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Selected Works on Modern Japan-China Relations

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PREFACE

From late 1960s to early 1970s the Japan-China relations was one of the issues on which global attention was focused. After the People's Republic of China had become the substantial unified power, the struggle over whether Beijing or Taipei government had the right to represent China at the United Nations became one of the crucial issues of international politics. The Japanese government, which was liberated from the occupation by the Allied powers in 1952, took the position that the government of the Republic of China, which it had recognized as the legitimate government of China, was still the government that represents China even though it only controlled Taiwan and small islands around it. For the Japanese government at that time there was neither domestic public opinion nor international environment to upset the decision. By late 1960s, however, domestic public opinion that the Japanese government should recognize Beijing government as the central government of China grew increasingly stronger. The international environment was also ripening. In addition to United Kingdom which established diplomatic relations with Beijing government in the 1950, France did so in 1964, and in 1970 Canada and Italy recognized Beijing government. In this changing situation the relationship among Japan, China, and Taiwan became the political focal point of global attention. Therefore, many international conferences were held in the academic community and the opinions and analyses of Japanese scholars on the Japan-China relations were sought by them. Under these circumstances I was requested to make presentations in English by many international conferences on Japan-China relations and the political-social conditions within Japan which shaped the bilateral relations. This volume is a compilation of some of the major articles I wrote in response to these requests.

Part I collects the studies on the Japan-China relations themselves, including their historical background. The articles in the Part II deals with the factors affecting the changes in Japan-China relations in the East Asian context, such as the US policy, the Soviet policy, the development of military technology in Asia and so forth. The part III collects articles which analyzed the domestic situation and psychological conditions in Japan which constrained Japan's China policy, and the process of foreign policy formation. In addition, the research guide on Japan-China relations written for foreign graduate students is included as the appendix, although it is rather old.

Just like the preceding volume, *Selected Works on the Political History of Modern China*, TBRL 4, the editorial work for this volume was carried out by some of my former students who are already in a rather advanced stage of their academic career. They are Professors HIRANO Ken'ichirō 平野健一郎 (Waseda University 早稲田大學), TAKAGI Seiichirō 高木誠一郎 (Aoyama Gakuin University 青山學院大

學), FURUTA Kazuko 古田和子 (Keio University 慶應義塾大學), YUNG Yingyue 容應萸 (Asia University 亞細亞大學), KISHIMA Takako 喜志麻孝子 (Waseda University 早稻田大學), and Mr. KAMATA Fumihiko 鎌田文彥 (National Diet Library 國立國會圖書館). I am grateful that they took time out of their busy schedule for this work. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the editorial team on the Toyo Bunko 東洋文庫 side for the huge amount of tedious tasks which they carried out with meticulous care. The editorial work for this volume and the preceding TBRL 4 was supported by the grants from the Nissho Iwai Foundation 日商岩井基金 and the Egusa Foundation for International Cooperation in the Social Sciences 社會科學國際交流江草基金.

PART1 PHASES OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Chapter I EVOLVING SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

In studying China, one must beware of falling into the trap of the seven blind men, who each felt only a part of the elephant but claimed to know the appearance of the whole. The purpose of this article is to investigate Sino-Japanese relations and to try to highlight the major factors which determine the course of the relationship.

Love-Hate Syndrome in Prewar Japan

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Japan was clearly a house divided against itself, not only in terms of defense questions but also in terms of Chinese affairs. Some vehemently supported the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan while others advocated the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the 1960s, the author developed a *center-periphery model* to aid in analyzing the impact of this dichotomy on Sino-Japanese relations. Borrowing from the field of psychology, the idea was subsequently likened to a *love-hate syndrome*, which the author discussed further in talks at the Japan Society in New York in 1976 and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1980.

Given Japan's history of foreign relations, one can only conclude that the Japanese are an extremely adaptable people. During World War II, the Japanese clamored for an Asian Monroe Doctrine and were inspired by their own sense of manifest destiny to fight the white men and expel them from Asia. Those Japanese who showed the slightest sympathy towards white war prisoners were bitterly condemned by their fellow countrymen. Shortly thereafter, in 1946, many Japanese schoolteachers in the Tokyo area volunteered to take their classes to General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters to celebrate his birthday by singing the American song "Happy Birthday"—just a few months after Japan's surrender. Although nothing came of it, a group of Japanese initiated a movement to construct a shrine to the

* This is a reprint of "Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations," in Joshua D. Katz and Tilly C. Friedman-Lichtschein, eds., *Japan's New World Role* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), 49-65. It was first published in 1983 in *the Journal of International Affairs* 37/1. This article is based on a series of lectures given by the author as a visiting professor in the Department of History of the University of Hawaii in 1982. It was substantially revised during his visiting fellowship at the Department of International Relations of Australian National University in 1983. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the members of both departments for their comments and to the secretaries for their editing and typing assistance.

supreme commander when General MacArthur was ousted by President Truman. Many Japanese people appeared more faithful to the supreme commander for the allied powers, an American white, than to his own subordinates in the Japanese government. The elasticity of Japanese emotions was surprising to anyone who had witnessed the war in Japan.

Many Japanese intellectuals are Francophiles, always dreaming of Paris and longing for French things. They memorize the city map of Paris and talk about the French capital with tears in their eyes. They look down on those who do not understand French, and they seem even more Francocentric than ordinary Frenchmen. Other intellectuals are Anglophiles, not only admiring British literature and political policies but also wishing to adopt the British aristocrats' way of life. Despising the American accent, these Japanese make every effort to imitate the Oxford accent, but they seldom succeed.

In a similar vein, a Kyoto 京都 University professor of European history, AIDA Yūji 會田雄次, was a great admirer of European civilization, and in particular, a firm Anglophile, who held the code of the "English gentleman" in great esteem. He was drafted during World War II and became a war prisoner in Burma. There he discovered to his great disillusionment that British officers and soldiers were just as crude and cruel as their Japanese counterparts. After repatriation, he honestly and soberly described his own experiences in the war prisoners' camp, and since then he has become very critical of Western civilization.[1]

Japanese intellectuals were both irresistibly attracted to European civilization on the one hand, and repelled by their countrymen who submitted to it on the other. From the Japanese viewpoint, modern Europe is located in the center of civilization

[1] AIDA Yūji 會田雄次, *Āron shūyōjo* アーロン收容所 (Arlon Prisoners' Camp) (Tokyo: Chūō kōron-sha 中央公論社, 1962). MORI Ōgai 森鷗外 was a leading writer in prewar modern Japan and well-known for his extraordinary understanding of Western Europe. He wrote a short novel based on his own experiences, *Dai hakken* 大發見 (A Great Discovery), in which a young Japanese medical doctor was sent to Germany by the Japanese government in the 1880s. He made a courtesy call on the Japanese Minister in Berlin and was asked what he planned to study. The young doctor answered that he intended to study hygienics. The Minister laughed and said, "What? I'm surprised. What use is hygienics for people who put strings between their toes to walk and who often pick their noses?" The doctor was enraged with the minister for this insult to his country but could not say anything at the time. Afterwards, he began to search for evidence of sandals and nose-picking in European culture. He soon discovered a simple Roman sandal not very dissimilar from the Japanese *zōri* 草履, but he failed to find evidence of European nose-picking for many years. One day while reading a novel by Gustav Wied, the Danish writer, he made a great discovery. The novel concludes with the following passage: "Oh behold, a sailor there, sitting at a counter, listening to a chat, and picking a gigantic pill-like something out of his nose. The former Minister Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire to the German Empire, Your Excellency Viscount S.A. please note that Europeans pick their noses, too."

while Japan lies on the periphery. The effect of this center-periphery relationship in the Japanese mind is characterized by extreme sensitivity to differences between Japanese and Europeans and a strong love-hate syndrome,[2] a complex of both admiration and contempt. An extreme sensitivity to differences coupled with ambivalent feelings has created a psychological pendulum that swings between extreme admiration and extreme contempt. The Japanese have developed a "periphery minority complex" ever since modern Japan came under the sway of European civilization in the late Tokugawa 徳川 Shogunate era.

By the same token, Japan has been located on the periphery of the Chinese sphere since the initial contacts of the two civilizations. The periphery minority complex is expressed by a love-hate syndrome. It was the Japanese Confucians of pre-Meiji 明治 Japan who developed the love factor of the complex, frankly expressing their adoration of Chinese civilization, while others developed a strong competitive spirit *vis-à-vis* China. For example, Zeami 世阿彌 of the fifteenth century, who could be considered the founder of the Nō 能 theatre, had a profound knowledge of Chinese classics, history, and literature. He wrote a play entitled *Haku Raku-ten* 白樂天,[3] in which Bai Luotian, who was the best-known Chinese poet among the Japanese, was awed by Japanese poetry and dance. Zeami's play illustrates the unyielding and competitive psychology of Japanese intellectuals *vis-à-vis* Chinese civilization.

A second anecdote concerns a scholar of the Tokugawa Shogunate era, YAMAZAKI Ansai 山崎闇齋, who one day asked his pupils what should they do if Confucius and Mencius were to lead an expeditionary force to invade Japan. No one could answer. He finally smiled and said, "One should fight the expeditionary troops and capture Confucius and Mencius for Japan. It is as they themselves taught."

Before the Meiji Restoration some Japanese visited Shanghai. In the land of their admired sages, they encountered filthiness, offensive odors, corpses afloat in the river, and a civil war. In Shanghai, British and French soldiers behaved arrogantly and had things their own way. Seeing this, the Japanese admiration of China suddenly changed to disillusionment.

KISHIDA Ginkō 岸田吟香, the first Japanese to publish a newspaper in Japan in the last year of the Tokugawa period, was an admirer of China. With Ginkō's aid, James C. Hepburn compiled his well-known Japanese-English dictionary. Hepburn had it printed in Shanghai because, at that time, Japan had no Western printing presses. Ginkō accompanied Hepburn to Shanghai as his assistant and lived there for about half a year. As soon as Ginkō arrived in Shanghai and began to observe the

[2] The author dealt with the love-hate syndrome in ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, ed., *Nihon wo meguru bunka masatsu* 日本をめぐる文化摩擦 (Culture Conflicts with Japan) (Tokyo: Kōbundō 弘文堂, 1980), 18-26.

[3] Cf. HIRAKAWA Sukehiro 平川祐弘, *Yōkyoku no shi to seiyō no shi* 謡曲の詩と西洋の詩 (Noh Song Poems and Western Poems) (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1975), 19ff.

decline of China, his adoration was quickly replaced by contempt. In his diary,[4] Ginkō wrote about his disillusionment with the Chinese, seeing their "foolishness and selfishness" everywhere. Once he came to feel that the Japanese were superior, he became arrogant. Later, when Ginkō accompanied the Japanese military expedition to Taiwan in 1874, he wrote "Why not conquer China now?"[5] His attitude had completely changed in only a few years.

Japanese intellectuals, viewing the declining fortunes of the Qing 清 Dynasty in the mid-nineteenth century, reasoned that China, having been victimized by the Western powers, was a poor example to follow. Still, Euro-American expansionism posed a common threat to the Qing Dynasty and to Japan; therefore, if the Qing Dynasty were to be subdued, Japan would necessarily be the next. This view was current among Japanese intellectuals whose Confucian education had nurtured an admiration for Chinese civilization, but who became bitterly disillusioned upon witnessing the decline of the Qing regime. Thus, this sense of common destiny dates back at least to the period of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century.[6]

Consequently, just after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, a common notion among Japanese youth was that Eastern peoples should cooperate with each other in order to stand up to the West. It was felt that China, with its glorious history, huge population, and vast territory, should be strengthened in order to defeat the West. Thus, an unusually deep concern for China developed among Japan's intellectuals. Opinion on this issue, however, was divided. Some Japanese thought that the Qing regime could be reformed, while others saw no future for the Qing Dynasty. The optimists felt that Japan should assist the Qing's reforms and urge governmental cooperation between China and Japan.

Most of the Meiji government leaders shared this opinion and supported reforms of the Qing administration within the imperial system. This explains why reformists such as Kang Youwei 康有爲 and Liang Qichao 梁啓超 were able to take political refuge in Japanese settlements in China and on Japanese ships when the coup d'état against them occurred in 1898, and were warmly treated by the government during their exile days in Japan.

Others were pessimistic. They saw no hope for the Qing's future. This posed

[4] Ginkō 吟香's diary during his stay in Shanghai is analyzed by the author in ETŌ Shinkichi, "Chūgoku kakumei to Nipponjin 中國革命と日本人 (The Chinese Revolution and the Japanese)," in MIWA Kimitada 三輪公忠, ed., *Nippon no shakai bunka shi* 日本の社會文化史 (Socio-cultural History of Japan), 7 vols. (Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 1974), 7:214-65.

[5] *Ibid.*, 257.

[6] The Japanese expression for the state of close interdependency, "Shin-shi-ho-sha 唇齒輔車" — in Chinese, "chun-chi-fu-che"; in English, literally, "lips-teeth-lower jaw bone-upper jaw bone" — conveys the perception quite graphically. Japan and China are to each other as lips are to teeth and as the lower jaw is to the upper jaw.

two alternatives for Japan: conquest of China or fostering a revolution within China. Even MIYAZAKI Hachirō 宮崎八郎[7], a civil rights activist and well-known writer, in 1874 advocated a Japanese occupation of Taiwan as a stepping-stone for the conquest of all of China. Arthur Smith, a Christian missionary, similarly disillusioned by the Qing regime, urged Christianity upon the Chinese people as an alternative.[8]

In contrast to some Japanese, who urged the conquest of China, URA Keiichi 浦敬一 strongly advocated the need for a strong China to check the eastward expansion of Russia. He was certain that Russia intended to occupy Xinjiang 新疆 and he planned to travel there personally to investigate Russian penetration. "It is unnecessary for Japan to colonize all of China," he wrote. "It would be sufficient to overthrow the Qing imperial regime and implement political reforms in order to revitalize the people and strengthen the state. Asia can only cope with the West if our country allies closely with China."[9] Giving up his honeymoon at home with his young wife in 1889, he went to Lanzhou 蘭州 and then set out for Xinjiang. No further word was heard of him. He was undoubtedly killed soon after his departure.

"Weak people become the victims of the strong," said MIYAZAKI Yazō 宮崎弥藏 as he formulated his idea that "those who advocate civil rights should consider how to strengthen the weak." In Yazō's view, "the best way to strengthen the weak is to strengthen China, with its vast territory and huge population. Should China be reformed and unified, it could restore yellow peoples' rights and further its leadership in world politics so that the moral way would spread throughout the world." But Yazō was not willing to sit by and wait for this to happen. In his mind, the ideas of Chinese revolution and Japanese conquest were closely related. "I have made up my mind to go to China to look for a hero who can implement my idea. If I cannot find this hero, I will assume the role myself."[10] Yazō died while enthusiastically studying the Chinese language and way of life at a Chinese merchant's home in Yokohama. His aspirations were taken up by his younger brother, MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, who later became Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙's most devoted Japanese friend. He trusted Sun so faithfully that he opposed every policy of the Japanese government to interfere with the revolutionary movement in China.

Unlike Tōten, many prewar Japanese grew dissatisfied with the progress of events in China during the late Qing and the Republican eras. They still believed in the sense of commonality and shared destiny, ardently calling for "participation," "commitment" and "assistance," all of which culminated in Japanese interference in the domestic politics of China. This explains why participants in Japanese reform

[7] Cf. ARAKI Seishi 荒木精之, *Miyazaki Hachirō* 宮崎八郎 (Kumamoto: Nihon dangi-sha 日本談義社, 1954), 62.

[8] Arthur H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1894), 325ff.

[9] HANAWA Kunzō 塙薫藏, *Ura Keiichi* 浦敬一 (Tokyo: Jumpū shoin 淳風書院, 1924), 81.

[10] MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, *Sanjū-san-nen no yume* 三十三年の夢 (My Thirty-three Years' Dream) (Tokyo: Heibonsha 平凡社, 1967), 22-3.

movements, such as the *Jiyū minken undō* 自由民權運動 (Popular Rights Movement), which supported the 1911 Chinese Revolution, later became vehement advocates of Japanese expansionist policies. YAMAJI Aizan 山路愛山, a socialist journalist during the late Meiji and Taishō 大正 eras, stated the case in a typical fashion:

> Looking at China as a politician, one naturally perceives the border between Japan and China. But as a Japanese, one recognizes no boundaries that separate our hearts. Japanese and Chinese are not strangers to each other. We are of the same flesh and blood... The Chinese are not considered foreign by the Japanese people. This vast area consisting of the combined territories of China and the Japanese islands ought to be the arena for our activities; it is here we should breathe deeply the air of harmony.[11]

Such an outlook afforded the Japanese government a pretense for staging frequent armed interventions and stimulated its policies of political interference in Chinese affairs. Nonetheless, the outlook reflected not hostility toward China, but rather a feeling of shared destiny, a desire to see China "stand up" in the world. This notion, moreover, enjoyed wide public acceptance in prewar Japan.

A genuine sense of commonality and of shared destiny may engender a relationship of collaboration and friendship. But if the differences in economic or military capability are too great, this relationship may promote intervention. Disillusionment with the late Qing administration stimulated Japanese interventionist policies in China in the name of a sense of commonality and shared destiny. The supremacy of the Japanese military emboldened the Japanese government to undertake military adventures in China. Adoration for the land of the Confucian sages was transformed into contempt for a weak China. The question of Sino-Japanese relations frequently provoked military actions and constituted one of the most controversial political problems in prewar Japan. This is demonstrated by the fact that nine of eighteen cabinets in the prewar Shōwa 昭和 era, beginning with the first Wakatsuki 若槻 cabinet were overthrown because of their failure to adequately deal with the China question.

The author has thus far examined the pre-war Japanese attitude toward China. But the question now arises: Did the Japanese attitude change after its defeat? To a certain extent, it did—the mood of confrontation between Asia and the West certainly disappeared. But the periphery minority complex has not yet dissipated among some Japanese in terms of Sino-Japanese relations.

[11] Cf. ETŌ Shinkichi, "Nitchū mochiaji wo sonchōsuru no ron 日中持味を尊重するの論 (A Discourse of Non-involvement for Sino-Japanese Relations)," *Bungei shunjū* 文藝春秋 59-7 (July 1981): 102.

Love-Hate Syndrome in Postwar Japan

It was only after Japan's defeat in World War II that China lost its ability to affect the survival of a cabinet in Japan. No cabinet in postwar Japan has resigned because of a China-related issue. While still important, the China problem has been superceded by US-Japanese relations. It is ironic that Japan succeeded in becoming a leading economic world power only after losing its interests in China and Korea.[12]

The failure of Japanese undertakings in China during the period before 1945 demonstrated conclusively that it was impossible to effect a modernization of China from the outside. In the years after the end of World War II, recognition of this fact, in addition to feelings of guilt over the depredations Japan inflicted upon the Chinese people during the 1931-45 period, caused many Japanese to respond positively to the accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party in unifying China and in enhancing the country's international status and prestige. The psychological pendulum of the periphery minority complex began its swing from contempt to adoration.

In 1937 a young Japanese newspaperman fabricated a report that two Japanese army officers had competed to see how many Chinese each could kill. His report, saying that each had killed over one hundred Chinese, appeared in a reliable Tokyo newspaper. As a result, after Japan's surrender, these two army officers were arrested by the occupation forces in Japan, sent to China, and executed as war criminals. The newspaperman is now working quietly in the office of a Sino-Japanese friendship organization as a faithful pro-China activist.[13]

To cite another instance, a young army captain was sent to Mukden from the Imperial Chief of Staff in Tokyo to stop the war in Manchuria 滿洲, shortly after the Mukden 奉天 Incident (滿洲事變) of 1931. Upon arriving, he quickly converted to expansionism, becoming even more dedicated than the Guandong 關東 army officers. He ignored an order from the army headquarters not to escalate the battle in China's northeast region. When later promoted to commander-in-chief of the army air forces, he sent hundreds of young pilots on suicide missions in planes filled with explosives. But after the surrender, he quickly reconverted to a Sinophile and has been expressing admiration for China ever since.

During the Cultural Revolution, the Peking government and the Chinese Communist Party put pressure on the foreign media and tried to stop undesirable reports on China. The media in America and Europe resisted. After the *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 initiated its submissive posture towards China, the rest of the Japanese press followed, jumping on the bandwagon of servility toward Peking.[14]

[12] Readers may find a similar precedent in British history: Britain became a world power only after she lost all her continental territory in France.

[13] SUZUKI Akira 鈴木明, "'Nankin daigyakusatsu' no maboroshi 「南京大虐殺」の幻 (The Myth of the "Massacre of Nanking")," *Shokun!* 諸君！ 4-4 (April, 1972).

When the Japanese and Chinese governments were beginning negotiations for normalization of relations, a leading businessman in Tokyo, OKAZAKI Kaheita 岡崎嘉平太, questioned the Japanese posture towards China in the following terms:

> If we were to consider Japan still at her point of defeat and trying to make peace, then it would not be fitting that she should issue conditions, but rather it is obvious that the terms stated by the other side should become the basis for talks... If we were to imagine that these last twenty-odd years had not passed and we were back at that moment of defeat, then [Japan's situation] would be identical to [that of] Percival when he surrendered to General YAMASHITA [Tomoyuki] 山下奉文 in Singapore. We can imagine then that peace really [would be] possible.[15]

OKAZAKI was likening Japan in 1972 to Percival, a British general who commanded the defense forces of Singapore in 1942. On the eve of losing Singapore, Percival tried to negotiate with YAMASHITA, then commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in Malaya. This infuriated YAMASHITA, who insisted that the British either surrender or fight. Percival quickly realized that he was in no position to negotiate. OKAZAKI himself labored during the war years in Shanghai to construct a financial system favorable to Japan, but thirty years later he advocated that Japan assume a very submissive position in the normalization negotiations with China.

Since the beginning of the 1970s, love and adoration have dominated Japanese attitudes toward China. When the Japanese feel that China is weak and incompetent, they accentuate the hate side of this love-hate complex by becoming arrogant. When the Japanese feel that China is stronger, they emphasize the love aspect, becoming rather servile. Neither of these extremes is desirable. Sino-Japanese relations can develop in a positive direction only within conditions of equality and equilibrium. The two peoples and governments must be extraordinarily careful to maintain a well-balanced relationship, otherwise the Japanese attitude will continue to swing back and forth.

Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations in Retrospect

In studying the modern history of East Asia, it is apparent that China opened up to

[14] Cf. MIYOSHI Osamu 三好修 and ETŌ Shinkichi, *Chūgoku hōdō no henkō wo tsuku* 中國報道の偏向を衝く (Media Reports on China Are Distorted) (Tokyo: Nisshin hōdō shuppan-bu 日新報道出版部, 1972).

[15] The quotation is from a speech OKAZAKI 岡崎 at a symposium, which was later published in *Ajia* アジア 7/8 (August 1972): 42-3.

the West more reluctantly than did Japan. China clung more tightly to its own culture than did Japan, and its break with the past engendered more agony and civil disorder. China lumbered along like a huge Spanish galleon while Japan plotted its course like a tiny British frigate. But once China started to move, it moved with vigor. From a feudalistic peasant society, China lurched towards a Communist regime. In contrast, Japan responded quickly to an aggressive West. In the early twentieth century, Japan strutted onto the world stage by defeating Russia, the first time a European country had been defeated by a non-European power. Its imperialist course was halted by its defeat in World War II, but like the Phoenix, it rose from its ashes. Japan developed into a Western-style democracy with a mixed economy of private initiative and social welfare. No matter what similarities China and Japan have –ethnic similarity, geographical propinquity, chopsticks, or their ideographic writing systems– the course China has plotted in the second half of the twentieth century once again contrasts sharply with that of Japan.

Are these two neighbors, who have fought against each other and more recently moved toward a conciliatory relationship, destined to be friends or adversaries?

In order to examine contemporary Sino-Japanese relations systematically, one can divide them into eight periods. The periods are as follows: (1) 1949-1950; (2) 1950-1953; (3)1953-1957; (4)1957-1959; (5)1959-1966; (6)1966-1971; (7)1971-1976; (8) 1976-present. They will be discussed in turn.

The first period begins with the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and ends with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It was a time when Sino-Soviet relations were on a good footing. Although the Chinese Communist Party must have had hidden reservations about the Soviet Union, it tried its best to improve relations. Mao Zedong 毛澤東, heading a team of more than one hundred Chinese, traveled to Moscow for negotiations which lasted from December 1949 through February 1950. The result was the Sino-Soviet treaty, which proclaimed "eternal friendship between China and the Soviet Union." Although Soviet and Chinese Communist Party leaders felt somewhat at odds with each other, cracks in the relationship were successfully kept secret. Both parties made harsh statements in reference to Japan and advocated severe punishment for Japanese war criminals.

In terms of the American reaction to the revolution in China, the United States signaled its openness to the new government in Peking by leaving some of its diplomats in mainland China. Then President Truman elaborated this policy further in a controversial declaration on January 5, 1950, asserting that "the United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."[16] Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee on January 10 that "the US defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians, Japan, and the Ryukyus 琉球 to the Philippines." This carefully enunciated policy intentionally avoided mention of Korea and Taiwan, two bones of contention in US-Chinese relations. The United States maintained its policy of nonintervention in Taiwan until the outbreak of the Korean War.

During this first period, the People's Republic of China adopted a flexible foreign policy with a view to consolidating the little international standing it had. The new Peking government thus gained recognition not only by communist countries but also by a majority of the nonaligned countries in Asia and Africa. In contrast, Nationalist China, exiled to the island of Taiwan, found itself not only internationally isolated but also in imminent danger of invasion by the five hundred thousand troops of the People's Liberation Army concentrated in the Fujian 福建 Province across the Taiwan Straits.

This initial period also saw a rise in Chinese concern with its Japanese neighbor. The Chinese Communist Party launched a campaign against "Japanese rearmament," which was grounded in the twenty-nine point manifesto issued July 7, 1949. Of six points relating to foreign policy, three of them concerned Japan:

(1) A peace treaty should be concluded with Japan as soon as possible;
(2) Japan should be demilitarized and democratized;
(3) The peoples of China and Japan must unite in the struggle against the US occupation of Japan.[17]

This declaration is significant for several reasons. First, it is clear that for the Chinese Communist Party, an early conclusion of peace with Japan was merely a means to counter the US occupation, which it feared might be permanent. Secondly, it expressed a serious fear about the possibility of a new military buildup in Japan. This fear led China to state explicitly in the preamble to the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty of February 1950 that it considered Japan to be an enemy, and therefore aimed to prevent Japanese rearmament and the establishment of US military bases. Thirdly, the twenty-nine point manifesto of 1949 reflected Peking's expectation of a revolution in Japan. The editorial in the Chinese *People's Daily* 人民日報 of January 17, 1950 supported the Cominform's criticism of the Japanese Communist Party: "the Japanese people... should carry out a determined revolutionary struggle against American imperialism and the reactionary forces in Japan."

The second period of postwar Sino-Japanese relations began with the outbreak

[16] US Department of State, *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), 2448-9.

[17] Ajia seikei gakkai アジア政經學會 (Japanese Society of Asian Political and Economic Studies), ed., *Chūgoku seiji keizai sōran* 中國政治經濟綜覽 (A General Description of Chinese Politics and Economy) (Tokyo: Hitotsubashi shobō 一橋書房, 1954), 264-5.

of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and ended with the ceasefire in June 1953. This period was marked above all by a radical shift in American policy toward China; the United States now opted for the neutralization of the Taiwan Straits, sending in the Seventh Fleet on the second day of the war. The Peking government thus lost any hope of "liberating" Taiwan.

During this period, Japan was incorporated into the American strategic system against the strong opposition of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. While Japanese preparations for concluding a separate peace with the US went on, the Chinese repeatedly asserted that "the US occupation authorities' policy in Japan has been to preserve Japan's militarism and to prevent the democratization of Japan,"[18] that "the US government and the Yoshida government in Japan are plotting together for the rearmament of Japan."[19] But it is interesting to note that as soon as the San Francisco Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan was concluded in September 1951, the Peking government recognized the impossibility of immediate revolution in Japan and began to take a more flexible view towards the Japanese government. As a sign of relaxed tensions, the Peking government issued visas to three members of the Japanese parliament, enabling them to negotiate the first Sino-Japanese Nongovernmental Trade Agreement. The accord was concluded in June 1952, more than a year before the Korean truce. In December of the same year, Peking again showed its willingness to negotiate with the Japanese over the question of repatriating those Japanese who had been detained on the mainland at the end of the war.

Meanwhile, the United States was urging Japan to recognize Taiwan as the sole government of China, and the one with which Japan should conclude a peace treaty. Treaty negotiations between Japan and the Nationalist government were conducted along the following lines.

First, the Nationalist government claimed that the forthcoming treaty should follow the lines of the Treaty of San Francisco, that it should be called a peace treaty, and that Japan should recognize the Nationalist government as the legitimate government of China. Japan conceded these claims. Secondly, it demanded reparations, claiming that Chinese national sentiment would not allow China, the chief victim of the war with Japan, to forego its claim for reparations. Japan, for its part, maintained that war damages suffered on the Chinese continent were outside the scope of the treaty. In the end, clauses relating to reparations were deleted. Thirdly, Japan insisted on inserting a clause limiting the application of the treaty to only those territories which were then under the control to the Nationalist government or which might

[18] Zhou Enlai 周恩來's letter of May 22, 1951 to the Soviet ambassador which appeared in Kazankai 霞山會, ed., *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryō-shū* 日中關係基本資料集 (Selected Basic Documents on Japanese-Chinese Relations) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1970), 15.

[19] Zhou Enlai's statement on August 15, 1951, which appeared in Kazankai, 22.

come under it in the future. The Nationalist government objected to this, and it was omitted from the actual text of the treaty, but Japan's position was accepted in the exchange of notes. Japan relinquished the form but retained the substance of her claim.

The third period of postwar Sino-Japanese relations extended from 1953 to 1957. Shortly before the truce in Korea was concluded, China had begun to reorient its policy from one of wartime emergency to one of peacetime economic construction. This shift in domestic priorities reflected changes in China's external policy. China began to emphasize the development of state-to-state relations rather than world revolution. Peking's earlier stress on a revolution in Japan was replaced by China's growing desire to normalize relations with the Yoshida cabinet. This was the same YOSHIDA Shigeru 吉田茂 whom China had recently accused of being just a running dog of "American imperialism."

There was a dramatic acceleration of this rapprochement, beginning with HATOYAMA Ichirō 鳩山一郎's rise to power in December 1954, and continuing into the years of the premiership of ISHIBASHI Tanzan 石橋湛山 and KISHI Nobusuke 岸信介. During this period, a nongovernmental agreement on trade was renewed four times, and an agreement on fishing was concluded without difficulty. In addition, governmental negotiations took place in Geneva. Peking, expressing the hope for an "independent peaceful and democratic Japan," addressed itself quite seriously to the question of the normalization of relations with Japan.

At the end of 1957, China exchanged its policy of moderation for one of radicalism; this marked the beginning of the fourth period, which lasted until early in 1959, the period of the "Great Leap Forward 大躍進," during which Chinese foreign policy, in line with domestic policy, became radicalized. It was during this time that the Nagasaki 長崎 Flag Incident took place. A Japanese youth tore a PRC flag to pieces on May 2, 1958 in Nagasaki. Infuriated by this act, the Peking government discontinued its trade with Japan, maintaining that the radical socialization policies of the Great Leap Forward would accomplish a quick increase in production without external trade. It vehemently called for the downfall of the Kishi cabinet and a revolution in Japan.

The fifth period lasted from 1959 until the summer of 1966, the beginning of the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命. It corresponds to what the Chinese call the adjustment period, and Chinese foreign policy at this time may therefore be termed "adjustment period diplomacy."

As long as the Kishi cabinet was in office, Peking, for reasons of principle and to save face, refused to compromise with the Japanese government. But as soon as KISHI was replaced by IKEDA Hayato 池田勇人 in September 1960, the Chinese government adopted a more conciliatory tone. Secret contacts were established between Chinese officials and Japanese conservatives in an effort to reopen Sino-Japanese trade. Finally, a Sino-Japanese trade agreement was concluded in January

1962.[20] Through this agreement, Japan became the only country in the world to trade both with Taiwan and with the Chinese mainland with substantial freedom.

The sixth period spans the era of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," from the summer of 1966 to the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's secret mission to Peking in the summer of 1971. There was little elaborate Chinese diplomacy or external policy during the period of great revolutionary zeal from 1966 to 1969. The Communist Party as well as the Chinese government stridently called for world revolution and a struggle against imperialism and capitalism. It was only after the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in March 1969 that the government in Peking gradually resumed diplomatic activities, culminating in the unprecedented Chinese rapprochement with the West and Japan.

Henry Kissinger's mission to Peking inaugurated the seventh period. Following Dr. Kissinger's visit in quick succession were the admission to the United Nations of the People's Republic and President Nixon's visit to mainland China. The improvements in Sino-American relations, however, were not paralleled by smooth relations between China and Japan. During the last few years of the SATŌ Eisaku 佐藤榮作 cabinet, Peking vehemently attacked the Japanese leader, claiming a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Peking's reproaches were provoked further by the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué made public on November 21, 1969. These actions focused Satō's attention on the issue of Taiwan: "the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan."[21] Satō's reference to Taiwan was undoubtedly motivated by a concern for the reversion of Okinawa 沖繩 to Japan. The Nationalist government had consistently opposed this reversion. Thus, as a concession to Taiwan in the joint communiqué, this issue was dropped to bolster the Nationalist regime. At that time, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was a primary policy goal of the Satō cabinet.

As expected, Peking reacted strongly, viewing the joint communiqué as interference in the internal affairs of China. Peking soon let loose with a vitriolic campaign against Japanese militarism. Every effort made by the Satō cabinet to settle differences with Peking was mercilessly attacked, not only by Peking but also by the Japanese media. In the early 1970s, the media in Japan was extremely solicitous toward Peking in an effort to diffuse Chinese criticism of the Japanese press.

Only two days after Satō was replaced by TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮 on July 7, 1972, Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩來 went out of his way to refer to that event in a speech welcoming a visiting delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen. "The Tanaka cabinet was inaugurated on July 7," said Zhou, "and with regard to foreign policy it has announced that it will endeavor to bring about a nor-

[20] It is known as the L-T trade agreement after the initials of the delegates, TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke 高碕達之助 and Liao Cheng-zhi 廖承志.

[21] *Mainichi shimbun* 每日新聞 (November 22, 1969).

malization of relations between Japan and China. This is certainly to be welcomed."[22] Zhou's speech, including his conciliatory remark directed toward Tokyo, was promptly broadcast by Radio Peking and widely disseminated in the Chinese Communist press.

Slightly more than a month later, the Chinese Communist Party's central paper, *People's Daily*, devoted the entire top half of its front page to stories about the return to Shanghai of a Chinese ballet troupe which had just completed a highly successful and warmly received tour of Japan. Banner headlines played up the "enthusiastic send-off" given to the troupe by "friends from all spheres of Japanese society" and the "deep friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples."[23] But what was most significant about this unusual press coverage was that it marked the first time that the Chinese party organ had given such front-page prominence to an event involving Japan without any suggestion of antagonism toward the ruling Japanese government.

In response to the change in Chinese attitudes toward the Japanese government, the Japanese media along with the opposition political parties, pro-Peking businessmen, and ruling Liberal Democratic Party politicians, promoted a movement to normalize relations between China and Japan. Foreign Minister ŌHIRA Masayoshi 大平正芳 was so cool to Taiwan that he did not hesitate to proclaim his intention to abrogate the Japan-Nationalist China peace treaty of 1952 upon normalization. Taiwan was too weak to cope with the pro-mainland flood of sentiment in Japan.

Coming after years of unremitting abuse directed by Peking at the preceding Liberal-Democratic governments of KISHI, IKEDA, and SATŌ, Zhou's gesture of conciliation and the subsequent abrupt change in the tone of Chinese Communist press treatment of Japan were important signs of a profound shift in Peking's attitudes *vis-à-vis* Tokyo. Both governments subsequently moved with surprising swiftness to pave the way for a top-level meeting between their respective leaders. In late September 1972, these moves culminated in the visit to Peking of TANAKA, ŌHIRA, and other ranking officials in the Japanese government. There is no doubt that the visit marked a historic shift in the long and tortured course of modern Sino-Japanese relations. Normalization between Japan and the People's Republic of China was achieved, and ŌHIRA unilaterally abrogated Japan's 1952 peace treaty with Taiwan while he was still in Peking.

But the rapprochement between the two countries still had some rough spots. Political struggles among the leaders in Peking during these years hindered smooth expansion of Sino-Japanese relations. Lin Biao 林彪 was ousted in 1971, possibly

[22] *New China News Agency International Service* (July 9, 1972). Also, *People's Daily* 人民日報 (July 10, 1972).

[23] *People's Daily* (August 17, 1972).

indicating a major shift, from radical to moderate policies. Building on this change, Zhou Enlai spent a great deal of political capital in improving China's relations with the West and Japan. For this he was fiercely criticized by those who were later to be called the "Gang of Four 四人幫." Except for mutual trade which increased from $1.1 billion in 1972 to $3.78 billion in 1975 as indicated in Table 1, Sino-Japanese relations fluctuated depending upon the current state of power relationships in Peking. Even trade decreased noticeably in 1976 when the "Gang of Four" temporarily succeeded in grasping political power after the death of Zhou Enlai.

The final period began when the Gang of Four was arrested and the new leadership in Peking started the drive for the "Four Modernizations." This period is still in progress. The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was concluded in August 1978, preceded by a long-term nongovernmental trade agreement in February of the same year.[24] Trade grew from $3 billion in 1976 to $10 billion in 1981, and Japan agreed in 1981 to supply the People's Republic of China with economic aid amounting to 300 billion Japanese yen or $1.3 billion. The allocation for the fiscal year ending in March 1982 was estimated to be 60 billion yen or $260 billion. Taking into account the Japanese government's budget deficit this agreement represents an enormous commitment by Japan.

Table I-1 Japan's Trade with Neighbors (million US $)

	People's Republic of China			Taiwan	Republic of Korea	USSR
	Export to	Import from	Total	Total	Total	Total
1972	609	491	1,100	1,513	1,406	1,098
1973	1,039	974	2,013	2,533	2,996	1,561
1974	1,984	1,305	3,289	2,964	4,224	2,514
1975	2,259	1,531	3,790	2,632	3,556	2,795
1976	1,663	1,371	3,034	3,470	4,720	3,149
1977	1,939	1,547	3,486	3,842	6,194	3,356
1978	3,049	2,030	5,079	5,335	8,594	4,372
1979	3,699	2,955	6,654	6,813	9,606	4,373
1980	5,078	4,323	9,401	7,438	8,364	4,638
1981	5,095	5,292	10,387	7,834	9,047	5,280
1982	3,511	5,351	8,862	6,698	8,135	5,557

(Sources provided by China Room, JETRO, Tokyo.)

[24] A detailed analysis of this period up to 1979 made by the author appeared in "Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey* 20 (July 1980): 726-43.

Another Factor?

