

## Chapter X MILITARY WEAPONRY AND NORTH-EAST ASIAN SECURITY

This chapter proposes to analyse the fundamental security problems of North-east Asia, defined as the region which includes Japan, China, and the Korean Peninsula. The author will also attempt to assess how changes in military technology affect the geopolitical configuration in the area.

### 1. The Han Civilization Region

The central ethnic unit in East Asia was the Han Chinese who flourished in the Huang Ho River 黄河 basin. They were threatened by the incursions of other groups who periodically swooped down on the Chinese over the Asian land mass from the north and west. This pattern began 3,000 years ago and lasted up to the 18th century. The Han Chinese moved southwards when the pressure from the north and west was severe and returned to the north and west in periods when this pressure declined. These groups of nomadic peoples and hunting tribes descended southwards in search of food in the fall and winter months. For the Chinese, who were an agricultural people, the most fundamental security issue of the day was how to deal with this challenge.

In the early 17th Century, the Manchu 满洲 army swept across the Korean peninsula, subjugated the Mongols, and eventually conquered all territories under Han control. The Tibetans then followed, with Lhasa being occupied. The Moslems in Sinkiang 新疆 were vanquished after several clashes. To the west, the Pamir

\* This was originally published as a chapter in Robert O'Neill, ed., *Insecurity!: The Spread of Weapons in the Indian and Pacific Oceans* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), 132-151. It was first presented to an international conference in Australia on the military capability and military technology in East Asia and printed after revision. It discussed the overall features of the security system in East Asia. The question of how the East Asian security system with the Japan-US security alliance at the core would change was one of the foci of international attention. I argued in the paper that it could not change. During the US presidential election campaign the candidate Carter promised to withdraw the US forces from Republic of Korea but could not implement the promise after he became president. When it became apparent that the United States which was heavily committed to the security system of East Asia could not withdraw its forces, the question was whether or not he had any other options, whether he could have realized transformation of the system as he advocated. I argued that it was impossible. I am indebted to Ms. Maura Brennan for her help in editing this chapter.

Highlands were clearly added to the Manchu sphere of control. To the south, in the 18th century, Vietnam and Burma were defeated and forced to become vassal states. Except for the Mongols at the peak of their power, the Ch'ing 清 court controlled a greater area than any other dynasty in Chinese history. In fact, the area under Ch'ing control was greater than that under the control of the People's Republic of China (PRC) today.

To the west of the Urals, Ivan the Great, the Grand Duke of Moscow, destroyed the Tartar Kingdom of the Golden Horde and unified most of the present Russian land mass. Timofeevich Yermak, the Cossack chieftain, crossed the Urals and subjugated the Tartar Kingdom of Sibir Khan. He then presented it to Ivan the Terrible, who had already been crowned Tsar. The name of this small Tartar Kingdom of Sibir Khan soon came to refer to all of Siberia.

The Russians trapped the fur-bearing animals of Siberia and moved rapidly eastward. They crossed the Yablonoi mountain chain and came into contact with the Ch'ing along the banks of the Amur River 黑龍江. After several battles, the Russians were defeated and in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Argun River and the Yablonoi mountain range were to serve as the boundary line for the two states. Since the Treaty of Nerchinsk prevented the Russians from developing the Amur River basin, they began to march to the distant north instead. The Russians moved into Kamchatka, the islands of the North Pacific and the Aleutians and Alaska. They even began to press down the Pacific coast of the American continent.

In the 19th Century, there were striking advances in the nature of weaponry in Western Europe. Thus the Ch'ing army, which relied chiefly on outmoded bows and arrows, and swords and spears, began once again to feel the pressure of the Russian forces, which were equipped with guns this time. By the middle of the 19th Century, the Russians had in fact succeeded in occupying the lower reaches of the fertile Amur River basin.

In 1858, the Russians dealt the Ch'ing court a crushing military blow and the Treaty of Aigun 愛琿 ceded the area to the north of the Amur to the Russians. The Maritime Province to the east of the Ussuri was henceforth to be under the joint control of the two countries. However, in the 1860 Treaty of Peking, the Maritime Province was ceded to Russia.

The original inhabitants of the Korean peninsula were primarily of Ural-Altaic stock and as such were completely distinct from the Han Chinese. However, for over 2,000 years, Korea was heavily influenced by Chinese civilization. It was forced to become part of the Chinese tributary system when China was strong, but moved towards greater independence when Chinese power was on the wane. Korea was condemned to repeat this cycle over and over.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤 藩吉, SATŌ Shin'ichirō 佐藤 慎一郎, MIYASHITA Tadao 宮下 忠雄, eds., *Higashi Ajia* 東アジア (East Asia), (Tokyo: Daiyamondo-sha ダイヤモンド社, 1970), 4.

A powerful kingdom appeared in western Japan about 2,000 years ago and gradually unified the Japanese archipelago. It expanded in power so drastically that around the 7th Century, Japan subjugated the southern part of the Korean peninsula. However, Japanese forces were defeated by the mighty T'ang 唐 army and lost control of the Korea Strait. It would be a long time before Japan would again become involved in a military conflict with a power on the Asian continent.

China is basically a land power and none of the Chinese dynasties ever plotted to cross the ocean to attack Japan with the one exception of the Mongols. Thus, Japan found itself in the enviable position of experiencing few external threats to its security which helped in creating a culturally homogeneous society.

## 2. The Impact of Guns, Aircraft, and Missiles

In August 1863, seven British ships under the command of Rear-Admiral Kuper bombarded Kagoshima City 鹿兒島市. This was Japan's first major battle with a foreign country since it turned back the Mongol naval attack in the 13th Century. The British had 101 guns, which included some of the newest Armstrongs with their rifled bores. Kagoshima, the capital of the Satsuma-han 薩摩藩, had 83 guns of an older type. The battle lasted three and half hours and after the smoke had cleared it was found that 10 per cent of Kagoshima City had been burned to the ground and that all Satsuma ships, including three steam ships, and all batteries had been destroyed. The British suffered only 13 dead and some 50 wounded.<sup>2</sup>

The following year, a joint British, French, Dutch and US expedition of 17 ships, again under Rear-Admiral Kuper, attacked Shimonoseki 下關. The Chōshū-han 長州藩 attempted to defend Shimonoseki with 65 guns, but these were soon destroyed and 2,000 foreign troops landed and occupied all the batteries.<sup>3</sup>

The sea power of the Western nations was based on a capitalist mode of production and on superior military technology and shipbuilding techniques. It dealt the previously isolated Japanese stinging blows at Kagoshima and Shimonoseki. Prior to this, the Western powers had fought the Opium War and the Arrow War with China. In response, both the Chinese and the Japanese began to concentrate on creating a strong naval force equipped with guns which had rifled barrels.

In 1895, the Peiyang Fleet 北洋艦隊 of the Chinese, the strongest naval power in Asia, fought with Japan, the second strongest naval power in Asia. The Japanese Navy, with its far more accurate guns, emerged as the victor. This experience clearly impressed upon the Japanese the efficacy of large fleets equipped with heavy

<sup>2</sup> KAJIMA Morinosuke 鹿島守之助, *Nihon gaikō-shi* 日本外交史 (A Diplomatic History of Japan) (Tokyo: Kajima kenkyūjo shuppankai 鹿島研究所出版會, 1970), 1:99-100.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

guns and manned by a carefully trained crew. These Japanese strategic precepts were vindicated by the Russo-Japanese War 日露戦争 of 1904-1905. The Russian Fleet was almost completely destroyed by the Japanese Navy, and Japanese control of the seas in the Far East became virtually absolute. The Japanese Navy continued to cling to these strategic precepts even into the 1930s.

Subsequently, only the Americans would be able to challenge the Japanese in East Asian waters. However, the Japanese themselves doubted their capability when matched against the US Navy, which was based on massive industrial productivity. Thus, while the Japanese Navy drilled hard with the USA in mind as the hypothetical enemy, it tried at all costs to avoid a conflict with this new Pacific power. From 1907 on, Imperial Navy staff officers did discuss in secret the possibility of fighting with the USA. They felt that the only naval war they could win would be one fought in the waters close to Japan. Since this was seen as their only hope for victory against the USA, they would have to wait patiently for the Americans to advance into the seas surrounding Japan. Because of their limited capabilities in seeking out and destroying the US Fleet, the Japanese never seriously considered this tactic.

In 1941, when the Japanese came to the conclusion that they had to fight the USA, Admiral YAMAMOTO 山本 felt that the first order of priority was the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet. For the first time in history, a task force was formed which was heavily dependent on aircraft carriers. This task force succeeded in its surprise attack on Hawaii. Moreover, H.M.S. *Prince of Wales*, which was considered invulnerable to air attack because of its ability to provide a heavy protective barrage, was sunk in less than an hour off the Malayan coast by Japanese aircraft.

Ironically, however, it was the USA and not Japan that learned a lesson from this experience. The USA came to feel that air power was of overriding importance. The US Navy moved rapidly to form new task forces centered on aircraft carriers and in the summer of the following year, it dealt the Japanese a serious defeat in the Battle of Midway.

Following that victory, the USA shifted its emphasis from large fleets and guns to a new strategic philosophy based on air power. The subsequent American task forces, centered on aircraft carriers, were so successful that the USA was able to maintain control of the seas throughout the world until three years ago.

Now, it seems to the author that a new strategic philosophy dominates military thinking in the Soviet Union. This is based on new developments in missile technology which have made it possible to defend oneself against air attack through the use of surface-to-air missiles. The might of the SAM-6 in the recent fourth Middle East War is a good demonstration of this new situation. It appears that the Soviet Union has embarked on the construction of a global naval force which is predicated on the belief that the development of missiles is the key to strategic power today.

On the 36th anniversary of Naval Day in 1975, Admiral N. I. Smirnov stated that the primary focus of the Soviet Navy should be on nuclear submarines armed

with long-range ballistic missiles. A secondary emphasis was placed on the importance of anti-submarine aircraft equipped with rockets.<sup>4</sup> In 1976, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov also observed that of all the weapons in its arsenal, the Soviet Union took the most pride in the nuclear powered submarine. He bragged about Soviet global naval power by saying that "The Soviet Navy which has made tremendous advances through a scientific and technological revolution has made the oceans of the world its own."<sup>5</sup> Today, as always, a navy is terribly expensive. The Soviet Union is the only nation in the history of the world to rebuild a navy once it had been destroyed. However, a note of caution should be added. There is some room for debate as to whether the Soviet Union has really moved completely to a strategy centered on missiles or whether it does in fact still subscribe to the aircraft centered task force concept with a concurrent emphasis on missiles. The appearance of the aircraft carrier *Kiev* would tend to support the latter proposition.

In any case, in addition to the Soviet impact on the nations of North-east Asia as a continental giant to the north and west, its impact as a naval power has also come to be felt. The Soviet Pacific Fleet does not have a single aircraft carrier but, as can be seen in Table 1, its total tonnage is over 1,200,000 tons and it is thus the foremost naval power in East Asia. As a result, in Admiral James Halloway's analysis, there are sections of the high seas that the United States Armed Forces cannot control

Table X-1 Military Power in the Far East

		<i>Ground Forces</i> (Divisions)	<i>Naval Forces</i> (Tons)	<i>Air Forces</i> (Aircraft)
Soviet: Far East (East of Irkutsk)	1965	170 (M.B.)	700,000	1,400
	1975	30-35	1,200,000	2,000
China	1965	115 (M.B.)	200,000 (J)	2,800 (M.B.)
	1975	142 (M.B.)	350,000 (J)	4,400 (M.B.)
Japan	1965	13	140,000 (J)	500
	1975	13	180,000	445
USA	1965	3 + 1 MD*	750,800 to 800,000 (125 ships)	more than 600
	1975	2 + 1 MD	600,000 (ca. 60 ships)	more than 423

Note: Figures marked (M.B.) are from *The Military Balance 1976-77*, I.I.S.S., London, 1976. Those marked (J) are from *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1976. Others estimated by the Author.

\* Marine Division

<sup>4</sup> *Krasnaya Zvezda* (July 27, 1975).

<sup>5</sup> *Krasnaya Zvezda* (February 11, 1976).

today even with the help of its allies. The Sea of Japan would be one such example.<sup>6</sup>

### 3. Nations of the Region: Their Intentions, Capabilities, and Constraints.

#### A. The Soviet Union

Admiral Gorshkov summarized the general goals of the Soviet Navy when he stated that,

The Soviet Navy is completely loyal to the Party of Lenin and keeps a constant vigil over the seas. The Navy splendidly safeguards the national interest of the motherland by joining forces with the other Soviet armed services.<sup>7</sup>

(The author will return to a consideration of the term “national interest,” later.)

The core of the present Soviet Pacific Fleet is 57 major surface combatants and 74 submarines which include four or five SSBN-D type submarines. The SSBN-D is equipped with SSN-6s or SSN-8s. The SS-8 has a range of 4,800 miles and can hit the eastern US seaboard from the Sea of Okhotsk. Thus it seems clear that the nuclear weapons of the Pacific Fleet have a second strike capability.

Another major purpose of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is to destroy any naval offensive task force dispatched by the enemy. However, a striking feature of the Soviet Navy is that it employs smaller caliber weapons. The Navy is built around missiles. Thus if it were to engage in an actual battle with US aircraft carrier task forces, the result would hinge on the effectiveness of Soviet missiles. Estimates of the effectiveness of the missiles of the Soviet Fleet vary widely: some specialists feel that the Soviets could rapidly increase their naval defensive capabilities and virtually protect themselves completely from US air attack by forming groups of one cruiser and three destroyers, but other analysts disagree.<sup>8</sup>

If the present Soviet Fleet fought the US aircraft carrier task forces, it seems likely that victory would go to the side which first fired an accurate volley. The future strategic balance in North-east Asian waters will obviously be deeply affected

<sup>6</sup> See Congressional testimony of US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, James Halloway III, February 2, 1976 in US Congress, *Hearing of US Congress House Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture H. R. 11500: Part 1* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 822.

<sup>7</sup> *Krasnaya Zvezda* (February 11, 1976).

<sup>8</sup> FUJIKI Heihachirō 藤木平八郎, “Soren kaigun no kyōi to sono jittai ソ連海軍の脅威とその實態 (Facts about the Threat of the Soviet Navy),” *Kokubō* 國防 (National Defense), 285 (November 1976), 19. Also cf. S. J. Dudzinsky, Jr. and James Digby, “The Strategic and Tactical Implications of New Weapons Technologies,” in Robert O’Neill, ed., *The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1977), 200ff.

by the advances in military technology. For example, new weapons which would enable one side or the other to launch a surprise attack, long-range high-accuracy ship-to-ship missiles, or rapid advances in the ability to search out enemy vessels would all obviously be of enormous importance.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would almost surely be destroyed by the Soviet SSN-11s which are armed with ordinary warheads. If for some reason, the Self-Defense Force should withstand a first volley by the SSN-11s, the continuing battle would be waged by guns. Then the Japanese would be in a very good position since their fleet has large guns, ranging in size from five inches and upwards. But it is inconceivable that the Japanese Navy could withstand a Soviet missile attack.

The next question to consider is whether the Soviet Union has any plans to land troops in Japan. At the present time, the Soviet Pacific Fleet does not have the type of landing craft that would be required for such an operation. In addition, the Soviets do not have the large-scale guns which would be needed to bombard the coast, and it would be too costly to use missiles, which also have limited destructive capability. Thus a Russian attack on Japan prior to the landing of troops would have to depend primarily on rockets and bombers; however, there is not the slightest indication that the Soviets are trying to increase the number of their bombers with this goal in mind. Thus it seems that for the present time, at least, the Soviet Union does not intend to attempt a military occupation of Japan. Although there is no immediate indication that the Soviet Union intends to do so, should it decide to develop a landing capacity it could probably do so in less than a year.

Another possibility to consider is whether or not the Soviet Union is likely to use its navy to attack merchant vessels. The use of submarines armed with strategic nuclear missiles would be very expensive and, in addition, would reveal the position of the submarines, thus preventing the submarines from fulfilling their original strategic purpose. For an attack on merchant vessels, the Soviets need a submarine equipped with non-nuclear warheads. However, at the present time, the Soviet Navy in the region has only nine of this type of submarine which could pass through the Tsugaru Strait 津輕海峽 or the Korea Strait 朝鮮海峽, surface, and attack merchant vessels. Thus it seems clear that the Soviet Union is not intent on preparing to destroy the Japanese merchant fleet at the moment. Needless to say, the Soviet Union could complete rapid preparation for such an attack in a matter of months once it perceived the necessity to do so.

All of the above considerations tend to lead one to the conclusion that the aims of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are two-fold: first, it serves to deter US use of force in the area and second, it serves to exert political influence on the various coastal nations during peacetime.

### B. China

The government of the PRC controls one-fourth of the earth's population. As such, it is the focus of much attention. However, since it does not yet have any offensive military capability, its threat is a potential one and is more of a problem for future consideration. The intentions of the PRC are clearer than those of the Soviet Union. In the eulogy following the death of Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, the Chinese Communist Party publicly proclaimed two foreign policy goals.<sup>9</sup>

The first goal is to adhere firmly to proletarian internationalism and to promote the struggle against "imperialism" and "social imperialism" to the fullest. Thus the Chinese have not relinquished their goal of world revolution. The second goal is to make China a powerful socialist nation. With this aim in mind, the Chinese are developing a foreign policy which stresses the maintenance of friendly relations with other states and the active importation of technology from various capitalist countries.

At times these two national goals come into conflict. Friendly relations with Japan are beneficial for China's industrialization and for building a powerful nation. However, this clearly downplays the goal of world revolution and solidarity with the "revolutionary people" of Japan. Good relations with the Malaysian government are clearly in China's national interest but result in discarding the goal of world revolution and the abandonment of the revolutionary Malayan Communist Party. The Chinese flow of weapons to Communist guerrillas in Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere seems to have completely dried up. For the time being, the Chinese will apparently stress the building of a strong Chinese state while downplaying their revolutionary goals.

For the Chinese, military power is a prerequisite for both the building of a strong Chinese state and the fostering of world revolution. Thus China became the fifth member of the nuclear club. However, the subsequent development of the Chinese ICBMs has taken far longer than most Western specialists predicted, and it is unclear whether or not they are at present ready for use in war. The development of IRBMs has also been lagging and it is estimated that the Chinese have approximately 20 IRBMs with a range of between 2,400 and 4,000 kilometers. The Chinese probably have between 50 and 90 MRBMs.

The main Chinese defensive warplane is reported to be the F6, a copy of the MiG 19, which does not have modern air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons.<sup>10</sup> The

<sup>9</sup> *Jen-min jih-pao* 人民日報 (People's Daily) (September 10, 1976).

<sup>10</sup> Drew Middleton's essay in *the New York Times* (June 24, 1977). Also, Ch'ien Hsüeh-sen 錢學森, a leading Chinese nuclear scientist complained about the terrible backwardness of scientific technology in the PRC in an article in *Hungch'i* 紅旗 (Red Flag), 7(1977). A PLA deserter stated in Taiwan that the plane in use by the Chinese which is identical to the Soviet

Chinese have an army of 3,000,000 with ten armored divisions, but it is not a fighting force which is capable of striking deep into its neighbor's territory. However, as was demonstrated in the Korean War, the Chinese army is capable of fighting in a restricted geographic area if it is prepared to take heavy losses. It would also seem to be very well suited to guerrilla warfare within China.

The government of Hua Kuo-feng 華國鋒 is aiming at the realization of the 'Four Modernizations'. This refers to the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and scientific technology. In order to fulfil these goals it is necessary to reduce the number of potential enemies while increasing the number of friendly nations. This is obviously doubly true of relations with the advanced industrial nations and is the reason for which Peking has been cultivating friendly relations with the United States, Western Europe and Japan in the years following Nixon's visit to China. The Chinese are trying to learn what they can from these countries while importing their scientific technology. It will be only in the distant future that the Chinese can possess an offensive military capability.

Taiwan is an extremely important political issue. At present, the Chinese have neither the ability nor the will to "liberate" Taiwan either by peaceful or military means. It is likely, however, that the will to "liberate" Taiwan would arise if the Chinese were to perceive it to be possible. The "liberation" of Taiwan actually depends on the USA. If US military aid and export of weapons to Taiwan were discontinued, it would be only a few years until Taiwan's defensive capabilities plummet. On the other hand, Taiwan lacks the military power to attack the Chinese mainland. This military deadlock in the Taiwan area has continued as long as it has because of US military aid to the Kuomintang 國民黨 government.

The Chinese are pressing the Americans to discontinue this military aid to Taiwan as a precondition for normalizing relations. Washington wants to normalize relations with China but does not want to discontinue its military aid to Taiwan. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated in his speech at the Asia Society on June 29, 1977, "We place importance on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves...But the progress may not be easy or immediately evident."<sup>11</sup> i.e., it would appear that the problem will remain unresolved for some time to come.

### C. The USA

During the Nixon years, the USA made a tremendous effort to extricate itself from the Vietnam quagmire. Washington decided to leave the fate of South Vietnam to the

MiG-19 is called the Chiencheng 6 and that he does not know the total number of Chiencheng 6 planes that China has, but that 2000 to 3000 would be a good estimate, in his opinion (*Sankei shimbun* 產經新聞) (July 29, 1977).

<sup>11</sup> *Wireless Bulletin* (Tokyo: Press Office, USIS, American Embassy).

Vietnamese themselves. In addition, in order to improve relations with Peking, the USA pledged in the Shanghai 上海 Communiqué to withdraw its troops from Taiwan.

Furthermore, President Carter pledged to pull American ground troops out of South Korea during the presidential election campaign. In his statements, on 9 March and 26 May 1977, President Carter reconfirmed his policy saying that he would withdraw US ground troops from South Korea within the next four or five years. At the same time, he promised to maintain a firm and undeviating commitment to the security of South Korea. It seems that the US policy will be to diminish its military commitments to countries like Taiwan and South Korea while trying to maintain the status quo in the region.

#### *D. Japan.*

Table 2 seems to indicate that Japanese economic dependence on trade is not very great. However, Table 3 shows that there is an extremely high level of reliance on foreign sources for key materials necessary for industrial production and survival. In this sense, Japan is economically, geopolitically and historically a maritime nation.

The Japanese people can survive only if the market mechanism functions freely and if the flow of goods, people and money is unimpeded. In other words, following their defeat, the Japanese gave up the idea of seizing goods and resources for themselves and concluded that they would have to seek prosperity through reliance on the free market system. Therefore, the present Japanese offensive capability is nil. Japan would be completely defenseless in the face of a nuclear attack and it has been estimated that the Japanese could last only a few days if an all-out offensive with conventional weapons was launched against them. Switzerland is only one-ninth the size of Japan but could raise 700,000 troops in two days. Including the 38,000 men in the reserves, Japan has only 280,000 men in the Self-Defense Forces 自衛隊.<sup>12</sup>

The next question to consider is whether or not Japan intends to develop military power commensurate with its economic might in the future. One can say with confidence that there is no such intention. In the first place, the strength of the opposition parties in the Diet is growing, and they are proponents of a reduction in the size of the SDF. It is even unclear whether or not the Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主黨 which advocates light rearmament and reliance on the Security Treaty system, will be able to maintain a monopoly of the government. The author personally feels that the LDP will be able to maintain itself in power. Nonetheless, the domestic political constraints regarding the SDF are so strong that it is virtually inconceivable that Japanese defensive capabilities will be significantly increased.

<sup>12</sup> KAIBARA Osamu 海原治, *Watashi no kokubō hakusho* 私の國防白書 (My White Paper for the National Defense) (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshin-sha 時事通信社, 1975), 125.

Table X-2 Dependence on Overseas Trade

	<i>Export/GDP</i>		<i>Import/GDP</i>	
	1965	(%) 1974	1965	(%) 1974
Australia	12.7	12.7	14.4	13.1
Belgium-Luxemburg	37.5	53.0	38.1	55.9
France	10.1	17.2	10.3	19.9
West Germany	15.8	23.6	15.5	18.3
Italy	12.2	20.2	12.5	27.3
Japan	9.6	12.2	9.3	13.6
Korea, South	5.9	26.5	15.6	40.6
Netherlands	33.3	47.4	38.8	47.2
Switzerland	21.3	26.6	26.6	32.2
USA	3.9	6.9	3.1	7.6

Source: *Annual Report of MITI*, Tokyo, 1977.

Table X-3 Dependence on Imported Raw Materials—Percentages of Each Commodity Imported

	<i>Japan</i>		<i>USA</i>		<i>West Germany</i>	
	1965	1975	1965	1975	1965	1975
Wheat	73.9	95.9	0.0	0.0	26.4	8.2
Corn	97.9	99.9	0.0	0.0	95.1	84.1
Soybean	88.9	96.4	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Lumber	24.1	62.4	6.9	4.5	35.7	33.4
Iron Ore	88.2	99.4	36.0	37.6	82.2	93.1
Copper Ore	74.9	89.7	33.5	8.3	99.8	99.7
Lead	62.7	73.5	63.7	30.7	81.8	85.6
Coal	20.5	75.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Crude Oil	98.9	99.7	13.9	28.5	87.1	94.4
Natural Gas	0.0	64.1	2.8	4.1	0.4	52.7
Energy Resources	65.7	92.5	7.3	16.7	28.0	53.5

Source: *Annual Report of MITI*, Tokyo, 1977.

For the foreseeable future, Japan will not pose a military threat to the members of ASEAN, Australia, or any of its other neighbors. For the USA and Australia, Japan will be a friendly country but one which will be militarily unreliable. For example, despite the importance of Japan for Korean security, it is impossible for the Japanese to play an active role in the defense of Korea.<sup>13</sup>

If an increase in Japan's military power is out of the question, it is worth considering the likelihood of Japanese sales of weapons abroad. Technologically and

<sup>13</sup> In my opinion, the Australians, in contrast to the Japanese, have a good bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States, i.e. uranium. I suspect that Prime Minister Fraser, when he visited the USA in June, tried to use this issue in an effort to persuade President Carter not to withdraw ground troops from South Korea too rapidly.

Table X-4 Defense Expenditures

	<i>Defense expenditures</i> (million US\$)		<i>Defense expenditure/GNP (%)</i>	
	1965	1974	1965	1974
Australia	1,130	1,620	4.36	2.66
New Zealand	136	237	2.10	1.75
Japan	1,250	3,670	0.96	0.82
PRC	6,500	17,000	6.76	7.62
Taiwan	360	814	10.70	7.17
Mongolia	15	55	2.50	6.87
North Korea	350	625	14.00	10.20
South Korea	143	642	3.71	4.33
Malaysia	98	295	3.43	3.79
Philippines	64	213	1.35	1.77

Source: *Kokubō* (National Defense), No 288, February, 1977 and No. 289, March, 1977.

economically, there is no doubt that Japan is quite capable of producing large quantities of sophisticated weapons. However, the Japanese people are as opposed as ever to the export of weapons. The government also has three principles concerning Japan's export of weapons.<sup>14</sup> Of course, there is some opposition to this policy from industrial circles and from those who advocate exporting weapons in order to be able to mass produce weapons and thus lower the cost. However, these people are in the minority.<sup>15</sup> Thus for the foreseeable future, Japan will not follow the example of France and become a weapon-exporter.

#### *E. Korea*

North Korea has a long-term goal of unifying the Korean peninsula. In April 1975, Chairman Kim Il-sung 金日成 visited Peking and made the following remarks in a speech at a banquet in his honor.

If a revolution occurs in South Korea, we, as their brethren, cannot remain on the sideline. We would actively support the people of South Korea. If the enemy should foolishly launch an attack, we will resolutely wage war against him and crush him to pieces. The only thing we have to lose through such a war is the military demarcation line. We have the unity of the motherland to gain.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> No Japanese is allowed to export weapons to 1) Communist countries, 2) those countries to whom the weapons-trade-ban resolution of the UN applies, and 3) those who are engaged in active conflict.

<sup>15</sup> e.g. TABE Bun'ichirō 田部文一郎, President of Mitsubishi Corporation 三菱商事, advocated the export of weapons in a press conference on July 7.

<sup>16</sup> *Jen-min ji-pao* (April 19, 1975).

There are three ways in which North Korea could attempt to unify the Korean peninsula. The first is all-out war; the second is the instigation of the civil strife, which Chairman Kim referred to in the above remark; and the third is to cause constant political turmoil in South Korea. There are too many constraints on the first method. In the first place, North Korea lacks the developed industrial base necessary to support large-scale war. Therefore, North Korea cannot launch total war without the support of either or both the Soviet Union and the PRC. Almost all analysts agree that neither the Soviet Union nor China wants a general war.

