist source wrote, "All the political power was held by the peasant union."⁸⁹

The First Peasant Congress of Kwangtung Province

The peasant union developed remarkably fast, not only in Hai-feng where the underground organization had existed, but also in other *hsiens* in Tung-chiang Region stimulated by the march of the Revolutionary Army and pushed forward by the organizers. Thus the Canton Government, which controlled the major part of Kwangtung Province, decided to hold the First Peasant Congress of Kwangtung Province on May 1, 1925. It claimed that the membership of the peasant unions in

⁸⁶ Liu Ping-ts'ui, *op. cit.*, 337.

⁸⁷ Kuo-min Ko-ming-chün 國民革命軍, *Hai-lu-feng p'ing-kung-chi* 海陸豐平共記 (A Record of Suppressing Communists in Hai-lu-feng) (Canton, 1928), 28. But Chung I-mou indicates P'eng Han-yuan was appointed in 1926. Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou*, 196. Another source suggests that, in 1925, P'eng Han-yuan was the magistrate of Hai-feng *hsien* and Liu Ch'in-hsi, a nian from Wu-hua *hsien*, was that of Lu-feng *hsien*. See Ch'en Hsiao-p'ai 陳小白, ed., *Hai-lu-feng ch'ih-huo-chi* 海陸豐赤禍記 (A Record of Red Calamities in Hai-lu-feng) (Hong Kong: Erh-yu yen-chiu-so 二友研究所, 1932).

⁸⁸ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 201.

⁸⁹ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 36.

Kwangtung Province amounted to over 210,000 in twenty-two *hsiens*.⁹⁰

The Congress explicitly expressed the basic policy of the peasant movement in its *Draft Resolution of the Alliance of Workers and Peasants* 工農聯合議決案: "We understand the following: our struggle must be concentrated in the city, because the political center is located in the city, therefore, the working class must strive to lead the peasants to participate in this struggle."⁹¹

In later years, after the Communist Party was forced to retreat from the city and was based solely upon rural organization, it still claimed the "workers' leadership." While this "workers' leadership" actually meant nothing but the leadership of the Communist Party, this *Draft of the Resolution of the Alliance of Workers and Peasants* must be understood to show that the Communists at that time actually put more stress upon the urban workers movement than the peasant movement. The Congress also passed the "Draft Resolution on Economic Problems,"⁹² the "Draft Resolution on the Future Policy of the Peasant Unions,"⁹³ and others, and proclaimed the "Declaration of Establishment of the Provincial Peasant Union of Kwangtung."⁹⁴ The contents of these resolutions and the declaration were far milder than the policy which was adopted in Hai-feng. For instance, while the 25 percent reduction of rent had been accepted in Hai-feng immediately after the First Eastern Expedition, the First Congress in May did not dare to support such a measure. There is no evidence of P'eng P'ai's attendance at this congress.

The leadership of the Communist Party was surprised and pleased with such a remarkable development of the peasant organization, which they had not expected, especially since the leadership of this peasant organization was controlled by their comrades. Somewhat belatedly the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the necessity of organizing peasant unions and peasant self-defence corps in the "Fourth Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Contemporary Affairs" in November of 1924 and in the "Letter to the Peasantry" in November of 1925.⁹⁵

The Second Eastern Expedition

Hai-lu-feng continued to border on the anti-Kuomintang area. There were a few large clans which checked the developments of the peasant union in Lu-feng *hsien* and Tze-chin *hsien*, taking advantage of their geographical position. The remaining

⁹⁰ Ho Yang-ling, *op. cit.*, 4:20.

⁹¹ SUZUE Gen'ichi 鈴江言一, *Chūgoku kaihō tōsōshi* 中國解放鬪爭史 (The History of the Emancipation Campaign in China) (Tokyo: Ishizaki shoten 石崎書店, 1953), 514.

⁹² *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 178 *et seq.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 185 *et seq.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 171 *et seq.*

⁹⁵ MURAMATSU Yūji, *op. cit.*, 161-162; SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 122.

troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming were garrisoned in these *hsiens*.⁹⁶ To the rear of these clans stood the troops of Hung Chao-lin 洪兆麟 and Lin Hu 林虎, who were members of Ch'en's clique.

In March 1925 Sun Yat-sen died in Peking and T'ang Chi-yao 唐繼堯, the leader of the Yünnan clique, claimed leadership of all southern cliques, and drew away from the Kuomintang in Canton. In June Yang Hsi-min of Yünnan and Liu Chen-huan of Kwangsi, whose troops were stationed in Canton, joined with T'ang Chi-yao and openly staged a revolt against the Kuomintang claiming that the Kuomintang was a Communist organization. The revolt was suppressed within a week. Meanwhile, Hsü Ch'ung-chih 許崇智, who had garrisoned the Tung-chiang Region with his Revolutionary Army, rapidly moved his troops to Canton in order to take advantage of this crucial situation to expand his power in the Canton Government. At this time Hsü Ch'ung-chih compromised with the Ch'en Chiung-ming clique to protect his rear from attack.

P'eng P'ai felt that the peasant union was too weak to oppose Ch'en's forces. He moved the organization to the mountainous district and went to Canton himself.⁹⁷ The peasant union which for over two months had been built up in Hai-feng, was crushed by the landlords acting together with Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops and the police. Over seventy persons, including Li Lao-kung, were executed.⁹⁸ The peasant union in Hai-feng had never before experienced such a violent attack.

In Canton the divergences which were developing between the left and right wings within the Kuomintang Party, were brought to a head by the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, leader of the left wing. But the left wing still retained the party leadership. The Kuomintang in Canton used Chiang Kai-shek's army to expel Hsü Ch'ung-chih when it became known that Hsü had compromised with Ch'en Chiung-ming's clique. In addition the Canton Government was firmly taking the leadership in the Hong Kong—Canton general strikes which were brought on by the May Thirtieth Incident. Because of this situation, the British Government aided the reorganized troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming which were marching towards Canton. In order to maintain its position the Canton Government was forced again into a military struggle with Ch'en Chiung-ming. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek began the Second Eastern Expedition in October 1925, for the purpose of destroying Ch'en Chiung-ming's base. The peasant underground again aided the Revolutionary Army as it had in the First Eastern Expedition. The Revolutionary Army advanced steadily, captured Hui-chou on October 14 and reached Swatow on November 4 passing through the Hai-lu-feng district. Ch'en Chiung-ming was forced to flee to Hong Kong.

⁹⁶ Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 191.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 40-41.

Restraint of the Peasant Movement

In general, when the lower echelons of the organization of a mass movement become especially vigorous, there are three situations in which the leaders of central headquarters hold down their demands or restrain them: first, when the strength of the opposition forces is still powerful enough to prevent the Communists from acting freely; second, when the Communists have to co-operate with their opponents, as for instance when they cannot do without the technical assistance of opposing elements; and third, when the Communists do not want to antagonize an ally. In Hai-feng the first situation no longer existed. The major opposition, the troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming, high officials and leading landlords had fled, and no longer had any power to check the radical actions of the peasants. The second situation applies only to urban workers' movements as in a case where the managerial talent and the engineering techniques of the opposing elements are indispensable to the maintenance of industry and the Communists have to use these trained men. Landlords and their supporters are scarcely considered indispensable to agricultural production. In the case of the Hai-lu-feng revolution, where the first and second situations did not apply, the policy which was followed must be considered from the viewpoint of strategy and the necessity of the Communist alliance with the Kuomintang.

At that time the Canton Government was concerned with the threatening split between the left and right wings and did not dare even to proclaim a reduction of rent.⁹⁹ As one of the major issues of this cleavage within the Kuomintang concerned the alliance with the radical Communists, such a political situation in Canton demanded the softening of Communist policy toward the landlords. Administratively P'eng P'ai and the peasant union in Hai-lu-feng district had to obey the policy of the Canton Government of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance.

The "Excesses of the Peasant Movement"

A meeting of peasant delegates was held on October 25 at Hai-feng, which fell under peasant control for the second time. P'eng P'ai seemed to ignore the factor of administrative direction. "We are heartbroken," he shouted at this meeting, "at the martyrdom of our Comrade Li Lao-kung. This is a great loss for the peasants. But we have to shift from sorrow to power. We are mad for merciless extermination of the enemy: we thirst for the last drop of the enemy's blood as compensation for our martyred comrades.... We must understand that we cannot treat the enemy with 'benevolence!' 'Benevolence' to the enemy is cruelty to the revolutionary side. From now

⁹⁹ As mentioned already, the First Peasant Congress of Kwangtung Province, which started May 1, 1925, could not demand a reduction of rent. "The Draft of the Resolution on the Future Policy of the Peasant Union" shows the attitude of the First Peasant Congress: "The Peasant Union would have been destroyed if the reduction of rent had been demanded immediately after the Union was organized." *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 180.

on we must go forward following the tracks of the martyrs' blood, and must exterminate our enemy to the last."¹⁰⁰

Generally speaking, peasants seldom become revolutionary without persistent indoctrination by some organization. Once they are aroused, however, strong discipline by the organization is indispensable to hold them under control. In Hai-lu-feng P'eng P'ai, the leader of the organization which was responsible for restraining the excesses of the peasants, did nothing but stimulate their radicalism. The retaliation of the peasants against the landlords and other privileged persons became violent. The peasants in Hai-lu-feng were fond of slapping the faces of the former privileged and of heaping abuses upon them.

In such an atmosphere a 40 percent reduction of rent was realized at a time when the Canton Government could not proclaim any reduction of rent. The peasant union granted the privilege of reduction in rents solely to its members in order to enlarge its membership.¹⁰¹ In 1926, it realized two consecutive 40 percent rent reductions, making a total of 64 percent. The former power of the land owners to ignore the tenants' rights and to collect miscellaneous additional rent levies was taken away. There were many small landowners in the Hai-lu-feng district. As they had lost their source of income by these measures, they desperately tried to retake their land from the tenants so that they themselves could cultivate it. But such small landowners as expressed their desire to cultivate their own land were often taken and beaten by their tenants. "All land rights became the property of the tenants."¹⁰²

The administrative organization of *hsien* government became only nominal. Most litigation came before the judicial committee of the peasant union, and the peasants would not heed the decisions of the *hsien* courts. Even the officials of the Canton Government could not control the peasants in Hai-lu-feng district. There occurred incidents such as that of an official of the Canton Government who was conducting a salt tax investigation in relation to smuggling in Hai-lu-feng district, and who was beaten and detained by the peasants when he tried to expose their smuggling. The Department of Finance in Canton insisted in vain on the punishment of these peasants.

Beside this powerful peasant union, other mass organizations such as workers' unions, merchants' unions, students' unions and women's unions were organized. Behind these mass organizations in Hai-lu-feng stood the District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The Secretary of the Committee was P'eng P'ai¹⁰³ and

¹⁰⁰ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 40.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁰² Anon., *op. cit.*, 8. It can be assumed, however, that the tenants still paid a part of their rent, at least to small landowners.

¹⁰³ Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 193.

later Chang Shan-ming 張善鳴.¹⁰⁴ The Party members were, “extremely revolutionary. They executed a great many *illegal landlords, local rascals and oppressive gentry*. Every Party member performed some executions.”¹⁰⁵

The membership of the Chinese Communist Party in this district, which had numbered only 700 in December 1926,¹⁰⁶ amounted to 4,000 in March 1927. There were Communist cells in about 330 villages among the over 850 villages where the peasant unions were organized.¹⁰⁷ Although the Kuomintang’s organization was developed too,¹⁰⁸ it can be assumed that the leadership of this organization was secured by the Communists, most of whom had been registered as Kuomintang members. P’eng P’ai held positions in the Kuomintang organization as a member of the Provincial Executive Committee in Kwangtung and Chief of the Provincial Peasants’ Department.¹⁰⁹ The town of Hai-feng was called “little Moscow.”

The above-mentioned description of Hai-lu-feng might remind us of the radical peasant movement in Hunan which developed explosively during the Northern Expedition in 1926 and 1927. In these years, the peasant unions in Hunan arrested a number of so-called “illegal landlords, local rascals” and “oppressive gentry” and executed them. “With the fall of the authority of the landlords,” wrote Mao Tse-tung, “the peasant union becomes the sole organ of authority, and what people call ‘all power to the peasant union’ has come to pass.... The union is actually dictating in all matters in the countryside, and it is literally true that ‘whatever it says, goes.’”¹¹⁰ The Sixth Provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Hunan passed a declaration which included a 50 percent reduction of rent.¹¹¹ Some local peasant unions proclaimed the “nationalization of land.”¹¹² The official document declared, “The urgent demand of all peasants is ‘nationalization of land’.”¹¹³ Although the Party

¹⁰⁴ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 203 *et seq.* Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 42–43.

¹⁰⁵ Anon., *op. cit.*, 8–9.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 10–11.

¹⁰⁸ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 43.

¹⁰⁹ Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang 中國國民黨, kuang-tung-sheng tang-pu hsüan-ch’uan-pu 廣東省黨部宣傳部 (Department of Information, Provincial Party Branch in Kwangtung, Kuomintang), *Chung-kuo Kuomintang Kuang-tung-sheng tang-pu ch’eng-li chih ching-kuo* 中國國民黨廣東省黨部成立之經過 (The Process of the Establishing of the Provincial Party Branch of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung) (Canton, 1925), 55–56.

¹¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, “Report of Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), 1:21. The author uses “peasant union” instead of “peasant association” which the translator used.

¹¹¹ *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 322.

¹¹² TACHIBANA Shiraki 橋樸, *Chūgoku kakumei-shiron* 中國革命史論 (Articles on the History of the Chinese Revolution) (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron-sha 日本評論社, 1950), 158, 234.

¹¹³ *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 199 (June 22, 1927). And also reprinted in *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 314.

organ was anxious to realize nationalization, it is doubtful whether the peasants themselves actually were anxious to do so. It is reasonable to think that the peasants would be pleased by the abolition of landlordism, but would be displeased by confiscation of land by the government. The above-mentioned sentence should be interpreted as a premature schedule made by the Party organ according to the Marxist-Leninist scheme.

Nevertheless, there was much similarity between the peasant movements of Hai-lu-feng in 1925–26 and of Hunan in 1926–27. The radical movement in Hunan provoked a vital split in the Kuomintang-Communist alliance and Mao Tse-tung, the leader in Hunan, had to defend peasant radicalism,¹¹⁴ but the Hai-lu-feng leaders were not so obligated. Why? Hunan was the homeland of T'ang-Sheng-chih 唐生智 and Ho Chien 何健, whose troops were the main force of the Wuhan Government, the government controlled by the left Kuomintang and the Communists after the April 12 anti-Communist *coup d'état* of Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, key officers of these troops belonged to the families of Hunan landlords. For this reason, the radical peasant movement in their homeland immediately aroused their opposition. Hai-lu-feng, in contrast, had been the homeland of Ch'en Chiung-ming who was branded a reactionary warlord by the Canton Government. Therefore, most landlords in this area had no close relations with the Canton Government. Thus, the radicalism in the Hai-lu-feng area did not provoke the vital opposition of officials of the Canton Government or members of the Kuomintang which might have caused a Kuomintang-Communist split. The above-mentioned incident of the salt official was a mere trifle. The peasant union in Hai-lu-feng, which held all the political power, received approval for effective co-operation in the Hong Kong-Canton strikes which were led by the Canton Government.¹¹⁵

In these years, the peasant movement in Kwangtung Province was developing rapidly in size, and began to overflow into Hunan and other provinces. The peasants struggled with the landlords, their subordinates and even with officials of the Canton Government who sympathized with the traditional order. There were many victims of these struggles. Hai-lu-feng especially was the scene of much strife, as is shown by the following list of peasant leaders who were killed¹¹⁶:

¹¹⁴ The famous "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" by Mao Tse-tung was written in March, 1927 for the purpose of defending peasant radicalism in Hunan.

¹¹⁵ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 202.

¹¹⁶ "Kuang-tung-sheng nung-min i-nien-lai chih fen-tou pao-kao ta-kang 廣東省農民一年來之奮鬥報告大綱" (An Outline Report of the Struggles of the Peasants in Kwangtung Province for This One Year), *Chung-kuo nung-min*, amalgamated issue of Nos. 6 and 7 (July 1926).

Kao-yao	9
Pao-an 寶安	7
Hsün-te 順德	more than 20
Hua-hsien 花縣	18
Wu-hua	16
Hai-feng	53 (48 men and 5 women)
Lu-feng	38 (36 men and 2 women)
Chung-shan 中山	7
Tung-huang 東莞	4
Ch'ing-yüan 清遠	1
vicinity of Canton	2
Kuang-ning	20

This list does not indicate that the forces of the landlords in the Hai-lu-feng district were particularly strong but rather that the peasant excesses in this district were greater than elsewhere and that there was therefore more fighting.

Another Kuomintang source, "Errors of the Peasant Unions at All Levels and of Organizers of the Peasant Movement," says, "In some districts, the Peasant union errs by intervening in the local administration and by detaining persons on its own initiative.... The peasant union in Hsin-hui 新會 *hsien* often seeks out persons who have fled to Canton and executes them. The same is true of the peasant movement in Nan-hai 南海 *hsien* and Hua-hsien. *There is no need to mention Hai-lu-feng here!* In Ch'ing-yüan *hsien* they arrest people, charge fines and release them only to arrest them again on some other peasant's charge."¹¹⁷

As these quotations indicate, Hai-lu-feng's peasant union was well known as being extremely radical in comparison to the other peasant unions in Kwangtung Province. It was not until the time of the Joint Conference of the Party Center and the Provincial Party Organs of the Kuomintang, which was held in October 1926 under the leadership of the left wing, that the Kuomintang was able officially to advocate the 25 percent reduction of rent.¹¹⁸

P'eng P'ai and the Northern Expedition

P'eng P'ai's Participation in the Northern Expedition

When the Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army began in July 1926, P'eng P'ai was the leader of the whole peasant movement in Kwangtung Province, as Chief of the Provincial Peasant Department of Kwangtung, in the

¹¹⁷ Ho Yang-ling, *op. cit.*, 3:82 *et seq.* Italics mine.

¹¹⁸ SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 534.

Kuomintang organization.¹¹⁹ In the Communist organization he was a member of the Provincial Committee of Kwangtung.¹²⁰ He seems to have had no position in the central headquarters of the Kuomintang: in March 1926 meetings of the Committee for Peasant Movements of the Central Peasants' Department were held. While there were such famous Communist leaders as Lin Tsu-han (Chief of the Peasants' Department), Mao Tse-tung, Yuan Hsiao-hsien, Lo Ch'i-yuan and Hsiao Ch'u-nü among those indicated as committee members, P'eng P'ai's name was not included.¹²¹ The sixth term of the Peasant Movement Training Institute was held from May to October 1926. P'eng's name does not appear among the list of lecturers in the sixth term. But there was a class entitled "The Situations of the Peasant Movement in Hai-feng and Tung-chiang" during this term.¹²² As it is assumed that nobody but P'eng P'ai could qualify to give this lecture, there is a possibility that he might have been temporarily attached to the Institute.

As the actual leader of the whole peasant movement in Kwangtung, he did not participate in the Northern Expedition in July, but at the end of 1926 he led a few hundred peasants from Kwangtung all the way to Hankow where he joined Ho Lung 賀龍's troops.¹²³

The Fifth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

After the April 12 *coup d'état*, when the Communist organizations in Shanghai and Canton were destroyed, Chiang Kai-shek established the Nanking Government. However, the left wing Kuomintang maintained its alliance with the Communists in the Wuhan Government. In Wuhan the Fifth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held openly from April 27 to May 6, P'eng P'ai attended the congress and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Party.

Before that, the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern was held in Moscow from November 29 to December 16, 1926. Delighted with the unexpected success and development of the peasant movement in China, the enlarged plenum approved a new strategy for the Chinese revolution.¹²⁴ From that time until September in 1927 when the Comintern—led by Stalin—was forced to realize that ultimately a split with the Kuomintang was inevitable, the principles of its policy towards the Chinese revolution concerning peasant problems could be summarized as follows:

¹¹⁹ Cf., Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 209.

¹²⁰ Yü Te, *op. cit.*, 50.

¹²¹ *Chung-kuo nung-min*, Nos. 4 and 5.

¹²² *The Peasant Movement during the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, 22.

¹²³ Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), 185, 205.

¹²⁴ Eudin and North, *op. cit.*, 356–364; Gaimushō Jōhōbu, *op. cit.*, 156–171.

1. The Communist Party should not split with the Kuomintang;
2. The peasant demands should be met, especially the reallocation of land which should be carried out boldly;
3. It was still too early to call for the convening of *soviets*.

The actual events of the Chinese revolution proved that the more boldly the peasant demands were met, the more the danger of a split increased. The first and second principles were in contradiction and the Chinese Communist Party was on the horns of this dilemma. The success of the Chinese Communist Party solely depended upon political tactics which would effectively balance these two elements. Neither the Comintern nor the Chinese Communist Party seemed to be fully aware of these political dynamics.¹²⁵ The Comintern might not have insisted that the Chinese Communist Party should enforce these two principles simultaneously if it had understood the political problems of the Chinese revolution as well as it did at the time of the formation of the anti-Japanese united front in 1935–37. In 1926–27 the authority of the Comintern over the Chinese Communist Party was absolute, and it is understandable that the Chinese Communists were perplexed by this directive.¹²⁶ Thus, the Chinese Communist policy was divided into two schools: one favored more attention to the first principle—the so-called rightist; the other advocated adherence to the second principle—the so-called leftist. In discussing the land question at the Fifth National Congress three opinions appeared:

1. In considering the political situation, only the landed property of the anti-revolutionary elements should be confiscated;
2. All the landed property of the large landowners should be confiscated. The small landowners and the officers of the revolutionary army should be excepted from this confiscation;

¹²⁵ Stalin expressed his opinion concerning these two principles at the meeting of the Chinese Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on November 30, 1926. "I know that there are Kuomintangists and even Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to unleash a revolution in the countryside, since they fear that if the peasantry were drawn into the revolution it would disrupt the united anti-imperialist front. That is a profound error, comrades. The more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China will be. The authors of the thesis, especially Tan P'ing-shan 譚平山 and Rafes, are quite right in maintaining that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasants is an essential condition for the victory of the Chinese revolution." *Works of J. V. Stalin*, 12 vols. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), 8:385.

¹²⁶ Cf. Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 63 *et seq.* Robert C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952; 2nd ed., 1963), 91 *et seq.*

3. All the landed property should be confiscated.¹²⁷

Those who advocated the third proposal were Lo Ch'i-yuan, P'eng P'ai,¹²⁸ and Mao Tse-tung.¹²⁹ Shortly before the convening of the Fifth Congress, the Joint Conference of Peasants in All Provinces was held in Wuhan, in which Mao Tse-tung, P'eng P'ai, Fang Chih-min 方志敏 and others participated. Mao Tse-tung proposed a thesis which included recommendations for widespread redistribution of land. Mao related to Edgar Snow, "A resolution was passed adopting my proposal for submission to the Fifth Conference [Congress] of the Communist Party. The Central Committee, however, rejected it."¹³⁰ The Fifth Congress passed the second proposal. Although the third proposal was rejected, the Congress established the National Peasant Union, Mao Tse-tung was appointed head of this organization,¹³¹ and P'eng P'ai became a member of its tentative executive committee.¹³²

The Southern March of the Troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing 葉挺

The continuous attacks against the Communists in 1927 culminated in a rupture of Communist-Wuhan Government relations. The Comintern was puzzled by these new developments. They modified their directive and ordered the Chinese Communist Party to establish a third government. On August 1 the first Communist insurrection in China was led at Nanchang 南昌 by Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing. However, the Comintern did not allow the Chinese Communists either to establish soviets or to split from the "Revolutionary Kuomintang" (left-wing Kuomintang). As a result even the anti-Communist Chang Fa-k'uei, and Huang Ch'i-hsiang 黃琪翔 were appointed absentee members of the Revolutionary Committee when it was organized in Nanchang immediately after this uprising. P'eng P'ai was also appointed a committee member, holding the position of Workers' Commissar. Upon the insistence of the Comintern, the August 7 Emergency Conference was called for the purpose of excommunicating Ch'en Tu-hsiu and promulgating a new policy. This was the beginning of the policy called the "Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai 瞿秋白 Line."

It would seem that P'eng P'ai did not attend this conference, although one source says: "... On August 7, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Li Lisan, P'eng P'ai (later executed), T'an P'ing-shan, Yün Pei-ying [probably Yün Tai-

¹²⁷ Gaimushō 外務省, Tōa-kyoku Daini-ka 東亞局第二課 (Second Section, Bureau of Eastern Asia, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Chūgoku kakumei* 中國革命 (Chinese Revolution), a Japanese version of Pavel Mif, *Chinese Revolution* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1934), 215-216.

¹²⁸ KUWAJIMA, *op. cit.*, 90.

¹²⁹ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, revised ed. (New York: Modern Library, 1944), 162.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ But another source indicates that the head was T'an Yen-k'ai 譚延闓. SUZUE, *op. cit.*, 169.

¹³² Yü Te, *op. cit.*, 50.

ying 惲代英]. Chou En-lai 周恩來 and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai assembled in Nanchang and held an emergency conference there...."¹³³ Other more reliable sources indicate that P'eng P'ai, Li Li-san, T'an P'ing-shan, Yün Tai-ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao 張國燾, Chou En-lai and others were in Nanchang at the time of the uprising,¹³⁴ but it is highly improbable that the August 7 Emergency Conference was held in Nanchang. Since the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing began the retreat from Nanchang on August 5, it would seem impossible that a conference would have been held there on August 7. Also there is some doubt as to whether this conference could have been held in the area around Nanchang which was under the control of the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing. If the conference had been held in an area under the control of these troops, why should these leaders have remained in the north instead of accompanying the retreating troops southward? This source seems to confuse the August 7 Emergency Conference with the Front Committee or the Revolutionary Committee attached to the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing.

Other sources suggest that the Emergency Conference was held in Kiukiang. This opinion is supported by most pre-war Japanese Foreign Office sources¹³⁵ and contemporary books from Mainland China¹³⁶; still other sources maintain that it was

¹³³ Ōsaka taishi keizai renmei 大阪對支經濟聯盟 (Osaka League of Economic Activities towards China), ed., *So-renpō to Shina Manshū no kyōsan undō* ソ聯邦と支那滿州の共產運動 (The Communist Movements in the Soviet Union, China and Manchuria) (Tokyo, Shinkō-sha 新光社, 1934), 314. Another source, which shows the "Nanchang" opinion, is SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 245.

¹³⁴ Kuo Mo-jo 郭沫若 proves in his memoirs that P'eng P'ai, Li Li-san, T'an P'ing-shan, Chou En-lai, and Yün Tai-ying were in Nanchang. Kuo Mo-jo, *Hai-tao* 海濤 (Billows) (Shanghai: Hsin-wen-yi ch'u-pan-she 新文藝出版社, 1951), 31-33. Chu Teh told Agnes Smedley, "Liu Po-cheng 劉伯承 was chairman of the Front Committee and Chou En-lai the vice-chairman. Other members were Yeh Chien-ying 葉劍英, Li Li-san, and Chang Kuo-tao party leaders, and Tan Ping-shan, and Lin Tsu-han." Smedley, *op. cit.*, 201.

¹³⁵ It is assumed that the origin of this "Kiukiang" opinion among the Japanese sources was KUWAJIMA, *op. cit.*, 91.

¹³⁶ Liang Han-ping 梁寒冰, *Chung-kuo hsien-tai ko-ming-shih chiao-hsüeh ti-kang* 中國現代革命史教學提綱 (Lecture Outline of the Revolutionary History of Modern China) (Tientsin: T'ung-su ch'u-pan-she 通俗出版社, 1955), 87. Ho Kan-chih 何幹之, *Chung-kuo hsien-tai ko-ming-shih* 中國現代革命史 (Revolutionary History of Modern China) (Peking: Kao-tung chiao-yü ch'u-pan-she 高等教育出版社, 1957), 1:124. The sources from mainland China do not give details about this Emergency Conference. There is a Chinese version of a part of Snow's *Red Star over China* which was published in 1947 by a Communist publisher in Ta-lien, in which the part giving some of the names of the attempts at the conference was left out. One may wonder whether there was any specific reason to keep names secret.

held in Hankow.¹³⁷ As P'eng P'ai was in Nanchang at that time, it makes little difference whether the conference was held in Hankow or Kiukiang, since he could not have been in either place.

In spite of the Comintern's expectation that "A new revolutionary center [was] being formed,"¹³⁸ the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing were surrounded by anti-communist forces only five days after the inception of the insurrection, and were forced to withdraw from Nanchang to the Tung-chiang Region in Kwangtung.¹³⁹ P'eng P'ai followed the troops. He probably was disgruntled by their moderate attitude toward agrarian problems. The Central Political Bureau did not accept the proposal of Ts'ai Ho-shen 蔡和森 at the Emergency Conference that the land in Nanchang should be confiscated and that the troops should not retreat.¹⁴⁰ The Revolutionary Committee of the Ho Lung-Yeh T'ing Troops led by T'an P'ing-shan,¹⁴¹ established the following points as its agrarian policy¹⁴²:

1. Confiscation of the land of those who own more than two hundred *mou* 畝;
2. Reduction of rent to 30 percent of the gross harvest;
3. Prohibition of the execution of "local rascals" and "oppressive gentry" by the workers and peasants;
4. No more confiscation of the property of the "local rascals" and "oppressive gentry."

These policies were much less radical than P'eng P'ai's known inclinations.

Shortly after the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing took Swatow, they suffered a severe defeat at T'ang-k'eng 湯坑 and Liu-sha 流沙 near Swatow, and disintegrated. T'an P'ing-shan¹⁴³ and Yeh T'ing fled to Hong Kong.¹⁴⁴ Chou En-lai, Ho Lung and the other leaders who remained held a conference at Liu-sha at which they decided that the armed troops should retreat to Hai-lu-feng and that the unarmed per-

¹³⁷ Gaimushō, Jōhōbu, *Chūgoku kyōsantō sen-kyūhyaku-sanjū-go-nen shi* 中國共產黨一九三五年史 (History of the Chinese Communist Party in the Year 1935) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1936), 640. TACHIBANA Shiraki, *op. cit.*, 243. Li-Ang 李昂, *Hung-seh wu-t'ai* 紅色舞臺 (Red Stage) (Chungking: Sheng-li ch'u-pan-she 勝利出版社, 1942), 18.

¹³⁸ *Imprecor* (August 18, 1927).

¹³⁹ Kuo Mo-jo, *op. cit.*, 31.

¹⁴⁰ Ts'ai Ho-shen 蔡和森, "Tō to hiyorimishugi 黨と日和見主義 (The Party and Opportunism)," in *Shina kakumei ronbun-shū* (A Collection of Articles on the Chinese Revolution), translated into Japanese by YAMAGUCHI Shin'ichi (Tokyo: Marukusu shobō, 1930), 171.

¹⁴¹ Kuo Mo-jo, *op. cit.*, 33.

¹⁴² TACHIBANA Shiraki, *op. cit.*, 254. SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 265. ŌTSUKA Reizō 大塚令三, *Shina kyōsantō-shi* 支那共產黨史 (History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Seikatsu-sha 生活社, 1940), 1:74.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁴⁴ Asiaticus, "Autobiography of General Yeh T'ing," *Amerasia* 5/1 (March 1941).

sonnel should make their escape to the sea coast with the aid of the peasants.¹⁴⁵ Ho Lung and Chou En-lai fled to Hong Kong,¹⁴⁶ while the remaining 800 troops, under the leadership of Tung Lang 董朗 and Yen Ch'ang-i 顏昌頤, made their way to Hai-lu-feng.¹⁴⁷ They arrived there in about the middle of October 1927.

In September the Chinese Communist Party had broken away from the "frame of the Kuomintang." "The center of the Communist Party... recognizes that [the policy statement went on] the uprising under the flag of the leftist Kuomintang in the resolution of August should be abolished."¹⁴⁸ The Comintern also agreed to the establishment of soviets.¹⁴⁹ In November the center of the Party decided to confiscate all lands.¹⁵⁰

These decisions indicate that the leadership of the Party was approaching the policies, which had already been realized in Hai-lu-feng during the previous two years.

The First and Second Hai-lu-feng Insurrections

The First Insurrection

In the spring of 1927 the Branch Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Kwangtung¹⁵¹ was already aware of the danger of a Kuomintang-Communist split. Up to this time there had been only two companies (two or three hundred men)¹⁵² of the peasant self-defence corps, under the command of Wu Chen-min, in Hai-lu-feng. Now they decided to train more cadres in order to organize a larger peasant self-defence corps and to appropriate 75 percent of the total peasant union income for armaments.¹⁵³ Wu Chen-min went to Canton to get the directives of the Branch (later Provincial) Committee.¹⁵⁴

The attack on the Communists began in Canton on April 15, 1927, only three days after the April 12 *coup d'état* in the Shanghai area. As this was earlier than the Communists had expected, and communications between Hai-lu-feng and Canton were severed, the Hai-lu-feng Local Committee had to prepare itself alone against

¹⁴⁵ Kuo Mo-jo, *op. cit.*, 35-36.

¹⁴⁶ Robert Elegant, *China's Red Masters* (New York: Twayne, 1951), 108.

¹⁴⁷ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 72-74; Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 151.

¹⁴⁸ SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 249.

¹⁴⁹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, revised ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 281.

¹⁵⁰ This decision is discussed below.

¹⁵¹ Later changed to Provincial Committee. The Hai-lu-feng Committee was one of the local committees under its jurisdiction.

¹⁵² Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 204.

¹⁵³ The armaments objective was realized on a very small scale. Anon., *op. cit.*, 11.

¹⁵⁴ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 203.

the expected attack. A special Communist organ, the Tung-chiang Special Committee, was organized in secret in addition to the official Party organ, the Hai-lu-feng District Committee. The Communists formed an underground military organization known as the Workers and Peasants Party Relief Army 工農救黨軍.¹⁵⁵

At dawn on May 1, 1927, the Communists arose. The police and the salt guards were disarmed and all the officials were arrested. There was no opposition from the anti-Communist group in the town of Hai-feng. Although the power was held by the Tung-chiang Special Committee, the administrative machinery operated officially by means of the Kuomintang Party Relief Committee, the People's *hsien* Committee, and the Peoples' Ward Committee. The Revolutionary Judicial Committee was organized in order to suppress so-called anti-revolutionary activities. But regardless of the fact that the Judicial Committee had been established, peasants were allowed to maltreat so-called anti-revolutionaries at will. Most of the officials and the important "anti-revolutionaries" were executed by the peasants without due process of law.¹⁵⁶ The members of the People's *hsien* Committee in Hai-feng were Yang Ch'i-shan, Li Kuo-chen, Yang Wang, Cheng Chih-yün, Ch'en Shun-i, Ma Huan-hsin 馬換新, Ch'en Tzu-ch'i 陳子岐 and others. The members of the People's *hsien* Committee in Lu-feng were Chang Wei 張威, Chuang Meng-hsiang 莊夢祥, Lin T'ieh-shih 林鐵史,¹⁵⁷ Ch'en Ku-sun 陳谷蓀 and others.¹⁵⁸

The main body of troops, led by Wu Chen-min, consisted of 200 men equipped with one cannon and "new-style guns."¹⁵⁹ There was a battalion of peasant troops that had been hastily raised by Lin Tao-wen and a number of self-defence corps scattered among the villages, but these were armed with only 1,000 guns, bamboo spears, spades and the like.¹⁶⁰ They had been unsuccessful in their attempts to secure arms before the uprising. The only source of supply, outside of capture, was small contraband shipments through Hong Kong.¹⁶¹ On May 9 they were attacked by a regiment commanded by Liu Ping-ts'ui. Over 3,000 troops under the command of Wu Chen-min were defeated at Fen-shui-ao 分水凹 and immediately the town of Hai-feng was captured by the Kuomintang army. The people called this the "ten days'

¹⁵⁵ Anon., *op. cit.*, 13-16.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁵⁷ Lin T'ieh-shih 林鐵史 was educated at Keiō University 慶應義塾大學 in Tokyo (from a registration file of Keiō University).

¹⁵⁸ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 55. Kuo-min ko-ming-chün, *op. cit.*, 30.

¹⁵⁹ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 204. Anon., *op. cit.*, 21.

¹⁶⁰ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 57. Ts'ai Ting-li, secretary of Chang Shan-ming at this time, told Nym Wales, "Nearly every day I saw peasants who had been hurt by their own home-made guns. The bullets flew back and wounded them. Most of them used bamboo pikes with an iron tip." Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 204.

¹⁶¹ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 31, 98; Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 202.

rule." But the rural villages around Hai-feng were still in Communist hands and Liu was prudent enough not to march into these areas carelessly. The Communist troops failed in three successive attempts to recapture Hai-feng. Two of these attempts failed because Wu Chen-min, with the main body of troops, did not act according to the tactics agreed upon.¹⁶²

The results of these engagements were far-reaching. The landlords, merchants and officials, who had fled to Hong Kong and Macao, began to return as their fellows became bolder and bolder. All previous rights, including Ch'en Chiung-ming's property, were restored.¹⁶³ On the other hand, there was a growing antipathy for and distrust of Wu Chen-min among the peasants, who were beginning to lose confidence in their own strength.¹⁶⁴ As has been mentioned, the leadership of the Communist Party still hoped to maintain its alliance with the Wuhan government, and as a result had not yet made its agrarian policy clear. Nevertheless, the Communists in Hai-lu-feng proclaimed, "Whenever the officials of the reactionary military, administrative and tax organizations, tax collectors, informers, spies, soldiers, and cooks and servants of reactionary associations are found, they should be executed. Their families should be exiled and all their livestock should be confiscated."¹⁶⁵ This radical policy was a futile attempt to combat the anti-Communist forces as the Communists were gradually forced into the mountainous regions.

At the same time, as all hope of recapturing Hai-feng was lost, a new uprising occurred in Wu-hua *hsien* to the north of Hai-feng. However, it failed. As the Tung-chiang Special Committee was informed that there were only two companies of anti-Communist troops in Wu-hua, they ordered Wu Chen-min and the main body of the revolutionary army to march north on May 21, 1927. Unexpectedly, Wu and his troops were pursued by a large anti-Communist force, before which they fled to the north along the route of their march to Wu-hua. Wu Chen-min's force arrived at Ling-*hsien* 酈縣, via Mei-*hsien* 梅縣, Chiao-ling 潯鄆, Hsün-wu 蕪嶺, Hui-ch'ang 會昌, I-tu 彝都 and Shang-yu 上猶. They were temporarily stationed there as Ho Chien's anti-Communist troops controlled the area to the north. Wu Chen-min sent Lin Su and others to Wuhan. They arrived in the beginning of July in Wuhan, where they met P'eng P'ai. Immediately after this the Wuhan government decided to split with the Communists and Wu Chen-min had to retreat from Ling-*hsien*. In order to avoid attack by anti-Communist troops they moved continuously from one place to another until they arrived at Ju-ch'eng 汝城 where they joined a local peasant

¹⁶² Anon., *op. cit.*, 22-23. It is assumed that the story of the abortive attack on the town of Hai-feng, which was described in Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 206 *et seq.*, dealt with this third attack, though it gave the date as the 15th or 16th day of the Seventh Month in the lunar calendar.

¹⁶³ Nym Wales, *ibid.*, 205.

¹⁶⁴ Anon., *op. cit.*, 24.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

army.¹⁶⁶ Later they were defeated by Fan Shih-sheng 范石生's troops, Wu Chen-min was killed, and the remainder of his army probably joined Chu Teh's 朱德 troops.¹⁶⁷

The Second Insurrection

The landlords' control of the villages immediately raised the problem of rents. As the peasants in Hai-lu-feng had paid very low rents or no rent at all since the autumn of 1925, the increase of rent instituted by the landlords was intolerable to them. Taking advantage of the discontent that began to spread from village to village the Party began a propaganda campaign utilizing the slogan of "Land for the tillers." The movement against paying rents began to spread and peasant executions of landlords and "anti-revolutionaries" increased.¹⁶⁸

In the middle of August the news that the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing were marching southward reached Hai-lu-feng, together with the directive for the Autumn Harvest Insurrection 秋收暴動.¹⁶⁹ Therefore the Communists decided upon September 1 as the time for a new insurrection. By that time Liu Ping-ts'ui's regiment had left Hai-lu-feng for Hui-chou and one company of soldiers and about 1,000 irregulars were all that remained of the anti-Communist forces. After they had captured Kung-p'ing 公平 and Mei-lung the peasant corps took the town of Lu-feng on September 8. This was a fruitful day for the peasants, with the capture of fifty-nine anti-Communist soldiers and their equipment.¹⁷⁰ The peasant corps controlled all of the Hai-lu-feng district except for 1,200 "anti-revolutionary" troops who were besieged in the town of Hai-feng. The assault developed into hand-to-hand combat as the peasants' ammunition was exhausted. The peasant corps was able to occupy Hai-feng only after the "anti-revolutionary" forces withdrew of their own accord on September 17.¹⁷¹ Expecting a strong counter-attack, the Party established a base in the mountainous district bordering Hai-feng, Lu-feng, Hui-yang and Tzu-chin *hsiens*. They explained their new revolutionary policy as follows:

¹⁶⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yüen-tung*, 59-65.

¹⁶⁷ Fan Cho 范卓, "Ta-ko-ming ch'ien-hou ko-ming tou-cheng te p'ien-tuan hui-i 大革命前後革命鬭爭的片斷回憶 (Memoirs of Episodes of the Revolutionary Struggles around the Period of the Great Revolution)," in the above-cited *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang tsai Chung-nan-ti-ch'ü ling-tao ko-ming tou-cheng te li-shih tzu-liao*, 1:128-129, *vide* footnote 49 *ante*. Another false rumour was reported by Nym Wales, "About a hundred Hai-lu-feng corps men joined the Kiangsi army, and later a temporary people's government was established near Kiangsi at Swatow. Kuo Mo-jo and Soong Ching-ling were elected to this government. Wu Ching-ming [*sic*] led his Self-defence corps to attack Swatow with the Kiangsi troops and was killed in battle in the winter of 1927." Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 204-205.

¹⁶⁸ Anon., *op. cit.*, 29-31.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁷⁰ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yüen-tung*, 66-67.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 66-69.

- “1. In contrast to the former people’s government, we have established a ‘Workers-Peasants’ Dictatorship,’ which government has as its sole task the extermination of anti-revolutionaries. Although we established a Revolutionary Judicial Committee as before, the people were free to execute traitors and the Judicial Committees handled extremely few cases.
2. As the result of our experience with several previous struggles, we realized that gentle treatment of the anti-revolutionary elements is futile. We often warned, ‘don’t let one slip away from the net, even if some be killed on false charge.’ Anti-revolutionary houses and villages were all to be destroyed or burned.
3. All the lands were confiscated and were re-allocated through the peasant union to peasants who had no land.
4. All the properties of anti-revolutionaries, including weaving factories of reactionaries and the total grain harvest of the landowners, were confiscated. Military expenses were levied from all the merchants and wealthy. As we effected a land revolution and established a government of a Workers-Peasants’ Dictatorship, we classified small landowners and merchants as reactionaries.
5. The problem of armaments has not been solved successfully.
6. Some of the peasants of Lu-feng, seeing the extremes of our levies, executions, and burnings, and our recommendations to them for violence, have said ‘if you go to extremes the peasant union will fail.’ Our major defect is our lack of skill in agitation.
7. Our comrades in the Party have been too fond of fighting and arresting reactionaries and we have been lax in discipline within the Party itself.”¹⁷²

In Hai-lu-feng a “revolutionary government” within the framework of the Kuomintang and in alliance with the bourgeoisie, which the Comintern and the leadership of the Party were still advocating, was out of the question. Although the Party organization in Hai-lu-feng did not use the name *soviet*, the actual connotation of the word was completely realized in this remote area.

According to their prepared plan, the Communists retreated to a base in a mountainous district when the anti-Communist troops marched towards Hai-lu-feng on September 25. The Communists commented on this retreat: “The peasants and the peasant corps should not be ordered to retreat, but only to march. This one retreat affected the morale of the masses and the peasant corps, therefore most of the plans were not realized.”¹⁷³

As on previous occasions the anti-Communist forces recovered only the towns

¹⁷² Anon., *op. cit.*, 34–36.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 38.

of Hai-feng, Lu-feng and Shan-wei, while most of the rural district remained under the control of the Communists. The anti-Communist forces were reluctant to occupy the rural district, knowing how ineffective this would be. This situation brought about a recovery of peasant morale to some extent, and the news that the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing had reached the Swatow area raised their morale to its highest point.¹⁷⁴

The Remnants of the Troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing

The Front Committee of the Ho Lung-Yeh T'ing troops sent a message requesting the recruitment of 2,000 soldiers in Hai-lu-feng. The Party in Hai-lu-feng decided to exceed the request and recruit 3,000. The first group of 700 men, who left Hai-lu-feng without arms, was checked by "anti-revolutionary" forces while on their way. Meanwhile the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing were defeated disastrously. A sizeable part of the troops who fled to Lu-feng surrendered there to the anti-Communist force, to the deep disappointment of the Communist organization at the mountainous base.

The Communist organization dispatched six patrols to search for other remnants, and finally rounded up about 800 demoralized soldiers, with ragged uniforms and without tents, hats or shoes. They supplied these soldiers with food and clothes and gave medical treatment to the wounded, thus attempting to revive their morale. As there was still the chance of these soldiers taking service with the "progressive warlords," the Hai-lu-feng Party organization endeavored to persuade them to respect the potentialities of the peasants and to work for the expansion of Communist influence in the rural districts.¹⁷⁵ It is understandable, however, that there must have been a great difference in the outlook of the Hai-lu-feng troops and the Ho Lung-Yeh T'ing troops.

After the morale of the soldiers revived, they were reorganized into the Second Division of the Workers-Peasant Revolutionary Army. The reallocation of ammunition gave forty bullets to each soldier, and even though the machine-gun which these troops had brought with them was the strongest weapon the Hai-lu-feng revolutionary organization had,¹⁷⁶ they were preparing a new insurrection.

The Formation of the Soviet Government

The Third Insurrection

The conflict in Canton between Li Chi-shen 李濟深¹⁷⁷ and Chang Fa-k'uei brought a

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 38-39.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 41-43.

¹⁷⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 74-75.

¹⁷⁷ Formerly Li Chi-ch'en.

rapid assembly of the Kuomintang troops in the Hai-lu-feng area at the town of Hai-feng beginning on October 29, 1927. On November 1 they withdrew from the town. The peasant corps, having been in readiness for action, took advantage of this event to capture the towns of Kung-p'ing, Mei-lung and Shan-wei. On November 1 they occupied the town of Hai-feng, and controlled all Hai-feng *hsien* except the town of Chieh-sheng. Chia-tzu 甲子, Lu-feng and Chieh-shih 礪石 fell into their hands, leading finally to the capture of Chieh-sheng on November 19.¹⁷⁸

The Tung-chiang Special Committee established a temporary Revolutionary Government, and appointed Yang Ch'i-shan, Ch'en Shun-i, Lin Tao-wen, Ch'en Tzu-ch'i, Yang Wang, Lin T'ieh-shih, and Cheng Chih-yün to the Presidium. The Revolutionary Government introduced a violent persecution of the landowners and all persons who had compromised with the landowners. According to the official decision of the Party, they were "to exterminate all the landowners."¹⁷⁹

The Establishment of the Hai-feng Soviet Government

A General Conference of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers in Hai-feng *hsien* was held publicly from November 18 to 21. According to Communist reports the delegates to the conference were of the following categories: peasants, 60 percent; workers, 30 percent; and soldiers, 10 percent. The categories of the delegates from the town of Shan-wei, however, were: workers, 60 percent; peasants, 30 percent; and soldiers, 10 percent, because there were more workers in a harbor town such as Shan-wei.¹⁸⁰ P'eng P'ai figured that the number of members of peasant families in Hai-feng, in general, amounted to 56,000 out of a total number of 70,000 and more families.¹⁸¹ On the assumption that there was no difference in size between a worker and a peasant family, 80 percent of the total population in Hai-feng were peasants, and the percentage of the workers was far less than 20. Therefore, this allocation of the delegates was remarkably favorable to the workers.

On November 18 the meeting was begun with an opening speech by the Chairman, Ch'en Shun-i. Speeches were made by P'eng P'ai, the representative of the Chinese Communist Party; Tung Lang, the Commander of the Second Division of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army; Liu Ch'in-hsi 劉琴西, the repre-

¹⁷⁸ Anon., *op. cit.*, 44-48, 60.

¹⁷⁹ Anon., *op. cit.*, 43. Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 207-208.

¹⁸⁰ Anon., *loc. cit.*

¹⁸¹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, 44.

representative of the Tung-chiang Revolutionary Committee¹⁸²; Yang Wang, the representative of the *hsien* Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Hai-feng; and Chueh Wu 覺悟, the representative of the Local Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps in Hai-lu-feng. P'eng P'ai read a long, triumphant political report.¹⁸³

On November 19 drafts for "The Confiscation of Land," "The Extermination of Local Rascals and Oppressive Gentry," "Reforms of Laborers' Life" and others were discussed. During the session the fall of Chieh-sheng was reported. They shouted for joy, and in the name of the General Conference they telegraphed their orders to exterminate the anti-revolutionaries and to convey all prisoners of war to the town of Hai-feng the next day. Discussions were continued on November 20. The session was shifted to receive as a group the corps on its triumphant return. After the closing of the session, more than thirty prisoners were executed.¹⁸⁴ On November 21 all drafts were passed. Ch'en Shun-i, Yang Wang and eleven other members of the Committee of the Soviet Government were elected as were Lin Pin 林彬 and thirteen other members of the Judicial Committee of the Soviet.