Until recently Sino-Japanese relations have progressed relatively smoothly despite some minor difficulties, such as the Chinese interruption of negotiations on economic cooperation and trade with Japan in January 1979, their unilateral abrogation of major, long-term industrialization plans in December 1980, and the textbook issue in 1982. These actions shocked Japan and toned down unrealistic hopes to open up a vast "China market," an idea developed by the Japanese media and businessmen. Shedding their "China euphoria," they began to appraise China more critically. This has worked to make Sino-Japanese relations more stable. But if shifts in policy on the Chinese side occur too frequently, the Japanese may increasingly revert to the negative aspect of their feelings toward the Chinese. In addition, should the Chinese "modernization" fail, it would be taken by the Japanese as an indication of China's weakness. A weak China might create a strong temptation among the Japanese to intervene in China, as indicated by the foregoing analysis.

Furthermore, the preceding examination of Sino-Japanese relations over the past thirty years reveals an important fact that the state of their bilateral relations reflects the domestic politics of China more than it does those of Japan. It was China which modified its policy from calling for a Japanese revolution to normalizing relations with Japan in 1953. It was China which shifted from moderation to radicalism in 1958. China returned to moderation after the Great Leap Forward and initiated the development of Sino-Japanese trade links in 1960.[25] China lurched again into radicalism in 1966 but later sought normalization with Japan in 1972. The Gang of Four pursued radical policies again in 1976 — but only briefly.

In all spheres, China regulates the extent of its contacts with Japan, as with other countries. The number of Japanese visitors to China has constantly increased since 1972, as China has moved to liberalize the issuance of visas. In 1976, when the Gang of Four temporarily took over the political leadership of Peking for several months, the number of Chinese visitors to Japan was drastically cut back, as Table 2 shows.

A substantial drop in trade between Japan and China took place in 1976, as indicated on Table 1 and Figure 1, while Japan's trade with other Asian neighbors increased smoothly in the same year. By 1980, however, the Republic of Korea was severely hit by the 1980 world recession, as was Taiwan in 1982. Economic recession in both South Korea and Taiwan was immediately reflected in their trade with Japan. The decrease of Japan's trade with China in 1982, however, should be

[25] For a detailed analysis of alternation of moderation and radicalism in Peking's policy, see ETŌ Shinkichi, "Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution," in James Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), 337-73.

Table I-2 Exchange of Persons between PRC and Japan

	Japanese to PRC	Chinese to Japan
1972	8,052	994
1973	10,238	1,991
1974	12,990	3,161
1975	16,655	4,441
1976	18,825	4,018
1977	23,445	4,039
1978	40,574	5,951
1979	54,096	11,622
1980	71,473	15,328
1981	109,977	17,550
1982 (by November)	128,112	19,284

(Sources provided by China Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese Government.)

attributed to different causes. The decrease in Chinese trade with Japan was due primarily to tighter political control over foreign currency spending in order to readjust the government budget.[26] These factor lead one to the conclusion that Sino-Japanese relations will continue to evolve in accordance with shifts in Chinese policy.

Students of contemporary Chinese affairs may introduce a third factor into the Sino-Japanese equation: What would be the effect of a Sino-Soviet détente on Sino-Japanese relations?

Efforts toward a relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China began with L. I. Brezhnev's speech on March 24, 1982 in Samarkand. The Soviet leader proposed a rapprochement with China in his speech, to which China responded favorably, if in a restrained manner. Prior to this, the Soviet Union had made a similar proposal, but in vain. China had officially defined the policy of the Soviet Union as "socialist-imperialism" at the Eleventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1975, and the definition had been included in the 1975 constitution of the People's Republic of China. China had made tremendous efforts to induce Japan to enter into its anti-Soviet camp and urged Japan to join it in labeling the Soviet Union as a state of "hegemony." China had meanwhile allowed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid to expire in April 1980.

In April, Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 and Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 made a secret visit to North Korea.[27] It is likely that the Chinese leaders wanted to diffuse any apprehen-

[26] It is also interesting to note that Japan's trade with the USSR, another socialist neighbor, has increased steadily. The Soviet government during this era did not make any articulate change in domestic policy, resulting in no abrupt change in trade volume.

[27] *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (September 17, 1982).

Figure I-1 Japan's Trade with Neighbors



sions Kim Il-song 金日成 might have had regarding China's possible rapprochement with the Soviet Union as North Korea fears collaboration between its two giant neighbors. To this point, North Korea has successfully profited from the rift between its neighbors. In May, Kapitsa, director of the First Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, visited Peking. In July, Yu Hongliang 于洪亮, director of the Bureau of Soviet Affairs, visited Moscow. In September, Hu Yaobang, in his speech to the Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, suggested that Sino-Soviet relations should be normalized. The word "socialist-imperialism" completely disappeared from the documents of the congress. In October, a series of vice-minis-

terial meetings between Ilyichev, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Qian Qichen 錢其琛 was held in Peking. In November, Huang Hua 黃華, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the funeral of Brezhnev and met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Upon Huang's return to Peking he was replaced by Wu Xueqian 吳學謙, who received a cordial congratulatory telegram from Moscow.

To what extent will Sino-Soviet relations improve? The consolidation of Sino-Japanese relations has taken place in an atmosphere where the Sino-Soviet rift is taken for granted. Should the normalization of relations imply merely a reduction of tension between the two states, it should not have a serious impact on Sino-Japanese relations.

If, on the other hand, it were to result in a resurgence of close political collaboration or a military alliance, grave consequences might ensue for Sino-Japanese relations. A historical precedent can be cited: the Japanese astonishment at the German-Soviet Non-Intervention Treaty of August 21, 1939.[28] HIRANUMA Kiichirō 平沼騏一郎, then Prime Minister, resigned from office on August 28. He stated that his firm conviction in moral diplomacy had collapsed and that international affairs was all too complicated and mysterious.[29]

Thus far, the recent changes in Sino-Soviet relations have not yet affected Sino-Japanese relations, but one cannot ignore their serious potential for affecting Sino-Japanese relations.

Conclusion

The three major factors which influence the course of Sino-Japanese relations have been analyzed above. First, there is the latent existence of the negative side of the love-hate dichotomy, which may be surfacing slightly due to frustrations with the stagnant Chinese economy. Second, the domestic side of Chinese politics reveals the emergence of more stable leadership accompanied by a shift of the political pendulum from liberalization toward tighter control. In accordance with this move, Peking is reorienting its course from openness to the West and Japan toward a more reserved stance. This swing of the pendulum creates cyclical shifts in Chinese policy toward the rest of the world. Finally, the present normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union will be extremely limited. The two communist giants must make much greater progress toward closer relations than is anticipated at present before they will constitute a serious threat to Sino-Japanese relations. In sum, Sino-Japanese relations will continue to develop without serious difficulties in the foreseeable future.

[28] *Asahi shimbun* (August 21, 1939).
[29] *Asahi shimbun* (August 29, 1939).

Chapter II JAPANESE MANEUVERS FOR PEACE WITH CHINA, 1937-1940

Prologue

Following the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge 盧溝橋 on July 7, 1937 the Japanese carried on a number of covert maneuvers to reach a truce with the Nationalist Chinese government. This essay describes some of the secret efforts made from July 1937 until April 1940 and examines the circumstances that worked against their success. Within the top ranks of its decision-makers, the Imperial Japanese Army was a house divided against itself regarding the peace moves. Most of the army's top military strategists agreed that all-out war with China must be avoided, but for the great majority of officers the overriding priority was to maintain the "prestige of the Imperial Army" (*gun no ishin* 軍の威信). Army strategists worried about growing Soviet power in the north saw extreme danger in a protracted war with China, but they too were concerned about the prestige of the Army.

Japan's response to the situation was to open up a number of clandestine lines of contact with the Nationalist government and to promote negotiations through a variety of personal channels. These approaches included contacts between FUNATSU Tatsuichirō 船津辰一郎 and Gao Zongwu 高宗武; assistance of German diplomatic mediators; efforts to open talks between UGAKI Kazushige 宇垣一成 and H. H. Kung 孔祥熙; approaches by the Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 faction to Japan; and the Tajiri-Qian Yongming 田尻-錢永銘 negotiations. Through these and other means the Japanese attempted to achieve peace with minimum cost to the Army, and without sacrificing Japan's interests in China. Yet these efforts were all in vain.

* This is a reprint of "Japanese Maneuvers for Peace with China, 1937-1940," in David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, eds., *China in the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945: Politics, Culture, and Society* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 45-61. It is a preliminary study, to be expanded upon after further examination of documentary materials in Nanjing 南京, Taipei 臺北, Berlin, and elsewhere. It build upon earlier work published in Japanese by the author, "Tai-Ka wahei kōsaku-shi 對華和平工作史 (A History of Japanese Peace Maneuvers toward Republican China)" in ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, *Higashi Ajia seiji-shi kenkyū* 東アジア政治史研究 (Historical Studies of East Asian Politics) (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1968), 253-98.

Realism of the Military Strategists

On July 18, 1937, shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, ISHIWARA Kanji 石原莞爾, chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff in Tokyo, went to see War Minister SUGIYAMA Hajime 杉山元 and Vice-Minister UMEZU Yoshijirō 梅津美治郎 in order to urge caution:[1]

> Of thirty divisions now available for deployment, only fifteen can be sent to China. It is not possible for us to wage an all-out war. The way things are going, however, there is great danger that the war will become a general war. If it does, Japan will be sucked into the quagmire of China just as Napoleon was in Spain. We must take courage and withdraw all our troops in North China back behind the China-Manchukuo 滿洲國 border. Prime Minister KONOE should fly to Nanjing and meet Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 for personal talks to settle the basic issues between Japan and China.

Only one month before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, ISHIWARA made a clear statement to a staff conference at the Foreign Ministry, in which he reiterated his strong convictions regarding Japan's position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and the deployment of Japanese troops in China: "The crucial factor in our country's security right now is defense against the Soviet Union. To deploy our troops in China is out of the question. As long as I live, I will never allow a single soldier to be sent to China to fight."[2]

The Army officers known as anti-expansionists shared the realism of the military strategists and urged strict containment of local hostilities. Among those in the Army most fervently opposed to expanding hostilities in China were TADA Hayao 多田駿 (Vice-chief of Staff), ISHIWARA Kanji (chief of Operations Division, General Staff), KAWABE Torashirō 河邊虎四郎 (chief of Intelligence Section, General Staff), and SHIBAYAMA Kenshirō 柴山兼四郎 (chief of Military Affairs Section, War Ministry). Among those who were stationed in China were TASHIRO Kan'ichirō 田代皖一郎 (commander of Stationary Troops in China; he was seriously ill at the time and died later), HASHIMOTO Gun 橋本群 (lieutenant general, chief of staff), IKEDA Sumihisa 池田純久 (senior staff officer in charge of operations), MATSUI Takurō 松井太久郎 (chief of the special agency in Beijing), and IMAI Takeo 今井武夫 (major, assistant military attaché). These people occupied key posts in Army operations, mobilization, and intelligence. Yet a skirmish near the Marco

[1] TANAKA Shin'ichi 田中新一, "Nikka jihen kakudai ka hukakudai ka 日華事變擴大か不擴大か (Should the Sino-Japanese Incident be expended or contained?)," *Chisei* 知性, supp. issue, 5 (December 1956): 221.

[2] ISHII Itarō 石射猪太郎, *Gaikōkan no isshō* 外交官の一生 (The Life of a Diplomat) (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha 讀賣新聞社, 1950), 273.

Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beijing was to escalate into a full-blown war spreading over all China. That process itself is an intriguing topic, but, belongs to a separate article.

"Realism" here describes a disciplined, detached mode of observation and analysis of actual events that is the basis for working out countermeasures. The realistic stance avoided wishful thinking and the temptation to be swayed by the glory and spectacle of aggressive policies. Thus the anti-expansionists may have been more realistic, but it is a mistake to conclude that, conversely, all expansionists were unrealistic, moved by inflated overconfidence as they sought to escalate what began as a local conflict. Japanese Army commanders in Manchuria (Guandong Army 關東軍) and Korean Peninsula, for example, were solidly in favor of a hard-line policy after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, but an important factor in that position was their judgment, not necessarily unrealistic, that the Soviet Union would not intervene. They believed that Japan could exploit the incident to strike a decisive blow and easily seize North China to establish a special zone for Japanese interests. The question was whether or not one "decisive blow" would be enough to assure success; and here they underestimated the strength of the anti-Japanese sentiment then taking hold in China. So, on the whole, even if we disregard the absurd over-optimism represented by War Minister Sugiyama's assurance to the emperor that the China Incident would be settled in a few months, the assessment of Japan's situation by the Guandong Army and the Japanese Army in Korea 朝鮮軍 was still less realistic than the anti-expansionists' conviction that the skirmish must be contained in order to avoid an overall war between the two countries.

The word "realism" as used in this article embraces the above connotations. Even though the realism of the Army leaders was constrained by their lack of political foresight and their obsession with the prestige of the Imperial Army, it was an important element in determining their position. When hostilities finally did engulf all of North China, many of the Japanese voices calling most ardently for moves toward peace were from within the Army itself. For instance, on the night of July 10, the General Staff adopted a proposal to send reinforcements to North China, but the next day, shortly before the Cabinet was to meet to discuss this, a liaison officer from the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry arrived at the Foreign Ministry East Asia Bureau, Section One, with a request that the Foreign Minister exerted his influence to kill the proposal. The Army moved first for a truce, but clandestinely. The peace-seekers in the military were reluctant to be regarded as cowards; therefore, they would not assert themselves for peace overtly. It was a matter of the warrior's prestige. East Asia Bureau chief ISHII Itarō 石射猪太郎 said that he was certain the Foreign Minister would in any event adamantly oppose the reinforcement proposal, even without being asked. ISHII then spoke with Foreign Minister HIROTA Kōki 廣田弘毅 and urged him to reject the proposal.[3] But the July 11 Cabinet meeting passed it with little question and produced a strongly worded statement announcing the

possible dispatch of more troops to North China. The statement so angered the Chinese government that, their determination stiffened, they decided to send large Central Army forces northward. This statement was also one of the major reasons for Chiang Kai-shek's "Life-and-Death Crisis" speech calling for national resistance against Japan.

The General Staff in Tokyo could not have put through any decision to send reinforcements had Operations Division chief ISHIWARA Kanji vetoed it. But ISHIWARA lacked the political foresight to understand what the ramifications would be. He approved it quickly, and in so doing took a grave first step toward expansion of hostilities. Neither Prime Minister KONOE Fumimaro 近衛文麿 nor Foreign Minister HIROTA gave any more consideration than ISHIWARA did to what the political implications of the decision might be.

By virtue of their offices, KONOE and HIROTA were responsible for gauging political consequences of their actions. At the time, KONOE enjoyed full confidence of the military, government and people. He had the potential to exert strong political leadership. As for HIROTA, he had been prodded by his subordinate ISHII to scrap any plans to send more troops. Both KONOE and HIROTA erred in their political judgment, however, and for that reason they must bear responsibility. It may seem like sheer folly, but in the evening of the next day, July 12, a number of influential politicians, businessmen and journalists were invited to a reception at the official residence of the Prime Minister, where, in an atmosphere of festivity, KONOE himself asked for their "understanding and support" of the government's decision.

Another anecdote: IKEDA Sumihisa, senior operational staff officer with the Japanese troops in North China, was transferred to Tokyo after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident had escalated into war. He visited KONOE one day, and recorded his recollection of their conversation as follows:[4]

> As soon as he saw me the Prince [KONOE] said, "They finally did it, IKEDA-kun. The China Incident was a conspiracy instigated by a group of young men in the Japanese Army." The Prince apparently assumed from what the Japanese Guandong Army had done earlier [in Manchuria] that the Incident was an Army conspiracy. I didn't bother to explain because I knew it would be useless. Instead I said, "Prince, the one chiefly responsible for the war is not the Army but the prime minister—you, yourself." "What?" he said, with a look of great surprise. "Yes, you are responsible, Prince," I repeated. I took out an old newspaper and showed it to him. It was dated July 13. In a very small space in a corner of a back page was a report of the proposal for a solution we had hammered

[3] *Ibid.*, 271-272.

[4] IKEDA Sumihisa 池田純久, *Rikugun sōgi iinchō* 陸軍葬儀委員長 (Overseer of the Late Army's Late Rites) (Tokyo: Nippon shuppan kyōdō kabushiki gaisha 日本出版協同株式會社, 1953), 28-29.

> out with the Chinese at great pains and signed together. Pages one through three were filled with articles whose bold captions called out to raise the pitch of war fever. "Prince, the government was supposed to be pursuing the policy for containing the conflict then, but look at this newspaper. No wonder it developed into full war," I said. Probably understanding what I meant, the Prince fell into silence.

The author does not doubt that ISHIWARA, KONOE, HIROTA, and others acted with good intentions, but what must be evaluated is not their intentions, but the political responsibility they bore for what they did and did not do on behalf of Japan: that is, shrewd political foresight was lacking in these vital decisions.

"Prestige of the Army" was a phrase heard frequently among military men. Its meaning was vague, but the general idea it conveyed held considerably more emotive appeal to military men than did the realism of the strategic experts. Concern for the "Army's prestige" may have affected ISHIWARA also. On the evening of July 25, ISHIWARA remained late in the office. That night he received a report of the Langfang Incident 郎坊事件 that had occurred earlier in the day at a railway station between Beijing and Tianjin 天津. Right away he telephoned from the Operations Division to TANAKA Shin'ichi 田中新一, chief of the War Ministry Armed Services Section. By then it was 1:00 a.m., July 26. ISHIWARA impatiently told TANAKA: "Now we have no other choice but to send reinforcements from Japan to North China. Delay will ruin everything. Make the arrangements immediately."[5]

This was the same ISHIWARA who had feared that full-scale war with China would entangle Japan just as the Spanish war had entangled Napoleon. It may be possible to explain his behavior in this instance as motivated by concern for the Army's "prestige." It took him no time at all to decide that troops had to be sent to China. That decision was approved the following day by the cabinet, and the flames of war spread over all North China.

Funatsu's Peace Maneuver

On July 31, SHIBAYAMA Kenshirō, chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, went to the Foreign Ministry to meet with ISHII Itarō. SHIBAYAMA wanted to find some way to have the Chinese side make the first move in proposing a halt to hostilities. ISHII replied, "It's a matter of face for the Army, isn't it? You all seem obsessed by the need to have China initiate a ceasefire. That seems small-minded, but we don't have time to quibble. Yes, there is a way."[6]

[5] TANAKA Shin'ichi, *op. cit.*, 222.

[6] ISHII Itarō, *Ishii Itarō nikki* 石射猪太郎日記 (Diary of Ishii Itarō) (Tokyo: Chūō kōron-sha 中央公論社, 1993), 174.

ISHII already had worked out a plan on his own. The War, Navy, and Foreign Ministries held joint meetings to discuss the situation, focusing on Ishii's ideas, and produced two concrete proposals, "Plan for the General Coordination of Japan-China Relations" and "Conditions for a Japan-China Ceasefire."[7] Both sets of proposals involved major concessions on the part of Japan. Ishii's diary describes exploratory contacts between Japan and China on pages 174-78. Before these proposals were officially adopted, ISHII thought it unwise to bring them directly into formal negotiations between the two governments. ISHII thought it would be more effective to have someone acting in a non-official capacity, and therefore less likely to arouse Chinese suspicions, approach the Nationalist government with the suggestion that the conflict could be resolved. ISHII chose FUNATSU Tatsuichirō, a businessman and former diplomat, who was director of a federation of Japanese spinning companies in China. ISHII asked FUNATSU, who happened to be in Tokyo at the time, to approach Gao Zongwu, chief of the Bureau of Asian Affairs of the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Ministry and a personal friend of Funatsu's. He agreed and left Tokyo on August 4 for Shanghai. There, having been cabled the text of the two plans mentioned above, FUNATSU made contact with Gao on August 9.

In the meantime, Japan's ambassador to China, KAWAGOE Shigeru 川越茂, ignored Foreign Ministry instructions regarding the unofficial Funatsu maneuver, and met Gao in his official capacity of ambassador. FUNATSU was not able to arrange a meeting to discuss Ishii's peace plans. At that moment, hostilities inopportunely broke out in Shanghai as a result of an incident in which a Japanese Navy lieutenant was shot on a busy street in broad daylight by Chinese public security officers. This new conflict in Shanghai doomed the Funatsu maneuver.

German Mediation

Earlier, ISHIWARA had arranged for Lieutenant-Colonel MANAKI Takanobu 馬奈木敬信 of the General Staff Intelligence Division to be assigned concurrently to the Operations Division. Serving as liaison with Eugen Ott, military attaché to the German embassy, MANAKI was well prepared to approach Ott as the first step in securing German mediation in an effort to end the hostilities. Following Ishiwara's instructions, he initiated discussions with Ott and then the two of them traveled to Shanghai to bring the German Ambassador to China, Oskar P. Trautmann, into the discussions.[8]

[7] Gaimushō 外務省 (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Nippon gaikō nempyō narabi ni shuyō monjo* 日本外交年表竝主要文書 (Chronology of Japan's Foreign Relations and Selected Documents), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai 日本國際連合協會, 1955), 2:367-68.

[8] SHIGEMITSU Mamoru 重光葵, *Shōwa no dōran* 昭和の動亂 (Turbulence during the Shōwa Period), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Chūō kōron-sha, 1952), 1:180.

On November 7, negotiations were expanded to involve the German ambassador to Japan, Herbert von Dirksen, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. On December 14, a newly-instituted Liaison Conference, consisting of the government's top-ranking civilian and military leaders, was convened to deliberate peace terms once more. But the atmosphere was one of disagreement and vacillation. Nanjing had fallen to the Japanese on December 13, and the war appeared clearly to be progressing in Japan's favor. Army opinion overwhelmingly wanted German mediation canceled as unnecessary. A Four Ministers Conference (consisting of the Prime Minister and the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers) held on October 1 had decided to accept German mediation, but the very next day War Minister SUGIYAMA went to Foreign Minister HIROTA to state that he wanted it rejected, and that Prime Minister KONOE supported him. HIROTA agreed to this for the time being. SUGIYAMA was good-natured but vacillating, notorious for his lack of firm, steady principles regarding public policy.

When the Liaison Conference met in December, the mood was colored by recent military success. The Foreign Ministry had prepared a draft of the peace conditions which sounded more like the declaration by a victor to its defeated opponent than a proposal for peace. In this respect its tone was quite unlike that of the Funatsu approach. In response to adamant demands from Home Minister SUETSUGU Nobumasa 末次信正 (a retired jingoist admiral), War Minister SUGIYAMA, and Finance Minister KAYA Okinori 賀屋興宣, the conference ended up making the peace conditions much more severe. Even Vice-chief of Staff TADA Hayao, a leading anti-expansionist, added new demands. HIROTA, known as a statesman and a member of the diplomatic elite who understood China well, remained silent.[9] The new set of peace terms drafted by the Liaison Conference was passed by the cabinet on December 21, and handed to Dirksen the following day.[10]

Peace Conditions

The document drafted by the Four Ministers Conference on October 1 was entitled, "Outline of a Policy for the China Incident." It contained more or less the same conditions as included in the Funatsu maneuver. A comparison of the "Outline" with the December draft given to Trautmann shows significant differences. Calling the former "Draft A" and the latter "Draft B," we can highlight the differences as fol-

[9] ISHII Itarō, *Gaikōkan no isshō*, 295, 301. HIROTA 廣田 was the only Class A civilian war criminal sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The author suspects the reason HIROTA was deemed guilty of a capital offense was the silence he maintained during the change in Japanese policy from peace to war, during which the Nanjing massacre occurred.

[10] Gaimushō, *op. cit.*, 370-372.

lows:

(1) Stationing troops: No mention in Draft A, but Draft B stipulates that Japanese troops be stationed "in designated areas of North China, Inner Mongolia, and Central China" for an unspecified "necessary duration."
(2) Manchukuo: Draft A makes an implicit commitment not to make an issue of Manchukuo, while Draft B requires that Manchukuo be recognized officially by the Nationalist government of China.
(3) Demilitarized zone: Draft A requires demilitarization of part of North China, whereas Draft B calls for demilitarization of Japanese-occupied North China, Inner Mongolia, and Central China.
(4) Reparations: No mention in Draft A; Draft B demands that China be liable for Japan's war expenses.
(5) Ceasefire: Draft A states that after the cessation of hostilities, Japan and China "will together forge a 'new deal' through which their true friendship will be realized, forgetting all that has passed between them." Draft B simply states that Japan and China will finalize a ceasefire once a mutual agreement has been reached.

Draft A was forwarded by Trautmann to the Chinese Government, and submitted to the 54th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Supreme National Defense Council on December 6, 1937.

According to statements made by Wang Jingwei after he defected from the Nationalists, all of the top Guomindang 國民黨 leaders, including Chiang Kai-shek, were ready to accept the peace terms of Japanese Draft A.[11] Chiang's position was (1) that German mediation should not be refused, as the terms offered would not result in the extinction of the Chinese nation, and (2) that Chinese authority in North China must be preserved.[12] However, while the political atmosphere at Nationalist Chinese headquarters in Wuhan 武漢 was becoming increasingly favorable to acceptance of the German-mediated peace conditions, success on the battlefield by the Japanese Army was hardening Tokyo's position. Nanjing fell, and each day sensational headlines in Japanese newspapers reported new "victories" in China (though the Nanjing massacre was never mentioned in the media). The political leaders in Tokyo shared this overconfidence. Their response was to drop the peace proposals embodied in Draft A, and to replace them with the much harsher demands of

[11] ANDŌ Tokuki 安藤德器, *ŌSeiei jijoden* 汪精衛自敍傳 (Autobiography of Wang Jingwei) (Tokyo: Dai Nippon yūbenkai kōdansha 大日本雄辯會講談社, 1941), 180-82.

[12] Wang Ching-wei (Wang Jingwei), "Securing Peace with Honour," in T'ang Leang-li, ed., *The People's Tribune*, 28 (Shanghai: August-October 1939): 60-67 (with original dating of Hanoi, March 27, 1939). The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor David P. Barrett for informing him about this article.

Draft B.

By this time Japanese policy makers had lost all sense of realism. Regardless of how accurate Wang Jingwei's account of the Chinese position may be, it was the Japanese leaders who effectively closed off the diplomatic openings for peace, even though ample room remained for further negotiations.

First Konoe Statement

After he read the new draft, Dirksen told HIROTA he feared that Chiang Kai-shek would not undertake any negotiations based on such severe conditions.[13] Dirksen's forecast was correct. The Chinese, despite their reluctance to continue an all-out war, could not accept Draft B. The Nationalist government replied on January 14, 1938. It stated that Japan's conditions were overly ambiguous, and requested a plain, concrete statement of the Japanese position. In Tokyo, the cabinet met to discuss the Chinese communication and, bending to the persuasion of the War Ministry, decided that the reply was a delaying tactic, indicative of Chinese insincerity. The decision was taken to issue a declaration stating that henceforth Japan "refuses to deal with" (*aite ni sezu* (國民政府を) 對手にせず) the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek.

The General Staff, reflecting the realism of the strategic experts, wanted to carry on peace negotiations. At the Liaison Conference of the cabinet and Imperial Headquarters on January 15, Vice-chief of Staff TADA is reported to have said:[14]

> I believe there are still many means open to us. We must make our conditions unmistakably clear to China. We should proceed with great caution, to avoid involvement in a long, drawn-out war. Let this chance slip by, and the conflict could be prolonged indefinitely.

Right from the beginning the General Staff vehemently opposed the *aite ni sezu* decision, fearing that it would close the door on a settlement. But its voice was drowned out by the loud and determined protests coming from the War Ministry. The hard line position taken by the ministry and the cabinet prevailed. On January 16, the Japanese government announced termination of all further mediation efforts by Ambassador Dirksen, and issued the first Konoe statement, which became known as the *aite ni sezu* declaration. With these moves, Tokyo deliberately closed the door to peace, and pushed the Nationalist Chinese government into a do-or-die position. Japan was now mixed in a war which would last until the summer of 1945, and from

[13] ISHII Itarō, *Ishii Itarō nikki*, 234.
[14] TANAKA Shin'ichi, *op. cit.*, 226.

which it never could find a way to extricate itself.

The Ugaki-Kung Connection

KONOE replaced HIROTA with UGAKI Kazushige as Foreign Minister when he reshuffled the cabinet in May 1938. UGAKI presented four conditions for his appointment, which KONOE accepted. They were: a new and strengthened cabinet, exclusive Foreign Ministry jurisdiction over foreign policy, continued promotion of peace negotiations with China, and the abrogation, as soon as possible, of the *aite ni sezu* statement.[15]

Prior to Ugaki's appointment, MATSUI Iwane 松井石根, supreme commander of the Expeditionary Army to Central China, had contacted an old friend of Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙's by the name of KAYANO Nagatomo 萱野長知.[16] KAYANO worked on establishing peace contacts,[17] and by the summer of 1938 had succeeded in opening a channel connecting War Minister ITAGAKI Seishirō 板垣征四郎 to Chiang Kai-shek, beginning with himself, and proceeding through MATSUMOTO Kuraji 松本藏次, Hong Kong Consul-General NAKAMURA Toyokazu 中村豐一, and Jia Huide 賈存得 (wife of Ju Zheng 居正 and H. H. Kung's reported agent), to H. H. Kung.[18]

Probably as a result of Kayano's effort, Qiao Fusan 喬輔三 (former president of Shanxi University and a reputed confidant of Kung) paid a secret visit to Consul-General NAKAMURA on June 26 and, following a suggestion from Kung, offered to establish a link that would enable newly appointed Foreign Minister UGAKI to pursue peace negotiations.[19] Kung's offer was welcomed by UGAKI, who had looked for just such an opportunity. UGAKI added one further requirement to those

[15] UGAKI Kazushige 宇垣一成, *Ugaki nikki* 宇垣日記 (The Diary of Ugaki Kazushige) (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1954), 314-315.

[16] KAYANO 萱野 had been an activist in the 1911 Revolution.

[17] MATSUI 松井 sent a further representative to Hong Kong to contact Chiang 蔣's brother-in-law, T. V. Soong 宋子文. See MARUYAMA Shizuo 丸山靜雄, *Ushinaware taru kiroku* 失われたる記錄 (A Lost Record) (Tokyo: Kōraku shobō 後樂書房, 1950), 66ff. Consul-General NAKAMURA 中村 reportedly assisted but this channel, too, was cut off by Konoe 近衛's *aite ni sezu* (國民政府を) 對手にせず declaration.

[18] MITAMURA Takeo 三田村武夫, *Sensō to kyōsanshugi* 戰爭と共產主義 (War and Communism) (Tokyo: Minshu seido fukyūkai 民主制度普及會, 1950), 169-78.

[19] NAKAMURA Toyokazu 中村豐一, "Shirarezaru Ugaki-Kō himitsu kaidan 知られざる宇垣、孔祕密會談 (The Secret Meeting of Ugaki and Kung)," *Chisei*, supp. issue, 5 (December 1956): 261-62. Interestingly, Chinese at the time held UGAKI in high regard as a reformist general and an opponent of landlord-class army conservatism in Japan. (See Feng Zuzhao 馮子超, *Zhongguo kangzhan shi* 中國抗戰史 (A History of the Chinese War of Resistance) (Shanghai: Zhenqi shuju 上海正氣書局, 1946), 128).

specified in the Trautmann mediation the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek from the government and with this new set of conditions he embarked on peace negotiations through NAKAMURA and Qiao.

Why did Kung have Qiao meet NAKAMURA, when KAYANO already had opened up a channel? Should we infer that Kung actually had no link to KAYANO? Or, if he did, should we assume that the Chinese so mistrusted Kayano's superior, ITAGAKI, and the whole Japanese Army that Kung hoped to approach UGAKI directly through NAKAMURA, who was a Foreign Ministry official? These remain unanswered questions.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist government in Wuhan was trying to set up another channel of communication to UGAKI. Soon after becoming Foreign Minister, UGAKI received a telegram from Zhang Qun 張羣. This gave him an immediate opportunity to establish peace contacts. However, UGAKI preferred to steer clear of pro-Japanese Nationalist figures such as Zhang Qun and Wang Jingwei, and to negotiate rather with Kung.[20] Ironically, it was Chiang Kai-shek, so Wang Jingwei stated, who directed Zhang Qun to send the telegram to UGAKI.[21]

But by then it was too late. In September 1938 UGAKI resigned his post, having been all but immobilized by the Kōain 興亞院 (Asia Development Board), the agency recently established by the cabinet to coordinate Japanese policy in China. The Kōain operated independently of the Foreign Ministry, and usurped virtually all of its powers to resolve hostilities with China. In Ugaki's view, the establishment of the Kōain was part of a plot by die-hard opponents of a China settlement to divest the Foreign Ministry, now that it was under his direction, of its capacity to pursue peace.[22] The author tends to agree with Ugaki's interpretation, and feels that it was sheer fickleness on the part of KONOE not to support UGAKI on the matter of the Kōain, after having approved Ugaki's China policy and having accepted Ugaki's conditions for taking the post of Foreign Minister. In a remark that reveals his insouciance regarding moves for peace, KONOE confided to HORINOUCHI Kensuke 堀内謙介, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, "To tell the truth, it makes no difference who is Foreign Minister."[23] KONOE then assumed the post of Foreign Minister himself, and ended the contacts initiated by Zhang Qun.

Collaboration and Defection

While continuing to keep possibilities for communication with the Nationalist government open, the Konoe cabinet also considered alternative policies. These includ-

[20] UGAKI Kazushige, *op. cit.*, 326-367.
[21] ANDŌ Tokuki, *op. cit.*, 191-92.
[22] UGAKI Kazushige, *op. cit.*, 333.
[23] ISHII Itarō, *Gaikōkan no isshō*, 321.

ed recruiting "first-rate" Chinese to administer the occupied areas, identifying anti-Chiang figures in the Chinese government for pro-Japanese manipulation, and winning over isolated Chinese army units through offering them favorable terms.[24] On July 12, 1938 the five-ministers conference endorsed this program, which would be implemented by a new Army agency under DOIHARA Kenji 土肥原賢二. An advisory committee was set up under two former "China hands," Lieutenant-General BANZAI Rihachirō 坂西利八郎 and Vice-Admiral TSUDA Shizue 津田靜枝.[25] Several "first-rate" Chinese, including Wu Peifu 吳佩孚, Tang Shaoyi 唐紹儀, and Jin Yunpeng 靳雲鵬 were approached, but they refused to collaborate. Personal connections of many years with leading Chinese military figures such as Li Zongren 李宗仁 and Yan Xishan 閻錫山 were also pursued, but they too met with failure.[26]

By this time, plans to use Wang Jingwei in forging a settlement were already under way. This meant that the Konoe government was involved in a number of complex maneuvers simultaneously. The Japanese leaders, on the one hand, were trying to reach an understanding with the Nationalist government through the KAYANO-NAKAMURA-Kung and Wang Jingwei channels, while on the other hand they were angling for collaboration with anti-Chiang "first-rate" Chinese. As each of these separate ventures unfolded in its own way, it constrained the others, reducing the effect that any one might have had if handled alone.

Japan and Wang Jingwei

In February 1938, the General Staff made contact with Dong Daoning 董道寧, chief of the Japan Section of the Chinese Foreign Office. In time a link was established with Gao Zongwu, head of the Bureau of Asian Affairs, who in turn had connections with Zhou Fohai 周佛海 and Wang Jingwei. In the fall of the year, KAGESA Sadaaki 影佐禎昭 (chief of the War Ministry Military Affairs Section) and IMAI Takeo (of the General Staff China Section) held extended discussions in Shanghai with Gao and Mei Siping 梅思平, Wang Jingwei's representatives. Known as the Chongguangtang 重光堂 agreements from the name of the mansion in which the meetings took place, they were transmitted to Tokyo as the "Japan-China Conference Proceedings" [*Nikka kyōgiroku* 日華協議錄], and approved by War Minister ITAGAKI and Vice-chief of Staff TADA.

Wang's initial premise in entering into these discussions was that if he, as a long-standing Guomindang leader, much senior to Chiang Kai-shek, demonstrated his resolve to make peace with Japan, he would be followed by many members of the

[24] Gaimushō, *op. cit.*, 2:389-90.
[25] SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, *op. cit.*, 1:195.
[26] MARUYAMA Shizuo, *op. cit.*, 74 ff., 165 ff.

Nationalist government. They would then be in a position to shift a divided Nationalist government towards a policy of peace. Should they fail to do so, Wang believed that, by drawing upon contacts of his such as Long Yun 龍雲, Governor of Yunnan 雲南, he would be able to set up a new government in the southwest that would work for peace.[27] The Japanese response to the Chongguangtang negotiations took the form of the second Konoe statement, "The New Order in East Asia," issued on November 3. This revised the earlier *aite ni sezu* declaration by stating that "if the Nationalist government repudiates its former policies, installs new and better leadership, and joins us in building a New Order [in East Asia]. Japan will never refuse to deal with it."

Contrary to expectations, no Chinese military commanders followed suit when Wang and several close associates defected from Chongqing 重慶 in December. Wang waited four months in Hanoi, and then, in April 1939, with no other course open to him, requested protection from Japan. An unofficial organization, the Plum Blossom Agency 梅機關, was set up in Shanghai under KAGESA Sadaaki, in order to assist Wang in constructing a new "peace government." The "return of the capital" to Nanjing took place on March 30, 1940, and the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China was officially proclaimed. Wang then began negotiations with special envoy ABE Nobuyuki 阿部信行 to establish diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Nanjing. Fifteen rounds of talks were held, and by the early fall the "Japan-China Basic Treaty 日華基本條約" was finally ready for official ratification.

Tajiri-Qian Negotiations

There were, however, Japanese who maintained that support for Wang Jingwei's regime would stand in the way of peace. Thus, at the same time as Wang's government was coming into being, efforts continued unabated to develop contacts with the Nationalists in Chongqing.

The Japanese General Staff and the China Expeditionary Army pinned their hopes on a man by the name of Song Ziliang 宋子良, said to be the brother of T. V. Soong 宋子文. He was introduced to Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI Takuji 鈴木卓爾, who had been sent to Hong Kong by the General Staff in November 1939. The negotiations carried on through Song were designated "Operation Kiri 桐工作." Partly because results were unforthcoming and partly because of opposition from the newly appointed War Minister, TŌJŌ Hideki 東條英機, the operation was terminated in September 1940.[28] NOMURA Naokuni 野村直邦, commander of the Third

[27] IMAI Takeo 今井武夫, "Tai-Ka wahei kōsaku-shi 對華和平工作史 (A History of Peace Operations with China)," *Chisei*, supp. issue, 5 (December 1956): 253-54.
[28] *Ibid.*, 255-56.