As for the second alternative of creating large-scale civil strife, the police system in South Korea is quite elaborate and the people are so anti-Communist that it is virtually impossible for Pyongyang 平壤 to infiltrate guerrillas into South Korean territory. Furthermore, as long as the political and economic situation in South Korea remains stable, a spontaneous, violent uprising among the people is extremely unlikely. Therefore, the North Koreans are left with the third alternative, i.e. to cause political confusion in the South.

Pyongyang's ceaseless declarations of support for the anti-government students and politicians in the South serves to make the South Korean government more suspicious of anti-government movements. The South Korean government has no way of knowing which of the anti-government activists have links with North Korea and which do not. Thus the government is forced to suppress them all. This, in turn, serves to aggravate the political strife and increase international criticism of Seoul. Pyongyang can thus isolate the Park regime by indirectly causing this increase in the criticism heaped on Seoul by the US and Japanese mass media.

At present, it looks very much as if this third alternative is succeeding very well. Therefore, the nature of the crisis in the Korean peninsula is not primarily military. It is a crisis of domestic South Korean politics. If the Park 朴 regime can handle this problem well, South Korea will return to economic and political stability and peace on the Korean peninsula will be maintained.

The withdrawal of the US ground troops by the Carter administration will result in the South Korean Army attempting to arm itself heavily and to strengthen its chain of command. There are, as a result, some people who fear that South Korea might attack the North of its own volition. However, most of the present leaders in Seoul have personally experienced the Korean War of 1950-53. They have not forgotten the havoc wreaked by war on the small Korean peninsula. Thus it does not seem reasonable to assume that an increase in modern conventional weapons by the South Korean Army will lead to a more dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula.

#### 4. Prospects for the Future

##### A. *The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

The three nuclear powers in the North-east Asian region are the Soviet Union, the United States and China. The Chinese, as observed earlier, are taking much longer to develop nuclear weapons than expected. As long as the Sino-Soviet conflict continues, most of its nuclear weapons will be directed at the Soviet Union.

Taiwan and South Korea are interested in developing nuclear weapons, but their technology and source of raw materials is controlled by the USA. It does not appear, therefore, that they will be able to develop nuclear weapons for the time being. Should they dare to consider going nuclear, they would face many problems such as finding a test site for explosions or devising computer simulated tests, determining whether a nuclear capability of their own would deter an enemy attack, developing their own delivery systems and so forth. At the same time, a decision to go nuclear would certainly antagonize the American government and people and would culminate in a total trade ban by Washington. This use of economic sanctions would surely asphyxiate their economies easily. Thus the bold decision to go nuclear would in fact be akin to suicide.

Japan is quite capable of producing nuclear weapons but has not the slightest intention of doing so. This policy is not likely to change as long as the international market mechanism is functioning. Japan is extremely interested in arms control in North-east Asia. For example, as early as May 1966, the Japan Socialist Party 日本社会党 called for Japanese efforts to create a zone of unarmed neutrality which was to include South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Singapore. Furthermore, in March 1972, the Japanese delegate to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament stated that

There is already a treaty in Latin America banning nuclear weapons... Last year in Asia there was a similar movement with the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Japan will actively cooperate to the fullest with this type of regional arms control.<sup>17</sup>

The author has constantly urged that this policy of the Japanese government to be worked out in greater detail and be given greater stress. The fact of the matter is that nuclear disarmament will be very difficult to achieve if left solely to negotiations between the USA and the USSR. The most that can be expected through these talks

<sup>17</sup> MAEDA Hisashi 前田壽, "Hokutō Ajia no gumbi kisei 北東アジアの軍備規制 (Arms Control in North-east Asia)," in World Economic Information Service 世界経済情報サービス, ed., *Konnichi no kokusai taiseika ni okeru shomondai* 今日の国際体制下における諸問題 (Problems in the Present International System) (Tokyo: World Economic Information Service, 1977), 148.

are arms control agreements like the NPT or SALT, which do not more than regulate nuclear weapons and benefit only Moscow and Washington. The author believes that the only way that nuclear disarmament can be achieved is through the formation of a strong united front by the non-nuclear nations.

Unfortunately, many Asian nations have been quite uninterested in this problem. However, Soviet and US nuclear-armed submarines are now operating freely in Asian waters and in ten years it is possible that Chinese MRBMs will be pointed at the various Asian nations. Therefore, it seems likely that a clear call for nuclear disarmament in the region would be a great contribution to the future peace of Asia and the world.

Care must be taken, however, to ensure that this movement to control nuclear weapons must not be allowed to serve the interests of any major power. Up to the present time, the Japanese movement against nuclear weapons has been soft on the Soviet Union, and there have even been some factions which have expressed support for Chinese nuclear weapons. This type of biased approach will not serve the cause of peace.

The movement to limit nuclear arms should not be too radical and impractical. For example, the Japanese Diet has declared its support for the three non-nuclear principles, namely that atomic weapons will be neither produced nor installed in Japan, and that they will not be allowed into Japan. The first two principles are fine since they are policies which can be decided by the Japanese government alone. However, the third principle poses a problem.

The principle was at first intended to block any country from bringing nuclear weapons into Japan proper, but due to strong pressure from the opposition parties, it was expanded to cover both the Japanese territorial sea and airspace. However, an executive agreement between the USA and Japan made Yokosuka 横須賀 the home port of the Seventh Fleet. It is inconceivable that vessels of the Seventh Fleet divest themselves of nuclear weapons before entering Yokosuka harbor. This has led to sharp criticism of the Japanese government by the opposition parties. The Japanese government only serves to discredit its non-nuclear commitment by adopting a policy that it cannot implement.

### *B. The Military Presence of the USSR in the Region*

As previously mentioned, Soviet naval power in the region is expanding. The Russians now have effective control of the Sea of Japan. According to the Self Defense Force, in 1976 at least 140 Soviet warships passed through the Tsushima Strait 對馬海峡, 60 through the Tsugaru Strait and 110 through the Sōya (La Perouse) Strait 宗谷海峡.<sup>18</sup> In 1971, the Air Self-Defense Force was put on alert 345 times. In

<sup>18</sup> Asagumo shimbunsha 朝雲新聞社, ed., *Bōei handobukku* 防衛ハンドブック (Defense Handbook) (Tokyo: Asagumo shimbunsha, 1977), 148.

1974 there were 323 alerts and in 1975, although there was a slight decline, there were still 281 alerts. Over 80 per cent of these alerts were called in response to the intrusion of Soviet warplanes into Japanese airspace.

The Soviet Union advocates détente but it is felt in some quarters that this is actually a strategy aimed at weakening the USA and Western Europe militarily. There are some analysts who insist that the Soviet Union will persist in an arms buildup whatever the costs.<sup>19</sup> Should this be the case, caution would be in order.

The USA used to be the predominant naval power in the region. One of the traditional goals of the USA has been to guard the freedom of the seas. For example, in Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's words:

Although we are not so dependent upon the seas as other nations such as Japan and Great Britain, the United States has significant and longstanding maritime interests. Many of the raw materials and energy sources vital to our economy reach us by sea and the seas provide essential links to our allies. The United States, together with its allies, therefore must maintain maritime forces that are capable of ensuring unhampered use of the seas.<sup>20</sup>

There is not the slightest reason to doubt that this is the US goal. However, it is unclear why the Soviet Union is strengthening its arsenal in North-east Asia. The Russian national interest is ambiguous on this point. Some people have said that the Soviet arms buildup in North-east Asia is in response to the Sino-Soviet confrontation. However, Soviet military strategy is clearly not that limited in its goals. Neither is it for the sole purpose of global competition with the USA. In the region, the Soviets are prepared to use their military power to confront the PRC, the USA, Japan and the other groupings of states in the area. This determination was voiced repeatedly by the Russians at the "Japanese-Soviet Specialists' Conference on Peace for Asia" which was held in Kyoto in April of last year.

Although the USA has been traditionally dependent on the ocean for trade links, the Soviet Union is fundamentally a land power. Moscow would not hesitate to disrupt sea trade, if it concludes that Soviet national interest demands such action. At present, the Soviet Union's military power is not playing a destructive role in the region, but it will certainly come to exert political influence on the Asian nations. Furthermore, there may come a day when Soviet military power has increased to such an extent that a rapid shift in their assessment of their capabilities occurs. At that point, the Soviet Union may very well exert direct military pressure on some

<sup>19</sup> H. Matsukane, "The Soviet's Long Range Strategy in North Asia," mimeographed, submitted to the Symposium on North-east Asian Security, held at Stanford Research Institute on June 20-22, 1977, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 10-11.

Asian adversary that has aroused its ire. It is impossible to estimate when Soviet military power will reach this critical level, resulting in a qualitative change in the political environment of the region.<sup>21</sup>

There are only two ways of dealing with this uncertainty. The first is the strengthening of the regional military alliances centered around the USA. The enhancement of naval power would be of particular importance. Since it would be difficult to consider the PRC an ally, the key alliance in the region would continue to be that between Japan and the USA. If the USA continues to withdraw from the Asian region, there would be only Japan to fill the military vacuum. This is why there are some who feel that Japan will embark on a rapid arms buildup in the 1980s.<sup>22</sup>

The second alternative response to the Soviet uncertainty is to deter the Soviet Union by non-military means. That is to say, the major nations in the Asian region should join together and present the Soviet Union with a united front in negotiations. They should strengthen economic ties with the Soviet Union by aiding the exploitation of Siberia and should strive in general to strengthen their bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union while maintaining friendly relations within. Close ties with the USA, and a friendly relationship with China would serve this end. In addition, negotiations for the establishment of a non-nuclear zone in the region would also enhance their bargaining position. This second alternative in effect responds to the Soviet challenge with a number of coordinated non-military moves. It is more sophisticated and far more attractive than the first alternative. There will certainly be a number of problems, but there is no question that the second choice is preferable to the first one.

### *C. The Proliferation of Conventional Weapons*

It is often observed that the US withdrawal from Korea is liable to stimulate the proliferation of conventional weapons in the North-east Asian region. The author does

<sup>21</sup> To the best of my knowledge, the earliest warning voiced concerning the rapid development of Soviet sea power was made by Commodore W. B. M. Marks, R. A. N., in his letter to the editor of the *West Australian* (March 19, 1974).

<sup>22</sup> MIYOSHI Osamu 三好修, "Semaru 1985-nen no kiki 迫る一九八五年の危機 (The Coming Crisis of 1985)," *Getsuyō hyōron* 月曜評論 338 (July 18, 1977). In the light of domestic constraints, I personally doubt that the Japanese government will embark on a military buildup. Japan will continue to limit itself to the development of a defensive system and will not turn to the development of an offensive capacity. However, I do not think it likely that there would be any strong opposition to the development of a sophisticated surveillance system around Japan. Geographically, the Japanese archipelago is in a good position to establish an elaborate surveillance system to monitor the activities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Tokyo recently extended its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles and the Tsugaru Strait 津軽海峡 has thus come under the control of Tokyo, although Japan has at least temporarily waived its rights in order to avoid a dispute with the Soviet Navy. The Korea Strait 朝鮮海峡 and the La Perouse Strait 宗谷海峡 now have only a narrow belt of high seas remaining.

not agree with the proposition that the US withdrawal would automatically cause South Korea and Taiwan to set about rapidly strengthening their own military capabilities. For the defense of Taiwan, the key factor is the control of the airspace over the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan therefore needs planes that are superior to the MiG-21s and it cannot obtain them without US aid. Thus arms proliferation in the Taiwan area will be governed by US policy towards China.

South Korea is in the same position. It has been extremely successful in its plan to build a modern heavy industry and thus assure itself of self-sufficiency in weapons. Nonetheless, it is still dependent on the USA for all sophisticated conventional weapons. Here again, US policy towards Korea will determine whether or not there will be an arms buildup in the region.

In conclusion, the USA remains the decisive military power in the region. This is true despite US efforts to withdraw from Asia following the defeat in Vietnam and the emergence of neo-isolationism in the USA itself. It will be US policy which will determine the fate of South Korea and Taiwan.

## PART 3 FOUNDATIONS OF JAPANESE POLICIES TOWARD CHINA

### Chapter XI ASIANISM AND THE DUALITY OF JAPANESE COLONIALISM, 1879-1945

This paper examines aspects of Asianism (*Ajia-shugi* 亞細亞主義) and colonialism (*shokuminchi-shugi* 植民地主義) in Japan's prewar relationship with Asia, to illustrate the contradictions and dilemmas of that relationship. Before beginning, it is perhaps wise to remind readers just what Japan's territorial possessions comprised. Japan acquired Taiwan 臺灣 as a colony in 1895, and the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianas Islands of the Pacific as a mandated territory in 1919. In the quarter of a century between those two dates, Japan's territory grew by nearly 80 percent. The picture may be summarized as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Table XI-1 Expansion of Japan's Territory

Territory	Means and year of acquisition	Land area (sq. km)
Japan proper ( <i>naichi</i> 內地)		382,561
Taiwan ( <i>Taiwan</i> )	Sino-Japanese War 日清戰爭, 1895	35,961
South Sakhalin ( <i>Minami Karafuto</i> 南樺太)	Russo-Japanese War 日露戰爭, 1905	36,090
Kwantung Leased Territory ( <i>Kantō-shū</i> 關東州)	– ditto –	3,462
Korea ( <i>Chōsen</i> 朝鮮)	Annexed, 1910	220,788
Pacific Mandated Islands ( <i>Nan'yō guntō</i> 南洋羣島)	World War I, 1919	2,149

Taiwan, South Sakhalin and Korea were Japanese "territory" in the narrow

\* This was originally published as a chapter in L. Blussé, H. L. Wesseling and G. D. Winius, eds., *History and Underdevelopment: Essays on Underdevelopment and European Expansion in Asia and Africa* (Leiden: Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, 1980), 114-126. This article presents the framework of Asianism of the Asians mainly for European readers. On that basis it explains how Japan in Meiji, Taishō and early half of Shōwa eras dreamed of being the leader of Asian liberation and yet emerged as the colonialist following the footsteps of imperialism of European nations. To mention a historical precedent, it is similar to Napoleon's expedition to Italy, in which he demolished dictatorships and claimed to be the liberator of the bourgeoisie and yet functioned as the oppressor. It points out this kind of duality of modern Japan.

<sup>1</sup> *Taiwan nenkan* 臺灣年鑑 (Taiwan Yearbook) (Taihoku (Taipei): Taiwan tsūshin sha 臺灣通信社, 1944), 16.

sense of that word. By contrast, Kwantung, a leasehold, and the Pacific Islands, a mandate, were Japanese territory only in the broad sense of that word. But insofar as they submitted to Japanese sovereignty, they fall within the category of Japanese colonies.

In 1939, Japan declared territorial sovereignty over the Spratly Islands 南沙羣島 and attached them administratively to Takao 高雄 City (Kaohsiung), Taiwan, under the name Shinnan guntō 新南羣島. But the possession question was never fully resolved with China and France and, moreover, the islands were sparsely populated. Since the Spratlys cannot be considered important in an examination of Japan's colonial experience, I have decided to omit their discussion here.

In any event, the colonial territories of Imperial Japan, all originally won by war were lost as they were won—by war.

This paper examines the fifty year history of Japanese colonial territories in an attempt to gauge their historical role, with chief consideration being given to Korea and Taiwan, Japan's most important colonial possessions.

### Japanese Manifest Destiny

Needless to say, it was with Taiwan that Japan first turned her hand to colonialism. Japan first sent troops to Taiwan in 1874 on pretext of the killing of Ryūkyū 琉球 fishermen by Taiwan natives. But the Meiji government 明治政府 was not then prepared to take over Taiwan. Accordingly, the government no more then thought about taking possession. In terms of results, the Japanese, once satisfied with having achieved their aim of “punishment”, recalled their troops.

At the same time, there were persons outside of government calling for the occupation of Taiwan. Not only that, but some thought of Taiwan as a base from which to take possession of the China mainland. For example, the people's rights advocate MIYAZAKI Hachirō 宮崎八郎, declared in 1874, “Wouldn't it be nice at this juncture to occupy Taiwan and then make it a base from which to involve ourselves in China's 400-odd prefectures (*shū* 州) at some future date?”<sup>2</sup> KISHIDA Ginkō 岸田吟香, who assisted most of Japan's China activists in the 1880s, wrote in the same vein in 1874: “The Court intends to pacify Taiwan and barbarian lands. If we could just attach these lands to our map....” And, “Now it seems to me that the government should send troops to bring the land south of the China border under control, make it a colony and thus expand Japan's map.”<sup>3</sup> The eyes of Japan were thus turned to the China mainland from early on.

<sup>2</sup> ARAKI Seishi 荒木精之, *Miyazaki Hachirō* 宮崎八郎 (Kumamoto: Nihon dangisha 日本談義社, 1954), 62.

<sup>3</sup> KISHIDA Ginkō 岸田吟香, “Taiwan shimpō 臺灣信報 (Taiwan Reports), no.7” *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbun* 東京日々新聞 688 (15 May, 1874).

This was 1874, a mere seven years after the Meiji restoration 明治維新. Japan was a weak and puny country under the western powers and their unequal treaties. What basis could have existed for thoughts of involvement in foreign affairs?

The idea that overwhelmed the Tokugawa shogunate 德川幕府 and brought the Meiji restoration into being was *sonnō-jōi* 尊皇攘夷, or revere the emperor and expel the barbarians. Ever since Commodore Perry's expeditions, Japanese thinkers had sensed danger in the eastward expansion of the western powers. They firmly believed that to expel the western intruders was to preserve the country, and were indignant at the *bakufu* 幕府 government's weak attitude in diplomacy. The sole path for Japan was to restore its imperial system and take a hard line against the foreigners. Even as the *sonnō-jōi* loyalists (*shishi* 志士) shifted from *jōi* 攘夷 to *kaikoku* 開國 (open the country) upon witnessing demonstrations of powerful western warships and artillery, they held on to *jōi* as a means of causing the *bakufu* grief.

We must note here that *kaikoku* did not stop at *kaikō* 開港 (opening the ports). It also involved absorbing western culture. No sooner had the Meiji government, established upon the *sonnō-jōi* principle, come to power than it adopted western things and took up the policy of *fukoku-kyōhei* 富國強兵 (rich country /strong military). To preserve its independence from the western expansion, Japan itself became a great power and leader of Asia. To prevent Japan's own colonization by associating with the powers and acquiring its own colonies—this was the conception. You might say that the *seikanron* 征韓論 (advocacy of a Korean expedition) of 1872 had such thinking behind it—as well as being a tool to appease the dissatisfaction of ruined, disgruntled former samurai.

In terms of intellectual sequence, *seikanron* preceded *seitairon* 征臺論, or advocacy of a Taiwan expedition. In 1870, SATA Hakubō 佐田白茅, MORIYAMA Shigeru 森山茂, and SAITŌ Sakae 齋藤榮, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advanced a plan to capture Korea.<sup>4</sup> Korea was Japan's first target not only because of Japan's history of invading Korea and geographical proximity, but also because of Korea's haughty attitude in the negotiations initiated by the Meiji government.

By 1873, for reasons intertwined with the above, calls for a Korean expedition suddenly accelerated. But IWAKURA Tomomi 岩倉具視, ŌKUBO Toshimichi 大久保利通, and KIDO Takayoshi 木戸孝允, just back from their inspection mission to the west, argued that the time was premature for a Korean expedition and that domestic affairs must take priority. The government suppressed the expedition. This does not mean, however, that thoughts of an expedition disappeared. In 1875, the Kanhwa Incident 江華島事件 occurred. Then, in 1894, Japan intervened in Korea's internal affairs, leading to hostilities with China, with which Korea had a suzerain relationship.


<sup>4</sup> *Nihon gaikō bunsho* 日本外交文書 (Diplomatic Documents of Japan) 3 (1870), doc. 88, attach. 1.

As to the Japan-Korea and Japan-China negotiations leading up to the war, Japan's justification for it was to effect the internal reform of Korea. Such a justification was not limited to the Korea question, but in fact gave life to "Asianism" (*Ajia-shugi*), the fundamental principle in Japanese overseas expansionism throughout the Meiji 明治, Taishō 大正, and early Shōwa 昭和 periods.

In order to resist the powerful white imperialism that was eating away at the East, Japan, China, and Korea with their common racial and cultural heritage had better link up, so the reasoning went, and institute those internal reforms requisite to becoming strong. Such is the gist of Asianism. Among Asianists were persons like KODERA Kenkichi 小寺謙吉 who argued that Japan should not dominate. Rather, Japan as "Asia's most advanced country" and China as "the world's most populous country" should cooperate, like "twins."<sup>5</sup> However, most Asianists—like FUKUZAWA Yukichi 福澤諭吉, a forerunner of Asianism—envisioned Japan as leader of Asia.

Originally, Japanese venerated ancient China as culturally peerless and regarded it as a country embodying the majestic spirit of Yao 堯 and Shun 舜. But seeing China's impoverishment under western aggression after the Opium War gave rise to feelings of contempt.<sup>6</sup> Take, for example, the case of URA Keiichi 浦敬一 who up to 1884 had considered forming an alliance with the Ch'ing to resist western aggression. That year he reversed himself. Diagnosing China as "like a large worm-infested tree", he ended up by making intervention in China, his life's purpose.<sup>7</sup> MIYAZAKI Yazō 宮崎彌藏 thought that if China had any great men who would overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty, he would help; otherwise, Japan itself should take over China.<sup>8</sup> This pre-Meiji and early Meiji thinking about China could be diagrammed as follows:

Diagram XI-1 Evolution of Japan's Attitude toward China



<sup>5</sup> KODERA Kenkichi 小寺謙吉, *Dai Ajia shugi ron* 大亞細亞主義論 (Essay of Great Asia) (Tokyo: Hōbunkan 東京寶文館, 1916), 256ff.

<sup>6</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤藩吉, "Nihonjin no Chūgoku-kan: Takasugi Shinsaku ra no baai 日本人の中國觀: 高杉晉作らの場合 (Japanese Views of China: The Case of Takasugi Shinsaku and Others)," in Committee to Edit a Collection of Articles to Commemorate the Late Dr. NIIDA Noboru 仁井田陸博士追悼論文集編集委員會 ed., *Nihonhō to Ajia* 日本法とアジア (Japanese Law and Asia) (Tokyo: Keisō shobō 勁草書房, 1970), 53-71. See esp, 65.

<sup>7</sup> HANAWA Kunzō 塙薫藏, *Ura Keiichi* 浦敬一 (Tokyo: Jumpū shoin 淳風書院, 1924), 38.

<sup>8</sup> MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, *Sanjū-san-nen no yume* 三十三年の夢 (My Thirty-three Years'

Thus, just as the Japanese view of China was changing and Asianism was becoming a keynote in Japanese thinking, Japan's hopes for China dimmed and a sense of Japan's mission as "leader of Asia" strengthened. Then, without regard for the racial and cultural homogeneity of Asia, Japan actively brought in western civilization and, passing through a *datsu-A ron* 脫亞論 (disassociate from Asia) phase to become more like civilized countries of the west, ultimately proceeded to cut China up. To borrow the formulation of HASHIKAWA Bunzō 橋川文三, this thinking underwent the following changes:

- (1) Western pressure—Japan-China cooperation (*teikei* 提携) for resistance—"Japan-Ch'ing alliance" (*Nisshin dōmei ron* 日清同盟論).
- (2) Realization that as an ally China was powerless—the conclusion that China's reform and strengthening were essential—"Reform of the Ch'ing" (*Shinkoku kaizō ron* 清國改造論)—
- (3) Beginning of Japan's imperialist phase—acute sense of time having run out to strengthen the Ch'ing—casting aside cooperation—"datsu-A ron" (disassociate from Asia)—
- (4) Alignment with the advanced imperialist countries—inclination towards cutting up China—the Sino-Japanese War (*Nisshin sensō* 日清戰爭)—"Call for invasion" (*shinryaku ron* 侵略論).<sup>9</sup>

### The Structures of Control: the Legal Aspect

With respect to the question of control, Japan designated territory in its possession as of the time it promulgated its constitution in 1889, as *naichi* 内地 (inner land, or Japan proper) and subsequent acquisitions as *gaichi* 外地 (outer lands). People of the *naichi* were called *naichijin* 內地人. The others were not called *gaichijin* 外地人, however, but variously *hontōjin* 本島人 (main island people) for Taiwan, *Chōsenjin* 朝鮮人 or *hantōjin* 半島人 (peninsula people) for Korea, *dojin* 土人 (natives) for South Sakhalin, *Shinajin* 支那人 (Chinese) for the Kwantung territory (or, after 1932, *Manshūkokujin* 滿洲國人 or, for short, *Manjin* 滿人), and *tōmin* 島民 (islanders) for the original inhabitants of the Pacific mandate territories. Along with these conventional terms were legal terms as well.<sup>10</sup>

Dream), rep. (Tokyo: Heibonsha 平凡社, 1967), 22-23.

<sup>9</sup> HASHIKAWA Bunzō 橋川文三, *Jun-gyaku no shisō: Datsu-A ron igo* 順逆の思想: 脫亞論以後 (Loyal and Treasonous Thoughts: After Datsu-A ron) (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1973), 33. See also BANNO Junji 坂野潤治, *Meiji: Shisō no jitsuzō* 明治: 思想の實像 (The Real Role of Meiji Thought) (Tokyo: Sōbun sha 創文社, 1977).

<sup>10</sup> KIYOMIYA Shirō 清宮四郎, *Gaichihō josetsu* 外地法序説 (Introduction to Gaichi Law) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku 有斐閣, 1944), 38.

The Japanese government made a clear legal distinction between *naichijin* and colonized peoples. First, the constitutional distinction.

Throughout Japan's colonial period, a problem never fully resolved was that of "whether the Imperial constitution applied to Japan's *gaichi*."

To summarize the range of views, there were the doctrinal extremes of ICHIMURA Mitsue 市村光惠's "fully inapplicable" (*zenmenteki hitsüyō setsu* 全面的非通用説) in his *The Imperial Constitution* and SASAKI Sōichi 佐々木惣一's "fully applicable" (*zenmenteki tsüyō setsu* 全面的通用説) in his *Essentials of the Japanese Constitution*; yet neither was a practical interpretation. The eclectic MINOBE Tatsukichi 美濃部達吉 (*A Commentary on the Constitution*), KURODA Satoru 黒田覺 (*The Japanese Constitution*), MIYAZAWA Toshiyoshi 宮澤俊義 (*Discourses on the Constitution*) took a "partially applicable" (*ichibu tsüyō setsu* 一部通用説) stance. These persons did not take the constitution as one and indivisible, but rather classified its articles into "territorial" (*zokuchiteki* 屬地的) and "non-territorial" (*hizokuchiteki* 非屬地的) groupings. The former applied only to Japan proper, they argued, not to colonial territories.<sup>11</sup>

The question of the constitution's applicability was extremely important for colonial territories. This is because the forms of control and the definition of people's rights and obligations are given shape in a constitution, and whether or not the position of the colonized is like that of the people of the home territory was to be decided in principle by the constitutional applicability question.

The Japanese government view when it began to acquire colonies was that the constitution did not apply. However, the government reversed its position—that is did apply—upon assuming actual control. The situation can be classified into three groups, by territory.

- (1) *South Sakhalin*. South Sakhalin was territory acquired from Russia by the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905. However, the whole of Sakhalin, initially inhabited by both Japanese and Russians, had become Russian territory by the 1875 Sakhalin-Kurile Islands Treaty of Exchange (*Karafuto-Chishima kōkan jōyaku* 樺太千島交換條約). Up to then it had been understood to be under Japanese sovereignty or, as it were, under joint Japan-Russia sovereignty. Through such special circumstances, South Sakhalin was incorporated into Japan's *naichi* in 1942, with the imperial constitution fully applicable.
- (2) *Korea and Taiwan*. Both were colonies, but they were territory in a narrow sense over which Japan exercised exclusive sovereignty. In spite of theoretical government view that the constitution automatically applied, in fact, when applying Japanese laws in whole or in part, these came to be formal-

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 63-76.

ly prescribed by imperial edict. That is to say, the laws of the Japanese *naichi* were not automatically applied to the colonial territories. In cases where separate laws were necessary, this was done in Korea through the regulations (*seirei* 制令) of the Government General of Korea and in Taiwan through the orders (*meirei* 命令) of the Government General of Taiwan.