Administrative System

The General Conference of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers in Lu-feng *hsien* was held on November 13,¹⁸⁵ and Lin T'ieh-shih and others were elected to the Committee of the Soviet.¹⁸⁶ Hai-feng *hsien* was divided into nine wards, Lu-feng *hsien* into five wards. Each ward had a ward soviet, under the jurisdiction of which there were village wards.¹⁸⁷ Special wards were established in Hui-yan *hsien* and Tzu-chin *hsien*.¹⁸⁸ There seemed to be no central administrative office to integrate these soviet governments.¹⁸⁹ "Hai-lu-feng soviet" was not a designation of a specific government office. In place of such an office, the Tung-chiang Special Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was the actual center for the integration of these sovi-

¹⁸² As for the "revolutionary committee," the November Resolution of the politburo reads as follows: "The guerrilla peasant movement is to attack and to move in turn, and therefore its leading organ is the revolutionary committee which has the character of a temporary government. In short, when a peasant uprising takes place, the revolutionary committee elected from peasant unions or other secret peasant organizations in this area leads it. In case of an urban uprising, the revolutionary committee elected from trade unions and others does the same task." TACHIBANA Shiraki, *op. cit.*, 263. Another Japanese version of this part of the resolution is cited in SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 260.

¹⁸³ Anon., *op. cit.*, 59; Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 79-80.

¹⁸⁴ Anon., *op. cit.*, 57.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 84-85.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 84-86.

¹⁸⁹ KUWAJIMA Kazue, *op. cit.*, 281.

ets. The Secretary of the Committee was P'eng P'ai, and the Committee members were Wang Pei 王備, Li Shen 黎深, Cheng Chih-yün, Ch'en Ch'ih-hua 陳赤華, Lin Tao-wen, Yang Wang, Lin T'ieh-shih, Wang Shu-t'ang 王樹棠, Wang Huai-tung 王懷棟, Chang Wei and others. The Chief of the Committee Office was Wang Pei; the Chief of the Military Committee, Yen Ch'ang-i; the Chief of the Propaganda Committee, Ch'en Ch'ih-hua; and the Chief of the Economic Committee, Ch'en Tzu-ch'i.¹⁹⁰

The Party organizations under the jurisdiction of the Tung-chiang Special Committee were the *hsien* Committee of Hai-feng (Secretary, a man called Ch'en 陳) the *hsien* Committee of Lu-feng (Secretary, Lin T'ieh-shih) and the Tung-chiang Party School. Among the teachers of the school were Ch'en Ch'ih-hua, Huang Yung 黃雍, two Koreans, Hsien Sheng 咸聲 and Chang Pei-hsing 張北星. Under the *hsien* committees were ward committees, village committees and party cells.¹⁹¹ In addition there were the Communist Youth Corps, the Pioneers and many mass organizations such as peasant unions and workers' unions.

Political power was concentrated in P'eng P'ai. Kim San 金山 told Nym Wales:

"This Soviet government was actually a democratic dictatorship, and P'eng understood how to manage this form of government. He was a revolutionary dictator with plenary powers, but he derived these from the consent of the people. They followed him. He did not command but influenced people to vote for his ideas—as a democrat should. If ever one man was in control, P'eng was in control of the Hailofeng [Hai-lu-feng] Soviet, yet he never thought of himself in this light at all, but believed in and jealously guarded the majority decision.

"P'eng had a staff, but it always followed him, and all the Party conferences and the mass meetings voted along his line, though he encouraged free discussion at all times. I remember that one day P'eng explained his principles of government to me, saying, 'We must centralize all powers at one given point. But if this is not based upon a foundation of mass democracy, it will be no firmer than bean-curd.'"¹⁹²

Chung I-mou wrote about Wang Pei. "He was dignified and scarcely smiled. It was said that his power was so great that he often admonished the comrades of the Red Army, and was fond of saying 'iron discipline and grandeur of the proletariat.'"¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 86, 97.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 86–87.

¹⁹² Kim San and Nym Wales, *Song of Ariran: The Life History of a Korean Rebel* (New York: John Day, 1941), 243.

¹⁹³ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 75.

Military Forces of the Soviets

The main military force of the Hai-lu-feng soviet was the Second Division of the Red Army which numbered 800 men. In addition there were the Revolutionary Corps of Workers and Peasants commanded by Lin Tao-wen, and the Red Guards in the villages for self-defence.¹⁹⁴ The Revolutionary Corps numbered over 1,000 specially selected troops.¹⁹⁵ The Red Guards probably outnumbered the other two forces, but were inferior in armaments.

On January 7, 1928, new troops arrived in Hai-lu-feng. They were part of the troops which had taken part in the insurrection in Canton known as the Canton Commune.¹⁹⁶ These remnants had retreated from Canton and assembled at *Hua-hsien*, where they had been reorganized into the Fourth Division of the Red Army. Yeh Yung 葉鏞, who had been a senior captain, was appointed commander, and Wang K'an-yü 王侃予 was appointed the Party representative. They retreated through *Tsung-hua* 從化 and *Lung-men* 龍門 to Hai-lu-feng.¹⁹⁷ Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 徐向前, later an important general of the Red Army and an officer in the Fourth Division at that time, estimated that the total force of the Second and Fourth Divisions amounted to 2,000 men.¹⁹⁸ Deducting the 800 troops of the Second Division, it can be assumed that the Fourth Division numbered around 1,200 men. In contrast to the remnants of the troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, they were well-equipped; some had revolvers in addition to rifles, some had eyeglasses or fountain-pens.¹⁹⁹ The Fourth Division increased its size to 2,000 troops by recruiting fresh soldiers.²⁰⁰

The problem of securing adequate arms was insoluble since the area was surrounded by anti-Communist forces and the supply routes from outside were extremely tenuous. A small arsenal, which was built at the base of a mountain, could only repair small arms and produce a type of iron gun which could shoot two hundred meters. Many of the fighters were armed with these.²⁰¹ The metal for these arms was mainly obtained by using the metal in equipment captured from the enemy. In addition a hospital was erected at the base.²⁰²

¹⁹⁴ Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," 207.

¹⁹⁵ Anon., *op. cit.*, 51.

¹⁹⁶ Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 103. Another source indicates that they arrived on December 19. Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chantou," 210.

¹⁹⁷ Kuo-min ko-ming-chün, *op. cit.*, 87.

¹⁹⁸ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 157.

¹⁹⁹ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 104.

²⁰⁰ Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 110.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 98.

The Policies of the Soviets

The basic policies in these soviet areas were the same as those which the Party in Hai-lu-feng had carried out in the period after the success of the Second Eastern Expedition. In other words, the peasants were led in ruthless retaliation, and once the peasants were aroused, the Party did not control their violence. At the beginning of the suppression of the anti-revolutionaries, very few Red Guards could be found to serve as executioners. Consequently, the government had to pay two *ta-yang-yuan* in silver 大洋銀 for each execution, but half a month later the bonus for the executioners became unnecessary.²⁰³ Kim San wrote:

“‘Look at his white hands and face,’ the peasants said: ‘There is no mistake. He is a counter-revolutionary landlord’s son and a class enemy.’”

“‘I liked his face, which was open and innocent, and said I thought there was no crime on it and that perhaps he would be glad to join with the revolution against his own father. P’eng P’ai smiled and took me by the hand.

“‘You are just as young and innocent as he,’ he said. ‘Class justice is not personal but a necessary measure of civil war. We must kill more, not less, in case of doubt. You don’t know the cruelty in Hai-lu-feng under the landlords. If you had seen what I have, you would ask me no questions. The peasants are a hundred times less cruel than the landlords, and they have killed very, very few in comparison. The peasants know what is necessary for self-defence; if they do not destroy their class enemies they will lose morale and have doubt of the success of the revolution. This is their duty and yours.’”²⁰⁴

They intended to destroy all landlords and their families in a wave of executions, and through such extreme measures they attempted to incite the people’s taste for violent revolution. This closely resembled the opinion of Mao Tse-tung as expressed in his article “Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan” which was written in 1927:

“... a revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, courteous, restrained and mag-

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 102. A source from the revolutionary side indicates that the persons liable for execution were as follows: exploiting and corrupted officials, local rascals, oppressive gentry, landlords, spies, organizers, policemen, security guards, informers, tax-farmers, persons employed by enemy organs, persons who gave refuge to enemies and anti-revolutionaries, and persons who worked for the enemies. Anon., *op. cit.*, 82–83. Besides these, the sources from the anti-soviet side add the blind and the old. Kuo-min ko-ming-chün, *op. cit.*, 34; KUWAJIMA, *op. cit.*, 435.

²⁰⁴ Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 107.

animous.... To put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror to every rural area; otherwise one could never suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.²⁰⁵

Not only did the Party confiscate the property of the landlords, but it also confiscated that of the landed farmers, and then re-allocated this property to the tenants, as well as to the landed farmers. The labor law established a ten-hour work day for adults and an eight-hour work day for female and juvenile labor.²⁰⁶ According to the anonymous source of the "Hai-lu-feng Su-wei-ai 海陸豐蘇維埃," all previous taxation was abolished except for taxes on cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, butchering and luxuries, and unified tax rates were established,²⁰⁷ but no details are given. However, the government of the soviets must have incurred heavy military expenses. It may be that the major source of the government's income was from property confiscation and requisitions laid upon the petit-bourgeoisie and the small merchants.²⁰⁸ It was very useful for their finances on a short-range basis for the Party to regard the small merchants as its enemies and to confiscate their property, but from a long-range view it probably resulted in a restriction on the circulation of goods and increased shortages in the soviet areas.

The November Resolution of the Politburo

At the beginning of November, when the Revolutionary Corps in Hai-lu-feng had captured most of Hai-feng and Lu-feng, the Central Headquarters of the Party held a meeting of the enlarged plenum of the Political Bureau probably in Shanghai. This plenum passed a resolution known as the November Resolution. The Party had never held such an extreme leftist policy before. The pendulum of Party policy swung to the extreme left, in a reaction against the right-wing policy held by the Party up to the summer of 1927.

The resolution indicated that the tide of the revolution was still rising. Its basic principle was that the Party should organize the spontaneous uprisings of the peasants into a general insurrection, and this peasants' insurrection and an uprising of the working class should aid each other. Thus, the resolution decreed confiscation of all the landed property of the landlords, ruthless suppression of the gentry, the yellow unions and all other anti-revolutionaries, and establishment of a soviet government.

It was because of this policy change that T'an P'ing-shan, who was held to be

²⁰⁵ Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, 1:27.

²⁰⁶ Anon., *op. cit.*, 49, 80-84. It is doubtful that this labor law was carried out, because they had to raise the productivity of their poor industry to its maximum as they were tightly surrounded by the anti-revolutionary forces.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

responsible for the moderate policy of the Ho Lung-Yeh T'ing Army, was expelled from the Party. The Provincial Committee of the Party in Canton was warned severely, because it was held responsible for the following policy errors: the slogans of non-confiscation of any property which did not exceed fifty *mou*, and of 30 percent reduction of rent; the failure to let the peasants rise; the isolation of the uprising at Hai-nan 海南 and Lei-kao 雷高; the failure to organize the peasants in the Tung-chiang Region except at Pu-ning, Wu-hua and Hai-lu-feng. Mao Tse-tung was discharged as candidate member of the Temporary Central Political Bureau, on the charge of the moderation shown in his hesitation to exterminate the anti-revolutionaries and of other variant policies. The Tung-chiang Special Committee was not criticized.²⁰⁹

This resolution was simply the embodiment of the policies that the Hai-lu-feng Party organization had already realized or were realizing. For many years the Hai-lu-feng Party organization had held to a different policy from that of the Party center, whether consciously or unconsciously. Because of the location of Hai-lu-feng and also because of its historical background, these actual divergences had not brought about any vital conflicts. From the November Resolution on, the Party organization of Hai-lu-feng could say publicly that they were obeying the resolution of the Party center. However, they had reached this extreme left position not as a result of the November Resolution but previously on their own initiative.

The Breakdown

Temporary Stability

The territory of the Hai-lu-feng soviets was not attacked by any troops with modern equipment until the Battle of Ch'ih-shih in January 1928. In Canton political disturbances occurred one after another, including the conflicts between Li Chi-shen and Chang Fa-k'uei, the Canton Commune, conflicts between Chang Fa-k'uei and Ch'en Ming-shu 陳銘樞, etc.²¹⁰ Therefore, the enemy forces, which surrounded the Hai-lu-feng soviets, were the Volunteer Corps (Min-t'uan 民團),²¹¹ the security guards (Pao-an-tui 保安隊) and small bandit-like warlords. The Hai-lu-feng soviets, though

²⁰⁹ TACHIBANA Shiraki, *op. cit.*, 253 *et seq.*; SUZUE Gen'ichi, *op. cit.*, 250–270.

²¹⁰ There is circumstantial evidence which suggests that the commanders of the anti-revolutionary regular forces did not pay attention to these Hai-lu-feng soviets. Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh 蔡廷鍇 (or Ts'ai T'ing-kai), a general under Ch'en Ming-shu's 陳銘樞 command, raided Wu-hua 五華, Lao Lung 老隆 and Ho Yuan 河源 around the territory of the Hai-lu-feng soviets in this period. But he did not mention the soviets at all in his autobiography. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, *Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai tzu-ch'uan* 蔡廷鍇自傳 (Autobiography of Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai) (Hongkong: Tzu-yu hsün-k'an-she 自由旬刊社, 1946), 227–228.

²¹¹ A kind of self-defense corps under the control of the landlords.

they had inferior weapons, could easily compete with such forces and could even defeat them.²¹² But, an explosive development of the peasant movement such as appeared at the time of the Northern Expedition did not occur in the area around the Hai-lu-feng soviets.²¹³ Their territory was neither expanded nor reduced for a short time.

Optimism

The soviets were optimistic about their future prospects, even though they fully expected an attack by the anti-Communist forces and established a base in a mountainous district in preparation for it. It seems, however, that they were not prudent enough in their military calculations, and trusted too much in the revolutionary spirit of the peasants, who appeared to be enthusiastic.

They succeeded in repulsing the first heavy attack against them at Ch'ih-shih at the end of January, when they were raided by 2,000 troops of Ts'ai T'eng-hui 蔡騰輝²¹⁴ and Chung Hsiu-nan 鍾秀南. This victory seemingly confirmed their optimism. In a meeting which celebrated the victory, such slogans as "March to Swatow" or "March to Canton" were raised. The Tung-chiang Special Committee planned a large-scale insurrection throughout the whole Tung-chiang Region, but was unable to realize it.²¹⁵

The soviets were optimistically confident that the tide of revolution was still rising. That is to say, their belief expressed the confidence which characterized the November Resolution. Although the tide of revolution was in reality ebbing, and soon they would have to fight troops with modern equipment, they were unable to comprehend this fact. They decided that the period of suppression of the anti-revolutionaries had ended, and began to shift to a period of reconstruction. In order to realize this they reorganized the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Soviet into a People's Committee of the Soviet.²¹⁶

The Fall of the Town of Hai-feng

The end was near. After the retirement of Chang Fa-k'uei, Yü Han-mou 余漢謀, who was a general under the command of Ch'en Chi-t'ang 陳濟棠 and had attacked Chang Fa-k'uei, was able to maneuver against the soviets. On February 28, his 3,000 troops assaulted them. A regiment marched from Swatow, through Chieh-

²¹² Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 99 *et seq.* and 107 *et seq.*

²¹³ They tried to expand the area of the soviets and dispatched troops to Hui-yan *hsien*, but a month later these were forced to retreat by the anti-revolutionary force. Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 106.

²¹⁴ Kim San and Nym Wales mistook Ts'ai T'eng-hui for Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh (Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai). Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 111.

²¹⁵ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 109-114.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

yang 揭陽 and Ho-po 河婆, to Lu-feng and captured it. Another regiment made a surprise attack on Kung-p'ing, where a mass meeting of 30,000 people was being held. Several thousand persons were killed, and immediately the town of Hai-feng was occupied.²¹⁷

The majority of the 70,000 Red Guards were mobilized for the battlefield but were defeated with 1,000 casualties. On March 6, they attacked the town of Hai-feng unsuccessfully and were scattered and retreated to the mountainous districts. All the major points of the Hai-lu-feng district fell into the hands of the anti-red forces.²¹⁸

The Remnants

On May 3, all the revolutionary forces of the soviets attacked the town of Hai-feng, but they were defeated severely and scattered to the mountainous districts again. The Second and Fourth Divisions, which were the main force of the soviets and trusted by the peasants, were reduced to about three hundred men. The Fourth Division, which had consisted of 1,200 when it arrived in Hai-lu-feng, was reduced to a mere sixty.²¹⁹

Two sources indicate that after their defeat in May, P'eng P'ai, Cheng Chih-yün and others, who should have been the center of the resistance, were in Hui-lai *hsien* far to the east of Hai-lu-feng.²²⁰ If this is true it is understandable that no systematic resistance was organized after the leaders had left.

Ch'en Ming-shu stationed the Sixteenth Division of the National Revolutionary Army in Hai-lu-feng, in collaboration with Ts'ai Teng-hui's troops, to suppress the soviet force. The soviet revolutionary force, believing that surrender meant death, broke up into small groups of from several dozen to about six hundred and wandered around avoiding attack. However, although Yeh Yung, who was arrested on June 17, and Lin T'ieh-shih, who was arrested on July 6, were executed, and Yang Wang was arrested and shot on September 1, the uprising was still not entirely suppressed.²²¹

On February 25, 1929, the Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution which was drafted by Bukharin, Stalin, Hsiang Chung-fa 向忠發 and Li Li-san, and which criticized the November Resolution as left-putschism, and set forth new tactics for the revolution. Nevertheless, the power of the Communists in Hai-lu-feng could not be again recovered.

²¹⁷ Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 111.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 111-114.

²¹⁹ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 151.

²²⁰ Kim San and Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, 122.

²²¹ A report of the suppression was found in Kuo-min ko-ming-chün, *op. cit.*, 49-77. KUWAJIMA, *op. cit.*, 281.

The Later Period

Seemingly the Party tried to reorganize the scattered revolutionary groups in 1929.²²² It is said that P'eng P'ai returned to Hai-feng secretly.²²³ A Canton-Fukien Special Ward of Soviet²²⁴ existed, as did the Tung-chiang Revolutionary Committee.²²⁵ The leader was P'eng Kuei 彭桂, who commanded about 1,100 peasant soldiers in 1931. But in later years P'eng Kuei was assassinated and his soldiers disbanded.²²⁶ Another peasant force, led by Ku Ta-ts'un 古大存, consisted, in 1930, of 5,000 soldiers, 3,500 rifles, 2 cannons, 34 machine guns and 80 revolvers.²²⁷ The Ku Ta-ts'un troops, called the Eleventh Army, continued their activities until 1949. During the Sino-Japanese War they were called the Tung-chiang Corps (Tung-chiang tsung-tui 東江縱隊).

P'eng P'ai was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Moscow in 1928.²²⁸ He was appointed a member of the Provincial Committee in Kiangsu and Secretary of the Committee of Agriculture in Shanghai. On August 24, 1929, P'eng P'ai, with Yen Ch'ang-i and several other persons, was betrayed by Pai Hsin 白鑫, a former comrade in Hai-lu-feng, and was arrested. The Communists broke out of the prison in vain and P'eng P'ai was executed on August 30 or 31. In revenge, Pai Hsin was shot by a Communist on a street in Shanghai.²²⁹

Conclusion: Summary of the General Trend of Political Tactics

The political tactics of the Party Center (and of the Comintern), Mao Tse-tung and Hai-lu-feng may be summarized as follows:

1. The Comintern and the Party Center discarded the right-wing appeasement

²²² KUWAJIMA, *op. cit.*, 281.

²²³ A memoir tells that a peasant soldier met P'eng P'ai in Hai-feng in the Second Month of the lunar calendar, 1929, Ting Feng-jen 丁豐人, ed., *Kuang-tung nung-min ying-mo* 廣東農民英雄 (Peasant Heroes in Kwangtung) (Canton: Hsin-hua shu-tien 新華書店, 1950), 13.

²²⁴ In a Japanese translation of the Election Law proclaimed by the center of the Chinese Communist Party on September 20, 1930. Minamimanshū tetsudō kabushiki-gaisha 南滿洲鐵道株式會社 (South Manchurian Railway Co.), *Iwayuru Kōgun mondai* 所謂紅軍問題 (So-called Red Army Problems) (Dairen: South Manchurian Railway Co., 1930), 277.

²²⁵ Nankin ryōjikan 南京領事館 (Japanese Consulate in Nanking), *Shina kyōsantō oyobi kyōhi ni kansuru kenkyū shiryō* 支那共產黨及共匪に関する研究資料 (Research Materials Concerning the Chinese Communist Party and Communist Bandits), mimeo. (1930), Document No. 11.

²²⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yün-tung*, 120–123.

²²⁷ Nankin ryōjikan, *op. cit.*, Document No. 14.

²²⁸ It is assumed that P'eng P'ai himself did not go to Moscow.

²²⁹ Onodera Kikan, *op. cit.*, 363–364, 483–484; Hou Feng, *op. cit.*, 45.

policy (the so-called Ch'en Tu-hsiu Line) at the August 7 Emergency Conference in 1927 and shifted their tactics to the left (the so-called Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai Line). They reached their extreme left position in the November Resolution of the Politburo. The February Resolution of the Comintern in 1928 redirected the Party policy a little to the right, and this policy was confirmed by the Sixth National Congress held in July and August of 1928 in Moscow, when Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was replaced by Hsiang Chung-fa and Li Li-san who thereafter held the leadership of the Party.

2. Mao Tse-tung became famous as an organizer of peasant movements in Hunan during the Northern Expedition. Up to the Autumn Harvest Insurrection of 1927, he had stuck to the left-wing tactics, the policy of revolution through terror, as did P'eng P'ai. The experience of the disastrous defeats in 1927 probably influenced the political tactics of Mao deeply. He turned away from simple terrorism and endeavored to preserve his military force. He tried to broaden the base of his support as much as possible; he would release prisoners of war to incorporate them into his troops; he did not plan to execute all landlords; he made compromises with the small, traditional, bandit-like warlords; he intended to treat the middle class moderately.²³⁰ Although he was severely criticized in the November Resolution of the Politburo, he adhered to the cultivation of more flexible tactics to compete with the anti-Communist forces in the rural districts. It is assumed that he even realized through his own experience that the revolution was at a low ebb. In a statement made in October 1928, Mao indicated his less optimistic opinion on several points in a pathetic tone,²³¹ although he apparently showed obedience to the Party line. There must have been continual strife during the year 1928 between the Party cadre sent by the Party Center, and Mao Tse-tung. Mao, the actual founder of the soviet in the Ching kang Mountain 井崗山 area, only held the position of the fifteenth member of the Special Committee of the party for his soviet area, among a total of nineteen members. The first member was T'an Chen-lin 譚震林, who was sent from the Hunan Provincial Committee, and the second was Chu Teh.²³²
3. From the beginning to the end, the tactics of the Hai-lu-feng Party organization were to the extreme left, as has been made clear in this article.

It is through a comparison of these different tactics, as outlined above, that the peculiar characteristics of the Hai-lu-feng soviets become more evident.

²³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains," *op. cit.*, 1:71 *et seq.*

²³¹ For example: "... not realizing that the period was one in which the ruling classes enjoyed temporary stability...." Mao Tse-tung, *ibid.*, 1:68; "If the Party in the border area cannot find adequate economic measures, then, under the condition that the enemy's rule remains stable for some time, the independent régime will come up against great difficulties." *Ibid.*, 1:70.

²³² *Ibid.*, 1:98.

Chapter V COMMUNIST CHINA: MODERATION AND RADICALISM IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Communist revolution in China, especially in the past few years, has fascinated a worldwide audience. Unquestionably a historic tide of tremendous change is surging through China, and the entire world is aware that China is in the middle of what its leaders call the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Although it is impossible to chart the full range and intensity of this revolutionary tide, various theories—some critical, others adulatory—have been advanced to interpret its scope and meaning. These divergent interpretations call to mind the tale of a group of blind men, each feeling and probing a small part of a large elephant, each conjuring up a distorted image of the beast, each confident that his was the reliable description. If observers of China have much in common with these blind men, nevertheless, there is no denying that the term “Cultural Revolution” has become a sort of universal shorthand for the Chinese Communist revolution and that the small, red handbook of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東 has become a bible for China’s youth and for radical student movements throughout the world. Contemporary China, as symbolized by Mao’s little red book and the concept of the Great Cultural Revolution, has captured the imagination of students and intellectuals in a way comparable to the memorable impact of the Bolshevik revolution. Thus, regardless of the mystery and ambiguities surrounding the Great Cultural Revolution, there is no reason as yet to question Chou En-lai 周恩來’s original judgment that it is “the gravest matter that may affect the fate and the future of our Party and the State.”¹

The Great Cultural Revolution began inauspiciously, in the spring of 1966, when an apparently small group of prominent officials and intellectuals in the Chinese Communist party were criticized publicly and censured by official party organs.² Among those particularly singled out for vitriolic criticism were Chou Yang 周揚, the chief of the party’s Central Propaganda Department; Ch’ien Po-tsan 翦伯贊, a distinguished historian; Lu P’ing 陸平, the vice president of Peking University; and T’ien Han 田漢, a famous playwright; along with Wu Han 吳晗, Teng T’o 鄧拓, and Liao Mo-sha 廖沫沙. In conjunction with this indictment of hitherto respected

* This was originally published in James B. Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970). It was the first work in English that tried to describe modern Chinese history as the spiral development of moderation and radicalism.

¹ *People’s Daily* 人民日報 (May 1, 1966).

² *Liberation Army’s Daily* 解放軍報 (April 18, 1966).

and reputable Communist intellectuals, Chou En-lai proclaimed that the prime problem confronting the party was “the fierce long-term struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field to see who will fight and which will win.”³ By seemingly confining the issue to ideology and his criticism to intellectuals, Chou conveyed the impression that the problem of the class struggle in China was to be found primarily in the ideological and cultural fields. At this time, outside observers were completely unaware that this Great Cultural campaign coincided with the purge of P’eng Chen 彭真, the mayor of Peking, or that it was the opening move in a major campaign designed to disgrace and eventually to oust Liu Shao-ch’i 劉少奇, who was then heir apparent to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Ignorant of these political overtones, observers felt the issue of the Cultural Revolution to be much like earlier party discussions of the problem of ideology and culture. In 1958, for example, during the Great Leap Forward 大躍進, Liu Shao-ch’i had himself defined and interpreted the Cultural Revolution as a matter of spreading education among the masses and of reforming bourgeois intellectuals.⁴ In the spring of 1966, it seemed that the party and Chou En-lai were addressing their remarks to the same problem in essentially the same terms.

This impression was soon corrected. In June, the party organs started to invest the concept of the Cultural Revolution with explicit political overtones bearing on the leadership of the party and the state. “The basic problem of the revolution,” declared the *People’s Daily*, “is that of power.... Possessing power means possessing everything, and not possessing power means losing everything.... The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological realm is basically a struggle for seizing leadership.”⁵ This shift in focus was clarified further in August 1966, at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Here, the party formally ruled:

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution now under way is a great revolution touching people to their very souls and is a new stage of our country’s socialist revolution for deeper and wider development.... Our immediate purposes are to crush those in power who are treading the capitalist road, to criticize bourgeois and reactionary academic “authorities,” to criticize ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, to reform education, literature and fine arts, and to reform all upper structures not suitable to the economic foundation of socialism,

³ *People’s Daily* (May 1, 1966).

⁴ *Chūgoku kyosantō daihachiki zenkoku daihyō taikai dainikai-kaigi bunkenshū* 中國共產黨第八期全國代表大會第二回會議文獻集 (Collection of the Documents of Second Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighth National Congress), Japanese ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 外文出版社, 1958), 52–53.

⁵ *People’s Daily* (June 1, 1966).

thus to help strengthen and develop socialist institutions.⁶

With this pronouncement, the Central Committee was, in effect, declaring war on “those in power” who presumably had not been sufficiently revolutionized—that is, had not truly transformed their class character into that of the proletariat. The injunction implicitly advanced the contention that only by “crushing” these bourgeois elements could the socialist system be strengthened and developed. If the logic of this reasoning was comprehensible within the framework of Marxism-Leninism, one vital question remained: Who within the state were “treading the capitalist road?”

Before probing this question, we must consider briefly some traits common to all revolutionary movements. In the drive for political power, the leaders of any revolutionary movement necessarily espouse comprehensive revolutionary goals. Once political power has been realized, however, the question of the tempo of the march toward the original goals inevitably becomes a vital and divisive issue among the new wielders of power. The result is usually a terrible power struggle, one that often compels a change in the revolutionary goals themselves. In the Russian Revolution, for example, Lenin’s shift to the New Economic Policy marked a change in the revolutionary tempo, and Stalin’s famous fight with Trotsky and Bukharin was a power struggle among revolutionary leaders. The question of the tempo of revolutionary change was also intrinsic to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched in 1966. So too, the question of who within the party were “treading the capitalist road” signified the onset of an ill-defined but undeniable power struggle among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Discussions of the tempo of the revolution were not, of course, a new concern in the Chinese Communist movement. Liu Shao-ch’i had previously addressed himself to this very question. Speaking at the second meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighth National Congress in 1958, Liu had declared, “The question of the speed of construction is the most important question placed before us amidst the victory of the Socialist revolution. In a word, our revolution is intended to develop social productivity most quickly.”⁷ In Liu’s judgment, the best way to promote social productivity was to predicate all plans on an objective assessment of existing social conditions. At the same time, he acknowledged that, if the party were meticulously cautious with its programs, it would tend to wipe away the “revolutionary character” of the revolution. At that time, however, Liu’s call for cautious programs and adherence to long-term revolutionary goals carried no stigma of being bourgeois or anti-socialist. No less a revolutionary than Liu, Mao Tse-tung, in his younger days, had also ridiculed the proponents of radical policies within the party. “Developing the

⁶ *Hong Kong Wen Hui Pao* 香港文匯報 (August 9, 1966).

⁷ *Collection of the Documents of Second Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eighth National Congress*, 53.

economy," he had said, "is the correct line, but development does not mean reckless or ill-founded expansion. Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions here and now are setting up an empty clamor for development; for example, they are demanding the establishment of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and unacceptable."⁸ One may reasonably conclude, therefore, that prior to 1956 disagreements over the tempo of the revolution were characteristic of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and that the call for moderate and cautious programs in pursuit of long-term revolutionary objectives was characteristic of many leaders, including Mao Tse-tung as well as Liu Shao-ch'i.

The question then becomes one of why, in 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Chou Yang, and other leaders were suddenly subjected to the wild accusation that they were not real Marxist-Leninists but bourgeois and antisocialist. The answer, in my opinion, should be sought in a historical perspective that regards the Great Cultural Revolution as part of a ten-year dispute within the party over the speed of the socialization of China. Throughout the decade 1956-66, the party experienced a series of major crises—for example, the episode of the "great freedom of speech," the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Vietnam war. These crises stimulated continuous debates about the tempo of the revolution, debates that eventually provoked serious factional struggles within the party. The onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was the consequence of this factionalism. It would be incorrect, therefore, to regard the Cultural Revolution simply as a narrow power struggle in the sense of a factional competition to become Mao Tse-tung's heir, although this element is surely present. Since, however, the nature of factionalism in the Communist party is not yet clearly delineated, the best one can say at this time is that the Cultural Revolution is unquestionably a fierce struggle for power in the broadest sense of the term—that is, a power struggle, at all party levels, that includes disagreements about the vital issues of the tempo of the Communist revolution in China. To comprehend this power struggle, we must understand the historical currents in China's recent past, especially those evident since 1957. It is the intent of this essay to interpret the Great Cultural Revolution in the context of these historical currents.

The Revolution: Times of Moderation

In the course of a revolution, policy changes are often accompanied by a change in leadership. In the October Revolution in Russia and in China's Communist revolution, however, changes in basic policies have been accomplished without changing

⁸ Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, "Economic and Financial Problem in the Anti-Japanese War," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, English ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 3:113.

leaders. Under the continuous leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the People's Republic of China has repeatedly, since its inception in 1949, tried and altered radical and moderate policies almost in a trial-and-error manner. It is consequently impossible to categorize the history of Communist China neatly into clear-cut periods of moderate and radical policies. Radical policies have contained moderate elements, and moderate policies have had radical components; shifts in policies have sometimes been wide, at other times narrow. Still, in general terms, it is possible to discern two definite periods of moderate policies. The first was 1949–50, the initial stage of the founding of the People's Republic of China, and the second was 1953–57, following the negotiation of the Korean armistice. The intervening years, 1950–53, were distinguished by a move toward radical policies, including a campaign to suppress “counterrevolutionaries,” the implementation of a major land-reform program, and involvement in the Korean War.

The second period of moderate policies, 1953–57, was characterized by the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan of economic growth, followed by the policy of “long-term coexistence and mutual surveillance” toward those who were not official members of the party. Domestically, this was the time of the mild, “let a hundred flowers bloom” approach to intellectuals, and foreign policy was keynoted by the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respecting the spirit of the Bandung conference. Temporarily, these policies seemed to have been remarkably effective, especially in the economic realm. Even Western observers invariably praised highly the economic rehabilitation realized under the Five-Year Plan. Against this background, the party gained considerable self-confidence in its policies and programs. Addressing the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956, Mao Tse-tung euphorically affirmed the “decisive triumph” of the socialist revolution in China.⁹ “We have,” Mao added, “conducted correct activities; but we also have committed a number of mistakes.” Modesty, not pride or arrogance, Mao reasoned, was therefore the most appropriate path to revolutionary progress. “We have no reason to be self-conceited and high-hatted,” he cautioned. The immediate imperatives, Mao judged, were unity and solidarity—unity within the party; party solidarity with the various races, or nationalities, in China, as well as with all democratic classes and parties in the nation; and, of course, unity and solidarity with the Soviet Union.

In reference to economic matters, Mao spoke of a “step by step” building program; and, in another setting, he reiterated the centrality of rationalism in economic

⁹ Mao Tse-tung, “Chūgoku kyōsantō daihachikai zenkoku daihyōsha taikai kaikai no ji 中國共產黨第八回全國代表大會開會の辭 (Opening Speech of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party),” in *Chūgoku kyōsantō daihachikai zenkoku daihyōtaikai bunkenshū* 中國共產黨第八回全國代表大會文獻集 (Collection of the Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party), Japanese ed., 3 vols. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), 1:9–15.

planning. "People's thinking must adapt to the changed conditions. Of course, no one should go off into wild flights of fancy, or make plans unwarranted by the objective situation, or insist on attempting the impossible."¹⁰ Mao's call for prudent leaders and moderate programs, as well as his categorical affirmation of the "decisive triumph" of the socialist revolution in China, were comprehensible in the context of the apparently dazzling successes of the Five-Year economic program.

Mao's opening remarks to the congress also marked the opening move in the party's affirmation of the principle of collective leadership. The party's rejection of Maoism and the cult of individualism in 1956 was partly influenced by the de-Stalinization movement then under way in the Soviet Union. It coincided, too, with the heady optimism inspired by the achievements of the Five-Year program. The denial of Maoism by the party was best exemplified by the famous "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution," submitted at the Eighth Congress by Teng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平, the secretary general of the party's Central Committee.¹¹ Here, Teng caustically berated party leaders for the evil trait of "commandism" and sarcastically ridiculed the practice of praising the role of party leaders in the realms of art and literature. Apart from these general indictments, Teng criticized the reluctance of the leadership to convene formal conferences to discuss programs and policies, as well as the fact that, when conferences had been held, they had always degenerated into mere formalism. Teng complemented these savage observations with words of praise for the principle of collective leadership. On this subject, Teng's report endorsed the ban on public birthday celebrations for party leaders and the prohibition against using their names for place and street names. Collective leadership, not individualism, Teng stressed, had been the guiding axiom of the party since 1949, and, he concluded, no one in the party had been free from mistakes and faults in all his activities.

The thrust of this report was unmistakably directed at any personification of the party's leadership and progress. Adhering to this approach, the Eighth Congress officially revised the party's constitution, pointedly eradicating, in the process, any reference to "Mao Tse-tung's thought."¹² Maoism was no longer sanctioned in principle. Indeed, the party, with Mao's public approval, affirmed the principle of collective leadership, credited this principle with the realization of the "decisive triumph" of the revolution in China, and sanctioned the course of modesty and moderation as the proper path for the party and the state.

The presentation of Teng's report and the favorable response it evoked have led some experts on Communist China to view the achievements of the Eighth Congress

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹¹ Teng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平, "Tō kiyaku kaisei ni tsuiteno hōkoku 黨規約改正についての報告 (The Report of Revision of the Chinese Communist Party's Regulations)," in *Collection of the Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, 1:243-250.

¹² *Ibid.*, 240, 250.

in terms of personal alignments and factionalism. In particular, the congress has been depicted as a contest between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i for party control, with the Liu faction emerging as the victor.¹³ This judgment, in my opinion, is exaggerated. Various sources indicate that Mao remained the firm leader in the Chinese Communist Party, and I tend to believe that any conflict that existed between Mao and Liu was either obscure or insignificant. Obviously Mao agreed, or pretended to agree, with Teng's report and officially admitted that the party had made many mistakes and party members should be modest enough to accept any criticism.¹⁴ In brief, there is reason to believe that in the context of 1956 both Mao and Liu espoused the moderate course and the principle of collective leadership. No one, in 1956, imagined that within a decade the "decisive triumph" of the revolution would be denied and China's crisis would be depicted as a "life or death struggle" against bourgeois and antisocialist elements. No one, in 1956, anticipated that Mao's call for personal modesty and "step by step" program would be displaced by the canonization of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, that Mao would be proclaimed "the greatest contemporary living Marxist-Leninist,"¹⁵ or that the government would declare that "the attitude toward the thought of Mao Tse-tung is the yardstick to measure who is a real revolutionary, who is a sham revolutionary, who is a Marxist-Leninist and who is a revisionist. All opponents to the thought of Mao Tse-tung are the staunch enemies of the revolution and of the people."¹⁶ Similarly, in 1956, few foretold that the program of "solidarity" with all democratic parties would become a prelude to a tough "antirightist" campaign; and few believed that "friendship and solidarity" with the Soviet Union would yield to a passionate Sino-Soviet ideological dispute which seemed to confirm the saying that, to believers, heretics are more hateful than pagans. The prevailing mood in 1956 was optimism about the future and confidence that existing policies and programs would confirm the "triumph" of the Communist revolution in China.

Turning Point: 1957

Speaking in February 1957 before an audience of some 1,800 party members, Mao

¹³ For example, Ho Yü-wen 何雨文 (Ying-chih 應之), "Mō-takutō wa naze taikyakushitaka 毛澤東は何故退却したか (Why Did Mao Tse-tung Bow Out?)," mimeographed by the Public Security Investigation Agency 公安調査廳, Japanese Government (March 17, 1959), 26.

¹⁴ Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai-Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang ch'üan-kuo hsüan-ch'üan kung-tso hui-i-shang te Chiang-hua 在中國共產黨全國宣傳工作會議上講話 (一九五七年三月十二日) (Speeches at a Chinese Communist Party's National Meeting on Propaganda Activities (March 12, 1957)), in *Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi* 毛澤東選集 (Selection Reading of Mao Tse-tung's Works), 5 vols. (Peking: People's Publishing Office 人民出版社, 1952-77), 5:403-418.

¹⁵ "Official Statement of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *People's Daily* (August 14, 1966).

¹⁶ *People's Daily* (July 1, 1966).

delivered a discourse “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People 關於正確處理人民內部矛盾的問題。”¹⁷ Here, Mao again reaffirmed the *ta-ming ta-fang* 大鳴大放, the “great freedom of speech” principle. Although this address was not officially published, it is commonly believed that Mao wholeheartedly championed the free-speech movement, allegedly reasoning that listening to the people was equal to being advised by the people and that the people should tell everything they know and everything they want to tell. A month later, before some 380 party propaganda operations men, Mao cast the *ta-ming ta-fang* principle in a different mold.¹⁸ Mao insisted, as usual, that while the Chinese Communist Party was a great party, it also had shortcomings. It was essential, therefore, that the party should become a Marxist party, which would not fear criticism. By listening to the people, Mao maintained, the party could conduct a rectification campaign against the harmful traits of subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism. Thus, in this second speech, the context of the *ta-ming ta-fang* principle intimated that it had the ulterior purpose of marshalling and organizing criticism against revisionism within the party. In conjunction with this speech, party literature invariably urged nonparty democratic groups to follow the path of “the great freedom of speech,” and in early May bold criticisms directed against the party by nonparty members began to be officially published. The party was castigated as a dictatorship under which only party members exercised power and nonparty men were entrusted with sinecure positions, and the demands for a *p'ing-fan* 平反, a retrial of those who had been falsely accused of crimes and errors by the party, surged to the forefront. The invitation to honor “the great freedom of speech” had been accepted with gusto, thereby causing a major crisis within the party.

The party reacted promptly. On June 8, in a dramatic *volte-face*, it called for a program of “correct rectification.”¹⁹ At the same time, a largescale anti-rightist campaign was launched. Thus, for example, when an anti-Communist demonstration began at the Hanyang First Middle School 漢陽第一中學, the death penalty was promptly meted out to the three ring-leaders of the demonstration.²⁰ And on June 18 a significantly revised version of Mao’s February rally speech on the “great freedom of speech” principle was published. In this published text, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” six criteria for judging the propriety of behavior and ideas were appended to the *ta-ming ta-fang*. Armed with this text, the party then utilized “the great freedom of speech” as a means to identify and attack “rightist” groups and individuals. In brief, those who had embraced the “great freedom of speech” movement and had castigated the party soon found themselves the targets of

¹⁷ *Ibid.* (March 3, 1957).

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, “Speeches at a Chinese Communist Party’s National Meeting on Propaganda Activities,” 510–512.

¹⁹ *People’s Daily* (June 8, 1957).

²⁰ *Ibid.* (September 7, 1957).

a raging anti-rightist campaign organized by the party as part of that very movement.

The party used the crisis fomented by “the great freedom of speech” in two decisive ways: to enforce discipline within the party and to locate, criticize, and purge those who were critical of the party line. The repression thus raised the question of whether the *ta-ming ta-fang* movement had been a carefully planned feint designed to flush out rightist elements, or whether the party leaders had launched this movement confident that China would not follow the example of either the Hungarian incident or the Poznan riots. The prevailing opinion is that Mao had sincerely championed the *ta-ming ta-fang* but that Liu Shao-ch’i and others had been apprehensive about the movement since its inception.²¹ How accurate this opinion remains an open-ended question. One should note, however, that there were some similarities between the opening phase of “the great freedom of speech” in 1957 and the “great democratic debates” that were to become part of the Great Cultural Revolution. In both instances, mass activities and speaking out in public were positively encouraged by the party, but, when public pronouncements and actions deviated from the framework and direction of the party, they quickly came to be criticized and punished by the party organizations.

Shortly after the crackdown on critics of the party, the government, on October 15, 1957, negotiated the Sino-Soviet Agreement on New Technical Aid for Defense.²² By this agreement, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with sample nuclear arms and the technical data essential for their production. A month later, during his visit to Moscow, Mao Tse-tung delivered his famous speech, “The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind.”²³ As is well known, Mao expressed the judgment that the strength of the socialist forces now surpassed that of the capitalist nations. With this axiom, Mao reasoned as follows: (1) In the event of a war between the socialist and capitalist camps, one-third to one-half of China’s population would be destroyed; (2) the socialist forces would be triumphant and would socialize the world, and, in a few decades, China’s population would be restored to its original size; (3) Communist China had yet to complete its reconstruction and desired peace with the capitalist nations; and (4) if recourse to war were intended by the capitalist nations, then China was prepared for war. Several months after presenting this doctrine of “The East Wind Prevails,” the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the “Three Red Flags 三面紅旗” program—that is, the people’s communes, the Great Leap Forward, and the socialist construction movement. Under the Five-Year Plan adopted in 1956, the government had set as its targets for 1962 an increase in annual food production to 250 million tons and an annual steel production of 12 million

²¹ For example, the remarks of Vukmanovic, former vice president of Yugoslavia, in *Mainichi shimbun* 毎日新聞 (January 18, 1967).

²² *People’s Daily* (August 15, 1963).

²³ *Ibid.* (October 31, 1958).

tons. As part of the Three Red Flags program, however, this schedule was drastically increased to a target of 290 million tons for food production and 10.7 million tons for steel production, both to be realized by the end of 1958.²⁴ This shift heralded a dramatic change from the moderate “step by step” pace to the quick march of the Great Leap Forward. It marked the beginning of the second radical period of the Chinese People’s Republic.

What Made Them Radical?

From 1953 to 1957, Communist China had pursued a course of moderate change. In 1958, the party accelerated the tempo of the revolution. Why? Again theories vary, but, tentatively, six considerations seem relevant to the onset of the second period of radical policies in the history of Communist China. First, as a consequence of the anti-rightist campaign launched in reaction to the “great freedom of speech” movement, it seems that the more radical, or left-wing, element of the party gained ascendancy. By 1958 this shift was reflected in the highest levels of the party. Second, the launching of Sputnik and the Soviet ICBM tests in 1957 were interpreted by Mao and his followers as “a new turning point,” signifying the strategic superiority of the socialist bloc over the capitalist nations.²⁵ Third, given this “new turning point,” they believed China no longer needed to fear the threat of nuclear attack. This new and favorable international environment reinforced the opinion that an “objective” appraisal of the new conditions warranted a more rapid socialization of China and a hard-line foreign policy toward the capitalist nations. Fourth, as Marxist-Leninists, all the Chinese Communist leaders believed in the basic assumption that increased socialization of the state would increase productivity. There was no disagreement about the eventual benefits of state socialism. Of course, those who had devised and directed the first Five-Year Plan (for example, Ch’en Yün 陳雲 and Teng Tzu-hui 鄧子恢) and those who, like Li Wei-han 李維漢, were in charge of the united-front operations and were responsible for the coalitions with the so-called right-wing elements preferred a moderate cause. In 1958, they argued that moderation was still the most appropriate tactic, the most effective approach given the actual domestic situation in China.²⁶ Still, they too subscribed to the goal of socialism, and by 1958 they were the minority within the party. Fifth, agricultural productivity had stagnated in 1957,

²⁴ *Ibid.* (August 1, 1958).

²⁵ *Ibid.* (October 27, 1958).

²⁶ Ch’en Yün 陳雲, “Chin-un dōshi no hatsugen 陳雲同志の發言 (Speech of Comrade Ch’en Yün),” in *Collection of the Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, 2:194–217; Li Wei-han 李維漢, “Ri-ikan dōshi no hatsugen 李維漢同志の發言 (Speech of Comrade Li Wei-han),” in *Collection of the Documents of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, 2:432–454.

enhancing the view that an intensive promotion of collectivization (a program already under way) would surely increase agricultural productivity and achieve the socialization of the villages.²⁷ This viewpoint was buttressed by a “new equilibrium theory” that denied the advantage of a balanced development of the total economy, reasoning in favor of a breakthrough in one sector of the economy on the premise that this would then automatically bring about a rapid development of the whole economy.²⁸ Sixth, the party leadership shared the belief that China would have to compensate for its deficiency in capital resources by an effective mobilization of manpower and by a program of ideological education that would improve the quality of the manpower base.²⁹ In brief, then, the shift to a radical tempo in 1958 was a consequence of the convergence of several factors: The more radical, or leftist, leaders had become dominant in the party; new appraisals of the international balance of power enhanced a general mood of radicalism; and the apparent stagnation of the existing agricultural policy seemed to vindicate the proponents of a greater intensification of the commune program.

The promulgation of the Three Red Flags program in 1958 symbolized the ascendancy of the more radical elements within the party. But the long-term struggle for party leadership did not disappear, and there were strong currents beneath the surface that flowed counter to the official radicalism.³⁰ Some party elements questioned part of Mao’s “East Wind Prevails” theory and respected the Soviet judgment that the capitalist nations still retained the capability of total destruction. These elements, moreover, were anxious to capitalize on Soviet aid, especially in the field of nuclear weaponry, and they were sharply critical of those who minimized the danger of nuclear war and abused the Soviet preference for “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist nations. Other elements, especially those convinced of the need for technical expertise and pragmatic programming, were repelled by the party’s insistence on applying the “new equilibrium theory” at all levels of planning. Still other elements were distressed by the passionate, in fact compulsive, demand for ideological purity that unleashed a virulent anti-rightist campaign entailing the purge of more than 2,000 party members. Nevertheless, those who championed the so-called Maoist viewpoint had gained the upper hand within the party by 1958 and had thrust the state publicly into the Great Leap Forward movement under the banner of the Three

²⁷ T’an Chen-lin 譚震林, “1956 nen kara 1967 nen ni itaru zenkoku nōgyō hatten yōkō (daini-ji syūseian) ni tsuitemo setsumei 一九五六年から一九六七年にいたる全国農業發展要綱 (第二次修正案) についての説明 (A Description of the 1956–1967 National Agricultural Development Outline (Second Revised Draft)),” in *Collection of the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party*, 103.

²⁸ *People’s Daily* (February 28, 1958).

²⁹ Vukmanovic, *Mainichi Shimbun* (January 18, 1967).

³⁰ Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 157–159.

Red Flags program.

Many China experts presume that Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were, from the beginning, wholly antagonistic to the Great Leap Forward program. This contention, however, should be qualified. The Three Red Flags program—the people's communes, the Great Leap Forward, and the socialist construction movement—was officially adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, held between May 5 and 23, 1958. During the important preparatory stage of this session, Mao was in Canton, suffering from ill health. The agenda was prepared under the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i, the vice chairman, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the secretary general of the party.³¹ It is unlikely, therefore, that Liu and Teng were, at that time, adamantly opposed to the principles symbolized by the Three Red Flags. Inasmuch as they were proponents of economic rationalism and pragmatic programming, they were, no doubt, chary about radical innovations. Still, there is little reason to assume, for example, that they were opposed to the basic idea of the people's commune movement. Under their leadership, the party had already endorsed the communal principle in theory, and in fact the government had already organized pilot communal projects. In the spring of 1958, these projects appeared to be remarkably successful and to offer the possibility of appreciably augmenting agricultural productivity. Moreover, as noted earlier, Liu had publicly affirmed in 1958 that "our revolution is intended to develop social productivity most quickly." In brief, Mao and Liu were both at this time proponents of a faster revolutionary tempo, with Liu preferring to step up the pace slowly and Mao anxious for more rapid acceleration.