China Expeditionary Fleet, is also said to have contacted Chongqing at this time, working through a Chinese collaborator, Wang Zihui 王子惠.[29] This avenue was closed off, apparently at the insistence of SHIMADA Shigetarō 嶋田繁太郎, commander-in-chief of the China Area Fleet.[30]

The second Konoe cabinet was inaugurated in early July 1940. Peace maneuvers were now highly fragmented and uncoordinated. It was rumored that as many as seventeen different channels were currently open.[31] When MATSUOKA Yōsuke 松岡洋右 agreed to take the post of Foreign Minister, he did so only after obtaining Konoe's agreement that Japanese peace efforts be conducted exclusively under Foreign Ministry supervision, and that activities of the Army and everyone else be fully subordinated to the Ministry.[32] Matsuoka's demands were formally embodied in the "Essentials for Adjusting the China Incident," approved on October 13 by the Imperial Conference.[33] However, the same conference also approved the Basic Treaty, which recognized the Wang regime as China's national government. Furthermore, Matsuoka's "Essentials for Adjusting the China Incident" stipulated that the Basic Treaty should be signed by the "end of November 1940 at the latest,"

[29] Wang Zihui 王子惠's personal history to this point is little known. He spoke Japanese fluently, but reportedly knew little Chinese. When the Reformed Government of the Republic of China 中華民國維新政府 was formed in Nanjing in 1938, he collaborated with the Japanese Army and for a time served as Minister of Industry in the new regime. At the end of World War II, he escaped arrest as a wartime collaborator and fled to Tokyo. He then returned to Shanghai and worked with OKAMURA Yasuji 岡村寧次, former supreme commander of the Expeditionary Army to China, and TSUJI Masanobu 辻政信, former colonel, General Staff of the Expeditionary Army, both of whom were in China until 1949 as advisers to Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石. See TSUJI Masanobu, *Senkō sanzenri* 潜行三千里 (Three Thousand Miles Underground) (Tokyo: Mainichi shimbunsha 毎日新聞社, 1950), 288. Little credence has been given to Wang Zihui's activities in seeking peace with Chongqing 重慶.

[30] YOKOI Toshiyuki 横井俊幸, *Teikoku kaigun kimitsushitsu* 帝國海軍機密室 (Intelligence Operations of the Imperial Navy) (Tokyo : Shin seikatsusha 新生活社, 1953), 156ff.

[31] TANEMURA Sakō種村佐孝, *Daihon'ei kimitsu nisshi* 大本營機密日誌 (Confidential Diary of the Imperial Headquarters) (Tokyo: Daiyamondo-sha ダイヤモンド社, 1952), 36. At this time there were many people from Tokyo and Chongqing trying to establish contact with each other, either in a private or official capacity. They were involved in peace maneuvers, covert operations, and information-gathering. Their activities created growing distrust between Tokyo and Chongqing. (For observations from the Chongqing perspective, see AOYAMA Kazuo 青山和夫, *Bōryaku jukurenkō* 謀略熟練工 (A Skilled Schemer) (Tokyo: Myōgi shuppan kabushiki gaisha 妙義出版株式會社, 1957), 142-43).

[32] SAITŌ Ryōe 齋藤良衛, *Azamukareta rekishi* 欺かれた歴史 (A History of Betrayal) (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimubunsha, 1955), 81-82.

[33] This document states: "This Imperial Government will take charge of activities pursued for the purpose of obtaining peace, and the related agencies will extend their cooperation to it. (Note: All projects so far undertaken for purpose of a peaceful settlement either military or civilian personnel shall cease.)"

unless peace efforts directed at the Nationalist government in Chongqing produced concrete results.

The Japanese government understood that signing the treaty would have a greater impact than the first Konoe statement. Failure to achieve a peace settlement with the Nationalist government would mean that Japan, regardless of circumstances, would choose "protracted war and would fight on until the Chongqing regime surrendered." MATSUOKA had no time to lose. Through an agent, TAJIRI Akiyoshi 田尻愛義, he contacted Zhejiang 浙江 banker Qian Yongming in Hong Kong. This connection had been established when Qian's secretary, Zhang Jingli 張競立, brought MATSUOKA a letter of introduction from Wang Jingwei's second-in-command, Zhou Fohai. Then, about November 20, MATSUOKA received a communication from Chongqing requesting that recognition of the Wang regime be delayed. Chongqing proposed that "All Japanese troops be withdrawn and discussions held regarding the stationing of troops in accordance with a separate treaty."[34] War Minister TŌJŌ reportedly did not address the question of troop deployments, but requested MATSUOKA to reply and ask Chongqing to send appropriate representatives to Tokyo.

Meanwhile, ABE Nobuyuki, who had negotiated the treaty with the Wang regime, flew to Tokyo together with Zhou Fohai and KAGESA Sadaaki, to lobby for the signing of the document, which would confer on Nanjing official Japanese recognition. Government and military opinion was sharply divided between those who wanted the treaty signed as scheduled, and those who wanted it postponed. At an informal meeting of cabinet ministers and military leaders on November 28, MATSUOKA said he thought Chongqing's request—that Japan postpone recognition of the Wang regime—was no more than a stratagem.[35] The decision was then taken that Japan would sign the treaty on November 30.

MATSUOKA was known to bluff, but he was a specialist in international affairs, with experience as a Foreign Ministry bureaucrat. One wonders why, then, he acted in so maladroit a manner by abruptly breaking off negotiations just as they were about to begin. One of Matsuoka's more perceptive advisers, SAITŌ Ryōe 齋藤良衛, explained what happened in the following way:[36]

> He [MATSUOKA] intended to put off signing the Basic Treaty with the Wang government and to continue negotiating in Hong Kong, so that he could keep the door open to any opportunity to unify the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei regimes. In other words, MATSUOKA wanted to use the Wang regime as a decoy in order to attain a comprehensive peace with China...However,

[34] TANEMURA Sakō, *op. cit.*, 36.
[35] SAITŌ Ryōe, *op. cit.*, 81.
[36] *Ibid.*, 82-83.

when the [Japanese] expeditionary troops in China learned of his thinking, they voiced a sharp protest. They were deeply committed to Wang because the establishment of his regime was conceived of and set in motion by staff officers stationed in China. They attacked MATSUOKA for apparently dismissing their efforts and trying to get rid of Wang. ABE, in Nanjing as ambassador plenipotentiary, concurred, and censured MATSUOKA for putting temporary expediency ahead of fixed diplomatic objectives. Passionately committed to quickly finalizing the treaty. ABE rushed back to Tokyo and went to see MATSUOKA at his home. In a reproving and sharply critical tone, ABE threatened not to leave the house until the Foreign Minister promised to sign the treaty with the Wang regime. MATSUOKA often put on a bold front, but he usually compromised in the end. He finally gave in to the pressure.

Epilogue

Thus it was decided that Japan would sign the Basic Treaty on November 30, as scheduled, and that peace negotiations with Chongqing would be suspended indefinitely. There were no further contacts with Chongqing until the last days of the Pacific War, when Japan found itself tightly cornered, and desperately sought to find an escape route. As the "Essentials for Adjusting the China Incident" foresaw, Japan had to adjust its China policy to sustain a protracted war, but the tactics required to do so only provoked the United States and Great Britain into joining the other side, leading to Japan's headlong plunge into the Pacific War.[37]

[37] For example, the Japanese advance into Southern French Indochina (July 1941), which deeply disturbed the United States, resulted from the failure of the movement for peace with the Nationalist government in Chongqing. That failure promoted the move further into French Indochina, which would give Japan a strategic advantage over Britain by placing Singapore within range of an air strike. This would help contain British moves, and thus increase Chongqing's isolation. See HATTORI Takushirō 服部卓四郎, *Dai Tōa sensō zenshi* 大東亞戰爭全史 (A Complete History of the Greater East Asia War), 8 vols. (Tokyo: Masu shobō 鱒書房, 1953), 1:140.

Chapter III POST-WAR JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS

A strange kind of Sino-Japanese friendship has begun. When the Satō 佐藤 cabinet was in power in Japan, Peking adopted a policy of "having no dealings with the Satō cabinet." In those days, Peking also maintained that it could not yield on the so-called "Three Principles" for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations as these were matters of principle, and that unless the Japanese government accepted them, it would never enter into any negotiations.

The Three Principles are: (1) the government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China; (2) Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China; and therefore (3) the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government in Taiwan is illegal and should be abrogated.[1] The Satō cabinet accepted the first of the three principles but not the second and third.[2]

However, on July 9, 1972, only two days after the formation of the Tanaka 田中 cabinet, in spite of the fact that the new Prime Minister, Mr. TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮, was a member of Mr. Satō's faction and one of his most loyal cronies at that, and in spite of the fact that Peking had scornfully refused to respond to repeated signals from the Satō cabinet indicating its desire to start government-to-government negotiations between Japan and China, Prime Minister Chou En-lai 周恩來 announced that he welcomed the Tanaka cabinet's efforts towards the normalization of relations.[3] Subsequently, leading figures in Peking ceased to make references to the Three Principles. And on August 15, less than six weeks after the formation of the Tanaka cabinet, China declared that it would "heartily welcome" a visit by Mr. TANAKA to Peking.[4]

On the Japanese side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo suddenly started to assume a subservient attitude towards Peking following the change of Foreign Minister. While the Peking government maintained silence on the Three Principles,

* This was originally published in *Survey* 85/4 (Autumn 1972): 55-65. It was written right before the normalization of the diplomatic relationship between Japan and China in September 1972. The representation of China at the United Nations had shifted to Beijing government in the previous year.

1 Cf. *Joint Communiqué of the Japanese Diet Members Group for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations and the Chinese Sino-Japanese Friendship Association*, October 2, 1971; appeared in the *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (Asahi Press) (October 3, 1971).

2 *Nihon keizai shimbun* 日本經濟新聞 (Japan Economic News) (May 25, 1972).

3 *Jen-min jih-pao* 人民日報 (People's Daily) (July 9, 1972).

4 *Mainichi shimbun* 每日新聞 (Mainichi Press), morning ed., (August 16, 1972).

and whereas Prime Minister TANAKA went no further than saying that "the Three Principles are understandable as basic concepts for China,"[5] the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs deliberately omitted the phrase "for China" and asserted that "the Three Principles are understandable as basic concepts." [6] This ambiguity in Japanese could easily be taken to mean that the Ministry has already accepted the principles as basic concepts of Japanese government thinking in any future Sino-Japanese negotiations. And in spite of Peking's silence, the Ministry also served advance notice that the peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan will be dissolved [7] and that it will adopt the view that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory.[8] And, indeed, this has been confirmed in the Tanaka-Chou En-lai agreement.

The purpose of this article is not to analyze the rapidly changing aspects of current Sino-Japanese relations, but to investigate the relationship during the last quarter-century and to put the change which is now taking place in historical perspective. Its main conclusions are that the Japanese government ought to have adhered to the principle of non-involvement in the China question, that three grave errors had been committed in the past, and that we cannot expect true friendship between Japan and China to descend suddenly from heaven one sunny day simply by accommodating all the wishes of Peking. Serious troubles and difficulties have to be overcome in order to achieve such a friendship.

Let us start with a historical analysis focusing on Sino-American and Russo-Chinese relations.

Relations between Japan and China after the Second World War can be divided into eight periods, the first of which runs from the end of the war in August 1945 to the formal establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949. During this period, the Chinese Communist Party had no actual say in the formation of China's policy towards Japan apart from the fact that its army took some part, in certain areas, in forcing the Japanese army in China to disarm.

The second period runs from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It was a time when Sino-Soviet relations were on a good footing. Although the Chinese Communist Party must have had hidden reservations about the Soviet Union, it tried its best to improve relations. In December 1949, Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東, at the head of a team of more than a hundred

[5] Jiyūminshu tō nitchū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai 自由民主黨日中國交正常化協議會 (Council on Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations, Liberal Democratic Party), *Nitchū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai daiikkai sōkai kaigiroku* 日中國交正常化協議會第一回總會會議錄 (Proceedings of the First General Meeting of the Council on Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations) (July 24, 1972), 5.

[6] *Nihon keizai shimbun*, evening ed., (August 3, 1972).

[7] *Mainichi shimbun*, evening ed., (August 9, 1972).

[8] *Ibid.*, evening ed., (August 11, 1972).

Chinese, visited Moscow and stayed there until the 14th February of the following year, patiently negotiating with the USSR. The result was the Sino-Soviet treaty, emphasizing the "eternal friendship between China and the Soviet Union."

At the beginning of this period the US showed some intention of approaching the People's Republic, leaving some of its diplomats in mainland China and thus keeping open the possibility of a reconciliation with the new government in Peking. When in October 1949 the State Department held a conference on a new China policy, inviting to Washington 35 specialists in Chinese affairs such as Owen Latimore, J. K. Fairbank, etc., the majority of the conference supported the recognition of the Peking government.

It was against this background that President Truman made the famous declaration of January 5, 1950 in which he asserted that "the United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa." [9] The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on January 10 that "the US defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians, Japan, and the Ryukyus 琉球 to the Philippines," thus excluding Taiwan and Korea.[10] This attitude of non-involvement in Taiwan continued until the outbreak of the Korean War.

The People's Republic of China adopted a flexible foreign policy during this period with a view to improving what little international standing it had. As a result, the new Peking government was recognized after its establishment not only by communist countries but also by the majority of non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa. Nationalist China found itself not only internationally isolated but also in imminent danger of invasion, with hundreds of thousands of the People's Liberation Army 人民解放軍 concentrated in the Fukien 福建 Province across the Taiwan Straits.

In this period, the Chinese Communist Party started its campaign against 'Japanese rearmament.' Even before the formal establishment of the Peking government, it had formulated a fairly concrete policy on Japan in its declaration of July 7, 1949. In this 29-point manifesto commemorating the outbreak of the war against Japan, only six points were concerned with foreign policy, three of them with Japan. They were as follows:

[9] US Department of State, *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955* (Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1957), 2448-49.

[10] McGeorge Bundy, ed., *The Pattern of Responsibility* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 199.

(1) A peace treaty with Japan should be concluded as soon as possible;
(2) Japan should be demilitarized and democratized;
(3) The peoples of China and Japan must unite in the struggle against the US occupation of Japan.[11]

What should be noted about this declaration is that the Chinese Communist Party's advocacy of an early conclusion of peace with Japan seems to have been merely a counter to check the US occupation, which it considered permanent, and not a serious effort for peace. Secondly, it expressed a serious fear about Japanese rearmament and the building up of military bases there. This fear led China to state frankly in the preamble to the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty of February 1950 that the treaty presupposed Japan to be a potential enemy, and was aimed at preventing Japanese rearmament and the establishment of US military bases in Japan. Thirdly, it reflected Peking's expectation of a revolution in Japan. The editorial of the *People's Daily* of January 17, 1950 asserted in support of the Cominform's criticism of the Japan Communist Party that "the Japanese people... should carry out a determined revolutionary struggle against American imperialism and the reactionary forces in Japan."[12]

The third period starts with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and ends with the ceasefire in June 1953. It was marked first of all by a complete change in American policy on China; the United States now opted for the neutralization of the Taiwan Straits, sending in the Seventh Fleet on the second day after the beginning of the war. The Peking government thus lost any hope of liberating Taiwan. US involvement with Taiwan was further strengthened with the visit there on July 31 of General MacArthur, General Commander of the UN forces, and the subsequent dispatch of a US military mission.

The Soviet Union pressed China to send troops to the Korean War and China found itself fighting directly with the US troops in Korea. In spite of the enormous cost (which is variously estimated at 500,000 to 1 million lives), the People's Liberation Army succeeded in securing the present ceasefire line.

During this period, Japan was incorporated into the American strategic system against the strong opposition of the Soviet Union and the Peking government. While preparations for concluding a separate peace with the US went on, the Chinese repeatedly asserted that "the US occupation authorities' policy in Japan has been to preserve Japan's militarism and to prevent the democratization of Japan,"[13] that "the

[11] Ajia seikei gakkai アジア政經學會 (Japanese Association of Asian Political and Economic Studies), *Chūgoku seiji keizai sōran* 中國政治經濟總覽 (A General Description of Chinese Politics and Economy) (Tokyo: Hitotsubashi shobō 一橋書房, 1954), 264-65.
[12] *Jen-min jih-pao* (January 17, 1972).

US government and the Yoshida 吉田 government in Japan are plotting together for the rearmament of Japan."[14] But it is interesting to note that during this time, Peking actually changed its position on Japanese rearmament from one of total opposition to a demand for arms limitation. Chou En-lai, then Foreign Minister, stated in a letter to the Russian Ambassador on May 22, 1951 that "in order to ensure that Japan's militarism should not revive, the Treaty should contain a clause limiting the size of armed forces, which should not exceed the minimum required for self-defense."[15] Peking was apparently following the example of the Soviet Union which hurriedly accepted the case for limited rearmament of Japan at the last stage of Japanese preparation for a separate peace.

In the situation which arose with the outbreak of the Korean War the Western countries moved rapidly towards concluding a peace treaty with Japan. The result was the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. There had already been disagreement, especially between the US and the UK, as to whether the Peking or the Nationalist government should be invited. In the end, neither government was invited to San Francisco. Later, after a strong hint from John Foster Dulles, then adviser to the US Secretary of State, that ratification by the US Senate of the San Francisco Peace Treaty could not be guaranteed unless Japan, in concluding a peace treaty with China, opted for the Nationalist government in Taiwan, the Yoshida government decided to negotiate a peace treaty with the Nationalists. Prime Minister YOSHIDA sent a letter to Mr. Dulles at that time, known as the First Yoshida Letter.[16]

In this letter he made the following three points: (1) that Japan's ultimate wish is the establishment of peace and trading relations with its continental neighbor, China (thus hinting that Japan expected to achieve peace with the Peking government in future); (2) that the forthcoming treaty was to apply only to those territories currently under the control of the Nationalist government or those which might come under its control in the future; and (3) that as the communist regime in China was assisting the Japanese Communist Party in its attempt to overthrow by force Japan's government and constitutional system, the Japanese government had no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with it. Treaty negotiations between Japan and the Nationalist government were conducted along the lines of this letter.

As far as can be ascertained from published material,[17] there were three main points of dispute between the two governments.

Firstly, the Nationalist government claimed that the forthcoming treaty should

[13] Chou En-lai 周恩來's letter to Soviet Ambassador in Peking dated May 22, 1951, appeared in *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryō-shū* 日中關係基本資料集 (Selected Basic Documents on Japanese-Chinese Relations) (Tokyo: Kazankai 霞山會, 1970), 15.

[14] Chou En-lai's statement on August 15, 1951, appeared in *ibid.*, 22.

[15] *Ibid.*, 18.

[16] *Ibid.*, 27-29.

follow the lines of the Treaty of San Francisco, that it should be called a peace treaty, and that Japan should recognize the Nationalist government as the legitimate government of China. Japan conceded these claims. Secondly, it demanded reparation, claiming that Chinese national sentiment would not allow China, the chief victim of the war with Japan, to forgo its claim for reparation. Japan, on its part, maintained that war damages suffered on the Chinese continent were outside the scope of the treaty. In the end, clauses relating to reparation were deleted. Thirdly, Japan insisted on inserting a clause limiting the application of the treaty to those territories only which were currently under the control of the Nationalist government or might come under it in future. The Nationalist government objected to this, and it was omitted from the actual text of the treaty, but Japan's position was accepted in the exchange of Notes. Japan relinquished the form but retained the substance of its attitude.

This was repeatedly made clear later during the debate in the Diet on the ratification of the Treaty, a few extracts from which may be cited here. On June 26, 1952, in answer to a question from Mr. HIRABAYASHI 平林 in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors, Prime Minister YOSHIDA replied: "... the Sino-Japanese Treaty is being concluded only with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan, and has nothing to do with the Chinese communist regime. As to what sort of relationship we shall have in the future with Communist China, we can do nothing but await future developments."[18] On January 30 of the same year, the Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, ISHIHARA Kan'ichirō 石原幹市郎, said: "We consider that the state of war will cease in relation to the area under the actual control of Nationalist China."[19] And on April 28, Cabinet Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo 岡崎勝男 stated that "This treaty covers the area under the control of the government of the Republic of China, irrespective of whether it expands or contracts."[20]

At that time, Japan had three alternatives. The first was to reject the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself, i.e. to continue in a state of occupation under American rule, in the hope of achieving an overall peace in the future. In this respect, Austria, which

[17] Gaimushō hyakunen-shi hensan iinkai 外務省百年史編纂委員會 (Committee for the Editing of a Centennial History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), ed., *Gaimushō no hyakunen* 外務省の百年 (A Hundred Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Hara shobō 原書房, 1969), 2:812-13.

[18] *Dai jūsankai sangiin gaimuiinkai kaigiroku* 第十三回參議院外務委員會會議錄 (Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee of Foreign Relations, House of Councilors) 5/43 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office 大藏省印刷局 , 1952): 6.

[19] *Dai jūsankai shūgiin gaimuiinkai kaigiroku* 第十三回衆議院外務委員會會議錄 (Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee of Foreign Relations, House of Representatives) 4/2 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1952): 3.

[20] *Ibid.*, 4/26: 30.

achieved an overall peace in 1955 (although, unlike Japan, it was separately occupied by the Allies), can perhaps be taken as an example. It can be argued that if Japan had waited until around 1955 it might also have been able to achieve an overall peace. But in view of the feelings of most Japanese at the time, it would have been difficult for the government to persuade the nation to acquiesce in the continued humiliation of the American occupation. This alternative was even more difficult because of the fact that Japan's economy had just recovered from its miserable state at the end of the war and any friction with the US might have led to some form of economic retaliation. This alternative thus entailed much more than a mere rejection of the San Francisco Treaty.

The second alternative was to take full advantage of the international situation arising from the outbreak of the Korean War by actively remilitarizing, revising the new constitution and aiming at the rapid resurgence of Japan as a great military power. But in view of the strong resistance expected from opposition parties and the national wariness arising from the bitter experience of the war, this alternative would also have been a very difficult one for the government to take, even if they had wanted to do so.

The third alternative was a middle course, i.e. while cooperating with the US and allowing Japan to be incorporated into the American strategic alliance system in Asia, to slow down the process of remilitarization as much as possible and to avoid as far as possible any involvement with the Chinese problem. This third course, which was in fact adopted by the Yoshida government, was, in retrospect, the one least likely to cause friction, and which would leave most room for diplomatic maneuver in the future.

The treaty between Japan and Nationalist China cannot be discussed without mentioning the legal position of Taiwan. I myself subscribe to the theory that its legal status remains unsettled. In my view, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are no more than declarations of the allies' intention to return Taiwan to China, and the contents of these Declarations can be confirmed legally only through a peace treaty embodying an agreement among the victorious former allies. Japan, as a defeated power, has no legal say over Taiwan, to which it has already renounced all right, title and claims.

If from a legal point of view Japan is not in a position to involve itself with the China problem, politically speaking it is better for it not to do so. My reasons for this view can be summarized as follows:

First of all, the history of Japan shows that political involvement with the problems of the Asian continent has always had dire consequences for Japan, especially since the beginning of the Showa era. The first Wakatsuki 若槻 cabinet, the Tanaka cabinet and others, all fell because they could not handle such problems. The less involvement with these problems, the better for the stability of Japan's parliamentary politics.

Secondly, China is very close to the Japanese people, both culturally and geographically, and most of them have so deep an interest in it that the China question is now more a problem of domestic politics than of diplomacy.

Thirdly, because division of opinion among the Japanese on this question must lead to the loss of government leadership in foreign policy, policymaking becomes merely a process of compromise among domestic pressures or more precisely among different groups of the government party of the day. The result can only be a lack of rationality and purpose in the conduct of foreign policy.

The fourth period extended from 1953 to 1957. During this time Peking's emphasis on a "revolution in Japan" was replaced by China's growing desire to normalize relations with Japan.

There was a dramatic acceleration of this trend when Mr. HATOYAMA 鳩山 came to power, which continued into the years of premiership of Mr. ISHIBASHI 石橋 and Mr. KISHI 岸. In this period a non-governmental agreement on trade was renewed four times, and an agreement on fishing was concluded without difficulty. In addition, governmental negotiations took place in Geneva. Peking, expressing the hope of an "independent, peaceful and democratic Japan," addressed itself quite seriously to the question of the normalization of relations with Japan. In that process, Chinese views on several important questions became clearer.

From Peking's point of view, Taiwan had become a political symbol of the China still unrestored. It was part of China's inalienable territory which had been occupied by the American imperialists, and which therefore had to be liberated by the Chinese people even if it took 50 or 100 years to do so; there was therefore no room for compromise as far as Taiwan was concerned. That it was part of Chinese territory became for Peking a matter of principle.

The first major mistake in Japan's post-war China policy committed by the conservative government was the official visit to Taiwan by Prime Minister KISHI. His statement supporting Nationalist China's intention of regaining the mainland further disturbed the Peking government. Once Kishi's government had adopted a policy favorable towards Nationalist China, they were forced to take the consequences of it, such as the refusal to allow the Chinese Trade Mission to raise their flag and the change in the restrictive interpretation of the treaty between Japan and Nationalist China.

The Fourth Non-governmental Trade Agreement signed at the beginning of 1958 provided for the mutual establishment of trade missions, each flying its flag. However, Kishi's refusal to allow Chinese flags to be flown greatly offended Peking. During Yoshida's premiership, painstaking efforts had been made to give a restrictive interpretation to the treaty; Kishi's government, however, took the view that the treaty had disposed of all the issues arising from the war with China, and that therefore it had settled the war with mainland China as well. This legal interpretation

meant that Peking could not negotiate for the establishment of formal relations with Japan as long as the treaty was in force, and in this sense Kishi's interpretation presented an obstacle to normalization of negotiations.

At the end of 1957 China changed its policy of moderation for one of radicalism; this marked the beginning of the fifth period, which lasted until early in 1959, the period of the so-called "Great Leap Forward 大躍進," when Chinese foreign policy, as in domestic policy, became radical and extreme.

It was during this time that the Nagasaki 長崎 Flag Incident[21] took place and Chinese trade with Japan was discontinued. In the wake of this incident, Mr. FUJIYAMA 藤山, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested the possibility of holding an ambassadorial meeting and negotiating a government trade agreement, but relations between the two governments deteriorated still further. (There were rumors in Hong Kong at that time that FUJIYAMA had repeatedly sent secret letters to Peking with a view to entering into governmental negotiations but that the Chinese failed to respond, saying that the time had not yet come.)

The sixth period lasted from 1959 until the summer of 1966, when the Cultural Revolution began. It corresponds to what the Chinese call the adjustment period and Chinese foreign policy at this time may therefore be termed "adjustment period diplomacy."

As long as the Kishi cabinet was in office, Peking, for reasons of principle of one kind or another and to save face, made no compromise with the Japanese government. But with the formation of the Ikeda 池田 cabinet in September 1960, it began to adopt a more positive attitude towards the reopening of Sino-Japanese trade, secretly starting to make contact with Japanese conservatives. Against this background, the L-T trade agreement[22] was concluded in January 1962, by which Japan became the only country in the world to trade with substantial freedom both with Taiwan and with the Chinese mainland. (Some students of China predicted towards the end of Satō's period of office that Peking would again use the change of cabinet in Japan to change its Japanese policy.)

The sixth period did not, however, last long. In autumn 1963, the Chou Hung-ching 周鴻慶 Incident took place and Japan's diplomatic relations with Taiwan almost came to an end. To rectify this situation, Mr. YOSHIDA went to Taiwan and burdened the Ikeda government with the Second Yoshida Letter, pledging that gov-

[21] The incident took place on May 2, 1958 when a Japanese youth tore to pieces a flag of the People's Republic of China in public in the city of Nagasaki 長崎.

[22] This Non-governmental Trade Agreement between Japan and China was signed on November 9, 1962 by Mr. TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke 高碕達之助 and Liao Cheng-chi 廖承志. It is known as the L-T trade agreement after the initials of its two signatories.

ernment money would not be used for trade with Peking; this discrimination has been under continuous attack by Peking ever since. I consider the writing of this letter to be another grave mistake. Even if diplomatic relations with Taiwan were on the verge of being severed, the Ikeda cabinet ought to have refrained from attempting to end this uneasy state of affairs. Even if the pressure from the Taiwan lobby in the government party had turned out to be too strong to resist, the government should have limited the validity of the letter to the year of its issue, 1964. As 1964 saw the takeover of the Ikeda cabinet by that of SATŌ, it was rather difficult for the Ikeda government to make such a move, but even so it is unfortunate that it did not do so.

The seventh period covers the "Cultural Revolution 文化大革命," from summer 1966 to spring 1969, during which there was no Chinese foreign policy, and the eighth period began after the Ninth Party Conference when this situation was remedied. In short, this was the period of a return to normality, and along with the rapid restoration of diplomatic machinery, meticulous endeavors were made to promote China's prestige in the world community.

During this period of Peking's return to normality, a third mistake was made by the Japanese government. On November 21, 1969, the Satō-Nixon Joint Communiqué made specific mention of the fact that "the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan."[23] To take a benevolent view of the motives of the Japanese government at the time, one assumes that this reference to Taiwan was motivated by considerations concerning the reversion of Okinawa 沖縄 to Japan. The Chinese Nationalist government had consistently opposed the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and so, to appease it on this issue, the reference to Taiwan was made as a psychological prop to the Nationalist regime.

As expected, Peking reacted strongly to this reference, taking it as interference with the internal affairs of China, and this soon led to a series of vehement accusations against Japanese militarism.

The foregoing analysis of Sino-Japanese relations during the last quarter of a century reveals two main characteristics in the policymaking patterns of Peking. Firstly, the hardening or softening of Peking's external policy corresponds largely to the radicalism or moderation of its internal policy.[24] Secondly, the Peking government takes the view that Japanese policy is influenced by the personal character of the Prime Minister and it tends therefore to change its policy towards Japan when there is a change of government there.

[23] *Mainichi shimbun*, morning ed., (November 22, 1969).

[24] For a detailed analysis of the alternation of moderation and radicalism in Peking's policy, see ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, "Moderation and Radicalism in Chinese Revolution," in James B. Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), 337-73.

One could deduce from the first factor that the current moderation in Chinese internal policy was bound in due course to be reflected in its policy towards Japan. This tendency has been further affected by the *détente* between China and the US, the continued tension between China and the USSR, and by the fact that the aging Chinese leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai[25] must have wished for the stabilization of Sino-Japanese relations before they left the scene. If they refused to deal with the Tanaka government, the chances were that the normalization of relations between China and Japan would not have been achieved during their tenure of power. One might therefore have expected that the transfer of power from Mr. SATŌ to Mr. TANAKA would be used by Peking as the occasion for a change of policy.

In 1969, Peking's internal policy was already becoming more moderate, and the outcome of the Lin Piao 林彪 affair consolidated this policy of moderation. However, Peking had indulged in too much abuse of SATŌ to be able to adopt a moderate line with the Satō cabinet without losing face. It is in fact probable that the Peking government had been waiting for Satō's resignation because immediately after the formation of the Tanaka cabinet, it demanded with unusual urgency the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The prospect of greater friendliness between China and Japan produced a veritable euphoria in the Japanese mass media, in which there was scarcely any mention of Taiwan, which became victim of the normalization process. In the circumstances, the Tanaka regime felt that it could do nothing else but respond to this urgent demand from China, whatever effect the normalization may have had on Taiwan, South Korea and other Asian countries. It is more than doubtful whether the present euphoria will permit the government to take a balanced view of what should be done.

[25] Mao was born in 1893 and Chou in 1896, whereas TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮, Japan's new Prime Minister, was born in 1918.

Chapter IV JAPAN AND THE CHINAS

Japan's geographical propinquity long allowed Japan to have close cultural, political, and economic contacts with China until the end of World War II, and those contacts were considered by the Japanese people as Japan's lifeline. The small landowner, it is often said, tends to stick to his ownership and oppose land reform more vehemently than the large landlord. Japan stuck to her special interests vehemently when confronted with Chinese nationalism, and thus she became involved in a vicious cycle — aggressive policy to secure Japan's vested interests provoked Chinese nationalism, which led to a more aggressive policy on the Japanese side, and that, in turn, contributed to a yet higher tide of Chinese nationalism.

Although Japan lost all of her special interests in China after World War II, she nevertheless maintained a vital concern in her relations with China. As a matter of fact, Sino-Japanese relations are, together with Japanese-American relations, among the most controversial problems of post-war Japan. The controversy over Sino-Japanese relations has long been a vital issue in Japanese politics.

Because of the bipolarization of post-war world order, Germany, Korea 朝鮮, and Vietnam were geographically split into two camps. Japanese politics, too, was split ideologically, and it looked as if a house was divided against itself. This bipolarization among the Japanese themselves reached its height in 1959 and 1960. For example, ASANUMA Inejirō 淺沼稻次郎, then the Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party 日本社會黨, went to Peking as the head of a Socialist Party good-will mission and made a joint statement with a Chinese representative that American imperialism was the common enemy of Japan and China. In the meantime, the Japanese conservatives wanted Japan to maintain its close alliance with the United States. The United States and the conservative Japanese Government took up the revision of the American-Japanese Security Pact 日米安全保障條約 late in 1959. This provoked an enthusiastic anti-government movement among the Japanese culminating in the political turmoil of the spring and early summer of 1960. In the fall of the same year, ASANUMA was stabbed to death by a 17-year-old rightwing extremist. Communist China was vocal in support of the anti-Security Pact movement. Thus, post-war Japanese opinions on foreign policy are characterized by their lack of consensus. In the last few months, however, it seems to me that the political atmosphere in Japan has been changing little by little and that a sort of consensus has

* This was originally published in *The New Japan: Prospects and Promise* (Princeton, NJ: the Princeton University Conference, 1963), 55-65, It is a paper presented at the conference on "New Japan: Prospects and Promise," Princeton, New Jersey, November 15-16, 1962.

begun to grow between the two major parties, the Socialist and Liberal-Democratic Parties 自由民主黨. The first purpose of this paper is to review this recent trend.

According to recent statistics, those who have voted for the Communists or Socialists in Japan have been mainly students, white-collar workers and housewives by occupation, lower middle class by social stratum, and between 20 and 40 years of age. Presumably, young intellectuals could in general be considered as the core of support for the Communists and Socialists in Japan who advocate a pro-Communist China policy—that is, recognition of the Peking government as the one and only legitimate government of China, elimination of the government on Taiwan 臺灣, and neutrality for Japan.

Recently I have recognized a growing dissension about the two-China problem among young intellectuals. The second purpose of this paper is to present my opinions on this new attitude in order to provoke further discussion.

1. The Japanese Socialist Party Moves to the Right[1]

For the first time in Japan, television debates among the leaders of the major political parties were held at the time of the general elections in 1960. In these debates, EDA Saburō 江田三郎, then Secretary General of the Socialist Party, advocated that Japan should be friendly with every country in the world including America. Although he did not dare to deny Asanuma's statement about the "common enemy" explicitly, his implication was clear, and everybody understood that many members of the Socialist Party were not satisfied with Asanuma's statement.

Therefore, it was the astonishment for many Japanese and foreign observers alike when SUZUKI Mosaburō 鈴木茂三郎, the head of another Socialist mission, signed a statement in Peking in January 1962 reconfirming the Asanuma statement. In this statement, both Chinese and Japanese delegates explicitly charged that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was being hindered by the American imperialism and the Ikeda 池田 cabinet which maintained a hostile policy toward China. It went on to state that Japanese people and Chinese people were resolutely fighting against the American imperialism and that they had a common struggle.

Actually SUZUKI himself was deeply dissatisfied with this formulation. While he pretended for various reasons to have fully agreed with this statement, SUZUKI sent a confidential letter to a senior leader of the Socialist Party, KAWAKAMI Jōtarō 河上丈太郎, in which he confessed that he had not had any intention of reconfirming Asanuma's statement. But as HOSOSAKO Kanemitsu 細迫兼光, a member of the mission, had expressed publicly in Peking the desire to reconfirm the statement

[1] In this chapter, "right" and "left" merely indicate distance from Communism. Within the framework of Communism, "left" means radical.

before SUZUKI started to negotiate, SUZUKI felt that he could not ignore Hososako's commitment. Suzuki's confidential letter was read by KAWAKAMI at a central committee meeting early in August, and it caused on outrage in the Socialist Party.

This incident indicates that the Socialist Party did not have confidence to stick to the Suzuki statement of January.

Another event that indicates the Socialist Party's movement to the right took place at the World Conference of the Anti-Nuclear Bomb Association held in Tokyo in August 1962. During the conference, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear bomb. Japanese Socialist delegates moved to protest the Russia explosion, while Chinese and Japanese Communist delegates vehemently insisted that the nuclear experiment in Russia strengthened the defense of peace. Finally the Socialist delegates walked out of the conference, and they publicly blamed the Chinese and Japanese Communists for insisting on supporting Russia's nuclear bomb experiment. Until then, the Japanese Socialist Party had never criticized Communist China. Consequently, the *People's Daily*, the Chinese Communist organ in Peking, railed against the Japanese Socialist Party, calling its chairman EDA Saburō as an agent of American imperialism.

In addition to these two events, the Japan Teachers Union which has long been active in leftwing political movements recently shifted its major effort from political struggle to economic struggle. The union is one of the major trade unions which support the Socialist Party, and its change of policy also reflects the Socialist's movement toward the right.

There are, however, people in the party like HOZUMI Shichirō 穗積七郎 and FUJIWARA Toyojirō 藤原豐次郎 who still believe that the Asanuma and Suzuki statements were completely right. FUJIWARA who was invited by the Communist China made a statement on October 13 in Peking that American imperialism was not only a common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese but also a common enemy of all the peoples in the world.

Therefore the Socialist Party's transition will be slow, as it will confront certain inner party struggles. But it has started and will continue to move, other conditions being equal. One more very recent indication.

Sōhyō 總評[2], the largest federation of trade unions supporting the Socialist Party, has started to investigate a possible alliance with Zenrō 全勞[3], another federation of trade unions which supports the Democratic Socialist Party 民主社會黨. The Democratic Socialist Party split from the Socialist Party after the Asanuma statement in 1959 and is considered to be the right wing of the socialist movement. Sōhyō and Zenrō were antagonistic to each other until this fall. So were the Socialist Party and

[2] General Council of Trade Unions of Japan 日本勞働組合總評議會.
[3] Japan Trade Union Congress 全日本勞働組合會議.

the Democratic Socialist Party.

2. Communist China Changes Her Policy

The Republic of China on Taiwan has had a consistent policy toward Japan; it has tried to maintain the political *status quo* and to develop Japan-Taiwan trade. The Peking Government's policy, on the other hand, changed frequently. It is unnecessary to say that the final aim of Communist China's policy toward Japan is to "liberate" Japan. The principal strategy by which Peking hopes to accomplish this is to strengthen the so-called "democratic-national united front" against American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism. But in seeking the best means to strengthen this united front in Japan, Communist China has taken up various policies. For instance:

1. Until the spring of 1958, Peking advocated the build-up of non-governmental trade and a distinction between economic affairs in order to broaden the pro-Communist sentiments of the Japanese people. The Chinese did not hesitate to make deals even with the Japanese conservatives.
2. A little before the abrupt trade embargo in the spring of 1958, Communist China started attacking the Japanese Government and encouraging people's revolutionary movement in Japan. She now adopted as her principle "the inseparability of politics and commerce".
3. Since 1959, Communist China has allowed a small amount of export for what it calls humanitarian reasons. In 1960, Peking designated certain Japanese firms as "friendly companies" eligible for two-way trade.