- (3) *Kwantung Leased Territory and Pacific Mandated Islands*. As a leasehold and mandated territory, these were territory only in the broad sense and so the constitution did not automatically apply. Except for laws of the common-law sort which were directly enforced and budget matters provided for in the constitution, all legal matters were prescribed by edict under imperial prerogative.

In this way, Japan's *naichi* and *gaichi* constituted different legal spheres. And since the orders of high colonial officials had the force of law, it is clear that laws in the *gaichi* were harsher than in the *naichi*.

Toward the end of the colonial period, such policies as "extending the *naichi*" (*naichi enchōshugi* 內地延長主義), "assimilation" (*dōkashugi* 同化主義), and "impartiality" (*isshi-dōjin* 一視同仁) were adopted, but these were insufficient to wipe out legal discrimination embedded in Japan's fundamentally separate legal spheres.

### The Structures of Control: the Military Aspect

Because Japan maintained colonial rule over foreign peoples, it relied upon military and police coercion to establish control and preserve the peace. The intense resistance to this in Korea and Taiwan is particularly striking.

Japanese control of Korea spanned 40 years from the Resident General protectorate period of 1905, or 35 years from its annexation in 1910. Armed resistance in the early period was tremendous. In the five years from 1907 to 1911, up to 141,818 persons took part in the *gihei* 義兵 (righteous volunteers) movement, with up to 2,852 engagements.<sup>12</sup> To suppress this armed resistance, Japan's initial division-and-a-half army was increased after 1915 to two permanent army divisions plus over 13,000 military and regular police. The situation was not much different in the Kwantung territory after September 1906, when it changed from the military administration of the *Kantō sōtokufu* 關東總督府 to the civilian administration of the *Kantō totokufu* 關東都督府, and also in the land attached to the South Manchuria Railway

<sup>12</sup> Rekishigaku kenkyūkai, Nihonshi kenkyūkai 歷史學研究會, 日本史研究會, comp., *Kōza Nihonshi* 講座日本史 (A Series on Japanese History) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1978), 6:253.

Company 南滿洲鐵道. The military capability of the Kwantung Army, which got its start as a railway guard unit, was invariably required to preserve the peace.<sup>13</sup>

Although Taiwan was smaller than Korea in land area and population, the resistance was quite fierce. Japan gained paper possession of Taiwan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki 下關條約 of 1895, yet required more than five months to actually secure its control, with the dispatch of two army divisions and a standing naval squadron (the later combined fleet). More than 10,000 died on the Taiwan side.<sup>14</sup> It is not known how many Taiwanese were injured in 1896-97. According to GOTŌ Shimpei 後藤新平, chief civilian administrator of the Taiwan Government-General, 11,950 Taiwanese "rebels" (*hanto* 叛徒) were slain by Japanese authorities in the five years from 1898 to 1902.<sup>15</sup> The Tapani (Seiraian) Incident of 1915 capped the anti-Japanese armed resistance movement which had continued intermittently for 20 years. 866 of 1,413 persons arrested in that incident received death sentences. But of these, 703 were commuted to life sentences.<sup>16</sup> The Taiwan Government-General's handling of this incident was abominable, and the Japanese government was unable to refute the statement by Dietman NAKANO Seigō 中野正剛 before the 44th Diet session that, "During the so-called bandit expedition, and entire village of 20,000 men and women was utterly destroyed."<sup>17</sup>

When the Meiji government established its initial six *chindai* 鎮臺 or garrisons, the chief purpose of the military was to maintain domestic peace. Domestic peace followed the Seinan War 西南戰爭. With that, the purpose of the military changed to preparedness for foreign wars. In 1888, the name *chindai* was changed to *shidan* 師團 (division). The constitution made provision for martial law, but the maintenance of domestic peace was chiefly carried out through police powers. The institution of martial law and the use of troops to preserve the peace was limited to the rice riots of 1918, the February 26th (1936) incident, and the like.

In the Pacific territories, South Sakhalin, and the Kwantung territory, police

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

<sup>14</sup> INŌ Kanori 伊能嘉矩, *Taiwan bunka shi* 臺灣文化志 (Cultural History of Taiwan) 2 (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin 刀江書院, 1928), 980.

<sup>15</sup> GOTŌ Shimpei 後藤新平, with commentary by NAKAMURA Akira 中村哲, *Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan: Nihon bōchō ron* 日本植民政策一斑：日本膨脹論 (A Comment on Japanese Colonial Policies: Japanese Expansion) (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha 日本評論社, 1935), 64.

<sup>16</sup> Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 臺灣總督府警務局, comp., *Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi* 臺灣總督府警察沿革誌 (A Chronicle of Police Work of the Taiwan Government-General), 2/1 (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 臺灣總督府警務局, 1938), 829.

<sup>17</sup> Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hōkika 外務省條約局法規課, comp., *Taiwan ni shikō subeki hōrei ni kansuru hōritsu (rokujūsan hō, sanjūichi hō oyobi hō sangō) no gijiroku* 臺灣ニ施行スヘキ法令ニ關スル法律 (六三法,三一法及び法三號) の議事録 (Proceedings on Laws no. 63, 31, 3, Relating to Ordinances to Be Enforced in Taiwan) (Tokyo: Gaimushō jōyakukyoku hōkika 外務省條約局法規課, 1966), 401.

powers alone were sufficient to preserve the peace, as in the *naichi*. But in Taiwan and Korea, not only was the governor general (*sōtoku* 總督) an active duty army officer until 1919, but the police (*keisatsu* 警察) and military police (*kempei* 憲兵) were one and the same. A civilian governor general was appointed in the major reforms of the HARA Kei (Takashi) 原敬 cabinet of 1919, which also formally separated the police and military police. But both the *kempei* and police officers could exercise peace-police and judicial-police powers over the common people, and in the event of riots, the army was immediately called up. The land attached to the South Manchuria Railway was exposed to constant threat of attack by *bazoku* 馬賊 (mounted bandits) up to about 1935, and so the exercise of military force—not merely its existence—was indispensable for maintaining the colonial system.

### The Structures of Control: the Political Aspect

Japan did not extend the right to vote to colonized persons. Despite the fact that Imperial Japan and Korea were formally amalgamated (*gappō* 合邦), the franchise enjoyed by Japanese was not extended to Koreans. The voting law of the Diet applied only to the home country. Japan decided to put voting laws into effect in Korea and Taiwan under the provisional amended voting law of the Diet promulgated on April 1, 1945, near the war's end. But with Japan's defeat, these never saw the light of day. At least in the case of non-elective peers, two days after promulgation, seven Koreans and three Taiwanese were so appointed under the amended House of Peers 貴族院 law. However, time had run out. Before these ten peers could undertake any political activity, the war ended in defeat.

However, because the pre-amended voting laws were territorial laws applying to persons in Japan proper, Japanese who went to *gaichi* areas such as Korea or Taiwan, though remaining Japanese, could no longer enjoy rights under these laws. Conversely, after living in Japan proper for two years or more, Taiwanese or Koreans could legally obtain the right to vote for Diet members, provided they met the legal requirements such as the amount of taxes paid. However, to the vast majority of colonized peoples settled in colonial areas, such privilege had no relevance. The practical problem remains that no cases are known of colonials living in Japan proper for the requisite time who actually exercised their franchise.<sup>18</sup>

Colonial peoples were also severely discriminated against in appointment as government officials. In making official appointments within the Government-General of Korea, the following unwritten laws are said to have operated:

1. As much as possible avoid engaging Korean government officials.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 419.

2. If unavoidable circumstances necessitate the appointment of a Korean, by all means exclude persons with scientific ability.
3. Do not appoint Korean officials to important positions.<sup>19</sup>

On top of this, it was common for the remuneration of Japanese government officials to be more than three times that of Korean officials.<sup>20</sup>

Appointment to high level bureaucratic posts in Taiwan was similarly restricted. In fifty years of colonial rule, not one Taiwanese was appointed to a bureau chief (*kyokuchō* 局長) level post within the Taiwan Government-General, and a mere single individual became a section head (*kachō* 課長). Not one was named county head (*ken chiji* 縣知事). And only toward the end of the period were a mere handful appointed to the lower level *gunshu* 郡守 (subcountry head) under the country head.

### Improvements in the colonies

The Japanese colonial period witnessed the continued rapid advance of industry in the Japanese home islands. Japan also worked to improve the economies of its colonial territories and, accordingly, colonial industries also developed greatly.

First, let us look at Taiwan. Before becoming a colonial possession, Taiwan was known only for its agricultural products, chiefly rice, sugar and tea, and as a principal supplier of camphor. Besides these, it produced only small quantities of gold and coal. Within a fifty-year period, it achieved remarkable advances in every area of agriculture, forestry, and marine products. These were the gifts of technological improvements and irrigation works. Of special note was industrial development. Textiles, chemicals, foodstuffs, metals, and machine industries flourished. Above all, productivity in the sugar industry took a great leap through the employment of modern equipment.

Twenty-five years after Taiwan's colonization, in 1921, Taiwan had 2,841 factories, and industrial production reached ¥140 million. In 1941, the year of the outbreak of the Pacific War 太平洋戰爭, there were 8,683 factories and an industrial production of ¥660 million.<sup>21</sup> Sugar production which stood at 18,000 tons in 1902 had reached 680,000 tons by 1939.<sup>22</sup> One factor underlying this industrial development

<sup>19</sup> Park Yinshik 朴殷植, Kang Toksang 姜德相, tr., *Chōsen dokuritsu undō no kesshi* 朝鮮獨立運動の血史 (The Bloody History of Korean Independence Movement) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1975), 1:79.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Taiwan sheng hsing-cheng-chang-kuan kung-shu t'ung-chi shih 臺灣省行政長官公署統計室, comp., *Taiwan sheng wu-shih-i nien lai t'ung-chi t'i-yao* 臺灣省五十一年來統計提要 (Statistical Synopsis of Taiwan Province over the Past 51 Years) (Taipei: Taiwan sheng hsing-cheng-chang-kuan kung-shu t'ung-chi shih, 1946), 763-778.

was electric power. Taiwan, which did not have a single power plant at the time of its colonization, had 150 plants by 1941, generating half a million kilowatts of power.<sup>23</sup>

Taiwan has always had some fine natural harbors. Modern equipment and port construction made it possible for large vessels to dock, contributing to Taiwan's foreign trade. Takao (Kaohsiung) in particular developed into one of the world's leading ports.

The twenty or thirty kilometers of narrow gauge, 0.762-meter track of 1894 were all converted under Japanese rule to 1.067-meter track and, by 1945, Taiwan's railway system extended 1,452 kilometers.<sup>24</sup> Along with roads, railways contributed not only to Taiwan's industrial development but by moving people back and forth brought together previously isolate villages and helped give shape to the social entity "Taiwan".

Nor can we neglect advances in education. Chinese *shuyuan* 書院 and other private schools of Confucian learning existed in pre-1895 Taiwan. Japan introduced lower, intermediate and higher institutions of education. Of particular note was Taihoku (Taipei) Imperial University 臺北帝國大學, modeled after the University of Tokyo 東京帝國大學 and on a grand scale. The various schools were separate for Taiwanese, but from 1922, all but elementary education became integrated for Taiwanese and Japanese. Particularly significant was that elementary education became compulsory, offering even the children of poor families a chance for education. The rate of school attendance of school-aged Taiwanese children reached 71.3 percent in 1943.<sup>25</sup>

The development of Korea is similarly apparent. After Japan established its Residency General (*sōkanfu* 總監府) in Korea in 1906, it set up the Central Testing Laboratory (*Chūō shikenjo* 中央試驗所) and carried out various studies and surveys. It also established organs for industrial education and endeavored to cultivate knowledge and technology. As a result, rather large scale industries in textiles, sugar, cement, and canning came into being. After 1916, large scale power projects, nitrogen fixation plants, metals industry, and fertilizer production were founded. Industrial production which stood at no more than ¥15 million in 1911 had reached ¥1.5 billion by 1939, a nearly 100 fold increase.<sup>26</sup>

One could say that South Sakhalin, virtually untouched before 1905, saw various enterprises flourish for the first time as a result of Japanese measures. Besides the main pulp industry, there were brewing and canning industries. In 1918, industrial

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 814.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 818-820.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 1147.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 1241.

<sup>26</sup> Takumu daijin kambō bunshōka 拓務大臣官房文書課, comp., *Takumu yōran: Shōwa 15 nen han* 拓務要覽：昭和15年版 (Handbook of Colonial Affairs, 1940) (Tokyo: Zaidan hōjin Nihon takushoku kyōkai 財團法人日本拓殖協會, 1941), 288.

production stood at ¥18 million and overall production at ¥37 million. By 1939 industrial production had reached ¥150 million and overall production nearly ¥300 million.<sup>27</sup>

Colonial economic development sustained by Japanese capital was common; for this reason, development often resembles economic exploitation by the mother country. However, accompanying industrial growth were considerable benefits to the colonized peoples, benefits that outlasted colonialism itself, from increased employment opportunities and acquisition of technological skills to a rise in the standard of living.

As for Japan's many vices as a conqueror, these were no different from the vices of European conquerors in their Asian colonies. There was one respect, however, in which Japan differed from European rulers. That was in the earnestness of Japanese efforts to achieve what was thought of as the modernization of its colonial territories. Japanese educators took up school posts deep in the lawless Taiwan mountains carrying swords and pistols, in order to propagate compulsory education. The South Manchuria Railway Company felt that elementary school teachers needed more than just a middle-level education (*chūtō kyōiku* 中等教育). Normal schools (*shihan gakkō* 師範學校) of the *naichi* were middle-level (*chūtō gakkō* 中等學校) at that time, and so the SMR established a higher-level educational technical school (*kyōiku semmon gakkō* 教育專門學校), and would not employ as teachers in its elementary schools any who had not completed higher-level education (*kōtō kyōiku* 高等教育). (In Japan proper—the *naichi*—it was not until after the Pacific War that elementary school teachers were selected only from among higher-education graduates). In Taiwan, in order to hold down the number of new opium addicts, the police were given full powers of control, and by the 1930s, opium addiction had practically disappeared from Taiwan. A similar policy was instituted in Manchuria, where the number of opium smokers was greatly reduced. (This is not to deny the fact of large scale secret traffic in opium in the Peking-Tientsin area in the 1930s, sheltered by the Japanese army and nurtured by secret Japanese army funds.)

One might draw an historical analogy between the radical “modernization” policy of Japanese colonial officials and that of the New Dealers who had a hand in US occupation policy in Japan in 1945. They carried out radical policies in Japan that could not have worked in the US.

### Dual roles

What was the Chinese view of Japan as it fought the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05? Dugald Christie, a Scottish medical doctor who had lived in Mukden for many

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 296-298.

years and spoke Chinese fluently, writes about the war:

Throughout the war the sympathies of the Chinese were no doubt on the side of Japan... The justice and mercy of the Japanese at the time of the previous (Sino-Japanese) war had been extolled, all excesses forgotten. The victors had now a great opportunity of making lasting friends of these Manchurian farmers, so often harried by war, who were eager to hail them as brethren and deliverers.<sup>28</sup>

Then the war came to an end. Christie continues:

But whatever their leaders and higher officials might aim at, the ordinary Japanese soldiers and civilians who came to Manchuria were incapable of realizing this position. A great nation had been defeated, Japan was exalted and supreme. China was nothing. They came not as deliverers but as victors, and treated the Chinese with contempt as a conquered people... Then with peace came crowds of the lowest and most undesirable part of the Japanese nation. The Chinese continued to suffer as before, and the disappointment made their resentment the more keen.<sup>29</sup>

This one brief description by an observer on the scene is suggestive of the dual Japanese role and experience in colonial and occupied areas.

First, the Russo-Japanese War had a jarring impact on the ruled and conquered peoples of the world, from Poland in the west to the Philippines in the east. Modern Japan, which before the war had already captivated the hearts of such fighters for independence as Kim Ok-kyun 金玉均, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, Huang Hsing 黃興, Phan Boi-chau, José Rizal, and Emilio Aguinaldo, came to be regarded as a trustworthy friend by even more independence fighters and revolutionaries. In this way, Artemio Ricarte, U Ottama, Rash Behari Bose and others counted upon Japan's firm support in their various independence struggles.

Second, with the exceptions of Taiwan and Korea, not only in Manchuria but in most other areas, Japanese troops were deliverers, and occupation by the Japanese army was "liberation" (*kaihō* 解放). Even the 1931 occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese army was regarded by most residents as liberation from the despotism of Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良. It was the universal experience of Japanese soldiers who advanced into such areas as French Indochina, the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia that the Japanese army was welcomed by the local people as a liberation army.

<sup>28</sup> Dugald Christie, *Thirty Years in Moukden, 1888-1913* (London: James Clarke, 1914), 182-194.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 194-195.

Third, to the extent that this liberation army was the national army of Imperial Japan 大日本帝國國軍, national interests always took precedence over the great cause of liberation. And so, exactly as Christie points out, the Japanese army was instantly transformed into the new conquerors. Incipient nationalism is readily transformed into expansionism, and early on Meiji nationalism was transformed into Japanese imperialism. Asianism strengthened the tendency to place Japan in the position as leader of Asia's liberation. With that, Asian interests came to be identified with Japanese interests. Japanese colonial rule was all the more legitimized in Japanese eyes when world history was viewed as a confrontation between haves and have-nots. As much as power permits, the special rights of the conqueror are protected.<sup>30</sup> However often one notes the fact that Japan's colonial policies were somehow more "modern" than other colonial powers, one cannot write off the stark reality that Japan was "ruler" in its colonial territories.

Nor does this deny that there were movements like the East Asian League (*Tōaremmei* 東亞聯盟) in support of self-rule for Taiwan and Korea. However, such movements had no more than a meager influence upon Japanese government policies. The Japanese government did grant independence to the occupied Philippines and Burma when the international situation during the Pacific War came to require it—albeit only formal independence. Yet to the end, Japan refused to grant independence to Indonesia. The reason is that Japan required Indonesia's natural resources.

Modern Japan's double role as liberator and conqueror of colonial territories resembles Napoleon, whose armies in Italy and Spain initially appeared as a liberation army aiding the bourgeois revolution against feudal authority, but at the same time functioned as an occupation army and conqueror. Of these two roles, the conqueror role is most pronounced. And so, accordingly, one could say that Japan's strongest push for the desired "modernization" was in the colonies it most firmly controlled: Taiwan and Korea.

## Conclusion

The shading of the above dual role seems to vary with the extent of contact with Japan.

Ever since Meiji, the dream of Asia's liberation had captivated both the government and people of Japan and, moreover, had a strong persuasive power among foreigners as well. British India knew only the reputation of Japan as a liberation army, but not the reality of Japan as an occupying force. Thus, the conqueror aspect

<sup>30</sup> For example, at the same time that Japanese were spouting the slogan *gozoku kyōwa* 五族協和 (harmony among the five races) when *Manshūkoku* 滿洲國 was founded, they continued to enjoy extraterritorial rights in that new country.

of Japan's double role was very slight in India. For that reason, Indians place main emphasis on "liberation" as Japan's historical role. Among all the justices on the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo for the Far East, the Indian justice alone declared "not guilty", and a military tribunal to try Indians who had cooperated with the Japanese army ultimately failed to materialize in India. Every country of Southeast Asia which experienced Japanese army rule during the four Pacific War years experienced the disillusionment of the Japanese army, welcomed as a liberator, turning out to be a conqueror. Particularly in those areas that became battlefields, the army used the harsh measures of the conqueror, and so only the images of tyranny in the final days of the war and battlefield atrocities persist in the imagination.

At the end of the Pacific War, when the situation turned adverse, the Japanese government worked hard to maintain somehow its rule and occupation within an adverse international environment. As a result, rights in occupied territories were largely restored. "Independence" was granted in Southeast Asia and, in China, foreign extraterritorial rights and concession areas were relinquished. Mortally weakened, Japan concealed its face as conqueror and again brought to the fore its face as liberator.

However, in the colonies themselves, an utterly different policy was adopted. That is to say, the assimilation movement (*dōka undō* 同化運動). Slogans like *naisen ittai* 內鮮一體 (Japan-Korea unification) and *kōminika* 皇民化 (to become imperial subjects) became the principles running through colonial policy near the war's end. Consistently, the policy was to bring the rights of colonized peoples closer into line with *naichi-jin*. Of course, the *kōminika* movement did not get so far as to cause the collapse of Taiwanese and Korean national identities. For with defeat came the severing of Japanese rule.

Finally, to compare Taiwan and Korea, the Taiwanese feeling towards Japan is almost without exception friendly; by contrast, the Korean anti-Japanese feeling is surprisingly strong. There are many reasons for this. One is that Taiwan being an island, it was difficult to form underground anti-Japanese organizations in the Japanese colonial era; by contrast, Korea, with land links to the mainland, had active underground anti-Japanese organizations. Thus, it was easy to nurture anti-Japanese feelings. Anti-Japanese education under the postwar president Syngman Rhee regime was formidable. Because the Taiwanese met in the postwar with a new conqueror from the mainland more despotic than the Japanese, this gave rise to nostalgia for the Japanese era. More precise political and psychological studies of this phenomenon deserve to be made.

## Chapter XII TWO FACES OF JANUS: THE ROLE OF JAPANESE ACTIVISTS IN MODERN ASIAN HISTORY

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Japanese attitudes toward the bourgeois revolution in China, in terms of two hypothetical frameworks; the "center-periphery relationship" and the "love-hate syndrome."

### 1. US and Europe as "Center"; Japan as "Periphery"

The more I study modern history, the more curious does the behavior of the Japanese people seem. During World War II, we made the liberation of Asia our national goal, declaring it our mission to fight against domination by the white race. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, most Japanese did not feel quite right about the protracted war that had been going on against China. Then, when word came of their country's declaration of war against the United States and Britain on December 8, it was as if a dark cloud overhead had suddenly lifted. IWANAMI Shigeo 岩波茂雄 (1881-1946), the founder of Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店 Publishers, who had stubbornly refused to comply with army requests for donations before the Pacific War, suddenly became very cooperative, saying it was a different matter if the war was to be against Britain and the United States. During the war, so virulent was the hatred of the white race that anyone who showed the least kindness toward a white person taken captive was subject to fierce criticism.

Then, in the summer of 1945, Japan surrendered, and the people's hatred for the white race seemed to evaporate overnight. They submitted quietly to the occupation of their country by the white soldiers from the United States. On General Douglas MacArthur's birthday, only a few months after the surrender, a large group of Japanese elementary school boys and girls, led by their teachers, gathered in front of general headquarters to sing "Happy Birthday" to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. In 1950, during the early stages of the Korean War, MacArthur planned the occupation of the whole Korean peninsula, but President Truman, fearing such a bold policy would provoke China, prompting it to send in troops, strongly opposed him. Later, even as he faced a large-scale Chinese intervention,

\* This is a paper presented at the 79th Annual Meeting, Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 13-17, 1986. Like the preceding chapter, it discusses the dual character of those who are called activists for Asian liberation in Japanese modern history similar to the two faces of Janus: the face of liberator and the face of conqueror.

MacArthur advocated strong retaliatory measures against China, strongly criticizing Washington's cautious attitude. Truman eventually removed MacArthur from command, and there was a group of Japanese at the time that started a movement to build a shrine dedicated to MacArthur, although it was not made a reality. During the American Occupation, most Japanese were quite obedient to Occupation policies, even more so than the Americans themselves.

Among Japanese intellectuals, there were, and still are, many devoted admirers of France. They dream of Paris, memorize its street names and idealize the city as if it were their own hometown. When they speak of France, they often become quite carried away with emotion, and in their complaints about the faults of Japan, they invariably compare it with France. There are also many Japanese worshippers of Great Britain. Some of them believe the works of Shakespeare are the greatest achievements in world literature, and have only contempt for people who have not read them. They scorn American English, and strive to master an Oxford accent—rarely with success.

But on the reverse side of this professed devotion to Western culture exists a strong urge to rival it. MORI Ōgai 森鷗外 (1862-1922), novelist and physician, was among the Japanese intellectuals most familiar with Europe during the Meiji 明治 era (1868-1912), and even he felt an intense resistance to the predominance of Europe. His feelings are expressed in a short story entitled *Daihakken* 大発見 (A Great Discovery), which can be summarized as follows:

A young medical student goes to Germany to study. Upon paying a courtesy call on the Japanese minister in Berlin, he is asked what he has come to study. He answers that he has come to study public hygiene, only to encounter the minister's scornful reply, "What a surprise. What do people who walk around in straw sandals and pick their noses need with public hygiene?" The young man, who does not represent the upper crust of Japanese society like the minister, is greatly offended. From that day on, he devotes himself singlemindedly to determining if Europeans ever wore straw sandals or picked their noses. It is not long until he learns that people in Rome once wore straw sandals similar to those used in Japan, but he does not see a single European picking his or her nose during his stay in Europe, nor does he come across such a person described in any form of European literature. More than ten years pass, and then he makes the "great discovery" in a book by Danish author Gustav Wied of a scene depicting a sailor picking his nose. The story ends with his exclamation, "Look! Viscount so-and-so, ex-minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary, here is a sailor pulling a great wad of snot from his nose while chatting away at a bar. Europeans, too, pick their noses!"

## 2. China as “Center”; Japan as “Periphery”

Japan has also stood in the periphery of Chinese civilization for two thousand years. The Chinese were the earliest people in East Asia to engage in agriculture, and the Han 漢 people used the enormous wealth they accumulated thereby to build a great civilization. The Chinese empire remained the center of East Asian civilization, and its overwhelming cultural predominance exerted pervasive influence over the Japanese archipelago for two millennia.

The Japanese looked up to China as the center of civilization and as the “land of the sages.” It was a country that filled them with ambivalence and a sense of inferiority on the one hand and strong feelings of resistance and rivalry on the other. A good example of the latter is illustrated by the song, “Hakurakuten 白樂天 (Po Chu-I)”, written by the Noh 能 playwright Zeami 世阿彌 (1363-1443). Po Chu-I 白居易 (772-846) was a great T’ang 唐 dynasty poet. The song recounts how Po is ordered by the Chinese emperor to go to Japan and determine the level of intelligence of its people. He lands on the coast of Kyūshū 九州, and there encounters a venerable fisherman. After they have introduced themselves, the fisherman suggests that they match their skills in composing poetry. For each Chinese poem Po composes, the fisherman promptly comes up with a Japanese poem. After repeating this several times, the old man proposes a dancing match. He dances with exceeding grace to ethereal music, and then tells Po how futile it is to try to test the wisdom of the Japanese. Deeply moved by the fisherman’s words, the Chinese poet sails back to China, not even knowing the old man’s name. According to the song, the fisherman was an incarnation of the god Sumiyoshi 住吉明神. It is a clear expression of Zeami’s strong resistance to the domination of Chinese civilization.<sup>1</sup>

Rumors of the rapid weakening of Ch’ing 清 China (1616-1912) in the wake of the Opium War 阿片戦争 and reports of its defeat by the Western powers began to reach Nagasaki 長崎, the only port through which Japan maintained contact with the outside world, in the early 1840s. As the news spread, Japanese intellectuals throughout the country experienced a sense of enormous shock. Handwritten copies of *Afuyōibun* 阿芙蓉彙聞 (Opium Notes), a collection of information gathered in Nagasaki on the Opium War (1839-42) between China and Britain, are preserved in libraries throughout Japan even today. These documents give us an idea of the eagerness of educated Japanese to know more about what was going on outside their country.

Prior to the Meiji Restoration (1868), in the 1850s and 1860s, a small number of


<sup>1</sup> HIRAKAWA Sukehiro 平川祐弘, *Yōkyoku no shi to Seiyō no shi* 謡曲の詩と西洋の詩 (Noh Song Poems and Western Poems) (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1975), 199ff. Zeami 世阿彌 was a Noh playwright of the early Muromachi 室町 period (1336-1573). He authored numerous Noh plays and songs, helping to make the classic dance-drama a refined art. He also expounded on the theory of art.

Japanese had the opportunity to see the situation in China for themselves. The country was in profound political and social turmoil resulting from the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion 太平天國 (1851-64), and in Shanghai they witnessed the haughty arrogance with which the British and French troops stationed there treated the Chinese people. After seeing the reality of the empire that had once been Japan's great teacher, it was not long before Japanese respect for China turned into disappointed contempt. It is often said that the Japanese began to despise the Chinese people after their victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, but historical sources indicate that a feeling of contempt for China had begun to spread among informed Japanese as early as the 1860s.