The dominant sentiment within the party favored the Maoist viewpoint. In this mood, the party ruled in favor of a crash program in agriculture and in industry, a program that stressed communes and the mobilization of workers and intellectuals by a zealous ideological campaign. By the end of August, according to official figures, 30 percent of all farm households in the nation had been communized.³² And, judging by the press, those in charge of the communal movement were unanimously reporting fantastic increases in productivity and total popular approval of the communal style of life. On the basis of these reports, the government even declared jubilantly that the communes had resulted in a striking increase in the yield of rice, in some instances to more than five hundred *tan* 擔 per *mu* 畝.³³ Comparable statistics were marshalled on behalf of the production of steel by the "backyard furnaces" that had been programmed into the Great Leap Forward. These statistics and prognoses probably disarmed the initial reservations voiced by Liu and Teng against any radi-

³¹ Ho Yü-wen, "Why Did Mao Tse-tung Bow Out?" 14.

³² Statistics Bureau of the People's Republic of China, *Glorious Ten Years* (Peking: People's Publishing Office, 1959), 36.

³³ Compare SUGI Mitsutane 杉充胤, tr. and comp., *Tanshū yonhyakkoku: Seiki no jikken* 反收四百石：世紀の實驗 (Four Hundred *Tan* Yield per Ten *Mu*: The Experiment of the Century) (Tokyo: Riron-sha 理論社, 1960).

cal implementation of the Three Red Flags program and instilled greater confidence and enthusiasm among those in the more radical party circles, including Chairman Mao.

Beginning in July, however, the successes of the “backyard furnaces” and of the people’s communes, which had received such fulsome praise, were subjected to closer scrutiny and questioning. At a party conference held at Peitaiho 北戴河 in August, these critical voices became quite audible. Few details are known about this Peitaiho conference. There is reason to believe, however, that the Great Leap Forward policy was subjected openly to severe internal criticism but that, mainly because of Mao’s strong adherence to the policies in effect, the party, after weeks of debate, announced on September 10 that the existing Three Red Flags program would continue.³⁴ With the dismal fall harvest and the inventory of the products produced by the backyard furnaces on hand, however, no one could deny any longer that the Great Leap Forward and the communes had been an unmitigated economic disaster. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, held at Wuchang 武昌 from November 18 to December 10, 1958, was a somber affair. After listening to the newly revised reports on productivity, party officials conceded that the communes had, in fact, sharply reduced production. The “miraculous” rice yields cited in earlier reports had proven, on inspection, to have been rice planted just for show; and the vaunted backyard steel production was branded as no better than dregs, completely unusable for anything except simple farm tools.³⁵ The economy was in deep trouble, and the nation faced an acute food shortage and even the possibility of mass starvation. The pressing problem was no longer how far the nation could leap forward; the government had to cope with serious shortages in all sectors of the economy.

In this bleak context, Mao advised the party congress that he would not again assume the post of chairman of the party,³⁶ and five months afterwards Liu Shao-ch’i was elected chairman. Eight years later, speaking of this startling proposal, Mao confessed, “I was dissatisfied, but I was unable to do anything.”³⁷ Two theories have been advanced by China experts to explain Mao’s withdrawal at this Wuchang conference. One holds that Mao was forced to resign by the Liu faction, which had opposed the Great Leap Forward program from the beginning; the other maintains that Mao, assuming personal responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward, voluntarily resigned his chairmanship before any explicit anti-Maoist mood could congeal in the party. If, as was suggested earlier, Mao and Liu had not already been seriously at odds during the formulation of the Three Red Flags program, disagree-

³⁴ *People’s Daily* (September 10, 1958).

³⁵ OKETANI Shigeo 桶谷繁雄, “Dohō seikō 土法製鋼 (Steel Manufacturing by the Indigenous Method),” *Chūō kōron* 中央公論 79/8 (August 1964): 142–143.

³⁶ *People’s Daily* (December 18, 1958).

³⁷ *Mainichi shimbun* (January 5, 1967).

ment between the two set in during the summer of 1958, when Liu responded quickly to the negative evidence but Mao preferred to discount it and to forge ahead with the communes. This disagreement, however, was not a personal power struggle between the two men. It was, as had happened in the past, a divergence of opinion over the tempo of the revolution. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that Mao was personally attacked or deprived of power by the Liu faction at the Wuchang conference. In subsequent years, Mao enjoyed extremely high prestige in the party and was permitted to conduct his activities freely. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Mao had retreated voluntarily from office in order to escape personal onus for the failures of the Great Leap Forward policy and that he was willing to entrust Liu and Teng with formal leadership during the inevitable reaction to the adverse consequences of that policy.³⁸ It would be a mistake, moreover, to assume that, with the Wuchang conference, Mao had become deeply antagonistic toward Liu's policies or the Liu-Teng faction. Mao's later contention that he was "dissatisfied" with the outcome of the Wuchang conference should be read as a retrospective exaggeration. His sharp, antagonism toward the Liu-Teng group and the genesis of the Great Cultural Revolution were most likely the consequences of events subsequent to 1959.

"Our Operations Had Not a Few Defects"

Little by little, following the Wuchang conference of December 1958, the Three Red Flags program was amended. Almost unnoticed, the third moderate stage of the revolution set in. By 1961, Liu Shao-ch'i could boldly admit that "our operation had not a few defects," and the party again publicly encouraged another free-speech movement.³⁹ This time, however, it took pains to constrict "free speech" by the six-fold criterion postulated by Mao's "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," which had been published in June 1957. In addition, "free speech" was technically restricted to academic and cultural fields.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, a mood of liberalism soon spread throughout Chinese literary circles, and fine satires by Teng T'o, Wu Han, T'ien Han, and others appeared, one after another. This third moderate period has been termed the *hsiao ming-fang* 小鳴放, or "small freedom of speech," and throughout it the party meticulously avoided any dramatic statements such as characterized the "great freedom of speech" campaign of 1957. Officially, party rhetoric praised the Three Red Flags and reasoned that the new moderation was

³⁸ *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (January 7, 1967).

³⁹ *People's Daily* (June 30, 1961).

⁴⁰ Denis Doolin, "The Revival of the One Hundred Flowers Campaign: 1961," *The China Quarterly* 8 (October-December 1961): 34-38.

part of this program—that, in fact, it was based upon the achievements of the Three Red Flags movement.

In other words, the radical tempo symbolized by the Three Red Flags was never denied in theory. In this sense, the genius of Mao's thought lies in its skillful combination of radicalism and flexibility. Thus, for example, when the party stressed "expertise" 專 over "redness" 紅 in this third phase, it wrapped this change of policy in such terms as "flying high Mao Tse-tung's banner, thoroughly implementing the Three Red Flags and, displaying the revolutionary spirit of Yen-an 延安, we will build our country into a powerful Communist State."⁴¹ In short, the party, under the leadership of Liu and Teng, never denigrated Mao or Maoism. While conceding mistakes and defects in party organization, Liu was always careful to avoid any public criticism of the people's communes or any concrete censuring of the Great Leap Forward policy. Rather, under Liu's chairmanship, the party attributed the economic disasters caused by the communal movement to "natural calamities." At the same time, it adopted specific steps to cope with these so-called calamities of nature. The "backyard furnaces," for example, were legally abandoned under the "Seventy Article Industrial Charter 文教七十條," and the "Sixty Article Agricultural Charter 農業六十條" of 1960 was clandestinely labeled an "anticommunistic movement" by the people.⁴² While manifestly praising Mao, Maoism, and the Three Red Flags, the party had, in fact, returned to the more flexible policies of the second moderate period.

There were, beyond doubt, great controversies within the party over the procedural question of how to combine the radicalism of the Three Red Flags with the specific task of recovering the productivity lost by the implementation of this program. Adherence to the principles of the Three Red Flags would have been an acceptance of the radical, or leftwing, approach to public policy, while any effort to promote agriculture by an outright appeal to the egoism of the peasant would have been subjected to the accusation of right-wing deviationism. Debates and controversies surely raged, generating passionate feelings about the course and tempo of the revolution. Unfortunately for historians, these arguments were not waged publicly. The Chinese Communists prefer understatement, calling these years "an adjustment period." Indeed they were, as the party supported the Maoist stand verbally while denying it in practice. Thus, for example, such "rightist" policies as the *san-tzu i-pao* 三自一包 and *tan-kan-feng* 單幹風 were sharply denied in the official statements of the party, but these policies were adopted nonetheless in order to cope with the economic crisis. The *san-tzu i-pao* was the program of expanding the amount of farmland the

⁴¹ Kan Tzu-ts'ai 甘粹材, "Wen-chiao ch'i-shih-t'iao 文教七十條 (Seventy-Article Educational Charter)," *Tsu-kuo* 祖國 (The Motherland) 40/13 (December 24, 1962): 16-19.

⁴² Lo Hung-chih 羅宏志, Wang Chin-ko 王金珂 and Ch'en Sung-wen 陳松文, "'Fan-kung-ch'an-feng yun-tung' chi 'Nung-yeh liu-shih-t'iao' 「反共產風運動」及「農業六十條」 (The 'Anti-Communist Movement' and the 'Sixty-Article Agricultural Charter')," *Tsu-kuo* 36/12 (December 18, 1961): 3-8.

peasant could cultivate freely for himself while, at the same time, linking the produce of this land with a “free market” and a “free accounting system” in which each household was responsible for the producing, selling, and reporting of its production and income. The *tan-kan-feng* policy was a program for small-scale industry that entrusted it to private management and a free market comparable to that given to the peasant under the *san-tzu i-pao*. The party, under the direction of Liu and Teng, steadily castigated these policies in theory, but it also implemented them by endorsing specific exemptions and regulations.

A similar pattern prevailed in the educational realm. Under the Three Red Flags program, as mentioned earlier, the party had stressed the quality of “redness” over “expertness.” In 1960, the government promulgated the “Seventy Article Educational Charter,” which began with a ringing reaffirmation of the principles of the Three Red Flags and a theoretical emphasis on redness over expertise. But then the charter proceeded, in substance, to contradict this theory. Intellectuals, for example, were notified that they should not spend more than three hours a week in physical labor, and workers were advised that they should not devote more than three hours a week to political studies.⁴³ In April 1961, once the acute food shortage had been alleviated somewhat by a good spring harvest, the government started to broadcast daily appeals to the students, urging them to “read hard” and to recognize that “to study is the essential duty of students.” By April, the party’s lip service to the rhetoric of “redness over expertness” had, in fact, been converted into a program directing Chinese “to be red and expert at the same time,” and Ch’en I 陳毅 stressed repeatedly the necessity for expertise in the party.⁴⁴ As part of this switch in tone, some twenty-six thousand party members who had been purged as “rightists” during the heyday of the Great Leap Forward were officially restored to party respectability. This pattern—a rhetorical affirmation of the ideology of the Three Red Flags joined with a practical negation of the specific programs adopted as part of the Great Leap Forward—also duplicated itself, albeit to a lesser degree, in the realm of foreign policy. Here, too, the tough ideology of the “East Wind Prevails” doctrine was praised in theory, while in fact, following the 1958 Wuchang conference, specific policies and behavior became more prudent and flexible.

On foreign-policy matters, the leaders of Communist China have not been inclined to compromise or make concessions on issues involving what they call “fundamental principles.”⁴⁵ Moreover, once they have transformed a question or issue into a matter of basic principles, they set in motion what can be called “the law

⁴³ Kan Tzu-ts’ai, “Seventy Article Educational Charter,” 16–19.

⁴⁴ Che’n I 陳毅, “Tui Pei-ching-shih kao-teng-yüan-hsiao ying-chieh pi-yeh hsueh-sheng te Chiang-hua 對北京市高等院校應屆畢業學生的講話 (A Lecture to Graduating Students of the Peking Municipal High School),” *Chung-kuo ch’ing-nien* 中國青年 (Chinese Youth) 17 (1961): 2–4.

⁴⁵ ETÖ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉 and OKABE Tatsumi 岡部達味, “Chükyō taigai seisaku no kōdō gensoku 中共對外政策的行動原則 (Principles of Action of Chinese Foreign Policy),” *Jiyū* 自由 7/3 (March 1956): 42–55.

of accumulation of involvements,"⁴⁶ which brings about a series of reactions and deeds that make it virtually impossible to return to the state of affairs existing before the "principles" were invoked. The most obvious illustration of the "accumulation of involvements" is the Sino-Soviet dispute. Beginning in 1950, with the Sino-Soviet security and trade pacts, the Soviet Union was idolized as the exclusive model for China's economic and technological development. Once Mao's doctrine of "the East Wind Prevails" became a cardinal principle of China's policy, however, the dispute with the Soviet Union over how to cope with the capitalist nations became a question of strategy, not tactics. China's distrust of the Soviets came to the forefront after 1959 and fostered the accusation that Russian leaders were "revisionist traitors" who were compromising with the imperialists. This charge bred another principle—namely, that the confrontation with Soviet revisionism was as important as the fight against imperialism. In response, of course, the Soviet Union withdrew its advisers, ceased its aid program, and challenged the "chauvinism" of the Chinese. In turn, the Chinese pursued a course of "self-reliance."

This Sino-Soviet pattern of dispute accumulating on dispute became linked to another issue that the Chinese Communists have considered to be a matter of fundamental principle—the insistence that Taiwan is an inherent part of the People's Republic. During the civil war, and especially in the early years (1949–53) of the Peking government, the Communists branded Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 a traitor and named American imperialism as the most important single force sustaining Chiang's regime on Taiwan. Yet, in the second moderate phase of the revolution (1953–57), even Mao expounded as a possibility the doctrine of a peaceful liberation of the island by Nationalist-Communist cooperation. But in the second radical period, along with the Three Red Flags, the Chinese Communist party adopted, as a matter of principle, a policy of confrontation with Taiwan and American imperialism. This policy began when the Chinese initiated the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu and has, in theory, remained unchanged. Indeed, it became deeply interwoven with Chinese policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union when, during his visit to Peking in 1959, Khrushchev urged a policy of coexistence toward the United States and Taiwan. Even though Mao had articulated the same line several years before, the party promptly condemned Soviet "revisionism" as being synonymous with the imperialist's "two China" policy.⁴⁷ The Chinese Communists would not let the Soviet Union pressure them into compromising the "principle" of liberating Taiwan, and, instead, they responded with the accusation that the Soviet Union was a traitor to the socialist bloc.

The Chinese Communists have not been able to deny the ideological principles

⁴⁶ ETŌ Shinkichi, "Hikainyū no ronri 非介入の論理 (Doctrine of Non-Intervention)," *Chūō kōron* 80/8 (August 1965): 42–55.

⁴⁷ *People's Daily* (September 1, 1963).

enumerated as part of the Three Red Flags. In terms of internal affairs, as noted, this fact did not prevent the practical modification of radical principles during the third moderate period (1959–66). In terms of foreign affairs, however, the theoretical adherence to radical principles automatically intensified the rift with the Soviet Union, without causing any amelioration in China's anti-imperialist posture. Even so, in reference to Asian countries, as opposed to the Soviet Union and the United States, the Chinese Communists have been flexible. Toward India, China adopted a hard-line approach, precipitating the 1962 clash. But the advantages won on the battlefield were not pursued; and, more important, between 1962 and 1964 the Chinese government concluded border demarcation treaties and nonaggression pacts with Pakistan, Burma, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Cambodia. In these cases, China articulated no general or fundamental principles that would have precluded a search for accommodation. More strikingly, the Chinese Communists have attenuated their passionate abuse of their former enemy, Japan. When the Soviet Union started to pull out of China, the Chinese sought to open trade with Japan, but in 1958 the tough diplomacy of the Kishi cabinet provoked a suspension of all trade. Yet, despite Japan's role as a past invader of China, despite Japan's existing alliance with the United States, and despite Japan's recognition of Taiwan, the Chinese Communists did not invoke any "principle" against Japanese trade. On the contrary, once the Ikeda cabinet was organized in 1960, the Peking regime softened its verbal abuse of Japan and called for a resumption of trade under the slogan "Friendship trade." This led, in 1962, to the so-called L-T (Liao Ch'eng-chih 廖承志 and TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke 高碓達之助) accord, by which an informal trade system was established. And in 1964 the Chinese Communists went so far as to discuss the possibility of organizing a conference between Japanese and Chinese government officials.⁴⁸

In effect, beginning in 1959 and continuing for several years thereafter, Communist China maintained a theoretically hard-line approach toward the Soviet Union and the United States. In domestic affairs, it reaffirmed, in theory, the basic principles of the Three Red Flags movement. At the same time, however, it pursued a cautious and softer diplomacy vis-à-vis the Asian nations on its borders, and it sharply slowed down the pace of socialization in order to recover the agricultural and industrial productivity that had been disrupted by the Great Leap Forward.

The Class Struggle

As has been outlined, the policies of the Chinese Communist Party have made pen-

⁴⁸ MATSUMOTO Shun'ichi 松本俊一, "Chū-kyō wo hōmonshite 中共を訪問して (My Visit to Communist China)," *Kasumigaseki-kai Bulletin* 霞ヶ關會會報 221 (July 1964): 4–6.

dulum-like swings between moderate and radical programs. Each of these swings has represented a shift in political power within the party. In the first Five-Year Plan of the second moderate period, for example, those who stressed economic rationalism came to the forefront; but they were overshadowed in the second radical period by those who championed the communal movement. Throughout these swings, the party skillfully combined both right- and left-wing elements, granting each a large measure of flexibility. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this practice has been the career of Ch'en Yün.⁴⁹ A strong proponent of economic rationalism, Ch'en abruptly disappeared from public view at the onset of the Great Leap Forward program, only to resurface during the acute financial crisis of 1962, when he was again entrusted with important positions. The tension between the right and left factions of the party became very acute by 1963, when it seemed, from the viewpoint of the more radical Maoist elements, that the party was moving toward capitalism in the economic recovery program directed by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. In view of the dismal record of the communes, however, the Maoists could hardly criticize the economic rationalism symbolized by a Ch'en Yün. Instead, they directed their fire against the "cultural" aspects of the programs adopted after the 1958 Wuchang conference.

Under the "small freedom of speech" movement, a number of fine satires appeared. The most outstanding satirist, Wu Han, even subjected Chairman Mao to some sharp criticism; and, in addition, the writings of Teng T'o, T'ien Han, and Hsia Yen 夏衍 reflected a caustic approach to the party's programs under Mao's leadership. Responding to this development at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1962, Mao demanded and received a party resolution stressing the absolute need of all party members "not to forget the class struggle."⁵⁰ In December, Mao blasted the tendency of the party to entrust the fine arts to men who were inclined to ignore the class struggle and to advocate feudalistic and capitalistic art. Six months later, in June 1963, Mao, claiming that almost all works in the fields of art and literature had failed to adhere to the directives of the party, preached the need for a basic reform of the cultural aspects of the revolution. Another indicator of this sense of unrest among the left-wing elements of the party was the accusation by Chiang Ch'ing 江青, Mao's wife, that the Peking opera should be revamped because it was being staged in ways that perpetuated traditional values.⁵¹

These salvos by Madam and Chairman Mao symbolized a keen dissatisfaction with the moderate programs of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. In view of the economic successes realized under these men, this unrest could not pass beyond an indirect indictment of the writers and artists for their failure to depict the class strug-

⁴⁹ *Mainichi shimbun* (January 28, 1967).

⁵⁰ *Liberation Army's Daily* (June 6, 1966).

⁵¹ Later, some would declare that Chiang Ch'ing's critique of the Peking Opera was the start of the Cultural Revolution. (*Liberation Army's Daily*, January 7, 1967.)

gle in the cultural fields. In February 1965, however, the American involvement in Vietnam provided the more radical elements of the party with a new issue. From September to October, during a series of party conferences, Mao made many appeals to the sense of crisis confronting the nation, linking the failures in the cultural fields to the threat raised by the United States. Finally, on November 10, under Mao's instructions, a hitherto obscure member of the editorial staff of the Shanghai *Liberation Daily*, Yao Wen-yuan 姚文元, savagely abused the distinguished Wu Han, a deputy mayor of Peking, a prominent member of the Philosophy and Social Science Department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and one of China's most respected writers.⁵²

In 1959 Wu Han had written a drama, *The Dismissal of Hai Jui from Office* 海瑞罷官, patterned after an upright mandarin of the Ming dynasty. Most of Yao's criticism of this play voiced sentiments common to the left-wing partisans of proletarian literature; that is, he stressed that while Hai Jui may have been a respectable individual, he was, nonetheless, a representative of the landlord class. Unlike earlier abuses of Wu Han's play, Yao's literary criticism concluded with a polemic on national policy. "Everyone knows," Yao remarked, "that, in 1961, when our country faced economic difficulties for a while because of the natural calamities in three consecutive years and when imperialism, reactionaries of various countries, and modern revisionism aggravated anti-Chinese moves, goblins started a gust of *tan-kan-feng* and *fan-an-feng* 翻案風."⁵³ (Reference to these "goblins," especially the *fan-an-feng*, meant the demand for a retrial of those who had been expelled from the party for being "rightists" during the apex of the Great Leap Forward program.) In his drama, Wu Han had praised Hai Jui's recovery of lands for peasants from crafty landowners and bureaucrats and his retrial of those who had been convicted under false charges. In allusion to this, Yao said,

What superiority of private management do they advocate, why do they demand the return to private economy, and why do they demand recovery of lands? This means nothing but destroying the people's commune system and restoring evil rule by landlords and rich farmers. It is imperialists, landlords, rich farmers, reactionaries, villains and right-wingers who convicted countless working people under false charges in old society. Having lost the right to make up false charges, they claim that their being overthrown is illegal. What kind of acquittal are they crying for wilfully?⁵⁴

In brief, Yao branded all that Wu Han had said, whether intentional or not, as oppos-

⁵² *People's Daily* (November 30, 1965); also, *Mainichi shimbun* (April 27, 1967).

⁵³ *People's Daily* (November 30, 1965).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

ing the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes.

Prior to the essay, literary and academic disputes had been restricted to the areas of arts and learning. Yao Wen-yuan's polemic, however, was a frontal attack on Wu Han's political positions, and it has been popularly regarded by the Maoist elements as the starting signal of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the Red Guard journal *Tung-fang hung* 東方紅, in an editorial against the Liu-Teng policies, declared:

The Great Cultural Revolution began with *The Dismissal of Hai Jui from Office*. Chairman Mao pointed out that the critical point of *The Dismissal of Hai Jui from Office* was the question of political struggle and that this drama should be completely criticized on this issue. Liu Shao-ch'i, in conspiracy with the P'eng Chen Group, however, made frantic efforts to drag the political struggle of *The Dismissal of Hai Jui from Office* into the alley of academic debates....⁵⁵

The Maoists, as represented by the party hack Yao Wen-yuan, argued, in effect, that the class struggle should never be forgotten, that Wu Han had ignored this point, that Wu's drama about Hai Jui was a satire on the Great Leap Forward policy, and that the writings of Wu Han were the prelude to a revival of capitalism.

The Class Struggle Reflected in the Party

The blistering polemic against Wu Han was followed by comparable indictments of P'eng Chen, Chou Yang, Ch'ien Po-tsan, Teng T'o, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Liu Shao-ch'i. Sometimes the radical critics voiced farfetched accusations; at other times they invoked such nebulous criteria as "anti-Maoist" or "antisocialist." Essentially, however, the logic of the Maoist elements was based on four points.⁵⁶ First, they charged that Liu Shao-ch'i and company were pursuing bourgeois policies, especially in their enforcement of moderate aims in opposition to the Great Leap Forward. Second, they claimed that these men had forgotten the fundamental principle of the class struggle, with the result that they not only had placed cultural and academic disputes in a bourgeois framework but also had protected bourgeois thought after it had

⁵⁵ *Tung-fang hung* (December 31, 1966).

⁵⁶ The criticisms of Liu Shao-ch'i that appeared in early 1967 are especially concrete and interesting. See, for example, Ch'i Pen-yü 戚本禹, "Ai-kuo-chu-i hai-shih mai-kuo-chu-i 愛國主義還是賣國主義 (Patriotism or Traitor-ism)," *Hung ch'i* 紅旗 (Red Flag) 5 (1967). A bulk of other criticism of Liu appeared in the Red Guard journals *Chan-pao* 戰報 (War report), *Tung-fang hung* (East is Red), *Shou-tu hung-wei-ping* 首都紅衛兵 (Capital City Red Guards), and *Ching kangshan* 井岡山 (Mount Ching kang). These are reprinted in Japanese translation in the mimeographed "Collection of Materials Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution of Communist China Obtained from Red Guard Papers, Continued," *Mainichi Shimbun*, (April 6, 1967).

appeared. Third, they charged that Liu's group advocated the increase of productivity by appeals to the egoism, individual initiative, and equality of all human beings, a cluster of traits that completely ignored the issue of class struggle. Fourth, they insisted that Liu's group had distorted Mao's personal instructions on the centrality of the class struggle in all fields.

These criticisms obviously represented a powerful reaction to the moderate policies pursued after 1958. As important, the critics stressed the principle of the class struggle as their decisive ideological axiom. With it, they branded the moderate policies of Liu Shao-ch'i as revisionist, as policies that were reviving capitalism. This indictment constituted the main thrust of the Maoist position, and it meant that the targets of the Great Cultural Revolution were not confined to a limited segment of the nation, to a few die-hards of the old capitalistic system or their fellow travelers. The proponents of the Cultural Revolution were attacking the leaders of the party itself, specifically, those who had been responsible for the moderate economic, cultural, and diplomatic policies of the post-1958 period.

Of the four main types of criticism articulated by the Maoists, the accusation that the party leaders had distorted Mao's instructions was the most delicate issue. In May 1963, the party adopted ten articles for farm-village operations, the so-called Anterior Ten Articles 前十條.⁵⁷ These articles were allegedly drafted by Mao himself, and they placed extreme emphasis on the principle of class struggle. In September 1963, however, the party drafted a set of concrete instructions for the implementation of the Anterior Ten Articles.⁵⁸ These instructions, popularly known as the Posterior Ten Articles 後十條, substituted the process of "unity-criticism-unity" for class struggle and instructed the cadre to treat those elements who had followed mistaken policies as "contradictions among the people" that could be reformed by a process of education. The ultimate goal, according to the Posterior Articles, was the increase of production for "mutual enrichment."

These articles, as well as the earlier, moderate "Sixty Article Agricultural Charter," which had censured the communal movement, were prepared under the direction of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen, and Liu Shao-ch'i.⁵⁹ In view of the generally moderate policies pursued by these men after 1958, as well as the specifics contained in the Posterior Articles, the Maoists believed that these men were waving the Three Red Flags theoretically in order to subvert their principles in practice. And, in fact, their accusations were partly correct. A content analysis of the *People's*

⁵⁷ Chinese Communist Party, "A Decision on Some Problems of Immediate Farm Village Operations" (draft), reprinted by the National Security Bureau of the Republican China 中華民國國家安全局 (Taipei: 1965).

⁵⁸ Chinese Communist Party, "Regulations Concerning Some Concrete Policies of the Socialist Education Movement in Farm Villages" (draft), reprinted by the National Security Bureau of the Republican China (Taipei: 1965).

⁵⁹ "The Many Crimes of Tang Hsiao-p'ing," *Chan-pao* 3 (January 19, 1967).

Daily editorials after 1958 reveals a marked decrease in references to Mao Tse-tung. Unquestionably, at all levels, Mao's personal leadership and prestige were weakened in the 1958–65 period. This fact, plus the successful agricultural policies of the so-called revisionists, undeniably intensified a feeling of crisis among the radical Maoist elements. This feeling, combined with developments in the army and American involvement in the Vietnam war, unleashed the Great Cultural Revolution.

The dismal consequences of the Great Leap Forward had produced a shift to moderation after 1960, including a gradual but undeniable downplaying of Chairman Mao. The agricultural crisis, which led to moderation in governmental policies, also posed grave problems to the People's Liberation Army.⁶⁰ The soldiers, deeply disturbed by the threat of starvation to their families, became demoralized. Discipline collapsed in many units, orders were disobeyed, and riots even broke out. This problem could not be resolved by appeals to personal incentives, as it could in the civilian sector. In contrast to the party, which turned to economic rationalism and the downplaying of Mao's thought, the army, under the leadership of Defense Minister Lin Piao 林彪 and Chief of the General Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing 羅瑞卿, launched a vigorous ideological campaign in order to restore discipline and morale. In short, the military directed a campaign to study the thoughts of Chairman Mao—a program that, of course, canonized Mao within the army. Later, one unanticipated consequence of this campaign would be the army's crucial support of the Maoist elements during the Cultural Revolution.⁶¹

American Aggression: Will It Attack China?

Although the initial impetus behind the army's stress on Mao's thoughts had been the problem of morale, the program was reinforced by American involvement in the Vietnam war. When American troops were directly committed in February 1965, the People's Liberation Army faced the old but always new question of whether it should counter the external threat with a modern military-industrial response or a conventional people's guerrilla war. In addition, the struggle against Western imperialists

⁶⁰ A rich source of this kind of information is *Kungtso T'unghsün* 工作通訊 (Work Bulletin), a classified periodical for Liberation Army officers released in KAWAGHCHI Akira 川口晃, "Bunkadaikakumei no teiryū: Kindaika-katei wo meguru futatsu no tachiba no gekitotsu 文化大革命の底流：近代化過程をめぐる二つの立場の激突 (The Undercurrent of the Great Cultural Revolution: A Clash of Two Stands over the Process of Modernization)," *Chōsa geppō* 調査月報 (*Monthly Report of Research*), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外務省, 8/4 (April 1967): 22–71.

⁶¹ MATSUMOTO Yūji, "This is China," *Yomiuri Shimbun* (April 18, 1967); KIKUCHI Masanori 菊池昌典, "The Undercurrent of the Great Cultural Revolution," *Asahi Shimbun* (May 13, 1967); Reported YOSHIDA, "The Course of China," Part 2, *Asahi Shimbun* (September 8, 1966).

was now entangled with the problem of Sino-Soviet relations.⁶² When the United States started to bomb North Vietnam, it had made certain calculations designed to control the extent and stages of escalation. From the Chinese perspective, however, there was a great deal of uncertainty about the ultimate intent and scope of the American action. If the United States were to bomb Chinese positions, China would have to cooperate with the Soviet Union. This, of course, would entail a radical shift in tone, if not an outright abandonment of Mao's abuse of the Soviet Union. And, in fact, during the opening months of the bombing of North Vietnam, the Chinese ceased all criticism of the Soviet Union, resuming their diatribes only after it became manifest that the United States was determined to avoid a major war against North Vietnam.

The uncertainty about American policy, when coupled with the acrimonious Sino-Soviet dispute, posed grave strategic issues for the Chinese. In 1959, Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai 彭德懷 had been purged, first, for arguing that China could not confront the American imperialists without a close military alliance with the Soviet Union and, second, for insisting that industrial strength was the key to a modern army, thus putting himself at odds with the radical Great Leap Forward movement. As a consequence of his approach, P'eng was replaced by Lin Piao, who was an advocate of the radical movement.

At first, Lin had the firm support of General Lo, the chief of staff. When confronted with the American intervention in the Vietnam war however, General Lo began to disagree with his superior. On May 11, 1965, General Lo presented the outlines of his "aggressive defense" strategy in the *People's Daily*.⁶³ He argued that it would not suffice to possess one or two (presumably nuclear) weapons. A modern army, he insisted, must have a firm economic foundation, which would require a great deal of time to construct. Until China developed an industrial complex, Lo reasoned, it would have to bide its time by allying itself with the Soviet Union and by supporting revolutionary movements throughout the world. Lo's "aggressive defense" was a restatement of Marshall P'eng's doctrine, and it contradicted the basic strategy of Mao Tse-tung. On September 3, 1965, Marshall Lin Piao set aside Lo's strategy with a ringing affirmation of Mao's reliance on a people's war.⁶⁴ Here, Lin faithfully praised the strategies employed by Mao against the Japanese invaders in 1937-45. In particular, he argued that the imperialists were mounting a major war and that Chinese territory, not the United States, would be the field for a confrontation with American imperialism. With this premise, Lin reasoned that China should

⁶² Compare OKABE Tatsumi, "Chūkyō no senryaku-shisō 中共の戰略思想 (Communist China's Strategic Thought)" in *Chōsa geppō*, 8/3 (March 1967): 1-24.

⁶³ Lo Jui-ch'ing 羅瑞卿, "An Article Written to Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism and to Carry Through the Struggle Against American Imperialism," *People's Daily* (May 11, 1965).

⁶⁴ "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *People's Daily* (September 3, 1965).

lie in wait for the American invaders and then drown them in a sea of seven hundred million Chinese. As part of this strategy, Lin called for arming the people with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung as the first priority.

From some points of view, Lin's strategy appeared outdated, a reliance on bygone campaigns. Still, if one assumes, as Lin and Mao apparently did, that the United States would attack China before it could build a modern military-industrial complex and that the Soviet Union would betray China and encourage the American imperialists, then the strategies of Lin and Mao become much less irrational. Assuming a Soviet-American conspiracy against China, Lo's strategy would be a disaster. Underlying these two strategic doctrines is a considerable difference in assessments of international politics. On the basis of available evidence, one must surmise—though it is by no means certain—that Mao and Lin believe that the United States will attack China and that the Soviet Union will not be a reliable ally. In any case, it is clear that the American involvement in Vietnam has contributed to the popularity and effectiveness of Lin's concept. In this sense, the Vietnam war contributed directly to the Cultural Revolution, to the sense of crisis confronting China, and to the stress on Mao's thoughts as the basis for resolving domestic and foreign problems.

Six Principles of Communist China

During the past twenty years, the policies of Communist China have oscillated between moderation and radicalism. Against this background, the inception of the Great Cultural Revolution can be seen as a sharp reaction to the third moderate period. Despite this oscillation between the moderate and radical poles, however, one can discern some basic principles or patterns that could be called characteristic of contemporary China. In general terms, the policies of Communist China are governed by six basic principles: (1) an affirmation of the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung, (2) a nationalistic Chinese Marxism-Leninism, (3) a principle-oriented flexibility, (4) Mao's four principles of guerrilla warfare, (5) the centrality of a military orientation, and (6) an emphasis on spiritual elements. Although all six traits are important, the most significant principle has been the infallibility of Mao.

1. As mentioned, Marshall Lin relied on the potency of political indoctrination based on the thought of Mao. The Liberation Army's campaign to study Mao's thoughts and ideas was later emulated on a nationwide scale in the Cultural Revolution. Particular emphasis was placed on the indoctrination of the younger generation, which had not personally experienced the difficult and bloody days of the pre-1949 Chinese Communist movement. Consequently, Chinese leaders invariably decorated their speeches and writings with the stereotyped expression, "under the accurate leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Even the successful nuclear tests

were proclaimed to be an accomplishment of “hoisting the great red flag of Mao’s thought.” So, too, a victory by Chinese ping-pong teams in a contest with Japanese teams was attributed to the “stubborn-minded military gymnastic battalion” of the team that had “armed themselves with the spirit of Mao Tse-tung.”⁶⁵

This adulation of Mao’s thoughts has also affected the party’s official interpretation of its own history. It has claimed, for example, that several serious mistakes were made by the leadership of left-wing adventurers during the Kiangsi 江西 Soviet era in the 1930’s, and that not until Mao assumed party leadership at the Tsun-i 遵義 conference in 1935 did the party start, for the first time, to march along the “correct” line of the revolution. Actually, however, a study based on original Chinese Communist sources from the Ch’en Ch’eng 陳誠 collection clarifies the powerful and vital role Mao played in the Kiangsi Soviet.⁶⁶ Accordingly, Mao should share the responsibility for some of the early decisions that have since been credited to left-wing adventurers.

From some points of view, it may seem absurd that victory in ping-pong games and success in nuclear weapons are equally attributed to the inspiration of Chairman Mao. What it signifies, however, is that, whether or not the old revolutionary actually participates in decision-making activities of the party, all contending elements, moderates and radicals, advance and defend their proposals by means of references to the thoughts of Mao. The writings of Mao Tse-tung are utilized as precedents and guideposts in all policy discussions and decisions. If only for this reason, therefore, it is imperative that anyone interested in studying Communist China thoroughly digest the works of Mao. This is an indispensable requisite for an understanding of contemporary policies and attitudes of the Peking government.

2. Closely related to the adulation of Mao is the fact that Chinese Communist leaders are and have been primarily nationalists. China suffered many humiliations from Westerners in the past century, and Chinese intellectuals, particularly the younger ones, resented deeply the political disintegration and the turmoil of their homeland. They turned to Marxism-Leninism merely as a means by which to achieve their nationalistic desires—to recover China’s national integrity and dignity. Moreover, the historical context of the Chinese revolution differed radically from that of the Russian Revolution. On the eve of the October Revolution, the major target of the Russian revolutionists was the annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Russia. Since the domestic class struggle was the crucial issue, Lenin, in order to protect the domestic revolution, advocated peace with Imperial Germany, no matter how harsh the German demands might be. In contrast, on the eve of the Chinese revolution, the major target of the Chinese revolutionists was Japan. In this context, the Chinese

⁶⁵ *People’s Daily* (April 20, 1965).

⁶⁶ ISHIDA Ryōko 石田亮子, “Kōsei Sovieto jidai to Mō-takutō 江西ソビエト時代と毛澤東 (The Political Leadership of Mao Tse-tung in the Kiangsi Soviet)” (B. A. thesis, Department of History, Ochanomizu University, 1963).

Communists, in order to protect their revolution, advocated a national united front and a war against the foreign invader. While the Russian revolutionaries in 1917 and 1918 shouted, "Peace in order to protect the revolution!" the Chinese Communists firmly believed that "a righteous war against foreign imperialism" was indispensable in achieving the ends of their revolution.

This past history is not unrelated to contemporary differences of opinion between Soviet and Chinese leaders. As the Sino-Soviet dispute became increasingly tense, there emerged an image of China shared by the Soviet Union and the Western world, namely, that Communist China is inherently expansionistic and is distinguished by atavistic ideas of Sinocentrism. Thus, for example, R. V. Vyatkin and S. L. Tikhvinskii, two leading Sinologists in the Soviet Union, bitterly indicted recent Chinese historical studies as being jingoistic and contrary to Marxism-Leninism.⁶⁷ Unquestionably, many outsiders fear that Communist China will eventually claim territorial rights over peripheral areas formerly under the hegemony of the Ch'ing dynasty. In fact, Mao once wrote that the imperialist states had stolen many of the Chinese tributaries and a part of China's territory—that Japan had occupied Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; that England had occupied Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; that France had taken Vietnam; and that even tiny Portugal had occupied Macao.⁶⁸

This proclamation has often been cited as a tangible evidence that China, under Mao, is seeking a restoration of these areas, but this seems highly unlikely. First of all, any such territorial claims would threaten the people in those areas and drive them to an anti-Chinese position, which would run counter to the great importance the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have in the past placed on the subjective feelings of native people. Second, China's short-term strategy is to isolate American imperialism and to create as broad a united front as possible against the United States. The ultimate long-term strategy is to bolshevize the world. In order to achieve both aims, China needs to foster friendly relationships with its neighbors. Third, the border agreements that China concluded with its neighbors in 1960–63 make it obvious that China's second short-term strategy is to stabilize its borders. In every border agreement, China was quite flexible, often yielding ground. Fourth, the Chinese Communists have a long experience of national humiliation and of nationalist struggle, and they understand the fierce nationalism of their neighbors. With the exception of the Sino-Indian border dispute, China has maintained an attitude of self-restraint toward its Asian neighbors. The Chinese leaders have been careful and calculating, and it is unlikely that they will resort to any aggressive action unless they feel certain

⁶⁷ Compare, R. V. Vyatkin and S. L. Tikhvinskii, "O nekotoryx voprosax istoricheskoi nauki v KNR," *Voprosy istorii* 10 (1963).

⁶⁸ "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (pamphlet) (Hong Kong, 1940), 10.

that China can draw some profit from it. One could interpret various events as indicative of China's territorial ambitions—for example, the Sino-Indian border dispute, Mao's claim to Outer Mongolia,⁶⁹ and the Taiwan issue. However, there are other explanations for these events, and, although one cannot deny the possible existence of a Sinocentric mentality in the psychology of the Chinese Communists, China's nationalistic fervor seems unlikely to be transformed into unlimited expansionism or the atavism of the old Sinocentrism as long as its neighbors do not seem to threaten China's major principles and interests.

3. The doctrinal praise of Mao's thought and the nationalistic basis of Chinese Communism have not produced excessive rigidity or dogmatism in specific foreign or domestic policies. On the contrary, a principle-oriented flexibility has distinguished the thought and behavior of Communist China. "We should," Mao affirmed, "be firm in principle; we should also have all the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles."⁷⁰ In restating one of Lenin's maxims, Mao insisted that the "soul" of Marxism is the careful analysis of specific conditions.⁷¹ And, in his famous essay "On Contradiction," Mao defined "investigation" as the process of ascertaining what principle ought to be applied in any given concrete situation and then how flexible the specific acts should be in order to achieve the correct principles.⁷² In practice, Mao and the party have constantly adhered to "principles," while at the same time displaying surprising flexibility in practice. In 1936, for example, the party defined the formation of an anti-Japanese national front as the basic principle involved in the concrete situation of Chinese politics. With this principle, the party decided that the "main contradiction" in this context was the conflict between Japanese aggression and the resistance of the Chinese people. Acting on this "investigation," the party abandoned its hitherto basic principle, land reform, in order to reach an accommodation with the nationalistic government. Also, in conformity with this investigation, it accepted the Comintern suggestion that it release Chiang Kai-shek, after he had been "kidnapped" in the famous Sian 西安 incident of December 1936. These moves are but two of many examples of the principle-oriented flexibility displayed by the Chinese Communists.

Today, the Chinese Communist Party's "investigation" of the concrete state of affairs has produced the principle that the "main contradiction" is the conflict between American imperialism and the Chinese people.⁷³ This principle has defined two major "intermediate zones" outside of China. In the first zone—Asia, Africa, and

⁶⁹ In his conversation with the delegates of the Japanese Socialist Party on July 10, 1964, Mao told them that in 1954 he had asked Khrushchev and Bulganin to return Outer Mongolia to China.

⁷⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, March 5, 1949," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 5:372.

⁷¹ "On Contradictions," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 2:26.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 41–42.

⁷³ *People's Daily* (January 21, 1964).

Central-South America—all the people, it says, are fighting American imperialism, while in the second zone—New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and Western Europe—many of the people are fighting American imperialism. In both zones, the Chinese Communists are prepared to encourage any and all anti-American sentiments and movements, whether or not they be directed or organized by local communist parties. In the case of Japan, for example, the party has enough flexibility to cultivate close contacts with those Japanese conservative groups that advocate anti-American policies. Indeed, in the logic of the Chinese Communists, any action that produces conflict with American imperialism must contribute to the ultimate resolution of the existing basic contradiction—the contradiction between American imperialism and the Chinese people. Therefore, within the confines of this principle, the Chinese government has unusual flexibility in the specific actions and programs it can pursue.

4. The fourth characteristic of Chinese thought has been Mao's four principles of guerrilla warfare. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest insurrection of 1927 in the four provinces of South China, Mao and his troops, exhausted by defeat and hunger, found their way to Chingkangshan 井岡山. Here, as is well known, Mao and Chu Teh 朱德 devised a strategy of guerrilla warfare based on their painful experiences. Mao summarized these tactics in four easily remembered principles: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy camps, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue."⁷⁴ The first principle may be interpreted as a policy of prudence. Mao, for example, warned that the party should not fight when it does not have the ability to win. In striking contrast to militarist leaders in prewar Japan, the Chinese Communists have avoided great risks comparable to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it is inconceivable that Communist China will resort to an aggressive policy that entails a strategic risk to the People's Republic.

The second principle, "enemy camps, we harass," is the strategy of pursuing disturbing activities. Thus, for example, as soon as General de Gaulle began to pursue policies that created friction in the NATO alliance, Communist China promptly approached France. De Gaulle responded by recognizing the Peking government, and the ensuing entente between Paris and Peking shocked the United States. Another application of this second maxim was Communist China's wholehearted support of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. Branding the existing United Nations as an organ manipulated by imperialist powers, Chou En-lai stated unhesitatingly that it would be a good idea to create a new United Nations, entirely different from the present organization. In fact, Communist China consciously promotes all efforts that disturb the present organization of the United Nations, which includes Nationalist China as one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

In the present context, the third principle, "enemy tires, we attack," can be taken to mean that the Chinese ultimately aspire to win an overwhelming victory

⁷⁴ "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 1:124.

over American imperialism. Still, Mao, in his essay "On Protracted War," advocated that a decisive attack should be made only when victory was absolutely certain.⁷⁵ In fact, Mao's strategy in the war against Japan was to concentrate at least three times the strength of his enemy at their weakest point. In the fall of 1937, for example, the powerful Japanese Fifth Division was marching through P'ing-hsing-kuan 平型關 valley in Shansi 山西 province. The Chinese Eighth Route Army 八路軍 remained quietly in the hills and did not move until the major part of the Japanese division had passed through the valley. Then it ambushed the last part of the marching division, a transport corps, defeating it quite easily. Before it could be reinforced, the Chinese Communist army had quietly disappeared. The fourth principle of guerrilla tactics, "enemy retreats, we pursue," suggests that Communist China will capitalize on any advantage in order to widen its sphere of influence. For example, wherever and whenever there emerges an independent country in the first intermediate zone (which the Chinese Communists consider the major battlefield in the attempt to defeat American imperialism), the Chinese will continue to attempt to infiltrate this zone and promote anti-American movements.

5. These guerrilla-warfare maxims are part of a broader militaristic orientation that has characterized the Chinese Communist movement. As is well known, Mao attaches great importance to weapons and warfare. "Political power," he declared, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."⁷⁶ And, he added, "Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war.... We may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed."⁷⁷ Since Mao and other leaders of his generation have survived continuous revolutionary wars, they know well the importance of weapons in the realization of political aims. This lesson has been applied in the Sino-Soviet dispute, in which the Chinese Communists repeatedly insist that peace will be obtained not by begging for it but by fighting for it. In brief, it is impossible to detect any pacifistic elements in the philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party. Imperialism, Mao proclaimed, is a tiger. "Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him—one or the other."⁷⁸ In line with this attitude, Communist China has not hesitated to produce nuclear weapons, and it will continue in its efforts to catch up with American military power. Moreover, the Chinese Communists will be prepared to use these weapons whenever they may feel it necessary to do so. Moreover, although many Asian nations were surprised at the Chinese invasion of India, it was perfectly consistent with China's philosophy of relying on military power in order to achieve political purposes.

6. Notwithstanding the centrality of weapons and warfare in Communist thinking, the Chinese have also emphasized the spiritual elements in policies, politics, and

⁷⁵ "On Protracted War," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 2:180–183.

⁷⁶ "Problems of War and Strategy," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 2:224.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁷⁸ "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 4:416.

war. "Whatever is done," Mao wrote, "has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action."⁷⁹ Political mobilization, Mao insisted, "is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary."⁸⁰ In fact, the Chinese Communist Party appears to believe that victory in war depends less on the weapons used than on the human element involved. Given this orientation, it is unlikely that Chinese troops would be sent to any foreign country without local support. Rather, the Chinese Communists are more likely to lend "spiritual" support to any movement or insurrection against the United States in any foreign country, striving, of course, to develop and widen such efforts by this ideological technique.

Communist China: A Prognosis

In retrospect, this essay has examined the onset of the Great Cultural Revolution in the context of a moderate-radical pendulum movement that has been characteristic of Chinese history since 1949. It has also outlined six general traits that have distinguished the thought and behavior of the Chinese Communist movement. The most hazardous task for a China specialist is to predict, on the basis of his understanding of Communist China, the future pattern of events and policies there. In this difficult assignment, six questions must be considered: (1) the question of political unity, (2) the role of Mao Tse-tung, (3) the dynamics of moderation and radicalism, (4) the importance of external pressure, especially by the United States, (5) China's relations with its neighbors, including the Soviet Union, and (6) the problem of demography and agricultural productivity.

Political unity was realized in 1949. This unity, however, rests on three pillars that have yet to demonstrate their long-term resiliency—namely, a particular form of nationalism, the personal prestige and authority of Chairman Mao, and the People's Liberation Army. Although nationalism in China may have reached the grassroots level, it remains a pubescent nationalism, similar in many respects to the nationalism of Meiji Japan. The centrality of the army and of Mao's role in China's political unity has been repeatedly conceded by the Communists themselves. On August 9, 1967 Lin Piao declared:

It is thanks to two conditions that we are able to start the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The first is nothing but the thought of Mao Tse-tung and Chairman Mao's supreme prestige. The second is the strength of the Liberation Army. Only these two conditions made it possible for us to venture to mobilize

⁷⁹ "On Protracted War," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 2:151.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 154.

the masses as we thought proper. At present both the Party and the Government are all paralyzed. On the surface this is disorder, but this disorder is absolutely necessary. But for disorder in a normal situation, it is impossible to expose the reactionary. It is because we had Chairman Mao's highest prestige and the strength of the Liberation Army that we could venture to do this.⁸¹

Since Chinese political unity is sustained by these elements, any prognosis of its future must be based on them. In my judgment, it is unlikely that the present system of Maoist absolutism will continue indefinitely. Sooner or later, China will shift to a style of political unity of the Soviet type or of the Latin American *junta* type. Or, if the Liberation Army were to fractionalize, one might see a militaristic decentralization of power, with each local ruler claiming to represent Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy—in effect, an up-to-date version of the warlord era. The first two possibilities, however, seem more viable. Which of these two forms ultimately prevails will depend, in large measure, on the foreign policy of the United States.