In other words, at one time Communist China took up a very tough policy toward the Japanese government, trying to expand the democratic-national united front against the Japanese government. But as this effort had no influence on the conservatives' majority in the Japanese Diet, and the turmoil in Japan's divided house did not reach the point of revolution, Communist China decided to slow down her efforts to export revolution to Japan.

Furthermore, some of the Japanese "friendly companies" made speculative contracts, and canceled them later. For example, in the spring of 1961 the Japanese contracted to import too much coal and canceled the agreements; late in the same year some contracts for ironore, alum shale and fluorite were also canceled. Obviously, the Chinese wanted more regular and stable trade. The number of so-called "friendly companies" reached 130 in August 1962, and the Chinese relied more and more upon dummy subsidiaries of big companies such as Mitsui 三井 and Mitsubishi 三菱. Yet, according to Marxist analysis, these are the real monopolistic

capitalists in Japan.

There is another possible reason why Communist China took up a more tolerant policy toward Japan. Sino-Russian trade reached its height in 1959, and then declined sharply in 1960 and 1961. In particular, Communist China's imports from Eastern Europe declined also. Therefore, other conditions being equal, China has to import more industrial products from outside the iron curtain. Actually, in accordance with this decline, her trade with Western European countries has been increasing. She did not hesitate to buy British Viscounts last year. But the problem is how to pay. Since 1956 China's imports from Western European countries have constantly exceeded her exports to these countries. In order to pay these countries, Communist China has had to export as much as possible to other countries. This has not been easy for her.

In comparison with Western industrialized countries, Japan needs more of what China produces — ironore, soyabeans, salt, and so on. Presumably, this is why China has extended a warm hand to the Japanese conservatives.

3. The Japanese Conservatives Move to the Left

Recently a senior leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Japan's governing conservative majority, MATSUMURA Kenzō 松村謙三, received and accepted a warm invitation to visit Communist China.

The conservative party is often criticized for its factionalism and nepotism. But sometimes factionalism or nepotism functions in the role of division of labor. ISHII Mitsujirō 石井光次郎 and his group are old Japanese empire specialists. They are close to Taiwan and South Korea 大韓民國 and never handle matters concerning Communist China. KISHI Nobusuke 岸信介 and his group are also Taiwan specialists. KŌNO Ichirō 河野一郎 and KITAMURA Tokutarō 北村德太郎 and their groups are Russian specialists, and they never handle Taiwan business. And our Communist China specialists, in addition to MATSUMURA, are ISHIBASHI Tanzan 石橋湛山, an ex-Prime Minister, TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke 高碕達之助, an old Manchukuo 滿洲國 hand, and their groups. They never handle Taiwan or South Korean affairs. Wonderful division of labor, and great harmony!

The Matsumura mission to Peking was fully supported by the Ikeda cabinet, because IKEDA himself wanted to increcse trade with the Communist China. The Japanese government was particularly dissatisfied with the "friendly company" system, since Western European countries were at the same time enjoying a more reciprocal system of trade with Communist China.

The Matsumura mission was warmly received by the Peking government in September 1962. Japanese interpretations of the attitudes and policies of the Peking government at the time of the mission's visit may be summarized as follows:

1. Up until the Suzuki mission in January 1962, the basic policy of Communist China toward Japan had been to alienate the Japanese people from their government and from the United States. At the time of the Matsumura mission, however, they reserved their bitter attacks for the United States and tried to alienate the government of Japan from the United States. Ch'en Yi 陳毅, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a press conference on September 19th which ran for two and a half hours. He spent most of that time attacking the United States. Also, he praised the Japanese as a great people.
2. Although they stuck to their principle of the inseparability of politics and commerce, the Chinese admitted that Japan could not immediately break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. And, with regard to their admission to the United Nations, they stated that their minimum request for Japan was to abstain from voting.
3. Naturally, they expressed their desire to develop Sino-Japanese trade.

When the mission returned home, the response of the Japanese government was on the whole favorable. Although the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan expressed their displeasure, the Japanese government in fact supported another mission headed by TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke, who went to Peking with a group early in November. There he concluded a five-year trade agreement for the total sum of 504 million US dollars on November 10th.

4. Changes in the Japanese Sentiment toward Communist China.

I now turn to the second purpose of this paper, and propose to report my impressions of the state of pro-Communist China sentiment on Japan.

In recent years advocacy of closer relations with Communist China has centered among young intellectuals who have tended to see the issues involved in terms of four abstractions:

1. Capitalism versus socialism. In underdeveloped countries a capitalist economy often exposes its ugliest face. If you read Ch'en Po-ta 陳伯達's *Four Great Families in China* 四大家族, you will be shocked by the corruption of the Kuomintang 國民黨 government before the end of World War II. The four great families he treats are those families of Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, T. V. Soong 宋子文, H. H. Kung 孔祥熙, and Ch'en Li-fu 陳立夫 and his brother. Of these four, three were peacefully received with their wealth by the United States. If you were a Chinese youth with a keen sense of justice, you would probably curse capitalism. Capitalism in Japan, too, has often shown its ugly face. On the excuse of protecting a few sugar beet cultivators, the government

forbids the import of raw sugar without a government permit. As a result, a few sugar refineries can maintain a monopoly over sugar, and keep the price far higher than the international price. They profit to such an extent that the government has even suggested that they make "donations" to the government.

There has probably never been a Japanese youth who has not at one time sought for some kind of reform. For the Japanese intellectuals, capitalism tends to be synonymous with imperialism, colonialism, corruption and injustice. There are several alternatives to capitalism. But anarchism, national socialism, and agrarian communalism have all declined. In post-war Japan Marxist socialism, including Marxism-Leninism, and social democracy were the major alternatives to capitalism. Young Japanese intellectuals tended to think that Marxian socialism had immense possibilities for the realization of a new, peaceful, and sound society. Thus they admired the rapid unification of China, the extraordinary amount of construction and the quick socialization carried out by the Chinese Communist regime.

2. "West" versus "Asia". Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Japanese world image has been characterized by the confrontation of the weak Asia by the powerful West. In this struggle, pre-war Japan saw herself as playing the role of leader and protector of the weak Asian peoples from the Western Powers. If you see the school songbooks of high schools in pre-war Japan, you will be surprised to find many songs about the dream of liberating Asia.

   After Japan had been defeated and the dream had disappeared, she experienced the Allied Occupation which helped the Japanese maintain their image of Asian confrontation with the West. Generally speaking, the youth in post-war Japan have been more sympathetic with Asian peoples than with Westerners. I suspect that this anti-Western feeling has been the subconscious basis for the recent movement among Japanese China specialists against accepting American foundation grants.

3. Hierarchy. As everybody knows the Japanese as well as other East Asian peoples have traditionally favored a hierarchical way of thinking. In the Japanese world image, there have existed hierarchies of nations. The image held by Confucian scholars in Medieval Japan was: China on top, Japan next, Western barbarians far below. Some of these scholars so admired China that they had Chinese names and wore Chinese costume. After the Japanese observed the decline of the Ch'ing 清 Dynasty and particularly after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5, their image of nations was reversed: Britain, America, France and Germany were now on top, Japan following them, and China beneath Japan.

After Japan's defeat, the Japanese derided themselves by saying sarcastically that Japan was a fourth-grade state. The implication was that Japan was now below China, the third grade state.

On observing the rapid emergence of a powerful Communist China, the Japanese were not slow to change their hierarchical order of peoples. In apparent atavism, the Sinophile reemerged. Two episodes will serve as examples. When Communist China banned the export of newspapers and periodicals to Japan in 1959, a prominent historian in Japan urged in a public meeting that Japanese scholars should think it over and apologize to China. His reasoning was that the Japanese way of conducting research on China had not satisfied the Chinese people, and they were using the ban of exporting books to punish the Japanese.

Also, in 1960 the quality of paper of Chinese printed matter suddenly deteriorated. We naturally tried to find out why. At this, several scholars, some well known, urged that this constituted a kind of intervention in internal affairs, that it was impolite to pry into the domestic problems of our good neighbor, and that we Japanese ought to stop it.

4. Guilt. The Chinese people were tragic victims of Japanese invasion. Millions of people are said to have been killed in China during the war. Some of those who admitted this terrible fact deeply regretted it and developed a guilt complex. Added to their admiration of China, their guilt complex made them shrink from criticizing and opposing Communist China. They praised the anti-rightwing movement in China in spite of the fact that many conscientious scholars and writers in China were demoted during this movement. They praised peoples' communes, the conquest of Tibet, and so on. They called for the unification of China under the Communist regime. They considered the Kuomintang as a remnant of an old China which they had despised. But, since the Kuomintang was the enemy of Communist China, their guilt complex did not extend to the Kuomintang.

Taken together, these four factors nourished pro-Communist China sentiment among young intellectuals in post-war Japan. Recently, however, I think these factors have started changing a little in this manner:

1. Socialism versus capitalism:
   While the socialist orientation of the students is still strong, it does not last as long after they graduate now as it used to. Up until a few years ago, the lives of the young white collar workers were rather hard because of their low salaries.

But now, as Japan has enjoyed economic prosperity for a few years, their lives are so improved that they easily loose their socialist-oriented enthusiasm. In addition, their disillusion must be great now that they have heard that Communist China has invaded India. They once admired the neutrality policy of India and her pro-Peking attitude. They must also be dismayed when they hear the official statement of Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi that Communist China is going to have nuclear bombs; previously, they supported and believed statements that Communist China would have no nuclear weapons.

2. "Asia":
   After a seventeen-year effort, Japan has succeeded in recovering from the devastation of the war. At the same time, the Japanese have started feeling some psychological distance between themselves and other Asian nations. Japanese youth are now losing the notion that Asia is one. Publicly and ideologically, to be sure, they would still advocate this belief. But actually they are not so sure anymore.
3. Hierarchy:
   Japan has recovered her confidence. Premier IKEDA likes to repeat that Japan is a big state, implying that Japan's rank in the world hierarchy is higher than other Asian countries. Japanese youth feel the same way. Furthermore, in the years to come, our youth, because of the new education and society, may not have any feeling of hierarchy at all.
4. Guilt:
   Those who are in their early twenties remember little of the horrors of the war. They are more optimistic and realistic than their elder compatriots. When they are told of the Japanese invasion of China, they will merely accept it as a historical fact. They will smile and say "We are not responsible for it".

   These recent changes will cause the disappearance of the extraordinary pro-Communist China sentiment sooner or later.

5. Conclusion

Against this background, I would suggest that we are likely to see the following developments in the future.

Pre-war Japan enjoyed monolithic national consensus, or perhaps we should call it national uniformity. Post-war Japan has long suffered from lack of consensus. The recent changes I have mentioned obviously indicate the possibility of a growing consensus. I do not think that the pendulum will swing back so fast as to create a new consensus soon. Nevertheless, I feel that Japan, as a nation-state, needs a certain kind of national consensus. Other conditions being equal, the following elements will

determine the speed and degree of this emerging consensus.

1. The smooth development of Sino-Japanese trade will advance it.

2. The smoother the relations between Communist China and the Japanese conservatives, the greater the growth of the consensus.

3. The greater the discrepancy between the Japanese Socialist Party and Communist China, the greater this same consensus.

4. The weaker the protests of the United States and Taiwan against Sino-Japanese trade, the greater the increase.

I also foresee a more realistic approach to the two Chinas problem. Up until now, as far as publicized opinions go, the majority of the Japanese public and intellectuals seem to desire one China, and they would not raise the questions which I will mention soon. A few months ago, in fact, three former Japanese prime ministers sent a joint letter addressed to the governments of both Peking and Taiwan. The purpose of their letter was to express their earnest desire for one China. These three were HIGASHIKUNI 東久邇, KATAYAMA 片山 and ISHIBASHI. All of them are definitely neither Communist nor Marxist. Their action therefore will indicate the Japanese desire for one China.

But recently some young students have started raising the following questions openly and discussing them:

Would "one China" really bring political stability to Asia?

What would be the bargaining power of Japan with this one China?

Would not one China threaten Japan's prosperity?

Is it not Japan that profits from the existence of two Chinas?

Is it true that China will offer an immense market for Japanese products?

Can we not help to better the political position of the native Taiwanese?

Chapter V JAPAN AND CHINA: A NEW STAGE?

On July 9, 1972, two days after the installation of Japan's new government under the Liberal-Democratic Party 自由民主黨 Premier TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai 周恩來 went out of his way to refer to that event in a speech welcoming a visiting delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen. "The Tanaka cabinet was inaugurated on July 7," said Chou, "and with regard to foreign policy it has announced that it will endeavor to realize a normalization of relations between Japan and China. This is certainly to be welcomed." Chou's speech, including his conciliatory remark directed toward Tokyo, was promptly broadcast by Radio Peking and widely disseminated in the Chinese Communist press.[1]

Slightly more than a month later, the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨's central daily *Jen-min jih-pao* 人民日報 devoted the entire top half of its front page to stories about the return to Shanghai of a Chinese ballet troupe which had just completed a highly successful and warmly received tour of Japan. Banner headlines played up the "enthusiastic send-off" given to the troupe by "friends from all spheres of Japanese society" and the "deep friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples" evidenced during the return flight from Tokyo aboard two planes, of Japan Air Lines and All-Nippon Airways.[2] But what was most significant about this unusual press coverage was that it marked the first time that the Chinese party organ had given such front-page prominence to an event involving Japan without any suggestion of antagonism toward the Japanese government.

Coming after eight years of unremitting abuse directed by Peking at the preceding Liberal-Democratic governments of IKEDA Hayato 池田勇人 and SATŌ Eisaku 佐藤榮作, Chou's gesture of conciliation and the subsequent abrupt change in the tone of Chinese Communist press treatment of Japan were straws in the wind pointing to a profound shift in Peking's attitudes *vis-à-vis* Tokyo. Both governments

* This was originally published in *Problems of Communism* 21/6 (November-December 1972): 1-17. It was written right after the normalization of the Japan-China diplomatic relationship. It analyzes Japan's policy, which was in the background of the normalization, and is the first to point out Japan's love-hate syndrome toward China.

[1] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), *International Service*, in English (July 9, 1972); *Jen-min jih-pao* 人民日報 (July 10, 1972).

[2] *Jen-min jih-pao* (August 17, 1972). The inclusion of an airliner of All-Nippon Airways, which is an exclusively domestic carrier, in this historic international flight is probably explained by the firm's connection with OKAZAKI Kaheita 岡崎嘉平太, who is discussed in fn.29 below.

subsequently moved with surprising swiftness to pave the way for a top-level meeting between their respective leaders, and in late September these moves culminated in the visit of Premier TANAKA and other high-ranking government officials to Peking. There can be little doubt that the visit marks a historic milestone in the long and tortured course of modern Sino-Japanese relations.

Many factors, on both sides, have been responsible for the rapid turnabout in the Sino-Japanese relations—a development that is bound to have a far-reaching impact on world politics. The present article proposes, first, to inquire into the attitudes and motivations that prompted each of the two powers to reorient its policies in the direction of rapprochement; second, to look at their respective positions on the major issues between them; and finally, to offer a preliminary assessment of what the Tanaka mission to Peking has accomplished toward resolving these issues and what effect the agreements reached appear likely to have on the future course of Sino-Japanese relations and international relations generally.

In broad perspective, the change in Peking's attitudes toward Japan can undoubtedly be seen as part of the overall reorientation of China's external diplomacy that has taken place in the last three or four years as the pendulum of Chinese politics has swung away from the ideological zeal and revolutionary fervor of the Cultural Revolution period back toward greater pragmatism and moderation.[3]

Peking's Changing World View

Reduced to its essence, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 represented an attempt to elevate "spirit"—*i.e.*, ideological dedication to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東—to the highest virtue in Chinese society. The slogan then in use was *cheng-chih-t'u-ch'u* 政治突出 (politics first), which underlined the priority that political indoctrination was to be accorded. In domestic policy, the old notion of combining "red" (devotion to Mao's political teachings) and "expert" (specialized knowledge and expertise) was temporarily cast aside in favor of a one-sided emphasis on the former. Politics took sole command, and overwhelming stress was placed on purity of political belief. In external policy, the pursuit of revolutionary ideological goals took precedence over diplomatic action and the development of interstate relations.

These extremist policies had serious consequences both at home and abroad. Inside China, the production of manufactured goods declined by more than 20 per-

[3] The alternation of swings to the left and to the right in the policies of the Chinese Communist Party has been discussed by the author in an essay entitled "Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution," in James B. Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 337-73.

cent according to recent outside estimates,[4] and the very administration of the country was so severely disrupted that it had to be saved from collapse by the interposition of the organizational strength of the People's Liberation Army 人民解放軍. Abroad, the virtual suspension of Chinese diplomatic activity, coupled with policies of continued intransigence toward both the Soviet Union and the United States and of active support for Third World revolutionary movements, thrust the People's Republic into a position of extreme diplomatic isolation.

Criticism of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution first began to appear in China in 1967, but it was only after the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the spring of 1969 that the shift toward more moderate policies became more clear-cut and rapid. Since then there has been a steady toning down of the Cultural Revolution's insistence upon exclusive reliance on Maoist teachings and the primacy of "spirit"—even to the point where the party's leading newspaper has inveighed against both the myth of the "great hero 人民英雄" and "absoluteness" of thought.[5] The phrase "red and expert" has reappeared in the Chinese press, signifying renewed recognition of the value of specialized knowledge and technical expertise.[6] There has also been a growing emphasis on the need for policies based on economic rationality and an increasing regard for the importance of concrete data and statistics.

The turn toward moderation and a more rational pragmatism in the PRC's domestic policies—and especially toward a primary preoccupation with strengthening the nation's economic structure—naturally led to a reconsideration of the foreign policies that had resulted in China's international isolation. In order to strengthen the economic structure and to accelerate the pace of economic development, the argument now ran, China must abandon past notions of solitary self-sufficiency and adopt policies that would facilitate the introduction of needed machinery and technology from abroad.

At this point the policy debate in Peking turned, in all likelihood, to the question of whether China should attempt a reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the latter's economically-advanced East European allies or should instead open her gates to the advanced industrial nations of the West. In the end, the Chinese Communist leadership apparently decided that the latter course would be more advantageous for China and therefore opted for the adoption of a more flexible diplomatic line.

The switch to greater flexibility also reflected an apparent underlying revision of the Peking leaders' image of the world. In place of the former image of a bipolar world, they appear to have changed over to recognition of a multipolar model of

[4] See US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 63.

[5] *Jen-min jih-pao* (December 16, 1971 and January 28, 1972).

[6] To the author's knowledge, the phrase "red and expert" reappeared in the Chinese Communist press for the first time after the Cultural Revolution in *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 10, 1971).

world politics.[7] This change seems to have been accompanied by a gradual revision of Peking's customary dualistic view which distinguished friend from foe by the sole criterion of ideology. No doubt what formed in the minds of the Chinese leadership was a new concept of world politics as being fluid in character and driven primarily by considerations of power—an environment in which friends can turn into foes and enemies can become friends. Having come through the turmoil of their own revolution, and having further experienced the setbacks caused by the ultra-leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution, the leaders in Peking seemingly came to a recognition that ideological rigidity is not conducive to victory in the political world.

Obviously, for the more moderate elements in the Chinese leadership, to have pressed such a line during the Cultural Revolution, when the winds of ideological radicalism were raging, would have been extremely dangerous. Only in the calm that followed the storm did it become possible for these elements to reassert themselves and regain a position enabling them to introduce the concrete changes in domestic and foreign policy that they had favored all along.

As the leaders in Peking proceeded to reexamine their foreign policies in the context of their revised conception of world politics, it was only natural—by reasons of geography and history—that they should give careful reconsideration to China's relationship with Japan. Moreover, this reconsideration was spurred, on the one hand, by the phenomenal postwar rise of Japanese economic power, which made Japan a potential source of industrial equipment and technology for China's developing economy but at the same time rekindled Chinese fears of a possible resurgence of Japanese militarist expansionism in Asia, and, on the other hand, by the apparent loosening of Japan's postwar ties with the United States.

In this reexamination of Peking's policy *vis-à-vis* Japan, the continuing Soviet threat to China was a major consideration. With 44-49 Soviet army divisions reportedly concentrated along China's northern and northeastern borders (as compared with only 21 divisions at the time of the Damansky Island clash in 1969) and nearly 150 ships of the Soviet Pacific fleet cruising the vast area between the Sea of Japan 日本海 and the Indian Ocean and traversing the East China and South China Seas *en route*,[8] the Chinese leaders had to consider the danger that a continued policy of abuse toward the Japanese government might drive Japan closer to the Soviet Union. There was a further consideration that, if this were to happen and Japanese big business interests were to become involved in the joint projects for developing Siberia in response to Soviet overtures, their eagerness to gain access to the Chinese market might be dampened.

[7] See OKABE Tatsumi 岡部達味, "Chūgoku no kokusai seiji-kan 中國の國際政治觀 (Chinese Views of International Politics)," *Kokusai mondai* 國際問題 (International Affairs) 149 (August 1972): 47-51.

[8] According to a recent estimate of the Japanese National Defense Agency 防衛廳 conveyed to the author in a private communication.

From the standpoint of accelerating development of the Chinese economy, Peking undoubtedly perceived that much could be gained through expanded trade and economic cooperation with Japan. So long as economic exchanges continued to be carried on solely through arrangements with private Japanese interests and not under intergovernmental agreements, they would necessarily remain unstable and restricted. On the other hand, normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations would promote development of expanded trade on a more secure basis. From the Chinese standpoint, the desirability of expanding trade with Japan was enhanced by the fact that China's trading account with Japan was in relatively better balance than her trading accounts with other advanced industrial nations, although the former still continued to be markedly favorable to Japan.

Peking also seems to have perceived internal political trends in Japan as creating a highly propitious atmosphere for moves toward a normalization of relations between the two countries. It could hardly fail to note that the Japanese mass media were almost unanimous in urging the government to move more rapidly in this direction and that the attitude of the media was reflected in widespread pro-Chinese sentiments among the public. The Chinese leaders had to consider the possibility that, if they failed to take advantage of this opportunity and continued to pursue a hard line toward Japan, the pendulum of Japanese public opinion might swing back in the opposite direction.

The Chinese leadership had of course made plain its refusal to deal with the Satō government, but as the time for its withdrawal drew nearer, there were increasing evidences that Peking, as a result of all the considerations outlined above, was leaning toward a reconciliation with the succeeding Japanese government. Criticisms of Japan, as measured by the frequency and volume of references in the central CCP daily *Jen-min jih-pao* to Japanese policies considered inimical to the PRC and to various "evils" attributed by the Chinese to Japanese society, showed a sharp decline between October 1971 and May 1972 (see Figure 1). In particular, vehement denunciations of the "revival" of Japanese militarism became reduced to mild expressions of suspicion concerning Japan's future role in Asia. There were even indications that Peking was becoming disposed not to let Japan's Mutual Security Treaty with the United States 日米安全保障條約 stand in the way of normalization of relations with Tokyo—possibly because it was beginning to see continuation of the treaty as a brake on Japanese rearmament. After January 23 of this year, *Jen-min jih-pao* ceased publishing any further criticism of the treaty.

In sum, Peking's reexamination of its international position and policies seems to have led it to abandon the idea—to which it had subscribed in the Cultural Revolution period—that the more revolutionary or people's wars flared up and spread in the areas outside China, the stronger the PRC's security would become. Today one no longer sees any trace of such reasoning in the Chinese Communist press. Instead, the Chinese leaders appear to have concluded that the new world sit-

Figure V-1 China's Critical References to Japan



* Frequency units represent number of references weighted by the width of column space occupied (columns run horizontally in Chinese newspapers). Hence, a single reference may account for more than one unit.
Source: Content analysis of *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking).

uation dictated a policy of expanding amicable relations with the governments of neighboring countries in order to achieve at least a provisional new balance of forces in Asia that would obviate the dangers inherent in the PRC's international isolation of recent years.

Japanese Attitudes Toward China

So much for the motivations underlying the recent shift in Peking's posture *vis-à-vis*

Japan. In turning to the Japanese side, it is important first of all to recognize that, despite the actual history of continuing tension and warfare between Japan and China, the Japanese have long had a sense of shared destiny with the Chinese. The Japanese expression for a state of close interdependency, "shin-shi-ho-sha 唇歯輔車" (in Chinese, "ch'un-ch'ih-fu-ch'e"; in English, literally, "lips-teeth-mandibula-maxilla"), conveys the perception quite graphically. Japan and China are considered to be to each other as lips are to teeth and mandibula is to maxilla.

This sense of common destiny dates back at least to the period of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate 徳川幕府 in Japan in the mid-19th century, though it was then mixed with a measure of contempt for things Chinese. While relations between Japan and China, both political and economic, were not particularly close then, Japanese intellectuals, viewing the declining fortunes of the Ch'ing 清 Dynasty, reasoned that China, having been victimized by the Western powers, was a poor example to follow, but they believed that there was a need to pay heed to it because Euro-American expansionism posed a common threat to the Ch'ing Dynasty and Japan, and that therefore if the Ch'ing Dynasty were to be subdued, Japan would necessarily be next. Such views were held especially by those Japanese intellectuals in whom a Confucian education had nurtured an admiration for Chinese civilization but who experienced bitter disillusionment upon visiting China and witnessing the decline of the Ch'ing regime.

The notion, then, of a complementarity of interests grew out of Japanese awareness of the probable consequences of Western expansionist pressures and realization that, in order to repel these forces, East Asia had, above all else, to strengthen itself. Among the Meiji 明治 leaders, it was commonly held not only that Japan should be made more powerful, but also that the development of Japan alone was inadequate, and they grew ever more anxious for a parallel strengthening of China.[9]

Prescriptions as to how such a strengthening could be accomplished varied in Japan during the final years of the Tokugawa period as well as during the Meiji era. Some maintained that the decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty was in direct proportion to its rejection of tradition and its willingness to open its ports to Western trade; others contended that the troubles of the Ch'ing Dynasty lay precisely in its strict adherence to traditional forms and ways and its failure to recognize objectively the advances that the West had achieved. With the transfer of authority from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government in 1868, the latter position ultimately won out.

But the problem of bringing about change remained. Doubting the possibility of reform from within the existing Chinese imperial leadership, Japanese intellectuals

[9] See this author's "Nihon-jin no Chūgoku-kan: Takasugi Shinsaku-ra no baai 日本人の中國觀：高杉晉作らの場合 (Japanese Views of China: the Case of Shinsaku Takasugi and Others)," in Committee to Edit a Collection of Articles to Commemorate the Late Dr. NIIDA Noboru 仁井田陞博士追悼論文集編集委員會, ed., *Nihon-hō to Ajia* 日本法とアジア (Japanese Laws and Asia) (Tokyo: Keisō shobō 勁草書房, 1970), 68ff.

looked for a hero who would lead China out of her despair. Many Japanese who were active in the domestic *Jiyū minken undō* 自由民權運動 (Movement for Liberty and Human Rights) were equally insistent in their advocacy of an external policy which would encourage a revolution in China since they held out no hope for reform under the Ch'ing regime. (Within Japan, the movement worked for the ouster of the oligarchical regime composed of leaders drawn from Chōshū 長州 [Yamaguchi 山口 Prefecture] and Satsuma 薩摩 [Kagoshima 鹿兒島 Prefecture] and creation of a parliamentary system.) Moreover, they at least contemplated that it might ultimately prove necessary for Japan itself to undertake the transformation of China—even if doing so required subjugation of the Chinese.[10] In time, they grew dissatisfied with the progress of events and were ardently calling for interference or "participation" in Chinese politics. YAMAJI Aizan 山路愛山, a socialist journalist during the late Meiji and Taishō 大正 eras, stated the case in typical fashion:

> Looking at China as a politician, one of course perceives a border between Japan and China. But as a Japanese, one recognizes no boundaries that separate our hearts. Japanese and Chinese are not strangers to each other. We are of the same flesh and blood...Only the politicians treat Chinese coldly; the Chinese are not considered aliens by us Japanese people. This vast area consisting of the combined territories of China and the Japanese islands ought to be the arena for our activities; it is here we should breathe deeply the air of harmony.[11]

Such an outlook, to be sure, afforded the Japanese government a rationale for staging frequent acts of armed intervention and political interference in Chinese affairs—in short, for attempting to impose Japan's policies and value system on China. Nonetheless, the outlook itself reflected not hostility toward China, but a feeling of shared destiny with it, a desire to see it "stand up" in the world. This notion, moreover, enjoyed wide public acceptance.

During ensuing years, the results of Japanese undertakings in China demonstrated conclusively that it was impossible to effect a revitalization of China from the outside. In the years after World War II, recognition of this fact plus feelings of guilt at the depredations that Japan had inflicted upon the Chinese people during the 1931-45 period caused many Japanese to respond positively to the accomplishments

[10] MIYAZAKI Yazō 宮崎彌藏— an advocate of *Jiyū minken undō* 自由民權運動 causes and an elder brother of MIYAZAKI Tōten 宮崎滔天, the closest and most trusted Japanese friend of the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙— articulated this perspective quite succinctly. He said: "I will search throughout China for the hero. If I do find this ideal leader, I will become his faithful subordinate; if not, I myself will assume the responsibility." For further discussion of MIYAZAKI, see *ibid.*, 70-71.

[11] YAMAJI Aizan 山路愛山, *Shina-ron* 支那論 (A China Thesis) (Tokyo: Min'yūsha 民友社, 1916), 3-5.

of the Chinese Communist Party in unifying China and in enhancing the country's international status—even though China had become a Communist power. Their attitudes created a growing base of support within Japan for normalization of relations between the two countries.

The feeling of a complementarity of interests, of course, constituted an underlying factor. What brought about the move of the new Tanaka government at this particular juncture was a combination of two other factors. First, Japan has recently been carrying out a reexamination of the role that it should play in world politics. Prior to World War II, the Japanese militarist government sought to function as a shaper of the world events and circumstances even if it had to provoke crises to do so, but the outcome of World War II radically changed the situation. During the Occupation period, the Japanese government had but one option—to conform completely to the existing shape of things, and the governments of subsequent years chose to adopt a relatively passive approach to international affairs in line with the thinking that SATŌ Naotake 佐藤尚武, Foreign Minister in the Hayashi 林 cabinet of the mid-1930's, had set forth in a speech to the Imperial Diet in 1936. SATŌ had argued that if Japan did not want to be plagued by crises, she did not have to since these crises were all products of Japan's own doing.[12] But with the restoration and increase of Japan's economic strength, there has been a mounting feeling among Japanese that Japan ought again to take a more active part in world politics.

Japan, it should be underscored, has resolved to be a pacifist state, and the current internal debate about its international role has not reflected a wish to forsake this basic principle of action in the international sphere. Nor has it mirrored even the remotest desire to provoke any international crisis or interfere with the détente moves of other powers. Rather, it has represented a belief on the part of many Japanese that Japan ought to do what it can in a positive way to influence world conditions and not merely adapt to "given" circumstances. To the Tanaka government, normalization of relations with Peking seemed to be such an affirmative step.

Second, the attitudes of the international community toward the People's Republic of China were in the process of rapid flux. In October 1970, Canada, the North American neighbor of the United States, established diplomatic relations with Peking, and in November of the same year, Italy, the last large NATO country in Europe aside from West Germany not to recognize the PRC, followed suit. Then in July 1971, President Nixon announced that he planned to make a trip to Peking to confer with Chinese Communist leaders. This journey, which took place in February 1972, appeared to inaugurate an era of peaceful coexistence between the PRC and the United States, though formal diplomatic relations have not yet been established between the two countries. In the meantime, moreover, the UN General Assembly,

[12] SATŌ Naotake 佐藤尚武, *Kaiko hachijū-nen* 回顧八十年 (Eighty Years in Recollection) (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshin-sha 時事通信社, 1963), 366.

on October 25, 1971, voted—by an absolute majority of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions and 3 absentees—to seat the representatives of the PRC government in that body and to expel those of the Nationalist 國民黨 government. By the summer of 1972, 74 states had recognized the PRC, while 51 maintained official relations with the Nationalists.

Within Japan, these changes in the attitudes of the international community produced overwhelming sentiment in favor of a rapprochement with the PRC. The leading, opinion-forming national newspapers, in a race to obtain permission to station special correspondents in Peking,[13] all endorsed the so-called "three political principles"—not to antagonize the PRC, not to participate in a "plot to create" two Chinas, and not to interfere with the normalization of state-to-state relations between Japan and the PRC. The three opposition parties—the Socialist 社會黨, the Kōmeitō 公明黨, and the Democratic Socialist 民社黨—sensed an opportunity to isolate the Liberal-Democratic Party and the government on the issue and commenced to do their best to create a pro-Peking mood in the country. Big business groups, frightened by warnings of a possible recession, began to pay considerable attention to China mainland as a new market, and the flood of Japanese businessmen to Peking produced a "bandwagon" effect and more glowing reports on economic and political achievements in China in the leading Japanese dailies. Even the cautious Mitsubishi 三菱 Group, which had determined not to join the scramble until the government had settled on a policy, finally decided to send a mission to Peking in the summer of 1972 in advance of the working out of a Cabinet position on the subject. As for the general public, an opinion poll published on July 28, 1972, revealed that more than 80 percent of those surveyed hoped for a normalization of ties with the PRC.[14]

The "Three Principles"

The evident desire on the part of both the PRC and Japanese leaders to achieve a rapprochement, however, did not automatically assure the fulfillment of that desire, for certain vital questions revolving around the Chinese conditions remained to be

[13] Details of relations between the Peking government and Japan's leading newspapers are discussed in MIYOSHI Osamu 三好修 and ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, *Chūgoku hōdō no henkō wo tsuku* 中國報道の偏向を衝く (Media Reports on China Are Distorted) (Tokyo: Nisshin hō dō shuppan-bu 日新報道出版部, 1972). A summary appeared in *The Los Angeles Times* (April 14, 1972).

[14] The poll, reported in *Sankei shimbun* 產經新聞 (Tokyo: July 28, 1972), yielded the following views: Question: "There are no official diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Do you think Japan should hurry to normalize relations as quickly as possible?" Results: "Yes"—58.2 percent; "Better to go ahead"—23.8 percent; "Better not to hurry"—12.0 percent; "No need of normalization"—0.2 percent; "Don't know"—5.8 percent.

answered. In March 1971, the Japanese delegation for negotiations on "Memorandum trade," which included FURUI Yoshimi 古井喜美 and TAGAWA Seiichi 田川誠一 of the Liberal-Democratic Party, signed a joint communiqué which laid down "three principles for the normalization of Japan-China relations."[15] The succeeding July, a delegation from Japan's Kōmeitō led by the party chairman TAKEIRI Yoshikatsu 竹入義勝 also agreed to these three principles in a joint communiqué concluded with the (Chinese) Sino-Japanese Friendship Association.[16] The principles were:

(1) The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and legitimate government of China.
(2) Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory.
(3) In light of the previous points, the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government is illegal and should be abrogated.

Clearly, these principles represented conditions that the Chinese hoped Japan would accept, but there was uncertainty in Japan as to whether Peking regarded them as preconditions for negotiations. Some Japanese held that negotiations on the restoration of the state-to-state relations could not take place unless the Japanese government embraced the three principles prior to the start of talks. The proponents of this view included the Socialist Party, the Kōmeitō, and all the major national newspapers with the exception of the *Mainichi* 毎日 chain. And since the argument ran that no talks were possible without a prior abrogation of the peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime, it was labeled the "Taiwan-prior-to argument" (*Taiwan-iriguchi-ron* 臺灣入口論).

Other Japanese, however, maintained that the Peking government did not regard the principles as preconditions for the opening of negotiations. They pointed out that in a number of key communiqués which the Chinese Communists had signed with visiting Japanese groups, it had been the Japanese side, not the Chinese, that had insisted upon the importance of immediate acceptance of the "three principles." In the July 1971 document put out at the close of the Kōmeitō deputation's visit to Peking, for example, the Japanese had stressed the "three principles," while the Chinese had stated:

[15] *Mainichi shimbun* 毎日新聞 (March 2, 1971). Before the normalization of Japan-China relations in September 1972, trade between the two countries consisted of two types: "Memorandum trade" and "friendly-firms" trade. The former was conducted through the Japanese and Chinese Memorandum Trade Offices (established by a formal memorandum in 1962) and accounted for 10 percent of Sino-Japanese trade in 1971. The latter, handled by Japanese firms which the Peking government deemed to be "friendly" to China, made up 90 percent of the trade volume in 1971.

[16] *Ibid.* (July 3, 1971).

> If the Japanese government will accept the above principles and take practical steps for their implementation, it will be possible for China and Japan to sign a peace treaty bringing to close the state of war and restoring diplomatic relations.[17]

Similarly, a joint communiqué signed in October 1971 by the (Chinese) Sino-Japanese Friendship Association and a visiting delegation of the Japanese Diet Members' Association for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations had contained references by both parties to the "three principles," but only the Japanese side had taken an unambiguous stand on the "Taiwan-prior-to argument":

> The Japanese side... resolves to exert its full effort to make the Japanese government accept these principles, and on the basis of these principles negotiate with the government of the People's Republic of China for a peace treaty which ends the state of war and restores diplomatic relations.[18]

These same skeptics also noted that Japanese visitors to the China mainland who were not wedded to the idea of acceding to the "three principles" before the start of negotiations had come away convinced that the Chinese were not adamant on the subject. For instance, MIKI Takeo 三木武夫, an influential member of the Diet and the Liberal-Democratic Party who had journeyed to Peking in mid-April 1972, had reported:

> There has been much talk [in Japan] about the abrogation of the Japan-China Peace Treaty—talk about "Taiwan-prior-to" arguments and theories about how the conversations would proceed—but my impression is that the Chinese side is more concerned about the Japanese government's fundamental policy toward China than about problems of business detail [like the timing of the Japanese government's acceptance of the "three principles"].[19]

In order to bolster their contentions further, these observers cited certain specific features of Chinese behavior. In May 1972, for example, Premier Chou En-lai had told the members of a second mission from the Kōmeitō:

> If the prime minister of the new government wishes to come to China, we will not be able to refuse him. It has been impossible to deal with the Satō cabinet,

[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.* (October 3, 1971).
[19] MIKI Takeo 三木武夫, *Chūgoku hōmon ni okeru hatsugen-shū* 中國訪問における發言集 (Speeches Concerning My Visit to China) (Tokyo: MIKI Takeo 三木武夫, 1972), 12.

but if the new cabinet sets out on a new path to normalization of Sino-Japanese ties, then we will welcome this.[20]

Moreover, after the formation of the Tanaka cabinet in July, not a single person of importance in the Peking government had uttered a word concerning the "three principles."

The Taiwan Problem

Apart from the question of how far Peking might require Japan to go toward acceding to the "three principles" before it would consent to talks on normalization of relations, there was also the question of how rigid (or flexible) the Chinese leaders would be in negotiating on the substantive issues involved in the actual implementation of the principles if the Japanese government accepted them. There were essentially two central issues: (1) the effect of the second principle (*i.e.*, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China) on Japan's future relationship with the island; and (2) whether or not the transfer of Japanese recognition to the PRC would, by itself, satisfy the third principle (*i.e.*, abrogation of Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 government) or whether that treaty would have to be formally abrogated and, further, whether a new peace treaty between Japan and the PRC would have to be concluded.