### 3. Love-Hate Syndrome

Whenever two different cultures meet, friction occurs. The frictions may be mild or intense, depending on the mode of the encounter, the pace with which the contact grows, and the degree of pressure one side exerts on the other. Mild friction may mean that either side, or both, experiences a sense of wonder, interest, fascination, and willingness to understand. When the degree of friction grows intense, love and hate become mingled. The former travels step-by-step from awe, intimidation, submission, to adoration. Hate begins with contempt, evolves into self-confidence, then to a feeling of superiority, discrimination against the other, and refusal of contact, and culminates with the urge to destroy the other (see Figure 1). The intense friction resulting from the encounter between two different cultures is what I call the "love-hate syndrome."

Figure XII-1 Degree of Misunderstanding



At first, one might think that adoration and submission represent the least degree of friction, but this is not the case. They are linked to the denial of the culture in which one has been raised and of its intrinsic value. In other words, adoration and submission are essentially self-denial, and this arouses psychological complex and violent tensions in the subconscious.

The better a nation understands another nation, the less serious the love-hate syndrome. For example, although there are always disagreements stemming from conflicts of interest between England and France or between Canada and United States, the degree of bilateral misunderstanding is small, so the love-hate ambivalence rarely flares up between them. On the other hand, between Poland and Russia, between Japan and China, or between Japan and Korea, for example, the degree of misunderstanding is large due to psychological complexes that exist despite geographical proximity, or rather because of that proximity.

Misunderstanding is an unavoidable phenomenon in human society. The idyllic love between a young couple is almost invariably accompanied by some degree of mutual misunderstanding. If, on the national level, the misunderstanding escalates into a pathological complex, it can be the cause of international disputes. I believe that the hypothetical framework of the "love-hate syndrome" helps better explain the attitude of the Japanese people of the Meiji era toward the Chinese revolution.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4. Asia and Europe

The Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century marked a turning point in world history. Prior to that time, Northeast Asia was more powerful than Europe. For example, when Russian troops moved into Eastern Siberia in the mid-seventeenth century and built a fortress at Albazin, they fought with the armies of the Ch'ing dynasty. The struggles entered a stalemate, but ultimately the Ch'ing troops using Aihun on the Amur River as their base, slew the Albazin commander, and forced the fortress to surrender. Under the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689 the area became part of Chinese territory. The military strength of the Ch'ing dynasty was overwhelming in those days, and through that power Chinese civilization held ultimate sway throughout the Northeast Asian region. The Ch'ing Empire lay in the center, and those areas within the reach of its military power were either made part of its territories or, like Inner and Outer Mongolia, were made subordinate states. The areas outside the reach of Chinese military influence were made tributary states by the force of China's traditional civilization. The tributary states included the Yi 李 dynasty in Korea, the Annam 安南 dynasty in Vietnam, as well as kingdoms of Burma and the

<sup>2</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤 藩吉, "Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations," *Journal of International Affairs* 37/1 (Summer 1983), 49ff. Included in this volume as chapter 1.

Ryukyus 琉球. Beyond these areas were other countries, like Japan, that accepted Chinese civilization and maintained friendly relations with China. This pattern of power relations created a stable international system in the region.

European ships had made their way to Canton 廣州 by the seventeenth century in search of silk and tea, and trade with China flourished. The important fact here is that the East India companies of European countries accepted the international order centering on the Ch'ing dynasty in Northeast Asia, and insinuated themselves into that system. The European countries were all treated as tributary states of China under the Canton trade system, and were forced to act as such. The characters used to denote the names of the European countries in Ch'ing official documents were those with the radical for "mouth" on the lefthand side. Attachment of this radical was an indication of contempt.

Then, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution occurred in Western Europe. The American War of Independence, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic wars were accompanied by considerable technological innovation in the field of weaponry. Cannon began to be made of steel, giving them much longer shooting range. Through skillful use of cannon, the former artillery commander Napoleon Bonaparte was able to conquer the whole of Europe. Warships, though still propelled by sail, began to travel faster, and could be maneuvered far more efficiently. Equipped with the new cannons, their fighting capacity tremendously increased.

Until the eighteenth century China's postal system and its roads were superior to those in Western Europe. In Western Europe at that time, as told in *A Tale of Two Cities* by Charles Dickens, security was so poor that even on main highways such as that between London and Dover coachmen had to carry firearms to ward off attacks by robbers. China under the Ch'ing and Japan under the Tokugawa 德川 were both far safer.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, things had changed completely. In Europe, roads underwent rapid improvement and sewer systems were built in the cities, and as modern nation-states became established, public security vastly improved. Meanwhile in China, there was little change. On the contrary, the outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion 白蓮教徒の亂 in 1795 toward the end of the long reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor 乾隆帝 (r. 1736-95), threw the dynasty into financial difficulty. Internal strife continued, aggravating domestic peace, and the decline of the Ch'ing became manifest.

The military strength of the Western powers in Northeast Asia gradually became superior to that of the Ch'ing. When Lord Amherst visited Peking as an envoy of the English king in 1816, and insisted on diplomatic treatment on the equal footing of independent states, he was immediately driven out of Peking. This incident was the last successful case in which China managed to maintain the traditional China-centered international system in the region. Afterwards, the harder it strug-

gled to maintain the system, the stronger the pressure from the West to break it down became.

After the industrial revolution, the weaponry of the Western powers rapidly grew stronger, quickly surpassing that of China. In the 1830s, 700-ton or 800-ton warships made in Europe and the United States began appearing in large numbers, whereas the best Chinese warships were only 50-tons. One Western warship was more than a match for several dozen Chinese warships. The Opium War of 1840-42 occurred with this change in the military balance of power as the backdrop, and troubles, both internal and external, continued to torment the Middle Kingdom, including the Arrow War アロー號戰爭 (1856), the T'ai ping Rebellion, and the Sino-French War 清佛戰爭 (1884-85).

The news of the Opium War was quick to reach Japan. Japanese intellectuals understood that the world was governed by the rule of the survival of the fittest, that the strong would prey upon the weak. A nation must be strong in order to survive in international society; this was an understanding held by Japan, or rather, by all the Northeast Asian countries.

Toward the end of the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), opinion was divided over which path Japan should choose: to continue its 200-odd year isolation, or to abandon it. Those supporting the continuation of isolation argued that the Ch'ing dynasty had been defeated by the West because its traditional Confucian system had grown corrupt. The Chinese had indulged in petty trade with the Europeans through Canton and this had been its undoing. Japan's only defense against a strong Europe was to shut itself up into the shell of tradition, they argued. And when Westerners arrived at Japan's shores, they should be driven away. The more naive "expel the barbarians 攘夷" advocates believed that all Japanese had to do was to put any foreigner that set foot in their land to the sword. Those who were slightly more realistic said that since Western weapons were superior, they should be bought, copied, and used to expel the foreigners. By contrast, those who called for an end to isolation declared that Japan must open its doors and introduce the superior technology of the West in order to defend itself from Western invasion.

In discussing the "expel the barbarian" and "opening of the ports" doctrines, school textbooks on modern Japanese history often give the impression that there was a vast disparity between these two schools of thought. In fact, however, there was a broad consensus at the time that the international system was one in which only those countries that possessed strong armaments would survive. Both sides shared the same objective i.e., strengthening their country and defending it. They differed only in the method they thought would be most effective.

It was, therefore, not surprising that some leaders advocated both the opening of the ports and the expulsion of foreigners at different times and in different contexts. One was TAKASUGI Shinsaku 高杉晉作 (1839-67), a man who had enormous influence over many of the leading architects of the Meiji Restoration. TAKASUGI

had a keen sense of realism in politics, and he skillfully discriminated between the two doctrines. During a short stay in Shanghai, where he was visiting for the first time, he wrote in his diary that Japan should expand foreign trade by sending many ships to London and Washington, and it was not long after returning to Japan from Shanghai that he plotted a scheme with other exclusionists to set fire to the British legation in Edo 江戸.<sup>3</sup>

The ideal of expelling foreigners and that of opening Japan were only one step removed from one another. INOUE Kaoru 井上馨 (1835-1915) and ITŌ Hirobumi 伊藤博文 (1841-1909), both to become leaders in the Meiji government, are also good examples. Both went to England in their youth, leaving home as ardent exclusionists. The thirty-year-old INOUE was only a few days away from home when he changed his mind, experiencing with shock the huge size of foreign ship he saw and the large number gathered in the port of Shanghai. His biography, *Segai Inoue kō den* 世外井上公傳, gives us a glimpse of the turmoil going on his mind at that time.

Upon his arrival at Shanghai, INOUE was taken aback by immense activity of the port. Standing on the deck, he saw hundreds of ship—warships, steamboats, sailboats, etc.—crowding the harbor. There was a constant coming and going of ships. He had long believed that Japan should strengthen its navy and then expel the Westerners from the land, and had been glad that the idea largely accorded with the ideas of SAKUMA Shōzan 佐久間象山. He was, however, not very sure about driving out the foreigners. Now, coming to Shanghai and seeing what was going on here with his own eyes, he was profoundly impressed, and saw how wrong he had been. He came to believe that Japanese should realize the error of exclusionism and adopt a policy of opening their country; otherwise, he realized, there will be no hope of future prosperity for the country. On the contrary, isolation could bring the country to ruin.<sup>4</sup>

Young INOUE explained his change of mind to his friend ITŌ on board ship, and his reasons for arguing for the opening of the country. ITŌ abused him for changing his convictions only four or five days after leaving Japan,<sup>5</sup> but that did not stop INOUE from becoming an enthusiastic advocate of the opening of Japan. ITŌ, too, eventually changed his mind and devoted himself to Japan's modernization and westernization.

<sup>3</sup> TAKASUGI 高杉 (1839-1867) was a leading figure in the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa 德川 government on the eve of the Meiji Restoration 明治維新. He stayed in Shanghai for two months in 1862.

<sup>4</sup> Inoue Kaoru kō denki hensankai 井上馨侯傳記編纂會, *Segai Inoue kō den* 世外井上公傳 (A Biography of Marquis Inoue Kaoru), 5 vols. (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki kabushiki-gaisha 内外書籍株式會社, 1933), 1:90-91.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

### 5. Despotism Versus Freedom

Once it decided to establish diplomatic relations with Western powers and strengthen its national power by learning from them, Japan inevitably came under the strong influence of Western political systems and thought. And it was not long after the country embarked on a new path of European-style absolutism that Japan emerged as a modern state.

In the history of Japanese politics, the freedom and popular rights movement (FPRM) 自由民権運動 that arose in the early Meiji period is usually treated as progressive and positive force. However, among the popular rights movement activists were many, from the mid-Meiji era onward, who advocated Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland, and who spent the latter part of their lives on the continent as so-called *tairiku rōnin* 大陸浪人, or continental adventurers. For that reason, historians are divided over the Osaka Incident 大阪事件 of 1885, an abortive attempt to establish a constitutional polity in Japan and force reform in Korea. One of the plotters was Ōi Kentarō 大井憲太郎 (1843-1922), a leading figure in the popular rights movement. HIRANO Yoshitarō 平野義太郎 believes that the Osaka Incident was part of the campaign to liberate the Korean people from despotism.<sup>6</sup> This interpretation is in sharp contrast with the majority view that regards the Incident objectively as part of Japan's invasion of Korea, regardless of Ōi's private intentions.

Although Ōi's exploits have already been discussed at length, I must mention a few points with regard to him here. Most of the Japanese intellectuals who were witness to the national crisis leading to the fall of the Tokugawa government saw the world within the framework of power relations. Their conception of international society was one in which the stronger preyed upon the weak. To popular rights movement activists, the former was epitomized by despotism and the latter by freedom. The governments of Korea and Ch'ing China and the rule over Asian colonies by the Western powers represented despotism. The popular rights movement activists naturally argued for alliance with the weak and the struggle against despotism. In addition, they reasoned, since freedom was righteous, it was their duty to promote it even in neighboring countries. They became strong sympathizers with the antigovernment movements in Korea and China. The following is part of the statement Ōi made at his first trial following in the Osaka Incident:

Part of our intention was to effect reform in Japan, China, and other areas in Asia. The reason which the advocates of the freedom and popular rights movement take up weapons and join in anti-government struggles in Korea is chiefly because they wish to bring peace and happiness to the people suffering

<sup>6</sup> HIRANO Yoshitarō 平野義太郎, *Ōi kentarō* 大井憲太郎 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1965), 242-243.

there... Our action was derived from compassion, a spirit of mutual help; it was not aimed at war with the people... The Koreans are our brothers and sisters. Just as they may offer help to Japan, Japanese, too, must be ready to help them. There should be no suspicion of one who sees another people suffering, feels compassion toward them and wishes to help them. It is the person who does not respond that way that should be suspected. Korean customs are as uncivilized as those of Africa, and its penal codes are barbaric. This country is the closest neighbor of Japan in Asia. For Japan, to just watch and do nothing for them was unbearable to those of us who love freedom and equality, and our mind was made up to help them... Our struggle in Korea is not a war in the usual sense; it is directed not against the country itself nor against its people but against a handful of leaders there who are oppressing the people. An ordinary war could result in great misery in Korea; our plot could have brought it peace and happiness.

As this statement shows, Ōi and other popular rights movement leaders distinguished clearly between the feudalistic rulers of Korea and its people. In their view, the former was despotism and the latter was freedom. They saw nothing wrong with intervention in a foreign country as long as it was directed at the overthrow of despotism. When this so-called justice was combined with the “adolescent nationalism”<sup>7</sup> of Meiji Japanese, it released a tremendous force of popular energy that burst out not only in Korea but also in China.

At first, this energy contributed to promoting the liberation and independence of neighboring countries, but once lifted by the great tide of Japanese nationalism, it led Japan itself into confrontation with the peoples of the region as a despotic, colonial ruler. The history of any nation has its light and shadow, its glories and its shames, and modern Japanese history is no exception. Arrogant deeds and attitudes vis-à-vis neighboring countries cast a dark shadow over modern history.

A proper understanding of the light and shadow of modern Japanese history helps clarify why many of the supporters of freedom and popular rights joined in the vanguard of Japan’s expansionism on the Asian mainland as chauvinistic patriots in the mid-Meiji era. It goes against the facts of history to try to categorize certain figures as “expansionists” and others as “pan-Asianists.” The framework which determined a person’s attitude toward the world differed depending on whether his focus was on the East versus West axis or the despotism versus freedom axis. The majority of Japanese in the Meiji era, however, believed that making their country strong and wealthy would help the weak of the Orient to rise up against the strong West,

<sup>7</sup> On “adolescent nationalism,” see ETŌ Shinkichi, *Mukoku no tami to seiji* 無告の民と政治 (The Voiceless People and Politics), new edition (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1973), 105-106.

and that Japan's colonization of Taiwan and Korea was intended to introduce modern government and oust oppression.

Of course, their understanding was largely an illusion. The reality was much uglier. What happened was a recurring theme of historical development. Napoleon's troops entered Italy as a liberating force, but immediately turned into the oppressors. At the end of World War II, Russian troops made their way into Eastern Europe as a liberation army, but it was no time before they imposed the iron straitjacket of their own socialism on the region.

## 6. "Lips-and-Teeth" Relations

To the Japanese of the nineteenth century, China's torments both from within and from without were not simply another country's affair. TAKASUGI Shinsaku said, "Even the people of our country should pay more attention (to China)."<sup>8</sup> HIBINO Teruhiro 日比野輝寛, who visited Shanghai with TAKASUGI, also felt the crisis approaching his country and wrote, "The example of a country that failed across only a narrow strip of water is warning to us."<sup>9</sup> NATOMI Kaijirō 納富介次郎, another man who went to Shanghai with TAKASUGI, found among the refugees some seeking help from Japan, and wrote that Japan and China were as close as "lips and teeth," an ancient Chinese phrase symbolizing the identity of interests between two nations: if either one is ruined the other will collapse. NAOTOMI was the first to use this phrase, later to come into frequent use, in referring to relations between Japan and China.<sup>10</sup>

The idea that what was happening to China was a warning to Japan, that China and Japan shared a common fate in the face of Western aggression and that if China fell Japan would be next, came from the fear of Western encroachment. Japan and China were one and the same within the framework of East versus West.

KUSAKA Genzui 久坂玄瑞 (1840-64) and YOKOI Shōnan 横井小楠 (1809-69) were influential thinkers on the eve of the Meiji Restoration. They both argued, based on the "East-West" framework, that Japan should learn from the mistakes of China, but they differed in what they thought Japan should do. KUSAKA said

<sup>8</sup> TAKASUGI Shinsaku 高杉晉作, "Yū-shin goroku 遊清五錄 (Notes on the Visit to China)," in Tōkō Sensei gojūnensai kinenkai 東行先生五十年祭記念會, ed., *Tōkō Sensei ibun* 東行先生遺文 (Writings of Takasugi Shinsaku) (Tokyo: Min'yūsha 民友社, 1916), 79.

<sup>9</sup> Tōhō Gakujutsu Kyōkai 東方學術協會, ed., *Bunkiyū ninen Shanghai nikki* 文久二年上海日記 (The Shanghai Diary, 1862) (Osaka: Zenkoku shobō 全國書房, 1946), 65. HIBINO 日比野 was a Confucianist, and in his later years was professor at the Meirindō 明倫堂 in Nagoya 名古屋. HIBINO Takeo 日比野丈夫, the well-known specialist on Chinese historical geography and professor emeritus at Kyoto University 京都大學, is his descendant.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 18. NATOMI 納富 was samurai of the Saga 佐賀 domain.

Westerners should not be allowed on Japanese territory, while YOKOI advocated that Japan should be opened to the outside. In considering Sino-Japanese relations, all Japanese referred to the “East-West” confrontation, but their conclusions varied greatly from person-to-person and with the passage of time.

In the first half of the Meiji era, the natural reasoning of young Japanese was, in essence: In order to resist the pressure from the West, the East must grow strong. For the East to be strong, it was not sufficient for Japan alone to increase its strength; China, too, must be resuscitated and made strong again.

The Meiji diplomat, TAKEZOE Shin'ichirō 竹添進一郎 (1841-1917), traveled in China in 1876, and compared the weakened China to a patient who had caught a slight cold but whose condition had become serious because the doctor prescribed the wrong medical treatment. Given the right medicine, the patient would recover quickly, TAKEZOE declared.<sup>11</sup>

What did the Japanese think was the right prescription? These would-be doctors soon developed signs of the love-hate syndrome. Seeing China, which they had so long adored as the cultural leader of all Asia, so enfeebled, they suddenly began to despise the weakness and become absorbed in finding ways to resuscitate their ex-mentor nation. This was the psychological factor that brought many Japanese civilians, or *tairiku rōnin*, to China during the Meiji and Taishō 大正 eras.

## 7. The Thin Line: Assistance or Aggression

In 1915, then Prime Minister ŌKUMA Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1838-1922), presented the Twenty-one Demands to China. Less than twenty years before, in 1898, he had stated in a well-known address on “Chinese integrity”:

China is sleeping now. Awakened, its people are sure to unite. If some heroic men arise and inspire the people with enough patriotism and loyalty, the 400 million people will immediately become as devoted loyalists as any...The Chinese are different from Africans or Indians.

URA Keiichi 浦敬一 (1860-89), indignant at the Western aggression in Asia, decided to go and investigate the situation for himself. He set out alone on a journey to areas west of Lanchow 蘭州, a city in the central part of China and never returned. At first URA had believed that the invasion of the Western powers could be fought through “concerted and cooperative action”<sup>12</sup> between Japan and China. Later he

<sup>11</sup> See author's preface, TAKEZOE Shin'ichirō 竹添進一郎, *San'un kyōu nikki* 棧雲峽雨日記 (“Mountain Clouds and Valley Rains” Diary), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Keibundō 奎文堂, 1879).

<sup>12</sup> HANAWA Kunzō 塙薫藏, *Ura keiichi* 浦敬一 (Tokyo: Jumpū shoin 淳風書院, 1924), 81.

changed his mind completely. In 1884 he had concluded that China was “like a huge old tree consumed by worms.”<sup>13</sup> He considered it his lifetime mission to intervene in China, saying,

To hold out against the West, it is not necessary to make China part of Japanese territory; all we must do is to overthrow the Ch’ing dynasty, correct misgovernment, boost the morale of the Chinese people, build up their national strength, elicit their cooperation, and revive the strength of the Orient.<sup>14</sup>

MIYAZAKI Yazō 宮崎彌藏 (1866-96), an elder brother of MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天 wrote in 1886:

The world today is an arena of battle, in which the stronger win and prosper... The rights of the weak are trampled upon, and their strength diminishes pitifully day by day... Anyone who prizes human rights and respects freedom should seek ways to regain them... Whether we can win them back or not depends on China’s revival or fall. China has grown weak, but it has a vast land and a huge population. If bad government is rectified and the people are brought under wise and proper rein, not only can the forfeited rights of the yellow race be regained, but righteousness can be established throughout the world. All that is necessary is for heroic men capable of carrying out this great task to rise to the cause. I am determined to go to China to look for such men and persuade them to rise. If I find them, I will do whatever I can to help them. If I cannot find them, I will rise myself to undertake that mission.<sup>15</sup>

MIYAZAKI Yazō clearly saw the world in the framework of the East versus West confrontation, and believed that Japan and China shared a common fate. That led him to the urge to help Chinese heroes to overthrow the Ch’ing dynasty, or, if there were no such heroes, to take over China himself, all for the sake of resisting the West. This is the same kind of thinking entertained by Japanese government leaders. IWAKURA Tomomi 岩倉具視 (1825-83), for example, wrote:

China is in an advantageous position in Asia. Its population is far larger than that of any world power. It is an old country with relations as close to Japan as lips and teeth. China is now at its lowest ebb, but its rise or fall will have an enormous effect upon Japan. What we must do now is to promote our friendship and commercial trade with China as the first step toward expanding relation-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>15</sup> MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, *Sanjū-san-nen no yume* 三十三年の夢 (My Thirty-three Years’ Dream) reissued and revised edition, (Tokyo: Heibonsha 平凡社, 1967), 22-23.

ships with other countries in order of geographical proximity. We should take the opportunity to engage in some stratagem for the long-range future.<sup>16</sup>

## Conclusion

Japanese attitudes toward the outside world changed, depending on how they saw the world situation, whether it be in the framework of East versus West or of despotism versus freedom. Which framework received more emphasis depended on the individual and the changing times. The balance point was, in most cases the “adolescent nationalism” of Meiji Japanese.

There were exceptions, of course. MIYAZAKI Tōten (1870-1922), for example, remained as purely faithful to the Chinese Revolution of 1911 as he could. He had no expectation of personal gain nor of expansion of Japanese interests in China. His son, MIYAZAKI Ryūsuke 宮崎龍介 (1892-1971) wrote in his memoirs:

Tōten was a lover of *sake*, but he regarded money with contempt. He therefore remained very poor throughout his life. When the issue of North-South conciliation, or republican’s compromise with Yüan Shih-k’ai 袁世凱, became a controversial subject after the 1911 Revolution, Tōten was strongly opposed to peace between the North and South. That was just before the peace came into reality. Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 went north and met with Yüan. Tōten received a telegram from Sun Yat-sen, then in Peking, urging Tōten to come to Peking immediately, because Yüan wanted to reward Tōten for his contribution to the successful revolution. By partially lifting the ban on the export of grain, Yüan would grant Tōten permission to export Chinese rice. Tōten did not go; he simply sent a telegram replying that, “Even if I were thirsty I would not drink stolen water. I don’t even like your going northward.”<sup>17</sup>

Tōten clung stubbornly to his despotism versus freedom approach to the China problem.

SUZUE Gen’ichi 鈴江言一 (1894-1945), on the other hand, was one whose thinking was governed by the East-West framework, and at first he was an ardent nationalist who looked down on China. Later, after being exposed to Marxist thought, he became devoted to the Chinese communist party, and had great hopes for the destruction of despotism and the achievement of freedom through the Chinese

<sup>16</sup> ŌTSUKA Takematsu 大塚武松, ed., *Iwakura Tomomi kankei monjo* 岩倉具視關係文書 (Papers Relating to Iwakura Tomomi), 8 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon shiseki kyōkai 日本史籍協會, 1927-35), 1:392.

<sup>17</sup> MIYAZAKI Tōten, *op. cit.*, 309.

revolution.<sup>18</sup>

In the modern history of Japan people like MIYAZAKI Tōten and SUZUE Gen'ichi were a minority. Most Japanese intellectuals were basically concerned with how to make their own country strong and wealthy, whether they viewed China in the context of East versus West or despotism versus freedom. Only after China united itself and became a strong nation did this basic pattern of thinking collapse, and the "love" syndrome became dominant.

<sup>18</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi and Hsü Shuchen 許淑真 (Kyo Shukushin), *Suzue Gen'ichi den* 鈴江言一傳 (A Biography of Suzue Gen'ichi) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1984).

## Chapter XIII JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MERCHANT DIPLOMACY

In 1971, while Dr. Henry Kissinger was on his secret mission to Peking, President Nixon spoke to newspaper and television reporters in Kansas City. He told them that the United States had been indisputably the superpower in the world, both militarily and economically, a quarter of a century before, enjoying a virtual monopoly on nuclear weaponry. He went on to say that the conditions of global politics were changing drastically and that ten years hence there would emerge a world organized around five 'giants' of international politics. These centers of power, he noted, would be Japan, the European community, the Soviet Union, Communist China and the United States.

More than a decade has elapsed since Nixon's prediction. Power relationships in East Asia have evolved and are continuing to do so. Among the notable occurrences of the 1970s were the drastic change in the Chinese diplomatic stance from a firm belief in the world Communist revolution to efforts to foster friendly relations with the West and Japan; the overall evacuation of United States troops from South Vietnam followed by the total collapse of the government in Saigon; *détente*, with its accompanying relaxation of military tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, dating from the conclusion of SALT I; and the Soviet effort to increase its influence over the Third World. The contrasting behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union during this period is of particular note. While the former was decreasing its military buildup and commitments overseas, the latter was making

\* This was originally published in *Asian and African Studies* 18/1 (March 1984): 41-56. This was written when I was in Honolulu as a visiting professor at the University of Hawaii in 1982. It was presented to the Pacific Forum conference held in Waikola, Hawaii in February and printed after revision. It is because of international environment that Japan until its defeat in the World War II was replete with warrior diplomacy as characterized by Harold Nicolson while Japan after the defeat had to switch fundamentally to merchant diplomacy. However, in modern Japanese history both warrior diplomacy and merchant diplomacy consistently co-existed as ambivalence. In other words, I tried to analyze that the effort for merchant diplomacy existed in the pre-war days and there were efforts for warrior diplomacy in the post war days though as minority opinions. I tried to suggest that future Japan would move toward the foreign policy of merchant diplomacy with some addition of warrior diplomacy rather than the merchant diplomacy-only approach. However, the strong opinions were voiced from the floor that Japan would quickly abandon its merchant diplomacy, which led to quite a controversy. I tried to argue adamantly that the revival of warrior diplomacy was impossible because of Japan's bitter experiences in the past but I am not sure how persuasive I was.

clandestine efforts to increase its naval and nuclear capabilities. In spite of Mr. Nixon's forecast, the People's Republic of China has withdrawn itself from world power relations, turning from an outward-looking revolutionary state to an inward-looking nation-state, and has started its four 'modernization' policies. Furthermore, Japan is still reluctant to play an active political and military role, not only in the world, but in East Asia as well. This paper discusses the findings of several recent public opinion polls published in Japan in an effort to reveal domestic constraints upon Japanese diplomacy. Reference is also made to scholarly debates on these issues.

Sir Harold Nicolson once distinguished between the diplomacy of the merchant and that of the warrior.<sup>1</sup> The former pursues profit and possesses little determination; the latter possesses much determination and pursues little profit. Prewar Japan was clearly under the direction of the warrior, while its postwar counterpart exhibits all the characteristics of the merchant. Before proceeding to examine more recent phenomena, however, a few historical comments on the prewar diplomatic style of Japan are in order.

As the international environment became intelligible to Japanese elites and political leaders of the late Tokugawa 徳川 era (the 1840s to the 1860s), there developed a firm conviction that a strong military was indispensable for dealing with the Western powers. Potential and actual leaders, having learned of the British style of diplomacy in the Opium War, the Arrow War and the intervention in the T'ai ping Rebellion 太平天國, concluded that might equaled right. This notion was brought home to ordinary Japanese citizens by such bitter experiences as the visits of American and Russian fleets to Japan in 1853, the British bombardment of Kagoshima 鹿兒島 in 1863, the miserable defeat of Chōshū 長州 at Shimonoseki 下關 by the four powers' allied fleet in 1864, the pressure put upon Japan to execute eleven Tosa 土佐 samurai who had prevented French sailors from illegally landing on Sakai 堺 beach in 1868, and the vandalism of the Peiyang 北洋 sailors in Nagasaki 長崎 in 1886. In fact, the examples are virtually endless. The Japanese perceived the world as a jungle, in which power was law and Japan was to be the liberator of Asian peoples oppressed by the Western nations. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 demonstrated a Japanese willingness to cross swords with rivals for desired superiority. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 established Japan as a world power. 'Oriental dwarfs' had defeated a 'white' nation. Military strength became the paramount concern and a confident 'warrior' style of diplomacy was developed.