External pressure, as well as internal tension, has played a prominent role in strengthening Chinese nationalism. Indeed, it has been the prime stimulant to Chinese political unity. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the Chinese communists will seek to foster among the people a sense of external crisis. In other words, they will continue to stress the dangers of American imperialism—which raises interesting (but, for the present, unanswerable) questions about the connections between the United States' bombing of North Vietnam and Chinese domestic policies, including the Great Cultural Revolution. For the moment, one may speculate that if the present American policy of containment were perfectly and powerfully implemented, the People's Republic of China would probably turn into a military state that would be ruled for a long time by a *junta* of the Latin American type. If, on the other hand, American external pressures were weakened, one could anticipate a shift to a Soviet-type government espousing the doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

The second question to consider is that of Mao's political leadership. Lin Piao has eulogized Mao's "supreme prestige" to the extent of claiming that China's political cohesion was sustained by Mao's personal leadership. If this is so, after Mao Tse-tung's death the loss of his charismatic personality must naturally produce major changes, one way or another, in China. Presently, it is impossible to ascertain with any accuracy the actual political role played by Mao, or even whether or not he is healthy. What is clear, however, is that Mao is deified in China as the omnipotent, flawless leader of the Chinese (and the world) Communist revolution. Still, the same was true in the past, and it did not prevent the Peking government from making major changes in policies. At the moment, the Cultural Revolution is apparently

⁸¹ *Kuangchou feng-lai* 廣州風雷 (periodical issued by the Yanan Commune of the Kuangchou Huanan Technical School) (September 22, 1967).

ending. Not only actions, but slogans as well, have recently changed. For instance, Mao Tse-tung's Twelve Article Directive of December 1967 was prudently followed throughout 1968, and this statement no longer advanced such slogans as "Rebellion is justified," or "Disorder is a good thing." Priority was given to the necessity of self-criticism and to a cautious handling of the problem of cadres and the reconstruction of party organizations. Along with this change, the party no longer advocated the fundamental goals of the Cultural Revolution—for example, the call for a remolding of the human soul. Instead, Mao Tse-tung's directive redefined the Cultural Revolution as a concrete political revolution that was connected with the class struggle and as a continuation of the long struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries.⁸² Moreover, specific action programs are becoming moderate at a faster tempo than are the slogans, as reflected, most recently, in the way the Chinese delegates negotiated the 1968 Sino-Japanese trade agreement. Whatever political role Mao may be playing, in my judgment Chinese policies are shifting toward moderation, albeit on a zigzag course. If the Cultural Revolution has not quite terminated, de-Maoization may nevertheless already have begun quietly. In addition, party organizations are being reconstructed, not by reinstating the former organizations but by forming new groups under such names as the Revolutionary Committee and Congress of Active Members Studying the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Along with the reconstruction of the party, the administrative system is also being quickly reconstructed, apparently in the search for a more simplified system that can be incorporated into party organizations.

In regard to the question of external pressure, especially American pressure, any softening in the attitude of the United States toward China should substantially increase the possibility of internal changes in China. Although one cannot be certain of the direction these changes would take, at least it is clear that if the United States' policy of containment remains fixed and continues to be carried out with the strength it has been since the Korean War, no major change in Chinese Communist diplomacy can be expected. Furthermore, the Taiwan issue remains a matter of crucial importance in American-Chinese relations. If both sides maintain their present attitudes concerning that issue, there could be only a very limited degree of softening in Sino-American relations.

Judging from the complicated developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1961, it is also unlikely that China and the Soviet Union will again form a united front against American imperialism. More probably, they will keep struggling for the leadership of the world communist movement and continue to have minor confrontations along their borders. Concerning other countries on China's periphery, we have already pointed out that the Chinese Communists do not, in theory, believe that China can export revolution. From their viewpoint, the key issue is whether or not a

⁸² *People's Daily* (April 10, 1968).

revolutionary situation exists locally. Not even during the most radical period of the Cultural Revolution did the Peking government do anything except voice support for indigenous revolutionary movements. One may reasonably conclude that China will spur any insurrection in which an indigenous revolutionary force is strong and that it will strive to maintain friendly relations with any central government in which the revolutionary force is weak. In brief, the Chinese Communists will not resort to direct aggression, they will stabilize diplomatic relations with the countries on their borders, and they will champion ideologically all indigenous revolutionary movements in these countries.

The last issue to consider in any prognosis is the problem of agricultural productivity. According to the information available, the annual net increase in the Chinese population is around 2 percent. Demographers, on the basis of past experience, believe that a developing country whose population increases annually by 2 percent must raise its food production by 3 percent annually in order to satisfy the people's demand for a higher standard of living. This type of agricultural productivity seems a sheer impossibility for China, which has a population of between 750 and 780 million people. Japan, the most outstanding developing economy in Asia, was able to double its food production in the first forty years of the Meiji era mainly through technical innovation in agriculture. Nonetheless, the average rate of the annual increase in this period was actually no more than 1.79 percent. In light of this record, it is obvious how difficult it will be for China to achieve a 3 percent annual increase in food production. Still, China must accomplish this impossible task if it is to develop as a viable nation.

Considering the awesome economic and political problems confronting the Chinese Communists, the People's Republic of China will scarcely be able to engage in global politics. Red China is too weak militarily, industrially, and agriculturally to play the role of a world power. Unquestionably, China will utter bombastic rhetoric, especially in domestic propaganda, and will direct its ideology toward indigenous revolutionary movements in all foreign countries. Still, despite its stress on forming an anti-American united front, it is doubtful whether China could actually provide much material or technical assistance to such a movement. In short, one should never slight the realistic actions of the Chinese Communists. Since they came to power in 1949, despite violent slogans and radical revolutionary ideology, they have acted prudently, and this gap between rhetoric and behavior will doubtless continue to exist. Whatever the future holds, the observer of China will have to cope with the arduous assignment of measuring behavior against ideology in the quest to understand the subsequent history of Communist China and the Chinese revolution.

Chapter VI FEATURES CHARACTERISTIC OF THE ECONOMY OF CHINA

Preface

Japanese people's views of China and Sino-Japanese relations are as varied as those of the blind men trying to describe an elephant by touching different parts of it with their hands. The scope of these interpretations ranges from those of intimate co-existence to those of tension and even conflict. Because of the geographical proximity of the two countries and the long history of cultural interchange, some Japanese feel confident in their individual knowledge of China.

Still, there are many political, economic, and social differences between the two states, which are not conducive to harmonious relations. At the center of China's highly centralized political system is the Chinese Communist Party. Its sole rule extends to the statewide networks of mass media. In contrast, the Japanese system is a multi-party parliamentary democracy with a free press. Economically, China is a "big land with abundant resources" as it was fondly referred to during the Ch'ing 清 dynasty. This same description has made a strong comeback recently in the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper, *People's Daily* 人民日報. Japan, in the meantime, is a narrow land with a scarcity of natural resources. Prosperity and the survival of the Japanese state depend on trade, aid and direct investment in the stable international economic system. The state policy of China is "self-reliance" to such an extent that there was even a political movement which criticizes an introduction of imported technology as "over-Westernizing." In addition, the Chinese government boasts of not having incurred any debts either at home or abroad. Socially, China is proud of its monolithic unity under Maoism. Chinese people are encouraged to work together for the betterment of all. In contrast, Japan is a pluralistic society and as such is much more tolerant of dissent. It is questionable if two countries that in many ways differ so substantially can get along well together.

The following discussion is an attempt to present the characteristic features of China's economy by referring to ideology-free solid data and hard evidence.

* This was originally published in *Peace Research in Japan* (1971). It expresses straight-forwardly my observation that the Chinese socialist economy would have to be transformed to permit competition and private ownership. This was a minority view at the time but seen from today's point of view it does not seem such an extreme view.

1. Economic Power of the Nation

Table 1 compares the approximate GNP of China and Japan from 1954–1968. In 1953, China embarked upon a plan of economic development based on the Soviet model. With the aid of the USSR the first Five-Year Plan was carried out quite smoothly; the average annual growth rate amounted to 5.6%. The Peking government praised its own achievement and foreign economists also, regardless of their ideologies, marvelled at this development. In 1957, however, some drastic changes (some details of which have been kept completely secret) occurred in the Sino-Soviet relations. It seems that Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東 and his associates thought it possible to hasten the country's economic development by accelerating the course of socialism with no external help. Thus, in 1958, three great campaigns, "the Great Leap Forward 大躍進," "the People's Commune 人民公社," and "the General Line of Socialism Construction 社會主義建設總路線," together called "the Three Red Flags 三面紅旗," Policy were coercively carried out. Consequently, labor was mobilized and that led to a rapid and quantitative growth of local industry. Eventually, the tripartite policies contributed to overall economic growth. And yet, the supply of some agricultural products such as pigs, chickens, eggs and vegetables swiftly

Table VI-1 Productivities of Japan and China


(In billions of US dollars)

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Japan (1)	21.7	24.6	27.6	31.2	32.7	37.8	45.0	55.1	60.1
China (2)				41.0	49.2	51.2		38.6	40.1
Aggregate amount of industrial and agricultural production of China (3)	42.5	45.3	52.7	56.9	69.4	68.8	70.0	62.0	57.5
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Japan	71.0	82.0	90.7	105.9	124.4	146.6	165.9	203.4	254.5
China			52.6	55.8		52.0			(approx.)
Aggregate amount of industrial and agricultural production of China	60.3	67.2	71.7	77.7	73.8	69.4			

Notes:

1. The exchange rates are \$1 = ¥360 prior to 1970 and \$1 = ¥308 in 1971.
2. Alexander Eckstein, *Economic Development Prospect & Problems in Mainland China*, mimeograph, 1970.
3. The figures (1954–1957) were officially announced by the Chinese government, and the others (1958–now) were calculated from estimated growth rates presented by the U.S. Department of State.

Chart VI-1 Productivities of Japan and China



declined. These items used to be supplied to the marketplace by individual farmers for their own profit. Communization substantially deprived farmers of their incentive to continue to produce, however.

In December of 1958, Mao Tse-tung, chief advocate of the Great Leap Forward campaign, officially declared that he would not be President again. The following year the Peking government quietly began to employ a moderate policy called the policy of adjustment. Each family was allotted a garden plot for private use; prices of agricultural products were raised; and merits-based wage differentials became common. The policy of what is called material incentives was introduced. Later, during the Great Cultural Revolution 文化大革命, the Peking government strongly criticized this policy of adjustment for bringing about a degeneration of the country into capitalism. Nevertheless, the economy of China began to improve gradually from the latter half of 1962. China still had to cope with three difficult conditions. The damages inflicted by "the Great Leap Forward," natural disasters that devastated the country three years in a row from 1959 to 1961, and exacerbated Sino-Soviet dispute over the return of Russian sciences and technology experts to their country in 1960. We foreign observers cannot help but recognize the great accomplishment of the decision-makers who overcame these difficult conditions. In the years of 1965 and 1966, the economy which had already turned upward surpassed the level of 1958 twice consecutively.

Taking the average between 1952 and 1966, we find the annual growth rate amounts to 4%. To illustrate the significance of this phenomenon, the averages of the nominal rates of growth of the Southeast Asian countries in the years, 1964-1968, are as follows: Taiwan (12.9%) and Thailand (10%) are the countries with higher rates; Indonesia (2.3%) and Laos (2.3%) are those with lower ones. The figure of

China, 4%, is similar to those of Burma (4.2%), Cambodia (4.9%) and South Vietnam (3.8%). Analyzing these statistics in a comparative context, estimates concerning the future of China and appraisals of its economy differ greatly.

The next question is that of the net sum of the GNP. The Peking government has rarely announced individual statistical figures since the breakdown of the Great Leap Forward, much less of the nationwide statistics. Inevitably, we have to rely upon pre-1958 figures. Alexander Eckstein of the University of Michigan estimates that the GNP of 1966 amounts to 55.8 billion U.S. dollars. Another method of calculation, based on the figures officially announced by China before 1958, yields 77.7 billion dollars, which is more to China's favor. The discrepancy between these two estimates is significant, more than 20 billion dollars, and hence, the net sum is obscure, inexact and remains open to question. Nevertheless, the GNP of Japan surpassed that of China around 1961-1962, and maintained a high rate of growth until 1970. By contrast, the growth of China has stood still. Moreover, the economic scale of Japan in 1968 (a nominal GNP of 146.6 billion U.S. dollars) is more than three times as large as that of the sum of all eleven Southeast Asian countries (43 billion dollars), and equals almost the total sum of the GNP's of the whole of Asia except for Siberia. We can see, therefore, that it is natural for China to keep a wary eye on its neighbor Japan.

Moreover, rapid population growth of Mainland China seems to press down heavily upon its economy. Researchers and institutions are having a hard time estimating its size due to the paucity of data. The index which we use here is that of the U.S. Department of State (Table 2). While the natural annual rate of increase is about 2%, agricultural products per capita declined to an index of 93 in 1968, if we take 1957, the year prior to the Great Leap Forward, as a base year. Thus the GNP per capita scarcely made any progress during these eleven years. Assuming that the rise and fall of agricultural products can be interpreted as that of food products, the food condition of China in 1968 was worse than in 1957.

On this matter of food, the differences among the estimates are also wide. The pessimistic view is that the condition of China, as the index shows, will grow worse; the optimistic view is that production increase in the agricultural sector has been "remarkable" and that the people are not short of food in spite of other difficulties.

Putting together the piecemeal reports of Japanese repatriates and Chinese refugees from the Mainland, both of whom I interviewed throughout Japan, it is my understanding that the food situation varies strikingly from place to place; the conditions of Peking, Shanghai and Canton are generally better than those of the countryside. Especially in such border areas as Heilungchiang 黑龍江 and Sinkiang 新疆 both quality and quantity of food seem to be quite bad. In actuality, the food situation is not bad enough to cause starvation, but the supply is not as plentiful as in more advanced countries. Soy beans and rice were exported by China before World War II. Today, however, wheat is imported from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and

France. It appears that the problem of food is one of the most serious ones confronting China.

Calculations of the national per capita income of China also differ widely: 92 dollars is a rather high estimate; 76 dollars is Eckstein's estimate, and 60 dollars is a low estimate. These figures are not merely incomparably lower than those of Japan and the U.S.; they are also strikingly lower than even Taiwan (Table 3). Other indications of the national standard of living, the figures of which are shown in Table 3, are surprisingly low. The energy per capita, compared with Taiwan, amounts to only two-thirds; the production levels of paper and of cement are one-sixth and one-third, respectively. We cannot accurately predict the future of China, but for the present, at least, Peking must bear the burden of these economic difficulties.

Table VI-2 Index of the Aggregate Production of Agriculture and Industry of China

Year	Index of agricultural production	Index of industrial production	Index of GNP	Population	Agricultural production per capita	GNP per capita
1957	100	100	100	100	100	100
1958	110	140	122	102.5	107	119
1959	92	165	121	104	88	116
1960	81	180	123	105	77	115
1961	87	140	109	105	83	103
1962	93	110	101	106	88	94
1963	97	114	106	108	92	97
1964	108	130	118	110	98	106
1965	108	150	126	113	96	111
1966	111	180	139	115	97	121
1967	118	155	132	117	101	112
1968	111	140	122	120	93	103

Notes: U.S.A. Department of State, *United States Foreign Policy, no. 4: Communist China, 1970.*

Table VI-3 Income and Annual Amount of Production per capita (1968)

	National income (US dollars)	Energy (calculated in terms of coal, kg)	Blister Steel (kg)	Cement (kg)	Paper (kg)
Japan	1,120	1,783	660	470	77
U.S.A.	3,600	9,201	592	342	184
Taiwan	255	654	-	187	11
Mainland China	92 (approx.)	461	17	14	2

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, New York, 1969.*

2. Fundamental Economic Policies

I shall now outline the fundamental features of the economic policies which the Peking government, burdened with the difficulties stated above, has been attempting to implement.

1. *Politics in Command*

This policy is based on the assumption that human reform can be effected through earnest political education, namely the learning of Maoism, and that once such reform is accomplished, efficiency and good organization are possible without material incentives. The slogan “Grasp revolution and promote production 抓革命，促生產” evidences this relationship between human reform (i.e., the revolution) and economic activities. Furthermore, the accumulation of capital by labor is possible if the masses are mobilized by the effective organization thus created. Consequently they say that “Political maneuvering is a life line for all economic activities.” All trade and financial policies give priority to politics so that determining foreign trade policies is as much a matter of political maneuvering as it is one of economic considerations. The slogan, “Both red and expert 又紅又專” which emphasizes equally the spirit of communism and learning of politics, and the acquisition of professional techniques is criticized as placing improper emphasis on the latter. Moreover, another slogan “Fight against the egoistic mind and criticize revisionism” evinces a total rejection of bourgeois pleasures and urges citizens to save their earnings instead. Nevertheless, the long-range durability of this policy, wherein every economic activity is motivated among the masses by spiritual incentives, is questionable. The significance of the subjective aspect of “politics in command,” that is political discipline, was greatly proclaimed during the course of the Great Cultural Revolution. However, such sayings as “There is a limit to each man’s ability,” and “Make your thinking coincide with the laws of the objective and external world” have reappeared since the beginning of this year, and even the slogan “Both red and expert” has reappeared a few times in the *People’s Daily*. It is probable that this policy, which attempts to improve the quality of labor and to accumulate capital as well through spiritual incentives alone, will be gradually abrogated.

2. *Prepare for war and disaster*

This slogan calls for the intensification of national consciousness, a decrease in the consumption of commodities, and an increase of provisions for times of crisis. In case of a war on the mainland, China wants to ensure the proper conditions for waging guerilla war. This includes decentralization of industry and the establishment of a system of local economic self-sufficiency. China has already made efforts since about 1960 to gradually replace its national economic plans with regional plans; this tendency has been particularly noticeable since the Great Cultural Revolution. In

addition, the policy of local self-sufficiency promoted medium- and small-size industries rather than major ones whose attention was directed toward a national market. China does not seem to be enthusiastic about building largescale industrial cities; rather, it seems to aim toward a situation in which local industries are evenly distributed among the rural areas. (Big cities are seen to have such inherent liabilities as a greater tendency on the part of laborers there to succumb to "bourgeois thought," and an obvious vulnerability in the face of nuclear attack.) China's simultaneous consolidation of the large established industries and fostering of new medium- and small-size industries is referred to as a policy of "walking on two legs 兩條腿走路."

3. Self-reliance

Since the Sino-Soviet dispute, China has made efforts to create a closed economy in accordance with the above slogan. Hence trade is limited to the needs of the domestic economy; the requisite imports takes priority over exports. Considering this slogan together with "Politics in Command," we see that politics comes on top and is followed by domestic economic needs, imports and exports in that order. This policy contributes to minimizing contacts with the outside world, which could be an effective measure to deal with a wide range of diverse liberal ideas and thoughts and disturbing influences from foreign countries. It also helps consolidate internal political leadership, and, from the economic point of view, maintain a low individual consumption level by eliminating the "demonstration effect" of foreign commodities in Mainland China.

4. Making agriculture the base

Originally, the Peking government engaged in a long internal controversy on the problem of whether the economic foundation of the nation should be agriculture or industry. The Great Leap Forward obviously was meant to promote industry, and the capital that was accumulated in rural villages was channeled into industry by means of the stormy campaign of the People's Commune. Yet this policy failed and since then policies that emphasized agriculture have been advanced under the slogans, "Industry as well as agriculture 工業和農業同時并舉," and "Making agriculture the base 以農業為基礎." The difficulties in the period of adjustment were partially overcome by these policies. Even during the Great Cultural Revolution, these policies were not abandoned; in fact they were reaffirmed in Lin Piao 林彪's report at the Ninth Convention of the Chinese Communist Party held in April of 1969. More recently it was asserted that capital for industry is accumulated by agriculture and that the promotion of agriculture should come first since commerce is dependent on agriculture. The leaders of China are clearly aware of the importance of the agricultural sector to the stability of their nation. To this end, the use of chemical fertilizer, irrigation, improvement of crop strains, and the organization of farmers will be strongly encouraged in the future.

3. Estimates of the Markets in China

Concerning trade with China, optimistic predictions are presented by members of the “friendly firms” and those who are eager to promote good Sino-Japanese relations, while a dismal future is predicted by some anti-Communists. I will discuss these viewpoints point by point.

The major pessimistic factors are enumerated. First, the unpredictability of China’s market for Japanese goods. This is due mainly to the doctrine of the supremacy of politics whereby trade is regarded as of secondary importance. The precipitous decline in the Sino-Japanese trade in 1958, shown in Table 4, can be attributed to the Peking government’s disapproval of the Fourth Nongovernmental Trade Agreement between Japan and China. The sudden growth after 1963 was a result of the completion of the LT Trade Negotiation between TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke 高崎達之助 and Liao Cheng-chih 廖承志. The abrupt decline in 1967 and 1968 was attributed to the Great Cultural Revolution and not to the “antagonistic policies of the reactionary Satō 佐藤 government against China.” In general, as illustrated in Table 5, the rise and fall of trade clearly reflects the trend of personal visits between the two countries (See Table 5 and Chart 3). These fluctuations stem not from changes in policy of the Japanese government—although we cannot totally

Table VI-4 Changes in Sino-Japanese Trade

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Aggregate of the Sino-Japanese trade	59	109	150	140	105	22	23	47	84
Exports to China	19	29	67	60	51	4	3	17	38
Imports from China	40	80	83	80	54	19	21	31	46
Ratio of China’s trade to Japan’s total trade (%)	1.5	2.4	2.7	2.0	1.8	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.8
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
Aggregate of the Sino-Japanese trade	137	310	470	621	558	550	625	823	
Exports to China	62	153	245	315	288	325	390	569	
Imports from China	75	158	225	306	269	224	235	254	
Ratio of China’s trade to Japan’s total trade (%)	1.1	2.1	2.8	3.2	2.5	2.1	2.0		

Source: *Customs Statistics of Ministry of Finance of the Japanese Government.*

deny their effect—but primarily from the political change in China.

Some say that the “Japanese reactionary government” is responsible for the unpredictable changes in trade levels, and that if only Japan normalizes its relations with China, everything will turn out well. Even after normalization, however, the pattern of China’s policies toward Japan, as seen in its manipulation of trade and personal visits, will probably be unchanged. China may well consider any Japanese

Chart VI-2 Changes in Sino-Japanese Trade





Table VI-5 Changes in Sino-Japanese Personal Visits

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Number of the Japanese visiting China	192	847	1,182	1,243	594	191	680	523	781
Number of the Chinese visiting Japan	10	100	142	140	93	0	13	85	78
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Number of the Japanese visiting China	1,782	2,223	4,486	3,502	2,583	2,028	2,111	3,020	5,718
Number of the Chinese visiting Japan	280	489	397	418	106	6	6	10	74

Source: *Statistics of Prime Minister’s Office of the Japanese Government.*

Chart VI-3 Changes in Sino-Japanese Personal Visits



policy toward China to be unacceptable and hence might retaliate. It is, therefore, rather optimistic to think that once the relations are normalized China's economy will be set free from politics.

The second negative factor is the instability of the Chinese market, or more generally, the unpredictability of China's economy. The aggregate amount of trade (Table 6) fluctuates greatly corresponding to political factors. So does GNP (Table 1). The future is unclear. We do not know if we can expect the annual rate of growth of 4% to continue in the future; or if China, rectified by the Great Cultural Revolution, will experience an unprecedented economic growth as those who are eager to promote good Sino-Japanese relations anticipate; or, rather, if China will remain stagnant as it was in the wake of the Great Leap Forward. Furthermore, the predictions now advanced are by no means free of politics and ideology. We cannot rely on the objectivity of any of these claims. We can assert nothing unless we explore the problem thoroughly based on the solid scientific data and hard evidence, and still we cannot be absolutely sure of anything.


Thirdly, China aims at self-sufficiency. If self-sufficiency is actually realized, China will need trade far less than it does at present. As is illustrated in Table 6, in stark contrast with Japan the net amount of China's trade comes to only 4 billion dollars. With regard to the Sino-Japanese trade, as shown in Table 4, it accounts for only 2% of the aggregate amount of Japan's total trade. By the time self-sufficiency is

Table VI-6 Changes of the Aggregate Trade of Japan and China

(In billions of U.S. dollars)

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
The aggregate trade of Japan	4.0	4.5	5.7	7.1	5.9	7.0	8.5	10.0	10.5
The aggregate trade of China	2.3	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.7	4.3	4.0	3.0	2.7
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
The aggregate trade of Japan	12.1	14.6	16.6	19.3	22.1	26.0	31.0	38.2	?
The aggregate trade of China	2.8	3.2	4.2	4.6	3.9	3.6	3.8	4.2	?


Chart VI-4 Changes of the Aggregate Trade of Japan and China



attained with sustained economic growth and industrialization, China's dependence on foreign economies will likely become less; however, it is possible that at such a time China will become rather closed to the outside world.

Next, I will discuss the three bases of the optimistic arguments. The first is the vastness of China's land and the size of its population. China has been "filled with many people and with abundant goods" since the Opium War, and it has always been a dream country for the entrepreneurs of advanced countries. Sir Potaingier, in con-

Chart VI-5 The Structure of Trade of China: A Model (1965-1969)



cluding the Nanking treaty, stirred the British bourgeois' blood by saying: "We can not produce the stockings that are to be consumed in China even with the entire productivity of Manchester." China has been seen as a tremendous potential market ever since.

Secondly, the trade structure of China is quite advantageous to Japan. The Sino-Soviet trade before 1960 was, as a rule, barter trade; however, that essentially ended with the Sino-Soviet schism. Consequently, China was forced to obtain foreign currency mainly from the Southeast Asian countries, especially from Hong Kong. That allowed China to purchase goods from the EEC, Canada and Australia. Japan is the only country among the free world nations, with which China can conduct barter trade. Moreover, the two countries are geographically close. As the Suez Canal is blockaded, Japan appears to be a more felicitous choice as a trade partner now than the EEC countries do. It is certain, in any event, that if political constraints are removed, the volume of trade will increase.

Thirdly, China has begun to direct its energy towards economic reconstruction since last year. In order to attain rapid economic growth, China, for the time being at least (that is, until it realizes a self-sufficient economic system), must also increase its level of trade.

Conclusion

Every nation gives rise to an amalgam of optimistic and pessimistic appraisals of its economy; however, in the case of China, the divergence of such views is too great.


The truth, in my opinion, is likely to be found somewhere in the middle of these opinions, which, for the most part, are rather exaggerated in one way or the other. The economy of China will develop at a medium pace as compared with other Asian countries. Foreign trade will also expand correspondingly. China's foreseeable economic prospects seem neither to be particularly rosy nor bleak—rather, moderate growth seems to be in store.* Japan's trade with China, therefore, will be about the same as its trade with South Korea, Taiwan and the Soviet Union for the time being, (as illustrated in Chart 6 and Table 7).

Table VI-7 Foreign Trade of Japan

(In 1,000 U.S. dollars)

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Mainland China	310,489	469,741	621,387	557,733	549,979	625,343
Taiwan	278,796	375,233	402,774	465,242	622,347	786,874
South Korea	150,508	221,619	406,858	499,341	704,283	902,118
North Korea	31,515	31,228	27,708	35,976	54,460	59,620
Outer Mongolia	728	455	569	922	944	852
U.S.S.R.	408,540	408,556	514,383	611,606	640,582	731,759

Chart VI-6 Foreign Trade of Japan



* After this manuscript was completed, there have been two important statistics publicized by Peking as follows:

(1) China's aggregate amount of industrial and agricultural general production in 1970 was 120 billion U.S. dollars equivalence (Chou En-lai 周恩來's talk broadcast by CBS at 21:00, July 28, 1971).

(2) China's overall food production in 1971 was 246 million tons (*People's Daily*, January 1, 1972). If this were true, a shortage of food scarcely exists now in China, and the food problem is almost solved at the moment.

PART 2 CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Chapter VII CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1911–1931

Modern China's fate has been intricately intertwined with the foreign policies of the powers, particularly of Japan. Although historians nowadays may shun the detailed chronicling of wars and treaties relating to China (as in H. B. Morse's *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*), this aspect of Chinese history is becoming more important in retrospect. After all, as Mary Wright pointed out in *China in Revolution*, the presence of foreigners and their various activities on Chinese soil provided part of the milieu in which Chinese politics evolved in the twentieth century. Moreover, not only the maritime and 'foreign presence' described in volume 12 of this series, but also the contradictions and conflicts among the foreign powers, affected developments within Republican China. This chapter, and chapter 10 below, therefore look at the external context of twentieth-century Chinese history, beginning naturally with the collapse of the old order.¹

Context: Decline and Fall of the Ch'ing Empire as an East Asian Regional Order

The Ch'ing 清 emperors' great achievement had been to assert their central power over the arid peripheral regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang 新疆 and Tibet as well as over the heartland so densely populated by the Han 漢 Chinese. Military force, feudalism, religion and trade had all served the Ch'ing politics of empire, in mixtures that varied for each region and people. In all these regions of Inner Asia, Ch'ing rule had been set up by warfare and was maintained by garrisons. In Manchuria and Mongolia the emperor made the tribal chieftains his personal vassals. In Tibet and Mongolia he patronized the heads of the Lamaist church. In Kashgaria

* This is a chapter in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 13/2. It surveys the historical development of Chinese foreign relations from the Xinhai Revolution to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

¹ The author is gratefully indebted to Douglas Reynolds, Marius Jansen and IRIYE Akira 江昭 for assistance in completing the English version of this chapter. Chapter 10 in the original volume is an essay by IRIYE Akira, "Japanese Aggression and China's International Position 1931–1949."

(southern Sinkiang) he appointed as rulers the local Islamic officials ('begs') and also accepted the Muslim law and the Islamic religious establishment. This use of Lamaist Buddhism and of Islam in governing parts of Inner Asia, like the Manchus' 滿洲族 use of Confucianism in governing China, showed a high order of skill.²

Foreign trade was similarly subordinated to imperial needs. Peking failed to protect the Mongol princes and monasteries from becoming disastrously indebted to Chinese local merchants. But trade with Japan via Liu-ch'iu 琉球, with Russia at Kiakhta, with Central Asia (Kokand) at Kashgar, and with the British, Americans and Europeans at Canton 廣東 was successfully restricted and controlled. Only the trade from South-East Asia to Canton and Amoy 廈門 was left outside the tribute system, for the simple reason that by the nineteenth century this trade was in Chinese, not foreign, hands.

The Ch'ing empire, like Ch'ing rule over China, was sustained by an intricate and sophisticated system of checks and balances between, for example, the local chieftains, ecclesiastics and tribal princes on the one hand and the central government generals and administrators on the other, between religious and civil elites within the local scene, between the military and civilian officials of the Ch'ing central government, and between local trade revenues and military expenditures. The empire began to fall apart only when international trade, backed by foreign military power, increased on the frontiers. The commercial, political and military advance of the tsarist Russian empire on China's north and west, and of the French and British empires on China's south and south-east is one of the best-known sagas of imperialism in the nineteenth century.³ Soon Japan encroached upon the east and north-east.

Certain patterns of Ch'ing response to encroachment may be seen all around the periphery of the empire. First, the Ch'ing subordinated frontier trade to strategic interests because historically the central government's control of the Inner Asian periphery had been essential to the security of the Chinese core area. The foreign powers' traders were confined to emporia on the frontier as long as possible. Thus the Russians were ejected from Manchuria in the 1690s and confined to the Kiakhta trade after 1727, with occasional caravans allowed at Peking.⁴ Meanwhile, as the British Canton trade increased in the early nineteenth century, the Ch'ing dealt with it along lines that they had found effective a bit earlier in Central Asia. The trade at Kashgar of the foreign state of Kokand had given rise to foreign traders' demands and a holy war led by rebel religious leaders. The upshot was that after suppressing

² See Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, 13 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978–1986), 10:35–106.

³ The classic survey is still William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890–1902*, 2 vols. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1935).

⁴ Mark Mancall, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

the Kokandian invasion of Kashgar, the Ch'ing sought stability; they paid an indemnity to the foreign merchants and accepted a kind of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the part of Kokand's representatives, who superintended the activity of their merchants in Kashgar, whereupon the trade continued on a stable basis. The similarity of this settlement in Central Asia in 1835 to the eventual settlement at Canton in the 1840s is too striking to be a pure coincidence.⁵

Second, as the Ch'ing dynasty's structure of power began to crumble around its periphery both in Inner Asia and along the eastern sea-coast, the dynasty found its defensive military capacity quite inadequate and so the foreigners had to be appeased by concessions of residence and further trade. This again was reminiscent of the well-developed methods for barbarian-taming. After the Opium War the Ch'ing followed the early Ming 明 policy of being ready, first, to admit all foreign states to contact with China and, second, to treat all such foreign states impartially.⁶ Egalitarian foreign relations had indeed been customary in times of weak central power in China.⁷ This long-time policy lay behind Peking's acceptance of the most-favored-nation clause in the British Supplementary Treaty of 1843. The emperor's claim to ritual supremacy, i.e. the tribute system, was left unresolved; as the emperor was a minor, after 1860 the issue of foreign envoys performing the kotow before him could be deferred until 1873.

This was of course not the first time that Chinese foreign policy had had to be conducted from a position of weakness. The inveterate strategy in such a situation had been the playing off of one invader against another. Almost before the geographical whereabouts of the United States and France were clearly ascertained, the barbarian-managers at Canton sought their help to check the British aggression. Subsequently Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, for example, made repeated efforts to secure American mediation and diplomatic help in his various efforts to check Japanese, Russian and French encroachments. After Britain failed to help against Japan in 1894, Li turned to Russia. 'Using barbarians to control barbarians' (*i-i chih-i* 以夷制夷) was a principal strategy throughout the modern era.⁸ Although Chinese thinking had to give up Sinocentrism, the idea of using one foreign power against another easily continued. It fitted rather neatly the Western concept of the balance of power.

⁵ See Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," *The Cambridge History of China*, 10:360-395.

⁶ Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 50-60.

⁷ Morris Rossabi, ed., *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors 10th-14th Centuries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

⁸ Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); ch. 4, "The United States in Li Hung-chang's Foreign Policy, 1879-1895."

During this transition Sino-foreign relations after 1860 were briefly characterized by the age-old device of synarchy—a non-Chinese dynasty's use of other non-Chinese in joint administration over China. Synarchy in the late Ch'ing was first exemplified by the Chinese use of foreign-officered gun corps to defend Shanghai 上海 and Ningpo 寧波, and then by the growth of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service 海關 under Robert Hart, but Hart was only the most prominent of many foreign employees and advisers after mid-century. After all, the borrowing of foreign technology naturally brought foreign experts along with it. All this was achieved by taking Britain into a sort of entente. But the tendency to achieve stability by adding the British to the Mongols in the synarchic Ch'ing power structure at Peking and in the treaty ports was feasible only under sinocentrism. Like the Mongols, the Manchus' skill at using Westerners to help govern China prolonged their alien rule; but it proved unavailing as soon as China began in the 1890s to see herself as a nation among nations.⁹

The fact that Manchu rulers could not lead a movement of Han Chinese nationalism was one principal impediment postponing China's adjustment to the international world. The Sinocentric empire of East Asia under the Ch'ing had institutionalized the relations between China's preponderant central culture and material power and the lesser peoples around her landward periphery. But when the republic succeeded the empire it confronted a profound dilemma. The emperor's former suzerainty over local rulers among the Inner Asian peoples could hardly be claimed by the president of a republic founded on the principle of nationalism. The concepts of nation and empire were compatible only if one accepted the Western type of colonial imperialism, against which Chinese patriots were most incensed. The traditional imperative that a new regime must unify the Chinese realm put the Chinese Republic under the burden of maintaining its central authority over the diverse peoples and sprawling terrain that had formerly comprised the Ch'ing empire. Yet the ideology of national liberation from imperialism provided little sanction for it. In fact, by the time the extinction of the Ch'ing monarchy in February 1912 shattered the multi-ethnic and supra-national empire that it had created, the new principle of nationalism had already undermined it.

Nationalism, in short, was among the 'maritime' influences that were eclipsing the old continental order.¹⁰ The late Ch'ing regime had presided uneasily over the continuing expansion of the Han Chinese economy. Increasingly the Mongol princes and lamasaries had become debtors in the grip of Chinese merchants. Chinese settlers

⁹ Richard J. Smith, *Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China* (New York: KTO Press, 1978); J. K. Fairbank, "Synarchy under the Treaties," in *id.*, ed., *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 204–231, 381–383.

¹⁰ See *The Cambridge History of China*, 12, ch. 1.

also had pressed into Inner Mongolia and eastern Tibet as well as into Manchuria. This penetration into Inner Asia of a Chinese 'secondary imperialism,' to use Lattimore's phrase,¹¹ had its counterpart in the commercial inroads and ambitions emanating from Russia into Mongolia and Central Asia and from British India into Tibet. The outlying non-Han parts of the Ch'ing empire thus found themselves caught in the middle between the expanding continental empires of Russia and Britain and the growth of the Chinese Han nation. As a result the Inner Asian peoples began to look two ways and nurture their own national identities while playing off Europeans against the Chinese. In the decade before 1911 anti-Ch'ing movements for independence had arisen in both Mongolia and Tibet, provoked by late Ch'ing reformist policies there.¹²

In Mongolia, the encroachment of an expanding China had ended the Ch'ing policy of abstention and indirect rule through the tribal princes and Lamaist prelates. As the pastoral economy was drawn into trade, both the ruling classes and the common people became impoverished and indebted to Chinese moneylenders, while Ch'ing subsidies were diminished and taxes increased.¹³ The New Policies (or New Administration: *hsin-cheng* 新政) of the last Ch'ing decade (1901–11) opened Mongolia to Chinese colonization and agricultural settlement, permitted intermarriage and Mongol use of the Chinese language, and so threatened to sinify the Mongols' previously preserved homeland. Projects for provincial governments, military conscription, railways and other reforms increased the Ch'ing demand for taxes, alienated the Mongol elites and roused a sentiment of nationalism. By July 1911 a group of leaders decided to seek independence and sent a delegation to Russia seeking help.

Tsarist Russia's aim for Mongolia, which bordered Siberia for 1,700 miles, had been worked out during the mid-nineteenth century: Russia secured from Peking more and more trading privileges and aspired to a dominant influence, as over a protectorate, but for this purpose St. Petersburg favored Mongolian autonomy under continued Ch'ing suzerainty, not independence. The reason was simple: independence would open Mongolia to contact with all the other powers, whose prospective trading rights would compete with those Russia already enjoyed; an independent country could not be taken over as a protectorate without diplomatic conflict with other powers such as Japan, whereas actual Russian predominance could be achieved under the cloak of the nominal suzerainty of China, whose nationalists loudly claimed Mongolia as part of China. By 1911 Russian trade was less than Chinese,

¹¹ See Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940; 2nd ed., 1951), 143–145.

¹² On these trends see Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day* (New York: Pica Press, 1975).

¹³ On this process see Joseph Fletcher, "The Heyday of the Ch'ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," *The Cambridge History of China*, 10:352–360.

and there were only about 800 Russians in the area. Russia therefore assumed a dual posture—against independence but for autonomy—and sent two squadrons of cossacks to reinforce its consular guard in Urga.

The outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in October 1911 quickly inspired an Outer Mongolian declaration of independence. On December 29 the Living Buddha at Urga, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, was enthroned in a rather Chinese style as theocratic ruler of a new state, and debts to China were repudiated. However, instead of recognizing Outer Mongolia as a sovereign state open to international relations, Russia continued to recognize Chinese suzerainty. While beginning to arm and train the Mongol army, Russia in January 1912 issued a disclaimer of any territorial ambitions while urging Peking to give up direct rule, colonization or stationing of troops. By November 3, 1912 a Russo-Mongolian treaty recognized Outer Mongolia's autonomy and confirmed Russia's trade privileges. But Russia refused to recognize Mongolian independence or Urga's leadership of a pan-Mongol movement including the western tribes that were still under Chinese rule. It only remained for a Russo-Chinese treaty of November 5, 1913 to acknowledge the formula of Mongolian autonomy under Chinese suzerainty; and after long and acrimonious negotiations at Kiakhta, a tripartite Chinese-Russian-Mongolian agreement of June 7, 1915 reconfirmed this formula as well as Russia's economic rights. In effect Russia had set up an informal protectorate which the Chinese Republic was powerless to oppose.

The new government of the Living Buddha (or Bogdo Khan) at Urga, however, upset the balance that the Ch'ing had maintained between the lay princes of the Mongol tribes and the Lamaist church. Once in power, the church 'came increasingly to compete with the lay princes for people, livestock, and pastures' and began to divert resources to purely religious purposes. The conservatism of this theocracy was matched at Peking, where the Chinese Republic tried to preserve the appearances of the ancient tribute system and uphold at least on paper the interests of the Mongol princes. But within a decade the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, under Soviet inspiration and the leadership in succession of Sukebator and Choibalsang, set up a new government in 1921, and after the Living Buddha died in 1924 declared it to be a republic no longer under Chinese suzerainty.¹⁴

A comparable process occurred in Tibet but with a different ending. British

¹⁴ Thomas E. Ewing, *Between the Hammer and the Anvil? : Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911–1921*, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series 138 (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1980), 39 and *passim*. See the full account in Peter S. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911–1931* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1959), chs. 7–13; also the more recent survey by Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia*, ch. 9. Events from 1917 are covered in an official *History of the Mongolian People's Republic*, vol. 3, *The Contemporary Period*, ed. by B. Shirendev and M. Sanjdorj, tr. by William A. Brown and Urgunge Onon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).

India's concern for the trade and strategic security of the hill states of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam on the southern slope of the Himalayas created a British resolve to keep Russian influence out of Tibet, to which the hill states were culturally and sometimes politically tributary. Ch'ing suzerainty over Tibet and also Nepal had been established by arms in the eighteenth century and as late as 1886 Britain acknowledged it in a Sino-British 'Burma-Tibet convention.' By 1904, however, Britain felt obliged to forestall Russian influence by sending the Younghusband expedition to fight its way to Lhasa and negotiate a British protectorate over Tibet. London, however, backed away from this commitment on the inaccessible roof of the world; in 1906 Britain, in an Anglo-Chinese agreement, once again acknowledged Peking's suzerainty over Tibet as the best way to safeguard British interests there. The British, aiming to keep Russian influence out of Tibet, disregarded the Tibetans' interest in establishing their independence from China.

This set the stage for a vigorous Ch'ing reassertion of control over eastern Tibet in 1908; eventually in 1910 modern-armed Chinese troops entered Lhasa, where a Chinese administration attempted to rule. This ruptured the ancient patron-client relationship between the rulers in Peking and Lhasa. The Dalai Lama, traditional ruler of the theocratic state, fled to India. Soon the Revolution of 1911 and collapse of the Ch'ing led to the expulsion of Chinese troops and officials. The young Chinese Republic could not reassert control, and in January 1913 the Dalai Lama declared the independence of Tibet and is said to have made a treaty with the Living Buddha at Urga (number three in the Lamaist hierarchy) which mutually recognized their independence. This led to prolonged Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan negotiations in 1914 at Simla, where British India tried to recognize Tibet's independence but China refused to do so. A British protectorate or suzerainty was never asserted, though trade and cultural relations with India were carried on independently. The Chinese Republic maintained its claim to Tibet as part of China, while the British settled for the formula of Chinese suzerainty (not sovereignty) and Tibetan autonomy (not independence). This meant no direct Chinese control over Tibet, and a growth of British Indian-Tibetan relations, but only as long as the British stayed in India and China remained weak and non-assertive.¹⁵

Sinkiang, like Tibet, lacking railway access to the outside world, also remained on the periphery of international politics during the early Republic. Yang Tseng-hsin 楊增新, a metropolitan graduate of 1890 who had served during two decades in Kansu 甘肅 and Sinkiang and since 1908 as circuit intendant at Aksu, was confirmed by Peking as governor of Sinkiang in 1912, and retained the post until his


¹⁵ H. E. Richardson, *A Short History of Tibet* (New York: Dutton, 1962), ch. 7, "The Simla Convention, 1914"; Clive Christie, "Great Britain, China and the Status of Tibet, 1914-21," *Modern Asian Studies* 10/4 (Oct. 1976): 481-508; Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

death in 1928. He placated Chinese revolutionaries, Muslim Uighur proto-nationalists, and Kazakh tribesmen by carrot-and-stick, divide-and-rule methods, suppressing official corruption and encouraging trade. By making Sinkiang virtually semi-autonomous, he was remarkably successful at insulating it from the disruptive affects of both the Chinese and the Russian upheavals. Yang's 1924 commercial agreement with the Soviet Union provided for reopening consulates and for relations as equals that respected the laws and judicial authority of each other's territory. Trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union increased dramatically in the wake of this commercial agreement. From a value of 3.4 million roubles in 1923–4, it jumped to 22.0 million roubles in 1926–7. No nationalist movement had gained power in politically fragmented, multi-ethnic Sinkiang, and Governor Yang managed to maintain a unified regime, trade with the Soviet Union, and yet ward off its political intervention.¹⁶

In these various fashions Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang fell out of Peking's control but remained of only marginal importance to the Chinese Republic. Manchuria was quite a different matter, because there the Republic directly confronted an imperialist power in a Han Chinese area, and China's national sovereignty was at stake.

Japan's encroachment raised the whole question of China's position in the international system. How could China, having had to abandon her traditional claim to ritual superiority over outsiders, get out of the humiliating status of semi-colony imposed by the unequal treaties? For this purpose how could she substitute, for the old image of a unitary world order centred at Peking, a new image of an international order of equally sovereign nations? In this context, how did wars taking place in and around China—whether or not the Chinese state was directly involved—affect its politics and economy? What were Chinese criteria for peace and order in East Asia? When conflicts arose with another country—Japan, in most instances—how did Chinese leaders and public opinion envisage the struggle? In short, how did they see their new position in the world? Efforts to answer these questions were an educational process through which modern Chinese came to define their conceptions

¹⁶ IRIE Keishirō 入江啓四郎, *Shina henkyō to ei-ro no kakuchiku* 支那邊疆と英露の角逐 (Chinese Frontiers and the Anglo-Russian Power Struggle) (Tokyo: Nauka-sha ナウカ社, 1935); and Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day*, 220–229. Also Howard L. Boorman, ed.; Richard C. Howard, associate ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 5 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967–1979), 4:11–13. Yang's Preservation of Chinese dominance in Sinkiang was continued by Sheng Shih-ts'ai 盛世才, a Japanese-trained officer under Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 who seized power in 1933, executed many opponents, and dealt with the Russians until Nationalist control was reasserted in 1943. For a recent appraisal see F. Gilbert Chan, "Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Reform Programs in Sinkiang: Idealism or Opportunism?," *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica* 12 (1983): 365–384.



Map VII-1. Manchuria (the 'Three Eastern Provinces')

of themselves and of the modern international world.

Japan's Rise to Power in Manchuria

China's international position on the eve of the Republican revolution was affected profoundly by the rise of Japan to a position of power and a relative decline in the role of Western powers in East Asia.¹⁷ After 1901 the Western powers had increasingly confined themselves to maintenance of the status quo and to the pursuit of their own established economic interests—Russia and Germany excepted. Russia proceeded with her penetration of Mongolia and North Manchuria, even after relinquishing her unequal treaty rights in China proper following her 1917 Revolution; and Germany, in the aftermath of the First World War, disappeared altogether from the East Asian theater until her resurgence in the 1930s. Japan by contrast not only pursued her expanding economic interests but flexed her political muscle in diplomacy and military action. The primary focus of her activity, after the absorption of Korea, was Manchuria.

The homeland of the Manchu tribes (now known as China's North East) was the most attractive of all the thinly populated regions around China. The old Chinese pale below Mukden (Shenyang 瀋陽), known as Liaotung 遼東, had been a settled part of China since the Han. Northern Manchuria, however, had remained tribal, and after the Manchu conquest of China the Ch'ing dynasty reserved the area as a racial preserve and governed it as a military frontier. By the mid-nineteenth century, immigration of Chinese could no longer be kept out, and Peking realized that it must even be encouraged lest Russia expand southward from the Amur to fill a vacuum. Yet the further opening of Kilin 吉林 and Heilungkiang 黑龍江 to immigration led to economic exploitation, especially of opium and ginseng root, accompanied by smuggling and banditry, which created problems of control and taxation more rapidly than the thinly spread Ch'ing military administration could cope with them. The Mongols in Manchuria, susceptible like those in Mongolia to Chinese merchants' exploitation, also posed a problem of loyalty.

By the 1890s the Ch'ing in self-defence had begun a program of railway-building northward from the Great Wall to counter the threat of Russia's projected trans-Siberian line, but Chinese efforts were too late and too little. Japan's victory over China in 1895 led directly to the Sino-Russian alliance of 1896 and Russian building of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria. Russian military occupation of

¹⁷ Hence Richard Storry's choice of title for his 1979 book *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943* (London: Macmillan, 1979). For the general context of this section see Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace 1894–1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally, c1975); also Joshua A. Fogel, *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866–1934)* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984).

Manchuria at the time of the Boxer rebellion 義和團事件 in 1900 completed the disaster. Japan led the other powers in demanding that the Russians leave Manchuria, while the tsarist government did its best to pressure Peking for secret agreements that would suit its interests. The one-time Manchu homeland was now a focus of great power rivalry, particularly between Russia and Japan.¹⁸ Unlike the other powers who reached China mainly by sea, these two were encroaching by land. Within another five years, Japan had supplanted Russia in the Liaotung peninsula and along the trunk railways to the north.