It goes without saying that on the Taiwan issue the Japanese government found itself in an extremely difficult dilemma. Not only was it deeply conscious of the fact that Japan had enjoyed friendly relations as well as mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Taiwan over the past twenty years, but it also had to recognize that the Nationalist government bore no responsibility for Japan's dilemma and should not have to suffer unduly as a consequence of normalization of Japan's relations with the PRC. The Tokyo government therefore hoped that Peking would not be so rigid in its interpretation of the second principle as to insist upon the immediate and total severance of all Japanese connections with Taiwan. In taking this position, the government appeared to have the support of a majority of the Japanese public, notwithstanding the heavy preponderance of popular opinion in favor of a speedy normalization of relations with Peking. [21]

While the government had not indicated how it might go about obtaining legal-

[20] *Nihon keizai shimbun* 日本經濟新聞 (May 24, 1972).

[21] On the question, "What should be Japan's relations with Taiwan when it normalizes state-to-state relations with Mainland China?," the July 1972 *Sankei shimbun* public opinion poll referred to earlier showed the following results: "Sever every tie with Taiwan"— 5.5 percent; "Maintain trade and exchange of persons"— 72.2 percent; "Stick to present relations"— 2.6 percent; "Very uncertain"— 14 percent; "Don't know"— 5.2 percent.

ization of continued *de facto* Japanese relations with Taiwan after the normalization of Japan-PRC relations, some LDP members—as a possible way out of the dilemma—had conceived a formula under which the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, following Japan's withdrawal of recognition from it as a duly-constituted independent government, would be accorded the status of a "belligerent group." Under international law, this status applies to a group in rebellion against the government of the parent state, having control of part of the state's territory and a governmental organization through which it manages the affairs of the region under its control, and maintaining its own military forces. It is immaterial whether the group seeks to overthrow the central government of the state or to establish a new state separate from the original homeland. In spite of the provisional nature of such a group, its recognition as a legal entity in international law is possible and would permit other states to engage in peaceful commerce and intercourse with it.

Admittedly, there appeared to be scant likelihood that Peking would explicitly agree to any formula according "belligerent" status to Taiwan. Nevertheless, so long as Taiwan retains its present *de facto* independence from Peking, such a solution would have certain practical advantages for the PRC as well as for Japan. This is because, under these conditions, if injury were to occur to the lives or property of Japanese nationals residing in Taiwan, the Peking government would in fact be unable to investigate the matter and take appropriate action. For this reason, those LDP members who proposed the formula saw some possibility that the PRC leaders might be willing to accept at least a tacit understanding according Taiwan something like "belligerent" status pending the ultimate resolution of the reunification issue between Peking and Taipei.

The Treaty Issue

The question of how Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government would have to be handled and the related question of whether a new peace treaty would have to be concluded between Japan and the PRC in order to end the state of war that Peking claimed still existed between the two countries raised complex considerations. This whole matter was rendered even more complex by the fact that Japanese interpretations of the scope and force of the 1952 treaty had differed over the years.

At the time the treaty was originally concluded, the Japanese government of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru 吉田茂 insisted upon limiting its applicability to only such territory as was then under the Chinese Nationalist regime's control or might come under its control in the future. After lengthy negotiation, an understanding to this effect was embodied in an exchange of notes between the negotiators on both sides.[22] Later, when the treaty came under discussion in the Japanese Diet,

Premier YOSHIDA made it quite clear that Japan considered the treaty not legally applicable to the mainland of China. He declared:

> Since the Japan-China treaty was signed with the Taiwan regime, it has no relation to the Chinese Communist regime. As for the question of what sort of relations should [eventually] be established [with the latter], I think that we had best wait for future developments before deciding.[23]

Some five years later, however, the government of KISHI Nobusuke 岸信介 substantially altered this interpretation of the treaty's scope. The government now maintained that the war with China had been settled entirely by the treaty and that—as Premier KISHI told the Diet in 1957—"...in essence, a state of war with China no longer exists."[24] In 1959 FUJIYAMA Aiichirō 藤山愛一郎, Foreign Minister in the Kishi cabinet, reiterated this position:

> As far as we the government are concerned, with the signing of the Japan-Nationalist China Treaty with the then legitimate government of China, this problem in Sino-Japanese relations was settled. Consequently, since that time we have not deemed that a state of war exists. It is a fact that diplomatic relations have not been restored [with the PRC], but on the whole we do not consider this to be a state of war."[25]

Thereafter the Japanese government's position regarding the 1952 treaty remained essentially unchanged. It again came into question, however, as Japan in recent months began moving toward a normalization of relations with the Peking government, which had demanded—in its third principle—abrogation of the 1952 treaty. In response to inquiries from the Liberal-Democratic Party's Council on Normalization of Japan-China Relations, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in August 1972, issued this

[22] The notes stated that "the terms of the present treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its government." Japanese Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Collection des Traités* 30/56 (October 1952): 1-2.

[23] *Dai jūsankai sangiin gaimuiinkai kaigiroku* 第十三回參議院外務委員會會議錄 (Proceedings of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Councilors) 5/43 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office 大藏省印刷局, 1952): 6.

[24] *Dai nijūrokkai kokkai shūgiin gaimuiinkai giroku* 第 26 回國會衆議院外務委員會議錄 (Proceedings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 26th National Diet) 2/15 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1957): 9.

[25] *Dai sanjūikkai kokkai shūgiin gaimuiinkai giroku* 第 31 回國會衆議院外務委員會議錄 (Proceedings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 31st National Diet) 2/17 (Tokyo: Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1959): 2.

rather baffling statement:

> If Japan were to recognize the People's Republic of China, this would mean that the Nationalist government would be replaced by the government of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, but this would not be a recognition on our part of an altogether new nation-state (that is, the People's Republic of China). Both the China that is presently represented by the Nationalist government (that is, Nationalist China) and the China that will be represented by the government of the People's Republic of China after our recognition (that is, the People's Republic of China) are one and the same state.[26]

Despite the obfuscatory language, what this statement boiled down to was that, in Japan's view, there had merely been a shift of central governmental powers from the Nationalist regime on Taiwan to the PRC government in Peking; that the 1952 treaty, though concluded with the Nationalist regime only, was nonetheless a pact between Japan and China; and that therefore the transfer of Japanese recognition from Taipei 臺北 to Peking would not require the negotiation of a new peace treaty with the PRC.[27] As to when legitimacy as the government of China would pass from the Nationalist regime to the government in Peking, Tokyo took the position that the shift would occur—so far as Sino-Japanese relations were concerned—from the moment of Japan's recognition of the PRC as the lawful government of China.

Japanese officials were aware, however, that Peking had taken a clear-cut position on the treaty issue. The Chinese Communists had declared war on Japan in 1932, during the Manchurian Incident 滿洲事變;[28] therefore, after gaining power in 1949, they had consistently maintained that a treaty would be necessary to bring an official end to the state of war between the PRC and Japan. As far as the 1952 treaty between Japan and the Chiang government on Taiwan was concerned, moreover, Peking would have logic on its side in contending that the transfer of legitimacy from the Nationalist regime to the PRC government had really occurred in 1949, since it was then that the larger part of Chinese territory came under Chinese Communist

[26] *Nihon keizai shimbun* (August 16, 1972).

[27] It should be noted that the Foreign Ministry statement, issued a week after the installation of the Tanaka government, seemed to conflict with an agreement reportedly reached prior to the Liberal-Democratic Party's election of TANAKA as its new president between the leaders of the party's three factions (TANAKA 田中, ŌHIRA Masayoshi 大平正芳, and MIKI Takeo) to cooperate on the conclusion of a peace treaty with the PRC. See *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (July 3, 1972).

[28] See HATANO Ken'ichi 波多野乾一, ed., *Shiryō shūsei chūgoku kyōsantō-shi — 1932* 資料集成中國共產黨史— 1932 (A Documentary History of the Chinese Communist Party — 1932) (Tokyo, Jiji tsūshin-sha, 1961), 22-24.

control and since the PRC government had thereafter functioned as the central power of the state. It would follow from this that the 1952 Japanese peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government, concluded three years after the establishment of the PRC, could have no validity so far as Japan-PRC relations were concerned.

Even on the Japanese side, there had been a recognition that, although Japan had never issued a declaration of war against China, a state of war had in fact existed for some length of time and might require a formal agreement to terminate it. However, if Japan were required—as a condition for the normalization of Japan-PRC relations—to negotiate a full peace treaty to settle a war which actually ended 25 years ago, she would—as the defeated power—be placed in a highly disadvantageous bargaining position with respect to such questions as war reparations and territorial issues (although with regard to the former Peking had indicated that it did not intend to present any claims).

Tokyo's Negotiating Posture

These uncertainties further fueled a longstanding argument among the Japanese about what the Japanese posture should be at the time of negotiations with the People's Republic of China on the normalization of state-to-state relations. One group of Japanese advocated a type of diplomacy similar to that employed before the Opium War in the 1840's by those countries on China's periphery with whom China had established a tributary relationship. Under this system, the tributary power accepted beforehand the superior position of the Chinese dynasty and, by acting out the subservient role, tried its best to reap some actual rewards. In practice, this tack frequently worked to the advantage of the tributary nation. In terms of trade, protocol required that the tributary power make presentations of gifts to the dynastic court in China, but the gifts that the dynasty in turn bestowed on the tributary nation always amounted to more than what the court received.

A leading proponent of such a negotiating posture, OKAZAKI Kaheita 岡崎嘉平太, argued as follows:

> If we were to consider Japan still at her point of defeat and trying to make peace, then it would not be fitting that she should issue conditions, but rather it is obvious that the terms stated by the other side should become the basis for talks...
>
> If we were to imagine that these last twenty-odd years had not passed and we were back at that moment of defeat, then [Japan's situation] would be identical to [that of] Percival when he surrendered to General YAMASHITA 山下將軍 in Singapore. We cannot imagine that then peace really [would be] impossible.[29]

Another group of Japanese favored a type of diplomacy which prevails in the Western international system, *i.e.*, neither party reveals its "hand" before the negotiating exchanges begin. Under this concept, one operates on the premise that the interests of the parties differ. As in commercial bargaining, each party tries to come to terms at a point which brings the greatest advantage to itself, through tactics such as concealment of the "cards in hand" and the points that it is willing to concede.

Those who supported this kind of posture maintained that Japan possessed important cards that it could play in the negotiations, notably the economic "ace." Moreover, they contended that even if one discounted the gulf that had separated the Chinese and Japanese peoples for twenty-odd years, it ought to be recognized that foreign observers might tend to see a "tributary" type of diplomacy as obsequious and thus to perceive the drive for normalization as an effort to open up the Chinese market rather than as a move to rectify a past Japanese policy of hostility and aggression against China. These foreign onlookers knew that Japan had the third-largest productive capacity in the world—equal to that of all the rest of Asia combined and four times that of Southeast Asia alone—and that China was a large and potentially powerful country (with a population of more than 700 million) trying to strengthen her economy as rapidly as possible. Hence, they would be inclined to conclude that Japan, having more or less exhausted the potential of the Taiwan and South Korean markets, was looking for additional outlets for its goods, and that it was willing to inflict injuries on a hapless Taiwan for the sake of its own economic benefit.

Such a judgment, the argument went on, could ultimately have adverse effects on Japan's prosperity by causing a loss of confidence in Japanese good faith. This loss of confidence, in turn, could heighten suspicions, particularly in the countries on the periphery of China, of possible collaboration between Japan and China in pursuit of Asian domination, and could strengthen resentment abroad of Japanese overseas activities. These suspicions and resentments, combined with an increase in Peking's influence over 18 million Overseas Chinese in Asia, might eventually spark movements to exclude Japanese goods and perhaps even to institute boycotts against Japanese nationals. Efforts of this sort could hurt badly in light of Japan's network of close ties with a wide variety of countries, both large and small. Trade statistics for 1971, for example, indicate that Japan imported nearly $20 billion worth of goods, including more than 200,000 tons of iron ore and 600,000 tons of crude oil daily, while it exported during the same period $24 billion worth of products. Hence, the retention of the trust of other countries was vital to Japan's own well-being.

[29] This quotation is from a speech OKAZAKI delivered at a symposium which was later published in *Ajia* 7/8 (August 1972): 42-43. OKAZAKI served as an executive in a bank in Japanese-occupied Shanghai during World War II and after repatriation he was president of All-Nippon Airways for many years until his retirement in 1970. He has been and still is active in Sino-Japanese relations as representative of the Japanese Memorandum Trade Office.

The Tanaka Visit

A great many of these matters had already been firmly settled by the time Prime Minister TANAKA left Tokyo for Peking on September 25. Although in a formal statement in July he had only gone so far as to affirm an "understanding" of the Chinese position regarding the "three principles,"[30] in fact Japan had in several indirect ways acceded to them in full prior to the start of negotiations. To begin with, the Satō cabinet had earlier embraced the first principle (that the PRC government would have to be recognized as the sole and legitimate government of China).[31] As for the second, the Tanaka government from time to time had "leaked" to the press acknowledgments that Japan would be forced to accept China's position that Taiwan was a part of China's territory.[32] Finally, the third principle was dealt with in Foreign Minister Ōhira 大平's statement of August 9 to the effect that the Japan-Taiwan treaty would be annulled at the time of the normalization of relations between Japan and China.[33]

This acceptance of the "three principles" in practice essentially determined the Japanese posture during the negotiations, for what remained open to discussion was really the implementation of the principles. Moreover, the fact that Premier TANAKA and Foreign Minister ŌHIRA relied on Diet members FURUI and TAKEIRI, both of whom had previously endorsed the "three principles," as liaison agents in the pre-negotiation dealings with Peking[34] made it exceedingly difficult for the government to keep its "cards" concealed.

Such a low posture on Japan's part may have been at least to some extent responsible for China's warm reception of TANAKA and ŌHIRA. Indeed, press reports leave the impression that their reception was far warmer and friendlier than the one which President Nixon had received the previous February. Yet the posture netted Japan little in the negotiations on the implementation of the three principles.

In the joint Sino-Japanese communiqué issued on September 29 (see pp.83-84 for the full text), China yielded nothing of substance but merely made some concessions on wording and phrasing. For example, the communiqué contains a clause which, in roundabout fashion, conveys Japan's acceptance of China's long-standing claim to Taiwan: "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this

[30] Jiyūminshutō Nitchū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai 自由民主黨日中國交正常化協議會 (Council on Normalization of the Japanese-Chinese Relations, Liberal-Democratic Party), *Nitchū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai daiikkai sōkai kaigiroku* 日中國交正常化協議會第一回總會會議錄 (Proceedings of the First General Meeting of the Council on Normalization of the Japanese-Chinese Relation), mimeo., (July 24, 1972), 5.

[31] *Mainichi shimbun* (May 25, 1972).

[32] *Ibid.* (August 11, 1972).

[33] *Ibid.* (Evening edition) (August 9. 1972).

[34] *Asahi shimbun* (Evening edition) (September 29, 1972).

stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration." Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, in turn, reaffirms the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which called for Japan to return Taiwan to China. In other words, Japan confirmed that it regards Taiwan as belonging to China, and since Tokyo now recognizes the Peking government as the sole and legal government of China, sovereignty over Taiwan thus passes to the People's Republic of China.

As regards the matter of Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government and the conclusion of a new peace treaty with the PRC, Premier TANAKA, confronted with China's insistence on the illegality of the 1952 treaty and the need for a new peace treaty, finally abandoned the arguments that the Japanese had put forth against the requirement for a new treaty. China did, however, make a small concession in agreeing to refer to the matter only obliquely in the joint communiqué. Thus, the communiqué spoke of the end of the state of war in these terms:

> The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan—the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

In short, it did not explicitly reject the Japanese contention that the 1952 peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalists had ended the state of war between Japan and China, but it firmly maintained the Chinese position that the "realization" (*i.e.*, implementation) of the end of the state of war remained to be accomplished, meaning that a new treaty—defined elsewhere in the communiqué as a "treaty of peace and friendship"—would have to be concluded.

Nor did the low posture render the Chinese very forthcoming on other issues of interest to the Japanese side. According to press accounts, Premier TANAKA proposed a discussion of the problem of the Senkaku Islands 尖閣諸島, which lie between Taiwan and the southern Ryukyus 琉球 and which both Japan and China claim as national territory, but Premier Chou demurred.[35] The two leaders do seem to have gone into the question of nuclear weapons and arms control; however, they apparently reached no concrete conclusions.[36] In response to a personal inquiry put to Chou, it has been reported, Premier TANAKA did receive an assurance that China would not collude with the Japan Communist Party 日本共産黨[37]—although TANAKA later denied that any such exchange had taken place.

[35] *Tokyo shimbun* 東京新聞 (October 2, 1972).
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Akahata* 赤旗 (October 3, 1972).

Results and Prospects

How, then, are the results of the Tanaka visit to Peking to be assessed? What, in the broadest terms, has each of the two powers directly involved—the PRC and Japan—gained from the understandings reached in Peking? What impact are those understandings likely to have on the future course of Sino-Japanese relations, as well as on the two powers' relations with other Asian nations and the rest of the world? So soon after the event, such an assessment must necessarily be tentative and perhaps somewhat subjective, but certain elements in the picture nevertheless seem fairly clear.

From the perspective of Peking, the gains achieved through the normalization of relations with Japan must be highly gratifying indeed. In terms of internal politics, the PRC government, by obtaining formal Japanese recognition, has bolstered its legitimacy as the sole government of China, including Taiwan. In so doing, it has not merely succeeded in further isolating its rival claimant to such legitimacy—the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan—but has acquired a solid juridical basis for challenging any residual Japanese links, direct or indirect, with that regime at whatever future time Peking deems it advantageous to do so.

Even more significant perhaps, Peking can justifiably view the rapprochement with Tokyo as having significantly strengthened the PRC's international position. From the economic standpoint, the way has been opened for the PRC to obtain freer access to Japanese supplies of capital equipment, advanced industrial technology, and financial credits so vitally needed to further the development of the mainland economy. From the political standpoint, Peking's gains are several and no less important. By reestablishing friendly relations with the PRC's most powerful Asian neighbor, Peking has dealt a damaging blow to whatever designs Moscow may have to encircle and contain China and, to that extent, has greatly enhanced the national security of the PRC. At the same time, it may reasonably see the rapprochement with Japan as attenuating the tendency of post-World War II Japanese governments to look toward the United States rather than toward Asia for assurances of Japan's own national security and economic prosperity.

Politically also, the normalization of relations with Japan must no doubt be viewed in Peking as a major breakthrough in the PRC's new international diplomacy aimed at broadening its contacts with the outside world and remedying the injurious effects of the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution period. Particularly in Asia, the effects of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement may be far-reaching. Peking has good reason to expect that practically every Asian government that has not yet established diplomatic relations with it will now become more favorably disposed toward doing so. The only remaining questions are when and how, and the answers are likely to depend mainly on Peking. If the PRC adheres to its present course of curtailing assistance to rebellious movements abroad in favor of cultivating friendly relations with the established national governments, it undoubtedly stands a good

chance of expanding its prestige and influence in Asia as well as elsewhere, incidentally gaining the opportunity to develop closer contacts with the eighteen million Overseas Chinese residing in various Asian countries.

On the Japanese side, the rapprochement with Peking has certainly produced short-term political benefits for Premier TANAKA and his government, as well as certain gains—and possible losses—for Japan as a nation. To dispose of the former first, there is little question that the successful achievement of the rapprochement has consolidated the personal leadership positions of Premier TANAKA and Foreign Minister ŌHIRA within the LDP and has markedly enhanced the Tanaka government's popularity in the country. These gains are strikingly reflected in the changed tenor of the news media, which had been overwhelmingly critical of the status-quo China policy of the preceding Satō cabinet but are now voicing warm support of the Tanaka government's normalization of Japan-PRC relations. The resolution of the China problem has also removed—at least for the time being—a major source of opposition-party criticisms of the LDP and thus appears to have significantly improved the ruling party's prospects in the coming general elections to the House of Representatives, which must be held by the beginning of 1974 but which the government is now expected to call sooner in order to capitalize on its China achievement. It is difficult to predict whether this achievement will result in an increase in the Tanaka-Ōhira faction's share of LDP representation in the Lower House inasmuch as foreign policy questions rarely become major issues in interfactional party struggles. Moreover, even if they were to become an issue in the present case, it is doubtful that the outcome of the China mission would necessarily benefit the Tanaka-Ōhira faction because there is a strong feeling among the more conservative elements of the LDP that both men—particularly Foreign Minister ŌHIRA—were more submissive to Peking's demands, and more ready to cast aside Japan's ties with Taiwan, than was necessary.

To turn to the gains for Japan as a nation, it must be recognized that, above all, the rapprochement between East Asia's two most powerful countries—at odds with each other for close to a century—constitutes a major stride toward stabilization of East Asian politics and hence toward greater national security for Japan. Tension had existed between Japan and China almost continuously since 1886 when a Chinese naval force visited the port of Nagasaki 長崎 and the sailors got into street fights with Japanese police; and it had been a constant obstacle to the construction of lasting peace and stability in East Asia. It would obviously be wrong to say that the understandings reached in Peking have removed that tension overnight, but they at least represent a significant first step toward dissolving the miasma of nonconfidence and distrust that has enveloped relations between the two governments and toward setting their relations on a new and more fruitful course that could turn the tide of history in Asia.

Another gain for Japan is that the normalization of relations with the PRC rep-

resents a significant accomplishment of Japan's own new diplomacy. As pointed out earlier, since the nation's defeat in World War II, successive governments had generally adhered to a low-posture, passive role in international affairs. However, as Japan gradually rebuilt its economy to become the world's third industrial power, such a role became incongruous, and there has been a steadily growing desire among Japanese to see their government assume a more active and independent role commensurate with the nation's rising international position. The move to restore relations with China is a response to this desire, and it marks an important initial advance toward a more active participation by Japan in the affairs of Asia.

Of direct benefit to both Japan and China, of course, will be the stabilization of economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. Since the Tanaka visit to Peking, the Japanese press has been filled with highly optimistic predictions concerning the prospects for expanded Sino-Japanese trade,[38] but it is difficult to foresee just how sizable an increase will actually occur. Factors favoring stepped-up trade are: (1) Peking's current pursuit of more rational and pragmatic economic policies designed to hasten national development and (2) the fact that the Japanese government is now ready to provide loans to underwrite Sino-Japanese trade, and that the PRC is agreeable to dealing on these terms. On the other hand, there are some limiting factors as well: (1) the continuing slow rate of the PRC's economic growth; (2) the generally low income-level of the mainland population, which restricts the ability to purchase sophisticated consumer goods; and (3) the likelihood that the PRC will seek to avoid excessive dependence on trade with Japan, which already accounts for more than 20 percent of the PRC's total foreign trade. Despite these restricting factors, this study's own estimate is that the volume of Japan-PRC trade is likely to expand at a rate of 4-10 percent annually as long as Peking's current economic policies continue to succeed.

Against these gains for Japan, certain losses have to be weighed, the most important being the damage done to Japan's relations with Taiwan. The Tokyo government had originally hoped to effect a rapprochement with the PRC in such a way as to avoid provoking anti-Japanese feeling on the part of the Chinese Nationalist regime, but this proved impossible in view of Peking's firm insistence that the normalization of Japan-PRC relations must be accompanied by the severance of all official Japanese ties with the Chiang government. The results of the Tanaka mission to Peking thus produced a far sharper reaction in Taipei than had the outcome of President Nixon's earlier talks with the PRC leaders. Although the Tokyo

[38] The most optimistic estimate has been made by the Mitsui Bussan 三井物産 Company. In August 1972, it forecast that during the five years after the normalization of relations Sino-Japanese trade would increase to 5.6 times the 1971 volume — that is from $900 million in 1971 to $5 billion in 1977. Of the total trade over the five-year period, $5 billion of China's exports would constitute scheduled repayments under its delayed-payments agreements, *Nihon keizai shimbun* (August 23, 1972).

government still maintains that economic and cultural relations between Japan and Taiwan can continue, there are already indications that Japanese investments on Taiwan are being sharply cut back and that Japan's sizable trade with the island will also suffer as the Nationalist government, backed by popular resentment of Tokyo's new course, moves to decrease Taiwan's economic reliance on Japan as much and as quickly as possible.

Tokyo's new understanding with Peking could also have some unfavorable side-effects so far as Japan's relations with other Asian countries and with Australia and New Zealand are concerned. Even though most of these countries publicly welcomed the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and despite the fact that the joint communiqué issued at the close of the Tanaka visit explicitly disavowed any intention on the part of either Japan or the PRC to seek hegemony over Asia, it would only be natural for some of the governments of the area to be somewhat apprehensive that collaboration between the two most powerful East Asian states might prove detrimental to their security and national interests. It was, in part, to allay these possible apprehensions that Foreign Minister ŌHIRA included visits to Australia and New Zealand on the itinerary of his post-Peking round-the-world mission, which also took him to the United States and the Soviet Union. Tokyo likewise dispatched special envoys to South Korea and several Southeast Asian countries with the same purpose in mind.

The effect of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement on Japan's relations with the Soviet Union is somewhat problematical. There can be no question that the reconciliation was highly unwelcome to Moscow, which fears a possible combination of an antagonistic China with its formidable manpower and vast natural resources and an economically powerful Japan with its high-level technology and abundant capital. The only bargaining card that the Russians had to deter Japan from proceeding to mend relations with the PRC was an offer of concessions with respect to Japan's claims to the disputed northern islands lying between Hokkaidō 北海道 and the Kuril Islands 千島列島, which the Soviet Union annexed at the close of World War II. That bargaining card was not played, and now that the reconciliation between Tokyo and Peking is an accomplished fact, Moscow is probably debating whether a tougher or a more conciliatory line toward Tokyo would be more effective in curbing Japanese enthusiasm for close collaboration with the PRC.

Japan's reconciliation with the PRC also poses certain potential problems affecting Tokyo's relations with Washington. To be sure, Premier TANAKA was careful to inform President Nixon in advance of Japan's intentions in the negotiations with Peking, and as far as one can judge from reports in the Japanese press, the US government does not appear to be overly concerned by the outcome of the Tanaka mission. Nevertheless, Japan's explicit recognition of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan could give rise to thorny questions regarding the interpretation of Article 6 of the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which autho-

rizes the US use of American military bases in Japan for the preservation of the security and peace of Japan and the Far East. Tokyo has hitherto agreed to interpret the term "Far East" as including Taiwan, and it has assured Washington that it does not intend to alter this interpretation. So long as the PRC continues to refrain from trying to reunite Taiwan to the Chinese mainland by force, no problem should arise, but if the contrary were to occur, Japan obviously would be placed in an awkward position.

Let us turn now to the longer-term prospects for Sino-Japanese relations. As already noted, normalization of state-to-state relations constitutes a first step toward dispelling the lack of confidence between Tokyo and Peking and thus opens up new possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. It also eases, though it does not completely eradicate, Japanese feelings of guilt about Japan's past behavior toward China.[39] This will help in the development of more detached and objective attitudes toward Chinese affairs among Japanese intellectuals and journalists. On the one hand, taboos concerning China that have long prevailed in some quarters will tend gradually to disappear; on the other hand, those Japanese journalists who have been most laudatory of the PRC will likely find less justification than before for viewing China uncritically, especially now that the special access to China that their positions have afforded them will eventually diminish, if not vanish.

But this easing of Japanese guilt feelings *vis-à-vis* China carries with it certain dangers. The Japanese suffer from an intense love-hate syndrome with respect to China. Among all Japanese, to a greater or lesser extent, there is a sense of identification with China which grows out of the notion of a common destiny; however, because of this perceived bond, the Japanese are inclined to manifest hatred and contempt for China whenever its behavior dissatisfies them. An overwhelming guilt complex served as a powerful restraint on the Japanese and prevented their adoption of an overly critical attitude toward China, but now that this restraint has at least been relaxed, the pendulum of Japanese emotions could conceivably swing wildly back and forth or, even worse, toward the extreme of hatred and contempt.

The leadership in Peking seems to be acutely aware of this possibility, for it has given assistance and encouragement to pro-Peking journalists investigating Japanese excesses during Japan's occupation of China in an obvious effort to keep positive and negative feelings on the part of the Japanese people in balance. Yet there is still definite potential in the current situation for activation of the Japanese love-hate syndrome regarding China. As mentioned previously, the Japanese press has recently contained highly optimistic assessments of the possibilities for Sino-Japanese economic relations, but this optimism could prove to be unwarranted. If so, and if

[39] The joint communiqué of September 29 included an explicit expression of these feelings: "The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility of causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself."

Sino-Japanese economic competition in the Third World markets should become unexpectedly severe and/or disputes over the Senkaku Islands or over the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf (particularly oil reserves) should arise, it is not at all impossible that popular Japanese attitudes toward China could grow exceedingly negative.

In short, the intricate and complex problems of Sino-Japanese relations cannot be resolved in a day or even in the course of one summit meeting. Dealing with them will require great patience and wisdom as well as detached analysis on both sides.

Normalizing Relations

At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei were Foreign Minister ŌHIRA Masayoshi, Chief Cabinet Secretary 内閣官房長官 NIKAIDŌ Susumu 二階堂進 and other Government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei on September 27. The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei 姬鵬飛 had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Prime Minister TANAKA Kakuei and Foreign Minister ŌHIRA Masayoshi, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of relations between China and Japan as the focal point, and the two sides agreed to issue the following joint statement of the two governments:

China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan—the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of rela-

tions and the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.

(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.
(2) The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Postdam Declaration [see accompanying article, p. 75-76]
(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other's capitals in accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.
(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

    In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter 國連憲章, the governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or the threat of force.
(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing non-governmental agreements.

—Official English text (verbatim) of the joint communiqué issued by the PRC and Japan on September 29, 1972, as released by New China News Agency.

Chapter VI DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE LATE NINETEEN SEVENTIES

In both China and Japan, 1976 brought some startling changes in the domestic political lineup. In January Zhou Enlai 周恩來 died, and Hua Guofeng 華國鋒, originally one of the radical faction in the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 was appointed to succeed him. Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平, a pragmatist who had been expected to succeed Zhou Enlai, was instead purged from the post of deputy premier after being accused of involvement in the Tiananmen Incident 天安門事件 of April. When Mao Zedong 毛澤東 died on September 9, it appeared briefly that the radicals would monopolize power. But after several tenuous weeks during which they tried to establish authority, they suddenly came under all-out open attack. As is well known, criticism was focused on the "Gang of Four 四人幫"—Jiang Qing 江青, Zhang Chunqiao 張春橋, Wang Hongwen 王洪文, and Yao Wenyuan 姚文元. Hua Guofeng made a tactical change in his own position by arresting all four, which was probably why he was able to hold onto the premiership. By then, despite the vacillating picture in China, it was generally assumed that a strong comeback by the pragmatists was only a matter of time. Then in July 1977 Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in his former post, and from that point on, he began to guide Chinese domestic and foreign policies almost singlehandedly, demonstrating real authority as China's top administrator.

In Japan, events were less turbulent but equally far-reaching. TANAKA Kakuei 田中角榮 had been forced to resign as prime minister in 1974 on charges of improper dealings in both political funds and personal assets. Then in July 1976 he was arrested on suspicion of having received huge bribes from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in exchange for pushing sales of Lockheed planes to Japan while he was in office. The arrest of a former prime minister was an unprecedented event, and it set off irreversible shock waves throughout the solidly entrenched Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主黨 (LDP) and horrified the public. Large blocs of voters, for the first time in the more than twenty years of LDP rule, began seriously to consider political alternatives.

This chapter is intended to examine the development of Sino-Japanese relations since the death of Mao Zedong, and to attempt some projections on the future of the relations.

* This was originally published as "Recent Developments in Sino-Japanese Relations" in *Asian Survey* 20/7 (July 1980): 726-743. This was written when China was turning from fundamentalism of the Cultural Revolution to pragmatism of reform and opening to the outside world, following the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in 1976.

Sino-Japanese Private Long-term Trade Agreement

From the beginning of 1955 when two conservative parties merged to form the LDP, it has been divided into several factions. Basically, the LDP is a loose coalition of conservative blocs, each formed under the leadership of a Diet member and tending to keep him in office more out of loyalty, obligation, or personal gain than political convictions. In their election districts LDP members each have solid support organizations that the politicians set up on their own. Thus, they are all ideologically conservative in domestic politics, but when it comes to foreign policy issues their opinions vary widely, particularly regarding China and the Soviet Union.

The LDP members agreed in principle that the wisest course was to steer clear of arrangements with either country that could involve Japan in the Sino-Soviet confrontation 中ソ對立. But on the practical level, factions and individual members had very strong and divergent ideas as to Japan's best moves in relations with China and the Soviet Union. When MIKI Takeo 三木武夫, leader of a small faction, became prime minister in 1974, it seemed inconceivable that his weak cabinet would be able to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with China even if MIKI personally pushed it very hard. His cabinet was under constant restraint from within the LDP, several factions of which were apprehensive about the Soviet reaction, and others about Japan's relations with Taiwan (there were no formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan even then). The large, powerful faction of FUKUDA Takeo 福田赳夫, on the other hand, although one of the strongest forces against closer ties with China, would probably have been able to push through a treaty if FUKUDA had wished to do so. He had the power for one thing, and he was more highly respected by Mao than was MIKI. His faction was considered among the "hawks" of the LDP, which Mao had already sanctioned in his remark, "I love hawks," after diplomatic relations with China were reestablished by two avowed anti-communist leaders, Richard Nixon and TANAKA Kakuei.

As it was, FUKUDA did not take over from MIKI until December 1976, and only two months before that something else happened to delay the treaty. Viktor Belenko, first lieutenant in the Soviet Air Force, landed a MiG-25 at Hakodate 函館 Airport in Hokkaidō 北海道 hoping to seek asylum in the United States, and Japan allowed American technicians to examine the plane's structure and functions. Quite coincidentally, Foreign Minister MIYAZAWA Kiichi 宮澤喜一 had just visited the Russian-occupied Northern Territories 北方領土 that Japan claims, the first time that a Japanese foreign minister had inspected this disputed area. This and the MiG-25 event immediately soured relations with the USSR, and by the time FUKUDA took office one of his cabinet's priorities was the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. FUKUDA did not dare move Japan one step closer to China by concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty 日中平和友好條約, and so the year 1977 came and went without the treaty being signed.

In February 1978, a long-term trade agreement between China and Japan was signed, which did not provide the broad ground for accommodating a friendship treaty but did promise to help lift Japan's recession.[1] The way had been opened three years earlier, in January 1975, when Premier Zhou Enlai presented a proposal for the "Four Modernizations 四つの現代化" to the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The proposal embodied a program of modernizing agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, with the ultimate goal of bringing the Chinese economy up to or beyond the level of the world's leading economies by the end of twentieth century. The proposal was translated into action, but a smooth implementation was impossible until the radical faction could be suppressed. With the overthrow of the Gang of Four, *Zhuan* 專 ("expert" or professionalism) replaced *hong* 紅 ("red" or politics first) in order of priority. Hua Guofeng was then free to conclude the long-term trade agreement with Japan as a foundation for a New Ten-Year Plan, which was adopted at the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978.

The New Ten-Year Plan (1976-1985) embodied the original Four Modernizations proposal. China's determination to carry through the Four Modernizations was also manifested in the Preamble of the New Constitution, promulgated at the Fifth National People's Congress. However, financing would involve an annual increase of more than 10% industrial production, 4% in agricultural production, and the construction of 120 large-scale projects and industrial complexes. The total capital required amounted to $30 billion, almost equivalent to China's total investments since 1949.[2] The only way to finance the program was to get assistance from Japan, the United States, and other industrially advanced nations.

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, trade between Japan and China has steadily increased. The principal exports to Japan are oil and raw silk, and steel and machinery are the top items exported from Japan to China. Since 1974, Japan's annual exports to China have been on the level of $1.3-1.5 billion. The long-term trade agreement, committing Japan to export a total of ten billion dollars in technology, plant and construction materials within five years from 1978, did not, therefore, signify a huge expansion of Sino-Japanese trade as much as it symbolized the positive direction in which relations between two countries are moving. To the business community in recession-plagued Japan, the agreement was favorable in that it promised to expand trade with China further, if not greatly. Moreover, because

[1] An eight-year trade agreement (1978-1985) signed on February 16, 1978 between INAYAMA Yoshihiro 稲山嘉寛 (president of Nippon Steel Corporation 新日本製鐵 and chairman of the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Consultative Committee 日本日中長期貿易協議委員會) and Liu Xiwen 劉希文 (vice-minister of Foreign Trade 中國對外貿易部副部長 and chief of China-Japan Long-Term Trade Consultative Committee 中國中日長期貿易協議委員會).

[2] *Nihon keizai shimbun* 日本經濟新聞 (December 5, 1979).

it was a semi-governmental agreement[3] and therefore expected to be securely backed, Japanese business reacted with assured optimism. Their hopes were crushed, however, when Chinese policy shifted, as announced at the December 1978 CCP Central Committee meeting, and the terms of the agreement were suddenly suspended because of a careless planning by the Chinese and a shortage of funds. This experience turned out to be a good lesson for Japan, however. Overseas loans were initiated on a government basis, and private business was forced to be very careful in analyzing and supporting the Chinese market.

The Soviet Union, for its part, injected political significance into the Sino-Japanese trade agreement, which they interpreted as heralding an imminent peace and friendship treaty. Three years before the Kremlin had proposed a "good neighbor" treaty between Japan and the USSR and in January 1978 presented a draft to Foreign Minister SONODA Sunao 園田直, then in Moscow. SONODA had carried the draft back to Japan, after making it clear that it would not be a subject of examination by the Japanese government.[4] Then on February 23, a week after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese trade agreement, the Soviet Union unilaterally made public the draft of "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the USSR and Japan."

All Japanese, regardless of political inclination, support the return of the Northern Territories to Japan. Apparently the Japanese government strategy was to use Sino-Japanese relations as leverage in settling the issue. It is speculated that the government hoped the Kremlin would make some move towards returning the Northern Territories in order to sway popular feeling in Japan and prevent ties with China from becoming closer. If that is true, then the scant attention Japan gave to the Russian draft was all too easily explained, for the document made no mention of the return of the Northern Territories.[5]

Quite apart from Soviet efforts to impede closer relations between Japan and China, however, a series of events originating in a totally different quarter erupted, once more threatening Sino-Japanese relations even after the trade agreement was concluded.

[3] Although this took the form of a private agreement, in substance it was a government-level accord because some high-ranking officials of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry participated in the signing as witnesses, and the Chinese delegation was headed by the vice minister of foreign trade.

[4] *Nihon keizai shimbun* (January 2, 1978).

[5] For further information, see Peggy L. Falkenheim, "The Impact of the Peace and Friendship Treaty on Soviet-Japanese Relations," *Asian Survey* 19/12 (December 1979): 1209-1223.