The loss of confidence brought on by defeat in the Pacific War 太平洋戰爭 and the subsequent seven years of allied occupation made the Japanese government and people reluctant to take up any active political role. Japan has made no claims to leadership in international politics. Postwar Japan can be compared to the big boy

<sup>1</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 51ff.

who always sits in the back of the classroom, hoping that quietude and obscurity will allow him to escape notice.

In truth, however, Japan's 'quietude' has been superficial. Domestically, it has constantly witnessed heated polemics *vis-à-vis* its stance toward world politics. Every Cabinet in postwar Japan has set goals in diplomacy and made its best effort to achieve them: YOSHIDA Shigeru 吉田茂 (Premier 1946-1947, 1948-1954) concluded the San Francisco peace treaty; HATOYAMA Ichirō 鳩山一郎 succeeded in normalizing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; KISHI Nobusuke 岸信介 (1957-1960) revised the US-Japan Security Treaty; IKEDA Hayato 池田勇人 (1960-1964) secured Japan's participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); SATŌ Eisaku 佐藤榮作 (1964-1972) succeeded in obtaining the reversion of Okinawa 沖縄; TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮 (1972-1974) normalized diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; FUKUDA Takeo 福田赳夫 (1976-1978) concluded the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty 日中平和友好條約; and ŌHIRA Masayoshi 大平正芳 (1978-1980) successfully chaired the summit conference in 1979. Few premiers in postwar Japan have failed to make some distinctive diplomatic accomplishment.


It should be noted that, despite a national consensus regarding the need for economic recovery after the war, Japan has often been a house divided against itself regarding the external environment. This paper therefore deals mainly with Japanese attitudes toward and perceptions of that environment.

Furthermore, notwithstanding constant criticism in the media of the ruling conservatives for their political corruption and scandalous collusion with business, agricultural and even underground organizations, a look at the general long-term policy of the conservative government indicates a performance over the past four decades with some rational consistency. Figure 1 shows that the government allocated a greater share of its budget to defense during the Cold War era, put more emphasis on improving infrastructure during the 1960s, and gave increased priority to social welfare in the following decade.

The achievements of Japan's merchant diplomacy have been so remarkable that it has become one of the few countries in the world to maintain prosperous trade relations with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan as well as with both the Soviet Union and South Korea (see Figure 2). Japan is now the largest trading partner of the PRC, Taiwan and South Korea, and the second largest non-Communist trading partner of the Soviet Union after West Germany.

During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a lack of Japanese consensus concerning foreign affairs. Approximately two thirds of the Japanese people willingly or reluctantly supported the US-Japan Security Treaty and an adequately armed Japan, while the remaining third tended to advocate an unarmed, neutral Japan. During the 1970s, however, various incidents shocked the Japanese people into assuming a more realistic stance. The 1973 Middle East War, followed by the first oil crisis, resulted in a

Figure XIII-1 Expenditures as Percentage of Japan's Total Budget




Source: NOGUCHI Yukio 野口悠紀夫, *System Dynamic Analyses of Japan's Finance Characteristics*, Saitama University Financial System Research Project, 1975 (in Japanese). Data for 1980 has been added by the author.

decreased annual GNP in 1974, the first such occurrence in postwar Japan. India, whose neutrality had long been cited by some as a model for Japan, had its first nuclear explosion test in the same year. In 1975, a Japanese fishing boat was shot at and detained in North Korea and two of its fishermen were killed. Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese, who had defied the Paris Treaty of 1973.

The most shocking event of all was when First Lieutenant Berenko, piloting a MIG 25, landed safely in Hakodate Airport 函館空港 in 1976 without interception by the Japanese air defense command. This indication of military weakness engendered serious open discussions concerning the country's military capabilities. Argument was further provoked by President Carter's decision in 1977 to initiate the withdrawal of US land troops from South Korea within a few years. It was also at this time that many nations unilaterally declared 200-nautical-mile economic zones, which the Japanese perceived as an economic threat with heavy overtones of a tactical military nature.

The crude oil trade ban and a sharp decrease in Iranian oil production following the Shah's overthrow and Ayatollah Khomeini's repatriation in 1978 brought heated debates about the vulnerability of sea lanes and communication between the Middle

Figure XIII-2 Fluctuations in Japan's Trade with the Soviet Union, the PRC, Korea and Taiwan



Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, *General Report of Foreign Trade, 1970-1981*(in Japanese).

East and Japan. Simultaneously, Japanese businessmen became sensitive to their economic vulnerability, while socialists and 'progressive men of culture' became disillusioned by the Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia, the Chinese self-styled 'punitive expedition' against Vietnam in 1979, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the same year and the Soviet intimidation of Poland. Moscow's increased troop levels in East Asia, widely reported by the media in 1979 and 1980, had a remarkable effect on the Japanese people as a whole, leading to an open dis-

cussion of the Soviet threat. Several books with detailed scenarios of Soviet aggression against Japan were published in these years.

It was these developments, among others, which awakened the heretofore dormant Japanese to a realistic consideration of their national security.

The existence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 自衛隊 has always been controversial among the Japanese. When the SDF's predecessor began to be organized in 1950, woman employees of the first-rate Iwanami Publishing Company 岩波書店 assembled and publicly resolved never to marry a member of the forces. Some twenty years later when Okinawa was once again to become Japanese territory, union leaders, including those of the teachers' union, tried to prevent SDF troops from entering it. They agitated strongly for barring school entrance to children of the troops.

Public opinion polls conducted by the Japanese government, however, indicate a gradual increase in acceptance of the forces (see Table 1). The *Jiji* 時事 Press recently conducted similar polls, the latest three of which show a similar tendency (see Table 2).

The remarkable increase in the number of those who accepted the SDF in 1980 was obviously a result of the widely reported increase of Soviet troops in East Asia, together with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Even polls conducted by *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞, the 'progressive' and rather anti-military newspaper,

Table XIII-1 Public Opinion Poll Taken by the Government (%)

Year	Better to have the SDF	Better not to have the SDF	Don't know
1956	58	18	24
1972	73	12	15
1975	79	8	13
1977	83	7	10
1978	86	5	9

Source: Public Relations Section, Defense Minister's Office, *Public Opinion Polls Concerning the SDF and Defense Problems*, 1979, 4 (in Japanese).

Table XIII-2 Public Opinion Poll Taken by the *Jiji* Press (%)

Year	Better to have the SDF	Better not to have the SDF	Don't know
1979	68.5	8.1	23.5
1980	78.2	5.5	16.3
1981	77.1	5.9	17.0

Source: *Jiji* 167 (November 11, 1979), 242 (December 11, 1981).

Table XIII-3 Public Opinion Poll Taken by *Asahi Shimbun* (%)

Year	(a) Should strengthen the SDF	(b) Should maintain the status quo	(a) + (b)	Should reduce the SDF	Should abolish the SDF
1978	19	57	76	11	8
1980	18	61	79	11	5
1981	22	57	79	11	5

Source: *Asahi shimbun* (November 1, 1978); (January 3, 1981).

indicate that approximately four fifths of the Japanese support the SDF, one fifth support an increase in its numbers, and only five to eight percent advocate its abolition (see Table 3).

The Japanese are ambivalent and confused with regard to national security. Article Nine of the constitution reads "...land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." No one doubts that the modern SDF is a complex of land, sea and air forces. There is a joke that if the SDF successfully defended Japan during an invasion its action would be unconstitutional.

Recent polls taken by *Asahi shimbun* reveal a remarkable change in attitude toward Article Nine, on the one hand, and a strong reaffirmation of support for the present constitution on the other. When asked whether Article Nine should be amended, 15 percent answered "Yes," 71 percent said "No" and 14 percent were noncommittal in 1978. The figures for 1981 were 24, 61, and 15 percent, respectively.<sup>2</sup> To the question: "Under the Japanese constitution, Japan forsakes war and chooses not to have a military. Some current opinion holds that this constitutional decision is not appropriate to the present state of world affairs. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?", 24 percent agreed, 61 percent disagreed, and 15 percent held other opinions.<sup>3</sup> Changed feelings toward Article Nine are easily understandable in light of the events of the 1970s mentioned earlier. Widespread support for the present constitution, however, is a bit puzzling.

Why do so many Japanese accept the SDF but refuse to amend Article Nine? The only possible explanation is that the pacifist idealism expressed in the constitution strongly attracts the Japanese heart, while the mind, aware of the objective international situation, is left in a dilemma. Hence, the ambivalent attitude of modern Japan toward defense.

The results of a different survey indicate another point of ambivalence between support for the SDF and advocacy of an unarmed, neutral Japan. A poll conducted by *Asahi shimbun* included the question: "What is the best way to defend Japanese national security?" Of the respondents, 48 percent supported the present policy of

<sup>2</sup> *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (November 1, 1978; March 25, 1981).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* (March 25, 1981).

collaboration between the SDF and American troops, 14 percent advocated an independent defense based upon a built-up SDF, 8 percent were unsure, and, strangely, 30 percent advocated unarmed neutrality.<sup>4</sup> How do we reconcile these figures with the overwhelming acceptance of the SDF? The only answer is again a matter of strong ambivalence. When considering the merciless reality of international relations, the SDF becomes acceptable, but the beautiful and romantic pacifist vision of unarmed neutrality continues to hold an undeniable attraction.

These romantic pacifists are also extremely selfish. Another question raised in the same poll was whether or not the respondent would fight, should foreign troops invade Japan. Only 34 percent said they would, 21 percent indicated they would flee the aggressor, and 16 percent said they would surrender. Another 17 percent replied that they would decide on the spot and 12 percent gave no answer. The findings of polls jointly carried out by Gallup in the United States and *Yomiuri shimbun* 讀賣新聞 in Japan (the latter now proudly claims the largest circulation throughout Japan, selling over 8 million copies a day) are even more remarkable. To the question, "What would you do in the case of an enemy invasion of your country?", 73 percent of the Americans indicated they would fight the aggressor as opposed to only 20 percent of the Japanese; only 0.6 percent of the Americans said they would surrender, as compared with 6.7 percent of the Japanese; 8.7 percent of the Americans and 23.9 percent of the Japanese said they would flee.<sup>5</sup>

By taking these ambivalent attitudes into consideration, one can understand the official defense policy of the Japanese government and the LDP, namely that Article Nine does not deny Japan's self-defense capability, and that defensive weapons are constitutional, but that it is unconstitutional to send troops abroad, to equip them with offensive weapons, or to conclude a mutual collective security system. This scholastic interpretation of Article Nine is suited to Japan's national sentiments for the present.

The *Jiji* Press has occasionally conducted polls directly referring to Japanese perceptions of threats to national security. Recent findings are given in Tables 4 and 5. On September 14, 1981 *Yomiuri shimbun* published almost identical results in a similar poll. Another poll conducted in Hokkaidō 北海道, however, points to greater perceptions of Soviet threats. To the question, "Do you fear a 'northern threat,' i.e., a Soviet willingness to invade Hokkaidō?", 55.2 percent answered "Yes," 36.4 percent "No," and 8.4 percent "Don't know."<sup>6</sup> The national positive response in 1981 to a similar question was a mere 29.1 percent (see Table 4). The much larger percentage of positive responses in Hokkaidō can be attributed to the region's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Yomiuri shimbun* 讀賣新聞 (November 14, 1981).

<sup>6</sup> *Hokkaidō shimbun* 北海道新聞 (August 6, 1981).

Table XIII-4 "Do you fear threats to national security?" (%)

Year	Greatly	To a certain extent	A little	Not at all	Don't know
1979	6.0	24.5	41.6	10.2	17.8
1980	7.5	32.4	36.0	5.6	18.6
1981	5.1	24.0	34.3	8.7	27.9

Source: See Tables 1 and 2.

Table XIII-5 "What country poses the greatest threat?"\* (%)

Year	USSR	USA	N. Korea	PRC	S. Korea	Other	Don't know
1979	77.3	11.2	6.9	6.1	2.5	1.5	9.3
1980	83.6	7.1	1.5	1.6	2.4	1.0	8.4
1981	77.4	12.5	2.5	1.2	0.5	1.6	11.1

\* Asked of those who had indicated that they felt a threat.

Source: See Tables 1 and 2.

The Gallup-*Yomiuri* 讀賣 polls referred to above also posed the question of trust. Their findings indicate a constant and remarkable increase in American trust of Japan between the years 1978 and 1981. In 1981, Americans perceived Japan as the sixth most trustworthy country in the world, choosing her over France, West Germany and Mexico (see Table 6). In contrast the United States has continuously received top rating by the Japanese, although a remarkable drop from 75 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1981 is noticeable among professionals and managerial personnel.<sup>7</sup> This can be explained by certain events in 1981, when Edwin O. Reischauer, former US ambassador to Japan, revealed the presence of American nuclear arms in Japan and when a US submarine, which had collided with a Japanese merchant ship, causing it to sink, made no attempt to rescue the crew. Tense debates on trade problems were also constantly in the news.

There is also an indication of a much cooler Japanese attitude toward Israel than that of the Americans, and a cooler American approach toward South Korea and Brazil than that of the Japanese despite the presence of US 'tripwire' troops in South Korea. Also noteworthy is that the Japanese gave the People's Republic of China the second highest score while the Americans ranked it very low.

A question referring to ways to improve Japanese national security also evoked differences of opinion between American and Japanese respondents. The Americans indicated belief in a free economic system and military alliances much more than the Japanese, and felt much more strongly that Japan should increase its military capa-

<sup>7</sup> *Yomiuri shimbun* (November 14, 1981).

Table XIII-6 "Choose the five most trustworthy countries out of the following thirty" (%)

	Japanese Respondents					American Respondents			
	1981	1980	1979	1978		1981	1980	1979	1978
1. USA	55.9	59.2	45.7	40.8	1. Canada	71.4	76.8	68.6	61.2
2. PRC	34.6	38.1	28.3	24.4	2. UK	47.6	55.8	43.0	43.3
3. UK	32.6	34.7	28.4	22.6	3. Australia	41.2	46.3	47.4	43.6
4. Switzerland	26.9	25.3	24.3	21.4	4. Switzerland	32.4	31.3	34.9	35.0
5. West Germany	26.6	24.7	21.5	19.5	6. Japan	26.0	21.8	17.1	12.6
6. Canada	24.7	27.1	23.0	19.6	8. West Germany	23.5	28.0	24.4	19.3
7. France	24.3	22.9	22.5	15.1	9. France	21.4	26.8	29.3	26.1
8. Australia	19.2	20.9	17.1	14.2	11. Israel	15.3	18.3	14.0	11.2
9. Brazil	16.3	17.3	18.0	17.6	12. Holland	13.0	11.5	16.4	16.8
10. Holland	8.5	5.5	7.6	5.3	17. PRC	7.1	8.0	5.3	3.0
14. South Korea	5.7	3.8	4.1	4.5	18. Brazil	5.2	5.9	5.5	4.7
17. USSR	2.7	2.3	4.0	3.0	21. South Korea	3.5	2.9	3.3	2.8
20. North Korea	2.3	1.5	1.2	1.4	27. USSR	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.5
29. Israel	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.6	28. North Korea	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.8
Don't Know	25.1	25.3	32.9	40.8	Don't Know	11.6	4.5	4.9	14.3

Source: *Yomiuri shimbun* (November, 14 1981).

bility. The role of the UN and neutrality continued to attract many more Japanese than Americans (see Table 7).

The higher percentage of Japanese respondents answering "don't know" in both tables (6 and 7) indicates vaguer and more ambiguous notions of international affairs. Americans seem to have more clear-cut opinions, be they biased or unbiased.

Table XIII-7 "Choose two items from the following as your preference for strengthening Japanese national security" (%)

	Japanese	Americans
Strengthen the free economic system in the West	18.3	32.8
Strengthen military alliance system in the West	5.5	44.6
Strengthen Japan's defense capability	24.6	46.6
Increase aid to developing countries	18.9	7.4
Strengthen the UN	28.8	15.8
Develop a neutral policy	27.8	10.3
Accelerate disarmament negotiations with the USSR	8.4	23.4
Increase economic and cultural intercourse with the East	12.1	8.6
Don't know	24.2	3.1

Source: *Yomiuri shimbun* (November 14, 1981).

Table XIII-8 Danger Zones (%)

	Japanese	Americans
Indo — China	22.2	29.5
Taiwan — PRC	2.0	5.5
Korean Peninsula	13.8	10.6
PRC — USSR	27.3	29.6
Japan — USSR	7.6	5.0
Don't know	27.1	22.4

Source: *Yomiuri shimbun* (November 14, 1981).

In an attempt to concretize the concerns of the people surveyed, the Gallup-*Yomiuri* polls also asked respondents to state where a serious military clash would take place, if and when peace in East Asia was disrupted. The data in Table 8 indicate little difference of opinion between the Japanese and the Americans. Both predict confrontation between the PRC and the USSR, followed by internal conflict in Indo-China or the Korean Peninsula.

Debates on national security published in the Japanese media during the 1950s and 1960s centered mainly on the acceptance or rejection of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the SDF. Current topics of debate, however, have expanded to include such issues as whether or not the SDF should maintain or increase its present military capability, the nature of security threats and the means to cope with them.

In 1979 MORISHIMA Michio 森嶋通夫, Japanese professor of econometrics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, provoked a debate with SEKI Yoshihiko 關嘉彦, professor emeritus of sociology at Tokyo Metropolitan University 東京都立大學. The controversy revolved around Morishima's firm belief in an unarmed, neutral Japan. In an article published in *Bungei shunjū* 文藝春秋<sup>8</sup> MORISHIMA asserted that any military defense buildup would lead to war. Moreover, should the Soviet Union invade Japan, the Japanese government and people ought to surrender with dignity and order. Soviet troops would then respect the occupied population, allowing Japan to maintain its own political system. SEKI immediately opposed MORISHIMA in an article appearing in the same periodical.<sup>9</sup> Referring to various historical precedents, SEKI argued that military weakness often invites foreign aggression, and therefore Japan needs her own military capacity along with American support to cope with the formidable Soviet buildup. SEKI also predicted that any Soviet occupation would be terrible and that Japan would never be allowed to preserve its polity. Many commented upon the Morishima-Seki debate,

<sup>8</sup> MORISHIMA Michio 森嶋通夫, "Shin 'Shin gumbi keikaku ron' 新「新軍備計畫論」(A New 'New Defense Plan')," *Bungei shunjū* 文藝春秋 57-7 (July 1979). This and all further articles cited are in Japanese.

<sup>9</sup> SEKI Yoshihiko 關嘉彦, "Hibusō dewa heiwa wa mamorenai 非武裝では平和は守れない (No Country can Maintain Peace without a Military Capability)," *ibid.*

the majority being highly critical of MORISHIMA.

In the following year, SHIMIZU Ikutarō 清水幾太郎's promotion of a nuclear-armed Japan aroused a new controversy. Formerly a professor of sociology at Gakushūin University 學習院大學, SHIMIZU had once vehemently advocated an unarmed, neutral Japan. His influence was so great that many of his disciples and students had become leaders of left-wing student movements in 1960, the year the Kishi Cabinet was implementing a revised US-Japan Security Treaty. Afterwards, he had dramatically converted into a believer in the omnipotence of the military. It was this 'convert' who published an article in 1980 calling for a nuclear-armed Japan to cope with the Soviet threat.<sup>10</sup> The piece stirred up arguments among various media commentators, retired military officers, social scientists and others. Among them was INOKI Masamichi 猪木正道, former Rector of the National Defense College. He described SHIMIZU as "a man converted from utopian pacifism to utopian militarism," criticizing his article as "a gigantic lie inlaid with glittering small truths."<sup>11</sup>

INOKI also rejected Shimizu's perception of the Soviet Union as a threat. He emphasized Soviet weaknesses, warning against the dangers of provoking antagonism by vocal exaggeration of the 'Soviet threat.'<sup>12</sup> NAKAGAWA Yatsuhiko 中川八洋, a young associate professor at University of Tsukuba 筑波大學, was quick to attack INOKI, asserting that the Soviet threat is overt and obvious. If INOKI persists in distorting the facts, he continued, he is playing a role tantamount to that of a Soviet agent.<sup>13</sup> Furiously enraged by this criticism, INOKI sued the young professor for defamation of character. The suit is still in litigation.

Japan imports over 700,000 tons of crude oil and more than 110 tons of iron ore daily. In 1981, it exported approximately 140 billion US dollars worth of processed goods and services to the rest of the world. In order to support a population of 116 million — which is thirty times larger than Israel's and more than one half the size of the US population — on a land area of only about 373,000 square kilometers — which is 18 times larger than Israel and only 4 percent of the territory of the United

<sup>10</sup> SHIMIZU Ikutarō 清水幾太郎, "Nihon yo kokka tare: kaku no sentaku 日本よ 國家たれ一核の選擇 (Japan, Be a State!— The Nuclear Option —)," *Shokun!* 諸君! 12-7 (July 1980). Prior to its appearance in the popular magazine *Shokun!*, the article had been privately published in pamphlet form and distributed to interested persons.

<sup>11</sup> INOKI Masamichi 猪木正道, "Kūsōteki heiwashugi kara kūsōteki gunkokushugi e 空想的平和主義から空想的軍國主義へ (From Utopian Pacifism to Utopian Militarism)," *Chūō kōron* 中央公論 95-12 (September 1980).

<sup>12</sup> *Idem.*, "Bōei giron no kyojitsu 防衛議論の虚實 (Truths and Falsehoods in Defense Polemics)," *Chūō kōron* 96-1 (January 1981).

<sup>13</sup> NAKAGAWA Yatsuhiko 中川八洋, "Kikaina 'Soren wa kyōi dewa nai' no daigasshō 奇怪な「ソ連は脅威ではない」の大合唱 (Outrageous is the Grand Chorus of 'The Soviets are not a Threat')," *Getsuyō hyōron* 月曜評論 547 (July 20, 1981), 549 (August 3, 1981).

States — 95 percent of the raw materials necessary for Japanese industry must be purchased abroad, processed and then approximately 30 percent re-exported as manufactured goods and services. This process, to make it very simple, represents the 'structure' of Japan's present affluence, as well as the elements crucial to its survival. Even if the present economic and social systems of production were replaced by a socialist one, these basic structural facts would not change. Similarly, any attempt to raise the standard of living or to support a larger population would necessitate a further increase in these figures.

This is the basic system, as I understand it, which the Japanese enjoy and wish to maintain. For this purpose, three conditions are indispensable: a peaceful international environment, a world system of free trade, and the maintenance of domestic social and economic efficiency.

The first condition is essential to ensure the uninterrupted flow of capital and goods to and from Japan. In an earlier era, when it was possible to guarantee that flow by sheer military might, Britain and other strong powers secured raw material sources and markets for their goods by militarily subjugating other countries. Japan practiced the same technique, although as a latecomer. Today the use of military power for economic ends is not only of extremely limited efficacy, it is often condemned. Therefore, only a complex of military and nonmilitary maneuvers can help to maintain international peace without any disturbances or disruptions. It is not easy to find and establish an optimum solution for this problem. This is why Japan fears Soviet military intentions and capabilities so much.

The maintenance of a system of free trade is the second element crucial to Japan's continued economic success. As a private-initiative economy, the system is premised upon the principle of laissez-faire competition. The production of high-quality, inexpensive consumer products has allowed Japan to compete successfully in the international market. Other than this Japan has no particular leverage in its international dealings. Thus, the tendency toward protectionism and other constraints on free trade that developed in the 1970s has been of much concern to Japan, although few people would label it a 'threat.'

The third and final condition necessary for maintenance of the status quo is to prevent a disruption of domestic social and economic efficiency. Avoidance of the 'British disease' requires not only high efficiency in private industry but also a balance of individual rights and social responsibilities. How to create a balance between respect for individual human rights and the preservation of social efficiency is a serious matter. This can be considered a threat from within, probably the most serious one confronting Japan in the years ahead. Barthold Georg Niebuhr was right when he stated, "No nation has ever died of suicide."

## Chapter XIV FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION IN JAPAN

The foreign policy of Japan is the outcome of a long, involved process that begins in the Diet. There, policy goals emerge from expressions of majority will, taking the form of conceptions of the national interest. The cabinet occupies a central role in the complex decision-making procedure, through which policy to accomplish those goals is hammered out. Finally, policy is implemented by government organs, primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 外務省. However, national policy must respond not only to immediate exigencies but must aim at future and distant future goals. This is particularly true of foreign policy. In this essay I will attempt to develop the simplest possible model of Japan's foreign policy decision-making process and identify certain problem areas in the mechanism itself.

### What Is Policy?

#### *Long-range National Goals*

National goals are by nature diverse, and conceptions of them held by individual citizens are bound to vary. For all their complexity, however, and regardless of how clearly they are perceived by the citizens, a number of national goals are always present. For the sake of convenience, let us analyze them in terms of Joseph Frankel's categories of short-range, medium-range, and long-range.<sup>1</sup>

\* This was published as a chapter in Japan Center for International Exchange 日本國際交流センター, ed., *The Silent Power: Japan's Identity and World Role* (Tokyo: The SIMUL Press, 1976), 119-139. It is a translation of my article in Japanese, "Nihon ni okeru taigai seisaku kettei 日本における對外政策決定," *Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi* 國際法外交雜誌 72/6 (March 1974): 25-43. It was translated by J. Victor Koschmann, and first published in *The Japan Interpreter* 10/3-4. Studies of Japan's foreign relations often focus on the internal and external limitations affecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others emphasize the preponderance of economic, as opposed to strictly diplomatic, concerns in Japan's foreign relations and the proportionately heavy influence on policy of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Indeed, the "Japan Inc." image has encouraged the conclusion that the central power structure as a whole, including the Liberal Democratic Party, the bureaucracy and big business, operates internationally like a giant trading company. I have constructed a somewhat different model of relationship among power centers — they are wired "in series" rather than "in parallel" as before the war. I then concentrate on foreign ministry professionals and domestic forces which "impede" their work.

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 138.

Long-range goals are the most ambiguous. They encompass the ultimate goals most of the citizens would like someday to achieve, and they may be considered equivalent to a priori values. When the people sense a national crisis, long-range goals are very much in evidence; in normal times they remain largely unnoticed. Conversely, when political leaders wish to stimulate a sense of national crisis they tend to appeal to long-range goals; when they want peace and stability to reign, they tend to obscure them.

Prior to the end of the Pacific War, for example, fighting against the West in order to “liberate Asia,” or to “restore the rights of the East,” was Japan’s long-range goal. At times of crisis such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the Manchurian Incident 滿洲事變, that goal was invoked through conscious agitation, while during the intervening peace, it was seldom brought up and therefore largely forgotten. For most prewar Japanese, the goal of liberating Asia was a legitimate extension of the a priori value of *raison d'état*. Apart from whether or not it could realistically be accomplished, that goal inspired strong commitment.

“World revolution” is an analogous goal for the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東 explained his long-range vision in 1949:

Like a man, a political party has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age. The Communist Party of China is no longer a child or a lad in his teens, but has become an adult. When a man reaches old age he will die; the same is true of a party. When classes disappear, all instruments of class-struggle—parties and the state machinery—will lose their function, cease to be necessary, therefore gradually wither away and end their historical mission; and human society will move to a higher stage.<sup>2</sup>

The “higher stage” is “the realm of Great Harmony 大同” which, we are told, “means communist society.”<sup>3</sup> During the quiet periods in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, that long-range goal goes unnoticed, never appearing in *People's Daily* 人民日報, or other organs of mass persuasion. In times of national crisis such as the Korean War 朝鮮戰爭, the Great Leap Forward 大躍進 or the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命, however, it forms an essential part of the daily exhortation designed to whip up zealous political participation.

#### *Medium-range National Goals*

A period of ten to fifteen years should be ample to realize medium range goals.

<sup>2</sup> “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 7:411-12.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 423.