This was the result of the Russo-Japanese War 日露戰爭 which broke out on February 8, 1904. The Russians suffered repeated defeats, but by the summer of 1905 Japan had lost much of her confidence and means to carry on the fight. Between February 23 and March 10, 1905, for example, at the great battle of Mukden, a Japanese force of 240,000 men and 992 cannon had been pitted against a numerically superior Russian force of 370,000 men and 1,219 cannon. The Japanese, not surprisingly, had been outshelled by 540,000 rounds of ammunition to 350,000 rounds. When the Japanese army began its general offensive against the walled city of Mukden on March 9 and took the city the following day, the main Russian force simply pulled out by rail to a new position at T'iehling 鐵嶺, north of Mukden. The Japanese army, having surrounded the Russian army at considerable cost, could not for lack of ammunition do more than watch the orderly Russian retreat. Their second reserves already mobilized, the Japanese found it virtually impossible to send additional troops and ammunition to the front.

Conditions thus seemed to favor the Russians, at least until May 27, when the Russian Baltic fleet, which had sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean with a final supply stop at Camranh Bay in French Indo-China, was annihilated in the Tsushima Straits 對馬海峽 by the combined Japanese fleet. This put Russia in a difficult position to continue the war. Meanwhile, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, which had begun on 'Bloody Sunday,' January 22, brought further difficulties to the tsarist system. In June, sailors of the warship *Potemkin* rebelled at Odessa. Although men and materiel continued to flow to the front along the Trans-Siberian Railway, troop morale flagged. Coupled with domestic turmoil, this caused the Russian government to lose its will to fight.

On May 31, the Japanese secretly asked President Theodore Roosevelt to act as mediator in arranging the peace conference, which convened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in August. Prior to doing so Roosevelt sought assurances about Japanese intentions, and accepted Tokyo's response that Japan adhered to the Open Door in

¹⁸ See Joseph Fletcher, "The Loss of North-east Manchuria," *The Cambridge History of China*, 10:332-350. Also Robert H. G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), and other sources cited in Michael H. Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895-1911* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), ch. 1.

Manchuria and intended to restore it to China. As the negotiations progressed the Russian plenipotentiary, Count Sergei Witte, refused to admit defeat, concealed Russia's domestic situation, and intimated Russia's intent to fight on. Pressed by this hard Russian line, the Japanese government, realizing its inability to continue the war, gave up its demand for a financial indemnity, saw that it would not succeed in asking for all of Sakhalin, and settled for the southern half. Russian rights and interests in the Liaotung peninsula were transferred to Japan, as was the South Manchurian Railway between a point near Ch'ang-ch'un 長春 and Port Arthur.

Foreign Minister KOMURA Jutarō 小村壽太郎, who knew Japan's real war situation, conducted the tortuous negotiations with Count Witte, and was blamed by many for what seemed a diplomatic setback. The Japanese public, not knowing the true situation, was angered by the treaty terms. Newspapers denounced the government, and anti-government disturbances, centering around Hibiya Park 日比谷公園 in central Tokyo, took three days to quell.¹⁹ The government leaders, however, knowing that the Portsmouth treaty offered the best settlement they could get, tried to gain the approval of China and the powers for the treaty in order to further East Asian stability and reduce the possibility of a Russian war of revenge.

They first approached China. KOMURA, who had returned from his exhausting negotiations with Count Witte in September, departed in November for Peking. Negotiating with Prince Ch'ing (I-k'uang 奕劻) and Yuan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱, he obtained Peking's recognition of those rights and interests ceded Japan by Russia. The Japanese also negotiated with the Chinese a secret protocol that strengthened Japanese economic gains and included a Chinese promise not to build any railway lines that would impair the interests of the South Manchurian Railway Company 南滿洲鐵道會社. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking was signed on December 12, 1905.²⁰ Within two years, however, discussions for American and British participation in Manchurian communications found the Chinese disputing this arrangement.

Japan simultaneously sought to strengthen its alliance with Great Britain. As initially concluded in 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance applied only to China and

¹⁹ On the Anglo-Japanese alliance and Russo-Japanese War see Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907* (London: University of London Press, 1966); OKAMOTO Shumpei, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); John A. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and KAJIMA Morinosuke, *The Diplomacy of Japan 1894–1922, vol. 2, Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese War*, tr. from *Nihon gaikō shi* 日本外交史, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, Kajima Publishing Co., 1976–80).

²⁰ The secret protocol is included in John von A. MacMurray, ed. and comp., *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919*, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 1:554, and is discussed by White, *Diplomacy*, 341. Hunt, *Frontier Defense*, 159–161, however, casts doubt on its validity.

Korea, but as the confrontation between Britain and Russia during the Russo-Japanese War had spread across the entire Eurasian continent, Britain wanted to strengthen the alliance, while Japan wanted a stronger bond to help deter Russia from a war of revenge. Accordingly the Anglo-Japanese alliance was revised on August 12, 1905, with its scope extended to India. After Anglo-Russian relations took a sudden turn for the better in 1907, in response to the swift rise of German power, the character of the Anglo-Japanese alliance changed once more. By 1911, in a third revision that ran for ten years, its focus was on Germany as well as Russia. An exclusion of countries with whom either power had a treaty of arbitration (such as that between Britain and the US) relieved English fears of conflict with the United States.²¹

France meanwhile felt it necessary to secure additional guarantees for her position in Asia. In 1907 Japan reached agreement with France in a compact which began with affirmations of respect for Chinese sovereignty and equal opportunity, and went on to forswear interference with each other's special interests and spheres. Buttressed with additional unpublished provisions, the agreement indicated France's desire to come to terms with the new continental position of Japan, and its desire to stabilize East Asian politics so that Russia might once again be free to exercise a larger role in the developing European alliance against Germany. As part of this new cordiality, France permitted Japan to float a 300 million franc bond issued in Paris that same year. Japan now had English and French support for its increased Manchurian role as well as for its economic primacy in Fukien 福建 province.

To reduce the danger of a Russian war of revenge, Foreign Minister HAYASHI Tadasu 林董 also prepared for negotiations with Russia about outstanding problems. The Russians seemed at first unwilling to come to terms, but as Russian prospects for German support grew worse, St. Petersburg was forced to seek accommodation in Asia. Russian relations with England improved, and her French allies urged stabilizing relations with Japan. Russia was shifting its foreign policy focus toward Eastern Europe. Negotiations culminated in the first Russo-Japanese agreement, signed on July 30, 1907. The agreement once again promised respect for China's independence and territorial integrity and the principle of equal opportunity in China, but in secret clauses Japan and Russia recognized each other's spheres of influence in northern and southern Manchuria, respectively; more, Russia acknowledged Japan's primacy in Korea; and Japan, Russia's special interests in Outer Mongolia.²² By

²¹ See Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923* (London: Athlone Press, 1972), 70, for ambiguities in the treaty's focus and wording, and Nish's conclusion that "The 1911 treaty was largely negative."

²² Japan, Gaimushō 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Nihon gaikō nempyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho* 日本外交年表並に主要文書 (Chronological Tables and Important Documents of Japanese Diplomacy), 2 vols. (Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai 日本國際聯合協會; Tokyo: Hara shobō 原書房, 1965), 1:280-281.

1909, when American Secretary of State Philander C. Knox put forward a proposal to neutralize the South Manchurian Railway, Japan's and Russia's common opposition brought them even closer together. A second Russo-Japanese agreement in July 1910 recognized the right of both states to take all necessary measures to defend their respective special spheres in Manchuria. When the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany formed a consortium to provide loans to the Ch'ing government in April 1911, Japan and Russia jointly protested their exclusion. As a result, it was made a six-nation consortium. Relations between the two became even more intimate. A third Russo-Japanese agreement, which divided Inner Mongolia into two parts, and recognized Japanese and Russian special interests in east and west respectively, was concluded on July 8, 1912. Thus England, France, Russia and Japan reached mutual agreements, essentially at the expense of China, whose protection and support they solemnly pledged.

Japan's relations with the United States meanwhile were strained over the anti-Japanese exclusion movement on the west coast. The American closing of California's Open Door for Chinese immigrant laborers had been achieved between 1882 and 1895 by dint of racist agitation, led by American labor organizers.²³ Thereafter the same racism focused on the Japanese. In 1906 California tightened its regulations governing Japanese immigration and excluding Japanese children from public schools.

Although China's first big patriotic boycott in 1905 was of American goods, in protest against the treatment of Chinese in the United States, the makers of Ch'ing foreign policy saw a chance to profit from the American-Japanese antagonism. The opportunity was seized principally by Yuan Shih-k'ai, who was in Li Hung-chang's old post at Tientsin 天津 from 1901 to 1907 and then dominant in Peking until his fall from power in 1909. Yuan and his group of reform-minded servitors of the empress dowager managed the late Ch'ing development of railways, telegraphs, mines, new armies and police forces, including relations with the imperialist powers.²⁴ Their strategy in Manchuria echoed that of Li Hung-chang in Korea twenty years before—to open the area to foreign trade and so give the trading powers a vested interest in preserving China's paramount position, or at least opposing Japan's or Russia's encroachment—an Open Door strategy 門戶開放戰略.

Unfortunately, the commerce of the trading powers did not keep up with Russo-Japanese military-economic penetration of Manchuria, and so Yuan had to fall back on a strategy of competition by promoting railways and other developments there under Chinese auspices. For this he hoped to get American financial aid. Many schemes were in the air. In 1905 the American railway magnate E. H. Harriman had

²³ Hunt, *Special Relationship*, ch. 3, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Exclusion, 1879–1895."

²⁴ Stephen R. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shih-kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901–1908* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

approached Prime Minister KATSURA 桂 in Tokyo proposing a unified transportation system encircling the globe that would include joint Japanese-American administration of the South Manchurian Railway, but on his return from Portsmouth, Foreign Minister KOMURA opposed the plan, and it was shelved. Meantime, the governor-general of the three Manchurian provinces, Hsü Shih-ch'ang 徐世昌, began to develop a reformed civil administration. He and his subordinate, the American-educated T'ang Shao-i 唐紹儀, governor of Liaotung, approached Harriman to finance railways that would compete with the Russian-built South Manchurian Railway that Japan had taken over. To finance this they proposed to imitate the imperialists by setting up a development bank to secure American and/or British loans. Their schemes found a ready response among young State Department officers suspicious of Japan's intentions toward China and toward American trade. In 1907-8 Chinese officials actively pushed the idea of a Sino-American alliance, an arbitration treaty was actually negotiated, and T'ang Shao-i started for Washington to settle a deal for American financing of China's development plans in Manchuria. By the time he reached Washington on November 30, 1908, however, his hopes had been undone by *realpolitik*.

President Theodore Roosevelt, conscious of China's weakness, dealt realistically with Japan. In return for a 'gentleman's agreement' whereby Japan restricted immigration to the United States, the Root-TAKAHIRA agreement of November 30, 1908 attempted to reduce tensions between America and Japan. Both countries subscribed to the status quo in the Pacific area, agreed to respect each other's territorial possessions there, to uphold the Open Door in China, and to support by peaceful means the 'independence and integrity of China.' In the event that any of these were threatened, both countries promised to exchange views. In informing Peking of this agreement, Tokyo made plain that it rounded out the agreements Japan had already made with Britain, France and Russia.²⁵

Although President Roosevelt took a realistic view of Japanese strength, and the American fleet was greeted warmly on its visit to Japan in 1908, American misgivings about Japanese expansion in Manchuria did not end, and each country's naval leaders regarded the other's fleet as a possible future enemy. The Japanese navy's 1907 national defence plan focused on the United States as Japan's hypothetical

²⁵ The account in Herbert Croly, *Willard Straight* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), and Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (Garden City, NY and Toronto: Doubleday, Page, 1922) have been superseded by Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door*. See also Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966); Charles E. Neu, *An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); IRIYE Akira, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). Text in Japan, Gaimushō, *Nempyō*, 1:312-313, and US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1908): 511-512.

enemy.²⁶

Japan attained a new level of effectiveness in penetration of China by establishing the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR) in 1906, to operate the railway lines transferred by Russia in the Portsmouth treaty. The company's first director-general, GOTŌ Shimpei 後藤新平, had earlier served as civil administrator on Taiwan 臺灣, and had ambitious plans for the SMR. He saw it as the centre of an economic plan that would include the development and operation of mines, agriculture and industry, and the administration of land adjoining the railway tracks. In this way, GOTŌ thought, Japan would be able to coordinate its efforts to colonize Manchuria and offset the Chinese development efforts organized by Hsü Shih-ch'ang and T'ang Shao-i. The SMR was set up as a joint-stock company under Japan's commercial law, with 50 percent of the stock held by the government. The remainder was to be offered to Japanese and Chinese investors, but by the closing deadline on October 5, 1906 no Chinese had purchased any stock. The company thus became, by default, entirely Japanese owned. The Chinese government protested after the fact, but it was too late.²⁷

The administration of the Kwantung 關東 leased territory, that area on the southern tip of the Liaotung peninsula transferred to Japan following the Russo-Japanese War, was based in the small town of Lüshun 旅順. Lüshun's Port Arthur had been developed as an impressive naval base under the Russians, and its siege by General NOGI's armies had been the most costly episode of the war. Its harbor was shallow, however, and the Japanese navy maintained only limited facilities there. The authority of the governor-general of the Kwantung leased territory extended only to this limited area. Until 1919 that individual commanded the army forces there; when the post became civilian, troop control passed to the commanding general of the Kwantung Army.

The South Manchurian Railway Company was based at Dairen (Ta-lien) 大連. The Dairen harbor was deep, and under SMR administration the city quickly developed into one of East Asia's leading commercial ports, the gateway to Manchuria. From that base, the company functioned almost like an independent government. Its primary mandate of railway administration soon expanded. The broad-gauge tracks of the Russian period were replaced by standard gauge, and an ambitious program of

²⁶ TSUNODA Jun 角田順, *Manshū mondai to kokubō hōshin: Meiji kōki ni okeru kokubō kankyō no hendō* 滿洲問題と國防方針: 明治後期における國防環境の變動 (The Manchurian Problem and Defence Policies: Change of Defence Conditions in the Late Meiji Era) (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1967), 705ff.

²⁷ Japan, Gaimushō, *Nihon gaikō bunsho* 日本外交文書 (Documents on Japanese Foreign Relations), 39, pt. 1, 650ff; and TSURUMI Yūsuke 鶴見祐輔, *Gotō Shimpei* 後藤新平 (A Biography of Gotō Shimpei), 4 vols. (Tokyo: Gotō Shimpei haku denki hensankai 後藤新平伯傳記編纂會, 1937–1938), 2:732–809, for Gotō's position papers and ten-year plan. Administration of the area brought sharp clashes between the Japanese and civilian leaders for primacy.

development was set in motion; up-to-date railway technology, and even railway ties, were imported from the United States. As relations with Russia improved, travel on the SMR through Harbin 哈爾濱 and on the Trans-Siberian Railway through Irkutsk became the shortest route linking East Asia and Europe. Taxes collected by the SMR from its lands were added to its operating profits, and large sums were devoted to everything from city planning and the construction of roads and water and gas lines, to education and research activities. The facilities of the SMR elementary and middle schools were frequently superior to those within Japan, and the SMR's Manchuria Medical College became one of the most advanced in the whole of China. SMR research on China was another outstanding achievement; it concentrated on current conditions when few scholars were doing so, and thereby laid a factual basis for the later flood of Japanese work on modern China's economy and society.²⁸

To protect its rights and privileges in the Kwantung leased territory and the South Manchurian Railway Company, the Japanese government, as noted above, established the Kwantung Army. Headquartered in Lüshun, its detachments were stationed outside the leased territory. Under the Portsmouth treaty, up to fifteen soldiers were permitted for every kilometer of railway line. This allowed Japan to have one full army division in Manchuria in peacetime. These units quickly became the vanguard of Japanese penetration into China.

It was inevitable that this range of activities would produce numerous sources of friction for which the language of the Portsmouth treaty contained no solution. Relations between Japan and China had been fairly amicable prior to the Russo-Japanese War, but after the Japanese victory and settlement those relations quickly deteriorated as conflict centered around four major issues.

First, the Chientao 間島 area: this border area had formed the traditional, unmarked boundary between China and Korea. By November 1905, as Japan set up a protectorate over Korea, it sent troops into the Chientao area, claiming territorial sovereignty. However, Japan later yielded the area to China, and the rights of the area's Korean residents were recognized by the September 1909 Sino-Japanese treaty regarding Chientao. But as the colonization of Korea by Japan proceeded, many Koreans who opposed Japanese rule moved to Chientao, and the area became the base for a Korean anti-Japanese movement.

Second, the Antung-Mukden railway 安奉線 question: during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had built a narrow-gauge railway from Antung on the Yalu River to Mukden, as an auxiliary route to the northern front. Administration of this railway was entrusted to Japan by the 1905 Sino-Japanese treaty of Peking. Linkage of this railway with the Pusan-Sinuiju 釜山—新義州 railway would make it the

²⁸ John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907–1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 1966).

fastest route between Japan and Europe, as well as a military supply route from Korea into Manchuria. For these reasons, the SMR Company sought to convert the railway to standard gauge. China protested vehemently, on grounds that no such conversion was provided for under the treaty. Japan finally had its way in the summer of 1909, but not before an ultimatum had forced Peking to yield.

Third, coal mines : Russia had begun the development of mines near its railway lines in south Manchuria. Japan continued the development of the rich open-pit Fushun 撫順 mines 40 km east of Mukden. Japan also operated the high-quality anthracite Yentai 煙臺 mines north of Anshan 鞍山. Since all these mines were far removed from the railway zone mentioned in the treaty, they were worked outside the principles of the treaty or Chinese permission; eventually the Chinese government recognized this state of affairs as a *fait accompli*.

Fourth, the Yingkow-Tashihchiao railway 營口大石橋線: Russia had originally been granted permission to construct this line as a temporary measure, to transport materials from the port of Yingkow for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the promise that it be dismantled upon the latter's completion. China therefore demanded that Japan dismantle the railway. The real Chinese objective was to take the line over, but Japan ignored the Chinese demands and retained the line as a branch of the South Manchurian Railway.

All of these conflicts irritated Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan's rise in national power stimulated the growth of nationalism in China. Chinese students in Tokyo learned from the example of Japan's progress in the modernization of her national life, while reform-minded officials of the Ch'ing government were roused to counter Japan's expansion.²⁹ This in turn brought a hardening of Japan's drive toward empire. At the same time that efforts to reach a *modus vivendi* with the United States were leading toward the Root-TAKAHIRA agreement of November 1908, a foreign policy plan the KATSURA cabinet adopted on September 25, 1908 revealed Japan's determination to hold on to its rights in Manchuria, and formalized the resolve to make the Kwantung leased territory Japan's permanent possession.³⁰

Japan's Twenty-one Demands 二十一箇條要求

When the Chinese Revolution broke out in October 1911, the Japanese government's major concern was the preservation of rights and interests in Manchuria

²⁹ Marius Jansen, "Japan and Chinese Revolution of 1911," *The Cambridge History of China*, 13 vols, 11, ch. 6.

³⁰ Japan, *Gaimushō, Nempyō*, 1:305–309. The same statement stressed the importance of directing future immigration to the continent in order to strengthen the Japanese presence there.

obtained after the victory over Russia in 1905. Since agreements had been worked out with the Ch'ing government and the revolutionaries were an unknown element, both Foreign Minister UCHIDA Yasuya 内田康哉 and Minister to Peking IJŪIN Hikokichi 伊集院彦吉 leaned toward providing assistance to the Ch'ing government. They persisted in this advice even after the revolution spread south of the Yangtze, arguing, as did many conservative Japanese, that even a divided China, with the Ch'ing ruling the north, was preferable to Republican rule of a united China. A republican system throughout China would be a negative example for Japan's monarchical system as well as a threat to Japanese interests.³¹ So the Japanese government proposed to the British government a joint military expedition. It also agreed to meet a Ch'ing government request for the purchase of arms. England rejected the Japanese proposal. The greater part of British interests lay in territory under revolutionary army control, and would be endangered by aid to the Ch'ing. London therefore replied that though it favored a constitutional monarchy in China, it did not consider outside intervention desirable. When Yuan Shih-k'ai finally returned to Peking on November 13, the British were already acting as secret intermediaries between him and the revolutionaries. Thus even while Yuan was declaring his support of a constitutional monarchy to Japanese Minister IJŪIN, he had begun peace talks with the revolutionaries. Even T'ang Shao-i, Peking's negotiator with the revolutionaries, favored a republic. The situation developed steadily in the direction of a republican system with Yuan as president. Thus Yuan's skillful political manoeuvres profited from British support. Japan felt that its stake in China was the greatest of any power's, but without the support of its British ally it could not send in troops and expect to maintain the Ch'ing as a constitutional monarchy. Intervention having failed, the Japanese government fell in line with Britain and switched to non-intervention.

Not a few Japanese outside of government firmly supported Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙's revolutionary movement. Over 600 Japanese are said to have gone to China to take part in the revolution. Some had been active in the people's rights movement in Japan, and considered the Chinese Revolution to be in the interest of China's democratization. Most believed that a strong China was essential to the liberation of Asia from Western dominance. Many others, however, went to China as 'revolutionaries' with their own interests uppermost. Initially these Japanese were warmly welcomed by the Chinese revolutionaries, but before long they were being shunted aside as troublesome meddlers. Prominent Japanese like the influential rightist TŌYAMA Mitsuru 頭山滿 traveled to Shanghai to try to control the activities and behavior of

³¹ Japan, Gaimushō, *Bunsho*, special volume on "Shinkoku jiken 清國事件 (The Chinese Incident)," 382ff. See also Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954); and IKEI Masaru, "Japan's Response to the Chinese Revolution of 1911," *Journal of Asian Studies* 25/2 (February 1966): 213-227.

the adventurers.³²

China's revolutionary forces ended up compromising with Yuan Shih-k'ai partly for financial reasons. Immediately upon reaching Shanghai, for example, Sun had contacted the Shanghai office of Mitsui & Co. 三井 to request arms. Its head agreed and granted several large loans; the Japanese aim was to bring the Hanyehping Co. 漢冶萍 under joint Sino-Japanese management.³³ Soon after Yuan took office in Peking as provisional president on March 10, 1912, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France and Russia formed a six-nation consortium to underwrite foreign loans to China.

Having adopted a policy of non-intervention, the Japanese foreign ministry tried to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations through negotiations at Peking. This effort was undercut by the kind of independent military action that was to hamper Japan's policy on China in future decades. Military men in the field were more aggressive than the Foreign Office representatives, and the popular reception of their unauthorized acts by jingoist elements in Japan encouraged them. The first challenge to government policy by Japanese outside government was the Manchu-Mongol independence movement. An activist named KAWASHIMA Naniwa 川島浪速, who had been involved in the Ch'ing program of police reform, had developed intimate personal ties with members of the Manchu nobility. During the 1911 Revolution, KAWASHIMA and a group of Japanese military men plotted to make Manchuria and Mongolia independent, and persuaded the Manchu Prince Su (Shan-ch'i) 肅親王 (善耆) to head the effort. According to plan, Prince Su left Peking for Port Arthur in the Kwantung leased territory, arriving there on February 2, 1912. But as the Japanese foreign ministry protested repeatedly to the army, Prince Su was forced to dissociate himself from the movement and go into retirement in Lüshun. (His daughter, who was adopted by KAWASHIMA, was executed as a Japanese collaborator after the Second World War.)

The Kawashima group succeeded in obtaining a large quantity of arms and

³² Kokuryūkai 黑龍會, ed., *Tōa senkaku shishi kiden* 東亞先覺志士紀傳 (Biographical Sketches of Pioneer Patriots in East Asia), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai Shuppanbu 黑龍會出版部, 1933–1936), 2:467. See also Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*; and for the account of Sun's close collaborator, MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, *My Thirty-three Years Dream: The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten*, tr. by ETŌ Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

³³ NAKAJIMA, Masao 中島正郎, ed., *Zoku taishi kaiko roku* 續對支回顧錄 (Memoirs concerning China, Supplement), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Dai nihon kyōka tosho 大日本教化圖書, 1941), 2:153ff. Sun had first, however, traveled to England to urge against Japanese government proposals to help the Ch'ing. For discussion of this and other loan proposals see Jansen, *The Japanese*, 146; Albert A. Altman and Harold Z. Schiffin, "Sun Yat-sen and the Japanese: 1914–16," *Modern Asian Studies* 6/4 (October 1972): 385–400; and C. Martin Wilber, *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 78ff.

munitions from the Japanese army. Strong feelings of animosity against Han Chinese were prevalent among the Mongols, and few welcomed the thought of coming under the rule of Yuan and his regime. Two Mongol princes took the Kawashima bait and joined the Manchu-Mongol independence movement. Arms were then sent into Inner Mongolia under Japanese escort, westward by horsecart from the Kungchuling station of the South Manchurian Railway. This convoy was attacked by Chinese government troops, however, and thirteen Japanese guards and nine Mongols died, thus ending this particular attempt. Until the Manchurian incident of 1931, however, Japanese were continually involved in movements for an independent Manchuria and Mongolia.³⁴

At another extreme of unofficial intervention were by the Japanese who opposed Yuan by assisting the revolutionaries. When the anti-Yuan movement known as the Second Revolution broke out in July 1913 it was suppressed within seven weeks, and Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing 黃興, and the military leader Li Lieh-chün 李烈鈞 had to flee for their lives. Yuan Shih-k'ai's government asked Britain and Japan not to admit Chinese political refugees to their territories. Despite the foreign ministry's best efforts, Japanese outside of government as well as military officers helped the revolutionary leaders escape. Huang Hsing was given passage on the Japanese warship *Tatsuta* from Nanking to Shanghai. From there he fled to Hong Kong on a private Japanese steamer, before transferring to another Japanese steamer bound for Moji 門司, Japan. Sun Yat-sen fled from Shanghai to Foochow 福州, where he was met by the Japanese steamer *Bunjun-maru* which took him to Kobe 神戸 by way of Taiwan. Li Lieh-chün, after his defeat in battle, was granted asylum at the Japanese consulate in Changsha 長沙 on September 1, 1913 and then put on a Japanese steamer for Hankow 漢口, whence he escaped on the warship *Fushimi*.³⁵

The Second Revolution was marred by three incidents that influenced Japanese opinion against their government's cautious policy: the detention of a Japanese army captain, the arrest of an army second lieutenant, and acts of violence by Yuan's troops as they entered Nanking which resulted in the deaths of three Japanese. The Tokyo foreign ministry sought to resolve these matters by quiet diplomacy, but the Japanese army, outraged by these 'insults,' demanded the punishment of those responsible. As tensions mounted, ABE Moritarō 阿部守太郎, head of the Political

³⁴ KURIHARA Ken 栗原健, ed. and comp., *Tai Man-Mō seisakushi no ichimen: Nichi-Ro sengo yori taishōki ni itaru* 對滿蒙政策史の一面: 日露戦後より大正期にいたる (An Aspect of Japanese Policies toward Manchuria and Mongolia: From the End of the Russo-Japanese War to the Taishō Period) (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1966), 139ff. See also OGATA N. Sadako, *Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

³⁵ See, for the Second Revolution, Chün-tu Hsüeh, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 159ff; and Jansen, *The Japanese*, 154ff.

Affairs Bureau of the foreign ministry, was murdered by a jingoist youth. Several thousand indignant Tokyo residents demonstrated to show their opposition to the foreign ministry's policies. These pressures constrained the foreign ministry in its dealings with the Yuan government.³⁶ Ultimately the Tokyo government prevailed, but in the process Chinese intellectuals, including revolutionaries, developed broadly anti-Japanese suspicions and animosities.

When the First World War broke out in Europe on July 28, 1914, China quickly issued a 24-point declaration proclaiming itself a non-belligerent. The thrust of the statement was that belligerents were not to occupy or conduct warfare on Chinese soil or in Chinese territorial waters; and Chinese territory was not to be used as a staging area for attacks. Troops and arms of belligerents were liable to detention or confiscation if they passed through Chinese territory.

For Japan, the First World War provided the opportunity to stabilize its imperialist interests. The Manchurian interests Japan had taken over from Russia had only a short time to run, and the affront Germany had organized in the Triple Intervention of 1895 could now be countered. Britain tried to discourage military action against Germany on the part of Japan, however, and the dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada were even more averse to Japanese involvement. Consequently the British tried to limit Japan's participation to naval action in the form of protection for British merchant shipping from German privateers in the Pacific. Japan was unwilling to accept such a limited role, however, and on August 15 delivered an ultimatum to Germany demanding that Germany hand over, not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow 膠州 with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.³⁷ Foreign Minister KATŌ Takaaki 加藤高明's idea was that the Kiaochow territory, if obtained without compensation, could be turned back to China in due course; if it was obtained at a high cost in blood and money, on the other hand, Japan would not give it up as easily.

As Germany did not respond to the ultimatum, Japan declared war and blockaded Tsingtao 青島 in the German leased territory. To minimize losses, the Japanese army decided to attack German fortifications from the rear, but to do so it would have to pass through Chinese territory and violate China's neutrality. Tokyo applied great pressure on Peking to get it to exclude the province of Shantung 山東 from its neutral zones, but Foreign Minister Sun Pao-ch'i 孫寶琦 steadfastly refused. Instead, China concentrated large numbers of troops in Shantung. Peking finally yielded, however, despite its doubts that Japan would abide by its promise to return Kiaochow to China after taking it by force.

Japanese troops landed on the north side of the Shantung peninsula on

³⁶ KURIHARA, 87ff.

³⁷ Japan, *Gaimushō, Nempyō*, 1:381.

September 2, 1914. Instead of concentrating on attacking the German fortifications at Kiaochow Bay, however, part of the army occupied Weihsien 威縣 and then headed westward, occupying the Shantung railway line all the way to Tsinan 濟南. The army then attacked and occupied Tsingtao. Even after the German surrender, however, the Japanese maintained troops along the entire railway line.

Throughout all of this, China stood alone. Britain, France and Germany were totally preoccupied with the war in Europe, and had no time or resources for Asian concerns. England also felt that the concentration of Japanese interests in North China might help stabilize British interests in Central and South China. Since, moreover, the Allies were hard pressed in Europe, Britain increasingly began to feel the need for Japanese assistance, and so tacitly approved Japan's pressures upon China. Russia, too, which was plotting its own penetration of China, had no objection to Japan's actions. Only the United States, which was not yet involved in the European war, offered China some sympathy. Yet even America, her primary concern concentrated on the war in Europe, had no wish for a confrontation with Japan over China. Unable to expect outside help, consequently, Vice Foreign Minister Ts'ao Ju-lin 曹汝霖 conveyed to the Japanese Yuan Shih-k'ai's willingness to negotiate Japanese economic demands; it was hoped that Japan, in return, would strictly control the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan.

The war years thus offered an excellent opportunity for Japan to stabilize its relations with China. Since the Shantung holdings, which had been taken by force, had to be renegotiated, it seemed a logical time to renegotiate the Manchurian concessions which did not have as long to run. Europe was unlikely to interfere. Numerous Japanese groups agitated for an overall settlement with China; the senior statesmen thought it important to have a meeting of minds in view of Europe's suicidal struggle, while pressure groups of many kinds presented arguments for overthrowing the Chinese regime altogether. Even Sun Yat-sen, a refugee in Japan once more, thought he saw the opportunity for help against Yuan Shih-k'ai. Needless to say, army leaders were particularly insistent.

In time the foreign ministry drew up a list of fourteen demands, arranged in four groups, and seven 'wishes' (Group V) which the ŌKUMA 大隈 government adopted at a cabinet meeting on November 11. On January 18, 1915, Minister HIOKI 日置 in Peking presented these directly to President Yuan and proceeded to explain them in an overbearing manner; should they be accepted, he assured Yuan, Japan would control Chinese revolutionaries and students in Japan.

HIOKI asked Yuan to keep the content of the demands and the process of negotiation secret, but the Peking government, through the young diplomat V. K. Wellington Koo 顧維鈞, soon leaked the demands to American Minister Paul Reinsch. Sun Pao-ch'i resigned as foreign minister, to be replaced by Lu Cheng-hsiang 陸徵祥. Then began a leisurely process of negotiations in which Yuan wore out the patience of the Japanese. Twenty-five formal and twenty informal negotiating

Table VII-1 The Twenty-one Demands

Synopsis of original demands	Final disposition
<i>Group I Shantung</i>	
1 China to assent fully to any agreements between Japan and Germany regarding former German rights and interests in the province of Shantung	Included in the May 25, 1915 treaty between China and Japan; annulled in 1922
2 No part of Shantung to be ceded or leased to any third power	Provided for in the May 25, 1915 exchange of notes
3 Japan to be permitted to construct a railway connecting Chefoo 芝罘 or Lungkow with the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway	Included in the 1915 treaty; invalidated in 1922
4 China to open to foreign residence and commerce additional Shantung cities and towns, to be named in separate agreements	Included in the 1915 treaty; invalidated in 1922
<i>Group II South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia</i>	
1 Leases of Port Arthur and Dairen (the Kwantung leased territory) and of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden railway to be extended to 99 years	Included in the 1915 treaty; in effect up to Japan's defeat in 1945
2 Japanese subjects to be permitted to lease or own land in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia for commercial, industrial and agricultural use	Granted for south Manchuria only
3 Freedom of Japanese subjects to reside and travel in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, and to engage in business and manufacturing of all kinds	Granted for south Manchuria only
4 Japanese subjects to have the right to open and operate mines in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, the mine sites to be determined by separate agreement	Permitted for specified mining areas of south Manchuria only, in the exchange of notes
5 China to obtain prior Japanese consent before granting railway concessions in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia to a third power, or before securing any foreign loans against the taxes of said areas	China to seek foreign capital from Japanese capitalists first with regard to both matters, according to the exchange of notes
6 China to consult with the Japanese government before engaging any foreign political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia	Japanese granted priority in employment for south Manchuria only
7 Japan to control and administer the Kilin-Ch'ang-ch'un railway for 99 years	Left to later negotiators

Synopsis of original demands	Final disposition
<i>Group III</i> The Hanyehping coal and iron complex of the mid-Yangtze valley area	
1 The Hanyehping complex to be placed under joint Sino-Japanese management, before which time no right or property to be disposed of without prior Japanese consent	Included in the exchange of notes
2 No mining to be undertaken by other operators in the vicinity of Hanyehping without prior consent of the Hanyehping Company	Deleted
<i>Group IV</i> Non-alienation of China's coastal area	
1 No harbor or bay or island along the China coast to be ceded or leased to any third power	Deleted. Identical statement issued separately by the Chinese president
<i>Group V</i> Japanese involvement in China's internal administration, and other rights	
1 Japanese to be engaged by the Chinese government as political, financial and military advisers	Tabled for future negotiations; given up by the Japanese government in 1922
2 Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in China's interior to be permitted to own land	
3 Localities in China with a history of Sino-Japanese conflict and police disputes to establish police departments jointly administered or staffed with Japanese	
4 Japan to supply China with 50 percent or more of China's munitions, or to establish a jointly managed arsenal utilizing experts and materials from Japan	
5 Japan to be granted the right to construct a railway connecting Wuchang 武昌 with the Kiukiang-Nanchang 九江—南昌 railway, and to construct railways between Nanchang 南昌 and Hangchow 杭州 and between Nanchang and Ch'ao-chow 潮州	
6 Japan to be consulted first when foreign capital is needed for railways, mines, and harbor works in the province of Fukien, due to its proximity and relationship to the Japanese colony of Taiwan (Formosa)	
7 Japanese subjects to be granted the right to preach in China	

sessions over an 84-day period resulted in many revisions.³⁸ In the course of the negotiations, the American government became increasingly disturbed both by Japan's demands and by her negotiating manner, and American public opinion turned against Japan. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was initially prepared to accept Japanese assurances that there was no substance to talk of a 'Group V', but when it became clear that the Japanese had not been candid with him, and as Minister Reinsch from Peking, in response to Chinese warnings, sent urgent predictions of a Japanese conquest, President Wilson took over direction of the American response.³⁹ Ultimately Tokyo abandoned Group V, and issued an ultimatum on May 7, 1915. The Chinese then gave in. On May 9, at one o'clock in the morning, the new foreign minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, and Vice Foreign Minister Ts'ao Ju-lin went to the Japanese legation and accepted the demands in their final revised form. The differences between the original and the final demands, including their long-term outcome, can be summarized as in the accompanying chart.

Considered in the light of imperialist precedents, the Twenty-one Demands contained little that was new; nor, with the exception of the extension of the Manchurian leases, did they mean a great deal to the Japanese position in China. They fitted into the sequence of special rights secured by the powers in China, and they did not directly threaten American economic interests or counter directly the general principles of the Open Door for trade.⁴⁰ The Japanese saw the 'wishes' of Group V as giving their nationals the sort of rights that Western missionaries already enjoyed; Japanese advisers and arms were already sought by most factions in China. What was distinctive about the demands was the insensitivity and clumsiness of Japanese diplomacy. The world, and especially America, saw a crafty Japan taking advantage of its weaker neighbor at a time when the Western powers were preoccupied elsewhere. Japanese diplomats, by requesting secrecy, enabled Chinese statesmen to build up alarm and distrust by leaking the contents of supposedly non-existent

³⁸ Madeleine Chi, *China Diplomacy, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1970); *id.*, "Ts'ao Ju-lin," in IRIYE Akira, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); HORIKAWA Takeo 堀川武夫, *Kyokutō kokusai seijishi josetsu: 21 kajō yōkyū no kenkyū* 極東國際政治史序説: 二十一箇條要求の研究 (Introduction to the History of Far Eastern International Politics: A Study of the Twenty-One Demands) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku 有斐閣, 1958); Pao-chin Chu, *V. K. Wellington Koo: A Case Study of China's Diplomat and Diplomacy of Nationalism, 1912–1966* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981), 10; and Jansen, *Japan and China*, 209–223.

³⁹ Paul S. Reinsch's account is *An American Diplomat in China*; the Washington response receives authoritative treatment in Arthur S. Link, *Wilson*, 5 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960–1965), 3, *The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914–1915* (1960).

⁴⁰ James Reed, *The Missionary Mind and American East Policy, 1911–1915* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1983), ch. 5.

demands. The ultimatum served on Yuan Shih-k'ai in May 1915 completed the picture of Japanese insensitivity. It gained Japan little the Chinese had not already agreed to, and provided the symbolism for what became, each May 25, a Day of National Humiliation 國恥記念日. Japan's attempt to forestall republican nationalism in China to guarantee its own position thus ended by advancing that nationalism and focusing it against Japan. What made the Twenty-one Demands so inflammatory to Chinese and also to the American public, was their anachronism. They were made in the spirit of the imperialist scramble of the 1890s but twenty years later, after the rise of the Republic of China and the progressive movement in the United States. It was, in every sense, a Pyrrhic victory for Japan.

Japanese Influence and China's Participation in the First World War

From the outset of the World War, the British had hoped for China's entry on the allied side. The Japanese government did not favor this, believing that Chinese participation would enhance China's voice in international affairs and thereby reduce Japan's role as a leader and spokesman for China. After consultations with the Japanese, Great Britain decided not to negotiate for China's participation without prior Japanese consent.

Japan's coercion of China into signing the Twenty-one Demands was subsequent to this understanding, and the Japanese government continued to deal in bad faith with the Yuan government. Non-government Japanese, meanwhile, continued to plot to detach Manchuria from China by exploiting the anti-Chinese sentiments of the Manchu and Mongol minorities, while other Japanese continued to be openly sympathetic to the anti-Yuan southern revolutionary forces around Sun Yat-sen. Thus, when Yuan Shih-k'ai in late 1915 attempted to create a new imperial dynasty with himself as monarch, Japanese government and non-government elements alike vehemently objected. Japan sought the support of Great Britain and then of the United States, Russia and France, to press for postponement of Yuan's monarchical plans. All but the United States agreed.

After an anti-Yuan movement sprang up in southern China in December 1915 and grew in force, the Japanese government decided in March 1916 to grant the southern revolutionary forces recognition as a belligerent body equal to the north and to give its tacit support to those Japanese activists aiding it. In North China, meanwhile, Japanese activists, with secret supplies of arms from elements of the Japanese army, were again plotting a Manchu-Mongol independence movement around the person of Prince Su, then retired in Lüshun. The Japanese foreign ministry itself gave these efforts its tacit support, to put pressure on the Yuan government. But in June 1916 Yuan Shih-k'ai died. The Japanese army decided that the movement had little chance of success, and withdrew its support. The independence army collapsed,

bringing an end to the second Manchu-Mongol independence movement.

Following Yuan's death, Prime Minister Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞, who controlled the army, moved swiftly to strengthen the executive power of the cabinet, but came into conflict not only with President Li Yuan-hung 黎元洪 but also with the national assembly on almost every issue. To increase his political leverage and consolidate his personal power base, Tuan planned to cultivate closer ties with Japan, where the political landscape was also in flux. In October 1916, ŌKUMA Shigenobu 大隈重信 was replaced as prime minister by TERAUCHI Masatake 寺内正毅, and KATŌ Takaaki as foreign minister by MOTONO Ichirō 本野一郎. TERAUCHI planned to approach the Tuan cabinet through NISHIHARA Kamezō 西原龜三, a close friend from TERAUCHI's days as governor-general of Korea.

Throughout this period relations between the United States and Germany continued to deteriorate. After the United States protested in April 1916 against German submarine attacks, Germany promised to restrict them. She reversed herself on January 31, 1917, however, with notification of her intention to resume unlimited submarine warfare. When President Wilson immediately severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the United States on February 3 called upon China and other neutral nations to do likewise. The Peking government demanded an American loan as a quid pro quo.

As the war dragged on, the European Allies faced a labor shortage in France and recruited 140,000 laborers from China. In February 1917 a French ship carrying 900 Chinese labourers was sunk by a German submarine in the Mediterranean, killing 542 Chinese. To counter such German submarine activity, the Allies turned to the Japanese navy. Great Britain in the previous month had already asked Japan to send destroyers into the Mediterranean and Japan had seized this opportunity to ask that the British support Japanese claims to former German rights and privileges in Shantung and to German Pacific territories north of the equator. The Japanese government made identical requests to Russia, France and Italy. All four countries secretly pledged to support Japanese claims at any future peace conference. Moreover, the Tuan government in China was now intent upon improving its Japan ties, and the war had suddenly strengthened Japanese economic power, precisely as it had caused the sudden weakening of European—particularly British and French—power in East Asia. For these new reasons, the Japanese government now shifted to a policy of acceding to China's entry into the war.⁴¹

In January 1917, NISHIHARA had arranged a five-million yen gold loan to the Tuan government. Thus began the 'Nishihara loans 西原借款.' After returning briefly to Japan, NISHIHARA arrived back in Peking in February and informed the Chinese government it could expect substantially greater aid if it declared war on Germany.

⁴¹ USUI Katsumi 臼井勝美, *Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō jidai* 日本と中國：大正時代 (Japan and China: The Taishō Era) (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1972), 104ff.

NISHIHARA met repeatedly with Prime Minister Tuan, strongly urging him to enter the war. Tuan finally concurred, against the objections of Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang 馮國璋 and the even stronger objections of President Li, and on August 14, 1917 the Tuan government declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. Feng eventually aligned himself with Tuan on this issue, but Li Yuan-hung persisted in his firm opposition, precipitating an intense internal power struggle. In exchange for China's entry into the war, Tuan hoped for financial assistance from the powers both to strengthen his own leading position within China and to enhance the stature of China within the international community. Tuan's policies enjoyed the support of three elements within China: first, the Anhwei 安徽 faction of the Peiyang military clique 北洋軍閥 under Tuan's personal leadership; second, the group around Ts'ao Ju-lin, the main funnel of the Nishihara loans; and lastly, the group of conservative republicans in the national assembly, around the person of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超. The latter opposed the Revolutionary Party or Kuomintang 國民黨 of Sun Yat-sen. Actively opposed to China's entry into the war were those with business interests, who hoped for continued prosperity from neutrality, and the Kuomintang which feared that participation would strengthen the Tuan regime.

At the urging of HAYASHI Gonsuke 林權助, Japan's minister to Peking, the Japanese government decided to aid Tuan exclusively, primarily through more Nishihara loans, and to ban all loans, arms and non-government assistance to the Kuomintang in the south. The confrontation between Tuan and the southern revolutionaries intensified until, in late August 1917, 134 anti-Tuan national assemblymen met at Canton and elected Sun Yat-sen generalissimo (*ta-yuan-shuai* 大元帥) of a new military government.

Japanese aid to Tuan increased enormously following his government's declaration of war. During the two years 1917 and 1918, eight Nishihara loans were extended to the Tuan regime for a total of some 145 million yen, or about US \$72.5 m. (of which a mere five million yen was ever repaid). These loans were violently attacked by anti-Tuan elements centred around the Kuomintang as promoting internal discord and propping up a reactionary regime. They thus served as a catalyst for the growth of the Chinese nationalist movement.⁴²

Collusion between the Tuan and Terauchi governments did not end there. When the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in November 1917, and the new Soviet government suspended hostilities with Germany and Austria-Hungary through the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Japan was suspicious of a Soviet-German alliance. Dreading Marxism-Leninism, she sought to stem the flood tide of Bolshevism in Siberia, and to that end proposed a military alliance with the Tuan regime. On March 25, 1918 in

⁴² See SUZUKI Takeo 鈴木武雄, ed., *Nishihara shakkan shiryō kenkyū* 西原借款資料研究 (Studies of Materials on the Nishihara Loans) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1972).

Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister MOTONO and Chinese Minister to Japan Chang Tsung-hsiang 章宗祥 agreed to cooperate to counter the growth of hostile forces in Russia. On May 16, the two countries signed a secret mutual military assistance agreement, followed by a series of separate agreements detailing army and navy cooperation. The terms of these agreements were kept secret by both China and Japan, who merely announced that negotiations were in progress. This secrecy heightened fears among Chinese intellectuals that Chinese troops were essentially being brought under Japanese army control, and that these agreements were but another manifestation of Japanese penetration. Anti-agreement demonstrations broke out around China, while large numbers of Chinese students in Japan returned home in protest.⁴³

The active pro-Tuan stance of the Japanese government did in fact strengthen the Tuan regime financially and militarily, and adversely affected the anti-Tuan, Kuomintang-centred forces of South China. The peace conference at Shanghai between North and South China, convened on February 20, 1919, thus faced insurmountable odds at the outset, and came to nought. In any event, the military agreements concluded between Japan and the Tuan regime lost all effect following the overthrow of the Tuan regime in mid-1920. They were collectively abrogated by Chinese notification to Japan on January 28, 1921.

Almost concurrent with the north-south peace conference at Shanghai was the Versailles peace conference at Paris. When it rejected the Chinese demands that German rights in Shantung be returned to China, the Chinese delegation walked out and the May 4, 1919 demonstration erupted in Peking. The impact of foreign affairs on domestic politics was never more clearly demonstrated.⁴⁴

The Washington Conference and China

Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, although exhausted by the war, desired nevertheless to maintain their interests in the Pacific and the Far East. But to do so would require the cooperation of both the United States and Japan, which not only had not suffered from the European war but had benefited economically from it. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were wary of Japan's recent expansion and Britain felt it essential to gain the goodwill of the United States to contain Japan. Yet, at the same time, Britain needed the friendship of its ally Japan to protect its own China interests. For all these reasons, the British desired a large-scale conference to adjust with one stroke their relations with the dominions, with the United States, and

⁴³ USUI, *Nihon*, 127ff.

⁴⁴ See Benjamin Schwartz, "Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and After," *The Cambridge History of China*, 12:407.

with Japan.⁴⁵

Ever since the Russo-Japanese War, the United States and Japan had frequently been at odds over China. Moreover, despite the best efforts of both governments, the immigration question had raised tensions further. These two countries, whose economies had flourished while war had sapped the European economies, rushed into a heated naval race in the Pacific. Japan, though lacking the natural resources, capital accumulation and productive capacity of the United States, nevertheless adopted an arms expansion program to counter the United States naval build-up, imposing an enormous burden upon its people. For 1920, military expenditure constituted 48 percent of total Japanese government expenditures and for 1921, 49 percent. To reduce this burden, the reduction of tensions with the United States was absolutely essential.

The United States also felt the economic burden of the naval race. More than that, she saw a need to respond somehow to the sudden advance of Japan into China during the First World War. Secretary of State Robert Lansing had attempted to maintain an Open Door in China by granting recognition to certain special rights of Japan in the exchange of notes known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917. This culmination of several rounds of negotiations in Washington between Lansing and the Japanese ambassador, ISHII Kikujirō 石井菊次郎, had two essential points. First, recognition of the existence of a special relationship between countries having contiguous boundaries. On this basis, Japan was recognized as having special interests in China. Second, the guarantee of China's independence and territorial integrity and the upholding of the Open Door principle of equal opportunity in commerce and industry. Once the war had ended, however, the United States revised its conciliatory position, and began to feel out alternatives, believing that the old diplomacy of imperialism should now be superseded by a new international order in East Asia. In 1918 the United States had proposed that a consortium of American, British, French and Japanese banks should be set up to make loans to China. In 1920 Washington also urged the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the device that had protected Japan's encroachment on China.

As part of this process, the Washington Conference met from November 1921 to February 1922. Armaments and Far Eastern relations were taken up in parallel sessions. The Chinese plenipotentiary, Alfred Sao-ke Sze (Shih Chao-chi 施肇基), made an effort to chip away at the unequal treaty system. He confirmed the Open Door for equal commercial-industrial opportunity of the treaty powers in China but demanded

⁴⁵ See Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Thomas Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1970); IRIYE Akira, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

that all agreements concerning China must be openly declared, made only with Chinese participation, have stated time limits, and be strictly construed in favor of the grantor.⁴⁶

At this time Japan was herself experiencing a flurry of democratizing activity (universal male suffrage, for example, became law in 1925) while suffering under the burden of her anti-communist intervention since 1918 in Siberia. She thus desired harmonious relations with the United States and Britain, and sought to keep in step with their China policies. She took a cooperative attitude on the eventual revival of full Chinese sovereignty and, along with advocating an unreserved, unconditional Open Door and equal opportunity in China, agreed to future negotiations to abolish extraterritoriality.