The Senkaku 尖閣(諸島)Event

On April 12, 1978, a Japanese Maritime Safety Agency 海上保安廳 patrol vessel spotted a flotilla of 108 armed Chinese fishing boats operating in the waters off the Senkakus, the fishermen brandishing wooden placards that said in Chinese, "Diaoyutai 釣魚臺 [the Senkakus] is Chinese territory."[6] Insofar as Japan, China, and Taiwan 臺灣 all claim sovereignty over the islands, the Japanese interpreted the fishermen's move as an invasion of Japanese territory. The incident occurred, moreover, at a delicate time, when resumption of suspended negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was imminent. It seemed very possible that the fishermen were sent by the Chinese government for some specific purpose.

The Senkakus, called Diaoyutai ("fishing terrace") by Chinese and Taiwanese, are situated north of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyu 琉球 islands. Both Beijing and Taipei 臺北 claim the islands as part of Taiwan. On the other hand, Japan regards them as part of the Ryukyu chain of islands and therefore within Japanese territory. After the return of Okinawa 沖繩 to Japan in 1972, Japan placed the Senkakus under its control.

Until 1968, the Senkaku islands received scant attention; they are eight uninhabited islets with a total area of only 6.3 square kilometers. The situation changed completely that year after the United Nation's ECAFE published a survey of natural resources in the East China Sea. The survey revealed what is thought to be vast amounts of mineral resources, including oil, under the sea floor surrounding the Senkakus. Suddenly a heated territorial dispute arose among Japan, China, and Taiwan. In 1972 when formal diplomatic relations were established between Beijing and Tokyo, the two countries tacitly agreed to shelve the Senkaku islands question, and Japan took the position of *de facto* control by doing nothing to change the *status quo*.[7] To avoid provoking China or Taiwan, Japan did not set up any facilities on the Senkakus; whenever Taiwanese fishing boats occasionally came within the twelve-mile territorial limit of the Senkakus, Japanese drove them away with warnings instead of capturing them.

But the appearance of the Chinese fishing boats in April 1978 was something new. It took the Japanese by surprise, for the boats carried PRC flags and were armed. The opposition parties in Japan, backing the LDP stand that "the Senkakus are Japanese territory," pressed the government to conclude the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship on the grounds that the Senkaku demonstration had been prompted by the delay in signing the treaty.[8] Pro-Taiwan LDP politicians who belong

[6] *Asahi shimbun* 朝日新聞 (April 13, 1978).

[7] The Beijing government claimed ownership over the Senkakus for the first time on December 30, 1971. The Taiwan government has not given official approval even to the return of Okinawa to Japan by the United States.

[8] *Sankei shimbun* 產經新聞 (April 14, 1978).

to the Asian Affairs Society, however, were still wary of a treaty with Beijing, and demanded that the Senkaku dispute be settled before a treaty was signed. Meanwhile the Executive Council of the LDP pressed the government to establish effective control over the Senkakus. The Fukuda faction, whose leader was currently prime minister, took an especially tough stand. The faction was unanimous in the opinion that the "invasion" of Japanese territory by China completely destroyed the possibility of a Sino-Japanese treaty. Its members urged FUKUDA to make no concessions on the territorial issue; "He must decide quickly on countermeasures," they declared, "and translate them into action."[9]

Thus, when the Japanese government filed an official protest through the Japanese embassy in Beijing, there was strong feeling behind it. While repeating its basic position that "The Senkakus are Chinese territory," the Chinese government replied that it would inquire into the facts of the event and that "We, too, hope that the development of friendly relations between Japan and China will not be damaged."[10] On April 15, Vice-Premier Geng Biao 耿飈 told a Japanese Dietmember then in China that the intrusion of the Chinese fishing boats was "totally accidental."[11] The Japanese government was not satisfied, however, for the statement was not made through formal diplomatic channels. As a result of subsequent negotiations with the Chinese government, Wang Xiaoyun 王暁雲, deputy director of the Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated the official position to DŌNOWAKI Mitsurō 堂ノ脇光朗, Japan's minister to Beijing—i.e., that the entry of the Chinese fishing boats into the territorial waters of the Senkakus "happened by accident."[12] The Japanese government sought a further assertion by requesting a reaffirmation on a higher level, and on May 10 a meeting was held between Japanese Ambassador to Beijing SATŌ Shōji 佐藤正二 and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong 韓念龍. They reached an agreement that "In the broad interests of Sino-Japanese relations, the Senkaku Islands issue will be shelved for the time being." The Japanese government was finally satisfied that the necessary diplomatic measures had been carried out and that the Senkaku dispute could be safely stored away for the present.

It is very possible that the Chinese were loathe to risk additional delay of the peace and friendship treaty by letting the issue heat up further, but why did Japan not insist on clarifying ownership of the Senkakus at that time? A statement by Foreign Minister SONODA suggested the attitude of the Japanese government then. Speaking to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors, he said, "China insists that Taiwan is part of Chinese territory; that the Senkakus belong to Taiwan; and that, therefore, the Senkakus are Chinese territory... Once we make a

[9] *Yomiuri shimbun* 讀賣新聞 (April 15, 1978).
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Asahi shimbun* (April 16, 1978).
[12] *Asahi shimbun* (April 27, 1978).

territorial issue out of the islands, we are getting into the question of whether Taiwan is part of China or not." In that case, he continued, "Territorial rights over the Senkakus could not be settled without solving the Taiwan territorial issue, and that would lead to great complications."[13]

Tokyo has vowed to "fully understand and respect"[14] China's claim to Taiwan, which Japan abandoned in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but it has maintained a position of nonintervention. It seems reasonable that Japan was not prepared and had no desire to bring the Taiwan issue to the surface deliberately, and decided to pass up the chance to force clarification of sovereignty over the Senkakus. Thus the issue was left dormant and Japan expressed satisfaction with the Chinese explanation that the intrusion was accidental. With that, one of the major blocks to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was removed.

"Hegemony"

The word "hegemony" was used for the first time in 1972 in two documents—the Sino-American Shanghai communiqué 米中上海コミュニケ and the Sino-Japanese joint statement 日中共同聲明 made in Beijing. At that stage, it was not yet clear that China intended to direct the negative implication of the term against the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet undertone was not manifested until negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty began in 1974. China hoped the treaty, with an unambiguous "anti-hegemony" clause incorporated into it, would serve to draw Japan into a unified stand with Beijing against the USSR, and that became the biggest factor in the delay in the treaty that followed. The early negotiations were secret, but it was learned early in 1975 that Japan's original stand was a refusal to sign if the preamble or body of the treaty included an anti-hegemony clause, on grounds that such a phrase was not accepted terminology in international law. During that time China remained firm: the clause must be part of the treaty. Thus the anti-hegemony clause created a heated controversy between the two countries, but not one that was made public until the *Tokyo shimbun* 東京新聞 on January 23, 1975, came out with a stunning scoop on the dispute,[15] and other newspapers rapidly picked up the issue. The Soviet Union, now fully informed, immediately launched its own political campaign against inclusion of the clause. The main thrust of the Soviet attack was that previous statements of the Chinese leaders made it clear that the anti-hegemony clause was an anti-Soviet clause. The Soviet reaction quickly stiffened the Chinese attitude. China's insistence became uncompromising; exclusion of

[13] The minutes of the House of Councilors' Standing committee on Foreign Affairs 參議院外務委員會 at the Eighty-Fourth Diet Session, 16 (April 24, 1978): 2.

[14] *Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué* (September 29, 1972), Article 3.

[15] *Tokyo shimbun* 東京新聞 (January 23, 1975).

the anti-hegemony clause from the text of the treaty, its leaders asserted, would carry China-Japan relations one step backward from the time of diplomatic normalization.

Negotiations for the treaty were suspended, and Chinese leaders began to drum the tough view into Japanese visitors to China, adding that Japan's hesitancy was responsible for the delay in the conclusion of the treaty. The combination of pressures began to tell. Pro-Beijing Japanese were joined by others who visited China and then the Japanese mass media as well in gradually espousing the Chinese view. The government itself slowly moved toward a compromise even though negotiations for the treaty were still suspended. Japan's first concession was agreement to include the words anti-hegemony in the preamble; China balked and demanded inclusion of the wording in the text. The Japanese government conceded again and decided to accept China's demand, on the condition that the anti-hegemony clause would be stated in such a manner that it would not run counter to the UN Charter or indicate any specific nation. In line with this decision, Japanese Foreign Minister MIYAZAWA Kiichi met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua 喬冠華 in New York when both were attending the General Assembly in September 1975. They met twice at that time for a total of ten hours, during which MIYAZAWA carefully detailed the Japanese position to Qiao.

Zhou Enlai was seriously ill at that time, just when the confrontation within the Central Committee between the radicals (Gang of Four) and the moderates was at a peak. For that reason the ten-hour talks ended and MIYAZAWA had gotten almost nowhere with Qiao. In 1976, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, KOSAKA Zentarō 小坂善太郎, tried to continue the talks in New York but Qiao was not receptive and there was no substantial discussion, another indication of the political turmoil going on in Beijing. Not long afterwards Qiao Guanhua was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Miki cabinet subsequently resigned *en masse* to make way for a new cabinet under FUKUDA Takeo. By that time anti-hegemony had become implanted in the views of the LDP and opposition parties, as well as an international principle that was not directed at the Soviet Union or any other nation. Parallel with the shift in Japan, the Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping government in China was gradually able to take a more flexible line as the regime stabilized its control. Moving away from the strident demands on Japan to join in a tough, anti-Soviet front, the PRC began to underline the friendly aspect of relations with Japan. At last conditions were growing ripe for the Peace and Friendship Treaty.

Emphasis on "Friendship"

The treaty talks, interrupted in September 1975, were taken up again in Beijing in July 1978. China hung on to the demand that the anti-hegemony clause be inserted

into the text of the treaty, while Japan insisted that the clause be lined up with another that would indicate that anti-hegemony was not directed at any specific third country (the so-called third-country clause). Despite this difference in views, the negotiators made significant mutual concessions. Foreign Minister SONODA visited China on August 8, 1978, and two days later the negotiators reached a settlement. The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed on August 12 and came into effect on October 23, after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

The treaty contains a preamble and five articles, and it is valid for ten years. Either contracting party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other contracting party, terminate the treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter (Article V). Article I requires the two countries to observe the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence and the principles of the UN Charter. Japan and China affirm that "all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use of threat or force." Article III stipulates further development of economic and cultural relations between Japan and China and the promotion of exchange between their peoples.

The anti-hegemony clause (Article II) and the third country clause (Article IV), the main products of concessions by both countries, were separated by Article III so that the two clauses would be softened enough to make it possible to interpret them flexibly. Article II stipulates: "The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or groups of countries to establish such hegemony." The first half of this stipulation binds Japan and China to renounce so-called hegemonious actions, (Once again this became a point of controversy in Japan very soon after the treaty went into effect, when Deng Xiaoping's "punish Vietnam" statement of January 1979 was followed by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February.)

China understands "any other country or groups of countries" in the second half of the stipulation to mean the Soviet Union, but Japanese efforts not to provoke the USSR succeeded in having the expression worded in such a way as to avoid implicating any specific country. In addition, by stipulating that "the present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries," Article IV does not narrow the meaning of anti-hegemony to mean Sino-Japanese concerted action. In other words, if the Soviet Union takes some "hegemonic action," China can demand a response from Japan against the Soviet move on the basis of Article II, but Japan can invoke Article IV to refuse.

An important footnote, perhaps the key to the success of the treaty in Japan, is that its form is not that of a peace treaty, but a peace and friendship treaty; Japan took the position that a peace treaty between Japan and China had been in force since 1952 when the Peace Treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan was concluded. This was a skillful diplomatic move, for by capitalizing on elements in its two China

policy, Japan was able to cement the new treaty with the PRC.

Anti-Soviet Alliance?

The long wait and patient jockeying for the Peace and Friendship Treaty finally paid off, and behind the treaty there lies a basic agreement that friendly relations between Japan and the PRC will serve both best in the future. Right after the signing of the treaty, SONODA told reporters that "I sincerely hope that Japan and China will continue to develop peaceful and friendly relations based on a sturdy foundation and that both, each in its own way, will contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and the other parts of the world."[16] *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 stated in its August 14 editorial that "The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan is the political recapitulation of their relationship over the past years, and is a fresh start for the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries."[17]

Nonetheless, the treaty by no means signifies full consensus between them. Their views about its role in the international community differ greatly. Look at a statement by SONODA: "The basic goal of Japanese diplomacy, to maintain and develop, on the axis of Japan-US relations, amicable and friendly relations with any country regardless of system, is assured now and in the future by the [third country] clause."[18] Compare this statement with *Renmin ribao*'s editorial: "The current of history that carries us toward friendship between China and Japan is not something which the Soviet Union is able to arrest. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty announces the shameful bankruptcy of the intrigue of interference and destruction by Soviet socialist imperialism."[19] While Japan emphasized that the treaty would have no effect on friendly relations with any other country, China stressed the blow it had aimed at the Soviet Union by signing the treaty.

The treaty does not contain any explicit reference to military cooperation, but recent Chinese overtures in inviting Japanese officials related to the Defense Agency 防衛廳 cannot be dismissed as coincidental. So far they include research specialists at the National Defense College 防衛大學校, retired officers of the Maritime Self Defense Force, a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former secretary-general of the National Defense Council, and several military critics. Then, on his way back from a visit to Mexico, Zhang Caiqian 張才千, vice-chief of the General Staff of People's Liberation Army 人民解放軍, stopped in Japan for meetings with Defense Agency officials and other related individuals.

China is clearly trying to cement a world strategy to keep the Soviet Union in

[16] Jiji tsūshin-sha 時事通信社, *Sekai shūhō* 世界週報 29 (August 1978): 68.
[17] *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 (August 14, 1978).
[18] *Sekai shūhō* 29 (August 1978): 67.
[19] *Renmin ribao* (August 14, 1978).

check. Immediately after the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed, the chief editorial writers from the major Japanese newspapers visited China and met with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on September 6, 1978. "Today China and Japan are exposed to the same menace," Deng told them; "Preparations are necessary. We [Chinese] have long been preparing ourselves. We support a self-defense capability on the part of Japan... If Japan and China are united against hegemony, war can be delayed. Preparedness would make a warmonger cautious. To have the capacity for self defense is a good thing."[20] Statements by ranking Chinese officials have also made it clear that China approves the Japan-US security system. Deng Xiaoping himself commented on that point to the group of Japanese editorial writers, saying that Japan's relationship with the United States was the most important to Japan, but the next important relationship for Japan was that with China. Thus, although indirectly, he expressed approval of the *status quo* in Japanese-American relations; that relationship also serves China in its aim to create a military balance with the Soviet Union, which rests partly on an increased self-defense capability for Japan. Although it is widely suspected that China hopes ultimately for Sino-Japanese military cooperation, Deng has flatly denied that idea: "[China] does not want [military] cooperation from Japan," he stated.

Japan has continued to be cautious in responding to China's move, and as of today does not align itself with China's anti-Soviet movement. Severe restrictions are still placed on visits to China by Japanese presently affiliated with the Defense Agency, and when Zhang Caiqian asked to visit the facilities of the Self Defense Forces, he was allowed to see only the gymnastics school. Japan repeatedly refuses any possibility of cooperation with China in the area of military technology also. Japan still sticks to the three principles that prohibit the export of weapons, and even today a very strict ban is imposed on arms sales to the communist bloc. So far it is safe to say that there is no military aspect to the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.

Future Economic Cooperation

China's enthusiasm to trade with Japan and to import Japanese technology has grown considerably since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. During the last year of Mao Zedong's life, at a time when the Gang of Four was still powerful within the Communist party and the government, China's foreign trade and technological imports declined somewhat, but after their arrest the "Four Modernizations" took priority in both party and State policies. Economic growth became the prime national target. On October 6, 1978, *Renmin ribao* carried a long, three-page article

[20] *Sekai shūhō* 24 (October 1978): 9.

written by Hu Qiaomu 胡喬木, head of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, entitled "Let's Go On in Accordance with the Law of Economics and Quicken the Realization of the Four Modernizations."[21] The gist of the article was that the law of economics has objectivity; productivity will not increase if it is not based on that law; the law of economics is not something that can be changed by the will of political authority, and nothing is gained by following the often self-serving, haphazard, or even ignorant guidance of leaders. The article spelled out the importance of honestly recognizing the backwardness of Chinese economy and exploiting advanced technology from other countries. Predating this article, after the normalization of diplomatic relations, China had already concluded four business agreements with Japan—on fishery, trade, air, and maritime transport. Again, in February 1978, the private agreement on long-term trade led to an arrangement by which trade between the two countries would increase to a level of US$20 billion by 1985 through exports from Japan of plant and equipment, technology, construction materials, and machine parts, in return for imports of coal and crude oil.

That projection turned out to be overoptimistic, however, and China began to waver towards the end of 1978 when the Central Committee undertook a drastic reappraisal of China's economic policy in December. Chinese policy changed at that point from an emphasis on heavy industry to a balanced development of heavy and light industries, cottage industry, agriculture and stock-farming, transportation and communications, and services. During the period of reappraisal and policy adjustments, all the negotiations for and implementation of planned imports of plant and equipment were temporarily postponed. More recently, however, Sino-Japanese economic exchange has once again grown active and China is reasserting the hope for across-the-board economic cooperation from Japan.

There are, however, a number of immediate and prospective logjams in planning for economic exchange. One is the quality of Chinese oil. China is counting on raising exports to Japan and increasing sales of oil and coal at least for the near future, but its low-quality crude is not sought in the Japanese market. Furthermore, smooth and rapid economic growth in China will mean steadily higher rates of domestic consumption of oil and coal, which will eat into export stocks and, consequently, the means to finance imports. There seems little doubt that China will have to rely on foreign loans and diversify its means to repay them.

Two main difficulties arise here. China already depends heavily on foreign loans acquired through an international investment trust company, not just to settle trade accounts but to fuel the domestic economy. The total amount that China now seeks is estimated at over $17 billion, of which it hopes $5.5 billion will come from Japan—a huge amount equivalent to almost 70% of Japan's total foreign aid in 1978. How Japan will or can respond to the Chinese request is a moot question at

[21] *Renmin ribao* (October 6, 1978).

Table VI-1: Japan's Trade with China 1972-1979 (in US$1 million)

Year	Exports	Imports
1972	609	491
1973	1039	974
1974	1984	1304
1975	2259	1531
1976	1663	1371
1977	1939	1547
1978	3049	2030
1979	3697	2955

Table VI-2: Sino-Japanese Exchange of Persons

Year	Japanese Visitors to China	Chinese Visitors to Japan
1972	8,052	933
1973	10,238	1,991
1974	12.990	3,161
1975	16,655	4,441
1976	18,825	4,018
1977	23,445	4,039
1978	40,574	5,951
1979	54,000 est.	11,000 est.

present. The second big problem is the massive adjustment in other countries, made necessary by fast-rising exports of cheap Chinese light industry products to other Asian markets. This pattern was already established in the 1960s, and it will grow stronger as the Chinese economy grows. Naturally, foreign currency, obtained in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia in particular, will continue to provide an increasingly important means of loan repayment to the industrially advanced countries, but that pattern of trade is going to make China a heavy competitor in light industrial goods. The industrializing countries of Asia may eventually have to compete with Chinese products in the heavy and chemical industries, machinery, and electronic equipment. As long as the international division of labor is accepted, this type of competition cannot be avoided, but we cannot ignore the consequences of Japan's cooperation; it will hasten the development of the Chinese economy and speed up the competitive power of Chinese products in the international market. As long as Beijing maintains its present policy, Sino-Japanese economic relations will progress smoothly, as the recent trade statistics in Table1 suggest.

Moving Closer to Japan and the United States

Postwar Japanese foreign policy is based on the principle of friendship with all countries, but in actuality its relationship with the United States has been the central axis, influencing relations with the socialist countries in particular. Thus as soon as China and the US established full diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, it was taken for granted that ties between China and Japan would grow closer.

When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping made an official visit to the United States from January 29 to February 4, 1979, he and President Carter had three very productive meetings. In addition to a joint communiqué, which stated that differences in social and political systems should not hinder friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries, China and the US signed several agreements on cooperation in science and technology and high energy physics, cultural exchange, and on the establishment of consulates general. They also reached a broad understanding on practical cooperation in other areas. Thus the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in January 1979 meant diplomatic normalization, but more, it signified the start of full, friendly relationship between China and the US

With the added leverage of friendship with both the United States and Japan, China began to take a tougher line toward the Soviet Union. One of its first moves was to register disapproval of the Vietnam-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed earlier in November 1978. On February 17, 1979, Chinese troops invaded Vietnam ostensibly to settle once and for all the border issue pending between the two countries, but also to divert Vietnamese troops in Cambodia at the same time. Then in April, in accord with a pledge to Japan, the 7th meeting of the standing committee of the Fifth National People's Congress decided not to extend the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty when it expired on April 10, 1980. On the same day, Huang Hua 黃華, Minister of Foreign Affairs, notified the Soviet ambassador to China of the decision, finally extricating China from the contradictory position of heightening political and economic relations with Japan while being party to a treaty with the USSR that pinpointed Japan as a potential enemy.

Just when China withdrew its troops from Vietnam in early March and began negotiating with Hanoi, Japan announced the dispatch of a survey team to the Senkakus and its intention of building a heliport there. China protested, claiming the move to be in violation of the agreement reached at the time of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that the Senkaku issue would be shelved indefinitely. Without backing down from the basic position that "the Senkakus are Japanese territory," Japan tried to placate China the following July by publicizing a proposal for a joint Sino-Japanese survey and development of the offshore zones of the islands. The proposal, specified an area outside the 12-mile territorial waters of the Senkakus, limiting the survey to open sea nearby, so as not to provoke the Taiwan government.[22] Japan clearly wanted to avoid a dispute with Nationalist China, and the PRC expressed

approval in principal.[23] But negotiations on implementation of the proposal have yet to begin.

Ōhira's visit to China

After TANAKA Kakuei, who went to Beijing to conclude the process of normalization of relations, no Japanese prime minister had visited China until December 1979 when ŌHIRA Masayoshi 大平正芳 went to meet with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and other leaders. In response to Ōhira's visit, Hua Guofeng visited Tokyo in May 1980. These reciprocal visits may be only symbolic, but they are a very positive development in the deepening relationship between China and Japan, indicating above all that ideological differences can be transcended.

When in China, ŌHIRA informed his Chinese hosts that Japan would extended 50 billion yen ($0.2 billion) as an initial loan for the first year (of a total of 370 billion yen [$1.5 billion] by about 1985) for six out of the eight major projects for which China solicited Japanese help.[24] ŌHIRA also expressed Japan's readiness to extend gratuitous assistance to China for the construction of a memorial hospital as a symbol of friendship, and announced that Japan would give China preferential tariff treatment starting in April 1980 as well as technical cooperation on the government level in railway construction, hygiene and medical care, agriculture, and fisheries. The decision to lend a hand in so many varied projects was certainly motivated by the wish to help the Hua-Deng 華-鄧 regime fulfill the "Four Modernizations," but behind them was another motive: to do anything possible to encourage stability and progress toward an open society in China, which is seen as the best way to insure Japan's national interests.

"If Japan and China cooperate, they can support half the Heavens," said Deng Xiaoping.[25] Indeed, the prospect is awesome enough, but simply economically, the Southeast Asian countries are perhaps still wary that closer relations between Tokyo and Beijing will work to siphon Japanese assistance away from Southeast Asia and into China. The US and Western European countries also feared that Japan would monopolize the Chinese market. To ease these worries, ŌHIRA made a point of publicizing the "three principles" underlying Japan's economic cooperation with China: (1) that Japan will cooperate with the United States and Europe in helping China's modernization; (2) that Japan will give full consideration to its relations

[22] *Asahi shimbun* (July 16, 1979).
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] This is the first time China has publicized receipt of a government-level loan from a foreign country since the 300 million ruble loan from the Soviet Union extended after conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of February 1950.
[25] Japan Communist Party's *Akahata* 赤旗 (Red Flag)(December 12, 1979).

with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other developing countries in all foreign policy and economic decisions; and (3) that Japan will not extended military cooperation to China.

On the first point, at the request of the United States, Japan untied its loans to China so that China is not obliged to buy Japanese products. Regarding the second, Japan did not accept the request for $5.5 billion in aid presented by Vice Premier Gu Mu 谷牧 in Tokyo in September 1979. The total amount Japan agreed to loan was reduced to 370 billion yen ($1.5 billion), to be paid within three to six years, by 1985. Moreover, when the agreement was announced, the total amount was deliberately withheld to avoid worrying the countries of Southeast Asia; only the initial loan of 50 billion yen ($0.2 billion) was made public. Incidentally, Japanese loans to the Philippines in 1979 were 33 billion yen, and to Indonesia—which received the largest loans from Japan—55 billion yen.[26] Finally, Japan's pledge not to conduct military cooperation with China was made chiefly with the intent of avoiding any involvement in the Sino-Soviet friction.

Chain Reaction?

Now, nearly two years after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of August 12, 1978, let us review the events of the intervening period. In November 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam concluded a surprise Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. December saw the signing of the Good Neighbor and Cooperation Treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, notice of normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and the beginning of reappraisal of economic planning by the Central Committee of the CCP. On February 17, 1979, war broke out between China and Vietnam. In April, China notified the Soviet Union that it would abrogate the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty upon its expiration. In the same month China withdrew its troops from Vietnam (although subsequent Sino-Vietnamese talks showed no progress). The dialogue between North and South Korea reopened (but there has been no progress to date). In May the second oil crisis occurred, triggered by the Iranian revolution. In June, the Tokyo summit was held, and in September, Sino-Soviet talks reopened in Moscow.

These are two possible interpretations of the way these events unfolded. One is that most of them are closely interrelated. First, the Soviet Union made a connection between the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and improving Sino-US relations since 1972. Conjuring up the old visions of encirclement, the Soviet Union concluded a Peace and Cooperation Treaty with Vietnam to resist moves by Japan, the US, and China. In an attempt to prevent the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship

[26] *Nihon keizai shimbun* (August 22, 1979).

Treaty, the Soviet Union repeatedly hinted to Japan that retaliatory measures would seem necessary if the treaty was signed, but after the treaty was concluded the Soviet Union judged that indirect resistance, including a reappraisal of relations with friendly nations, would be more advantageous than the direct retaliation against Japan. Thus the Russians decided to cultivate closer relations with Vietnam, which happened to coincide with the interests of Vietnam, then internationally isolated and economically distressed. Vietnam would probably have steered away from a treaty with the Soviet Union otherwise, but with some hesitation, agreed and concluded the treaty. The US and China, however, saw this treaty and the later accord between the USSR and Afghanistan as important steps in the Soviet thrust into Asia. Both the US and China in turn felt pressure to join forces and they normalized relations. This gave a huge boost to China's sense of security, and as a result China was able to make the bold decision to send troops to "teach Vietnam a lesson."

The other possible interpretation of the chain of events since summer 1978 is that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early 1978 and the confrontation between China and Vietnam made a Soviet-Vietnamese agreement inevitable, sooner or later, and that the Sino-Japanese treaty expedited the conclusion of that agreement. But in this interpretation, there is no causal relationship between the Sino-Japanese treaty, on the one hand, and the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty and subsequent developments in Indochina, on the other.

Adequate materials are not available to decide which interpretation is closer to the truth. I, for one, am inclined toward the second, because it seems improbable that the Sino-Japanese treaty could have exerted a political impact on the Soviet Union strong enough to merit such a response. The Kremlin leaders more than anyone must be aware that the essence of the treaty is not an alliance against the Soviet Union but the friendship between Tokyo and Beijing.

Prospects

As of now, Sino-Japanese relations have progressed smoothly, despite some difficulties. Trade has expanded, as Table 1 shows, and human exchange has also increased, as Table 2 indicates. A group of Japanese city banks consented to a short-term loan of US$6 billion plus mid-and long-term loans of US$2 billion. The Export-Import Bank of Japan, in cooperation with the city banks, is financing payments for Japanese products exported to China. It was also agreed that the Export-Import Bank of Japan would extend the People's Bank of China 420 billion yen (about US$1.9 billion) for 15-years oil and coal development projects at 6.25% interest. The original long-term trade agreement of February 16, 1978 was revised in March 1979 and its term of validity extended for five years until 1990, while the volume of trade stipulated in the agreement was doubled or tripled to US$40-50 billion. Plant and equip-

ment as well as technological assistance are being sent for application in a wide variety of projects including oil exploration in the South China Sea, electrification of railways, and construction of the Baoshan Steel Mill 寶山製鐵所 which will produce six million tons of steel annually when completed.

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Japan's Japan-China Science and Technology Exchange Society have been exchanging scientists and technicians since 1978. In 1979, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Japan's Japan-China Cultural and Social Sciences Exchange Society began a program of cultural exchange involving scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The numbers of people on exchange programs have also risen significantly, particularly in sports, music, calligraphy, and education. Student exchange has risen as well; in 1979 more than 100 Chinese students came to Japan and 20 Japanese students went to China, and those numbers are expected to increase in 1980.

Barring any serious policy changes, unprecedentedly warm exchanges between Japan and China will continue for the foreseeable future. And the shifts in China's policy that occurred recently were probably more beneficial than harmful. The Chinese violation of the waters off the Senkakus in April 1978 and the interruption of negotiations on economic cooperation in January 1979 made the Japanese tone down their unrealistic expectations. Shedding their euphoria they began to appraise China more critically, which so far has worked to make relations all the more stable. At no time since the beginning of the Meiji 明治 period over a century ago have relations been so solid, almost unaffected by the "love-hate syndrome" that traditionally has affected Japanese attitudes towards China.[27] If Beijing's policy does not change and if there is no drastic change in the Sino-Soviet relations or the situation around Taiwan, we can expect at least a few years of a positive and creative friendship with China.

[27] For further information on the "love-hate syndrome," see ETŌ Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉, "Japan and China," *Problems of Communism* XXI/6 (November-December, 1972): 5-7.

Chapter VII CHINA AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

When Zhou Enlai 周恩來 died on January 8, 1976, some China watchers publicly predicted that Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 would succeed Zhou as premier, unaware of the quiet campaign to discredit Deng underway in the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party; one or two even referred to Deng's accession as a certainty. By February, however, writings critical of Deng had appeared in the *Renmin ribao* 人民日報 (People's Daily),[1] and in no time it was clear that he had fallen from grace.

In a similar vein, right up until Lon Nol's *coup d'état* of 1970, most observers of the Cambodian scene agreed that an extended era of stability under Prince Norodom Sihanouk lay ahead. As it happened, however, the coup destabilized Cambodian politics overnight and plunged the country into two decades of civil strife. Or again, in 1977, the vast majority of "Iran hands" were confident of Shah Pahlavi's hold on power. Yet in the spring of 1978, uprisings shook Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in Paris, the shah fled the country, and in no time the revolution was victorious.

It is not easy to gauge the winds of political change through scholarly analysis, and in countries where representative democracy is not yet firmly established, political stability tends to be fragile, making such judgments all the more difficult. With this in mind, I would like to discuss the future of China and Sino-Japanese relations in broad terms, relying not on the conventional wisdom of experts in the field but on my own intuition, nurtured over four decades of China watching. Below I divide my discussion into several topics, each corresponding to the basic factors that must be included in any consideration of this subject.

Three Basic Factors

Population

One day in 1978, I was told by a Chinese acquaintance, two representatives of the CCP visited a frail and aged gentleman at his home. They announced that they had

* This was originally published as "China and Sino-Japaneses Relations in the Coming Decades" in *Japan Review of International Affairs* 10/1 (Winter 1996): 16-34. This article is an attempt to ascertain the future of China that aspires to establish a stable policy of reform and opening to the outside world like the previous chapter. On that basis it tries to examine the future outlook of the Japan-China relations.

[1] The *Renmin ribao* carried criticisms of Deng on February 17, 18, and 19, 1976.

been delegated by the party to inform the gentleman of his rehabilitation after almost two decades of disgrace, and they respectfully apologized for the party's treatment of him during those years.

The gentleman was Ma Yinchu 馬寅初. Regarded as one of the country's most distinguished economists, Ma had served as president of Beijing University 北京大學 and had been accorded the utmost respect within the party. That was before he expounded his view that excessively high population growth was standing in the way of China's economic development. Ma's basic argument was as follows:

"An estimated 79% of China's national income goes toward consumption, with the remaining 21% going toward saving. To increase production it is necessary to promote light industry, but when the population grows excessively, food consumption increases, and fields that could be used to produce raw materials for industry must instead be diverted to production of foodstuffs. By the same token, when the population expands, the proportion of national income that goes toward consumption increases, and capital saving is reduced. As a result, both industrialization and economic growth are impeded.

"Accordingly, instead of allowing the population to grow unhindered, it is necessary to disseminate the practice of late marriage, birth control, and family planning."[2]

This theory flew in the face of Mao Zedong's 毛澤東 doctrine that a larger population benefited the country because each person born contributed: "one mouth to feed but two hands to work." During the 1950s the population issue was furiously debated in China. Premier Zhou Enlai and Minister of Public Health Li Dequan 李德全 were among the advocates of population control. Ultimately, however, rejection of such controls gained the political high ground. In March 1960, Ma Yinchu was relieved of his post at Beijing University and was in virtual exile until rehabilitated 18 years later.

Meanwhile, population pressure in China generated one headache after another for Beijing's economic policy makers. As a result, population policy became extremely vague as the government attempted to play down the policy of promoting population growth and at times work surreptitiously toward population control. After Mao Zedong died in 1976 and the Gang of Four 四人幫 was arrested, the need for population control was touted in every quarter. Taking advantage of this mood, China's top leaders took the opportunity to implement drastic policies. Thus it was that the Chinese people were subjected to the one-child-per-family rule 一人っ子政策, the most far-reaching population-control policy in history.

[2] YOSHIDA Tadao 吉田忠雄, "Chūgoku no jinkō to minzoku 中國の人口と民族 (China's Population and Peoples)," in Ajia seikei gakkai アジア政經學會, ed., *Chūgoku seiji keizai sō ran* 中國政治經濟綜覧 (General Survey of Politics and Economy in China) (Tokyo: Nikkan rōdō tsūshinsha 日刊勞働通信社, 1962), 99.

While many families circumvented the law, keeping their "shadow children" hidden from the authorities, the policy did succeed in curbing China's population growth. Nonetheless, Beijing's goal, adopted early in the 1980s, of keeping the population to 1.2 billion through the end of this century is clearly out of reach; current projections suggest that the population will reach 1.55 billion by 2050.[3] What, then, does the future hold for this huge and growing nation?

Food

In a report delivered in May 1995, HAYAMI Yūjirō 速水佑次郎 expounded his view that while Africa faces critical food shortages in the years ahead, Asia will manage reasonably well and East Asia faces no danger. HAYAMI minutely analyzed the situation in East Asia, including China, up through the year 2010. He projected no serious food shortages, even taking into account natural disasters and armed conflicts, cyclical crises involving climate and soil, and population growth. While acknowledging that China, now a net importer of foodstuffs, will have to continue to boost its imports of agricultural products and that global grain prices are likely to rise, Hayami expressed his belief that East Asia had the economic strength to cope with such price increases.[4]

Hayami's relatively sanguine forecast stands in contrast to Lester Brown's pessimistic outlook.[5] As a huge country still very much at the mercy of natural disasters, China could be hit by crop failures at any time. A massive food shortage ravaged this huge and populous country from the winter of 1958 through the autumn of 1959, resulting in a reported 7 million deaths from starvation and malnutrition in the Shanghai 上海 area alone. At that time, however, China was in virtual economic isolation, cut off completely from the global economy. But if the nation continues on its current path of reform and opening, its economy will become integrated into the global economic system, and as long as China remains stable politically and socially, it will find the resources to compensate for the occasional bad harvest. With today's open economy, it seems fair to forecast China's food situa-

[3] WAKABAYASHI Keiko 若林敬子, *Chūgoku: Jinkō chōtaikoku no yukue* 中國 人口超大國の行方 (China: The Future of a Population Superpower) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店, 1994), 123ff. According to estimates by WAKABAYASHI, India's population will surpass China's around 2035 (*ibid.*, 25). The potential impact of India, as the world's most populous country, on the international community is another interesting topic, one that unfortunately must be left for another occasion.

[4] HAYAMI Yūjirō 速水佑次郎, "Ajia no shokuryō mondai アジアの食糧問題 (Food Supply in Asia)," report presented to the Asian Order Study Group, May 30, 1995.

[5] See Lester Brown, "Who Will Feed China?," *World Watch Magazine* 7/5 (September-October 1994), 10–19. Lester Brown, president of the Worldwatch institute, has been sounding the alarm regarding overpopulation, food supply, resources, and the environment for many years, and his assessment of China's future is the bleakest of all.

tion on the basis of Hayami's optimistic projection.

Now that China is a net food importer, however, North Korea will inevitably feel the pinch when China's domestic food supply is tight, as happened in 1994. We can surmise with a high degree of certainty that the agricultural assistance China had provided North Korea over many years was cut off that year. The cutoff in aid was a huge blow to the fledgling regime of Kim Jong-il 金正日 and, in combination with floods and other natural disasters, created a situation that obliged Pyongyang 平壌 to swallow its pride and request grain shipments from Japan and South Korea in order to avert a crisis of confidence.

To sum up, during the first decade or so of the twenty-first century Japan can rest assured that, at least where the task of feeding the population is concerned, China is unlikely to confront the sorts of difficulties that would make it a dangerous neighbor. Even further down the road, the kind of food shortage envisioned by Lester Brown is unlikely to occur as a problem restricted to China. A global pinch in food supplies could conceivably trigger a worldwide crisis, but such speculation is beyond the scope of this essay.

Energy resources

Between 1975 and 1987 the annual global increase in primary energy consumption averaged 2.4%. In Asia, however, consumption grew by 3.8% annually, and in China the rate of increase was 5.2% (Japan's average increase during this time was 1.1%). To keep up with this huge increase in consumption China has had to boost its energy supply continuously. Coal is the cheapest energy source for China, which is said to hold 40% of the world's deposits. While coal accounted for 76% of China's energy consumption in 1975, the figure had risen to 80% by 1987. China now accounts for almost 30% of the world's solid fuel consumption, surpassing America's 21%.[6]

Accordingly, there is little chance that China—now a net energy importer—will face an energy crisis any time between now and the early decades of the twenty-first century.

The Socialist Market Economy

As the foregoing suggests, for the next 40 years or so the basic factors of popula-

[6] YAKUSHIJI Taizō 藥師寺泰藏, "Ajia keizai to enerugī daitai ni tsuite アジア經濟とエネルギー代替について (Models for Alternative Energy Sources for the Asian Economy)," in World Order Study Association, ed., *Ajia no keizai hatten to shin chitsujo* アジアの經濟發展と新秩序 (Economic Development and the New Order in Asia) (Tokyo: World Economic Information Services, 1995), 83–101.

tion, food, and energy resources are unlikely to give rise to a situation that would make China a serious threat to international stability. The potential problem lies, instead, with the motives and abilities of the country's policy makers.