They might be reduction or elimination of threats to national security, acquisition of adequate food and other essential commodities, consolidation and defense of national interests, preservation of the political system, and so on. Specific purposes of and issues in those goals vary according to country and historical era. In Meiji 明治 Japan, the goal of augmenting national strength through an absolutist system of government learned from the Western powers—described by the slogan *fukoku kyōhei* 富國強兵 (rich country, strong army)—was to be achieved within a period of ten to fifteen years. Once the country was opened to foreign intercourse, the medium-range question of agricultural policy also arose: whether to adhere forever to agricultural self-sufficiency or expose Japanese agriculture to the rigors of international division of labor. In general, the Meiji government preferred self-sufficiency. As a step in that direction, government leaders fervently strove through liberal investment in research and development to push back the northern geographical limits of rice cultivation, thereby insuring that Japan would continue producing enough of the staples for domestic needs.

Most Japanese at the time felt that the goals of consolidation and defense of national interests should be pursued through military force if necessary. Should the government have appeared to neglect those goals it would have come under severe public criticism. Furthermore, since the political system centered upon the emperor, the goal of preserving and exalting that system was of utmost importance.

Needless to say, medium-range goals changed after World War II. In the first place, national survival now could be insured only by cooperating with the Occupation forces. Once the San Francisco peace treaty was concluded, ending the Occupation, the conservative party entered into the Japan-US security treaty system on the strength of majority support at the polls. Even now, the conservative party supports the medium-range goal of maintaining the treaty system to reduce threats to national security.

The medium-range goal of self-sufficiency has been upheld in the case of rice, but in other food items self-sufficiency has actually dropped precipitously: soybeans 3.7 percent, wheat 8.3 percent, salt 11.5 percent, and so on.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, against the background of economic devastation, beginning in the latter stages of the war and extending through several years of the Allied Occupation, achievement of a welfare state in material terms became an important medium-range goal. Later, as Japan's economic strength grew, and a vigorous commercial network was soon regarded as indispensable to continued prosperity. Hence continued free passage over the world's sea routes emerged as a new intermediate goal. Politically, preservation of the post-war system of parliamentary democracy numbers among Japan's medium-range

<sup>4</sup> Keizai kikakuchō chōsakyoku 經濟企畫廳調査局, ed., *Keizai yōran 1973* 經濟要覽 昭和48年度版 (Economic Yearbook for 1973) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office 大藏省印刷局, 1973), 225.

goals. Despite its many implications, the concept itself continues to symbolize positive value.

Intermediate goals are far more tangible and concrete than long-range ones. Therefore, views among the citizens concerning intermediate goals diverge widely, and lively controversy is inevitable. As the Edo 江戸 period ended, for example, the long-range goal of resisting Western domination commanded virtually unanimous support among intellectuals and government leaders.

But on the more concrete medium-range level, sharp conflict emerged between those who sought resistance through continued isolation and exclusionism, and those who favored parrying the powers by opening the country to foreign intercourse and establishing amicable relations with them. Similarly, broad confrontation emerged following the Manchurian Incident over whether Japanese interests in China could best be consolidated and protected by entering into friendly relations with the Nanking government 南京政府, or by attacking it. Even now, such a division exists between those who feel that to reduce external threats and maintain security the Japan-US security treaty system should be preserved, and those who feel it should be abrogated. Domestically, supporters of a welfare state achieved through a policy of economic growth—increasing the size of the economic “pie”—have been locked in conflict with those who place primary emphasis on distribution, revising the way in which the “pie” is sliced. Debates over intermediate goals are such that they often focus on fundamental issues of political and economic structure.

### *Short-range Goals*

Short-range goals are designed to be fulfilled in five years or less as immediate steps in the realization of intermediate or long-range goals. The Meiji government, for example, in order to achieve self-sufficiency in staple foods, mapped out such short-range goals as improving rice strains and field contours. Plans were also made to promote light industry beginning with spinning and later to assist heavy industry as short-range goals leading toward achievement of the intermediate goal of *fukoku kyōhei*. More recently, the decision to seek the early reversion of Okinawa 沖縄, thereby preserving the Japan-US security treaty system, became a short-range goal. There was general agreement that international reconciliation is necessary to reduce the external threat to Japan, and that conflict with the Peking government should, therefore, be avoided, but judgments differed regarding the best timing for restoration of diplomatic relations with China.

National goals, then, according to the three types, require a variety of means for fulfillment once they are set. The means may be called “policy,” and the process of their selection, “policy decision-making.”

**A General Model of Policy Decision-making**

*Consensus Model*

A handbook on Japan for American businessmen published by the US Department of Commerce emphasizes the role of consensus in Japanese economic policy formation.<sup>5</sup> The book concludes that since Japanese decision-making is characterized by active consensus, government and business amount to a single entity. In my view, an *active* consensus is not always required, and therefore government and the private sector do not necessarily form a united front. Furthermore, there is often friction among government agencies themselves. The authors of the study seem to have overlooked those realities. Nevertheless, I agree that decisions are premised on a *passive* consensus among the mainstream elements of the ruling party, business leadership, and the government ministries concerned. It is possible, therefore, to apply a consensus model of decision-making such as that sketched in Diagram 1.

As long as the conservative party remains in power, A, B and C in Diagram 1 are the Liberal Democratic party 自由民主黨 (LDP), business leaders and the bureaucracy, respectively. Each of these elements has veto power over policy. That is to say, if any one strongly disagrees with the definition of a policy need or the advisability of taking action, the actual policy formation process cannot begin. Before the

Diagram XIV-1 Series Connection





Diagram XIV-2 A Series Connection Model of Japanese Foreign Policy Formation



<sup>5</sup> US Department for Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, *Japan: The Government-Business Relationship: A Guide for the American Businessman* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972). The study was actually prepared under government contract by the Boston Consulting Group. The project leader for Japan in BCG is James Abegglen.

war, the military's role in policy formation was so central that from time to time it was able to force through a given viewpoint over objections from other elements. In an electrical metaphor, before the war the links in the policy-making process were connected in parallel—one bad connection would not break the circuit. Since the war, however, they are connected in series, so that the policy-making current cannot flow in the absence of a single element.

Any element—LDP, business, or ministry—can take the initiative in identifying a need for policy in a given area. But a specific policy measure to achieve a given objective will not be drafted until the feelings of key individuals in the other two elements have been sounded out, informal talks and negotiations have taken place, and it is clear at least that none of the elements actively opposes the policy in question. Only then is movement toward formulating a concrete policy draft possible. As far as I can ascertain, the only policy decisions since the end of the Occupation which are difficult to explain according to the above model are the Hatoyama 鳩山 cabinet's restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union<sup>6</sup> and the Tanaka 田中 cabinet's normalization of relations with Peking.<sup>7</sup> Even so, neither case involved dramatic incidents, such as the resignation of Foreign Minister UGAKI 宇垣 when, with full ministry support, he opposed establishment of the Asia Development Board (*Kōain* 興亞院) in 1938. That is because both policy decisions, to restore relations with the Soviet Union and normalize relations with mainland China, took place against a background of consensual recognition of their ultimate necessity.

Policy-making elements are linked "in series" because of an inclusive system of "checks and balances." The business community controls the financial "lifeline" of the LDP, the LDP has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under its thumb through control over foreign ministerial appointments, and the ministry exerts considerable influence over business through its control of specialized knowledge and information and the ability to provide foreign junkets and other favors. In the future, however, should the LDP be replaced by a conservative-progressive coalition, or even a fully progressive one, the process through which policy needs are identified, and therefore, the "consensus model" itself, would change markedly.

#### *A Model of Policy Formation by the Bureaucracy*

It is usually the bureaucracy that follows through with tangible identification of a policy need in relation to certain goals. A simple model of policy decision-making by

<sup>6</sup> For an analysis of the circumstances surrounding Democratic Party contact with the Soviet Union over the heads of MFA personnel as a result of the confrontation between Prime Minister HATOYAMA 鳩山 and Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU 重光, see Donald Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Angels: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union* (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

<sup>7</sup> Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮 visited Peking despite sharp dissension within the LDP concerning relations with China.

the bureaucracy is offered in Diagram 2. The actual drafting of the measure is done by individuals in the operational division under whose competence the matter falls. Along the way, however, division staff members meet and confer with other concerned ministries and private groups. Coordination with other components in the same ministry takes place along the way, but to simplify the diagram that function was placed next in line.

Let us call contact between the operational division or department and entities outside the ministry "coordination." Functionally, it consists of refinement of the draft, and adjustment of its relationship with other policies, which may be either conflicting or augmentative. On the other hand, other interested departments and bureaus, ministries, and private groups also take the initiative to make their views and interests known. They either seek to promote the measure and thereby "amplify" support for it, or they try to revise, hinder or stop its progress, thereby playing the role of "impedance." In either case, to recall the electrical analogy, their involvement functions as "modulation" in the drafting process as it is carried out by the operational division. Most routine draft proposals reach the stage of implementation, once "coordination" and "modulation" run their course and formalities such as ministerial and cabinet approval are completed. There are, of course, variations in the total time elapsed, and also in the extent of Diet deliberations.

Major problems arise, however, when there must be a decision on a major policy which affects the nation's medium-range goals. Sometimes further coordination is required even after a ministerial level decision has been made, or impedance on the part of ruling and opposition party Diet members may be still intense, leaving the final decision in doubt even as the proposal reaches the cabinet. At the time of Japan-Soviet peace negotiations, opposition by the MFA was predicted in advance, so the conventional policy-making process in the bureaucracy was avoided. Instead, the decision was made and implemented almost solely by the ruling party itself. By the same token, revision of the security treaty in 1960 became a nationwide issue only after reaching the stage of Diet deliberations. In the case of Japan-China civil aviation agreement, as well, coordination with the LDP was an uphill fight even after a ministerial decision had been made.

## Goals and Policies

### *Cumulative Intervention*

Intervention in the affairs of another state, seen from a reverse perspective, is to be entangled in the problems of another state. A policy of intervention may begin as a means of achieving established ends, but it can easily become an end in itself. Great Britain, for example, in pursuing the goal of securing the sea routes to India, successively occupied Aden, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar; finally, having inter-

vened in the Egyptian problem, the British found themselves entangled in Cyprus. Clearly, each successive intervention led to another.

While Japan's goal was always the consolidation and maintenance of its interests in southern Manchuria 南滿洲, pursuit of that goal necessitated annexation of the Korean peninsula 朝鮮半島, which led to intervention in Chientao 開島 problem. In order to protect those interests Japan issued the Twenty one Demands 二十一箇條要求 and finally adopted a policy which sought total severance of Manchuria from China. Having succeeded in that, in order to bring security to Manchukuo 滿洲國 it became necessary to plunge into battles in the vicinity of the Great Wall 長城, and following the Ho 何-Umezu 梅津 Agreement, to adopt a policy of wresting North China from Nationalist government control. Following the formation of the East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government 冀東防共自治政府 and the Hopei-Chahar Political Affairs committee 冀察政務委員會, defeat in the Suiyüan Incident 綏遠事件, and finally with the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident 盧溝橋事件, fighting spread all over China. What began with an intent to secure Japanese interests in southern Manchuria gradually expanded to become a major war, placing the destiny of the nation in the balance. This is the very essence of cumulative intervention.<sup>8</sup>

Once intervention begins to escalate, it continues apace until eventually it is smashed by an external force. It happened to Napoleon I, Napoleon III, and Nazi Germany; and it happened to Japan. It is extremely difficult to set limits on intervention through the voluntary exercise of restraint, and it is even more difficult to observe those limits in practice. Today, the momentum of Japan's economic expansion has mounted to vast proportions. Whether the external expression of that momentum will be stemmed from without, by restrictions imposed on resources and the rise to preeminence of anti-Japanese movements, or from within, through voluntary restraints on the part of the Japanese, will gravely affect the destiny of our nation in the future. Those who participate in decisions on foreign policy must bear the responsibility for finding that restraint.

#### *Adapt to the Environment, or Recreate It?*

In the last years of the Tokugawa 德川 era, Japan was enveloped by the struggle between "repel the foreigners" (*jōi* 攘夷) and "open the country" (*kaikoku* 開國). The *jōi* view rejected all thought of adapting to the fast-changing international environment. By repelling the efforts of Western forces to open the country to foreign intercourse, *jōi* advocates sought to create from whole cloth a new environment which would sustain Japan's continued isolation. The *kaikoku* adherents, on the other hand, pushed for adaptation to the fluctuating environment. Persistence by a

<sup>8</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤藩吉, *Mukoku no tami to seiji* 無告の民と政治 (The Voiceless People and Politics), revised edition, (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1973), 54ff.

nation in its own long-term and medium-range goals and the attempt to change the environment accordingly must lead to intense friction with that environment. In 1937 Foreign Minister SATŌ Naotake 佐藤尚武 said, "In my view, whether or not Japan will be confronted by a true crisis—in other words, the outbreak of war—will depend upon Japan's own intentions."<sup>9</sup> For this, he was severely criticized by the army, which at that time was the foremost advocate of autonomous creation of the environment.

Decisions concerning the degree to which the nation should adapt to the environment and the degree to which it should set about creating its own, are never simple. And it is even more difficult to decide what policy is most suitable, and precisely how rapidly that policy should be implemented to adapt to new circumstances, or bring about a more congenial environment. But such decisions must be made one by one if a country is to survive in international society. In the past, that sort of question was handled through the experience and intuition of politicians or MFA professionals, but in the Japan of today which, through economic power, has the ability to manipulate the environment to some extent, intuition and experience are not enough. Selective mechanisms must be created which can insure a continual search for all possible contingencies and alternate courses of action, and provide a channel through which the results of painstaking research on them can be brought to bear on the policy-making process. It is the responsibility of those involved in the process to see that this gets done.

### *Reconciling Divergent Goals*

In addition to the tendency already noted for the means (a given policy) to become an end in itself, means-end relationships also arise among various goals themselves. A short-range goal may be formulated in order eventually to achieve a medium-range goal, so in those circumstances short-range goals are equivalent to means. Accordingly, it is possible to conceptualise short-range goals as policy. For example, economic expansion is planned to achieve the intermediate goal of constructing a welfare state. In this case economic expansion is a means, a policy, as well as being a goal.

The problem is that development of heavy and chemical industries to achieve the short-range goal of economic expansion causes environmental pollution, a side effect that interferes with the original intermediate goal of enhancing public welfare. Hence contradictions may arise among goals themselves, particularly on the level of policy implementation. Now we have to face the problem of assigning priorities and deciding in what manner it is possible to reconcile conflicting goals at given levels of fulfilment. The most important pitfall is pursuit of a short-range goal which, if

<sup>9</sup> SATŌ Naotake 佐藤尚武, *Kaiko hachijūnen* 回顧八十年 (Eighty Years in Recollection) (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshin-sha 時事通信社, 1963), 366.

realized, would be destructive of goals in the intermediate range.

For example, Japan's rapid economic advance into South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines is consistent, in the short run, with Japan's economic development, and also contributes to the economic growth of those countries. The host country's ability to supply Japan with necessary raw materials is enhanced, and at the same time a market for Japanese goods is developed. In the longer run, however, the psychological shock dealt the people, particularly the intellectuals, as a result of rapid economic incursion eventually rebounds in such a way as to interfere with Japan's intermediate goal of constructing a welfare state. In order to build a welfare state, it is necessary to continue economic growth, and economic expansion depends heavily upon friendly relations with those countries. But while rapid economic incursions provide short-range economic benefits, in a long-range sense psychological reactions touch off political activity; political activity may catalyze an anti-Japanese movement which, ultimately, will profoundly damage Japanese interests. Xenophobic movements often go beyond rational calculation to become destructive.

To the extent that the problem is caused not by the absolute quantity of Japan's economic presence in other countries but, rather, by the shock of the speed at which the economic advance has taken place, it should be possible to continue to strive for the intermediate goal of welfare through economic expansion even though in the short run restraint must be exercised. It is absolutely necessary that this type of analysis and forecasting be carried out somewhere in the policy decision-making process.

### **Increasing Complexity in the Decision-making Process**

#### *Identification of Policy Needs*

When H. J. T. Palmerston was foreign minister, neither the English parliament nor influential public opinion showed concern with foreign policy beyond insisting on expansion of free trade and suppression of slavery. As a result, as long as Palmerston observed these guideline, he was quite free to run Great Britain's foreign relations at his own discretion. He strove to support the independence of Belgium, protect the independence and territorial expansion of Greece and, in the East, to foil Russian intervention in Turkey. He pursued a conciliatory policy toward France in opposition to the absolutist monarchies of Russia, Prussia and Austria. He intervened in Spain and Portugal to suppress absolutist monarchy. Most of those policies were the product of Palmerston's own judgement based on the image of international society he had developed.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> C. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*, 2 vols. (London: Bell and Sons, 1951), 1:43.

But as times changed, and the issues involving policy decision-making became more complex, the institutions to carry it out had to expand and diversify. The information available to decision-maker's also became incomparably greater than in Palmerston's day. Even so, when KOMURA Jutarō 小村壽太郎 (1855-1911) was foreign minister, he always went to the ministry in the morning but returned to his official residence at noon. When he was tired, he then took an hour's nap, followed by *zazen* 座禪 style meditation in a chair. Barring unusual circumstances, he devoted himself until about four P.M. completely to consideration of foreign policy matters, "with a stern and awesome look."<sup>11</sup> Even when SHIDEHARA Kijūrō 幣原喜重郎 (1872-1951) was foreign minister early in the Shōwa 昭和 era, and the telegraph had begun the proliferation of communications, he was able to look at every communication that came into the ministry.

Since World War II, that has all changed. In the first place, international society has become incomparably more complex. Before the war there were some fifty independent nation-states; there are now more than 140. Furthermore, the volume of information in the form of telephone, telegraph and telex messages has rapidly expended. In the US Department of State in the fifties, for example, the desk chief for a geographical area was obliged to process from 250 to 350 messages a day, which meant that in a ten-second interval he had to decide whether or not a given item was worth reading.<sup>12</sup> The volume of administrative paperwork handled in Japan's MFA is comparable. That certainly indicates the extent to which foreign policy-makers have to keep firm grasp of the overall situation without drowning in incomplete or biased information. These abilities are on the same order as that required mentally to elaborate a coherent, accurately balanced image of international society, and cannot be developed overnight. As long as the "decision-maker" is totally absorbed in handling information, such an image will never emerge—nor will there be sufficient time for him to take part in actual decisions. It is urgent that the problem of how to eliminate useless information be more seriously considered throughout the system.

### *The Cost of Democracy*

In an autocratic or aristocratic system of government, foreign policy decision-makers can shut themselves off from the public without constantly having to "coordinate" policy domestically or answer to pressure groups. In a democratic political system, however, all bureaucracies must be "open systems," though not necessarily to the extent of encouraging a free flow of personnel in and out. As a result, contact with decision-makers is sought not only by those directly connected with the ruling and opposition parties, but also by members of pressure groups and virtually everyone

<sup>11</sup> KOMURA Toshiharu 小村捷治, "Chichi no omoide 父の思い出 (Memories of My Father)," *Kasumigasekikai kaihō furoku* 霞ヶ關會會報付録 (February 1962), 8-12.

<sup>12</sup> R. E. Elder, *The Policy Machine* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960), 22.

else whose interests are somehow affected by policy. That means that the individuals responsible on the working level of the bureaucracy for a given-policy problem, and the department and bureau chiefs who supervise them as well, have to pay the high price of democratic politics. They have to answer not only to the minister and vice-ministers who are the legal heads of their bureaucratic households, but to 743 Diet member "mothers-in-law" and countless pressure group-leader "sisters-in-law" as well. To mix metaphors, they must serve four lords simultaneously: the government (cabinet in power), the LDP, opposition parties, and pressure groups. Skillful handling of all is essential to the policy-making process. Such coordination and adjustment is a particularly critical responsibility in Japan, where the tendency is strong for foreign policy to be decided merely on the basis of domestic political considerations. Indeed, sometimes policy-makers are obliged to spend more time in the domestic realm than the international. Even when an official reaches the status of councilor or achieves the pinnacle of the career bureaucracy, the position of administrative vice-minister, he is harassed by the need to guide policies through the domestic political labyrinth. The general affairs councilor cannot begin to handle it all. The price exacted from policy-makers by democratic politics will continue to rise at an ever accelerating pace if not checked through decisive action.

#### *Changing Role of the Foreign Ministry*

Diplomacy used to be recognized as a recondite craft requiring grand vision and statesmanship. Accordingly, only those who had demonstrated such qualities through long experience were considered fit to hold the post of foreign minister. For evidence that at one time foreign ministerial choices reflected these assumptions, consider the *Kenkenroku* 蹇蹇錄 (Memoirs) of Foreign Minister MUTSU Munemitsu 陸奥宗光 (1844-97), who guided Japan through the Sino-Japanese War and the Trilateral Intervention, or the *Gaikō taikō* 外交大綱 (Principles of Diplomacy) of KOMURA Juntarō,<sup>13</sup> who laid the groundwork for Japanese diplomacy during and after the Russo-Japanese War. These works amply demonstrate the impressive diplomatic mastery of their authors. Or take SHIDEHARA Kijūrō, foreign minister for many years in the late Taishō 大正 and early Shōwa periods, and review his grasp of the China issue.<sup>14</sup> In their broad conception of Japan's national interest in world affairs, and in the various policy measures advocated to realize that conception, each of these men consistently displayed penetrating insight and forcefulness.

In prewar Japan, even when party cabinets were in vogue, the post of foreign minister was considered a special duty which required lengthy diplomatic experi-

<sup>13</sup> SHINOBU Jumpei 信夫淳平, *Komura gaikōshi* 小村外交史 (History of Komura Diplomacy), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1953), 2:292ff.

<sup>14</sup> ETŌ Shinkichi, *Higashi Ajia seiji-shi kenkyū* 東アジア政治史研究 (Studies in the Political History of East Asia) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1968), 159ff.

ence. In the democratic politics of postwar Japan, on the other hand, the foreign minister, like every other politician, is generally a member of the House of Representatives 衆議院 and of the LDP, as well as a perpetual candidate in his constituency. For just plain busyness, that combination is hard to match. What with having to service the needs of his constituents, drum up and maintain support in the party, and tend to the business of his faction, a foreign minister obviously has little time to deliberate adequately on *affaires d'état*. In short, no matter how much ability its occupant may have, the position of foreign minister no longer allows him the freedom or scope to exercise that ability.

To be sure, the price exacted from the bureaucracy by democratic politics is usually less when the foreign minister is a powerful LDP faction leader. Since LDP Dietmen respect his authority over ministry affairs, they hesitate to bother his underlings often for detailed explanations and justifications of policy measures. Involved disputes in the course of the policy decision-making process also tend to be less frequent in that case. Of course, if our powerful foreign minister also happens to be allied with antimainstream forces, the situation is totally different. Unlike their prewar counterparts, postwar prime ministers retain the exclusive right to appoint, and dismiss, cabinet ministers. Therefore, if he is at odds with the foreign minister, he will either replace him or, if that for some reason is politically impractical, he will ignore him. A case in point is Japan's diplomacy when Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichirō 鳩山一郎 led the nation into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union: the MFA under Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Mamoru 重光葵, a rival of the prime minister, often was excluded from policy making. Should the foreign minister lack personal political clout, on the other hand, no amount of diplomatic acumen will prevent the cost of democratic politics from rising. Policy 'modulation' from without will heighten, and the functionally rational policy formation favored by the MFA will suffer.

The role of foreign ministry professionals also has changed. What used to be expertise peculiar to ministry personnel is no longer so special. The ability to read, write and speak a foreign language before the war, for example, was a special gift indeed. Moreover, in the case of Japan, which after the Meiji Restoration 明治維新 rapidly emerged from isolation to conclude a web of treaty relationships with a number of Western nations, understanding of international law and the legal technicalities of treaty-making was an extremely rare accomplishment. In fact, the afterglow of that brilliant glory of yesteryear still glimmers in the higher-than-average prestige of the ministry's Treaty Bureau. In those days, therefore, any individual whose abilities qualified him for a career in the MFA stood head and shoulders above other government officials.

In postwar Japan, however, that is no longer the case. Officials who can handle a foreign language well now are spread throughout the other ministries as well. Furthermore, the vast expansion of technology and compartmentalization of spe-

cialized knowledge have meant that international negotiations on such matters as fishing, communications, air transport and technological exchange are impossible without expert advice from the other ministries concerned. Even in the area of foreign intelligence, the time has come when Japan's general trading firms 綜合商社 are sometimes larger in scale than the ministry and can perform this function more efficiently.<sup>15</sup> In sum, ministry officials have lost all claim to special talents and prestige just as their load of routine "busy-work" has increased.

Diplomatic representatives in the field also have seen their job change markedly. Before the telegraph was put into operation, the embassy was vested with full authority to act on behalf of its government, and the fate of nations often hung in the balance. Constantly pressed for on-the-spot decisions, a diplomat acted vis-à-vis his host country as a policy-making official on a par with the foreign minister. Despite the development of communications, basic belief in the ambassador's autonomy still prevailed in the prewar years, but in the postwar world it is all too simple to query Tokyo when a problem arises. In fact, if the issue is serious enough, the foreign minister or even the prime minister can visit the post and handle it personally. So rather than venturing to "make waves" unnecessarily, it is now safer and easier to leave all decisions up to ministry headquarters. What makes life difficult now for the chief of mission is "visiting firemen" from Tokyo. Above all, it is essential that ruling party Diet members, pressure group leaders, and other dignitaries not have their feathers ruffled during a boondoggle abroad.<sup>16</sup>

As a result of changing functional priorities, it makes little difference whether a diplomat is in Tokyo or posted abroad; he has, in either case, little opportunity to accumulate the lore of statesmanship. Rather than serious study of host-country institutions and policies, the new measure of a diplomat's devotion to duty is the warmth and solicitation with which he can hold a visiting politician's hand. It is no wonder the ministry's base of support within the government is eroding.

## Conclusion

If left alone, the above problems will continue to grow more serious. Before long,

<sup>15</sup> According to the *Tensei jingo* 天聲人語 (Vox Populi, Vox Dei), column in the *Asahi shinbun* 朝日新聞 of January 23, 1974, in 145 installations abroad, the MFA as of early fiscal 1974 had 1,384 dispatched officials and 2,400 locally hired employees. In contrast, a certain trading company, in 117 foreign branches and subsidiaries, had 800 staff employees and 2,500 local employees.

<sup>16</sup> An excellent example of politician who interfered with MFA personnel matter, basing his actions upon impressions of diplomats abroad, was KŌNO Ichirō 河野一郎. See KAWAMURA Kinji 河村欣二, ed., *Gaimushō* 外務省 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo: Hōbunsha 朋文社, 1956), 113ff.

foreign policy decisions will amount to no more than short-range expedients devised ad hoc in response to domestic political pressure. As a result, Japan's diplomacy will lose all continuity; particular policies will increasingly contradict medium-range goals. In his book *Gendai gaikō no bunseki* 現代外交の分析 (The Analysis of Contemporary Diplomacy),<sup>17</sup> BANNO Masataka 坂野正高 writes only six lines in the section entitled, "Where in Japan are long-range policy proposals formulated?" The implication is that there is no such place!

In addition to confronting the serious policy decision-making problems raised above, the MFA should halt the erosion of its traditional expertise by cultivating unique knowledge and talents in the functional realm of broad policy planning. First, however, an overall policy-formation system must be established that is conducive to long-range planning. The LDP should make sure that a major faction leader occupies the post of foreign minister. The foreign minister, in turn, should see to it that a variety of policy options are considered within the ministry. The tendency to patronize those lower officials in the ministry who faithfully, or only outwardly, repeat the policies advocated by their superiors is to be avoided at all cost. The administrative vice-minister should encourage a constant, enriching flow of personnel in and out of the ministry, and should push ahead with reforms toward the establishment of a merit system of promotion within the ministry (by the phrase "within the ministry" I exclude the "merit" of serving ruling party politicians). Finally, the Ministry of Finance should not begrudge ample funds for retraining MFA personnel. With these measures as a beginning, the ministry should be able to reduce the excessive influence of domestic political forces on foreign policy formation.

<sup>17</sup> (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1971), 210.

## Appendix JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD CHINA, 1868-1941: A Research Guide

The study of Japan's policies toward China has been undertaken primarily by diplomatic historians using, especially in the postwar period, the official documents of the Foreign Ministry and to some extent relevant military and private archives. The result has been an impressive number of monographs on particular incidents and periods, some of the more important of which are listed below. It should be recognized that little consensus on periodization, to say nothing of interpretation, has yet emerged, so that the division offered here, on the basis of what are presumed to be major policies, is personal and tentative. Many more monographic studies of a historical type are needed before a satisfactory overall explanation of Japan's China policies can be attempted. In addition, the resources of the behavioral sciences need to be brought to bear on problems of a new type: those relating to the dynamics of policy and to the formulators and the executors of policy, their purposes, and their relations with one another. Some suggestions for the methodology of conducting such a study, together with relevant sources, are also offered below.