In the end, two treaties and nine resolutions on China came out of deliberations on sixteen separate items such as tariffs, spheres of influence, the Open Door, and a ban on military supplies to China. The Anglo-Japanese alliance came to an end and a four-power treaty (Britain, France, Japan and the United States) took its place but without any military provisions, merely promises to consult. A naval limitation treaty agreed to a 5-5-3 ratio for the British, American and Japanese fleets, which would leave Japan secure in her home waters. Concerning China, it was agreed that the powers would subsequently convene a separate conference aimed at the abolition of extraterritoriality. On tariff matters, since the Chinese government was in severe financial straits, a major objective was to increase Chinese government revenues. A treaty provided for revision of tariff rates at the same time that it called for a future conference to revise the entire tariff structure. Most important was the nine-power treaty of February 6, 1922 on China, which incorporated strict and concrete stipulations regarding the Open Door and equal opportunity, and against unfair discrimination on railways in China. Japan and China settled the Shantung question through direct negotiations from November 1 to February 4, 1922, when they signed a treaty returning the former German leased territory of Kiaochow to China. Japan withdrew all troops from Shantung. The Tsingtao custom-house was integrated into the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway 膠州濟南鐵道 and all its properties were transferred to China.

The Washington Conference formulated high ideals but provided no way to enforce them. It left China's sovereignty still impaired by the unequal treaty system, partly because China in 1922, split between regimes in Peking and Canton, had no single government capable of exercising sovereignty. At the same time the Soviet Union and Germany were left out of the new system. At first glance the chief practical result was a negative one, that Japan's expansion during the First World War had

⁴⁶ *Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington*, 866-868; and TAMURA Kōsaku 田村幸策, *Daitōa gaikōshi kenkyū* 大東亞外交史研究 (Study of the Diplomatic History of Greater East Asia), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Dainippon Shuppan 大日本出版 1942), 2.

been cut back to the boundaries of 1905. Great power expansion had been forsworn, but only by the nine-power signatories and only on paper.

Some historians, on the other hand, have argued that the 'Washington powers'—notably, the United States, Britain and Japan—successfully put an end to years of rivalry and mutual suspicion, and were at last taking seriously the idea of cooperative action in the Far East to minimize instability. In this regard, Anglo-American-Japanese diplomacy may be seen paralleling postwar developments in Europe in which recent historians have detected a pattern of internationalist cooperation underneath surface animosities. The term 'informal entente,' which has been applied to the postwar pattern of Anglo-American relations in the Middle East, might be applied also to East Asian affairs after the Washington Conference. True, there was no rigid mechanism for enforcing collective behavior; but the three countries opted for entente instead of hostility, and for cooperative competition instead of unilateral or particularistic action.⁴⁷

One's interpretation of the Washington Conference period may ultimately hinge on one's view of the 1920s either as a decade of short-sightedness and failures that prepared for the tragedies of the following decade, or as a time of serious efforts to restructure the international order, efforts that have continued to this day. In this latter perspective, the conference represented a search for a new order in the Far East, paralleling similar searches in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. The story of Chinese foreign affairs, then, takes on significance as a chapter in the struggle to define a global structure that would ensure international security and domestic stability.

The Washington Conference system was to have been one such structure. Unfortunately, it could never be solidified. For one thing, China's political and financial instability threatened it. Even as the conference closed, in 1922, Westerners and Japanese were proclaiming that China was on the verge of political collapse; the Peking government no longer able to pay full salaries to its officials; teacher salaries unpaid for several months; classes not held; and market conditions in Peking in sharp decline. Government finances seemed beyond repair, and the cabinet changed hands five different times.

Then on May 6, 1923, the Blue Express of the Tientsin-Pukow railway 天津浦口鐵道 was attacked at Lincheng by more than a thousand bandits.⁴⁸ The bandits

⁴⁷ See IRIYE Akira, *After Imperialism*, ch. 1; Jon Jacobson, "Is There A New International History of the 1920s?" *The American Historical Review* 88/3 (June 1983): 617–645; Michael Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919–1952*.

⁴⁸ Lau Kit-ching Chan, "The Lincheng Incident: A Case Study of British Policy in China between the Washington Conference (1912–22) and the First Nationalist Revolution (1925–28)," *Journal of Oriental Studies* 10/2 (July 1972).

killed a number of Chinese travellers and carried off over a hundred others, including some sixteen foreigners, among whom was a woman of the Rockefeller family. The Peking government in a panic ordered the release of the foreign hostages. Their release finally came on the 12th, but not without reminding everyone of the impotence of the Peking government. The debate over a joint foreign government administration of China revived in earnest.

If a government existed as the central government in anything more than name, it was because the powers chose to recognize it as such. For the powers required a central government to pay China's debts, negotiate new foreign privileges and deal with various matters under international law. Without one main conduit through which to channel their interests, the powers would have had to negotiate individually with numerous territorial warlords. Thus, the Peking government was a mockery as a central government—no more, really, than a fiction—but it was kept in being by the powers. Despite political instability, they went ahead with a special tariff conference, convened in 1925, to discuss tariff revision in accordance with the Washington Conference agreement. Ironically, the convening of such meetings coincided with the launching of a nationalist revolution led by the Kuomintang and its Communist allies, who denounced the Washington Conference as imperialist collusion and demanded the unconditional return of full sovereignty to China. Meantime warlord dealings with foreign countries surged ahead, as exemplified by the ties of Chang Tso-lin 張作霖 and Tuan Ch'i-jui to Japan, of Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚 and Ch'en Chiung-ming 陳炯明 to the British, and of Feng Yü-hsiang 馮玉祥 and the Kuomintang to the Soviet Union.

Moscow's Dual Approach to China

Where the Washington Conference powers had aimed at gradual reforms to abolish the treaty system at some future time, the Soviet Revolution had a far more active approach to China's problems both domestic and foreign. V. I. Lenin, from early on, had formulated the notion that backward countries might serve as the reinforcements of the proletarian revolution. The May 18, 1913 issue of *Pravda* carried a short essay entitled 'Backward Europe and advanced Asia.' Lenin's main points may be summarized as follows. (1) In Europe the bourgeois class, its life nearly exhausted, still controls things through its governments. And, likewise, the bourgeoisie in Europe is the enemy of the proletariat, the sole advanced class. (2) These bourgeois governments rule their colonies in Asia by joining hands with the medieval, reactionary controlling forces of Asia. It followed that the democratic movement in these colonies in Asia was propelled forward by the combined anti-colonial movement of the colonial bourgeoisie and the proletariat. And so, the bourgeois democratic movement of Asia was progressive, whereas the bourgeoisie that

controlled Europe was regressive.

Lenin accordingly believed in the possibility of an alliance between the proletariat of Europe and the bourgeois democratic movements of Asia. A similar concept inspired Joseph Stalin to write 'Don't forget the East' in 1918. The idea was taken up concretely at the second congress of the Comintern in Moscow in 1920. The national bourgeoisie of backward colonies were thus granted revolutionary status. That is, they were seen as the standard bearers of nationalism. But, at a certain stage, the colonial bourgeoisie would go beyond this to become oppressors of the proletariat. The congress agreed that the proletarian movements of backward colonies could support national liberation movements of the bourgeoisie only to the extent that the bourgeoisie was truly revolutionary. Moscow ruled the nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha of Turkey to be a bourgeois national liberation movement, and supported it actively. Next came China. Lenin had decided at about the time of the 1911 Revolution that Sun Yat-sen's political involvements constituted bourgeois nationalism. Moscow's principal China policy thus came to be for China's proletariat and its revolutionary bourgeoisie to work together in an alliance, with Moscow aiding in that effort. It fell upon the Comintern to carry out the plan.

A second Moscow plan was to work directly with the Peking government and with various warlord regimes.⁴⁹ The original principle of revolutionary work was to minimize the number of one's enemies and maximize the number of allies and friends. Lenin explained his thoughts on exploiting all the cracks and conflicts of interest within enemy ranks, and all the possibilities of alliance with the masses, in his 1920 essay, "'Left-wing' Communism—an infantile disorder.' (Stalin was to make a similar argument in his 1924 work *Foundations of Leninism*.) And so, after the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917, though their power base was still shaky and troubled by anti-revolutionary forces within and intervention from without, it became incumbent to somehow make allies of neighboring countries or, barring that, at least to establish friendly relations by having those countries sever relations with Moscow's enemies, namely the anti-revolutionary Russian troops, Japan, Great Britain and other intervening countries. On top of that, even China's Peking government and warlords could play an auxiliary role to the extent that their sense of nationalism pitted them against the imperialism of Japan and Great Britain. In terms of minimizing the number of one's enemies, the idea of improving relations with the Peking government seemed promising indeed. The Soviet government itself assumed responsibility for this.

Moscow, in short, attempted to support and enlarge the forces of socialism in

⁴⁹ On the Soviet approach to central and local governments, consult Wang I-chün 王聿均, *Chung-Su wai-chiao ti hsü-mu* 中蘇外交的序幕 (Prelude to Sino-Soviet Foreign Relations) (Taipei: IMH, 1963); and Sow-theng Leong, *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917-1926* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976).

China by a policy of double dealing: giving aid to Chinese revolutionary forces through the Comintern, while promoting friendly relations with the domestic enemies of those same forces (like the Peking government and the warlords) through the Soviet government.

The initiative toward the Peking government came very early with the call for the restoration of diplomatic relations immediately after the October Revolution. Then in July 1919, Soviet Russia, through Assistant Foreign Commissar Leo M. Karakhan, boldly announced its termination of Boxer indemnity claims and its readiness to relinquish all the other old tsarist rights and privileges in China. This was followed in September 1920 with a more concrete set of proposals. The two declarations taken together are known as the Karakhan manifesto. Coming in the immediate post-May Fourth period, when the rights recovery movement in China was near its height, the Karakhan manifesto created a considerable stir throughout China, in and out of government. However, it left unresolved the major question of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which the Soviet Union simply refused to give up. A high-ranking Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe, began to discuss restoration of diplomatic relations in Peking in 1922. (While there he received an invitation from GOTŌ Shimpei to visit Japan, where he played a major role in the restoration of Soviet diplomatic relations with Japan. He was later accused of being a Trotskyite and committed suicide in 1937.) Next, Karakhan's lengthy negotiations in Peking in 1923-4 primarily with Chinese Foreign Minister V. K. Wellington Koo finally resulted in a 1924 agreement to restore diplomatic relations, based on three guidelines: (1) abrogation of the unequal treaties; (2) the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia; (3) the joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway by China and the Soviet Union.

In tandem with the efforts of the Soviet government were the Comintern efforts toward the Kuomintang and Chinese socialists, considered to constitute China's revolutionary force.⁵⁰ In the spring of 1920, Gregory Voitinsky, who bore the title of head of the Far East department of the Comintern, turned up in Peking and met with Li Ta-chao 李大釗. With Li's enthusiastic recommendation, Voitinsky proceeded to Shanghai to meet with Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀. There, in July 1921, the first national congress of the Chinese Communist Party was secretly convened in the French concession, and the party formally founded. In the Comintern analysis of the situation, the Kuomintang was a revolutionary bourgeois political party. To the extent that it was revolutionary, the Communist Party as the representative of the

⁵⁰ For details of the Comintern approach to the Chinese revolutionaries, see C. M. Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, eds., *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927: Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Richard C. Thornton, *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); Allen S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); and Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952; 2nd ed., 1963).

Chinese proletariat must cooperate with it. The question was what form that cooperation should take. This was discussed at the central committee meeting of the Chinese Communist Party at Hangchow, in August 1922. Maring (Hendricus Sneevliet),⁵¹ the Comintern representative in China, argued that cooperation should take place within the Kuomintang, with Communist Party members entering the Kuomintang as individuals (the 'bloc-within' strategy). Opposed to this was Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who argued for cooperation with the Kuomintang from outside the party. After a heated debate, Maring declared that the party should properly observe Comintern directives and his view prevailed.⁵²

Next, Joffe visited the hapless Sun Yat-sen, then a refugee in Shanghai from the warlord Ch'en Chiung-ming. This resulted in the Sun-Joffe joint statement of January 26, 1923. The clause declaring that the Communist system was not suited to Chinese conditions represented a major concession from Joffe. Sun was reinvited to Canton in February to head a new government whose exchanges with Moscow became surprisingly active. In August, Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and Chang T'ai-lei 張太雷 were sent for several months to the Soviet Union to study Soviet military organization and her political representative system. Starting around November, the political adviser Mikhail M. Borodin arrived at Canton and was followed in 1924 by the military adviser General Vasili K. Blyukher (known in China as Galen). Aid and arms flowed in with them. Against this background the Kuomintang held its first national congress in January 1924. Under the rubric of the new basic Kuomintang policy of *lien-O jung-kung* 聯俄容共 (ally with the Soviets, admit the Communists), Li Ta-chao and two other CCP members were elected to regular membership in the 24-member central executive committee of the KMT. Mao Tse-tung's name appears on the list of its seventeen alternate members.

The subsequent vicissitudes of the Comintern-Kuomintang alliance were to be deeply imbedded in the great drama of China's Nationalist Revolution from 1923 to 1927. This Russo-Chinese cooperation in making revolution has been recounted in its socio-political context in volume 12 of this series. Here we can note that it saw the start of a Soviet influence on the Chinese Revolution which continued in one form or another for a whole generation. It also set up an alternative structure of international order based on the premise that Moscow's brand of communism would inevitably sweep over the world. As the Nationalist Revolution marched north from Canton, the Washington Conference powers were put on the defensive and made various accommodations.

⁵¹ Dov Bing, "Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP," *The China Quarterly* 48 (October-December 1971): 677-697.

⁵² These developments are treated more fully in Jerome Ch'en, "The Chinese Communist Movement to 1927," *The Cambridge History of China*, 12:514-518; and Martin C. Wilbur, "The Nationalist Revolution: From Canton to Nan King, 1923-28," *The Cambridge History of China*, 12:531-540.

China's Nationalist Revolution and the Powers

The National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek's command headed north through Hunan 湖南 in July 1926 with the aim of unifying the country. Changsha fell on August 12, Yochow on the 18th, Hanyang on September 6, Hankow on the 7th, Wuchang on October 10, Kiukiang on December 4, and Nanchang on December 7. Lurking in the background of this invincible military sweep was the growing discord between the Kuomintang left wing and the new anti-Communist right wing around Chiang Kai-shek. The Comintern judged the time ripe to seize the leadership of the Chinese Revolution, so it issued directives to pursue a radical revolutionary course.

Britain, who until then had taken a hard line against Chinese nationalism, made an about-face in December 1926 and announced a moderate new China policy. Her hopes for moderation were dashed, however, as the tide of nationalism picked up greater force. Massed demonstrators broke into the British concession areas of Hankow and Kiukiang on January 4 and 9, 1927 respectively. Unable to send in relief forces, the British ultimately gave up these concession areas through a restoration agreement.⁵³

When Nanking fell on March 24, six foreigners were killed in acts of violence by revolutionary army elements. British and American gunboats on the Yangtze 揚子江 shelled the city from the river to help their nationals get away. Japanese who had assembled at their Nanking consulate were raided by officers and troops of the revolutionary army. Some were manhandled and others pistol-whipped. Property was damaged. But at no point was any resistance offered. The naval officers and men who happened to be at the consulate to establish communication links dismantled their machine-guns and stored their weapons in a back room at the request of Japanese civilians, lest their weapons excite the Chinese soldiers. As a result, and despite the violence, not one life was lost, and all were rescued without incident.

In the aftermath of this Nanking incident, Britain reinforced her Shanghai defences, and pressed Japan and the United States to do likewise. The United States sent reinforcements, but tried to avoid exciting Chinese nationalist feeling. Japanese Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA Kijūirō 幣原喜重郎 held fast to his principle of non-intervention in China. Criticism of the moderate Shidehara foreign policy, led by the opposition Seiyūkai party, had been growing in strength for some time. Both the army ministry and the army general staff, moreover, supported joint military action with the British, arguing that the British dilemma of today could well be the Japanese dilemma of tomorrow.

SHIDEHARA's thinking was different. He felt, first, that Japan's real China

⁵³ For these developments in detail see C. M. Wilbur, "The Nationalist Revolution: From Canton to Nanking, 1923–28," *The Cambridge History of China*, 12:527–720.

interests lay not in territory but in markets. Secondly, if indeed, as seemed likely, the Nationalist government should bring all China under its control, it behooved Japan to avoid friction. Thirdly, signs of a split were emerging, as the confrontation between pro- and anti-Communist elements within the Nationalist government intensified. And lastly, what if China failed to respond to a Japanese ultimatum, and rejected Japanese demands? To give Chiang Kai-shek foreign support might make him seem like a traitor. There was no real alternative to letting Chiang clean the CCP out of the Nationalist government on his own. This is of course what he did in the bloody coup of April 1927 and in the subsequent effort to exterminate the CCP.

With Chiang's anti-radical coup, it might have been expected that the Washington Conference system would finally be in place. After all, there was a central government in China with a promise of stability, standing against the Soviet Union, the one power that had remained outside the Washington framework. Despite their differences, the Washington powers had not entirely given up the principle of mutual consultation and cooperation in China. Unfortunately, the years after 1927 were to demonstrate how difficult it was to create a stable international order in the Far East, in a period of domestic turmoil which was to engulf not only China but Japan and the Western nations as well.

The story of this progressive destabilization is treated in a subsequent chapter. Here, a bare outline of Chinese-Japanese relations after 1927 should suffice to illustrate the extreme difficulties in working out a pattern of international order that would be acceptable to and sustained by domestic forces.

In the same month that Chiang Kai-shek made his move against the Communists, opening up the possibility of the foreign treaty powers dealing with him and his new Nanking government, the Japanese cabinet changed hands. Japan's new prime minister and concurrent foreign minister was retired army general TANAKA Giichi 田中義一. As head of the opposition party, TANAKA had never missed an opportunity to criticize his predecessor, SHIDEHARA, for the weakness of his China policy. Now suddenly TANAKA was in the position of having to adopt a strong China policy of his own.⁵⁴

In May, as revolutionary army troops approached the province of Shantung in the 1927 phase of the Northern Expedition 北伐, TANAKA dispatched troops to Shantung on the pretext of protecting Japanese lives. Chinese troops drew back south of Shantung, and a clash was avoided. The Northern Expedition was resumed in April 1928, whereupon TANAKA again sent troops into Shantung. Chinese troops who had taken possession of Tsinan earlier encountered the Japanese there, and the two sides clashed on May 3 after some minor incidents. Driven by anti-imperialist passions, some Chinese soldiers went out and massacred eleven Japanese civilians.

⁵⁴ William F. Morton, *Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).

The Japanese army initiated a large-scale operation against the Chinese army, and drove them out of the Tsinan vicinity. Chinese forces evaded the Japanese and marched north toward Peking. Though there were no further clashes with Japanese troops, the fighting at Tsinan nurtured deep anti-Japanese feelings even among Chiang's politically moderate troops.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, defeated by these Chinese forces, left Peking by special train on June 3, headed for his Mukden (Shenyang) base. A large explosion just this side of Mukden killed him early the following morning. His assassination had been plotted by a small group of Japanese army officers. Their thinking was that the death of Chang Tso-lin would deprive Manchuria of its leader and plunge it into chaos. The Japanese army would then step in to restore order, and occupy Manchuria.⁵⁵ But, on the contrary, Manchuria was not plunged into chaos. Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良, then in Peking, rushed back to Mukden where his father's death was kept a secret until June 21, when young Chang assumed his father's mantle. The assassination was soon confirmed to be the work of the Kwantung army but, realizing that to make an issue of it might put him at the mercy of Japan, Chang Hsüeh-liang held his peace.

While taking care not to upset Japan, this new ruler of Manchuria also found himself drawn to the rights recovery element of Chinese nationalism. First he grasped the hand of his father's old enemy, the Kuomintang, and then he hoisted the Kuomintang 'blue sky and white sun' flag over Manchuria. The flag went up on December 29, 1928, at the end of secret negotiations with the Nanking government. Chang joined the Kuomintang, and was designated commander-in-chief of the northeast frontier defence army. Thereafter, Chang gradually adopted an anti-Japanese policy and the Chinese anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria came into the open. Japanese businessmen suffered, and even the giant South Manchurian Railway Company fell into the red. Then came the great depression of late 1929.

The deteriorating situation in Manchuria was marked by a series of incidents. Korean farmers in Manchuria, who at one point were said to have numbered two million, were engaged chiefly in rice culture. But in 1931 the Chinese anti-Japanese movement became far more widely organized, and farmers from Korea, Japanese subjects since 1910, living in remote areas out of easy reach of Japanese authority, bore the brunt of countless incidents. The Korean population of Manchuria fell to about 800,000.

In 1931, about 400 Korean farmers rented land in Wanpaoshan 萬寶山, north of Ch'ang-ch'un, from some Chinese, and began the hard work of converting it to rice lands. However, Chinese authorities forbade them to settle, and ordered them out.

⁵⁵ Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977); and BAMBÀ Nobuya, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924–1929* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press; Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1972).

The order was temporarily rescinded at the protest of the Japanese consul. But on July 1, about 800 Chinese farmers stormed the land and started smashing the new irrigation ditches. Skirmishes broke out between the interlopers and the Japanese police who rushed to the scene from nearby Ch'ang-ch'un. This made the front page of Japanese newspapers, and for some time Koreans in various parts of Korea took violent revenge on local overseas Chinese.

The number one hypothetical enemy of the Japanese army at this time was the Soviet Union. During the period of the Wanpaoshan incident, the Japanese army had sent general staff officer Captain NAKAMURA Shintarō 中村震太郎 into western Manchuria to survey its geography, in the event of a war with Russia. Rapidly anti-Japanese soldiers of Chang Hsüeh-liang caught and shot him. The alleged murderer was finally brought to Mukden on September 18, 1931, and the Japanese consul notified.

But it was too late, for September 18 was the night of the Mukden incident. A small group of Kwantung army officers blew up a part of the South Manchurian Railway and, using that as a pretext, launched an attack on Chinese troops. In less than half a year, the whole of Manchuria had fallen to the Japanese army and been severed from China. Japan had become the primary concern of Chinese foreign policy. Within less than a generation, a mere two decades, the East Asian regional order of the Ch'ing dynasty, the international legal order envisaged by the Washington Conference treaty powers, and the world revolutionary order dreamed of in Moscow, had all proved unavailing as an international matrix for the Chinese Republic.

Chapter VIII CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSESSMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

There is generally speaking a difference between Western and Japanese Sinologists in their interpretation of Communist China. The latter tend to place emphasis on *China* and to believe that Communist China is basically Chinese: the former argue that Communist China is finally *Communist*. The Chinese Communist himself, I believe, has long been struggling with this problem. In the summer of 1961, Ch'en I 陳毅 talked to a group of youths who had just graduated from universities in Peking: "I would like to advise the cadres here," he said, "to re-examine repeatedly your levels of thought and the ways you do thing. I will never believe that you have no selfishness at all. You are, first of all, not qualified to use such a strong word. My own thought, when I re-examine it, is very complicated; it is a complex mixture of Communism, Confucius, Mencius and even the bourgeois thought. I now frankly accept it. Though I am a veteran revolutionary with a career of forty years of struggle, I cannot say I am "hung-t'ou 紅頭" (really red). What I can say now is that the Communist thought just dominates the other bourgeois, Confucian and Mencian thoughts."¹

This veteran Communist's words to intellectuals may well reflect one of the important problems of the academic world of the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the problems which students in Mainland China interested in the nineteenth century foreign relations must face. The problems I am going to deal with are divided into two groups; the framework of historical interpretation and the evaluation of history.

* This is a paper presented to the Conference on Chinese Communist Historiography, organized by Professor Roderick McFarquar and sponsored by *The China Quarterly*, held at Ditchley Manor, Oxfordshire, September 6-12, 1964. In this paper I tried to elucidate the difference between Chinese and Japanese historiography on Chinese foreign relations in the 19th century. I remember being frustrated throughout the conference when I came to see clearly how little Japanese scholarship on China was recognized by the Western world.

¹ KUWABARA Toshiji 桑原壽二, "Mō Takutō no shisō to senryaku 毛澤東の思想と戦略 (The Thought and Strategy of Mao Tse-tung)," *Chūō kōron* 中央公論 78/3 (March 1963): 119-120.

1.

The Chinese people long suffered from foreign aggression. Many young intellectuals had the chance to see the great difference between the clean foreign settlements or legation areas and the dusty Chinese cities, and to learn of the miserable history of their own compatriots. Their fatherland was plagued with civil war from year to year. For the modern Japanese, their government was, generally speaking, righteous; but for the Chinese, their government was nothing but a distasteful group. A dominant Chinese image of China in the 1920s was that every warlord had his foreign sponsor: Chang Tso-lin 張作霖 had Japan, Wu P'ei-fu 吳佩孚 had Britain and so on. (This image is somewhat different from what they really were, but what is important is that they believed it to be true.)


A persecution complex grew. It enabled the Chinese youth to draw a model of modern China as follows:



Hsiao I-shan 蕭一山, now an old member of the Legislative Yuan 立法院, wrote a four-volume *History of the Ch'ing Dynasty* in 1933 when he was twenty-five years old. Although he had no Marxist-Leninist background at all, his basic image of the Ch'ing 清 history was exactly the same as the above model and he advocated that the goal of national revolution was the withdrawal of foreign powers from China.

The Marxist-Leninist concept of oppressed colonial people fits precisely the image of China held by the Chinese intellectuals. A simplified model drawn from the Lenin's report in the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 is as follows:

THE WEST



This was one of the reasons why many Chinese youths ran into the camp of the Chinese Communist Party. And, the Communist of the 1930s had already created a concrete frame of reference for late Ch'ing history. In short this was:

- 1) The Manchu 滿洲 government was subdued by the foreign capitalism,
- 2) The people fought the Manchus as well as the foreign invasion,
- 3) Imperialism emerged after the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5,
- 4) The foreign capitalist invasion destroyed manufactures in China and impoverished the masses.

The basic frame of reference has not yet been changed and in Communist China research has merely reinforced it: many facts of “peoples” resistance, corruption of the government and its collusion with the foreign powers have been found. Emphasis on the modern and rational side of various rebellions has become stronger.

Japanese Marxist-Leninists of the 1930s argued vehemently about the character of the Meiji régime: in the case it was a bourgeois democracy, the forthcoming revolution should be a one-stage socialist one. In the case it was an absolutist monarchy, they needed a two-stage revolution. In China, on the other hand, Marxist-Leninists unanimously argued that China needed a two-stage revolution. For a Chinese Communist, historical materialism is merely logic. What the Communist has to do is to *create* the revolution. Thus, they are anxious to praise any revolt against either the Manchus or the foreign powers.

According to the Chinese Communist frame of reference, the people had two enemies during the Ch'ing dynasty: one was the foreign powers and the other the Ch'ing government. I have wondered which one was less oppressive for the “people” in this scheme of things. In other words, which was worse from the present Communist's point of view?²

There is no clear-cut answer to the question. One can, however, presume that foreign powers might be worse than the Manchus. Lin Tse-hsü 林則徐 was an official of the Manchu government: he was a *han-chien* 漢奸 from the Han 漢 point of view. But, as he stuck to tough policies towards the British, he is praised as “the delegate of the best elements of the feudal culture of China.”³

On the other hand, Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩, who likewise was an official, has never been praised. He was said to have been both a traitor and executioner, because

² Professor ICHIKO Chūzō 市古宙三 once tried to clarify the Communist view of *min-pien* 民變 in the late Ch'ing dynasty. The Communists argued that the *min-pien* was caused by foreign invasion and the corruption of the Manchu régime. He divided major works into two according to which factor they emphasized. The reason why the opinion was divided into two is not explained (*Ochanomizu shigaku* お茶の水史學 1 (1958): 30–37).

³ Fan Wen-lan 范文瀾, *Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih* 中國近代史 (A History of Modern China) (Hong Kong: Hsin-chung-kuo shu-chū 新中國書局, 1949), 1:15.

he suppressed the T'aipings and submitted to foreign pressure. It is possible, however, to presume that this evaluation is based on the belief that Lin did not suppress the T'aipings and Tseng did. But this assumption does not appear good if one recalls Lin's determined attitude towards the revolt immediately before his death. It may be that Chinese scholars have not yet compared these two enemies separately.

In this framework, *ti-kuo-chu-i* 帝國主義 (imperialism) is used with a little confusion, as Professor Feuerwerker has suggested.⁴ Lenin defined imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism and it is commonly accepted that the Era of Imperialism began in the 1890s. Mao 毛澤東 ambiguously used the word *ti-kuo-chu-i* in his *Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*. Some Chinese scholars, therefore, use the term *imperialism* instead of *capitalist invasion* in the prefaces of their books dealing with the Opium and Arrow Wars. But they do not misuse the term in the main text, with the exception of Liu Ta-nien 劉大年.⁵ Even in three textbooks of the junior high school in the holdings of the Tōyō Bunko Library 東洋文庫, I have found accurate interpretation and precise use of the "imperialism" in Lenin's terms.

Now there is one more question about the frame of reference. Are there any preferences among foreign powers? The answer is yes. The Tōyō Bunko Library has thirty Chinese scholarly books on Chinese diplomatic history, published in Mainland China. Of the thirty books, eighteen have some antagonistic expression in their titles. The target of antagonism and the years of publication are as follows:

1928	Japan	1
1929	Japan	1
1930	Japan	1
1931	Japan	3
1933	Japan	1
1938	Japan	1
1939	England	1
1941	Japan	1
1951	U.S.	1
1952	U.S.	2
1954	U.S.	1
1955	U.S.	2
1958	U.S.	1
1959	U.S.	1

⁴ A. Feuerwerker, "China's History in Marxian Dress," *The American Historical Review* 66/2 (January 1961): 334.

⁵ Liu Ta-nien 劉大年, *Mei-kuo ch'in-hua-shih* 美國侵華史 (A History of American Aggression towards China) (Peking: Hsin-hua shu-tien 新華書店, 1953).

Also, the library has issues of *Li-shih yen-chiu* 歷史研究. Out of 810 titles seen in the contents' pages, eighteen articles are concerning the foreign relations of China.

Foreign Powers in general	5
Russia	2
U.S.	3
England	2
Japan	1
France	1
Portugal	1
U.S. and Japan	2
England and France	1

Thus, at present it is obvious that the U.S.A. is the most distant country in the framework of history among powers. It is, however, not easy to draw the same conclusion from reading Chinese scholarly publications. The titles of chapters often contain antagonistic expressions: an extreme case of which is, "Extraordinary crimes of colonialistic exploitation, persercution and humiliation, economic invasion and atrocity of emigrants executed by American invasionists against the Chinese people during the latter half of the nineteenth century."⁶ It is interesting that the contents are not necessarily propagandistic; some are rather sober and calm.

2.

Non-Chinese students of modern Chinese history are often surprised at how little difference there is in the evaluation of the nineteenth century foreign relations of China presented by scholars in Mainland China. We know of the great polemics about *Hung-lou-meng* 紅樓夢, the proto-capitalist, Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操 and so on. But we have not yet heard of any major polemics about the foreign relations of China in the nineteenth century. Would it not be possible to change the framework and give a stimulus to the evaluation of the foreign relations?

As I mentioned above, the framework itself is a combination of the *Chinese* image of modern China and Communist framework of feudal China. In addition, it has remained valid for almost thirty years and basically it contains much truth. I, therefore, do not think that it will change at any time soon.

The basic framework, however, is very coarse and within it, I would say, there are many possibilities for change.

⁶ Ch'ing Ju-chi 卿汝楫, *Mei-kuo ch'in-hua-shih* 美國侵華史 (The History of American Aggression towards China) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she 人民出版社, 1952).

First, during the Great Leap Forward 大躍進, students and scholars were forced to work outside, and those who enthusiastically studied inside were often bitterly criticized. But from the spring of 1961 onwards, the cadres in the universities started encouraging research.⁷ If one analyzes the past with fervor, one must see the other side of the coin sooner or later. At some stage, one will read the memorials of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang 李鴻章 resolutely refusing Japan extra-territorial rights: the Japanese government wanted to insert an article of ex-territoriality in the draft of Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty 日清修好條規 in 1870. Then one will not be satisfied with the official evaluation of Tseng and Li.

Secondly, the Peking government itself has two faces like Janus—a rigid basic framework of principles and an experimental and practical approach. In 1955–56, many Japanese visitors to Peking asked when the Chinese people would take over Hong Kong. They thought this was a flattering question. The Chinese answered unanimously: “We can take back Hong Kong whenever we want. But one has to think over the existence of Hong Kong’s history of one hundred years under British rule.” Without a slight change of principle, the Chinese were marvellously successful in explaining the situation to the Japanese. Ten years ago they talked about acquiring Taiwan before long. They are now openly talking about two ways of liberating Taiwan, one is with force, the other is by peaceful liberation. I suspect that the real scholar in a monolithic society must have taken similar wisdom into his own passion. Presumably, in some publications one is able to see conscientious works with red trappings.

Thirdly it is undeniable that the scholar under Communist rule has to serve the “people” and that politics dominate historical research. Thus, P’eng Ming 彭明 published a book in 1957⁸ and predicted an everlasting amity between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, after the Peking government had secretly decided to assert its interests. On the other hand, would it not be possible that the political atmosphere of the university may change?

Conclusion

I have referred to the immovability of the basic framework which the Chinese Communists have long been applying to the history of modern China. And also, three of the above-mentioned reasons may, I feel, bring about a move to re-examine the official assessment. Tso Tsung-t’ang 左宗棠, the third figure in the Yang-wu

⁷ SHUDŌ Seiji 首藤青滋, “Pekin daigaku sotsugyōki 北京大學畢業記 (A Report of Graduation from Peking University),” *Chūō kōron* 78/4 (April 1963): 279–280.

⁸ P’eng Ming 彭明, *Chung-Su yu-i-shih* 中蘇友誼史 (The History of Friendly Relations between China and the Soviet Union) (Peking: Jen-min ch’u-pan-she 人民出版社, 1957).

Movement 洋務運動, has received a similar evaluation to that of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. He, who unlike the other two mandarins, was sent to Ili in order to push back Russian infiltration, may be a good start for a Chinese historian to begin with.

Chapter IX THE CONCEPT OF “MILITARISM” IN MARXISM-LENINISM AND MAOISM

According to the *Century Dictionary* (1904 edition), there are three definitions of “militarism”: “the military spirit”; “the addiction to war or military practices”; and third, as “the maintenance of national power by means of standing armies.” This third meaning seems to be most prevalent today. In this essay, after reviewing the development of traditional Marxist usage, I want to discuss the Peking government’s use of the term “Japanese militarism.”

1.

So far as I know, the first appearance of “militarist” in Marxist writings was when Karl Marx himself used it in 1868 in an essay entitled *Fourth Year Report of the Standing Committee to the General Conference of the International Workingmen’s Association* in Brussels. In this report, Marx analyzed the situation where labor movements had been suppressed in France, Belgium, Italy and Prussia between 1867 and 1868. After his melancholy analysis, Marx stated:

These militaristic governments, which are always ready to attack each other, march to battlefield shoulder to shoulder in their crusade against the proletariat, their common enemy.¹

In 1877 Friedrich Engels took a further step in analyzing militarism. In his *Anti-Dühring*, published at the time of the Russo-Turkish War—which had followed the Crimean and Franco-Prussian Wars—Engels was impressed with the military build-ups of Germany and Italy, two late-developing capitalist countries, which after their respective unifications were trying hard to become first-rate nation-states. Engels wrote:

... [the Franco-Prussian War] compelled all the powers of the continent to adopt

* This is a revised version of my lecture at Hebrew University. It was originally a chapter in Harold Z. Schiffrin, ed., *Military and State in Modern Asia* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1976). It examines the relationship between the mass movement and the military and explains that what integrated the two as peasant-soldiers was Mao’s Red Army 紅軍.

¹ Karl Marx, “Vierter jährlicher Bericht des Generalrats der internationalen Arbeiterassoziation,” *Marx/Engels Werke* (Berlin (Ost): Dietz Verlag, 1964), 16:321.

an extremely strict Prussian-type universal conscription system and shoulder a military burden large enough to destroy themselves along with that burden within several years. Military forces have become the major purpose of a state.... Militarism will dominate and eat up Europe. The people of a state exist only to supply goods and services to soldiers, i.e., to feed them. Militarism will gradually dominate and destroy Europe. But militarism has within itself the seeds of its own ruin.²

Engels predicted that the maintenance of standing armies would create excessive financial burdens which would inevitably bankrupt the states. At the same time, the masses, taught how to use weapons by universal conscription, would gradually oppose a monarchy until the dialectics of its own development would ultimately bring about military self-destruction. The concept of militarism as used by Engels, therefore, can be considered the same as the *Century Dictionary's* third meaning for "militarism" given above.

Later, the unified German Empire became the center of European affairs, while the standing armies of other states were also steadily expanding. In such an environment, the Second International (International Socialist Workers' and Trade Union Congress) was reorganized in 1899 and, as revealed later, almost all members were Marxists. In 1905, when Tsarist Russia turned its attention to the West, especially to the Balkans again after her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, competition in European military expansion was further intensified. It was now most urgent for the Second International to decide on the Marxist opposition to European military expansion and war. A key work on this issue was Karl Liebknecht's *Militarism and Anti-Militarism with Special Consideration of the International Youth Movement*.³

The origin of this work was the report he submitted to the conference of youth groups of Germany held in Mannheim on November 28, 1906. Liebknecht later revised this report in 1907. The gist of his thesis was that, first, imperialistic worldwide policies at that time threatened to generate major disturbances in the international sphere. Second, in order to prevent such disturbances, the people of each state should refuse to provide the gigantic appropriations needed to finance the (standing) armies and navies of their respective countries. Third, he stressed the great need to educate and organize young people in order to launch struggles against militarism. Liebknecht stated that underlying these problems was the fact that military affairs are crucial, being deeply rooted in the actual life of man. The history of militarism, he

² Friedrich Engels, "Herrn Ergen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft ("Anti-Dühring")," *Marx/Engels Werke* (Berlin (Ost): Dietz Verlag, 1962), 20:158.

³ Karl Liebknecht, *Militarismus und Antimilitarismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung: Der internationalen Jugendbewegung* (Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei Aktiengesellschaft, 1907).

argued, is the history of the political, economic, and cultural life of the state and its people, and at the same time, it is the history of the class struggle. He contended that insurgency and war were consistently important forms of the class struggle in history. Accordingly, just as the form and nature of power politics are determined by the level of weaponry, so are the forms of class struggle determined by military superiority. Merely to possess and distribute weapons equally among all citizens, therefore, is not sufficient to build permanent democracy. Only when the production of those weapons is controlled by the masses, he continued, will democracy be solidly established. In other words, Liebknecht claimed that real democracy cannot be realized unless power is seized by the proletariat. In all stages of history, the militarism of the power-holding class is directed first of all at foreign countries. The ruling class sees itself as bearing the obligation to offer protection and prevent encroachment by outside forces. He called this type of militarism "outward militarism." Furthermore, the class holding power utilizes military force to counter enemies within the country and to maintain domestic order. This is what Liebknecht called "inward militarism." He explained that the greater the class contradictions, the more important militarism will become as a force to suppress the class struggle.

According to Liebknecht's theory of capitalist militarism, capitalism encouraged and developed militarism to further its own goals. Within a framework of "outward militarism" when greater attention and appropriations were given to the navy as a tool of global expansion policies, colonization followed quickly. A larger navy, required for competing for markets, led to wars of aggression and seizure of colonies overseas. He also argued that capitalistic militarism forcibly conquers the indigenous people of the colonies in an attempt to make them slaves of capitalism. "Inward militarism" on the other hand, suppresses the proletariat, the enemy of the capitalist in the class struggle, by using the army, and by indoctrination based on patriotic ideology, in order to prevent the unity of the proletariat and to destroy its chance of striking. How, then, can the proletariat fight against this type of militarism?

In order to destroy the military, Syndicalists such as Gustave Hervé advocated inciting strikes in the army, and thus starting rebellions from within. But Liebknecht criticized this type of strategy as visionary and anarchistic. He insisted that the Social Democrat must first educate the people in the class struggle, explaining the interests of the proletariat, and thereby showing it the road to victory. Liebknecht furthermore emphasized the need for special propaganda and education among the youth because he believed that gradual and organic destruction of the militaristic spirit was the only effective means of fighting militarism that was available to the Social Democrat. In other words, Liebknecht's "militarism" was used in a wider sense, although occasionally he simply referred to military preparedness. The idea of suppressing the proletariat by military force was seen as an extension of militarism.

2.

Lenin frequently mentioned "militarism" in works such as *International Socialists' Congress in Stuttgart* (1907) and *A Letter to Arthur Schmidt* (1916). He described his own ideas on "militarism" most concretely in *Warlike Militarism and Anti-Militaristic Tactics of Social Democratic Parties*, written in 1908. In this work which refers to the situation that prevailed in the early 20th century, when the European nations were expanding their armies and preparing for war, Lenin proposed counter-measures that should be undertaken by the Social Democrats:

Though published and non-published treaties and agreements are laid out like a network throughout Europe, to snap the tiptoe of the Great Power, only a little is sufficient for a fire to flare up out of sparks.⁴

"In order to solve the problem correctly," he said, "one should understand that 'modern militarism' is the result of capitalism."⁵ "Militarism" is, in this sense, a physiological attribute of capitalist society, whether "outward militarism," which capitalist states employ in conflicts with foreign powers, or "inward militarism" by which the ruling class suppresses the proletarian struggle. Militarist activity is deeply rooted in the very structure of capitalism, and thus, as long as the capitalist system exists, "militarism" exists. Only when capitalism is extinguished, will "militarism" disappear. Lenin noted that some German Social Democrats at that time held the belief that the "strong love of mankind cannot weaken the notion of being a good German," and that they furthermore felt that if war were instigated by other powers, they would take up arms just like the bourgeois parties.

Lenin claimed that these German Social Democrats were in direct conflict with the basic premise of the international socialist movement and that there is no fatherland for the proletariat. He also criticized Hervée and other Syndicalists for advocating destruction of the military without destroying the root of militarism: capitalism. According to Lenin, when the time would be ripe for the socialist revolution, there would be no doubt as to the role militarism would play, and therefore it is crucial that campaigns and propaganda against military forces be carried on more vigorously. It is necessary, he said, to reduce the capacity of military force to suppress rebellion, and to draw those in the military over to the revolutionary side. He warned, however, against the illusion that war can be averted by means of anti-militarist campaigns and propaganda. Since militarism is an outgrowth of capitalism, it is impossible to stop wars as long as capitalism exists. Thus, the duty of Socialists is

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Voinstvuyushchii militarizm i antimilitaristskaya taktika demokratii," *Lenin: Bolnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moskva, 1961), 17:186.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

not to foster illusions about peace, but rather to expose the hypocrisy and impotence of diplomacy among capitalist nations. It is important to note that Lenin's pronouncements of the inevitability of militarism and war under the capitalist system became firmly established in Marxist thinking on militarism.

In the 1930s, "militarism" began to take on increasingly negative connotations and was used to characterize developments in Japan and Germany. The terms "militaristic Japan" or "militaristic Germany" gained currency. The adjective "militaristic" was often used to demonstrate the antithesis between good "democracy" and bad "militarism." The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 included such expressions as "irresponsible militarism," and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 日米安全保障條約, concluded in 1951, warns that "irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world." While this latter use of "militarism" refers to Communist activities and the former to those of Japan, the connotations are similarly unfavorable.

China was the most unfortunate victim of Japanese "militarism" in the 1930s and it was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 中國共產黨 that continued to denounce this militarism most harshly and consistently, from a Marxist point of view. Thus, even after the surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers in 1945, Chinese fear of Japanese militarism did not abate. Only one month after the Japanese surrender on September 14, 1945, the *Liberation Daily* 解放日報 stated that:

After the surrender of the aggressive Japanese Army, the only important tasks the Allied Powers face are to punish war criminals, and to purge the residue of Japanese fascism and militarism. Cunning Japanese rulers are disguised as being democratic rulers, betraying the Allied Powers. It is through this disguise that Japanese rulers are preserving the former militarism, and undertaking to prepare for a future war of revenge.⁶

The *Liberation Daily* listed a broad range of individual war criminals, including the Japanese Emperor, military men, bureaucrats, and financial tycoons. The CCP presented a coherent and consistent argument for a non-militaristic Japan, and continued to denounce the American Occupation Forces' alleged attempts to "revive" Japanese militarism. For example, in the *July Seventh Declaration* of 1949, the following already appeared:

The policy of the United States Government toward Japan ... is neither to demilitarize nor democratize Japan; it continues, rather, to de-democratize and militarize it.⁷

⁶ *Chieh-fang jih-pao* 解放日報 (*Liberation Daily*) (Sept. 14, 1945).

⁷ *Ajia seikei gakkai* アジア政經學會 (Association for Asian Political and Economic Studies), ed., *Chūgoku seiji keizai sōran* 中國政治經濟總覽 (General Descriptions of Chinese Politics and Economies) (Tokyo: Minshushugi kenkyūkai 民主主義研究會, 1966), 271.

Criticizing the U.S. policy toward Japan at the time of the Korean War, the CCP asserted that a hastily made peace treaty with Japan would simply preserve Japanese militarism. But realizing that a partial peace treaty with Japan, scheduled to be concluded in San Francisco, was unavoidable, the Peking Government quickly changed its attitude and came out with a policy of tolerating Japan's rearmament. However, Peking demanded a guarantee that Japanese militarism would not revive, stating:

In order to guarantee that Japanese militarism will not revive, the Treaty should provide for restrictions on the scale of its military power. And this military power should be limited to self-defense needs only.⁸

This signified a change in the tone of Peking's strictures against Japanese militarism. While it had previously denounced the fact that Japan was not demilitarized and that militarism had been preserved, from then on, it charged that militarism "is reviving."

China continued to use the term "revival of militarism" very frequently, especially from 1958 to 1960 in condemning the Kishi 岸 Cabinet. In 1964 and 1965, when a Japan-China detente mood began during the Ikeda 池田 Cabinet, China still used the term but with considerably less frequency. China also criticized the revival of militarism under the Satō 佐藤 Cabinet (1964-72). Thus, "revival of militarism," as applied to Japan, is nothing new in the vocabulary of the CCP. The CCP has also used the term "Japanese imperialism" frequently, but this expression has invariably referred to Japan's past aggression. China has never asserted that post-war Japan represents the imperialist stage. Its position is that the United States, the mightiest "monopoly capitalist country," is at present the sole "imperialist" country, and other capitalist countries are more or less subordinate to it. (The term "social imperialist" is used by the CCP to define the nature of the Soviet Union since the ninth Congress of the CCP in 1969.) Japan, in particular, has been sharply criticized as a prop of American imperialism, but China has never claimed that Japan reflects the same level of imperialism as the United States. It is clear, however, that as Japan's economic growth continued unabated, China was compelled to take cognizance of Japan's own frame of reference which was relatively independent of the United States. In vilifying the Kishi government (1957-60), China often accused Japan of "flattering" or "submitting to" American imperialism. During the Satō regime, China no longer used this expression, but claimed, rather, that Japan was going to "annex Taiwan 臺灣" and that Japan "took a hostile view of China." This change indicates that China regarded Japan as having become more independent of the United States during the Satō regime than in the period of the Kishi Cabinet. China's position is, however, that Japan has yet to reach the imperialist stage, and criticism of Japan's rearmament and rapid economic growth must be expressed in terms other than

⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

“imperialism.” Their favorite terms are “Japanese reactionaries” and “Japanese militarism.” These terms are probably used because of the belief that, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, Japan can become militarized at any time as long as it remains a capitalist state.

It was during Chou En-lai 周恩來’s visit to Pyongyang 平壤 in 1970 that the expression “Japanese militarism has already revived” was used for the first time. According to the *People’s Daily* 人民日報, Chou En-lai referred to Japan four times in Pyongyang, somewhat differently on each occasion. His first reference was made on April 5, when he said at Pyongyang Airport, that “Japanese reactionaries are willingly discharging their role as American imperialism’s spearhead and are *reviving militarism* even more than before.”⁹

His second reference was in his speech at a welcome dinner, also on April 5. He stated that, “The Satō Cabinet, the most reactionary and most aggressive cabinet Japan has had since the end of World War II, *intends to pursue the road of Japanese militarism* and to re-establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”¹⁰ On April 7, at a luncheon at the Chinese Embassy, in the presence of Kim Il-sung 金日成 and others, he said that “There is no longer any question about the *danger of Japanese militarism reviving*. It is an indisputable reality.”¹¹ Finally, the Joint Communiqué of the Chinese and Korean Governments released the same day stated that, “Under the positive protection of American imperialism, Japanese *militarism has already revived* to become a dangerous aggressive force in Asia.”¹² Chinese statements of that period always referred to “Japanese reactionaries” and “militarism” but never to “Japanese imperialism,” whereas the Korean side often used “US-Japanese imperialism”. Immediately before Chou En-lai’s visit, the *Rodong Sinmun* 勞動新聞 (North Korea) carried an editorial, “To Oppose the Revival of Japanese Militarism,” and after Chou’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung began to use the term, “Japanese militarism.”

A week after Chou’s speech on the revival of Japanese militarism, in the Joint Communiqué of April 14 between the Chinese and seven Japanese organizations, including the Japanese International Trade Promotion Society 日本貿易振興會, the expression “Japanese militarism has already revived” was used. Furthermore, immediately afterwards, in its Memorandum Trade negotiations with FURUI Yoshimi 古井喜實, a National Diet member from the Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主黨, the Peking Government successfully demanded that this expression be used in the Joint Communiqué. The *Hong Kong Ta-kung-pao* 香港大公報 on April 15, 1970, lost no time in criticizing as an “outrageous mistake” the statement that Japanese militarism

⁹ *Jen-min jih-pao* 人民日報 (People’s Daily) (April 6, 1970). (Emphases are the author’s.)

¹⁰ *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 7, 1970). (Emphasis added.)

¹¹ *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 8, 1970). (Emphasis added.)