After the Tiananmen Square Incident 天安門事件 of June 4, 1989, many observers both inside and outside China feared that a radical oneparty dictatorship would abruptly steer the country back to a rigid planned economy. After all, in the past, whenever the government veered toward radical socialism, the economy would invariably shift toward lockstep planning. The result would be a loss of economic vitality, causing living standards and national strength to stagnate. In response, Beijing would relax its radical socialist stance and adopt a more moderate economic policy allowing the market mechanism to function in a limited way, thus restoring a measure of economic vitality. This relatively liberal economic policy would be accompanied by a trend toward political moderation seen in an expansion of political liberties, including greater freedom of expression, expanded academic freedom, and a more democratic political process. In this way the pendulum swung back and forth between radicalism and moderation. Although the reaction was sometimes a bit delayed, economic policy and political leadership moved more or less in tandem.

Accordingly, it was natural for people to fear that after the Tiananmen Incident the government would not merely clamp down politically but also abandon its policy of opening up the economy. The infusion of foreign capital stopped abruptly, urban construction projects were halted, economic stagnation quickly set in, and the number of foreigners visiting China dropped precipitously.

As it turned out, however, Deng Xiaoping's approach broke with the traditional pattern. Having experienced both the decade of radicalism known as the Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 and another decade of relatively liberal policies, Deng realized that the people would be unable to turn their backs on the fruits of economic freedom. He also understood that without economic development China could never boost its strength or its international position. Speeches delivered by Deng during his tour of Guangdong 廣東 Province and other southeastern coastal areas early in 1992 indicated Beijing's resolve to throw its full weight behind economic reform. That is, while strengthening the dictatorship of the CCP on the political front, the government intends to make sure that the so-called socialist market economy takes root.

Thanks to this policy, China's gross national product grew at an average annual rate of 9% in the 15-year period ending in 1993, a pace that stands out even within booming East Asia. At the same time, however, the government has considerable authority to regulate economic activity, and at this level there is rampant abuse of power by government and party officials who manipulate the market mechanism for their own profit. This corruption has spread to the point where it threatens the stability of China's power structure. One critical problem facing China today is how

to curb corruption among government and party officials, and restore the people's trust in the government and party. Indeed, Beijing is now engaged in an epic struggle to restore the erstwhile purity of the party and defeat the corrupt officials who have succumbed to greed—a struggle whose outcome will determine the country's destiny.

Another source of consternation to the country's policy makers is the degree to which money worship and a get-rich-quick ethic have gripped the populace. People speak of an incident in which two members of the newly moneyed class of entrepreneurs tried to upstage each other at a karaoke bar in Changchun 長春. One declared he would foot the bill for the entire evening's entertainment, whereupon the other announced that he was going to buy up all the cut flowers in the city. One wealthy businessman in Beijing paid 20,000 yuan 元, roughly $3,600, entertaining a magnate from Guangdong at a fancy restaurant. The Guangdong businessman responded by wining and dining his Beijing associate to the tune of 60,000 yuan. One hears numerous stories of people buying clothes or dogs for thousands of dollars.[7] As long as this tendency toward extravagance is confined to a small fraction of the populace, it does not pose a threat to political stability, but there is good cause for concern over the extent to which this ethic may be pervading the ranks of government and party officials.

Rapid economic growth has produced a number of other side effects that weigh heavily on the country's policy makers. Among these are the widening economic gap between the coastal and inland regions, resulting in the massive migration of workers in search of more lucrative jobs; the increasing unprofitability of state-owned enterprises; the crisscrossing "triangular debt" among these enterprises, which will ultimately have to be paid out of government coffers; and a chronic income shortfall in the national budget.

Nonetheless, if we view China's progress over the last three decades, there is no denying that the zigzag path it is following leads inexorably toward a reformed and open economy. However the political winds may shift, this basic economic posture is unlikely to change.

An Emerging Hegemon?

A source of anxiety to China's neighbors has been the enthusiasm with which Beijing has continued to build up its military despite the end of the cold war. Judging from government statistics alone, there is no denying that China continues to place great emphasis on military spending despite its chronic budget deficits:

[7] UEMATSU Reiko 上松玲子, trans., "Haikinshugi ni ketsubetsu wo! 拝金主義に訣別を！ (Farewell to Mammonism!)," *Zenrin* 善鄰 193 (July 1993): 21.

Between 1990 and 1994, defense outlays rose from 8.7% to 9.6% of the national budget. In 1994 in particular, the defense budget grew 22.4%, to about $9.5 billion. In actuality, anywhere from five to seven times this amount is probably spent on defense.

The modernization of the People's Liberation Army 人民解放軍 has been one of Beijing's basic priorities for years, but in 1993 Liu Huaqing 劉華清, vice-chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission 中央軍事委員會, specifically called for priority to be placed on building up the navy, air force, and high-tech weapons systems, with emphasis on mechanized army units, war vessels, aircraft, and improved missile performance and firing ability. These will require a huge infusion of funds at the same time that the military has called for restraint in expenditure in deference to the party's policy of placing priority on economic development. Thus, China has thrown itself into the task of building a truly modern military with the help of foreign technology.

The question is, what will these new, improved military forces be used for? The PLA of old tried to serve as an exemplar for the people by sharing in their labors on the domestic front. Today's military brass, however, is fast becoming a technocracy, dominated by commissioned and noncommissioned officers with advanced technical training. Meanwhile, Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian 遲浩田 has promoted an "active defense," which he defines as a military prepared to defend both the mainland and surrounding waters.

Chi's words should be taken at face value. Beijing has no qualms about sending in the PLA to "defend the mainland." Included in this category of activity is the suppression of incipient antigovernment movements by ethnic minorities within China, as is evident from Beijing's repressive policies against the Tibetans and the Uighurs of Xinjiang 新疆. Also included are the large-scale missile tests and naval exercises designed to register Beijing's displeasure and apply pressure in the wake of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui 李登輝's US visit in June 1995 and Taiwan's general election in December that year. There are few territories left for China to recover. Both Hongkong and Macao 澳門 are scheduled to revert to Chinese control in the near future. Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands 尖閣諸島 has been left to future generations. Where the Spratlys 南沙羣島 are concerned, China has already established a presence on one corner of the island group, thus gaining a foothold for oil exploration and the building of a naval base somewhere down the road.

It will be some time, however, before China has the power to seriously contemplate the "liberation of Taiwan." For the foreseeable future, the Kuomintang government will retain control over the Taiwan Straits and its airspace with the help of American-made weapons.

Under present circumstances, then, there is no possibility of China's emerging as an expansionist, hegemonic power wielding military force against its neighbors to augment its own territory. At the same time, there is no question that it seeks to

establish itself as a major political power capable of exerting global leadership. In pursuit of this objective, China's foreign policy over the next few decades will doubtless be shaped by the interim goal of achieving a position of economic and political leadership in East Asia.[8]

After Deng Xiaoping

Born in 1904, Deng Xiaoping is now in his nineties. Inevitably, the world is speculating on the direction China will take after he is gone. Let us briefiy examine three proposed scenarios.

The most extreme position is that civil disturbances will break out. Proponents of this theory have cited the magnitude of the economic disparity between the coastal and inland regions; back when Ye Xuanping 葉選平 began implementing bold economic growth policies as governor of Guangdong Province, they pointed frequently to the area's semi-autonomy and its defiance of Beijing. Now, however, Ye is comfortably ensconced in the Beijing leadership as vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 中國人民政治協商會議. While scattered antigovernment movements may break out among peasants or ethnic minorities, we are unlikely to see the emergence of a leader capable of challenging the authority of the CCP Central Committee 中國共產黨中央委員會. The possibility of civil war can be safely discounted.

Another possible scenario is the orderly transfer of power to President Jiang Zemin 江澤民 and Premier Li Peng 李鵬. It is well known that the Central Committee is now laying the groundwork for such a transfer of authority. Jiang Zemin is not only president of the country but also general secretary of the CCP and chairman of its Central Military Commission. He has followed Deng's lead faithfully in regard to economic reform and has worked tirelessly to win points on the diplomatic stage, especially in regard to the United States—an effort that has begun to pay off. He has begun to consolidate popular support by taking a hard line in international affairs, whether the issue be Taiwan or the dispute over the Spratly

[8] See Jin Hongfan 金泓汎, *Chūgoku keizaiken* 中國經濟圈 (The Chinese Economic Sphere) (Tokyo: Simul Publishing サイマル出版會, 1995). Jin emphasizes the solidarity and leadership of the Chinese within the East Asian economy. A related theory is the idea that the "Confucian cultural sphere" is predisposed to rapid economic growth. Although formerly Confucianism was widely regarded as an impediment to modernization, today a number of scholars hold that Confucianism is conducive to economic growth. While I would not categorically refute such theories, I am skeptical of any attempt to draw a simple and direct connection between Confucianism and economic growth, especially in view of the contribution that so many Malaysians, Indonesians, and Filipinos have made to economic growth in the region.

Islands. I would estimate a 40% chance of a smooth succession centered on Jiang Zemin and Li Peng.

As I see it, however, circumstances more strongly favor a power struggle within the party. It is difficult to predict the behavior of Political Bureau Standing Committee members 政治局常務委員 Qiao Shi 喬石, Li Ruihuan 李瑞環, Zhu Rongji 朱鎔基, and Liu Huaqing, who controls the PLA; and in the party secretariat, there is no telling whether Hu Jintao 胡錦濤 and Wei Jianxing 尉健行 will obey Jiang. Keeping these variables in mind, one is inevitably reminded of the fierce power struggle that shook the CCP leadership in the autumn of 1976 following the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong and culminated in the arrest of the Gang of Four, a virtual *coup d'état.*

In short, while the policy of economic reform can be expected to continue, it is impossible to predict what configuration the country's political leadership will assume after Deng's death.

Food Supply and Sino-Japanese Relations

Notwithstanding the work of numerous experts, the world has yet to discover effective measures to deal with the earth's overpopulation. Neither the relaxation of the hold of the Catholic Church's traditional ban on artificial birth control nor the World Health Organization's promotion of family planning has had an appreciable effect on global population growth. China's stringently enforced policy of one child per family is likely to go down in history as the most successful population-control program ever attempted.

If current trends continue, China's population will grow to no more than about 1,555,500,000 as of the year 2050. Meanwhile, India will overtake China as the world's largest nation, with an estimated population of 1,591,000,000. Japan's population, by contrast, will actually shrink by about 10 million, to around 115 million.

In the past, citing "food security" concerns, Japan maintained a policy of self-sufficiency in its staple food, rice. In time, however, it became apparent that by closing its borders to foreign rice Japan was inviting retaliation from countries on which it depended for the bulk of its other grain, including feed grains and wheat. The full implementation of the agricultural agreements arrived at in the Uruguay round is now only a matter of time.

There is only one policy option open to Japan, as a food-importing nation, if it is to survive within the global distribution system. That is to encourage policies to control population on a global scale. This presents no obstacle where Japan is concerned. (On the contrary, at the current rate of negative population growth, the Japanese as an ethnic group will vanish from the face of the earth in another 1,000 years.) Beijing's population-control policy has both merits and demerits and will

inevitably draw mixed reviews, but as China's neighbor, Japan can only welcome the end result. On the campus of Beijing University there now stands a bust of Ma Yinchu. One hopes the statue and the memory it represents will be revered.

At the conference on the theme "Prospects and Strategies for China's Food Supply" held in Beijing in June 1995, Mei Fangquan 梅方權 of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 中國農業科學院 provided a long-term projection of domestic food supply and demand. According to his estimate, the shortfall will rise as high as 33 million tons by 2020, but adjustments thereafter will bring supply and demand into balance again by the year 2030.[9] Mei Fangquan's forecast is much more optimistic than Lester Brown's. The majority of scholars fall about midway between these two extremes. Whether it officially embraces the optimistic or the pessimistic view, Beijing fully recognizes that food supply poses a serious challenge for the country. That is why shipments of food aid to North Korea were halted, as mentioned above. In addition, grain to be exported to Mongolia was priced almost three times higher last year than the year before, making negotiations unproductive. The government of Mongolia is hoping that Japan will provide some form of assistance to tide the country over its food crisis.

At the same time, Beijing is busily tackling the food-supply issue from every conceivable angle, including the semi-compulsory relocation of farmers for the purpose of developing farmland, the expansion of farmland through irrigation and flood-control projects, and the development and propagation of high-yield varieties. Lately the government has adopted a policy of stepping up production of fruit wines in order to cut back on the diversion of grain for the brewing of alcoholic beverages.

As long as Beijing seriously addresses the food problem, even a crisis on the order of what Lester Brown has predicted would not decimate the world's supply of grain. As long as grain is coming onto the world market and the market mechanism is functioning, Japan should be able to continue buying what it needs.

This does not mean that Japan's own programs for boosting agricultural productivity and stockpiling food are of no importance. A food crisis is bound to hit eventually, and it behooves the Japanese government to implement serious programs on a variety of levels so that the country will be prepared when it does. Simultaneously, China and Japan should step up consultations, on both the governmental and the private levels, in an effort to find the most effective means by which Japan can cooperate in China's measures to boost production of foodstuffs. The time to act is now, before a food crisis looms.

[9] KOBAYASHI Hironao 小林熙直 "Chūgoku no shokuryō jukyū no tembō 中國の食料需給の展望 (The Outlook for Food Supply and Demand in China)," *Ajia kenkyūsho shohō* アジア研究所所報 (Report of the Institute for Asian Studies) 80 (November 30, 1995): 10–11.

The Environment and Sino-Japanese Relations

In my discussion of energy resources I predicted that China would be able to avoid an energy crisis at least through the early part of the twenty-first century. This forecast presupposes, however, that China continues to make unstinting use of fossil fuels, and such a policy raises serious environmental problems. To begin with, deforestation has proceeded at an alarming speed. Even in ancient times vast areas of woodland were cleared over centuries for the building and repair of the Great Wall. More recently, a huge amount of timber was cut to fuel the small backyard iron smelters that sprang up over the countryside during the Great Leap Forward 大躍進 of the late 1950s, and little of the deforested area was replanted. During the Great Leap Forward 1.3 million hectares of forests were cleared, and only 240,000 hectares were replanted.[10] Industrialization and urbanization, while raising the standard of living, also resulted in the destruction of vast areas of woodland for fuel and building materials. Meanwhile, deforestation opened the way for the loss of fertile farmland through leaching, desiccation, and even desertification. If this vicious circle is not interrupted, the destruction of the environment can only accelerate.

Although this state of affairs does not pose an immediate threat to Japan, it does have extremely serious ramifications for East Asia as a whole. The destruction of the land can have a profound impact on the food supply, and loess carried by the prevailing westerlies and deposited on North and South Korea and Japan may have a direct impact on the ecology of these countries.

Furthermore, as a result of China's dependence on coal and wood for energy, carbon dioxide and sulfur and nitrogen compounds are emitted into the atmosphere in huge quantities. (The general deterioration of the environment and ecological disruption caused by industrialization, the decimation of forests for fuel, acid rain, and so forth have reached a point where one observer has seen fit to speak of China's "artificial environment.")[11] Naturally, this atmospheric pollution drifts with the westerlies toward the Koreas and Japan, where it threatens the native flora and fauna. Already pines and other trees in western Japan have begun turning brown and dying, and acid rain is thought to be responsible for the changes on the surface of such bronze monuments as the Great Buddha in Kamakura 鎌倉 and the statue of SAIGŌ Takamori 西郷隆盛 in Tokyo's Ueno Park 上野公園. Clearly it is imperative that all of East Asia begin cooperating on measures to rectify China's unnatural environment.

[10] ISHI Hiroyuki 石弘之, "Chūgoku kankyō no genjō 中國環境の現狀 (The Current State of the Chinese Environment)," report presented to the Asian Order Study Group, July 4, 1995.
[11] MATSUOKA Hideo 松岡秀雄, "Kankyō mondai 環境問題 (Environmental Problems)," paper presented to Forum 1000, sponsored by the Building Center of Japan, December 14, 1995.

Because this is such a vital issue, I strongly urge that it be given priority over all the other matters pending between Japan and China. To be sure, Japanese organizations have engaged in various projects aimed at helping to reverse the environmental degradation underway in China. The research center of the Wild Bird Society of Japan 日本野鳥の會 has conducted a survey on the development of agriculture on state farms in Heilongjiang 黒龍江 Province. The Center for Area Studies of Keiō University 慶應義塾大學 has conducted a study of the environment in Chengdu 成都 and has worked to establish a "JACK Network" linking Japan, China, and the Koreas for the purpose of collecting data on atmospheric pollution.[12] Chiba University 千葉大學, the Foundation for Earth Environment 地球環境財團, and Tottori University 鳥取大學 are among the other institutions that have undertaken studies or reforestation projects aimed at reversing some of the damage that has been sustained by China's environment. Japan insists on the installation of desulfurization equipment in virtually all factories constructed under Sino-Japanese business partnerships. But these are isolated, small-scale efforts. A comprehensive survey or research project undertaken jointly by China and Japan or by China, Japan, and South Korea has yet to materialize. Under plans now being hammered out by the Global Infrastructure Fund Research Foundation Japan 日本グローバル・インフラストラクチャー研究財團, the foundation would conduct a comprehensive survey of the studies that have been conducted on the Japanese side, providing the basis for a project to prevent desertification along the Yellow River 黄河 and promote greening that would be conducted jointly with China. And in the summer of 1995 the Japanese government sent a delegation to China regarding a large-scale environmental survey to be carried out under the supervision of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Such projects should be placed at the very top of the Sino-Japanese agenda, since they involve matters of the utmost concern for the bilateral relationship. When we recall the vast tracts of Germany's Black Forest that have withered and died and the beautiful European glacial lakes that have been transformed into lifeless bodies of water, we cannot help feeling the urgency of attacking this problem as soon as possible. There are fascinating ideas afoot that may supply the world with sources of clean energy over the long term; examples are the notion of using the moon to project the sun's heat toward the earth, or that of erecting a parasol in space to collect solar energy.[13] But in the short term, global energy policy has reached an impasse, particularly in the wake of the sodium leak recently discovered in the

[12] YAMADA Tatsuo 山田辰雄 and HASHIMOTO Yoshikazu 橋本芳一 eds., *Chūgoku kankyō kenkyū: Shisenshō seitoshi ni okeru jirei kenkyū* 中國環境研究：四川省成都市における事例研究 (The Chinese Environment: Case Studies in Chengdu, Sichuan Province) (Tokyo: Keisō shobō 勁草書房, 1995).

[13] MATSUOKA Hideo, *op. cit.*

Monju もんじゅ fast breeder-reactor in Fukui 福井 Prefecture. This was a crushing setback, especially since the problem was recognized early on by the project's opponents and supporters alike. It is unlikely that the reactor will be abandoned as Japan's nuclear submarine program was after a radioactive leak in the submarine Mutsu triggered a barrage of emotionalistic media coverage. Even so, the accident is likely to delay the project for years—perhaps even a decade or more. It is painful to think that Japan's ambitious plan for providing a source of clean energy for East Asia by means of fast breeder-reactors has fallen by the wayside.

The least we can do in these circumstances is to follow through on initiatives to convert a major portion of China's energy from solid fuels to natural gas from Siberia. Since natural gas pollutes the atmosphere far less than coal and much less even than oil, this would be an important step toward curbing air pollution. Let us begin now. If we wait until pollution and environmental destruction take their toll, it will be too late.

The Economy and Sino-Japanese Relations

Economists are observing China closely to see whether it can negotiate a "soft landing" in its transition from a rigid, centrally controlled planned economy resembling state socialism to the managed capitalist system that the Chinese have dubbed a "socialist market economy." I have suggested—based on China's history and a comparison of the experiences of Japan (which has developed under a system of managed capitalism) with those of Britain and northern Europe—that the future of the Chinese economy will be determined in some degree by the government's ability to control corruption among top-level bureaucrats and party officials.

Even in the event that official corruption spirals out of control, the resulting economic chaos and stagnation need not threaten Sino-Japanese relations. If, on the other hand, China is successful in fighting corruption and emerges as an economic superpower, Japan and China will have no choice but to coexist within a competitive and mutually dependent relationship. In this case, the thing to do is to fashion a relationship similar to that between Japan and the United States, one in which vertical and horizontal divisions of labor are deftly interwoven. Although short-term conflicts will doubtless flair up, in the long run a stable system of cooperative coexistence is bound to prevail. Where future economic relations with China are concerned, this writer takes an optimistic view.

Don't Goad the Elephant

I have already discussed the nature of Beijing's political ambitions in the region.

The next question is how Japan should respond to China's moves to extend its influence.

In terms of our geopolitical relationship, Japan and China can be likened to a small boat floating alongside a great warship. When the warship bobs even slightly, the boat pitches and rolls. This is not simply a matter of the difference in population and land area. Whereas China is extremely unresponsive to foreign pressure, Japan tends to overreact. When the Western powers were encroaching on East Asia around the middle of the nineteenth century, Qing 清 dynasty China viewed this as no more than a regional disturbance; Japan, however, took it as a threat to the nation's very survival. For China, the Sino-Japanese War 日清戦争 of 1894–95 was merely a conflict engaging the Northern Fleet 北洋艦隊 ; from Japan's viewpoint, it was a life-and-death struggle. Such is the difference in scale between our two countries.

Accordingly, it is not in Japan's interest to have the great warship next door pitching violently. Or, to use a different metaphor, when the elephant runs amok, it may unintentionally trample the little dog nearby. Matters that China regards as most central to its national interest—for example, the territorial issues revolving around Taiwan and Tibet—should be regarded as the sensitive hairs on the elephant's chin; one prerequisite for a manageable relationship is never to touch them. Private individuals are free to say whatever they like, of course, but our public officials must be careful at all times not to goad the elephant.

The same does not apply, however, to military expansion and the development of nuclear weapons. Even if China has no intention of using its rapidly growing military power, this is a tool for intimidating and psychologically pressuring other countries, and Japan is bound to feel threatened by it. Two basic requirements for dealing with this threat are the continuation of our security arrangements with the United States and accurate analyses, by the Defense Agency 防衛廳 and other organs, of China's military capabilities and intentions. I would also encourage the exchange of information and personnel between China's PLA and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Finally, let us cultivate among our own people a flexible and levelheaded attitude toward China, impervious to the mass media's instinctive tendency toward sensationalism. Education, indeed, determines a nation's destiny.

The truth is that in the course of 15 years of war with China, Japan earned the label of "aggressor," and this perception—borne out by historical evidence—has greatly complicated the bilateral relationship. China has frequently raised the issue of Japan's historical guilt as a card to be played in bilateral negotiations, and it will doubtless continue to do so. In this country of free expression, meanwhile, many people feel intensely guilty about Japan's past transgressions and sympathize deeply with China. In this context, in 1972 the pro-Chinese business magnate OKAZAKI Kaheita 岡崎嘉平太 criticized Prime Minister SATŌ Eisaku's 佐藤榮作 China policy with the following comment: "If we were to go back to the moment of Japan's

defeat, we would be in exactly the same position as Percival when he went to General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki 山下奉文. If we think of Japan as being back at the point of defeat and seeking to make peace, we will see that Japan is in no position to lay down conditions."[14] (The mention of General Arthur Percival refers to the incident, just before Britain surrendered Singapore to General YAMASHITA in February 1942, when YAMASHITA cut short negotiations by yelling, "Do you surrender or not?")

For years to come, a significant portion of Japan's intelligentsia will doubtless continue to suffer from the kind of guilt complex expressed in Okazaki's statement. This greatly weakens Tokyo's position when negotiating with Beijing. Nonetheless, it is at once a historical debt and one of the unavoidable costs of an immutable guiding principle of our society, freedom of thought and expression. It may be tempting to put the past behind us and never look back, but this is scarcely the best way to solve the problem. To those who ask in exasperation how long Japan must continue to apologize, I answer: "As long as China continues to demand it." At the same time, let us pursue a dispassionate, objective study of modern East Asian history that acknowledges both Japan's infamy and its glory.

Conclusion

Above I have discussed China's outlook over the next 10 to 15 years and analyzed the impact of projected developments on Sino-Japanese relations. My conclusions can be summed up in five points:

1. Regardless of how the situation in China develops in the coming years, the environment is the single biggest and most pressing issue in Sino-Japanese relations. For the sake of East Asia's continued prosperity, it is essential that we tackle this area of concern immediately.
2. Food supply should be the next item on the agenda.
3. Economic relations between Japan and China are likely to proceed smoothly and grow closer regardless of developments in the Chinese economy.
4. China's military might, while not an immediate threat, could well become an intimidating presence. To avoid overreacting to isolated developments, we must accurately gauge China's military capabilities and intentions while cultivating among our people the mental fortitude to stand up to Beijing's muscle flexing. (To add a final proviso, I believe Japan should continue to vigorously protest China's nuclear tests.)

[14] OKAZAKI Kaheita 岡崎嘉平太, ISHIKAWA Tadao 石川忠雄, and TAKADA Fusao 高田富佐雄, "Nan no tame no 'Nitchū kokkō' ka なんのための「日中國交」か (What's the Aim of [Normalizing] Sino-Japanese Relations?)," *Ajia* アジア 7/8 (August 1972): 42, 43.

5. A huge and powerful country, China also holds a decisive psychological advantage over Japan in every type of negotiation owing to its consciousness of having been wronged by us in the past. We must foster among the Japanese people a mentality that allows us to maintain a flexible attitude and yet calmly and firmly resist unreasonable pressure or demands.

PART 2 JAPAN AND CHINA IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

Chapter VIII JAPAN AND AMERICA IN ASIA DURING THE NINETEEN SEVENTIES

In 1946, after the end of World War II, per capita income in Japan fell to less than $70. Prospects were dismal; to the occupation authorities, to restore the economy even to its 1935 level seemed utterly hopeless. Poverty was rampant — to the extent that a return to material prosperity became one of the few issues that could elicit a broad consensus in this country, which otherwise remained a "house divided" on both ideology and foreign policy. Through bold application of a neo-Keynesian economic policy in the years following, Japan achieved the highest growth rate in the world. In so doing, while one of the most passive of nations politically and militarily, it became a troublesome economic competitor. There is no way, however, for Japan to continue in the same role during the seventies. It must adjust its position in international society, seek an appropriate military and political role, and become the pacemaker for stable, international economic development.

Nuclear Weapons

According to one theory, hostility is determined genetically as an adjunct to the instinct for survival. If that is true, both offensive and defensive instincts are genetically derived. A river trout, for example, preserves an area of about one square yard for his own exclusive use. He immediately attacks any of his own species who venture onto his "turf," maintaining a state of equilibrium between his area and others, and creating a "balance of hostility." Biologists tell us that this intraspecies conflict performs the function of keeping the trout evenly distributed and also, through natural selection, insuring development by making it possible for the strong to leave offspring. On the other hand, continual conflict results in overdevelopment of certain

* This was originally published as "Japan and America in Asia during the Seventies" in *The Japan Interpreter* 7/3-4 (1972): 245-254. It was originally written in Japanese for this journal and was translated by J. Victor Koschmann. It was written in order to elucidate how the Japan-US relations, especially the regional bilateral relations in East Asia, were formed in the 1970s. It was written in the context of the Vietnam War and the Nixon shock and was one of the few articles which treated the Japan-US relations in positive light.

parts of the body — the "weapons" — and they ultimately become a burden; the huge muscles of reptiles and the horns of deer, for example. *Homo sapiens* has also developed tools for intraspecies conflict. There are many theories about nuclear weapons, but looked at as a biological process, they can be regarded as products of the extreme development of man's offensive and defensive instincts.

Defense problems have regained respectability as a topic for discussion and at the same time the number of Japanese who advocate nuclear armament seems to have grown. Supporters of nuclear armament fifteen years ago were only 3% of the population, but according to a poll conducted by the *Yomiuri* 讀賣 newspaper on August 7, 1969, they comprised 16.1% of the population by that year. The same poll asked, "Regardless of your preference, do you think that Japan will have nuclear weapons during the next decade?" 32.1% answered "Yes." Furthermore, rapid economic growth has given us both the economic and technical means to produce nuclear weapons. The particular socio-psychological background of the Japanese is conducive to looking at international society as a system of hierarchical relationships and such thinking has encouraged the idea that Japan should become a great power, perhaps even a "superpower." These elements underlie the view that sooner or later Japan will develop nuclear weapons.

Barring other changes, however, I do not think that will happen during the next decade; it will probably not become a practical problem before the 1980s. In the first place, public opinion *against* the possession of nuclear weapons presents an entirely different picture from that brought out by the figures quoted above. To the question in the same *Yomiuri* poll, "Do you want nuclear weapons for Japan?", 71.8% answered "No." Of those who had answered "Yes" when asked if they thought Japan would have nuclear weapons in the next decade, two-thirds subsequently observed, "I hope not, but I suppose it's inevitable." Japanese hypersensitivity to the very idea creates the tendency to overstate out of apprehension, to exaggerate rearmament and militarism. Taking that into account, the significance of the 32.1% as a measure of unemotional prediction, markedly declines. Secondly, it is debatable whether nuclear weapons would add anything to Japan's security. The Gaullist philosophy that possession of even a one-shot nuclear capability is politically and militarily strategic is not widely held in Japan. For France, the target is the Soviet Union, a country separated from France by West Germany. On this side of the world, Japan confronts China just across the East China Sea. In addition, Franco-Soviet relations are relatively more stable than Sino-Japanese. China's denunciations of Japan under the Satō 佐藤 regime have been stronger than ever, striking against the present policy of maintaining friendly relations with Taiwan 臺灣 and South Korea 韓國 and against Japan's rearmament.

The differences between Japan and France are great enough to provide an argument for rearmament but it is difficult to conclude that nuclear weapons would materially add to Japan's security. Conversely, if China were to launch a preemptive

attack on Japan and leave it in a state of smoking rubble, what would the Chinese do with their new, pulverized acquisition? Even if they attacked and the United States, fortunately, chose not to retaliate against China, it would be extremely difficult for the Chinese to decide on the next move. They could use only one very small weapon and avoid complete destruction of the country and Japan might summarily surrender, but those who survived would harbor smouldering hate for the Chinese. The smaller countries surrounding China would become deeply suspicious, turning perhaps to the United States or the Soviet Union and thus further undermining China's security.

Even if China limited itself to threats, the reaction of most Japanese would be very negative, especially as feelings towards Chinese have never been particularly positive. As long as the Peking government is aware of the sensitivity of the Japanese situation and that awareness is reflected in the policy-making process, China will probably avoid further aggravation by letting fly nuclear threats. There are two situations which could become ominous exceptions, however.

The first is the hypothetical case of brinksmanship where some provocation from the Japanese challenges a principle strongly held by China, and China decides that only a nuclear threat would create domestic turmoil in Japan enough to produce a more "fluid" state of affairs. The second exception is the case where, assuming Japan-US relations are extremely cool, Japan persists in needling China until the Peking government uses nuclear threats to force Japan's surrender. To avoid either situation, internal stability must be maintained in Japan, even against the potential turmoil aroused by a nuclear threat. Secondly, America's nuclear deterrent against China must remain credible. The Chinese Communist Party is faithful to its word, however, and I personally think the repeated assurances that China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons are almost completely reliable.

The third element operating against a nuclear-armed Japan in the seventies is opposition from other countries. Should Japan dare to develop nuclear weapons in this climate of opinion, it would result in vehement objections and possibly the erection of barriers to needed resources. The United States and the Soviet Union, having supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 核不擴散條約, do not want any more members admitted to the nuclear club. Theoretically, China maintains that the more nuclear powers, the better, but in the face of political reality, it could not tolerate a nuclear Japan. Thus, it would be very difficult for Japan to arm with nuclear weapons, against such strong pressures.

Finally, most of the technologists who constitute Japan's capability to develop nuclear weapons are emotionally committed to prevent nuclear armament. This atmosphere in the scientific community will probably continue during the next decade. Were the government to adopt a policy of nuclear armament, it would be difficult to obtain their cooperation.

The above four factors have convinced me that Japan will not become a nuclear country for the next decade, all other factors being equal. It is more likely that the

present Japan-US security structure will remain, to siphon political energy away from independent nuclear armament.

A Dual Security System

Following the defeat of Christian XII at Pultowa, it took Sweden a whole century to shake off its reputation as a great military power. The image Japan created in East and Southeast Asia between the Mukden 奉天 Incident (滿洲事變) in 1931 and the defeat in 1945 is still a potent, unpleasant memory in the 1970s. Financially, it would be easy to refurbish that memory. Even if Japan implements its new defense plan, defense expenditures will still fall below 1% of the national income. The present defense budget is about $1,800 million. The national income is expected to reach $270,000 million by 1975 and 1% of that will be $2,700 million.

India's 1971 defense expenditures were $1,500 million, Pakistan's $600 million, and South Korea's $2,500 million. Japan's 1975 expenditures will be, therefore, large compared with other Asian countries, coming to approximately two-fifths of what the People's Republic of China spends on defense. Part of it has gone into building phantom fighters capable of flying round trip hydrogen-bombing missions to China — although it must be added that Japan's fighters are not equipped with bombing mechanisms. Such military potential demands that Japan must plan the quantity and quality of its weaponry with utmost discretion both to minimize the military threat to neighboring nations and to maintain a sense of security among its own people.

Although the US-China rapprochement has certainly not ended tension, a new system of peaceful coexistence between the two is being forged. In the process, small countries which once prospered from support for one side or the other must either stagnate or adapt to the changes. They include South Korea, North Korea 北朝鮮, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and also Japan. To adapt to Sino-American peaceful coexistence, Japan must itself find a way to coexist with China and must then find a way to establish peaceful relations with North Korea as events in the peninsula move toward change. The most feasible way to adjust these relations is through a series of nonaggression treaties.

On July 25, 1957, during an interview with a group of Japanese journalists visiting China, Chou En-lai 周恩來 remarked, "If relations between Japan and China are ever normalized, it will be possible to conclude a mutual nonaggression treaty..."(*People's Daily* 人民日報, July 30, 1957). Later reiterating the statement, in a recent interview with James Reston, Chou added a pointed comment on the current threat of Japanese militarism (*New York Times*, August 10, 1971).

As in Sweden's case, distrust towards Japan will not dissipate quickly, but a sincere response to China's proposal and serious reevaluation of the national arma-

ment policy might go a long way to moderate Chinese and North Korean suspicion.

We cannot determine exactly how far nuclear power and the potential for political infiltration by the Chinese, or North Korean hostility constitute real threats to Japan. If, however, a nonaggression pact were concluded, it would function as a supplement to the Japan-US military alliance. For the last twenty years Japan has supported one side in the US-China cold war. A dual security system during the seventies would therefore be more effective and make a stabilized US-China relationship even stronger under the aegis of peaceful coexistence.

Chinese nuclear potential is, theoretically, tempered by the commitment not to use it, but Japanese are nonetheless wary. Conversely, the nations surrounding Japan, particularly China and North Korea, are seriously disturbed by steady Japanese rearmament. Fears on both sides could be allayed under the "dual security" of the Japan-US Security Treaty 日米安全保障條約 and the extra security of a nonaggression treaty with China. If only for the sake of Japan's security, the uneasiness and distrust of neighbor countries should be broken down. Fear of aggression can become a self-fulfilling prophesy and the beginning of a vicious circle of military confrontation. A system of nonaggression treaties could play a dual role in forestalling such a situation. The first step is diplomatic recognition of North Korea and China; conclusion of the treaties themselves is the second step.

The adjustment of relations with the Soviet Union and Mongolia might follow the same procedure. Relations with Mongolia are already at the stage of implied recognition. Formal recognition followed by the conclusion of a commercial treaty seems to be the next logical step. Finally, a formal peace treaty with the Soviet Union would provide new opportunities to strengthen economic relations, and on that foundation a nonmilitary treaty of friendship could easily follow. Should Japan succeed in building such a combination of treaties as a subsystem within the framework of Sino-American peaceful coexistence, the same pattern could probably be applied elsewhere in Asia. It is not inconceivable that the outcome would be an all-Asia agreement limiting the use of nuclear weapons. If the political stability of Asia were strengthened by a regional commitment to similar goals, Japan's economic activities would naturally be strengthened, for its own advantage and for the advantage of the other countries in Asia.

Economic and Cultural Cooperation

Japan's budget for international economic cooperation came to only $485 million in 1965, but by 1970 it has swelled to $1,824 million. This sphere of activity is, however, filled with problems. Quantitatively, the amount is only one-third the budget of the US, and is considerably below that of West Germany and France. Furthermore, most is in the form of deferred-payment loans whose profitability is directly related

to private enterprise in Japan. The advantage gained by the recipient country is extremely small. Technical assistance, for example, is only 1.2% of the Japanese total, while the percentages are 28.4 for France, 17.5 for Belgium, 13.9 for Sweden, and 13.7 for the US.

These figures indicate an incredibly narrow, shortsighted perspective on Japan's part. If the philosophy which guides our aid policy continues unshaken, and Japan's economic growth goes according to plan, in ten years Japan will be importing more than 35% of the world trade in energy resources. By that time, the developing countries will have suffered the loss of their natural resources and will regard Japan with bitterness and resentment. An aid policy aimed only at the immediate benefit of private enterprise is very dangerous; it could create an accumulation of anti-Japanese feeling that, if strong enough, would suddenly explode in a burst of political antagonism fatal to Japan's prosperity.

Cooperation with developing countries must rest on a new philosophy whose basic rationale is assistance to the entire people. A wide gap lies between the privileged classes and the masses in the developing countries; serving the interests of a small elite buys only the hostility and envy of the many. In the long run, that is hardly in Japan's interests. Recognizing that compromise with powerholders in the recipient countries is necessary for international economic cooperation to take place at all, we must avoid at all costs aid which widens the chasm between rich and poor. Surely Japan's efforts in sending doctors overseas, or experts in bamboo crafts or pottery-making are more beneficial than a modern hotel which may cost the country several million dollars.

Secondly, aid should not be given, but shared. Technical aid in the past has been undermined by the unnecessarily luxurious living and irritating sense of privilege of Japanese technicians stationed in less affluent countries. By contrast, in China's aid to Mongolia, which continued until 1964, and Taiwan's agricultural cooperation with African countries, a strong sense of sincerity and cooperation operates among technicians, who work not simply *for*, but *with* the people. The day will probably come in Asia when Chinese rice cultivation experts and Japanese engineers will cooperate to construct irrigation systems — or Chinese nurses and Japanese doctors will work together. To hasten that day, Japanese must begin immediately to cooperate and share *with* the people.

Third, genuine aid does not cater to vested interests. All Japanese know that politicians and businessmen with political connections swarm around large sums of money like flies at a picnic. And we take no pride in the many stories of scandal connected with Japanese reparations payments to Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Vietnam. International activities, especially aid, are too valuable to be used for partisan or individual interests .

Fourth, aid should be given without political strings attached. International cooperation must be completely independent of the political struggles, domestic or

foreign, of the recipient country. No matter how seductive the offers or potent the threats made in the name of justice or power, international cooperation must be completely neutral. We must be prepared to suspend any project which threatens this neutrality. Japanese intervention in the political affairs of the recipient country could engender an unhealthy situation where political change in either country would reverberate in the other.