### **The Adjustment of National Boundaries and Foreign Relations, 1868-1895**

Fervent nationalism supported the Meiji government 明治政府 from its inception. This national feeling consisted on the one hand of a mixture of "premodern ethnocentrism" with modern state consciousness, and on the other of crisis consciousness in international politics. Furthermore, the men who established the new government did so at great personal risk, and they emerged from a civil war with deep insight about the workings of power politics. It was rather natural, therefore, that they sought to promote measures calculated to enrich and strengthen Japan and to raise the country's national prestige through the expansion of Japanese influence over weaker adjacent areas. The immediate motives that prompted this policy, however, are more difficult to discover, although there is no doubt that one was to redirect the repressed

\* This was a chapter in James William Morley, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941: A Research Guide* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), 236-264. This introduces with annotation a selection of Japanese language articles on Japan-China relations for foreign graduate students. This is a product of the time when I was engaged in research as a senior fellow at the East Asian Institute of the Columbia University. There were innumerable articles published on the subject in Japanese language at that time. It is my pleasure to note that the ones I have carefully selected for inclusion in the essay are still evaluated today, after forty years, as excellent articles and books.

energies of the samurai class, which was disgruntled by the loss of its former special privileges.

The first basic aim of the Meiji government's continental policy, therefore, was the adjustment of the country's boundaries and its relations with its neighbors. To define national boundaries in the north, Japan had to solve problems involving Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and in the south it had to cope with issues involving the Bonin and Ryukyu 琉球 Islands. With regard to neighboring areas the Meiji government had to establish new arrangements relating to Korea and Taiwan 臺灣.

Before embarking on full-scale relations with the continent, the leaders of the Meiji government in 1871 concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the Ch'ing 清 dynasty in China. The Western powers had subjected both Japan and China to unequal treaties. In the treaty of 1871 the two countries accordingly recognized each other's right to consular jurisdiction. In reality, however, Japan attempted to get China to submit to an unequal treaty similar to the treaties the Ch'ing government had concluded with the Western powers. Japan withdrew its demand only because of strong Chinese opposition. Little study has been made of this Sino-Japanese treaty. Only one work Wang Yun-sheng 王芸生, ed., *Liu-shih-nien lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen* 六十年來中國與日本 (China and Japan in the Past Sixty Years), 7 vols. (Tientsin: Tientsin ta kung pao she 天津大公報社, 1932-34), refers to this subject in some detail.

Having secured a treaty with China, Japan's leaders turned to problems involving Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, and Taiwan. In 1873 they divided over a proposed military expedition against Korea. They held in common a strong sense of nationalism involving a desire to enhance the world prestige of the Japanese empire. Moderates, however, felt that a premature international adventure would endanger the country. The moderates finally prevailed and the government canceled the projected expedition. On the other hand, Japanese leaders did use military force to settle both the Ryukyu (1872-81) and Taiwan (1874) questions. This was particularly true in the case of Taiwan. ŌKUBO Toshimichi 大久保利通, who had opposed the policy of the Korean expedition the year before, strongly advocated the use of military power on this occasion, and the Japanese government followed ŌKUBO at the risk of war with China.

Since World War II many Japanese scholars have bitterly criticized the leaders of the Meiji government for being subordinate to the West and for adopting aggressive policies toward other Asian countries. These criticisms contribute to an understanding of factual developments, but they do not analyze the fundamental reasons behind the aggressive policies of the Meiji government, nor do they give adequate explanations for the fervor of Japanese public opinion since the early Meiji period concerning China and Korea.

We must therefore reexamine Japanese policy toward China in order to try to answer these basic questions. On the Ryukyu question several essays are available,

but almost no studies exist on the Taiwan question. Every student of the history of Taiwan should read the books by INŌ Kanori 伊能嘉矩 and YANAIHARA Tadao 矢内原忠雄. A monthly magazine, *Taiwan Seinen* 臺灣青年 (The Young Formosan) (Tokyo: Taiwan toklip lianbeng 臺灣獨立聯盟 (United Formosans for Independence), a monthly publication), also known as *Taiwan chinglian*, published by the United Formosans for Independence, a group advocating independence for Taiwan, often provides useful historical essays. MUKŌYAMA Hiroo 向山寛夫, a professor at Kokugakuin University 國學院大學 in Tokyo, has written a comprehensive history of Taiwan under Japanese rule with an excellent bibliography, but it has not yet been published.

Whether the motivation for Japanese policy toward Korea was a desire for territorial aggrandizement or a wish to assist Korea in becoming a modern independent nation is another much-debated question. Most Korean scholars and Marxist scholars in Japan support the former view. Hilary Conroy and TABOHASHI Kiyoshi 田保橋潔 argue the latter. Whatever the outcome of this debate, it is certain that until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Korea had the "alternative" of maintaining its independence through positive internal reforms. If Korea had taken this alternative course, there is no doubt that Japan would have had no justification for or intention of dispatching troops there.

Scholars have explored the Korean question and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 with comparative thoroughness. Some Marxists, including SHINOBU Seizaburō 信夫清三郎, tend to make economic ambition the major cause of the war. MINAMI 南 and OKA Yoshitake 岡義武 play down the economic cause and pay more attention to psychological motives. The works of UEDA Toshio 上田捷雄 and YANO Jin'ichi 矢野仁一 furnish a guide to source materials on international problems surrounding the war.

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**Addition of Korea to the Japanese Sphere, 1895-1904**

After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Japanese government set about immediately to attain a position of national equality with the Western powers. Examples of the implementation of this policy include the successful efforts for treaty revision and the maintenance of tight military discipline among Japanese soldiers at the time of the Boxer Rebellion 義和團事件.

Furthermore, the Japanese people, enraged by the Triple Intervention 三國干涉 (1895), determined with vengeance to resist further Russian expansion in the Far East. Accordingly, when Japan was confronted with Russian infiltration in Korea, the government's objective became the maintenance of the territorial integrity of that country.

This is a much-debated point. Many Marxist scholars emphasize that a goal of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was the acquisition of the Manchurian market. SHIMOMURA Fujio 下村富士男 asserts, however, that the Japanese government did not intend to go beyond the maintenance of Korea's territorial integrity. FUJII Shōichi 藤井松一 and INOUE Kiyoshi 井上清 advocate the market theory. It is undeniable that there were Japanese decision-makers, like Foreign Minister KOMURA Jutarō 小村壽太郎, who promoted the expansion of Japanese rights and interests into Manchuria after the war with Russia. But as far as the Japanese government's objective immediately before the war is concerned, SHIMOMURA seems to have the better of the argument. As long as Russian influence was restricted to Manchuria, regardless of the uneasiness it might have caused Japan, the Japanese government would have taken no steps toward war. Furthermore, the Anglo-Japanese alliance,

which was based on the antagonism between Britain and Russia, maintained at least temporarily the balance of power in the Far East. The period 1894-1904, then, is best seen as one when Japan's primary continental purpose was to keep Korea within Japan's sphere of influence.

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### The Consolidation of Rights and Interests, 1905-1915

With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea lost the "alternative" of maintaining its independence. Since an independent Korea would block the flow of communication between Japan proper and its new rights and interests in Manchuria, the Japanese government decided from geopolitical considerations to place Korea under Japanese control by military force. Consequently, in February 1904 Japan forced Korea to accede to the Japan-Korea Protocol 日韓協約, which gave Japan the right to interfere in Korea's internal affairs. And through successive treaties of protection and amalgamation, in 1910 Korea became a Japanese colony.

The acquisition by Japan of rights and interests in Manchuria terminated the short period of amicable relations between Japan and China that had emerged after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and a period of unending friction commenced between the two nations. Since Japan merely succeeded to the rights and interests that Russia had held in China, many of them had early terminal dates or were insecure. Therefore, after the Russo-Japanese War, consolidation of the newly acquired rights and interests became the objective of the Japanese government. For this purpose Japan first resorted to alliance and entente with the Western powers. By recognizing the powers' spheres of influence in China south of the Wall, Japan succeeded in having the powers recognize its rights and interests in southern Manchuria.

Japan further consolidated its rights and interests by dispatching two ultimatums to the Chinese government: one concerned the policy question related to the Mukden-Antung 奉天—安東 rail line, and the other included the Twenty-One Demands 二十一箇條要求. Japan also showed signs during the 1911 revolution of taking advantage of China's internal turmoil; from this time on, both the revolutionaries and the Yüan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱 regime were suspicious of Japanese intentions.

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### The Maintenance of Rights and Interests, 1915-1931

After Japan legally consolidated its rights and interests in China through treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands and World War I, the maintenance and full realization of those rights and interests became the central aim of its China policy. The Terauchi 寺內 cabinet assisted Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞 because TERAUCHI thought that Japan's vested interests in China would be more secure if a unified pro-Japanese regime could be set up under Tuan's leadership.

The Hara 原 cabinet which succeeded Terauchi's, on the other hand, promoted a policy of nonintervention in Chinese internal affairs. Until 1931 succeeding cabinets more or less faithfully carried out this policy, except during the years under the Tanaka 田中 cabinet, 1927-29. Some writers, such as EGUCHI Keiichi 江口圭一, assert, however, that Japan in these years actually wanted to interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

The Tanaka cabinet, however, found it could not completely renounce the policy of non-intervention. In 1927 and 1928 TANAKA dispatched troops to Shantung 山東 with the stated purpose of protecting Japanese residents in that area. These unnecessary expeditions originated in fact in Seiyūkai 政友會, in order to save "face." Leaders of the party had actively criticized former Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA Kijūrō 幣原喜重郎 for his non-intervention policy toward China, and when in power felt compelled to adopt a "positive policy." Moreover, the Seiyūkai at that time had many members like MORI Tsutomu (Kaku) 森恪, then Parliamentary Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, who strongly advocated an even more aggressive policy toward China. Therefore, when troops of the Chinese Nationalists 中國國民黨 marched into north China, the Tanaka cabinet twice sent troops to Shantung. One result was the Tsinan Incident 濟南事件 of May 1928. Shortly afterwards, staff officers of the Kwantung army 關東軍 assassinated Chang Tso-lin 張作霖. Chinese nationalism, more and more infuriated by these actions, now turned its force against Japan.

The Kuomintang 國民黨 government's success in unifying China strengthened the nationalist movement throughout the country. Before long, the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria became so strong that it posed a threat to Japan's rights and interests there; in September 1931, in defense of these interests, the Kwantung army fabricated the Manchurian Incident 滿洲事變.

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### The Establishment of Manchukuo and the Separation of North China, 1931-1937

The tendency of the Japanese army in the Kwantung Leased Territory to take positive action in defiance of orders from the central government came into the open in 1928. The murder of Chang Tso-lin in June of that year made the phenomenon clear to all knowledgeable observers. Matters reached a climax on September 18, 1931, in Mukden. The Tokyo government was indecisive and failed to take strong action. The frustrated Japanese people, however, rejoiced over developments, and the army's use of force was a kind of catharsis. As a result, even some responsible officials began to support the army's decisive action, and the government became more and more impotent. After the incident, the Kwantung army's plan to establish Manchukuo 滿洲國 succeeded. Next, activists carried out operations in rapid succession to separate north China and Suiyuan 綏遠; and in 1936 the official policy of the Japanese government decreed that the five provinces of north China should be made "autonomous."

Besides the books on the Manchurian Incident by Maxon, OGATA, and YOSHIHASHI, KIMURA Yoshito 木村義人's dissertation manuscript is on deposit at Tokyo University. Hata 秦's book is a compilation of several essays based mainly on military records; it also includes a list of publications concerning the era. An outstanding work edited by the Manshikai 滿史會 clarifies problems related to the economic development of Manchuria, but many other subjects, such as Japanese investments in Manchuria or the activities of the South Manchuria Railway Company 南滿洲鐵道株式會社, remain unexplored. SEKI 關 and SHIMADA 島田 have used basic materials to write a bird's-eye view of the topics noted below.

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After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, the army gradually usurped the

powers of the Foreign Ministry until the ministry came to be called the “foreign affairs bureau of the army.” Throughout these years the Japanese government aimed at the subjugation or dissolution of the Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 regime, except during the short period in 1940 when the Army General Staff proposed to withdraw troops from China voluntarily; this proposal, however, suddenly died with the success of the German blitzkrieg in Europe.

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### Concepts and Sources for Dynamic Analysis

In the future, if the study of Japan's China policies is to yield more than descriptive knowledge, it must be based on a more explicit understanding of the processes by which policy was formed. The following analytical concepts may prove useful.

#### *Initial Response*

The immediate response of an individual or group to an external stimulus is a kind of conditioned reflex. Take, for example, the immediate reaction of the average Japanese to the news of the Triple Intervention. It was probably an outraged, "How could we have given up our Liaotung Peninsula 遼東半島" As he underwent a process of rational judgment, however, he finally realized, "It would be tough to fight Germany, France, and Russia." The average Japanese upon hearing the report of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 shouted in exultation, "We did it!" He had not the slightest doubt about the deceptive announcement of the Kwantung army that the explosion on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway had been detonated by Chinese soldiers. For the time being, such an immediate response, which has not yet undergone a process of rationalization, can be called an initial response. Different people have different initial responses; the majority of Japanese, however, show a more or less common response, due to a similar environment. The bureaucrats, politicians, and all those who have an important role in decision-making are not exceptions in their initial responses; nor are their initial responses much different from those of the masses.

#### *Responsible Officials*

The group of government officials responsible for policy-making included cabinet members, high-ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry, middle-ranking officials in the Asia Bureau of the ministry, and responsible officers in the Army Ministry and the Army General Staff. In a government that maintains a huge bureaucratic system, unless the leadership of cabinet members is very strong, the basic draft of a policy is usually formulated among middle-ranking bureaucrats. It becomes a policy of the government after undergoing a process of successive adjustments at the hands of higher bureaucrats. In most cases the draft is not amended except for certain detailed points. In Japan this tendency was strengthened as the bureaucratic system became consolidated and the number of political leaders who had personally participated in the Meiji Restoration 明治維新 gradually decreased.

As we have observed, the initial response of responsible officials to an outside

stimulus is basically no different from that of other Japanese. The only difference is that they, being in positions of authority where accurate information is most accessible, tend to reach the most 'practical' and therefore 'conventional' conclusion.

### *Interested Agencies*

Included were politicians, bureaucrats, local "subleaders," and others not directly responsible for the management of foreign affairs. They were not experts on China affairs, but they applied great pressure and influence on actual decision-making through their organizations and by use of their political positions. In Japan there have been many instances in which the bureaucrats played the same role as that of the pressure groups in America. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan concentrated all its efforts on rapidly catching up with the West's achievements of the previous three hundred years, and therefore the establishment of nongovernmental organizations was considerably behind that of the state organization. Consequently, units within the governmental organization often took over roles usually performed in other countries by civil organizations. For instance, throughout the Meiji and Taishō 大正 eras, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 農商務省 (reorganized in 1925) were the staunchest advocates of a modern labor relations law, and the Agricultural Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 農林省 (established in 1925) stressed the necessity of land reform in prewar Japan. In addition, there have been many examples of organizations set up as civil bodies which actually were mere auxiliary organs of the state and thus subject to the strong leadership of the bureaucrats. The Imperial Reservists Association 帝國在郷軍人會 and the Imperial Education Association 帝國教育會 were examples of this type of "civil" organization. Membership in these organizations, which came in direct contact with the public, included such people as local politicians, small businessmen, small and medium scale landlords, and schoolteachers.

### *Interested Private Sector*

This is a category for those who had a special interest in China affairs, having reached their own opinions by attentively following current developments in Sino-Japanese relations. Journalists specializing in China affairs, some scholars on China, and military men who were commonly called *shinaya* 支那屋 or 'China hands' were outstanding examples of members of this group. Associations of China activists, who devoted themselves to China affairs with a great sense of mission and ambition, such as the members of the China Affairs League 對支聯合會 and the Dark Ocean Society 玄洋社, also were included. Other organizations of the interested private sector were the associations of Japanese residents in China, the League of the Japanese Textile Industry in China 在華日本紡績同業會, and the societies of Japanese businessmen in China, each of which clearly had a special interest in China.

These organizations were generally nationalistic and seldom went so far in

their activities as to defy the framework of *kokutai* 國體 or the national polity of Japan. Within this framework, they frequently championed policies contrary to those of the government, as during the Hibiya Riot 日比谷燒打事件 at the time of the Portsmouth Treaty (1905) and in the behind-the-scenes maneuvering of the China activists who assisted the Chinese revolution of 1911, when the official policy of the Japanese government was to support the Yuan Shih-k'ai regime. In contrast to the responsible officials who were apt to resort to makeshift policies, these organizations were generally more radical and, in a sense, irresponsible. At times they displayed great power to move the masses by utilizing the masses' emotional initial response.

The growth of an interested private sector on the China question, which in some cases included people who were against the established system of the state, was considerably delayed in Japan. It finally sprouted after World War I and reached its climax in the movement of the Alliance for Nonintervention in China 對支非干涉運動全國同盟 at the time of the Tanaka cabinet and in the activities of the Proletarian Science Research Center プロレタリア科學研究所. This interested private sector, however, gradually declined after the Manchurian Incident in 1931 because it failed to mobilize the masses against the existing system.

The research problem, then, is two-fold: first, to describe accurately the above-mentioned elements, i.e., the initial response, responsible officials, interested agencies, and interested private sectors; and, second, to investigate the relationships among them. For the former purpose, recourse should be had to a great variety of sources which until now have been little consulted by researchers. A discussion of some of the more important of these sources, together with the few analytical studies so far attempted, follows.

### *The Japanese Image of China*

As suggested above, an "initial response" occurs when an individual reacts to an outside stimulus according to a preconceived notion gained from his own experience. When information on China affairs is transmitted to an individual, his initial response depends upon his preconceived image of China. Therefore, to estimate the nature of the initial response, it is necessary for us to grasp clearly not only the structure of various organizations but also the nature of the image of China held by Japanese.

In postwar Japan, extensive field surveys and questionnaires have enabled social scientists to analyze Japanese national character, racial and nationality distances, and national images in the minds of the people. Four books are suggestive:

Nihon jimbun gakkai 日本文學會, ed., *Shakaiteki kinchō no kenkyū* 社會的緊張の研究 (Studies of Social Tensions) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1953).

Ningen kankei sōgō kenkyūdan 人間關係總合研究團, ed., *Nihonjin: Bunka to pāsonariti no jissōteki kenkyū* 日本人：文化とパーソナリティの實證的研究 (The Japanese: Studies of Personality and Culture) (Nagoya: Reimeiji shobō 黎明書房, 1962).

Tōkei sūri kenkyūsho kokuminsei chōsa iinkai 統計数理研究所國民性調査委員會, ed., *Nihonjin no kokuminsei* 日本人の國民性 (The Japanese National Character) (Tokyo: Shiseidō 至誠堂, 1961).

WAGATSUMA Hiroshi 我妻洋 and YONEYAMA Toshinao 米山俊直, *Henken no kōzō: Nihonjin no jinshukan* 偏見の構造：日本人の人種觀 (The Structure of Prejudice: Japanese Views of Race) (Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai 日本放送出版協會, 1967).

With respect to prewar Japan, two general works are listed below along with several prewar books specifically on the Japanese image of China. Most of them are simple and impressionistic compared with some of the postwar works. No student has ever undertaken a serious study of the long-held Japanese dream of the emancipation of Asian peoples. The books by TAKEUCHI 竹内 and KAMEI 龜井 and the article by HANZAWA 判澤 are useful introductions to further study. Mushanokōji 武者小路's note is an attempt to make a brief sketch of Japanese images of the external world from the standpoint of behavioral science.

There seem to be three approaches to the study of Japanese views of China. The first is the use of biographies, diaries, and written works of the officials responsible for Japanese policy. There were several responsible officials in the field of Chinese affairs who left materials to be analyzed. These are listed below.

A second approach is through the images of China held by middle-ranking military officers, entrepreneurs, and journalists who lived in China. These included such men as Colonel TŌMIYA Kaneo 東宮鐵男, the journalist KIKUCHI Teiji 菊地貞二, and an active member of the Amur River Society 黑龍會 and the Dark Ocean Society, UCHIDA Ryōhei 內田良平.

A third approach is to extract Japanese views on China from a survey of literary or popular writings and school textbooks. For instance, NATSUME Sōseki 夏目漱石's *Botchan* 坊ちゃん and *Man-Kan tokoro-dokoro* 滿韓とところどころ will give us a glimpse of his views on China. KARASAWA Tomitarō 唐澤富太郎 made an extensive survey of Japanese school textbooks in his *Kyōkasho no rekishi* 教科書の歴史. Would it not be possible to draw Japanese images of foreign countries from textbooks? It might also be useful to analyze the writings of such men as TAKEZOE Shin'ichirō 竹添進一郎, a poet and Japanese minister to Korea, 1882-87.

KARASAWA Tomitarō 唐澤富太郎, *Kyōkasho no rekishi: Kyōkasho to Nihonjin no keisei* 教科書の歴史：教科書と日本人の形成 (History of Textbooks: Textbooks and the Development of the Japanese Character) (Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社, 1956).

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— *Man-Kan tokoro dokoro* 滿韓とところどころ (Impressions of Manchuria and Korea) (Tokyo: Shun'yōdō, 1910).

TAKEZOE Seisei (Shin'ichirō) 竹添井井 (進一郎), *Gen Isan monzen* 元遺山文選 (Selected Poems of Yüan I-shan) (Tokyo: Keibundō 奎文堂, 1883).

— *Dokuhōrō shibun kō: Fu San'unkyō'u nikki* 獨抱樓詩文稿：附棧雲峽雨日記 (Dokuhōrō Poems and the Sen'unkyō Diary) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1912).

Prewar Japan:

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KASAI Takashi 笠井孝, *Ura kara mita Shina minzokusei* 裏から見た支那民族性 (An Inside View of the Chinese National Character) (Tokyo: Nihon gaiji kyōkai 日本外事協會, 1935).

KIKUCHI Teiji 菊池貞二, *Chōkyōro mampitsu* 丁杏盧漫筆 (Essays from my Chōkyōro Villa) (Hsinking: Shinkyō nichinichi shimbunsha 新京日日新聞社, 1936).

MATSUNAGA Yasuzaemon 松永安左衛門, *Shina gakan* 支那我觀 (My View of China) (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no sekai 實業之世界, 1919).

TAKIGAWA Masajirō 瀧川政次郎, *Hōritsu kara mita Shina kokuminsei* 法律から見た支那國民性 (Chinese National Character from a Legal Point of View) (Tokyo: Daidō inshokan 大同印書館, 1941).

WATANABE Gizan (Shūhō) 渡邊岐山 (秀方), *Shina kokuminsei ron* 支那國民性論 (An Essay on Chinese National Character) (Tokyo: Ōsakayagō shoten, 1922).

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- Tōmiya Taisa kinen jigyō iinkai 東宮大佐記念事業委員會, ed., *Tōmiya Kaneo den* 東宮鐵男傳 (Biography of Tōmiya Kaneo) (Tokyo: Tōmiya taisa kinen jigyō iinkai 東宮大佐記念事業委員會, 1940).
- UCHIDA Ryōhei 內田良平, *Shina kaizō ron* 支那改造論 (Reconstructing China) (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai 黑龍會, 1911).
- *Nihon no san dai kyūmu* 日本の三大急務 (Three Urgent Tasks before Japan) (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai, 1912).
- *Zen Mammō tetsudō tōitsu ikensho* 全滿蒙鐵道統一意見書 (Views on the Unification of Railroads in Manchuria and Mongolia) (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai shuppambu 黑龍會出版部, 1930).

### *The Role of Organizations.*

Except for a descriptive official history of the Foreign Ministry, there is not at present available a complete history of the Japanese armed forces or their ministries. Therefore, the structural framework within which the 'responsible officials' acted is difficult to ascertain.

On the other hand, there are a number of institutional histories and chronological compilations of facts and documents relating to the activities and functions of various interested agencies and private organizations. These refer to official bodies, such as the Kwantung Government-General 關東廳 and the Deposits Division in the Ministry of Finance 大藏省預金部; to semi-private organizations, such as the South Manchuria Railway Company, the Bank of Korea 朝鮮銀行, the Tientsin Residents Association 天津居留民團, and the Imperial Reservists Association; and to various private bodies, including business firms, such as the League of the Japanese Textile industry in China, and residents associations. Few of these bodies have been studied; and those which have, such as the Dark Ocean Society studied by Herbert Norman, need to be looked at again objectively. The following are among the most significant sources.

## Bank of Korea:

Chōsen ginkō 朝鮮銀行, *Chōsen ginkō nijūgonenshi* 朝鮮銀行二十五年史 (Twenty-five Year History of the Bank of Korea) (Seoul: Chōsen ginkō, 1934).

Chōsen ginkō shi hensan iinkai 朝鮮銀行史編纂委員會, *Chōsen ginkō ryakushi* 朝鮮銀行略史 (A Brief History of the Bank of Korea) (Tokyo: Chōsen ginkō, 1960).

## Bank of Taiwan 臺灣銀行:

Taiwan ginkō 臺灣銀行, *Taiwan ginkō jūnenshi* 臺灣銀行十年史 (A Ten-year History of the Bank of Taiwan) (Tokyo: Taiwan ginkō, 1910).

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— *Taiwan ginkō nijūnen shi* 臺灣銀行二十年史 (A Twenty-year History of the Bank of Taiwan) (Taihoku (Taipei): Taiwan ginkō, 1919).

— *Taiwan ginkō yonjūnen shi* 臺灣銀行四十年史 (A Forty-year History of the Bank of Taiwan) (Tokyo: Taiwan ginkō, 1939).

## Dark Ocean Society:

Norman, E. H., "The Genyōsha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs* 17 (September 1944): 261-84.

## East Asia Common Culture Association 東亞同文會:

Koyūkai 滬友會, ed., *Tōa dōbun shoin daigaku shi* 東亞同文書院大學史 (History of the East Asia Common Culture University) (Tokyo: Koyūkai, 1955).

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Tōa dōbun shoin (Shanghai) 東亞同文書院, *Sōritsu sanjūssūnen kinen Tōa dōbun shoin shi* 創立三十周年記念東亞同文書院史 (A Record Commemorating the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the East Asia Common Culture Academy) (Shanghai: Tōa dōbun shoin, 1930).

## East Asia Research Institute 東亞研究所:

Tōa kenkyūsho 東亞研究所 (ITŌ Yū 伊藤斌), *Tōken seika tekiyō* 東研成果摘要 (Outline of the Results of Research by the East Asia Research Institute) (Tokyo: Tōa kenkyūsho, 1943).

## Finance Ministry, Deposits Division:

NAKATSUMI Tomokata 中津海知方, *Yokimbu hishi* 預金部祕史 (A Secret

History of the Deposit Division of the Finance Ministry) (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha shuppambu 東洋經濟新報社出版部, 1928).

Foreign Ministry:

Gaimushō hyakunenshi hensan iinkai 外務省百年史編纂委員會, ed., *Gaimushō no hyakunen* 外務省の百年 (A Hundred Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Hara shobō 原書房, 1969).

MIKAMI Akiyoshi 三上昭美, "Gaimushō setchi no keii 外務省設置の経緯 (The Establishment of the Foreign Ministry)," *Kokusai seiji: Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū: Nihon gaikōshi no shomondai I* (International Relations) 26 (1963): 1-21.

Imperial Reservists Association:

Teikoku zaigō gunjinkai 帝國在郷軍人會, *Teikoku zaigō gunjinkai sanjūnenshi* 帝國在郷軍人會三十年史 (A Thirty-year History of the Imperial Reservists Association) (Tokyo: Teikoku zaigō gunjinkai hombu 帝國在郷軍人會本部, 1944).

Kwantung Government-General:

Kantōchō 關東廳 (Kwantung Government-General), ed., *Kantōchō shisei nijūnenshi* 關東廳施政二十年史 (A Twenty-year History of the Administration of the Kwantung Leased Territory) (Dairen: Kantōchō, 1926).

— *Kantōchō shisei sanjūnenshi* 關東廳施政三十年史 (A Thirty-year History of the Administration of the Kwantung Leased Territory) (Dairen: Kantōchō, 1936).