¹² *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 8, 1970). (Emphasis added.)

has yet to revive and that there is only the "danger" of such a revival.¹³

In China, the words of a political leader often take hold, regardless of whether or not they are accurate. Consequently, the pronouncement that "militarism has revived" was not the result of careful analysis of the Japanese affairs in order to define the nature of Japanese politics, but was used for definite political purposes during Chou En-lai's negotiations with North Korea at Pyongyang. In other words, Sino-Korean relations, which had in any case been showing signs of detente since the spring of 1969, now finally returned to a friendly basis, using confrontation with Japan as common ground.

There were signs that Peking tried afterward to prove the revival of Japanese militarism. It reported every fact, however trifling, to substantiate this contention. For instance, China made a fuss over the reprinting and sale (in Japan) of pre-war state-authorized textbooks; the inauguration of the Bayonet Fencing League; the Yasukuni Shrine Bill 靖國神社法案¹⁴; the "military song revival" boom; the movies, "Isoroku Yamamoto 山本五十六"¹⁵ and "Military Clique"; the white collar workers' enrollment in the Self Defense Forces (SDF) 自衛隊 for a few weeks for experience; visits to Taiwan of Dietman KITAZAWA Naokichi 北澤直吉 and the SDF Chief of Staff; Japan's participation in the Jakarta Conference; and the convocation of the Conference of the Heads of Japanese Diplomatic Missions in Asia. In their joint editorial, the *People's Daily* and the *Liberation Army Daily* 解放軍報 cited the following nine points to identify the revival of militarism for future reference:

1. Large financial cliques (*zaibatsu* 財閥) are dominating the State and increasing the militarization of the economy.
2. The SDF is planning large-scale arms expansion, including preparations for nuclear armament.
3. Militarist elements, such as SATŌ, KISHI and KAYA 賀屋興宣 are holding on to the prerogatives of military administration.
4. Police power is strong: Japan has become a special-class police state both in name and reality.
5. [Japan] is exploiting the peoples of other countries in the name of economic cooperation.
6. It has included Taiwan and South Korea in its sphere of influence.
7. It has become American imperialism's military police in Asia and has concluded anti-revolutionary alliances with Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 and Park

¹³ *Ta-kung-pao* 大公報 (April 15, 1970), Hong Kong.

¹⁴ The Yasukuni Shrine 靖國神社, which is sacred to the memory of the war dead, was financed by the Japanese Government until the end of the Pacific War. Afterwards, it became a non-governmental shrine. The bill which is to provide a government subsidy to the shrine has not yet passed the Diet.

¹⁵ Name of a Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy during the Pacific War.

Chung Hee 朴正熙.

8. It is looking for a pretext to send troops abroad, and

9. It is building up anti-revolutionary public opinion through the mass media.¹⁶

This is a remarkable list of accusations which totally condemns contemporary Japan. The Peking Government continued to insist that Japanese militarism has “already revived,” creating vehement arguments between the CCP and the Japanese Communist Party 日本共產黨, which demanded the use of the expression, “fear that Japanese militarism might revive.”

In reality, Japan’s rearmament and the degree to which monopoly capital controls the state are not as strong as China claims. It seems to me, that to a certain degree, the Peking Government recognizes the difference between its assertions and reality. Since the fall of 1970, both in volume and in tone, arguments directly denouncing Japanese rearmament and the Self-Defense Forces have been lowered, and instead, China has begun to concentrate upon the purported peculiarity of Japanese economic development and “the revival of militarism” in Japanese education as proof of the revival of militarism. When Peking began to emphasize the economic and ideological aspects, Premier Chou En-lai himself gradually stopped saying that Japanese militarism has “already revived.” For example, in his statement to the Committee of Concerned Scholars of Asian Studies on July 19th, 1971, Chou said nothing about “Japanese militarism.”¹⁷ When he was to mention it at the meeting with James Reston, the Premier ambiguously said that the U.S. had promulgated the development of Japan towards militarism by the indefinite prolongation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.¹⁸

The most remarkable changes in the Chinese Communist usage of the term “militarism” can be seen at the time of the formation of the Tanaka 田中 Cabinet in Tokyo in July 1972. The Peking leadership began to show its enthusiasm and fervor for normalization of Sino-Japanese relations during 1971 and then waited for a change of premiership in Tokyo as an opportunity to change its policy towards Japan. The newly formed Tanaka Cabinet indicated, covertly at the beginning and overtly later, that it would abrogate the Peace Treaty with the Republic of China 中華民國 (Taiwan). The Peking Government urged early normalization of relations and stopped all critical remarks about Japan in its official periodicals, as can be seen in Graphs 1 and 2.

These two graphs are based upon data drawn from matrices Z formed by the following procedure. What I call a message-unit is a coding unit for my frequency analysis of the *People’s Daily*. Message-units are based upon the size of an article.

¹⁶ *Jen-min jih-pao* (Sept. 3, 1970).

¹⁷ *New York Times* (July 29, 1971).

¹⁸ *New York Times* (Aug. 10, 1971).


Taking the size of the *People's Daily* as the measuring base, an article at least a quarter of a page long is counted as three message-units. An article between a quarter to one-twelfth of a page is counted as two message-units, and an article occupying less than one-twelfth of a page, is counted as one message-unit. Y in Table 1 is the monthly sum of message-units referring to Japan for each month. As for the attributes, they consist of 14 symbolic usages frequently invoked by the Chinese Communists when they refer to Japan:

- AI = American imperialism
- AR = American reactionaries
- JR = Japanese reactionaries
- MI = Japanese militarism, revival of militarism, militarists, etc.
- EA = Economic expansion, economic invasion, economic aggression, etc.
- GR = Japanese aggression, and nature of aggression.
- HC = Japanese hostility to China, hostile to the Chinese people, etc.
- TC = Two Chinas' plot, policy of the two Chinas, etc.
- OF = Japanese occupation of Formosa, ambition to occupy Formosa, annexation of Formosa, etc.
- SA = Japan's submission to American imperialism; subservience to, surrender to, flattery of American imperialism; running dog, etc.
- AA = Japanese struggle against American imperialism, anti-American demonstrations, etc.
- PS = Japanese patriotic struggle, patriotic movement, etc.
- VI = Japanese visitors to China.
- FR = Sino-Japanese friendly relations.

Thus, the following matrix Z is obtained on a monthly basis:

AI AR JR MI EA GR HC TC OF SA AA PS VI FR	
Z1,1Z1,2	Z1,14
Z2,1Z2,2	
.	
.	
.	
Z8,1	Z8,14

Graph IX-1 Absolute Frequencies of 14 Attribute Symbols: April–November 1972



Graph IX-2 Polemicity concerning Japan




Table IX-1
Z Matrix

	AI	AR	JR	MI	EA	GR	HC	TC	OF	SA	AA	PS	VI	FR	Y
APR.	4	10	19	14	3	3	9	4	10	3	5	0	32	30	64
MAY	17	15	27	17	5	12	10	0	19	2	3	0	39	34	80
JUNE	15	6	18	22	7	7	7	2	2	8	6	5	12	18	61
JULY	4	6	12	50	6	36	5	2	0	0	2	0	23	75	152
AUG.	8	2	2	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	52	107	159
SEPT.	3	3	9	17	3	13	0	3	0	0	0	0	54	134	203
OCT.	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	46	125	173
NOV.	1	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	62	83

Y is the total sum of message-units before being classified in terms of attributes. Some single message-units contain more than one attribute, hence Y is not the sum of AI, AR, ... FR.

Code:

AI = American imperialism

AR = American reactionaries

JR = Japanese reactionaries

MI = Japanese militarism ...

EA = Economic expansion ...

GR = Japanese aggression...

HC = Japan/China hostility...

TC = Two Chinas' plot ...

OF = Formosa occupation ...

SA = Japan's submission to AI ...

AA = Japanese struggle against AI ...

PS = Japanese patriotism

VI = Japanese visitors to China

FR = Sino/Japanese friendly relations

Graph 1 is made out of a Z matrix (Table 1) for the eight month period, April 1972-November 1972, and Graph 2 is derived from Z matrices for the eight-month periods as indicated in the graph. The "polemicity" in Graph 2 indicates intensity, how controversial are the CCP's attitudes towards Japan. The Z matrices for Graph 2 consist of 12 symbolic usages: AI, AR, JR, MI, EA, GR, HC, TC, OF, SA, AA and PS, excluding VI and FR. Y in the denominator in the graph indicates sum of message-units for each month.

Graphs 1 and 2 clearly show how remarkable the change in attitude of the *People's Daily* toward Japan was during the period of the normalization of relations. Graph 2 also indicates that the Chinese attitude towards Japan became a little tougher from August 1973 until November 1974 than it was from April 1972 until July 1973, and reflects a change in the political climate in Peking from moderation towards radicalism.

Conclusion

The historical facts on the use of the term "militarism" within the framework of Marxism have been reviewed. Since Maoists consider themselves Marxist-Leninists,

in my opinion they firmly believe that militarism is completely inseparable from the capitalist system itself and that as long as that system exists, it will sooner or later expand its economic activities abroad, eventually inviting military intervention, and consequently develop into an imperialist state based upon the monopolist capitalist system. This analytical framework will not be easily destroyed in the near future. On August 5, 1971, Chou En-lai stated the following conviction to James Reston:

She [Japan] is bound to demand outward expansion. Economic expansion is bound to bring about military expansion. And that cannot be restrained by a treaty.¹⁹

The fact remains, however, that Japan cannot maintain its present economy without development of her economic cooperation overseas. It can be concluded, therefore, that the disappearance of China's accusations of Japanese militarism which occurred during 1972 and 1973 was entirely a matter of political expedience. Conversely, the basic suspicions held by the Chinese Communists vis-a-vis Japan's emergence as an economic power in the world, were only imperceptibly decreased.

Yet, there are two distinct differences between the pre-war international system and the present one. The first is that former colonies have become independent states in the sense that their raw materials and markets can no longer be controlled by the military force of economically advanced states. The second is that today's international network of trade, transportation and finance does not allow the conquest of new colonies. Today the European Community and Japan have elaborate economic relationships with the whole world, and therefore even partial destruction of this exchange system by war would by no means benefit the majority of entrepreneurs in capitalist states. For example, Japan imports more than 200,000 tons of iron ore daily from all five continents. If a sudden change in this present system occurs in any part of the world, this delicate and elaborate commercial and industrial system would fall apart.

Although the schematic interpretation of capitalism by Marxist-Leninism can no longer adequately explain the future relationships of Europe and Japan, it is not easy to make people of neighboring Asian countries, especially Marxist-Leninists, understand that a militarized Japan would by no means be advantageous to the Japanese economy. Whenever the CCP should decide that a serious conflict of interest exists between China and Japan, it would not hesitate to accuse Japan again of promoting militarism.

¹⁹ *New York Times* (Aug. 10, 1971).

Chapter X THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SITUATION AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPAN-CHINA TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP

1. Introduction

The conclusion of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty 日中平和友好條約 has caused varied reactions in many countries as the *Straits Times*, in its September 25, 1978 issue, pointed out that, "the treaty conclusion is a major incident giving rise to both fears and expectations at the same time." For example, although it is welcomed by many countries around Japan, it is also interpreted as a part of China's strategy toward the Soviet Union (August 14 issue of the *Financial Times*, August 14 issue of *The Times*, August 15 issue of *Le Monde*, September 15 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, etc.) and particularly the ASEAN nations (August 14 issue of the *Nation Review*). Some predicted a major change in the Asian situation, and felt that the conclusion of the treaty was a spectacular victory for Chinese diplomacy (August 15 issue of *Le Monde*, October 2 issue of *Business Week* and others).

Others expressed a fear that as a result of the treaty's conclusion, economic relations between Japan and China will rapidly become closer, and that eventually Japan will lose interest in extending cooperation to Southeast Asian countries and to the Republic of Korea (*Straits Times* on September 25, and the Diet speech made on October 6 by Prime Minister Coi Kyu-ha of the Republic of Korea). Countries which openly opposed the new treaty were the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Mongolia and Taiwan.

The following is my own opinion concerning the Northeast Asian situation after the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty.

* This is a chapter in Chong-shik Chung and Chong-wook Chung, eds., *Major Powers and Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1979). Published right after the conclusion of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, I tried to discuss its impact on Northeast Asia. My conclusion was that it would not cause any major change. The only thing would be that China would try to push Japan to the anti-Soviet side. In this sense, it is an analysis of one aspect of the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

2. Japanese and Chinese Intentions

China has been referring to "a great commotion in the whole world" as its basic description of the international situation. The country firmly believes that a third world war cannot be avoided, and that people must store away food in preparation for the war. Recently, however, China also believes that the outbreak of a new war could be delayed with efforts by the countries concerned. At the July 20, 1977 general meeting of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tenth National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, Teng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平 made the following remarks:

"We must cooperate together to battle and eliminate the present grave crises by utilizing all possible means available. Of most serious concern is the future outbreak of a third world war. A new world war is unavoidable. If we could delay its outbreak until the end of this century, however, we would be able to hold on to the leadership under an advantageous situation. All policies that we take, therefore, should not be separated from this goal."

Judging from various documents issued by the Chinese Communist Party, Teng's remarks seem to imply that, of the two superpowers, it is the Soviet Union which is trying to exercise hegemony and planning to wage a new war, and that the Chinese policy is intended to deter such Soviet intentions. It seems to me that China's international diplomacy since 1969 is basically designed to fight against the Soviet Union, and that the country will maintain the same posture as long as Chinese-Soviet tension remains unabated.

I do not think, however, that China deliberately used the anti-hegemony clause in the 1972 Shanghai Communique, exchanged between the United States and China, and in the Peking Joint Statement, issued by Japan and China in the same year, for the purpose of condemning Soviet efforts to attain supremacy. Rather, China's intention to bring Japan into the anti-Soviet camp became obvious when China tried to include the anti-hegemony clause during the process of negotiations for the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty which began in 1974.

What made the situation worse was a report in the January 23, 1975 issue of the *Tokyo Shimbun* 東京新聞 which scooped the press with the anti-hegemony issue. Before that, Japan refused to include the anti-hegemony clause in both the preface and the main text of the treaty because it was an unfamiliar phrase in the field of international law. It became the object of heated debates as the Chinese side strongly insisted on its inclusion in the main text. The negotiations were held in secret but the *Tokyo Shimbun* first reported that the anti-hegemony issue was the central point of discussions, and then other newspapers followed suit. As a result, the Soviet Union pointed out that the anti-hegemony phrase could only be interpreted as an anti-Soviet term in light of past remarks made by Chinese leaders, and the country began preparations to conduct various political activities to oppose the use of the phrase.

The Soviet move hardened the attitude of the Chinese side, which, as a result, claimed that a treaty without the anti-hegemony clause would mean a retreat from the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations.

For this reason, the negotiations were suspended. Later, Chinese leaders continued to emphasize the necessity of including the phrase whenever any Japanese visited China, and to claim that the Japanese government was responsible for the delay in concluding the treaty. While suspending the negotiations, the Japanese government gradually yielded to the Chinese demand to include the anti-hegemony clause in the preamble. The Chinese side, however, repeated its demand that the clause be included in the main text. In accepting the Chinese request, Japan called for a basic understanding that the inclusion of the clause did not violate the United Nations Charter and that it did not mean a specific country. According to this guideline, Foreign Minister MIYAZAWA 宮澤 talked with the chief of China's diplomatic department, for about 10 hours when they visited New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September 1975, and gave him a detailed explanation of Japan's basic posture. At the time, Chou En-lai 周恩來 was reported to be seriously ill, and the confrontation between the radical faction (the so-called Gang of Four 四人幫) and the moderate faction in the Communist Party further intensified. Under these circumstances, no concrete answers were given by the Chinese side. In 1976, Foreign Minister KOSAKA 小坂 proposed meeting the same Chinese representative in New York, but the Chinese response was cool, so substantial discussions could not be held. This might have reflected the political crisis and instability in Peking at that time. (Shortly afterward, the chief of the diplomatic department lost his position.)

In Japan, the Miki 三木 Cabinet was succeeded by the Fukuda 福田 Cabinet. The government, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and opposition parties all agreed that the anti-hegemony ideology was a universal concept in international society and that it did not refer to a specific country. As the Hua Kuo-feng 華國鋒 and Teng Hsiao-p'ing system became stable, the Chinese side began to change its hardline posture of pulling Japan into the anti-Soviet front and started to place emphasis on new friendly relations with Japan.

Changes in the attitudes of the two sides resulted in the successful conclusion of the treaty.

The treaty consists of two phases—one in which complete agreement has been reached and the other in which opinions still differ. Completely agreed upon are the new relations between Japan and China. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, Foreign Minister SONODA 園田 met the press and said, "We sincerely hope that Japan and China will expand their peaceful and friendly relations, established on a solid foundation, and contribute to peace in Asia and the whole world from their respective positions." The *People's Daily* 人民日報, August 14, said, "The China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty is a political termination of past unpleasant rela-

tions between the two countries and signifies a new start of expanded goodwill and friendship." It can thus be said that the two nations share almost the same opinion in this respect although some differences may exist in their interpretation of future relations.

On the other hand, opinions of the two sides differ widely in regard to the significance of the treaty in international society. Foreign Minister SONODA emphasized that "Japan's fundamental diplomatic posture is to maintain its relationship with the United States as the main axis and develop and expand new friendly relations with other countries regardless of their political systems, and this policy will take effect as a result of the conclusion of the new treaty."

The *People's Daily* stated in an editorial that "The historical current of the friendship between China and Japan cannot be disturbed by Soviet intervention. The conclusion of the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty is a testimony to the complete failure of the Soviet imperialists' plot to interfere with and destroy the new amicable relations between China and Japan." While Japan emphasizes that the new treaty with China will not affect relations with other countries, China seems to interpret the new treaty as a new blow to the Soviet Union.

3. Is Japan-China Military Cooperation Possible?

The treaty does not mention any military cooperation in its text. Recently, however, China has been inviting many Japanese Defense Agency officials. Among those invited to China were a retired official of the Defense Research Institute and retired Maritime Self-Defense officers who form the Sea Power Group; a former chief of the Joint Staff Council; and a former secretary general of the Defense Council as well as some military critics. The deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army made positive efforts to talk with Japanese officials on his way to Mexico.

It is obvious that the latest Chinese moves stem from the country's international strategy against the Soviet Union. Recently, a group of Japanese newspaper editorial writers visited China. Meeting with Japanese journalists on September 6, Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing said as follows (carried in the October 24, 1978 issue of the *Sekai shūhō* 世界週報):

"Japan and China are facing the same threat. They must be prepared for future difficulties. We have long been making efforts for national defense. We support Japan's move to possess a self-defense capability. We can delay the outbreak of another war if China and Japan join forces to block hegemony-seeking moves. Good preparedness will make warmongers more cautious. It is not wrong to possess power for defense."

Past remarks made by many Chinese leaders indicate the fact that China recognizes the Japan-U.S. security system. Teng also expressed this understanding,

although indirectly, by saying that, for Japan, its relationship with the United States is of prime importance, while the relationship with China comes second. China, furthermore, hopes that Japan will increase her self-defense capability to create a military balance with the Soviet Union. China evaluates the importance of the Japan-U.S. security system highly, and its defense officials are trying to seek more contact with their Japanese counterparts. It is natural to assume that the Chinese side is expecting the development of military cooperation between Japan and China (although Teng has denied such speculation, saying "China does not need Japan's cooperation in the military field").

At present, Japan remains cautious on this issue. Visits of Japanese Defense Agency officials to China are strictly limited. Chang Ts'ai-chien 張才千 wanted to inspect the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, but he was only allowed to visit a school of gymnastics. Japan will have to decide whether to continue such restrictions in the future.

As for Japan-China cooperation in the field of military technology, the Japanese side has repeatedly denied such a possibility. Regarding the export of weapons, Japan has strict guidelines restricting arms exports, and the shipment of weapons to Communist bloc countries is still severely restricted. Restrictions on military technology cooperation and arms exports all depend upon the attitude of the Japanese side. Therefore, the true nature of the Japan-China treaty will be decided according to future Japanese moves.

4. Will Japanese-Chinese Economic Cooperation Put Any Pressure on Other Countries?

Since 1972, the Chinese side has shown a strong desire for expanded trade relations with Japan, especially for the import of Japanese technology. During the final year of Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東's reign, during the period when the Gang of Four remained influential in the Peking government, China's foreign trade and technology imports declined. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, China adopted four slogans for national modernization, which have become important guidelines for the future economic expansion of China. The *People's Daily*, in its October 6 issue, carried a three-page thesis entitled "Early realization of four modernization measures on the basis of basic economic principles" which was written by Hu Chiao-mu 胡喬木, director of the Social Science Research Institute. In brief, the thesis emphasized that economic principles feature objectivity; that production cannot develop unless it is based on such a principle; that economic principles cannot be changed according to the wish of political authorities, and also that politicians cannot create other principles and force them on economic circles. The writer also discussed the backwardness of the Chinese economy and the necessity of importing advanced technology from foreign

countries.

Since the normalization of Japan-China relations, the two countries have signed four practical agreements at the government level in the fields of fishery, trade, aviation and shipping. In addition, the two nations concluded a long-term agreement on a private basis in February 1978. The agreement stipulates that during the coming eight years (by 1985), two-way trade comprising of the Japanese export of plants, technology, construction materials and machinery, and Chinese exports to Japan of oil and coal will be expanded to a total value of U.S. \$20 billion. Recently, Minister KŌMOTO 河本 of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry visited China and agreed with Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien 李先念 to further expand bilateral trade relations. Compared with the past, Japanese-Sino economic exchanges have made spectacular progress. However, trade with China constitutes only 4 % of the total value of Japan's foreign trade. In this respect, even if Japan-China trade relations expand rapidly, as expected by Japanese and Chinese trade circles, it would not grow at a rate likely to adversely affect Japan's trade with Southeast Asian countries.

For future Japan-China trade relations, the most serious factor is China's restrictive capacity for exporting its products to Japan. Chinese policy is to strengthen its export capacity by using oil and coal. Chinese crude oil, however, is not welcome in the Japanese market. Moreover China will need more and more oil and coal as her own industrial activities develop.

For these reasons, the strengthening of China's export capacity is likely to remain a problem. In such a situation, China will have to depend upon foreign bonds for the payment of its imports. From now on, China's liabilities toward foreign countries will inevitably increase. However, it is not likely that Japan-China trade will develop at a pace that will influence Japan's trade with and economic assistance to other developing countries.

There is one disquieting factor, however. It is the fact that China is exporting a huge quantity of low-cost light-industrial products to other markets in order to increase her capacity to pay advanced countries including Japan. This trade pattern has been used since the 1960s. China obtains foreign currencies in the markets of third countries like Hong Kong and Southeast Asian nations so as to boost her potential for paying advanced countries. The same pattern will be strengthened in the future. As a result, semi-advanced countries in Asia will inevitably be affected by China's quick development in the field of light-industrial products. Some day, Asian countries will have to compete with China in the sales of synthetic chemical products, machinery and electronic equipment if China's economic development makes steady progress. As long as the international system of the division of labor is recognized, such a trend cannot be avoided. The reality is that economic cooperation between Japan and China will facilitate China's economic expansion and also hasten the rivalry between Chinese products and those of other countries on the international

market. In preparation for such intense competition, Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries must do something to increase their industrial potential.

5. The Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands and Taiwan

The Paracel Islands 西沙 have been under Chinese rule since 1975. China, having dispatched several fishermen to the island, has continuously claimed that the islands are Chinese territory despite persistent protests from the Vietnamese government. The issue will remain a major cause of conflict between China and Vietnam. The Spratly Islands 南沙 have already been divided by Vietnam, the Philippines and Nationalist China and ruled by their respective government forces. On the other hand, China continues to claim its territorial rights. The continued occupation of part of the islands by Nationalist forces is likely to cause some action by mainland China toward the Spratly Islands in the future.

Another problem is Taiwan. The liberation of Taiwan 臺灣 is stipulated in the 1978 Constitution of China, and is one of China's major national policies. Yet, as explained earlier, China's fundamental policy is to put pressure on the Soviet Union. So far, China has improved its relations with the United States in an effort to resist Soviet influence, without, however, giving up hope of liberating Taiwan. China is not likely to change these basic policies, therefore, as long as the Soviet threat remains. At the same time, China is not expected to damage its friendly relations with the United States by pressing the Taiwan issue too aggressively. At the high energy physics conference held in Tokyo at the end of August this year, Chinese scholars sat side by side with Taiwanese representatives. The Chinese, apparently upon instructions from Peking, also invited their Taiwan colleagues to a dinner party. Their behavior signifies a change in Peking's policy toward Taiwan. As long as Taiwan maintains military supremacy over the Taiwan Straits and remains capable of ruling the island nation effectively, and continuing its present economic prosperity, the Peking government would have to use force to liberate Taiwan. The Peking hierarchy is not likely to take any action toward Taiwan unless the time is ripe.

6. Competition to Win Friendship

The termination of the Vietnam War resulted in a changed Asian political map. New relations of goodwill between the United States and China, and normalized relations between China and Japan, indicate that the strategy of winning friends is again being promoted in international society. The conclusion of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty has brought about surging waves in various countries, resulting in a quiet but steadily growing competition to establish friendly relations with each

other. Already, China has opened her doors to the West and has adopted economic development as its major national target. In so doing, China is making increased efforts to cement goodwill ties with advanced countries.

During the past several years, however, China has lost the friendship of many countries like Albania, Vietnam, Laos, Tanzania, Zambia and Cuba. In order to recover these losses, China has promoted the expansion of friendly relations with Japan and made greater efforts to develop better relations with North Korea (Both Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing have visited Pyongyang 平壤). The country has also normalized relations with Libya and Oman (without taking up the Taiwan issue). China is now busy making efforts to improve relations with Southeast Asian countries and India and to establish new goodwill relations with neighboring countries. After visiting Japan to exchange the instruments of ratification of the new treaty, Teng toured Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in November. The Soviet Union also will not remain idle.

So far, the Soviet Union has demonstrated her "awkward and high-handed posture" of increasing military strength (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 18, 1978), but today, Soviet leaders are beginning to realize that such a policy is not effective enough to influence the peoples of Southeast and East Asian countries. Even after the conclusion of the Japan-China treaty, the Soviet Union, which had expressed strong opposition to it, is not taking any retaliatory measures against Japan. The Kremlin is also opening its doors to the Republic of Korea, although only gradually. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union plans to tour ASEAN countries with the aim of strengthening the bond of friendship with his smiling diplomacy.

At the same time, Cambodia and Vietnam, which had condemned the "militarism" of Japan and rapped ASEAN nations as followers of America, are beginning to make friendly gestures to set up amicable relations with Japan and to receive economic assistance from her. Cambodia has dispatched Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary to Japan to establish better relations. For the same purpose, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of Vietnam visited Bangkok and other capitals of ASEAN countries. Shortly after, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sary also visited the same areas. Vietnam publicly declared that, in order to win the friendship of ASEAN countries, it would not support the Communists in those nations.

It is certain that such friendship-winning competitions are gradually changing the political map of Asia. It may be possible that, at an unexpectedly early time, a large-scale network of economic cooperation will be established in the Asian-Pacific region, involving Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

7. Conclusion

The China-Soviet treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, which had promised lasting goodwill between the two countries, has turned into a mere piece of paper because of the changing political circumstances. The 1907 Britain-France agreement, which had simply clarified their spheres of influence, developed into an important military agreement of the Allied Forces in World War I. The role of an agreement, therefore, is apt to undergo many changes according to the subsequent international situations and according to the wishes of the countries involved.

It is true that the text of the new Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty provides that Japan can avoid becoming involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Japan would not want to be drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict nor into the troublesome situation between Vietnam and Cambodia.

However, to maintain the status quo Japan must make ceaseless determined efforts.

In this sense, it is necessary to carefully watch the diplomatic postures of other countries, because the Asian situation, following the conclusion of the Japan-China treaty, still remains unstable, and because the friendship-winning competition continues to intensify.

Chapter XI CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY IN EAST ASIA

This chapter is based on my keynote speech at the 1995 International Symposium on East Asia. I start with the question of what the traditional society was, and discuss the process in which tradition collapsed. Next, I consider the dualism of reforms and revolutions both in China and Japan. Finally, I summarize the light and the shadow in modern Japanese history.

What is Traditional Society?

As far as East Asia is concerned, traditional society can be considered as a feudal society. Some scholars maintain that the dynasties in China were not based on feudalism, but a close study of the Qing 清 dynasty shows that the power of the governor-general in each region was very strong. When he collected taxes, he sent a certain amount of it to Beijing and then put the rest in his own pocket. Under such a governor-general there was a well-organized system of bureaucracy with centralization of power. However, the salaries of officials were surprisingly meager—so meager that they could hardly live on them. Instead, they were as a matter of course permitted to take commissions, and that was the reason why many Chinese people longed to become government officials and exerted every effort in order to pass the classical examination for government service. Of the numerous official posts, those most eagerly sought after were the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi 兩廣總督, the governor of Guangdong 廣東巡撫, and the commissioner of Yuehaiguan 粵海關. The last was the highest position of customs at Guangdong, and only Manchus were appointed to the post. Because trade at Guangdong was most lucrative and brought in huge wealth, and the income of the commissioner was so enormous, the post was not to be given to Han Chinese but to be monopolized by the Manchus. The wealth these posts controlled far exceeded that of Japan's Ministry of Finance. Therefore, even the Qing dynasty, when its administration system is studied closely, reveals many remarkably feudalistic elements.

* This is a chapter in IKEO Aiko, ed., *Economic Development in Twentieth Century East Asia: The International Context* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). This was written when the world's attention was focused on the developments in China after Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening policy, pondering the question of whether China would revert to the old China or a new China would emerge. I tried to argue that there were both aspects of historical continuity and discontinuity.

Now, let us proceed to the question, 'What is a feudal society?' Needless to say, a feudal society is basically an autarkical society. Accordingly, Japan under the Tokugawa 徳川 Shogunate was basically autarkical, as was Korea under the Yee 李 dynasty and China under the Qing dynasty. The external trade that flourished at Nagasaki 長崎 and Guangdong was an exceptional case under these feudal autarkical regimes. In such a society, it was only natural that production would stay at the same level; in other words, the stagnation of production was a major premise. The stagnation of population was also taken for granted. Towards the end of the Edo 江戸 era, however, the productivity in some of the feudal clans began to rise rapidly and they tried to break away from the shogunate. At the same time, serfs started to run away from rural villages to towns, breaking away from the bondage to the land. The samurais whose salaries had been paid in rice were reduced to poverty. Thus the system's self-sufficiency began to collapse, bringing about the growth of commerce or distribution systems. Such scholars as ISHIDA Baigan 石田梅巖, SHIBATA Kyūō 柴田鳩翁, and ANDŌ Shōeki 安藤昌益 developed a very modern way of thinking, which spread to the public through the last days of the Tokugawa regime and the Meiji 明治 era (i.e. in the last half of the nineteenth century). KISHIDA Ginkō 岸田吟香, founder of Japan's first modern newspaper, entirely denied the hierarchical discrimination which had been the basis of feudalism. The real purpose of life he showed to the public was money-making. As his opinion is very interesting, I would like to quote KISHIDA's letter to his niece on the occasion of her marriage.

If you make efforts in your youth to learn writing, reading, and calculations, and acquire many arts and skills as well as wisdom, you will be able to become wealthy. Human bodies are made convenient to use, equipped with such organs as eyes, ears and nose, as well as hands and feet. You are given such a useful body by the Father in Heaven, whose command to you is to work hard and become wealthy by making use of this body.¹

It is noteworthy that KISHIDA grew up in the Tokugawa regime which imposed the strictest hierarchical order. His message was the same as that of FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福澤諭吉 who wrote (in 1900), 'A feudal regime is as hateful as the murderer of one's parents.'² It can be said that these people were well prepared for

¹ ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, "Chūgoku kakumei to Nihonjin 中國革命と日本人 (The Chinese Revolution and the Japanese)," in MIWA Kimitada 三輪公忠, ed., *Nihon no shakai bunka-shi* 日本の社會文化史 (Social and Cultural History of Japan) (Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 1974), 7:259-260.

² FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福澤諭吉, *Fukuō jiden* 福翁自傳 (The Autobiography of FUKUZAWA Yukichi) (Tokyo: Jiji shimpō-sha 時事新報社, 1900).

modern society even before the shogunate regime broke down in 1868.

It can be said that the situation was almost the same under the Qing dynasty. Emperor Yongzheng 雍正帝 did everything to save money; he was extremely frugal in everything. The next emperor, Qianlong 乾隆帝, spent money generously and brought about the golden age of the Qing dynasty. He had almost emptied his treasury-box in his later days, namely, in the latter half of the eighteenth century. However, with a large amount of money circulating in the society, production rose remarkably. Prices were going up little by little. This period thus witnessed the phenomenon called creeping inflation in modern terminology. Such inflation strongly stimulated output, and when people could secure enough to eat, the population grew. Scholars have always maintained that this was how the Chinese population exploded towards the end of Qianlong era. According to one record, the population increased five-fold in thirty years. This cannot be true; it is impossible. But there are other documents relating that the government tried desperately to absorb the increased population by encouraging people to develop land for cultivation. In addition, many people migrated from China to Southeast Asia in this era. It seems, however, that the development of productivity and the increase in population which occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth century were not well balanced, and the population explosion proceeded much faster. Hong Liangji 洪亮吉, a government official who lost his position at that time, wrote—as did Thomas R. Malthus—that overpopulation invites famine and war. The closing days of the eighteenth century in the Qing empire were another example of this principle. Since the White Lotus (Bailian jiao 白蓮教) Rebellion, homeless peasants strayed about the country, and the government began to lose its authority over the people. In short, the feudal system and its order collapsed from the inside. This situation was the same in the Japanese shogunate regime and in the Qing dynasty.

At the same time, the Western impact compelled China's transformation and played an important role in the collapse of traditional society. In the case of the Qing dynasty, the outside pressure was foreign military power. As Yu Xinchun 俞辛焞 explained in Chapter 2,³ according to the traditional Chinese concept, China was the center of the world and a flowery celestial empire, while countries outside were all barbarians. So long as this neat hierarchical system could be enforced by its military strength, the authority of the Qing empire was protected. For instance, the Manchus used military force mercilessly to suppress the Yee dynasty. They also brought Vietnam under their control, but failed to do the same with Burma. Yet Burma became a tributary state which paid tribute to Qing.

When European East India Companies started trade at Guangdong in the seventeenth century, their ships were far inferior to those of Qing in military capabil-

³ Yu Xinchun 俞辛焞, "Transition of the International System and Relationships in East Asia in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," in IKEO Aiko, *op. cit.*, 11–18.

ity. Therefore, the companies had to accept and follow the system imposed by Qing. From the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, the balance between West Europe and Qing underwent a great change. The Qing empire remained in stagnation. In eighteenth-century Europe, bridges built of stone were rare and it was dangerous for a woman to travel alone. According to Charles Dickens' description in his novel *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859), a journey from London to Dover by a stage coach was so dangerous that after dark the coachman had to drive with a gun in his hand in constant fear of highwaymen.⁴ In contrast, in both the Qing empire and in Japan under the Tokugawa government, travel was extremely safe, and the roads were kept very clean, as reported by Engelbert Kämpfer (1727).⁵

This situation then underwent a complete change. The developments of the industrial revolution coupled with the Napoleonic wars advanced Great Britain's capacity to manufacture excellent firearms. It also built fast ships using timber from North America and Russia. As a result, British battleships of the 1830s became much stronger than those of the Qing empire. Within a few decades, the design of European ships and armaments made extraordinary progress. In 1839, only two gunboats of the British navy, surrounded by more than seventy Qing battleships, could confront them unvanquished.

Having lost its overwhelming military strength, the Qing empire lost its authority and the regime began to collapse. The monopoly on Guangdong business was broken up in 1834, and several opium merchants, called free traders at that time, joined the trade. Their ships were different from the large vessels used by the East India Companies when they had monopolized trade. These new ships were very slim and small. When tea was shipped for Europe at Guangdong, they could sail faster, thus enabling the free traders to sell their tea sooner and for a better price. In this way, the free traders rapidly accumulated wealth, and organized themselves into companies such as Jardine Matheson & Co. and Dent, though the latter went bankrupt later. The turning-point in relations between China and Europe came when China was surpassed in military strength, while Britain succeeded in developing modern industrial productivity against the background of its struggle with Napoleon.

While the difference in military strength between Britain and the Qing empire became apparent, Qing naturally continued to protect its traditional regime against the Europeans. Such situations invite cultural conflicts; some may call it cultural 'friction,' but I prefer the term cultural conflict 文化摩擦. The same phenomenon is now to be observed between Japan and the USA. The cultural conflict between Great Britain and Qing was fatal because everything about the two countries was different, from their daily life to the official system of decision-making. Nothing

⁴ Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities* (London: Macmillan, 1859).

⁵ Engelbert Kämpfer, *The History of Japan: Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 1690–92* (Glasgow: J. Maclehoose, 1906; 1st ed. 1727).

short of a war could decide which side should prevail; in fact, military strength finally settled the issue. The Opium War between Qing and Britain erupted in 1839. As it did not open wide enough the doors of Qing, the Arrow War followed in 1856. Still unsatisfied, the Anglo-French Army occupied Beijing in 1860. The Sino-French War broke out in 1883, followed by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5. The subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki included clauses to the effect that foreigners would have the right to establish factories at open ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin. Such privileges brought no direct advantage to Japan, which had not yet accumulated enough capital to build factories in these areas. The countries that wanted factories in China were Britain, the USA and Germany. The Japanese government understood the desire of these world powers and included the clause granting foreigners the right to build plants at the open ports. Thus China was dragged into a system in which the principle was free trade in the European style.

Harry Parks, the second British Minister to Japan, who had been in China for a long time, is once said to have advised that when one would have diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese, one should shout, be angry and pound on the table. I have been looking for documentary evidence of this statement, but so far I have not found it. However, the anecdote has been handed down very tenaciously in East Asia. It reflects the perception that the world powers used gunboat diplomacy, namely, the policy of threat by warships.

In this way, tradition collapses both from the inside and through the force of foreign countries. In the case of Japan, tradition was destroyed by force from the outside. The Anglo-Satsuma War in 1863 and the occupation of Shimonoseki by the four allied fleets in 1864 were just two instances among many. At that time, what the great powers of Europe wanted to achieve—even by resort to arms—was abolition of the feudalistic monopoly of trade. In the case of the Qing dynasty, the Treaty of Nanjing signed after the Opium War revoked the licenses for foreign trade issued to the Chinese traders, called Hong merchants, with the result that anyone could engage in it. Up to that time, in Anglo-Chinese trade, Qing conducted a monopolistic policy while Britain followed a free trade principle. In such a case, it is evident that the country following a free trade policy will lose; it is absolutely disadvantageous. Current trade negotiations between China and Japan reflect the situation. Chinese negotiators are monolithic, while on the Japanese side, the *Asahi* newspaper says one thing, the Socialist Party says another and the New Frontier Party says still another, making the situation disadvantageous to Japan. The same thing happened in this Anglo-Chinese trade. The trade monopoly of the Qing traders had to be destroyed, even by force, and that destruction had to be carried out in the name of free trade. When the great powers succeeded in opening the Japanese ports, their first action was to abolish the silk guild in Yokohama which had monopolized the silk trade.

Chinese import taxes were next brought under control. If heavy taxes were

imposed on English merchandise by the Qing government, penetration into the Chinese markets would be difficult; import tax must therefore be controlled. Similar attempts were made in Japan. As a result of the *Edo Kaizei Yakusho* 江戸改稅約書 (Edo Tax Amendment Agreement), the import tax imposed by the Tokugawa shogunate government was brought under the control of foreign countries. Although the phrase 'free trade' sounds admirable, in order to realize it in nineteenth century East Asia it was necessary to overthrow the feudal regimes by military force. The new system was established on the basis of enforced change; it did not grow by itself and was far from *laissez-faire*.

This is the way in which traditions have been destroyed in East Asia. I would like to emphasize the fact that what decides whether a tradition can survive, or whether reform can take place, is the difference in power. To some extent, persuasion also plays a part. Whether an argument carries conviction or not may be important. I believe, however, that the final deciding factor is always power. Otherwise, the modern history of East Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can never be understood.

I have just mentioned that persuasion might play a part. This part can be very important. Even though tradition could be suppressed by force, unless the means of suppression were persuasive the results would be very different. The European powers that entered the Qing empire were by no means acceptable to that hierarchical system and they met with bitter resistance. In order to overcome this opposition, the European powers resorted to wars and won. As history teaches us, the winners of wars have always perpetrated cruelty. At present, Japan is under the crossfire of blame, but similar or worse things happened when the British and French armies attacked Beijing and Guangdong in 1860.

In the case of Japan, although there must have been much conflict, the people did not defend their traditional value system or culture as desperately as the Chinese. The reason why the Japanese did not offer such resistance is an interesting topic. For them, the center of civilization has always been far across the ocean, ever since the Tempyō 天平 and Nara 奈良 eras. The Japanese have learned from the center. Students, if they really want to study something, had to go abroad, ever since the era of envoys to the Sui 隋 dynasty in the seventh century. The priests at Gozan 五山 (the Five Temples) in the Ashikaga 足利 era also stayed in China to study in the fourteenth century. Zhu Shunshui 朱舜水, who left China and settled in Mito 水戸 in 1659, was welcomed with great respect in Japan. At the beginning of the Meiji era around 1870, when Chinese diplomats or merchants who could write poems arrived from China, many Japanese gathered to welcome them and pay their profound respects. Therefore, when new culture came from Western Europe and America, the Japanese were prepared to try to understand it. RAI San'yō 賴山陽 traveled to Nagasaki to learn the latest situation in Europe. In one of his poems he praised Napoleon, though he called the great hero Louis. At Nagasaki he must have

been told that this was the name of the hero who conquered Europe.

In the same way, if you have a chance to study old manuscripts at the prefectural library, you will find a great many concerning the Opium War. These manuscripts were based on news learned from foreigners at Nagasaki and, though they were kept under control by the Tokugawa government, they were copied secretly by many feudal clans. There are a considerable number of copies of the anonymous *Afuyō ibun* 阿芙蓉彙聞 (A Collection of Hearings on Opium) which shows how eagerly the samurais in many feudal clans wanted to learn of the latest happenings in foreign countries.

Thus, whether new things are rejected as heresy or accepted as progress is an important issue for a government in persuading its people. Each time dynasties changed in China, the new one wrote an official history condemning the preceding regime for its evil acts. When the Manchus conquered the whole country, they wrote *Manchu yuanliu kao* 滿洲源流考 (The Origin of the Manchus) in order to claim that they were the supporters of legitimate culture.⁶ When they invaded and conquered Korea, they mercilessly persecuted those Koreans who insisted on the authenticity of the Ming 明 dynasty. Whenever tradition and innovation come into conflict, the problem of legitimacy is the focus of political battles and politics. In Japan also up to the Meiji era, the dispute on a *de jure* government between the Northern and Southern dynasties in the imperial pedigree had been an extremely delicate but basic issue among scholars. The present emperor belongs to the Northern dynasty. However, RAI San'yō⁷ and *Dai nihon shi* 大日本史 (The Grand History of Japan)⁸ stated that it was the Southern dynasty 南朝 which was legitimate. Therefore, the Northern dynasty 北朝 is a traitor to the Southern dynasty, and the legitimacy of the emperor is doubtful. Finally, however, all the scholars who expressed doubt about the legitimacy of emperors who did not belong to the Southern dynasty were purged from the national universities. Therefore, at present we no longer trouble ourselves with the issue of the legitimacy of the Southern and Northern dynasties, and accept the present emperor as the only emperor. Yet, until the issue was finally settled there were a number of arguments about the legitimacy of the emperors.

Concerning this problem of legitimacy, the mentality of the Japanese people has been rather opportunistic and practical. Half a century ago, many people, with the *Asahi* newspaper leading, accepted in a matter of a few days the occupation pol-

⁶ A Gui 阿桂, *et al.*, *Manchu yuanliu kao* 滿洲源流考 (The Origin of the Manchus), 20 vols. (Beijing: Qing Government, 1778).

⁷ RAI San'yō 賴山陽, *San'yō shishō* 山陽詩鈔 (Selected Poems of San'yō), ed. by OKUYAMA Seikan 奥山正幹 (Tokyo: San'yō shishō shuppankai 山陽詩鈔出版會, 1914), 621 ff.

⁸ TOKUGAWA Mitsukuni 德川光圀, *et al.*, eds., *Dai nihon shi* 大日本史 (The Grand History of Japan), 397 vols. (Mito and Edo (Tokyo): Shōkōkan 彰考館, 1657–1906).

icy for democratization of Japan imposed by the US military forces. Japanese people are very flexible, which is the reason why they have reached this present age without fierce disputes about political legitimacy. In the case of Germany, the Nazis, a very particular heretical group, seized power and enforced their policy. Therefore, the authenticity of Germany did not exist in what they did. In their view, all the evil was done by the heretical group, the Nazis. Most German intellectuals active in post-war society were anti-Nazis during the war. There are one or two Nazi ideologues, but they are evaluated in another sense. Accordingly, the postwar German intellectuals are able to proclaim with pride that what was done in the past Nazi era was not of their doing. The authenticity of Germany is with them, not with the Nazis. At conferences the German scholars proudly make this claim. Germany must take responsibility for what the Nazis did, but the policies and ideology of the Nazis were heretical.

On the other hand, in Japan, although there had been many criticisms against the militaristic control before World War II broke out, these were whispered in secret. The whole of Japan as a nation participated in the conflict and fought it strenuously. After the war, in a Japan which was democratized and freed from militarism, the Japanese worked hard to ensure that they could eat well and to reconstruct the country to what it is now. As to the problem of the responsibility for the war, only a very few people can say that they were not responsible because they were anti-militarists and fought against the policy of the government. Some of the people who make such claims are fakes; some changed their position overnight. So, half a century after the war, this problem has not been settled in Japan as squarely as in Germany. In foreigners' eyes, this must look very strange.

The Dualism of Revolutions and Aggressions

As I have explained, innovation needs force and persuasive power in order to acquire legitimacy. Standing on this premise, let us think about the 1911 Revolution in China. Many Chinese are still unable to evaluate this revolution which was like a storm, as in France one can still find royalists even after the French Revolution completely changed the course of history. The problem of legitimacy is extremely delicate and at the same time needs force to be solved.

It is only natural that in Japan—where politics, economy and society have been drastically changed in the two hundred years since the last days of the shogunate—tradition and innovation should cause conflicts. The modern history of Japan can be explained only from the understanding that through these conflicts the Japanese dialectically created new things. Now, this leads us to the second theme of this chapter, the dualism of innovation and revolution. It is often said that Japan consists of people who are pragmatic and unreligious. This may be true, but the anti-

Buddhism movement in the Meiji era and the severe suppression of the Ōmoto cult 大本教 in 1933 show that there were very serious conflicts. As a result of these sufferings the Japanese made the dialectical decision to allow coexistence of multiple religions. A majority of Japanese go to the Shinto shrine to pray for their newborn babies, marry in Christian churches and when they die their funerals are conducted by Buddhist priests. These ways of worshiping are unquestioningly accepted in Japanese society, which is the product of such sufferings.

In the previous chapter Yu Xinchun mentioned that the Chinese have absorbed new concepts while resisting them. The same is true of the Japanese, for example those who went to Europe in the Meiji era to study. MORI Ōgai 森鷗外 was one of them, and although he became an outstanding European scholar, it is remarkable how he resisted the Europeans. Angered by a thesis condemning the Asians as an inferior race, he fiercely rejected it though his German was still far from fluent. Once a renowned Japanese diplomat ridiculed MORI for studying hygiene in Germany, saying, 'Japanese pick their noses. For such a race you wasted your time studying hygiene.' MORI was determined to refute him. After a few decades of search, he found a passage in a novel by Danish writer Gustaf Weed, describing a European sailor picking his nose. Wild with joy, MORI wrote a novel about it. The same can be said of NATSUME Sōseki 夏目漱石, who stated, 'When there are mountains, the Europeans dig tunnels through them. We make roundabout ways between the mountains. That is the difference between the East and the West.' To the end of his life he was severely critical of modern Europe, although as a scholar of English literature he was second to none in Japan. I believe that the reason NATSUME is still loved by many Japanese as a novelist is that he kept struggling between the East and the West throughout his life.

In the politics and economy of Japan we find apparent the view that the Japanese must learn from the West but that they cannot help resisting it has been apparent in their politics and economy. Without such a dilemma and tension, the dialectical development of tradition and innovation could never have been achieved. This is the theme of this chapter. As Yu Xinchun took up nationalism as an example in the previous chapter, let me do the same. The people who are devoted to a new ideology, for instance, the soldiers in the National Army organized during the French Revolution, fought fiercely with revolutionist fervor. Their strength was entirely different from that of mercenary soldiers. However, when the French army led by Napoleon crossed the Alps and attacked Italy, they became invaders. They overthrew the ancient regimes and small Italian kingdoms one after another, and behaved as a merciless occupation army. As you see, when nationalism acts outside its own country, it reveals such a remarkable degree of aggression that the nationalists turn out to be the new aggressors. I believe this is an invariable law in human history. When Bismarck, the iron chancellor, unified Prussia into the German Empire and endeavored to establish friendly relations with neighboring countries

with a view to preventing further expansion of the German Empire, the young mustachioed Kaiser was displeased. He adopted a new aggressive policy towards East Africa and the Near East, and launched the battleship-building race. Who was more popular among the German people, old gouty Bismarck or the young Kaiser with his mustache? In those days the one more popular in Germany was the latter. When Napoleon III was elected president by an overwhelming majority, what did he do to maintain his popularity? He followed an aggressive policy so as to externalize the domestic social instability. He dispatched his army to Mexico and started a war against Prussia, though he finally failed in both attempts.