Finally, it is absolutely necessary to study the project, the people and the country. He who does not investigate the facts has no right to an opinion. All developing countries are different and each has its own national character. Aid activities must be based on accurate knowledge of and care for the people's needs and the political climate. We should also take careful note of existing Japanese organizations and their activities in the country. Private health organizations such as the Japan Christian Medical League and the Association for Prevention of Leprosy in Taiwan should be understood in depth, and government measures to cooperate with them should be initiated. Japan's mission in the field of economic cooperation will fail if we cling to bureaucratic sectarianism and an irresponsible spending.

The Undesirable Alternative

I have outlined some of the ways Japan might improve its relationship with the rest of Asia. There are, of course, other and less desirable choices and it is unfortunate that the mediocre so often becomes the reality.

In the first place, Japan could encounter severe economic problems. The following, for example, must be carefully considered during the seventies.

1. The problem of cultural conflict. When divergent cultures meet, conflict is inevitable. Widespread economic activities have brought the Japanese to many different cultures in Southeast Asia, America and Europe. Although conflict in these areas has not yet inhibited such activities, the arrogance of the Japanese in Southeast Asia and their bad reputation in developed countries are unmistakable signs of increasing tensions. As I mentioned earlier, there is a real possibility that these feelings will accumulate until they finally explode in a burst of political hate. If the Japanese exclusionist movement of the early twentieth century were to be revived in the United States, or if a movement were organized to bar Japanese goods in Southeast Asia, or if severe restrictions were gradually placed on Japanese economic activities, the prosperity of this country could easily suffer economic asphyxiation.
2. A rupture in friendly Japan-US relations. This would be disastrous. As of 1968, for example, 83% of Japan's consumption of soy beans, 75% of its scrap steel, 50% of its wheat and 25% of its raw cotton were imported from the United

States. One-third of Japan's trade is with the United States, and every year $30 million in American technology is imported. Without this technology, there would be, for example, no bullet-train nor automated steel factories in Japan. It is therefore easy for anyone to understand the importance to Japan's prosperity of cultural and economic relations with the United States, irrespective of military and political alliances. This friendship will remain a categorical imperative throughout the seventies.

3. The problem of qualitative decline in the labor force. In view of Japan's poverty in natural resources, its economic prosperity must be supported by social efficiency. If this efficiency declined and wages rose, Japanese products would quickly lose their competitive power. Social efficiency is closely related to the quality of the labor force. While the labor shortage in Japan will probably stimulate higher wages, workers will possibly become far less productive as a result. Japanese are not "naturally" hardworking, but because they have been trained, they make up one of the most efficient working forces in the world. If Japan's prosperity continues, we must motivate the next generation to maintain the high level of productivity that has transformed this country from a backward to a first class industrial nation.

The existence of these problems alone casts serious doubt on the feasibility of my suggested alternatives. Should any of these difficulties bring an end to Japan's economic prosperity, political extremism on both left and right will grow more powerful, resulting in a dangerous confrontation. The outcome of such a confrontation would be one of three unattractive possibilities: perpetuation of the conflict, rightist seizure of power, or leftwing revolution.

Furthermore, if relations with other countries do not change, the outcome will be Japanese economic domination of another country such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia or the Philippines. This could lead to internal political involvement and ultimately military aid. This eventuality is by no means as imminent as Chinese propaganda would have it, but the possibility exists. If the tendency to intervene goes unchecked economic cooperation would become a dangerous road for Japan to travel.

What Can America Do?

To realize my proposals, the cooperation of the United States is essential. What, then, do we want from the United States?

1. Stable peaceful coexistence of the US and China. President Nixon's proposed visit to China guarantees neither immediate peaceful coexistence nor reconcili-

ation. But it is a small step towards eventual reconciliation. If the United States-China axis is shaky, all of East Asia will feel the tremors. In the process of consolidating relations between America and China, Indochina, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan must be approached carefully and their different circumstances taken into account. The guiding principle of any policy should be the absolutely unquestionable right of a nation to determine its own political system. In the case of Taiwan, the problem should, ideally, be solved by Taipei 臺北 and Peking. Talks between them could be promoted by the former Allied Powers, particularly the US. No matter how close the economic ties between Japan and Taiwan, Japan was a defeated nation and its statements concerning the destiny of its surrendered territories constitute political intervention. Similarly, the dispute between North and South Korea 南北朝鮮 should be adjusted by the two Korean governments with the encouragement of their former allies, and Japan should keep in the background. The same general guidelines could be applied to adjusting relations in Indonesia.

2. To prevent the Soviet Union from becoming a disruptive element. Stability in Asia will be threatened if, in the transition from confrontation to peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union steps into the gap and causes unnecessary problems. Peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union came after years of confrontation. It is important to sustain that relationship and prevent the Soviet Union from interfering. Only the United States can perform that task.
3. To maintain the principles of international free trade. Some limitations on trade and the flow of capital are perhaps necessary. But the principles underlying the system of free trade, including the international flow of capital and technology which the United States has upheld since the Atlantic Charter 大西洋憲章, must be sustained. Asians fear that the slump in the American economy might make it difficult for the US to continue being the guardian of free trade. If the US undermines these principles by reverting to a bloc economic policy, the rest of the world will follow its lead. The US, China and the Soviet Union appear to be the only nations in the world sufficiently independent to form bloc economies. Japan relies on trade for 18% of its GNP. It depends on other nations for 100% of its bauxite, raw cotton and wool, 99% of its petroleum and iron ore, 85% of its wheat, and 50% of its coal. This problem must be met if Japan attempts to form its own economic bloc, an attempt that would almost certainly result in intervention in the internal politics of neighboring countries. We have no choice but to hope that the US will adhere to a policy of free trade. In the 1970s, as in the past, the question of peace in Asia hinges on what America chooses as its foreign and economic policies.
4. To increase the credibility of limited US military commitment in Asia. It is clear that the US is going to continue withdrawing its military forces from Asia. If

done precipitously, and only in US interests, American credibility among Asian countries will decrease; if it is too slow, it may adversely affect the nascent relations with China. It must be executed at the proper tempo, and ultimately it must be a reconfirmation of guarantees against nuclear attack. In addition, while the United States can no longer use direct military intervention as an effective control over regional wars in Asia, it should be prepared to use indirect means. For that reason, a flexible military alliance between the United States and Japan will be of tremendous value.

Conclusion

Political dynamics are rarely rational, and things do not always work out the way one would like. Nevertheless, if the nations concerned share a degree of understanding and are able to cooperate, I believe the proposals I have outlined can succeed. Should some other choice be made, Japan faces the dangers of militarism and economic decline. Neither of those alternatives would benefit the peoples of Asia, nor would they serve the welfare of the Japanese people.

Chapter IX IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

Is it possible to develop amicable relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, and if so, how? What choices do we have? Any answer to these questions rests on a clear understanding of the historical complexities that lie at the base of the relationship.

In our examination of these questions we will first analyze the factors, both national and international, that would contribute to the development of friendly relations as well as discussing those that are operating against a close and creative relationship. We will, finally, offer suggestions as to how the negative factors might be eliminated.

I. National and International Factors Conducive to Friendly Relations

A. Change in the National Objectives of the Soviet Union

There has been radical change in the national objectives of the Soviet Union in the last twenty years. Briefly, this change has hinged on the following two points:

1. Change in Asian Policy

When the World War II in Asia came to an end in 1945, August, the Soviet Union lived up to its agreements with the United States on military matters. Even though United States forces were slow to occupy the Korean Peninsula the Soviet Union did not extend its forces below the 38th parallel. Despite delay in the deployment of

* This is a paper presented at "Peace in Asia: Japan-USSR Tokyo Seminar," Takanawa Prince Hotel, Tokyo, May 29-31, 1973. The conference where it was presented was organized by the agreement between the Council on National Security Problems on the Japanese side and the Institute of World Trade and International Relations of the Soviet Academy. The delegation of over ten Soviet scholars made the first visit to Tokyo after Japan's defeat in the World War II for the conference with the Japanese scholars. I happened to participate in the conference and presented a bird's-eye view of the Japan-Soviet relations and a concrete proposal for the solution of the Northern Territories problem. This conference was nothing but rigid controversies form to start to finish. However, as it was repeated every other year the rigidity was gradually dissolved and personal opinions began to surface. After the disintegration of the Soviet communist system this conference is continued on broadened basis. It interests me somewhat that the issue I raised at the first conference is yet to be solved after thirty years.

Kuomintang forces 國民黨軍 in North and Central China, the Soviet army refrained from moving into those areas, confining its presence as an occupation force to the Northeast, in which the Soviet Union had direct interests. Furthermore, in the case of the Kurile Islands 千島列島, on which there was no clear agreement, the Soviet Union consulted with the United States and sent occupation forces only after confirming that the latter would not occupy the islands.

Politically, however, the Soviet Union was eager to promote the development of people's democratic revolutionary movements throughout Asia. Particularly after 1948, when all of Western Europe except Czechoslovakia seemed dead to revolution, Moscow began to build the claim that conditions for revolution were ripe in Asia and to lend solid support to people's democratic revolutions throughout Asia. After the popular front had been formally adopted by the Comintern in 1935, it began to pursue, with Moscow, a "dualistic policy." On the one hand, the Comintern and the Soviet government sought friendly relations with all and any non-Communist forces and governments, no matter how reactionary they were, insofar as they were opposed to fascism and were willing to join the popular front or the national united front in their own countries. On the other hand, efforts were made to strengthen the international solidarity of the Communist parties throughout the world under the central leadership of Moscow.

After 1948, however, this dualistic approach was abandoned for people's democratic revolutions in Asia. At that time, Nehru, with whom the Indian Communist party had cooperated, was called imperialist and rebuked by Moscow (June 1947). The communist-inspired Southeast Asian Youth Congress, held in Calcutta in February 1948, then resolved that the communists should proceed directly to the people's democratic revolution without cooperating with the national bourgeoisie and without going through a bourgeois democratic revolution. Denouncing United States imperialism and the American-backed imperialism of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the conference expressed its determination to support the anti-imperialist struggle of Asian youth. The thesis of the Second Comintern, which had provided the theoretical basis of colonial liberation strategy for many years, was discarded. Also, the popular united front strategy of the Sixth Comintern of 1935 was revised and armed insurrection was begun in various parts of Asia. In 1948, under the leadership of Ranadive, the Indian Communist party began armed violence throughout the country. During the same year in Indonesia, Musso returned after twenty years in the Soviet Union and led the uprising that occured in Madiun. This marked the beginning of armed struggle against the government by the Indonesian communists. In Burma the White Flag Communist party began a rebellion which shook the entire country, to the extent that they declared, in February 1950, the establishment of a people's government. The Malayan communists extended their control until they held way over all rural areas of the country, and the British were forced to mobilize an army of more than 400,000 to deal with the rebellion. The

Philippine Hukbalahap also adopted a policy of armed insurrection for people's democracy. In this storm of people's democratic revolutions which were causing so much disturbance in Asia, the Soviet Union supported the strategy of armed insurrection and ordered the Japanese Communist party (JCP) 日本共産黨 to begin the same in Japan. Until this time, the JCP was gaining political power through a democratization movement carried out under the auspices of the United States occupation forces. On the sixth of January, 1950, NOSAKA Sanzō 野坂參三, leader of the JCP, was denounced by the Cominform. His idea that reactionaries could become democrats and that imperialists could turn into socialists through peaceful means were, the Cominform claimed, part of an anti-socialist, anti-Marxist argument that had long been proven wrong and that had nothing to do with the working class. The effect on the JCP was violent. After much meandering and trial, it was decided at the Fifth National Council of the JCP on October 3, 1951, that a policy would be adopted that called for partisan tactics and a central self-defense organization formed for taking up arms and rising in insurrection.

As in many parts of Asia, this plan did not succeed in Japan. The JCP fell into a position which gained it little popular support and no sympathy from other political groups; more accurately, it almost collapsed. Unification of the Korean Peninsula which was attempted as an integral part of the people's democratic revolution throughout Asia failed as a result of US intervention in the Korean War. With the death of Stalin in March 1953, the pace of peace talks in Korea quickened, resulting in armistice in July of that year.

After the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy changed in line with the de-Stalinization campaign into what has been called a policy of peaceful coexistence. The Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration, which came out of the October 1954 visit to Peking of Bulganin and Khrushchev, expressed strong desire for restoration of diplomatic relations with the Japanese government, despite its conservative, pro-American stance. This represented a rather drastic change in the Soviet-Japan policy when one realizes that the Japanese government at that time was under the leadership of YOSHIDA Shigeru 吉田茂—a man denounced by the Soviet Union as reactionary, as a puppet of American imperialism and an enemy of people's democratic revolution.

Of course, in light of such overtures by the Soviet Union, the United States moved to prevent the development of any strong relationship between the USSR and Japan so that Japan would remain within the American sphere of influence. In December 1954, the Hatoyama 鳩山 cabinet was formed, and despite considerable interference from the United States and Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Mamoru 重光葵, the cabinet successfully restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The surfacing of the Sino-Soviet conflict caused a dramatic rift and much confusion in anti-government forces in Japan. During the course of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the JCP turned first to support Peking, until in March 1966 they broke with the Chinese.

At present they take an independent line. The Sino-Soviet dispute has had a very great effect on the East Asian situation, as both China and the Soviet Union have fought hard to gain supporters for their separate causes. The result has been rapid improvement in Soviet-Indian relations. The Soviet Union hopes that other countries of East and Southeast Asia will adopt a similar policy of friendly relations toward Moscow. The Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia can be interpreted as a diplomatic expression of this desire.

2. Change in Economic Policy

The change in the national objectives of the Soviet Union can be seen first in the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956 when the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war, the necessity of violent revolution, was discarded and the non-revolutionary peace movement was boosted. This became an important turning point in postwar international relations. Another change that must be mentioned is that the same party congress declared the validity of peaceful competition with capitalist economies. This type of announcement had been made before by the Soviet Union, but it meant simply temporary competition with capitalist countries in a period that was relatively stable for capitalism; never before had the Soviet Union renounced its ultimate goal of destroying the capitalist countries through political struggle. The statements made in the twentieth congress, however, did not call for a political struggle but an economic struggle to overwhelm capitalism. The aim of this declaration was to speed up the trend toward socialism by showing the world its superiority. This indeed marked the first step in peaceful coexistence which involved economic competition. In the seven-year plan (1959-1965) presented to the twenty-first congress in 1959, the Soviet Union withdrew from its previous closed socialist system, and proceeded on a path toward international division of labor and the doctrine of comparative costs.

The thinking that trade with the capitalist countries was an act of support for reactionary power gradually lost out, and a policy of encouraging active trade with capitalist countries was adopted. The capitalist economies of the West were at the same time anxious to find a way out of the cold war markets forced upon them after the war. The convergence of mutual interests gradually led to the growth of East-West trade. This shift toward an open economy by the Soviet Union culminated in the application of the Liebermann method to the domestic economy.

B. Change in the International Environment

A paper written for this conference by MIYOSHI Osamu 三好修 discusses in detail changes in the international environment in terms of the new multipolar world and the "new frontier" for American and Soviet diplomacy. I would simply like to add here a few lines of my own observations.

1. US-USSR Peaceful Coexistence and Sino-American Detente

There is no doubt that improvement in Japan-Soviet relations must be seen not simply as a problem of the relations between the two countries but as one which derived from the change in international conditions. Of decisive importance have been peaceful coexistence, now firmly established between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Sino-Soviet détente. The latter, which suddenly came to the surface in the midst of continuing tension between the USSR and China, had a tremendous impact on Japan-Soviet relations.

Much of the cause for this Sino-Soviet discord can be found when we reflect on the history of the two countries, for it is unlikely that there was anything approaching amicable relations from the 17th century to the present. There was probably only one period that approached friendliness in the eight-year period from 1949 to 1957. It is a tradition in Chinese foreign relations that one befriends countries far away and antagonizes those nearby, and the tributary state system was a common practice during most of China's history of foreign relations. It was extremely rare for any of the countries near China to have relations that were conducted on an equal and friendly basis. Peking refused the nonaggression pact that was proposed by the Soviet Union all through the period 1949-1957, and the Chinese government pressed their demand for the return of Outer Mongolia.

Likewise, the Soviet Union, as the first socialist country, wanted to maintain its leadership of the world communist movement. Its proposal for a joint Soviet-Chinese fleet and demand for Soviet air bases in China were too difficult for the Chinese to accept and still remain uncompromising in their stand on national integrity.

In a situation in which the tense relations between the Soviet Union and China show no sign of improving while the hitherto frigid relations of both with the United States have been rapidly thawing, Soviet policy toward Japan and other Asian countries will most certainly undergo steady, subtle change.

2. Increased Interdependence

The above observations are made from the standpoint of power politics, but we must also consider qualitative change in the structure of international society. At no time in the history of man have the countries of the world been so interdependent as they are today. A close network of nations tied not only by political and military interests but also by economics and culture is by now so developed that some believe the world as we know it no longer contains such a thing as a totally independent country. Isolation and seclusion will now bring only conflict and poverty, and if the international network of cooperation were destroyed, the country which caused the destruction would suffer the greatest loss. Japan itself daily imports 600,000 tons of oil and more than 200,000 tons of iron ore, while it exports every year more than 20 billion dollars worth of goods produced in this country. If only one link in the network were destroyed, Japan would be severely and dangerously affected.

3. Declined Effectiveness of Military Power

Prior to the World War II, military power was considered to be absolutely decisive in the international game. Thus, if a country had superior military power, it could expand colonies and monopolize the natural resources of other countries for its own use. Then, after the war, the importance of military power went into relative decline. Particularly with the easing of tension between the superpowers the decline of the military factor in international relations has become even more accentuated.

Nuclear weapons are now capable of destruction on so vast a scale that they have become gradually unusable. There is also a great deal of uncertainty with regard to the effect of nuclear blackmail; the nuclear powers themselves are still not convinced of the effect of blackmail with nuclear weapons.

Excluding such cases as the Soviet incursions into Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Sino-Soviet border clashes and the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab countries, there are very few instances where conventional military force has brought about a decisive effect on international politics as would have been the situation before the World War II. Since 1971, the rate of expenditure for military purposes by the superpowers has slowed down. It has become impossible for any country to acquire the resources and the labor force by military means alone.

C. Japan's Changing Status in International Society

1. Greater Economic Power

In 1946, the year after the end of the war, the per capita income in Japan is estimated to have been about 60 dollars. In 1972, the income per capita was approximately 3,000 dollars. At the end of the war the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) lamented over the belief that there was absolutely no hope that Japan could raise its economic level up to what it had been in 1935. From about 1957, a great drive was put on to push the economy forward, and throughout the 1960s Japan achieved the highest rate of growth in the world. The most recent figures for GNP are now at a level approximately four times in real terms that of all Southeast Asian countries combined. If one excludes Siberia and Japan, the Japanese GNP is equivalent to twice that of all Asia. Since the population of Asia, again excluding Japan and the Soviet portion (Siberia), is twenty times that of Japan (2 billion in comparison with 100 million), it becomes very clear how overwhelmingly strong Japanese economic power is in this region. The 1972 GNP of Japan is greater than 300 billion dollars and it is projected that the Japanese GNP in 1980 will reach 800 billion dollars.

2. Japan as a Non-Nuclear, Medium Power

As described above, Japan is gradually arriving at a point where it can be regarded as a non-nuclear state possessing medium military capacity. Let us turn first to the question of whether or not Japan will "go nuclear." There is an opinion survey often quoted by Japan specialists abroad to claim that Japan will eventually equip itself

with nuclear weapons. This survey is one which the *Yomiuri shimbun* 讀賣新聞 conducted on August 7, 1969. When asked the question, "Will Japan have nuclear weapons within the next decade?" 32.1 percent of the respondents (all Japanese) replied "Yes." However, taking a closer look at this survey, we find another question: "Do you desire Japan to have nuclear weapons?" 71.8 percent replied that they did not. Also, two-thirds of the group who answered yes to the first question stated, "I don't want them but we'll probably have them." It is probably necessary to take into account the tendency prompted by Japanese intellectuals of being overly sensitive to Japan's rearmament and the revival of militarism. Thus, this 32.1 percent figure should not be taken at face value.

Whether or not it would be profitable for Japan's security to have nuclear weapons is a question on which the Japanese tend to be negative. A nuclear strategy based on thinking somewhat like the Gaullist would be difficult for Japanese to accept. An additional factor is that no country in Japan's proximity wants Japan to have nuclear weapons. If Japan were to be so bold as to set out for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it would not only receive an immense amount of pressure from other nations but would also find it difficult to obtain the necessary raw materials. Given the network of interdependence in international society, the world in which Japan today must function, it is doubtful that a Japanese choice for nuclear weapons would be profitable.

Another point is that there is no denying that Japan has the technological potential necessary for the development of nuclear arms. However, the vast majority of the scientists and technicians who could develop such a capability are flatly opposed to their country's nuclearization. The atmosphere which provides the thinking for these technologists will not recede within the next ten years. From the above four reasons, barring any unforeseen changes in the situation, it would be unlikely that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s.

Next is the question of whether or not heavy weapons will be developed. For example, 85 percent of the oil that Japan uses is shipped through the Straits of Malacca. In light of this high proportion, one may well argue that it is imperative for Japan to gain control of the seas in regard to the Straits of Malacca. British foreign policy in the nineteenth century was based on such a strategic philosophy. It was on these premises that the British acquired Aden, Egypt, Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus so as to secure the route to India. If Japan were to strengthen its naval power in such a way that it could take control of the Malacca Straits, serious consideration would have to be given to the impact that such policies would have on neighboring countries. The impact would be so great that the international network might be seriously damaged. Thus, Japan desires some other method by which to maintain this network than the method of military power.

The assumption that an expansion of overseas economic activities would inevitably be accompanied by the strengthening of military power necessary to pro-

tect those economic interests, was the law of international politics in the times before the World War II. However, this sort of theory is no longer applicable to Japan today.

Such a philosophy was what provided a military expenditure in prewar Japan of over 10 percent per annum of GNP, and consequently the proportion of government investment for peaceful production was extremely low. After the World War II, however, a relatively small defense expenditure has enabled the government to allocate a high percentage of its investment toward peaceful endeavors. It has been conjectured that the growth rate of more than 12 percent per annum that Japan attained in the latter half of the 1960 would have decreased by about eight percent (in the 1952-60 period) if the prewar level of military spending had been maintained. Thus, from the point of view of economic prosperity it is clearly more desirable for Japan to keep armaments investment at a very low rate.

3. Greater Bargaining Power with the United States

Along with the growth of her economic power, Japan's status in international society has rapidly risen ever since the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to which the Soviet bloc of nations were not signatory. Restoration of relations with the Soviet Union, membership in the United Nations and in the OECD and the normalization of relations with China each marked an important step in this direction. In the relations with the United States, the first change to appear was a vast increase in Japan's economic competitive power, which in turn has led to an improved political bargaining position as well. The process is gradual, but Japan now seems to be extricating itself from the pattern of following the American lead to choose its own course of action. Of course, friendship is the keynote of the relations between Japan and the United States and this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. From here on, there will be many occasions which involve clashes of interests between the two countries and these may develop in the political as well as the economic area. On such an occasion dispute will arise, which will have to be ironed out through a thorny process of negotiations. Thus, the relationship between these two will gradually change from a leader-follower relationship into one of equals characterized by frequent clashes of interests.

II. External and Internal Factors Detrimental to Friendly Relations

The factors that will have a negative influence on Japan-USSR relations include A) psychological obstacles, B) the territorial issue, and C) China.

A. The Perception Gap

The history of Japanese contact and association with the Soviet Union, from the very

beginning, is filled with unpleasant memories. During the Revolution of 1917, Japan sent an Expeditionary Force to Siberia. Even as the Soviet Socialist Republic came into being with the Revolution of 1917, Japan sent an expeditionary force in a joint effort with other capitalist countries to encircle the newly-born state. Later, particularly after the birth of "Manchukuo 滿洲國" in 1932, border clashes occurred with increasing frequency between the Kwantung army 關東軍 and the Soviet Red army. They also grew in seriousness: the one on the Amur River between Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk 乾岔子島事件 in 1937, the Changkufeng Incident 張鼓峰事件 in 1938, and others. Then, in 1939, the Battle of Nomonhan (the Khalkhin-gol Incident) ノモンハン事件 broke out, which, after six months of fighting, ended in a resounding Japanese defeat.

From the outset, Imperial Japan confronted the Soviet Union as a military power set on forcibly achieving wide-ranging territorial ambitions in continental Asia. It is, then, understandable that because of this historical background the people of the USSR continued to be plagued by visions of Japanese militarism. Militarist Japan was totally crushed in World War II, but the Soviet Union has, nonetheless, never been able to fully trust Japan.

Japanese, on the other hand, have their own reasons to distrust the Soviet Union. The main source of distrust lies in the unilateral abrogation by the Soviet Union in August 1945 of the five-year Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact 日ソ不可侵條約 (concluded in April 1941). Although the Soviet Union had notified Japan in advance of its intention not to extend the treaty, its abrogation and declaration of war against Japan came at the point when this country was militarily at its lowest ebb. The Soviet attack on the vulnerable enemy that Japan was in the summer of 1945 is remembered by many Japanese as one of the most unpleasant episodes of the last world war. The misdemeanor of Soviet soldiers against civilian Japanese in Manchuria and their inhumane treatment of Japanese prisoners of war naturally intensified Japanese feelings of distrust, and humiliation toward the Soviet Union. Opinion polls on attitudes toward other countries conducted periodically by both government and private organizations have shown how difficult it has been to assuage or modify these feelings. The Soviet Union has always ranked high in these polls among the countries most disliked by Japanese.

The United States—Japan's chief adversary in World War II—inflicted great human and material damage on Japanese. By comparison, the physical damage wrought by the Soviet Union was only negible. The Soviets continue to be heartily disliked, nevertheless, while Americans have always been among the people preferred by Japanese. Several reasons perhaps account for this gap in popularity, but I think one of the most important is that Japanese derive a sense of satisfaction from defeat by Americans after many years of struggle in an all-out war effort, whereas they feel as though their country was slyly "ambushed" by the Soviet Union. Because of this wartime experience, Japanese harbor doubts about the credibility of

the Soviet Union's observance of international treaties and agreements.

The United States is an open society as is Japan. Its policy toward Japan is predictable to a certain extent and its credibility in observing contracts is relatively high. By contrast, the Soviet Union is one kind of closed society; its political and economic systems are different from ours and its policy toward Japan cannot always be predicted. This deep-rooted distrust explains at least in part why Japanese hesitate to make more active commitment to long-term economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, despite substantial profits that Japan can expect.

B. Northern Territories

I do not intend to go into the historical or legalistic arguments advanced in connection with the northern territorial issue. But I would like to offer several theoretically feasible solutions.

Broadly, I see three possible procedures that might offer a solution: bilateral negotiations between Japan and the USSR, mediation, or settlement by the International Court of Justice.

Quite concretely, the following would be theoretically practicable solutions:

a) To shelve the issue permanently or for an indefinite period of time.
During the World War II, the only country that managed to expand its territory by a sizable amount was the Soviet Union. It would, therefore, have merely invited serious conflict over many other territorial claims had it conceded anything on the northern territories. From the Japanese viewpoint, the southern Kurile Islands (Chishima) have historically been recognized as originally Japanese, not a chunk of territory taken from some other country. (The same is true, in fact, of the northern Kuriles.) Any smooth and satisfactory adjustment of the northern territories issue indeed stands out as a thorny problem for both countries. For that reason, until the power balance between them changes, it may be that shelving the issue is the best possible solution.

b) Dividing the territory – 1 –
This might be accomplished by returning to Japan only Habomai 歯舞 and Shikotan 色丹 Islands and incorporating Etorofu 擇捉 and Kunashiri 國後 into Soviet territory. This solution would not only be acceptable to international law but Japan would also accept it.

c) Dividing the territory – 2 –
This solution would mean the Soviet Union would make concessions and return to Japan not only Habomai and Shikotan but also part of the other two; these would become recognized as part of the Japanese territory.

d) Partial servitude
This solution would involve returning Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but as far as Etorofu and Kunashiri are concerned, the Soviet Union would retain the territorial rights and extend partial servitude to Japan. The partial servitude might include the free use of fishing ports or fishing privileges within the territorial waters.

e) Lease
This solution would involve returning Habomai and Shikotan and leasing Etorofu and Kunashiri to Japan.

f) Joint possession
This solution would involve returning Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but Etorofu and Kunashiri would be possessed jointly by Japan and the Soviet Union.

g) UN trusteeship
This solution would involve returning Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, but Etorofu and Kunashiri would be placed under a Japanese-administered UN trusteeship.

h) Servitude to the Soviet Union
This solution would involve recognizing Japan's territorial rights over all of the four islands in question, in return for which Japan would provide the Soviet Union with maximum servitude. The servitude might include the installation of radar bases or the freedom of using the ports for military purposes.

i) Conditional return of the four islands
This solution would involve returning to Japan all of the four islands in question, but only on certain conditions spelled out in a treaty, such as prohibiting armaments on those islands.

j) Unconditional return of the four islands
Self-explanatory

k) Purchase
This solution would involve the purchase by Japan of the islands in question, similar to the US purchase of Alaska in 1868.

As we have seen in the above, there are a number of options for the solution of the

northern territorial issue. But no matter what formula or option is chosen, the solution for this particular issue would require efforts on both sides. Unfortunately, however, the two governments have failed so far to make any progress toward a solution.

C. Chinese Apprehension of Japan-Soviet Friendship

Having begun with a series of ideological disputers, the Sino-Soviet conflict has continued unabated to this day, involving Soviet refusal to cooperate in China's nation-building efforts and rivalry for hegemony within the Socialist camp, and culminating in the border disputes. These disputes are further complicated by a long history of distrust between the two countries, making the whole matter a mixture of old and new problems that are exceedingly difficult to solve. It is, of course, beyond China's hope to reduce the enormous military might of its superpower neighbor with whom China shares a border stretching over thousands of kilometers. For the sake of its security, however, China perhaps feel compelled to minimize the members of Soviet allies and alienate the potential friends of Moscow as much as possible. This reasoning helps to explain what prompted China in 1971 to devote so much of its energy to Sino-American rapprochement, to reaccommodating the very US imperialism that China used to condemn so vehemently. Through such an effort China wanted to improve its bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

The reasons why the Peking government was so eager at that particular time in 1972 to put an end to the long-pending problem of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations also relate to the Soviet Union. Apart from the domestic factors, China looked forward to establishing formal diplomatic relations with Japan as a way of undermining any rapid improvement of Japan-Soviet relations. Peking extended its warm welcome not only to those in the media and various fields of cultural activities but to the business community and conservative party leaders. These Chinese overtures certainly helped to quicken the pace at which normalization was carried out. But one must not forget that behind all this was China's sensitiveness toward the Soviet Union's political and diplomatic gains.

The situation is further compounded by the peculiar love-hate syndrome of the Japanese that is often exhibited toward the Chinese people. Japan owes the origin of its culture to China, and both Japanese and Chinese have the same skin color. These factors have sustained a kind of transnational sense of community in the typical Japanese attitude toward China. An additional factor here is the postwar tradition of pacifism in Japan, which has served as a constant reminder of guilt feelings for the invasion of China during the thirties and the forties. Thus, Japan today is definitely inclined toward "love" for China. This tendency is best represented by the mainstream media. The dominant attitude there is to condemn not only any criticism of China but any opinions different from China's as anti-Chinese and militaristic.

Given this general mentality among Japanese, China should find it fairly easy to manipulate Japan. During the Hatoyama cabinet anyone opposed to the improvement

of Japan-Soviet relations was labeled as reactionary, but today under the Tanaka 田中 cabinet anyone in favor of the same cause is likely to win that label. Thus, as long as the Sino-Soviet conflict continues and China opposes the development of friendlier relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, then there will always remain elements in this country who are easily swayed by the feelings and wishes of the Peking government. It is for these reasons that I have treated China here as a factor detrimental to Japan-Soviet relations.

III. Efforts to Reduce Negative Factors

If we assume that improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan is not only desirable to both nations but helpful to the easing of international tensions and strengthening of world peace, then we must make every effort to bring it about. In this connection, it would be highly desirable to eradicate the elements hindering improvement in relations but if this is not presently possible, effort should be directed to at least reducing the effects of these hindering elements.

A. Closing the Perception Gap

International relations can be viewed as the relations between one state and another, but they are more than that; they are relations between one group of human beings and another. Even though diplomatic relations are in the exclusive province of the government, that government itself is composed of bureaucrats and politicians, merely another group of human beings. The average citizen does not directly participate in national affairs, but the policy maker cannot overlook the popular feelings. In any discussion of the relationships between states, it is the human element which is preponderant. Because of this, and because human beings are human beings, international relations are caught up in the web of some rather complex and subtle psychological factors. Much disbelief arising from accumulated experience and unwarranted misunderstanding with one's opposite are not uncommon. There are only two methods by which this feeling of distrust and misunderstanding can be eradicated. One is through an increase in cultural exchange and closer association of people aimed at enhancing mutual understanding and trust. The other method is that government pay greater attention to those points of dispute which give rise to mutual distrust. These methods are roundabout, but if they are faithfully adhered to, they will provide the results desired by both Soviet Union and Japan.

The citizens of the two countries are ethnically quite different and the spoken and written languages, important for mutual understanding, belong to entirely different families. The Japanese language is isolated internationally, while the Russian language is quite alien to the Japanese who have been educated in West European culture. Consequently, cultural and personal exchange between Japan and the Soviet

Union faces an enormous obstacle, but precisely because of such a difficulty, it is all the more important that an active exchange program be implemented without delay.

For the immediate future, I would propose that academic cooperation be expanded by organizing, for example, a conference between Soviet and Japanese economists. Research on Soviet affairs has been conducted in Japan since before the war and is said to be fairly advanced, but the majority of research studies seem to have been politically motivated. There is little research of a comprehensive, academic kind, which treats the Soviet Union with the interdisciplinary, areas-studies approach. Research on Japan in the Soviet Union also leaves a lot to be desired. At any rate, it is absolutely important that both countries try to promote academic studies of the other country. A joint research project on the history of the Japan-Soviet relationship using sources available to each country would help develop a just appraisal of that relationship. It would provide a good start as it would claim the interest of many scholars and be rather easy to carry out. The success of such a project could then provide a basis for a large-scale exchange of students and scholars.

An accumulation of economic exchange and trade would make for a greater degree of mutual dependence. Figure 1 shows that compared to trade with the US, Japan's trade with the Soviet Union is rather insignificant. This explains why Japan



Figure IX-1
Comparison of Japan-USA and Japan-USSR Trade
(Unit: US$10 million)



Figure IX-2
Japanese Trade with USSR, Taiwan, China; US-USSR and USSR-China Trade (Unit: US$ one million)

must give priority to its relations with USA. Figure 2 is a further evidence for the low rate of trade with the Soviet Union. The level of trade is just about the same as that with China and does not even reach the level of trade with Taiwan which has a population of only fifteen million.

The great potentials inherent in trade between a country second in the world in GNP (Soviet Union) and one which is number three (Japan) remain almost totally unexploited. Trade between our two countries must be much more expanded, especially in view of the great risk involved for Japanese business in investing heavily in the Soviet Union without active trade relations. The modern corporate leader tends to avoid unpredictable risks. He prefers to accumulate economic exchange before making any major investment. This accumulation also plays an important role in closing the perception gap. Large-scale economic cooperation is not something which will come about all of a sudden.

B. Suggestions for Solving Disputes Existing between Japan and the Soviet Union

There are several points under dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union, including the fishery question in the northern waters, but the greatest pending problem is that of the northern territories. The islands of Habomai and Shikotan are not members of the Kuril (Chishima) Islands but have been regarded both historically and legally as small islands which are part of Hokkaidō 北海道. Thus, there should be no major obstacle to the reversion of these two small islands to Japan; a bilateral negotiation for ending the occupation by Soviet military forces should settle this part of the dispute. Etorofu and Kunashiri, although not clearly defined as such in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, were referred to as part of Japan's territory by YOSHIDA Shigeru in his speech as the chief Japanese delegate to the peace conference. It cannot be denied that these two islands are popularly conceived as being part of the Kuriles, but if we consider Yoshida's references and also look at paragraph 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, we can see that the Japanese government had no intention of waiving rights to these islands. (We should note here that during postwar military occupation the Japanese government and the ruling party were not able to study and achieve a consensus on the definition of Chishima.)

Now, in light of this, let us take a look at the history of the two islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri. It cannot be denied that both of these islands have been Japanese territory for most of recorded history. In the Russo-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1855 日露和親條約, the boundaries were set out between Etorofu and Uruppu 得撫 and in the 1875 treaty for the exchange of Chishima and Sakhalin 樺太千島交換條約 these two islands were not included as part of the eighteen included in the Chishima group. Thus, the loss of these two islands is something which the Japanese people feel "unreasonable" and find unacceptable. With regard to a legal interpretation of the northern territories issue today, it is the understanding of this author that since the Soviet government does not recognize the San Francisco Treaty, the Japanese gov-

ernment proposed a new negotiation for the settlement of Kunashiri and Etorofu and requested the Soviet Union to return the islands or end the military occupation. It is my opinion that the governments of both countries base their actions on rational solutions and settle the status of these four islands in accordance with both legal and historical precedents.

C. Japan's Neutrality in the Sino-Soviet Dispute

As far as Japan is concerned the Sino-Soviet dispute is none of its business. This is something which has arisen from a situation peculiar to China and the USSR and there is no call for Japan to meddle in the affair. Even were we to consider the network of international society, Japan should have no complicity in the affair and there is no choice for us but to pursue a policy which treats both of these countries equally. The 1950 Sino-Soviet Pact is directly aimed at Japan, and despite the Sino-Soviet dispute the treaty is still in force. As long as that treaty is in force, it is by no means in the interest of Japan to have the two countries return to the close relationship that they had before. But were this conflict to broaden and expand to a large-scale hostility it would have a deleterious effect on the conditions of peace in East Asia. This would certainly be disadvantageous to Japan which puts a high premium on international peace and peaceful commerce. Thus, Japan must depend on the two countries themselves to solve the questions that arise between them.

The postwar Japanese generally show no desire to get involved in the disputes of foreign nations, and can thus easily see their position in the Sino-Soviet conflict to be one of neutrality. One of the problems here is that the Japanese have unusual emotions in regard to China; this is one point where there is an opportunity for China to influence Japanese opinions. However, the image of China that resides within the psychological make-up of the Japanese is a problem that the Japanese must take care of themselves and as such is not pertinent to the relations between Japan and the USSR.

Conclusion

An overall factor affecting the Japan-Soviet relationship is that there is a great deal of distrust among the citizens of each country in their impressions of the other. This lack of trust should gradually diminish if the people in both countries extend their efforts toward that end. We believe that this can be achieved through exchanges of persons, and exchanges on the cultural and economic level but a great deal can be done to ameliorate the situation if a rational solution to the issue of northern territories can be found. For a country such as the Soviet Union, with its great amount of territory, the possession of these small islands cannot be vital, and a solution should be possible.