Kantōchō chōkan kambō bunshoka 關東廳長官官房文書課 (Kwantung Government-General, Secretariat, Records Section), ed., *Kantōchō yōran* 關東廳要覽 (Handbook of the Kwantung Government-General) (Dairen: Kantōchō, 1925, 1927, 1928, 1934).

Mukden Chamber of Commerce and Industry 奉天商工會議所:

Hōten shōkō kaigisho 奉天商工會議所, *Hōten keizai sanjūnenshi* 奉天經濟三十年史 (A Thirty-year History of Economic Activities in Mukden) (Mukden: Hōten shōkō kaigisho, 1940).

Naigaimen Company 內外綿株式會社:

MOTOKI Mitsuyuki 元木光之, *Naigaimen kabushiki gaisha gojūnenshi* 內外綿株式會社五十年史 (A Fifty-year History of the Naigaimen Company) (Osaka: Naigaimen kabushiki gaisha, 1937).

## North China Development Company 北支那開發株式會社:

Kita Shina kaihatsu kabushiki gaisha 北支那開發株式會社, *Kita Shina kaihatsu kabushiki gaisha oyobi kankei gaisha gaiyō* 北支那開發株式會社及び關係會社概要 (An Outline of the North China Development Company and Related Companies) (Peking: Kita Shina kaihatsu kabushiki gaisha, 1940-44).

## Oriental Development Company 東洋拓殖株式會社:

Tōyō takushoku kabushiki gaisha 東洋拓殖株式會社, *Tōyō takushoku kabushiki gaisha sanjūnenshi* 東洋拓殖株式會社三十年誌 (A Thirty-year History of the Oriental Development Company) (Tokyo: Tōyō takushoku kabushiki gaisha, 1939).

## Shanghai Residents Association 上海居留民團:

Shanghai kyoryū mindan 上海居留民團, *Mindan sōritsu sanjūgoshūnen kinenshi* 民團創立三十五年記念史 (A History Commemorating the Thirty-fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Shanghai Residents Association) (Shanghai: Shanghai kyoryū mindan, 1942).

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## Sino-Japanese Steamship Company 日清汽船株式會社:

ASAI Seiichi 淺居誠一, *Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha sanjūnen-shi oyobi tsui-ho* 日清汽船株式會社三十年史及追補 (Thirty-year History of the Sino-Japanese Steamship Company, and Supplement) (Tokyo: Nisshin kisen kabushiki gaisha 日清汽船株式會社, 1941).

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- *Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha nijūnen ryakushi* 南滿洲鐵道株式會社二十年略史 (A Short Twenty-year History of the South Manchuria Railway Company) (Dairen: Minami manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha, 1927).
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- Young, John, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907-1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1966).

Tientsin Residents Association:

- Tenshin kyoryū mindan 天津居留民團, *Tenshin kyoryū mindan nijūshūnen kinenshi* 天津居留民團二十周年記念誌 (A Twenty-year Commemorative Record of the Tientsin Residents Association) (Tientsin: Tenshin kyoryū

mindan, 1930).

USUI Chūzō 白井忠三, *Tenshin kyoryū mindan sanjūshūnen kinenshi* 天津居留民團三十周年記念誌 (Thirty-year Commemorative Record of the Tientsin Residents Association) (Tientsin: Tenshin kyoryū mindan, 1941).

Universal Benevolence Association 同仁會:

HOSAKA Yūichirō 穗坂唯一郎, *Dōjinkai yonjūnenishi* 同仁會四十年史 (A Forty-year History of the Universal Benevolence Association) (Tokyo: Dōjinkai 同仁會, 1943).

ONO Tokujirō 小野得二郎, *Dōjinkai sanjūnenishi* 同仁會三十年史 (A Thirty-year History of the Universal Benevolence Association) (Tokyo: Dōjinkai, 1932).

### *The Role of Individuals.*

Policy is made by men; that is, the process from the “initial response” down through various rational judgments to the concrete decision of a policy is work done by men. Therefore, biographical studies of important politicians and major “opinion leaders” are as important as studies of organizations. To be useful, however, biographies should not tell “a story of a great man”, but rather should focus on the process by which a given man responds initially to certain information, constructs his rationalizations, and finally reaches his conclusions.

The following are useful bibliographies of biographies of prominent Japanese of the past century.

IKEDA Toshio 池田敏雄, *Ningen kiroku shomoku* 人間記録書目 (Bibliography of Biography), 2 vols. (Mimeographed and privately circulated, n.d.).

Nihon gakujutsu kaigi daiichibu 日本學術會議第一部, ed., *Bunkakei bunken mokuroku 14: Nihon kindaiishi: Denki hen* 文化系文獻目錄14—日本近代史傳記編 (Bibliography of Works in the Social Sciences and Humanities No.14: Modern Japanese History: Biographies and Autobiographies) (Tokyo: Nihon gakujutsu kaigi 日本學術會議, 1963).

Tōyō bunko 東洋文庫, *Tōyō bunko shozō kindai Nihon kankei bunken bunrui mokuroku: Washo maikurofirumu no bu* 東洋文庫所藏近代日本關係文獻分類目錄—和書マイクロフィルムの部 (Classified Catalogue of Books in the Tōyō Bunko on Modern Japan: Japanese Books and Microfilms) (Tokyo: Tōyō bunko kindai nihon kenkyūshitsu 東洋文庫近代日本研究室, 1961-63).

There are many biographies and memoirs of responsible officials who played important roles in Sino-Japanese relations. These include works on two Japanese ministers at Peking and one at Nanking; Japanese consuls at Mukden, Kirin 吉林, and major Chinese cities; four foreign ministers; and other Japanese diplomats.

Some of those who were either in interested agencies or in the private sector and were also appointed responsible officials for certain periods have memoirs or biographies. They were primarily politicians or military officers. Besides the responsible officials, a number of persons in interested agencies have biographies or memoirs. Some of the key figures listed below include: ISHIWARA Kanji 石原莞爾, the planner of the Mukden Incident; AOKI Norizumi 青木宣純, a long-term army officer in China; SASAKI Tōichi 佐々木到一, the army officer who first appreciated the prospects of Chiang Kai-shek; TŌMIYA Kaneo, the commander on the spot when Chang Tso-lin was killed; and KŌMOTO Daisaku 河本大作, the planner of Chang's assassination. In addition, NAITŌ Konan 内藤湖南, a professor of Oriental history at Kyoto Imperial University 京都帝國大學, influenced thinking about China during the late Meiji and Taishō eras. His writings are described in the Masubuchi 増淵 and Ikeda 池田 articles. NISHIHARA Kamezō 西原龜三, the famous promoter of Japanese loans to Tuan Ch'i-jui, is represented by his autobiography and articles by KITAMURA 北村 and HATANO 波多野.

There are also important sources on certain entrepreneurs, particularly in the cotton industry, and on a number of China activists. As shown in Marius Jansen's *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*, many Japanese took part in the Chinese revolution of 1911-14. TANAKA's biography of YOSHINO Sakuzō 吉野作造 describes the attention paid to the democratization of China and Japan during the Taishō period, while later, more radical pro-Chinese figures include SUZUE Gen'ichi 鈴木言一, AOYAMA Kazuo 青山和夫, and KAJI Wataru 鹿地亘.

In addition, there are biographies of Chinese leaders written by Japanese, especially about Sun Yat-sen 孫逸山. A list of writings on Sun is available in the compilation by NOZAWA.

One must realize, however, that many of these biographies and memoirs were written simply to praise their subjects. Only a few are worthwhile analytically. Among these latter are Suzue's biography of Sun Yat-sen, books by WATANABE 渡邊 and SHINOBU on MUTSU Munemitsu 陸奥宗光's diplomacy, and Tanaka's works on KITA Ikki 北一輝. To these should be added certain critical shorter studies: Hatano's and Uno's articles on Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Nomura 野村's on Sun's nationalism, Terahiro 寺廣's two essays on MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, and Ishizaka 石坂's article on KITA. Although the bulk of the remaining biographies and memoirs are neither analytical nor critical, they have little purposely planned distortion; the Japanese prefer silence in this respect.

#### Foreign ministers:

ARITA Hachirō 有田八郎, *Hito no me no chiri wo miru: Gaikō mondai kaikoroku* 人の眼の塵を見る—外交問題回顧録 (Beholding the Mote in Other Men's Eyes: Memories of Diplomatic Problems) (Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 1948).

- *Bakahachi to hito wa iu: Gaikōkan no kaisō* 馬鹿八と人はいう—外交官の回想 (People Call Me “Hachi” the Fool: Memories of Diplomatic Problems) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1959).
- Shidehara heiwa zaidan 幣原平和財團, ed., *Shidehara Kijūrō* 幣原喜重郎 (Tokyo: Shidehara heiwa zaidan 幣原平和財團, 1955).
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- SHIGEMITSU Mamoru 重光葵, *Shōwa no dōran* 昭和の動亂 (Turbulence during the Shōwa Period), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha 中央公論社, 1952).
- *Gaikō kaisōroku* 外交回想録 (Diplomatic Reminiscences) (Tokyo: Mainichi shimbunsha 毎日新聞社, 1953).
- TAKAKURA Tetsuichi 高倉徹一, *Tanaka Giichi denki* 田中義一傳記 (Biography of Tanaka Giichi), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tanaka Giichi denki kankō kai 田中義一傳記刊行會, 1956-60).

Ministers, consuls, and other diplomats:

- HAYASHI Gonsuke 林權助, *Waga shichijūnen wo kataru* わが七十年を語る (Story of My Seventy Years) (Tokyo: Daiichi shobō 第一書房, 1935).
- HORIUCHI Tateki 堀内干城, *Chūgoku no arashi no naka de: Nikka gaikō sanjūnen yawa* 中國の嵐の中で一日華外交三十年夜話 (Through Storms in China: A Diplomatic Memoir of Thirty Years of Japanese-Chinese Relations) (Tokyo: Kengensha, 1950).
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- Obata Yūkichi denki kankōkai, ed., *Obata Yūkichi* (Tokyo: Obata Yūkichi denki kankōkai, 1957).
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 — *Mantetsu wo kataru* (An Account of the South Manchuria Railway Company) (Tokyo: Daiichi shuppansha, 1937).  
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### *Some Remaining Questions*

These include national character, the nature of the emperor system, and the motivation for Japanese expansion.

By national character is meant those characteristics which are common to all or nearly all members of the nation because of a common historical, social, and cultural background. This, of course, cannot be ascertained by analyzing one individual; it must be sought in those characteristics of an individual that resound among other individuals of the same nation. Japan's national character definitely expressed itself

in this way with respect to China policy. For instance, the Japanese have an excessive respect for the pure; they tend to reject compromise or reconciliation in politics and to agree with the "extremist" who maintains a high degree of purity. Because of this tendency, radical opinions often tend to prevail, and actions tend to suffer from a lack of flexibility. This national characteristic can be seen, for example, in Japan's policy during the League of Nations debate on the Manchurian question and in Japan's insistence in 1937 on excessively severe terms at the peace negotiations with China promoted through the mediation of Dr. Oskar Trautmann, the German ambassador to China.

Another Japanese trait is that of excessive sensitivity to shame, symptomatic of a "shame culture." This trait induced a strong sense of army prestige among military men, leading eventually to an attitude whereby no sacrifice was too great if it would maintain the prestige of the army. The Tsinan Incident, referred to above, is an example of how the Japanese army used force merely to save "face." As a result, the basic aim of dispatching troops—the protection of the Japanese residents in the area—was forgotten and many Japanese residents were killed. The military men on the spot did not show any sense of guilt, nor was there any reprimand from higher officials for this mistake. Such national character traits might well be included in the study of Japanese policies toward China.

It is interesting to note in connection with the Japanese national character that the outpourings of mass emotion, which often occurred during the Tokugawa regime in such forms as the *okage mairi* 御蔭參 (a mass pilgrimage to the Grand Shrine of Ise 伊勢神宮) and the "*ee ja nai ka* ええじゃないか" ("Why shouldn't I?") frenzy, suddenly disappeared with the Meiji period. During the feudal regime, the masses, who were oppressed, engaged in these outbursts as a kind of catharsis. Does this mean that in post-Meiji Japan the oppression of the masses was mitigated? Or did war come to take the place of mass frenzy?

The emperor system also presents problems for students of Japan's China policy, for it oppressed not only politics but also every aspect of social activity in prewar Japan. On the one hand, it functioned as the strongest element uniting the state, but on the other, it stood as an obstacle to the development of rational thinking. Did Japanese leaders really believe in the ideology of the emperor system when they had to deal with the bitter realities of international politics? ISHIWARA Kanji's writing, for example, is filled with emperor-worship. On the other hand, in 1931, in defiance of an order from the central government, the emperor's executive organ, ISHIWARA advocated Japan's further advance into Manchuria. Ultimately he went so far as to declare that had the central government continued its 'interference' with the Kwantung army's action, the army would have solved the Manchurian question independently, even if it had necessitated the severance of the Kwantung army from Japan proper. Thus, whenever ISHIWARA encountered the reality of international politics, he seems to have ignored the emperor, whom he professed to worship.

SUGIYAMA Gen 杉山元 is another case in point. In his capacity as minister of the army, he once told the emperor that the China Incident would be solved within one month. It did not bother him at all that his prediction turned out to be inaccurate. Again, in September 1941 the emperor asked him, as chief of the General Staff, the possible outcome of a war in the Pacific. SUGIYAMA answered, "It will be over in three months." This drew an angry retort from the emperor. "If you can say that China's great size is the cause of the protracted war, isn't the Pacific Ocean even greater? Then how can you say that a war in the Pacific will be over in three months?" SUGIYAMA could only lower his head and make no reply. The incident, however, did not change Sugiyama's policy, and Japan rushed into the Pacific War. Obviously, SUGIYAMA did not consider the emperor inviolate. Then can we say that the emperor was regarded seriously? This old and yet not fully analyzed question has always haunted the researcher.

Another important question is: Why, from the waning days of the Tokugawa regime on, were the Japanese so interested in overseas expansion? England launched its overseas expansion after losing its territory in Brittany. In contrast, Japan sought a foothold on the Asian continent but in the end lost everything because it clung to its rights and interests on the continent. Was the expansion of its commercial market the basic "incentive" for Japan's overseas adventure? OKA Yoshitake and MINAMI Tokuko 南とく子 do not believe so. Long before Japanese industrial products started flooding the China market, many Japanese, such as KISHIDA Ginkō 岸田吟香, ARAO Sei 荒尾精, and NEZU Hajime 根津一, entered China, still under the Ch'ing dynasty, with the dream of emancipating the mainland. These people appear to have been motivated by a sense of Pan-Asianism rather than dreams of economic expansion. More research is needed on this desire to emancipate Asia, for it constituted the reverse side of fervent Japanese nationalism.

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*Mainichi shimbun* 毎日新聞.

*Nihon keizai shimbun* 日本經濟新聞.

*Sekai shūhō* 世界週報

*Sankei shimbun* 産經新聞.

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## CONVERSION TABLE

*Wade-Giles to Pinyin*

<i>Wade-Giles</i>	<i>Pinyin</i>								
a	a	chiung	jiong	ha	ha	jih	ri	k'ung	kong
ai	ai	ch'iuang	qiong	hai	hai	jo	ruo	kuo	guo
an	an	cho	zhuo	han	han	jou	rou	k'uo	kuo
ang	ang	ch'o	chuo	hang	hang	ju	ru		
ao	ao	chou	zhou	hao	hao	juan	ruan	la	la
		ch'ou	chou	hei	hei	jui	rui	lai	lai
cha	zha	chu	zhu	hen	hen	jun	run	lan	lan
ch'a	cha	ch'u	chu	heng	heng	jung	rong	lang	lang
chai	zhai	chü	ju	ho	he			lao	lao
ch'ai	chai	ch'ü	qu	hou	hou	ka	ga	le	le
chan	zhan	chua	zhua	hsi	xi	k'a	ka	lei	lei
ch'an	chan	chuai	zhuai	hsia	xia	kai	gai	leng	leng
chang	zhang	ch'uai	chuai	hsiang	xiang	k'ai	kai	li	li
ch'ang	chang	chuan	zhuan	hsiao	xiao	kan	gan	liang	liang
chao	zhao	ch'uan	chuan	hsieh	xie	k'an	kan	liao	liao
ch'ao	chao	chüan	juan	hsien	xian	kang	gang	lieh	lie
che	zhe	ch'üan	quan	hsin	xin	k'ang	kang	lien	lian
ch'e	che	chuang	zhuang	hsing	xing	kao	gao	lin	lin
chen	zhen	ch'uang	chuang	hsiu	xiu	k'ao	kao	ling	ling
ch'en	chen	chüeh	jue	hsiung	xiong	ken	gen	liu	liu
cheng	zheng	ch'üeh	que	hsü	xu	k'en	ken	lo	luo
ch'eng	cheng	chui	zhui	hsüan	xuan	keng	geng	lou	lou
chi	ji	ch'ui	chui	hsüeh	xue	k'eng	keng	lu	lu
ch'i	qi	chun	zhun	hsün	xun	ko	ge	lū	lū
chia	jia	ch'un	chun	hu	hu	k'o	ke	luan	luan
ch'ia	qia	chün	jun	hua	hua	kou	gou	lueh	lüe
chiang	jiang	ch'ün	qun	huai	huai	k'ou	kou	lun	lun
ch'iang	qiang	chung	zhong	huan	huan	ku	gu	lung	long
chiao	jiao	ch'ung	chong	huang	huang	k'u	ku		
ch'iao	qiao			hui	hui	kua	gua	ma	ma
chieh	jie	en	en	hun	hun	k'ua	kua	mai	mai
ch'ieh	qie	erh	er	hung	hong	kuai	guai	man	man
chien	jian			huo	huo	k'uai	kuai	man	mang
ch'ien	qian	fa	fa			kuan	guan	mao	mao
chih	zhi	fan	fan	i	yi	k'uan	kuan	mei	mei
ch'ih	chi	fang	fang			kuang	guang	men	men
chin	jin	fei	fei	jan	ran	k'uang	kuang	meng	meng
ch'in	qin	fen	fen	jang	rang	kuei	gui	mi	mi
ching	qing	feng	feng	jao	rao	k'uei	gui	miao	miao
ch'ing	qing	fo	fo	je	re	kun	gun	mieh	mie
chiu	jiu	fou	fou	jen	ren	k'un	kun	mien	mian
ch'iu	qiu	fu	fu	jeng	reng	kung	gong	min	min

Wade-Giles	Pinyin								
ming	ming	pi	bi	sui	sui	tsang	zang	yüan	yuan
miu	miu	p'i	pi	sun	sun	ts'ang	cang	yüeh	yue
mo	mo	piao	biao	sung	song	tsao	zao	yün	yun
mou	mou	p'iao	piao			ts'ao	cao	yung	yong
mu	mu	pieh	bie	ta	da	tse	ze		
		p'ieh	pie	t'a	ta	ts'e	ce		
na	na	pien	bian	tai	dai	tsei	zei		
nai	nai	p'ien	pian	t'ai	tai	tсен	zen		
nan	nan	pin	bin	tan	dan	ts'en	cen		
nang	nang	p'in	pin	t'an	tan	tseng	zeng		
nao	nao	ping	bing	tang	dang	ts'eng	ceng		
nei	nei	p'ing	ping	t'ang	tang	tso	zuo		
nen	nen	po	bo	tao	dao	ts'o	cuo		
neng	neng	p'o	po	t'ao	tao	tsou	zou		
ni	ni	p'ou	pou	te	de	ts'ou	cou		
niang	niang	pu	bu	t'e	te	tsu	zu		
niao	niao	p'u	pu	teng	deng	ts'u	cu		
nieh	nie			t'eng	teng	tsuan	zuan		
nien	nian	sa	sa	ti	di	ts'uan	cuan		
nin	nin	sai	sai	t'i	ti	tsui	zui		
ning	ning	san	san	tiao	diao	ts'ui	cui		
niu	niu	sang	sang	t'iao	tiao	tsun	zun		
no	nuo	sao	sao	tieh	die	ts'un	cun		
nou	nou	se	se	t'ieh	tie	tsung	zong		
nu	nu	sen	sen	tien	dian	ts'ung	cong		
nü	nü	seng	seng	t'ien	tian	tzu	zi		
nuan	nuan	sha	sha	ting	ding	tz'u	ci		
nüeh	nüe	shai	shai	t'ing	ting				
nung	nong	shan	shan	tiu	diu	wa	wa		
		shang	shang	to	duo	wai	wai		
o	e	shao	shao	t'o	tuo	wan	wan		
ou	ou	she	she	tou	dou	wang	wang		
		shen	shen	t'ou	tou	wei	wei		
pa	ba	sheng	sheng	tu	du	wen	wen		
p'a	pa	shih	shi	t'u	tu	weng	weng		
pai	bai	shou	shou	tuan	duan	wo	wo		
p'ai	pai	shu	shu	t'uan	tuan	wu	wu		
pan	ban	shua	shua	tui	dui				
p'an	pan	shuai	shuai	t'ui	tui	ya	ya		
pang	bang	shuan	shuan	tun	dun	yai	yai		
p'ang	pang	shuang	shuang	t'un	tun	yang	yang		
pao	bao	shui	shui	tung	dong	yao	yao		
p'ao	pao	shun	shun	t'ung	tong	yeh	ye		
pei	bei	shuo	shuo	tsa	za	yen	yan		
p'ei	pei	so	suo	ts'a	ca	yin	yin		
pen	ben	sou	sou	tsai	zai	ying	ying		
p'en	pen	ssu	si	ts'ai	cai	yo	yo		
peng	beng	su	su	tsan	zan	yu	you		
p'eng	peng	suan	suan	ts'an	can	yü	yu		

## Pinyin to Wade-Giles

<i>Pinyin</i>	<i>Wade-Giles</i>								
a	a	chu	ch'u	er	erh	hou	hou	la	la
ai	ai	chuai	ch'uai			hu	hu	lai	lai
an	an	chuan	ch'uan	fa	fa	hua	hua	lan	lan
ang	ang	chuang	ch'uang	fan	fan	huan	huan	lang	lang
ao	ao	chui	ch'ui	fang	fang	huang	huang	lao	lao
		chun	ch'un	fei	fei	hui	hui	le	le
ba	pa	chuo	ch'o	fen	fen	hun	hun	lei	lei
bai	pai	ci	tz'u	feng	feng	huo	huo	leng	leng
ban	pan	cong	ts'ung	fo	fo			li	li
bang	pang	cou	ts'ou	fou	fou	ji	chi	lia	lia
bao	pao	cu	ts'u	fu	fu	jia	chia	lian	lien
bei	pei	cuan	ts'uan			jian	chien	liang	liang
ben	pen	cui	ts'ui	ga	ka	jiang	chiang	liao	liao
beng	peng	cun	ts'un	gai	kai	jiao	chiao	lie	lieh
bi	pi	cuo	ts'o	gan	kan	jie	chieh	lin	lin
bian	pian			gang	kang	jin	chin	ling	ling
biao	piao	da	ta	gao	kao	jing	ching	liu	liu
bie	pieh	dai	tai	ge	ke,ko	jiong	chiung	lo	lo
bin	pin	dan	tan	gei	kei	jiu	chiu	long	lung
bing	ping	dang	tang	gen	ken	ju	chü	lou	lou
bo	po	dao	tao	geng	keng	juan	chüan	lu	lu
bu	pu	de	te	gong	kung	jue	chüeh	luan	luan
		dei	tei	gou	kou	jun	chün	lun	lun
ca	ts'a	deng	teng	gu	ku			luo	lo
cai	ts'ai	di	ti	gua	kua	ka	k'a	lü	lü
can	ts'an	dian	tien	guai	kuai	kai	k'ai	lüe	lueh
cang	ts'ang	diao	tiao	guan	kuan	kan	k'an		
cao	ts'ao	die	tieh	guang	kuang	kang	k'ang	ma	ma
ce	ts'e	ding	ting	gui	kuei	kao	k'ao	mai	mai
cen	ts'en	diu	tiu	gun	kun	ke	k'o	man	man
ceng	ts'eng	dong	tung	guo	kuo	ken	k'en	mang	mang
cha	ch'a	dou	tou			keng	k'eng	mao	mao
chai	ch'ai	du	tu	ha	ha	kong	k'ung	mei	mei
chan	ch'an	duan	tuan	hai	hai	kou	k'ou	men	men
chang	ch'ang	dui	tui	han	han	ku	k'u	meng	meng
chao	ch'ao	dun	tun	hang	hang	kua	k'ua	mi	mi
che	ch'e	duo	to	hao	hao	kuai	k'uai	mian	mien
chen	ch'en			he	ho,he	kuan	k'uan	miao	miao
cheng	ch'eng	e	o	hei	hei	kuang	k'uang	mie	mieh
chi	ch'ih	ei	ei	hen	hen	kui	k'uei	min	min
chong	ch'ung	en	en	heng	heng	kun	k'un	ming	ming
chou	ch'ou	eng	eng	hong	hung	kuo	k'uo	miu	miu

<i>Pinyin</i>	<i>Wade-Giles</i>								
mo	mo	pin	p'in	seng	seng	tu	t'u	yue	yüeh
mou	mou	ping	p'ing	sha	sha	tuan	t'uan	yun	yün
mu	mu	po	p'o	shai	shai	tui	t'ui		
		pou	p'ou	shan	shan	tun	t'un	za	tsa
na	na	pu	p'u	shang	shang	tuo	t'o	zai	tsai
nai	nai			shao	shao			zan	tsan
nan	nan	qi	ch'i	she	she	wa	wa	zang	tsang
nang	nang	qia	ch'ia	shei	shei	wai	wai	zao	tsao
nao	nao	qian	ch'ien	shen	shen	wan	wan	ze	tse
ne	ne	qiang	ch'iang	sheng	sheng	wang	wang	zei	tsei
nei	nei	qiao	ch'iao	shi	shih	wei	wei	zen	tsen
nen	nen	qie	ch'ieh	shou	shou	wen	wen	zeng	tseng
neng	neng	qin	ch'in	shu	shu	weng	weng	zha	cha
ni	ni	qing	ch'ing	shua	shua	wo	wo	zhai	chai
nian	nien	qiong	ch'iong	shuai	shuai	wu	wu	zhan	chan
niang	niang	qiu	ch'iu	shuan	shuan			zhang	chang
niao	niao	qu	ch'ü	shuang	shuang	xi	hsi	zhao	chao
nie	nieh	quan	ch'üan	shui	shui	xia	hsia	zhe	che
nin	nin	que	ch'üeh	shun	shun	xian	hsien	zhei	chei
ning	ning	qun	ch'ün	shuo	shuo	xiang	hsiang	zhen	chen
niu	niu			si	szu,ssu	xiao	hsiao	zheng	cheng
nong	nung	ran	jan	song	sung	xie	hsieh	zhi	chih
nou	nou	rang	jang	sou	sou	xin	hsin	zhong	chung
nu	nu	rao	jao	su	su	xing	hsing	zhou	chou
nü	nü	re	je	suan	suan	xiong	hsiung	zhu	chu
nuan	nuan	ren	jen	sui	sui	xiu	hsiu	zhua	chua
nüe	nüeh	reng	jeng	sun	sun	xu	hsü	zhuai	chuai
nuo	no	ri	jih	suo	so	xuan	hsüan	zhuan	chuan
		rong	jung			xue	hsüeh	zhuang	chuang
o	o	rou	jou	ta	t'a	xun	hsün	zhui	chui
ou	ou	ru	ju	tai	t'ai			zhun	chun
pa	p'a	ruan	juan	tan	t'an	ya	ya	zhuo	cho
pai	p'ai	rui	jui	tang	t'ang	yan	yen	zi	tzu
pan	p'an	run	jun	tao	t'ao	yang	yang	zong	tsung
pang	p'ang	ruo	jo	te	t'e	yao	yao	zou	tsou
pao	p'ao			teng	t'eng	ye	yeh	zu	tsu
pei	p'ei	sa	sa	ti	t'i	yi	i	zuan	tsuan
pen	p'en	sai	sai	tian	t'ien	yin	yin	zui	tsui
peng	p'eng	san	san	tiao	t'iao	ying	ying	zun	tsun
pi	p'i	sang	sang	tie	t'ieh	yong	yung	zuo	tso
pian	p'ien	sao	sao	ting	t'ing	you	yu		
piao	p'iao	se	se	tong	t'ung	yu	yü		
pie	p'ieh	sen	sen	tou	t'ou	yuan	yüan		

Based on John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, 13 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978-1986), 13:1012-1014.

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