This is the same with modern Japan. So long as its nationalism stayed within the national borders, it was respected and loved as a rising country in Asia. However, there was an undercurrent rapidly coming into power: this was a new ideology, the liberation of Asia, which was formed through the last days of the shogunate and Meiji era, and captured many hearts of the young. A well-known anecdote of the time was that HARA Tei 原禎, a captain on active service, gave up his military career and joined the anti-American war of independence in the Philippines led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Another famous episode concerns YAMADA Yoshimasa 山田良政, who was working for the School of Sino-Japanese Trade Study, then located in Shanghai. When the Huizhou incident took place, he dashed away to fight with Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 and was lost in action. MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天 wholeheartedly supported the revolutionary philosophy of Sun. He sold his entire estate in support of the Chinese revolution, and lived in poverty devoting his life to Sun. In the Shōwa era, however, the disciples of these people began to take an aggressive approach towards China. They eagerly supported the idea of invasion by military force in order to make it a submissive vassal of Japan. The best examples were TŌYAMA Mitsuru 頭山滿, UCHIDA Ryōhei 內田良平 and the members of the Kokuryū Kai Group 黑龍會.

This is an iron law in history, and it seems that all the Japanese people agreed with such a law. For example, in 1913 a civil war took place in Nanjing and a Japanese national flag was smudged and dishonored. On this occasion, ABE Moritarō 阿部守太郎, then Chief of the Bureau of Political Affairs, told his staff that the case was no more than the damaging of an object, and that friendly relations between China and Japan were more important. His opinion was that Japan should not demand disgraceful apologies from China. The army and the right-wing, however, demanded that the government should give China a severe punishment and demanded an apology. ABE Moritarō was assassinated by an eighteen-year-old boy, and China was forced to apologize with due ceremony as the Japanese army demanded. The Chinese army was forced to perform a very formal ceremony. According to newspapers of the time, the eighteen-year-old patriotic boy was popular among the Japanese, while the assassinated minister was not. This reflects the trend of the time, or the national sentiment.

Social scientists must confront such sentiment boldly, even if they find themselves in the minority in society and are criticized by the mass media of the day. They must recognize those few people who have stood up against such trends. For instance, ARAO Sei 荒尾精, one of the founders of Dōbun Shoin 同文書院, objected to demanding reparations after the Sino-Japanese War. His opinion was that, as Sino-Japanese relations were going to continue over a long period of years, there should be no grudge left on the Chinese side as a result of Japan's insistence on reparation. Then there is the example of ISHIBASHI Tanzan 石橋湛山, an advocate of free trade, who was a kind of 'Little Japanist.' In England in the nineteenth century there were 'Little Englanders' who argued that as long as trade could be carried on freely, it was not necessary to acquire colonies by force. ISHIBASHI Tanzan was of the same opinion and he never changed it, arguing that it was unnecessary for Japan to plunge into military action in China and Manchuria so long as it could secure access to the markets in those areas. At that time such a view was very rare among the Japanese. An army general, ISHIMITSU Maomi 石光眞臣, who started his military career as an artilleryman, ran up the social ladder to general, and firmly opposed engaging in military activities in China. Although he was a general, he spent his later years in utter obscurity as a result of his views. We did have such people, although they were very few.

Although it is currently accepted that Japanese aggression culminated with the founding of a puppet state, Manchukuo 滿洲國, when we study the history of Manchukuo more closely, we find some Japanese who resisted—at the risk of their lives—such expansionist intentions of the Kwantung army. Some of them lost their jobs over it. History is not a straight line. Whenever something new finds its way into the old regime, tremendous tension and friction take place.

Light and Shadow in History

In the last part of this chapter, I would like to discuss light and shadow in the history of mankind. All history has its light and shadow. Viewed from one standpoint, modern Japanese history is shady and dark. Chinese, Koreans and overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia will find it very dark. In contrast, from the viewpoint of the Indonesians, Malaysians and Indians, the Pacific War expedited their independence. Especially in Indonesia, thousands of Japanese soldiers fought together with Indonesians in the war for independence, and some of them were even executed by the British or Dutch armies after the war. That is why Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia, said to Mr. MURAYAMA Tomiichi 村山富市, Japan's Prime Minister, when they met in 1995, that it was not necessary for Japan to be so apologetic all the time. Viewed from the perspective of tradition and innovation, both perceptions are true. Seen from one standpoint it is light, and from another it is shadow.

As I understand that this book is meant for straightforward discussions, I have tried to be very straightforward and have said that there is light and shadow in real history. Lenin criticized such a multilateral view of history as bourgeois objectivism. However, he was a revolutionary and not a scholar, so I construe his statement as a political message.

As the problem of Confucianism is being taken up in relation to the economic development of modern East Asia, I would like to make one remark as my interpretation of the issue.

Confucianism is by nature not compatible with production development or modern market mechanism. Accordingly, in a stagnant society, it is a very convenient philosophy from the ruler's standpoint. However, in East Asia, it is said that Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Japan were able to achieve their economic development because of Confucian ethics. This is equivalent to Max Weber's idea that the behavioral ethics of Protestantism promoted the development of modern capitalism. Incidentally, two Australians, Reg Little and Warren Reed, wrote an interesting book, *The Confucian Renaissance*, in 1989, which explains how the social order based on Confucianism has contributed to the explosion of productivity. As it is observed through the eyes of Australians, it is all the more interesting and convincing. However, I have lived fifty years in post-war Japan, and I do not think that Confucian obedience or the ethic of paying respect to superiors stimulated Japanese corporations to achieve higher productivity. This was not the case. In Japan, competition was stimulated under the guidance of the government. In the automobile industry, competition expedited technological innovation, and Japan had sufficient human resources to realize such innovations. These people went abroad to study after the war, and with very little language skill they studied hard and brought back state-of-the-art technologies. The success of Japanese industry was achieved by human resources and the market mechanism. In Korea, those first-class people who are promoting the economic development and revitalization of society are very far from Confucianism. They are Americanized and aggressive. I am much more Confucian than they.

Therefore, I do not think that the ethics of Confucianism promoted economic development. Rather, where an adequate market mechanism coexists with the traditional ethics of Confucianism which is still playing a certain role, workers must face dilemma, conflict, tension and friction, thus making them more hardworking. Such dialectical principles can explain the phenomenon better.

Chapter XII TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The international system of today is characterized by a complicated balance of conflict and cooperation.

A delicate balance also exists between man-made social systems and nature. In the long run, shifts in climatic conditions will be of utmost importance. There will be drastic changes in the conditions of human existence, should the earth's surface cool or grow warmer. For example, the earth's temperature is largely a function of the balance between the heat-preserving effects of CO₂, on one hand, and the dust in the air which serves to cool the earth by sheltering it from the direct rays of the sun, on the other.

According to the voluminous research of the Resources Research Society of the Japanese Government's Science and Technology Agency, the world supply of gold and silver will be depleted in about 10 years, mercury, tin and zinc in a little more than 10 years, lead and copper in 20 years and tungsten in 25 years; there is no question that a number of natural resources, including rare nonferrous metals will be exhausted within our lifetime. There are, of course, many ways to calculate oil reserves, but it would seem to be reasonable to estimate that oil reserves will be exhausted in about 30 years with the exception of Saudi Arabia. It is inevitable that the price of natural resources will rise and in the course of time they will be exhausted.

The third long-term problem to be considered is that of population. Professor KIRA Tatsuo 吉良龍夫 of Osaka Municipal University estimates that the earth could support a population of 72.8 billion people provided they lived on cereals alone, 17.6 billion on milk alone and 6.6 billion on pork alone. If people ate moderate quantities of pork in addition to cereals, the absolute population would be limited to about 36 billion. However, when analyzed in terms of the land that is cultivable and inhabitable, the figure shrinks to less than 25 billion. Based on realistic calculations, the Club of Rome has estimated that a population of 7 billion people would be close to the limit.

* This was included in ETŌ Shinkichi and ICHIMURA Shin'ichi, eds., *Proceedings of Asian Colloquium on Conflict and Regional Cooperation in Asia* (Japan Society for Asian Studies, 1977). On the basis of the analysis of contemporary facts, I pointed out that the international relations of East Asia would gradually evolve toward detente but simultaneously small-scale conflicts would continue to occur.

In the 1960s, relatively optimistic population theories were prevalent, and many claimed that the food problem would be solved by the "green revolution" for the time being, at least. However, from the early 1970s on, this optimism faded noticeably. The Club of Rome and others became more and more pessimistic about the food supply for even the immediate future. I will not deny that sufficient food can be produced in the short run, and agree to Lester R. Brown's observation in *World Watch* Paper No. 8 that population growth will tend to decline.

Nonetheless, the problem of the population explosion will still remain a heavy pressure upon human society.

Although it took 1,650 years for the world population of approximately 300 million in the year zero of the Christian era to double to 600 million, and 200 years for the 600 million to double to 1.2 billion, it took only a hundred years for the population to increase to 2.4 billion in 1950. The world's population surpassed 4 billion in the spring of 1976. This is quite clearly an extraordinary increase. As Malthus observed many years ago a drastic increase in population would in due course lead to a disaster. For example, as seen in the case of the black-tiled deer in the Kaibab High in Arizona, an extraordinary increase in population could bring about destruction of the delicate equilibrium between the environment and the species.

These three issue areas are the examples of the type of problems that can arise from an imbalance between man-made social system and nature.

Finally, it seems clear that we are now in the midst of the fourth communication revolution in history. The first revolution in human communication was the development of language, the second was the evolution of writing systems and the third was the advances in printing technology. We are now witnessing a fourth revolution centering around the development of electronically-mediated communication technologies. It is commonly recognized that not every technological progress is desirable. We have reached a stage where technological advancement could contribute to the improvement of humanity, while at the same time, do us great harm.

It is not the primary purpose of this article to discuss the four long-range problems mentioned above. However, in light of their tremendous importance for the future, these problems deserve to be addressed at the outset.

The objective of this chapter is to analyze six middle- and short-term problems facing the Asian peoples following the collapse of the bipolar Cold War structure and the consequent shift toward multipolar fluidity. The six problem areas are (1) the United States' search for an optimum role in the region, (2) growing Soviet influence, (3) China's dual manipulation, (4) intra-regional solidarity, (5) the North-South problem and (6) Japan's growing impact on the region.

Prior to a discussion of these six issues, it is necessary to look first at two changes of enormous impact that have occurred in the international political system, namely, the expansion of the socialist region and the reduction in East-West tension.

A. Expansion of the Socialist Region

The October revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 were major turning points in world history. Marxist-Leninist forces gained a renewed impetus and further expanded with the seizure of power by the People's Revolutionary Party in Mongolia in 1921, the establishment of a government in North Korea by the Korean Workers' Party in 1945 and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1954. Events of 1975 have now put those forces in power in the three remaining countries of Indochina, or South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. At the present time, a total of 42 percent of the land area of Asia (excluding Siberia) and 40 percent of its population is ruled by the communist governments. If we include Siberia, estimating its area at 7,800,000 square kilometers and population at 42 million, the land area of communist countries in Asia jumps to 54 percent, and the population to 41 percent. It is impossible now to discuss politics and economies of Asia without taking these Marxist-Leninist forces into account. In addition, if we consider the fact that Burma, Sri Lanka, Singapore and Pakistan are moving toward a non-Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism, the contraction of the area where the principles of *laissez-faire* still reign is evident.

The five charts show the shifting levels of political influence exercised in the world respectively by advanced capitalist countries (marked ●), Marx-Leninist socialist countries (marked ○) and the Third World which exists between them (marked △). Apart from economic strength, it is clear that the area and the number of socialist countries are on the rise.

B. Reduction of East-West Tension

The thaw in Soviet-American relations that began in the 1950s culminated in the system of peaceful coexistence. In the 1970s arms limitation talks entered their second stage, and a new mood of peaceful coexistence settled over Sino-American relations as well. Whereas in the fifties the bipolarization of international society as a result of the Cold War put small- and medium-sized nations under the firm grip of the superpowers, the trends toward multipolarity and fluidity in the late sixties allowed those small- and medium-sized countries to exercise a new-found maneuverability in autonomous action. "Detente" necessarily involved nations in East-West interchange. Japan first normalized relations with China, and then proceeded to do the same with Mongolia and North Vietnam, while Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines also established relations with Peking. Economic relations between East and West expanded correspondingly. As shown in Figure 1, Japan's trade with China multiplied eight times and that with the Soviet Union multiplied 6.8 times in the last decade. Figure 2 provides figures on travel, indicating a fourfold increase in travel between Japan and the Soviet Union and an increase of 4.7 times in travel between Japan and China.

As contact between the Soviet Union and the Asian and Australasian countries

CHAPTER XII

Chart XII-1

Comparison of the Number of Capitalist, Marxist, and Third World Countries




Chart XII-2

Comparison of the Land Area Under Capitalist, Marxist, and Third World Countries

(Source: *The World Encyclopedia*, 1975 by Heibonsha)




Chart XII-3

Comparison of Electric Power Consumption of Capitalist, Marxist and Third World Countries (Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook. *The Growth of World Industry*)




Chart XII-4

Comparison of Raw Steel Production of Capitalist, Marxist and Third World Countries (Source: *Statistical Handbook* by the British Steel Corporation)




Chart XII-5
 Comparison of the GDP of Capitalist, Marxist and Third World Countries
 (Source: *U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*, A.S. Banks, Cross-polity Time-Series Data)




Figure XII-1 Japan-China and Japan-Soviet Trade Volume
 (Unit: 1,000 US dollars)

	Japan-China Trade		Japan-Soviet Trade	
	Export	Import	Export	Import
1965	245,036	224,105	168,357	240,198
1975	2,258,577	1,531,016	1,626,200	1,169,618

Figure XII-2 Travel between Japan and China, Japan and U.S.S.R.

	Japan-China		Japan-Soviet	
	China to Japan	Japan to China	U.S.S.R. to Japan	Japan to U.S.S.R.
1965	576	3,921	1,650	3,843
1974	3,161	12,990	4,722	15,918
1975	4,441	16,655	5,443	16,666

Source: *Ministry of Justice Immigration Statistics Annual*, 1975.

increased, one after the other, Peking established diplomatic relations with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

1. The American Search for an Optimum Commitment

In retrospect, following the announcement of the Nixon doctrine, it was foreseeable that the US would eventually withdraw from Vietnam. In his foreign affairs message to Congress on February 25, 1971 President Nixon announced three fundamental principles. The first was, "The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments." The explanation of that principle, however, made it clear that American interests would shape commitments rather than commitments determining interests. The distinct implication was that commitments judged not to be in accordance with US interests would be renounced.

The second principle was, "The United States will provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the US or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to its security." It appears that, as has often been pointed out, a nuclear umbrella based solely upon a treaty or declaration cannot be trusted. Were Japan suddenly subjected to a nuclear attack or threat, would the US offer protection with full knowledge that to do so could invite nuclear devastation on the American continent? As long as tens of thousands of American troops are stationed here, it is conceivable that the US would take such a risk, but in their absence such resolve is likely to be weak compared to the risk of nuclear war. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the nuclear umbrella, therefore, it is essential to have American troops as hostages in the manner of West Germany and South Korea. That being the case, it is apparent that this second principle without the "hostage" provides an extremely weak commitment.

The third fundamental principle was, "In response to non-nuclear aggression the US will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with its treaty commitments." Even this principle was subject to conditions, however. It was clearly stated that the primary responsibility for mobilizing forces in defense of a nation rests with those who are threatened. The document emphasizes that each country has the primary responsibility to provide for its own security, and, if that is insufficient, cooperation should be sought from other nations in the region. According to this reasoning, aid should be provided by the US only as a last resort. After outlining these principles, the message continued, "The Nixon doctrine certainly does not mean that friends will be foresaken, nor is its intent to transfer the burden onto America's friends too swiftly."

Nevertheless, the message meant that the US would move in the direction of stressing self-support and self-reliance, and while maintaining a power balance, gradually transfer the burden of defense onto the shoulders of others. Accordingly,

testimony to the US House of Representatives by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Morton I. Abramowitz on March 4 indicated that the 1,050,000 US military personnel in East and Southeast Asia in 1973 was reduced as of fiscal year 1975 to 230,000, and to be reduced further to 218,000 in the fiscal year 1976.

In applying the above principles to South Vietnam, the balance was in fact upset little by little until finally the "critical mass" was exceeded causing a rapid military turnabout at the beginning of 1975. Within four months, all of South Vietnam had fallen into the hands of the Liberation Front and North Vietnam, and the state of war that had plagued Vietnam for thirty years finally ended. In the process, US aid to South Vietnam, \$1,100 million in fiscal 1974, fell to \$700 million in 1975. The magnitude of the victory of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and the Liberation Front in South Vietnam was such that on April 12 the American embassy was withdrawn from Phnom Penh, Cambodia prior to the fall of Saigon, and on the 17th the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh. The Americans also washed their hands of Laos, and in May the Pathet Lao took Savannakhet. By June they were in control of Vientiane, having carried out a bloodless revolution with no military resistance from the right wing. On August 23 the Laotian Revolutionary Administrative Committee was formed, and in December National People's Congress annulled the monarchy and established the People's Democratic Republic of Laos.

Is it possible for the US to remain a trusted friend of Asian countries in view of such trends? In my opinion, the US remains reliable in three ways, but is unreliable in two. To begin with the former, first of all, American military strength remains overwhelming. Only the Soviet Union can stand up to it. As long as domestic and international public opinion allows it, the US government can deploy its tremendous military power at will. In an effort to recover the Mayaguez in the wake of the defeat in Vietnam, for example, the US government was quick to secure the domestic support and then proceeded to sound out China. Having determined that the Chinese were not particularly concerned with the issue, American leaders acted resolutely in order to attain its objective. While a debate is in progress within the US concerning the level at which the military might should be maintained, it is safe to say that, as always, it will be kept at the highest level possible given domestic and international opinion and economic constraints.

Secondly, economic relations between the US and the free-world Asian countries are extremely close. Only Canada spends more than Japan to buy American agricultural products such as wheat, cotton, soybeans and maize, and economic ties between the US and the other free-world Asian countries are exceedingly close. Consequently, should economic relations with capitalist Asia, particularly Japan, be cut off, the American economy would be seriously hurt. Therefore, it is in the interest of the US to keep Japan and other Asian countries in the capitalist bloc and such a policy is also supported by the public opinion.

Third is the affinity Americans have for the Asian people, including the Japanese. It is natural that Americans, most of whom are the descendants of European immigrants, should feel closest psychologically to Western Europe. If their affinity for Western Europeans is most intense, however, the next peoples in line must be the Japanese and the Filipinos. Those feelings are the result of the large number of Americans who have lived in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Southeast Asia in the thirty-year postwar period that includes the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, and the long period in which American troops have been stationed in Asia. They also arise from the American discovery of Asia since World War II as a new mecca for tourism. The degree of contact between Americans and Asians has been incomparably greater since World War II, and now that the loss of three countries in Southeast Asia has followed the loss of mainland China in 1950, there is every possibility that relations between Americans and the remaining countries in the free-world Asia will proliferate.

The first factor which could contribute to an unreliability is the fact that a change in the political environment may make it impossible for the US to honor its commitments. When I was at Columbia University in 1962, I was already an outcaste on the Vietnam issue. Those were the Kennedy years when the US first made a firm commitment to South Vietnam. Most of my colleagues at the university supported Kennedy's policy of intervention in Indochina, and the atmosphere was such that abandoning South Vietnam was unthinkable. I maintained that no matter how much the US intended to support the South Vietnamese government from outside, rotten timbers in the framework of the government itself would cause it to crumble all the same, but I failed to persuade my colleagues. It was terribly frustrating. Now, considerably more than a wartorn decade later, the US has finally given up on Vietnam. From now on, it is likely that if a friendly country moves in the direction inimical to the interests of the US, it may well be summarily abandoned. At the present time, it is inconceivable that the US would ever abandon Japan, but if the political environment changes, American policy is quite capable of changing along with it.

Thirdly, we would do well to realize that even today when international exchange has developed so remarkably, there are still three countries that can largely maintain their present economic level autarchically: Soviet Union, People's Republic of China and the United States. The US now has treaty relationships with fifty-some odd countries, following the Vietnam defeat, no doubt further commitments will be seen as burdensome and some adjustments may be made in existing ones. It should be clear, then, that a country can no longer unconditionally trust an American commitment.

Since its defeat in Indochina in the spring of 1975, the US has been searching for an appropriate balance between commitment and disengagement. The major consideration, needless to say, is the US national interest, including the preservation of America's prestige in the international society. Recently, the government of

Thailand demanded the withdrawal of all American troops, and the US promptly complied with it by agreeing to complete the withdrawal within four months. And this may well be the last of the series of the US efforts to cut down its presence in Asia. Though the next fiscal year will likely see further budget cuts, from then on an effort will probably be made to hold the line.

However, the American military presence in Asia itself is problematic. Showing off its military might in Asia can be seen as demonstrating America's resolve, and hence will work as an effective deterrent, but in the present domestic and international environment it would be most difficult for American ground forces to again engage in large-scale operations. On the Korean peninsula, for example, short of a massive, frontal attack across the border similar to that of June 1950, it is inconceivable that the forty thousand American troops stationed in South Korea would become involved in large-scale maneuvers. It would actually be embarrassing for the American government to be asked by a country where American troops are stationed to have them participate in military operations. In that sense, the American military power in Asia is subject to the condition that it cannot in fact engage in combat operations. Accordingly, while from this point forward American policy in Asia will be to maintain the status quo militarily, efforts will be concentrated on expanding as much as possible the scope of political and economic influence.

2. Emergence of the Soviet Union as Sea Power in Asia

It appears that the Soviet Union is attempting to gain a stronger voice in Asian affairs by, first, gaining recognition of the U.S.S.R. as an Asian country in international organizations; secondly, by persuading Asian countries to support a Soviet proposal for the Asian collective security system; and thirdly, by increasing Soviet military aid and naval presence in the region. Soviet military aid for Asia goes mainly to North Korea in East Asia, North Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, and India and Afghanistan in South Asia. Increased Soviet attention to Asia is also evident in the expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet from 700,000 tons in 1965 to what is estimated at present to be 1,200,000 tons (See Figure 3).

Meanwhile, the US has reduced its naval forces in Asia to approximately 600,000 tons since the end of the Vietnam war. As a result, the US no longer enjoys the overwhelming sea power which it once had in the Sea of Japan (Congressional testimony by the head of the US Naval Strategy Department, James Halloway, February 2, 1976 at the Naval Military Committee).

There were 345 scrambles by Japan's Air Self-Defense Force in 1971 and 323 in 1947. Scrambles decreased in 1957, but there were still 281. Eighty percent of the objects of those scrambles were Soviet Union military planes. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is building up its naval presence under the pretexts of fishing or con-

Figure XII-3 Military Power in the Far East

		Ground Forces	Naval Forces	Air Force
Soviet: Far East (East of Irkutsk)	1965	170 (M.B.)	700,000 tons	1,400 Aircraft
	1975	30-35	1,200,000	2,000
China	1965	115 (M.B.)	200,000 (J.)	2,800 (M.B.)
	1975	142 (M.B.)	350,000 (J.)	4,400 (M.B.)
Japan	1965	13	140,000 (J.)	500
	1975	13	180,000	445
U.S.A.	1965	3+1 MD*	750,000-800,000 (125 ships)	more than 600
	1975	2+1 MD	600,000 (ca. 60 ships)	more than 423

Note: Figures marked "M.B." are from *Military Balance*
 Those marked "J." are from *Jane's Marine Yearbook*
 Others estimated by the author.
 * Marine Division

ducting scientific research. And the ships used under such pretexts are said to surpass a total of one hundred in number and a third of which are playing an active part in Asian and Pacific waters. Moreover, in the waters surrounding Japan, the real Soviet fishing boats have become remarkably active and have often hindered Japanese fishing activities.

This increase in Soviet sea power is of serious concern to Asian countries. Up to the present, the United States has been the dominant naval power in the region. However, the goal of the United States is a benign one, i.e., the protection of maritime trade routes. In the National Defense Report published this year, Rumsfeld says: "Although we are not so dependent upon the seas as other nations such as Japan and Great Britain are, the United States has significant and long-standing maritime interests. Many of the raw materials and energy resources vital to our economy reach us by sea and the seas provide essential links to our allies. The United States, together with its allies, therefore must maintain maritime forces that are capable of ensuring unhampered use of the seas." The objective of the Soviet naval buildup, however, remains unarticulated, and there is no guarantee that the Soviets will not obstruct the commercial interests of the other countries if their own interests dictate so. The appearance of this vast sea power whose goals are unclear will necessarily contribute to heightened instability.

Needless to say, it is hardly the case that no countervailing measures have been taken in response to the Soviet buildup. The US intends to maintain military equilibrium by acquiring a naval base at Diego Garcia, showing its interest in the countries around the Indian Ocean, and protecting the safety of transportation and supply

routes in the region. What is more, since the shift from a labor cabinet to a liberal one in Australia, ANZUS has again become a more willing ally of the US. In June 1976 Australian Premier Fraser gave permission to US warships to call at Cockburn Sound Naval Base, south of Perth. This had been rejected under the former regime. Furthermore, on July 28 Fraser met with US leaders in Washington, D.C., and in the communique published after the meeting, it was agreed that the Indian Ocean was of great strategic and economic importance and that Australia would support US efforts for the expansion of the military establishments on Diego Garcia.

How would the Soviets react to these moves? There are so many factors to be taken into account that it is difficult to predict. The Soviet Union may either pursue the status quo or compete in the naval buildup. But if the Soviet Union does embark on naval expansion, a military environment which is most undesirable for Japan will be created, for the existence of predominant Soviet sea power would have great political importance. The very existence of the fleet would be a political fact of life. In order to influence other nations, the Soviet Union would not necessarily have to "do" anything with the fleet.

3. China's Dual Manipulation

While East-West tensions relaxed and new bridges were built, the schism between the Soviet Union and China remained. Their bitter confrontation was reflected even in their fundamental analysis of world trends. While the Soviet Union emphasized the abatement of international enmity, China called for revolution and emphasized the intensification or worldwide class struggle. Although the Chinese have strengthened government-to-government relations with Asian countries, they have not been quite successful in persuading Asians to engage in the continuing world revolution. Peking thus continues to aid those communist parties which are carrying out guerilla activities in other Asian countries.

On April 29, 1975 on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Malayan Communist Party, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party publicly sent a telegram of congratulation. On May 20, a telegram of condolence was sent to the Burmese Communist Party when its chairman and secretary were killed in a surprise attack by government troops. These telegrams and another recent one which was sent on May 22 on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Indonesian Communist Party all made the front page of the *People's Daily* of China. These telegrams openly sang the praises of the victory of armed struggle. Furthermore, two weeks before the President Marcos of the Philippines' visit to China, a broadcast of the "Voice of the Malaysian People" said, "the Chinese Communist Party resolutely supports the Philippine Communist Party."

In the case of Burma, the Burmese Communist Party bases itself in an area near

the Chinese border and receives particularly vigorous and substantial support. The communist parties of Malaysia and the Philippines, on the other hand, present the Chinese with difficult logistical problems. While commentary in the *People's Daily* and broadcasts from Peking clearly indicate support for their guerrilla activities, a debate is underway over whether such moral support is merely a gesture of loyalty to ideological premises or is evidence of substantial material aid.

The fact of the matter is that, while guerrilla forces are still weak, aid from Peking goes little further than moral support whose aim is primarily to demonstrate Peking's ideological fidelity. Once indigenous guerrilla forces expand their power, however, the Chinese Communist Party will provide substantial support without hesitation. The result is a form of dual manipulation. While maintaining friendly government-to-government relations, Peking keeps pursuing revolutionary solidarity with communist comrades of these Asian countries. Therefore, whether or not communist parties in other Asian countries will receive aid such as that presently being given to the Burmese depends primarily upon the degree of success of their own guerrilla activities.

4. Regional Integration

The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was from the outset a product of the Cold War era, has steadily declined as East-West detente and the withdrawal of American troops have progressed. Similarly, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) which had met every year since its establishment in 1966 found itself unable to convene in 1973 due to the rapid improvement of the relationship between China and neighboring countries since 1971. Both of these old-style regional organizations continue to exist in name only. The members of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the meantime, have reacted to the communist advance in Indochina by promptly strengthening their ties. Although the matter has not been discussed openly, the major concern of the ASEAN members is internal security. They tend to feel that the stronger their intergovernmental ties with Peking are, the more determined they must be to maintain internal order and security of their countries. In May 1975, the ASEAN foreign ministers met at their regular conference in Kuala Lumpur and carefully examined the "post-Indochina" situation. In November their economic ministers met in Jakarta and reached an agreement on the expansion of agricultural production and cooperative development of energy resources. In February 1976, the 5 member countries held a summit meeting in Bali. This was the first summit held since the association was founded in 1967. It resulted in an agreement that called for an improvement of cooperation and the adoption of the ASEAN Cooperation Declaration (Bali Declaration). The agreement calls for peaceful coexistence with those countries whose social systems may not be compat-

ible with that of the ASEAN members' and pledges non-aggression and non-use of military force among member nations to settle disputes. The declaration announced joint steps to establish an emergency supply of resources such as rice and oil to member states. Moreover, the economic ministers of five countries met again in Kuala Lumpur in March and agreed to a plan for an industrial division of labor, that would provide the conditions in which a steel industrial complex in the Philippines, a urea and fertilizer industry in Indonesia and agricultural industries in Thailand could be established.

These centripetal forces are counterbalanced by other centrifugal forces, however. For example, we see a wide range of diverse cultures among the member nations, which are distinctive and might be even mutually incompatible. Adherence to their distinctive cultural identities will most likely impede future joint projects. In addition, there is no telling when territorial disputes will break out, and since all the ASEAN members except Singapore are developing countries, they lack the complementarity to create an integrated economic system. Furthermore, the member countries are likely to develop disparate policies to deal with Indochinese communist countries. Thailand is subject to direct pressure by virtue of geographical propinquity and has no choice but to adopt a policy of accommodation. The Philippines and Indonesia, in contrast, are at some distance and can afford to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The problems which would be derived from these differences make it no easy task to forge unity in the ASEAN region. The future of ASEAN will be determined by the relative strength of these centripetal and centrifugal forces.

5. The North-South Problem

Since 1973 the OPEC nations have seriously shaken the international economy with a series of price increases. Most of the oil-producing countries are developing nations and are thought to be friendly with the Third World. By virtue of their price increases, however, conflicts of interest suddenly arose between oil producers and the resource-poor Third World countries. The Rome agreement marked a first step towards dealing with the problem but a solution is not yet in sight. The already dismal economic level of countries such as India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Burma seems destined to fall even further. The advanced industrial nations can minimize the damage by adding the increased price of oil to the prices of their manufactured goods, but developing countries without resources have no such recourse. Whereas for industrial countries expensive energy entails at worst a brake on economic growth, it threatens to reduce the resource-poor developing countries to utter devastation.

An increasing capital flow from advanced to developing countries could conceivably solve this dilemma, but ironically the economic aid which constitutes an

important portion of the capital flow has been decreasing as a result of worldwide recession. Japan, for example, simultaneously faced with inflation, an international payment imbalance and recession in 1974, and was forced to take measures to effectively contain demand. As a result, Japan experienced minus growth for the first time since World War II. Japan ranks fourth in total amount of aid extended to developing countries after the US, France and West Germany, but a series of measures restrict the outflow of capital. A series of measures to restrict the outflow of investment capital were adopted beginning in November of 1973, and Japan's flow of long-term capital was suddenly contracted. Consequently, Japan's total economic aid fell sharply from \$5,840 million in 1973 to 2,960 million in 1974 and 2,890 million in 1975. Even for the DAC member countries the former average annual aid increase rate of 80-90 percent was pared down to 13.4 percent in 1974. Moreover, since most of that aid from DAC countries went to oil-production countries, the flow of aid to resource poor developing countries actually decreased.

In contrast to the cases of EC and the US, 37 percent of all Japanese funds for economic cooperation have gone to Southeast Asia. The figure reached 42.4 percent in 1975. In 1974, 54.5 percent of all official Japanese development aid went to Southeast Asia. In 1975 the figure was 50.1 percent. As such, Japanese economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries assumes considerable proportions. Despite that, one must concede that Japan's contribution to a solution of the North-South problem is still minimal.

6. Japan's Impact to the Region

Japan imports 700,000 tons of oil and 200,000 tons of iron ore daily, and last year exported \$60 billion worth of manufactured goods. In order to feed 110 million people on a land area of 360,000 square kilometers, Japan must purchase 95 percent of its resources abroad and then export 10 percent of its manufactured goods in order to survive. This fact of life will not change, regardless of whether we continue our capitalist orientation or decide to move toward socialism.

Exports to countries in Southeast Asia accounted for 22.5 percent of all Japanese exports in 1974 and imports from Southeast Asia amounted to 18.3 percent of all imports. As for the commodities that Japan imports, Australia supplies 79.5 percent of the total wool consumption, 57.7 percent of bauxite, 45.6 percent of iron ores and 26.7 percent of nickel ores. Therefore, close ties with the nations of Southeast Asia and Australia are a life and death matter for Japan, but of course, the same could be said for Australia and Southeast Asia.

What conditions are necessary for Japan's continued prosperity? There seem to be three prerequisites: a peaceful international environment, a system of free trade, and domestic productivity. In other words, Japan's national goals should be deter-

mined by these three prerequisites rather than by ideology. The first, a peaceful international environment is necessary to enable the maximum amount of goods and capital to flow into and around Japan. In the days when military power was all that mattered, resources were secured and markets for manufactured goods were found by subjugating other nations by military might. The role of military power in international society has declined, however, as the importance of international public opinion and peaceful negotiations within the framework of international organizations has increased. Therefore, today large-scale international economic activity is possible even for a lightly-armed nation like Japan. As a country that is able to prosper only by virtue of the smooth functioning of an intricate worldwide economic network, Japan is naturally apprehensive about the emergence of conflicts which could impair the flow of goods to Japan.

The second prerequisite for prosperity is free trade system. Japan's economy is based on capitalist production and free competition among private enterprises, and it has done well in the international market by producing competitively priced high quality goods. Japan has no other bargaining power in international society. Its economic bargaining power can only be effective in a system of free competition, where the market mechanism functions. Ever since the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Free World has achieved rapid economic growth by adhering to the principles of free trade. Any contraction of the realm within which the market mechanism is effective entails a proportionate disadvantage to Japan. Moving into the seventies, however, we have found that even those countries which in principle adhere to capitalist production, including the US and the European Community have begun to place restrictions on free trade. If, in these circumstances, resource supply cartels such as OPEC become more numerous, Japan's survival will become increasingly tenuous.

The third prerequisite is domestic productivity. Even if the scope of the operation of the market mechanism remains undiminished, Japan can not prosper if it becomes unable to supply high quality goods with competitive prices to the world. What makes it possible for Japan to provide such goods is high domestic efficiency. By this I mean not just a high level of efficiency in private enterprises, but a high level of productivity in the society at large. Should domestic order be disrupted and the distribution process impeded, this social efficiency would fall. It will also be disrupted if people begin to demand their individual rights without feeling obliged to fulfill their duties, Japan must come to terms with the problem of how to find an appropriate balance between respect for individual rights, on the one hand, and social productivity, on the other.

Conclusion


The six issue areas mentioned above are causing problems for Asian nations. These

urgent problems demand a response. Theoretically, there are two choices. The first is to completely reject the existing system, i.e. to say "no" ideologically to all current political and economic cooperative relations. The second choice is to attempt to improve the current system through piecemeal reform. I favor the latter. If one prefers the latter option, one must work to reduce mutually incompatible interests and to expand the area of common interests.

However, this will not be an easy matter. As I said at the outset of this chapter, because of growing scarcity the prices of natural resources and food are bound to skyrocket in the not too distant future. Moreover, as restrictions on free trade increase, countries, blocs of nations and regions that have other non-economic bargaining cards (armaments, resources, strong central governments, etc.) will expand their influence. Regional groupings will have more international bargaining power than smaller individual countries.

The world can be divided into four quadrants for analytic purposes. (See Chart 6). Multiple alliances and increasingly complex patterns of interstate cooperation will come about in response to the need for heightened bargaining power. If the countries in the second and third quadrants remain isolated, they will be defeated easily in international competition. Building regional cooperation or supra-regional cooperative relations is a prerequisite for survival. Only those regions that satisfy this condition will continue to enjoy prosperity.

Chart XII-6 The World in Four Quadrants



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CONVERSION TABLE

Wade-Giles to Pinyin

<i>Wade-Giles</i>	<i>Pinyin</i>								
a	a	chiung	jiung	ha	ha	jih	ri	k'ung	kong
ai	ai	ch'iuung	qiong	hai	hai	jo	ruo	kuo	guo
an	an	cho	zhuo	han	han	jou	rou	k'uo	kuo
ang	ang	ch'o	chuo	hang	hang	ju	ru		
ao	ao	chou	zhou	hao	hao	juan	ruan	la	la
		ch'ou	chou	hei	hei	jui	rui	lai	lai
cha	zha	chu	zhu	hen	hen	jun	run	lan	lan
ch'a	cha	ch'u	chu	heng	heng	jung	rong	lang	lang
chai	zhai	chü	ju	ho	he			lao	lao
ch'ai	chai	ch'ü	qu	hou	hou	ka	ga	le	le
chan	zhan	chua	zhua	hsi	xi	k'a	ka	lei	lei
ch'an	chan	chuai	zhuai	hsia	xia	kai	gai	leng	leng
chang	zhang	ch'uai	chuai	hsiang	xiang	k'ai	kai	li	li
ch'ang	chang	chuan	zhuang	hsiao	xiao	kan	gan	liang	liang
chao	zhao	ch'uan	chuan	hsieh	xie	k'an	kan	liao	liao
ch'ao	chao	chüan	juan	hsien	xian	kang	gang	lieh	lie
che	zhe	ch'üan	quan	hsin	xin	k'ang	kang	lien	lian
ch'e	che	chuang	zhuang	hsing	xing	kao	gao	lin	lin
chen	zhen	ch'uang	chuang	hsiu	xiu	k'ao	kao	ling	ling
ch'en	chen	chüeh	jue	hsiung	xiong	ken	gen	liu	liu
cheng	zheng	ch'üeh	que	hsü	xu	k'en	ken	lo	luo
ch'eng	cheng	chui	zhui	hsüan	xuan	keng	geng	lou	lou
chi	ji	ch'ui	chui	hstieh	xue	k'eng	keng	lu	lu
ch'i	qi	chun	zhun	hstün	xun	ko	ge	lū	lū
chia	jia	ch'un	chun	hu	hu	k'o	ke	luan	luan
ch'ia	qia	chün	jun	hua	hua	kou	gou	lüeh	lüe
chiang	jiang	ch'ün	qun	huai	huai	k'ou	kou	lun	lun
ch'iang	qiang	chung	zhong	huan	huan	ku	gu	lung	long
chiao	jiao	ch'ung	chong	huang	huang	k'u	ku		
ch'iao	qiao			hui	hui	kua	gua	ma	ma
chieh	jie	en	en	hun	hun	k'ua	kua	mai	mai
ch'ieh	qie	erh	er	hung	hong	kuai	guai	man	man
chien	jian			huo	huo	k'uai	kuai	mang	mang
ch'ien	qian	fa	fa			kuan	guan	mao	mao
chih	zhi	fan	fan	i	yi	k'uan	kuan	mei	mei
ch'ih	chi	fang	fang			kuang	guang	men	men
chin	jin	fei	fei	jan	ran	k'uang	kuang	meng	meng
ch'in	qin	fen	fen	jang	rang	kuei	gui	mi	mi
ching	jing	feng	feng	jao	rao	k'uei	kui	miao	miao
ch'ing	qing	fo	fo	je	re	kun	gun	mieh	mie
chiu	jiu	fou	fou	jen	ren	k'un	kun	mien	mian
ch'iu	qiu	fu	fu	jeng	reng	kung	gong	min	min

<i>Wade-Giles</i>	<i>Pinyin</i>								
ming	ming	pi	bi	sui	sui	tsang	zang	yüan	yuan
miu	miu	p'i	pi	sun	sun	ts'ang	cang	yüeh	yue
mo	mo	piao	biao	sung	song	tsao	zao	yün	yun
mou	mou	p'iao	piao			ts'ao	cao	yung	yong
mu	mu	pieh	bie	ta	da	tse	ze		
		p'ieh	pie	t'a	ta	ts'e	ce		
na	na	pien	bian	tai	dai	tsei	zei		
nai	nai	p'ien	pian	t'ai	tai	tsen	zen		
nan	nan	pin	bin	tan	dan	ts'en	cen		
nang	nang	p'in	pin	t'an	tan	tseng	zeng		
nao	nao	ping	bing	tang	dang	ts'eng	ceng		
nei	nei	p'ing	ping	t'ang	tang	tso	zuo		
nen	nen	po	bo	tao	dao	ts'o	cuo		
neng	neng	p'o	po	t'ao	tao	tsou	zou		
ni	ni	p'ou	pou	te	de	ts'ou	cou		
niang	niang	pu	bu	t'e	te	tsu	zu		
niao	niao	p'u	pu	teng	deng	ts'u	cu		
nieh	nie			t'eng	teng	tsuan	zuan		
nien	nian	sa	sa	ti	di	ts'uan	cuan		
nin	nin	sai	sai	t'i	ti	tsui	zui		
ning	ning	san	san	tiao	diao	ts'ui	cui		
niu	niu	sang	sang	t'iao	tiao	tsun	zun		
no	nuo	sao	sao	tieh	die	ts'un	cun		
nou	nou	se	se	t'ieh	tie	tsung	zong		
nu	nu	sen	sen	tien	dian	ts'ung	cong		
nü	nü	seng	seng	t'ien	tian	tzu	zi		
nuan	nuan	sha	sha	ting	ding	tz'u	ci		
nüeh	nüe	shai	shai	t'ing	ting				
nung	nong	shan	shan	tiu	diu	wa	wa		
		shang	shang	to	duo	wai	wai		
o	e	shao	shao	t'o	tuo	wan	wan		
ou	ou	she	she	tou	dou	wang	wang		
		shen	shen	t'ou	tou	wei	wei		
pa	ba	sheng	sheng	tu	du	wen	wen		
p'a	pa	shih	shi	t'u	tu	weng	weng		
pai	bai	shou	shou	tuan	duan	wo	wo		
p'ai	pai	shu	shu	t'uan	tuan	wu	wu		
pan	ban	shua	shua	tui	dui				
p'an	pan	shuai	shuai	t'ui	tui	ya	ya		
pang	bang	shuan	shuan	tun	dun	yai	yai		
p'ang	pang	shuang	shuang	t'un	tun	yang	yang		
pao	bao	shui	shui	tung	dong	yao	yao		
p'ao	pao	shun	shun	t'ung	tong	yeh	ye		
pei	bei	shuo	shuo	tsa	za	yen	yan		
p'ei	pei	so	suo	ts'a	ca	yin	yin		
pen	ben	sou	sou	tsai	zai	ying	ying		
p'en	pen	ssu	si	ts'ai	cai	yo	yo		
peng	beng	su	su	tsan	zan	yu	you		
p'eng	peng	suan	suan	ts'an	can	yü	yu		

Pinyin to Wade-Giles

<i>Pinyin</i>	<i>Wade-Giles</i>								
a	a	chu	ch'u	er	erh	hou	hou	la	la
ai	ai	chuai	ch'uai			hu	hu	lai	lai
an	an	chuan	ch'uan	fa	fa	hua	hua	lan	lan
ang	ang	chuang	ch'uang	fan	fan	huan	huan	lang	lang
ao	ao	chui	ch'ui	fang	fang	huang	huang	lao	lao
		chun	ch'un	fei	fei	hui	hui	le	le
ba	pa	chuo	ch'o	fen	fen	hun	hun	lei	lei
bai	pai	ci	tz'u	feng	feng	huo	huo	leng	leng
ban	pan	cong	ts'ung	fo	fo			li	li
bang	pang	cou	ts'ou	fou	fou	ji	chi	lia	lia
bao	pao	cu	ts'u	fu	fu	jia	chia	lian	lien
bei	pei	cuan	ts'uan			jian	chien	liang	liang
ben	pen	cui	ts'ui	ga	ka	jiang	chiang	liao	liao
beng	peng	cun	ts'un	gai	kai	jiao	chiao	lie	lieh
bi	pi	cuo	ts'o	gan	kan	jie	chieh	lin	lin
bian	pian			gang	kang	jin	chin	ling	ling
biao	piao	da	ta	gao	kao	jing	ching	liu	liu
bie	pieh	dai	tai	ge	ke, ko	jiong	chiung	lo	lo
bin	pin	dan	tan	gei	kei	jiu	chiu	long	lung
bing	ping	dang	tang	gen	ken	ju	chü	lou	lou
bo	po	dao	tao	geng	keng	juan	chüan	lu	lu
bu	pu	de	te	gong	kung	jue	chüeh	luan	luan
		dei	tei	gou	kou	jun	chün	lun	lun
ca	ts'a	deng	teng	gu	ku			luo	lo
cai	ts'ai	di	ti	gua	kua	ka	k'a	lū	lū
can	ts'an	dian	tien	guai	kuai	kai	k'ai	lüe	lueh
cang	ts'ang	diao	tiao	guan	kuan	kan	k'an		
cao	ts'ao	die	tieh	guang	kuang	kang	k'ang	ma	ma
ce	ts'e	dīng	ting	gui	kuei	kao	k'ao	mai	mai
cen	ts'en	dīu	tiu	gun	kun	ke	k'o	man	man
ceng	ts'eng	dong	tung	guo	kuo	ken	k'en	mang	mang
cha	ch'a	dou	tou			keng	k'eng	mao	mao
chai	ch'ai	du	tu	ha	ha	kong	k'ung	mei	mei
chan	ch'an	duan	tuan	hai	hai	kou	k'ou	men	men
chang	ch'ang	dui	tui	han	han	ku	k'u	meng	meng
chao	ch'ao	dun	tun	hang	hang	kua	k'ua	mi	mi
che	ch'e	duo	to	hao	hao	kuai	k'uai	mian	mien
chen	ch'en			he	ho, he	kuan	k'uan	miao	miao
cheng	ch'eng	e	o	hei	hei	kuang	k'uang	mie	mieh
chi	ch'ih	ei	ei	hen	hen	kui	k'uei	min	min
chong	ch'ung	en	en	heng	heng	kun	k'un	ming	ming
chou	ch'ou	eng	eng	hong	hung	kuo	k'uo	miu	miu

<i>Pinyin</i>	<i>Wade-Giles</i>								
mo	mo	pin	p'in	seng	seng	tu	t'u	yue	yüeh
mou	mou	ping	p'ing	sha	sha	tuan	t'uan	yun	yiin
mu	mu	po	p'o	shai	shai	tui	t'ui		
		pou	p'ou	shan	shan	tun	t'un	za	tsa
na	na	pu	p'u	shang	shang	tuo	t'o	zai	tsai
nai	nai			shao	shao			zan	tsan
nan	nan	qi	ch'i	she	she	wa	wa	zang	tsang
nang	nang	qia	ch'ia	shei	shei	wai	wai	zao	tsao
nao	nao	qian	ch'ien	shen	shen	wan	wan	ze	tse
ne	ne	qiang	ch'iang	sheng	sheng	wang	wang	zei	tsei
nei	nei	qiao	ch'iao	shi	shih	wei	wei	zen	tsen
nen	nen	qie	ch'ieh	shou	shou	wen	wen	zeng	tseng
neng	neng	qin	ch'in	shu	shu	weng	weng	zha	cha
ni	ni	qing	ch'ing	shua	shua	wo	wo	zhai	chai
nian	nien	qiong	ch'iong	shuai	shuai	wu	wu	zhan	chan
niang	niang	qiu	ch'iu	shuan	shuan			zhang	chang
niao	niao	qu	ch'ü	shuang	shuang	xi	hsi	zhao	chao
nie	nieh	quan	ch'üan	shui	shui	xia	hsia	zhe	che
nin	nin	que	ch'üeh	shun	shun	xian	hsien	zhei	chei
ning	ning	qun	ch'ün	shuo	shuo	xiang	hsiang	zhen	chen
niu	niu			si	szu, ssu	xiao	hsiao	zheng	cheng
nong	nung	ran	jan	song	sung	xie	hsieh	zhi	chih
nou	nou	rang	jang	sou	sou	xin	hsin	zhong	chung
nu	nu	rao	jao	su	su	xing	hsing	zhou	chou
nü	nü	re	je	suan	suan	xiong	hsiung	zhu	chu
nuan	nuan	ren	jen	sui	sui	xiu	hsiu	zhua	chua
nüe	nüeh	reng	jeng	sun	sun	xu	hsü	zhuai	chuai
nuo	no	ri	jih	suo	so	xuan	hsüan	zhuan	chuan
		rong	jung			xue	hsüeh	zhuang	chuang
o	o	rou	jou	ta	t'a	xun	hsün	zhui	chui
ou	ou	ru	ju	tai	t'ai			zhun	chun
pa	p'a	ruan	juan	tan	t'an	ya	ya	zhuo	cho
pai	p'ai	ruì	jui	tang	t'ang	yan	yen	zi	tzu
pan	p'an	run	jun	tao	t'ao	yang	yang	zong	tsung
pang	p'ang	ruo	jo	te	t'e	yao	yao	zou	tsou
pao	p'ao			teng	t'eng	ye	yeh	zu	tsu
pei	p'ei	sa	sa	ti	t'i	yi	i	zuan	tsuan
pen	p'en	sai	sai	tian	t'ien	yin	yin	zui	tsui
peng	p'eng	san	san	tiao	t'iao	ying	ying	zun	tsun
pi	p'i	sang	sang	tie	t'ieh	yong	yung	zuo	tso
pian	p'ien	sao	sao	ting	t'ing	you	yu		
piao	p'iao	se	se	tong	t'ung	yu	yü		
pie	p'ieh	sen	sen	tou	t'ou	yuan	yüan		

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