

On the Ideas concerning the Change of the Mandate and the Relationship of Sovereign and Minister

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Is a dynasty something destined to endure for ever? Or must we acknowledge that at some time it will be destroyed, it will perish? This is indeed a great question. In fact, however we look at it, there has never been in history a dynasty that did not perish. Old dynasties have perished, new ones have arisen, in constant iteration of what is called the change of the mandate. How has this matter been treated in the doctrinal field? In ancient Chinese thought, we find the view that change of the mandate is admissible, and the view that it is to be rejected. The term, change of the mandate, means change of the mandate of Heaven, of the command given by Heaven. Heaven gives its command to one who has virtue, and makes him king. He who has the virtue receives the mandate, becomes king and founds a dynasty. But when, in the course of the passage to posterity, the virtue falls away, the mandate of Heaven is removed and passes to another man of virtue, the old dynasty thus perishing and the new arising. But, though it was desired that such change of dynasty take place in peaceful conditions, it was at the same time acknowledged that it could be brought about by force of arms. When this came about by force of arms it was 'forceful punishment', when in peaceful conditions, it was 'abdication'. This was the theory of the receipt of the mandate and change

* This is one of the posthumous papers of Shigeshi Katō 加藤繁 (1880.9.3-1946.3.7) which have been bequeathed to the Toyo Bunko. Actually, this is a part of his lectures at the Imperial University of Tokyo either in 1938 or in 1940. In connection with the subject dealt here, no other articles which can be compared with this in its acuteness and originality are not yet available. It is expected that the readers can enjoy even from the translation the clear-mindedness of the author, as well as the lucidity of the original Japanese text.

The word here rendered 'change of the mandate' is *kakumei*, Ch. *ko-ming*, 革命, the normal word for 'revolution'. It will be evident that in the present context, this is virtually a technical term, for which 'revolution' would be unsuitable and inaccurate.

As to the biography of the author and the bibliography of his publications, the readers are suggested to refer to the *Shina Keizaishi Kōshō* 支那經濟史考證 (*Studies on Economic History of China*), Vol. II, pp. 793-896 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1st edition, 1953, of which the 3rd impression is still in print.) Regarding his posthumous papers, see the *Toyo Bunko Shohō* 東洋文庫書報, No. 7 for 1974, pp. 13-36.

of the mandate as explained by the Confucians, which is repeatedly set forth in the *Book of Chou* 周書 and the *Book of Hsia* 夏書 in the *Classic of History* (*Shu-ching* 書經). For it was essential, in the face of the actual rise and decline of dynasties, which had already occurred, to construct some sort of theory in connection with the new dynasty and provide an explanation. The theory of the receipt of the mandate and change of the mandate certainly arose with this object, and its construction must have taken place in the Chou period.

However, though it goes without saying that the new dynasty would recognise the destruction of its predecessors, it was only natural for it to hope for its own perpetuation, and to regard a further change of the mandate as to be rejected. The *Ta-ya* 大雅 section of the *Book of Songs* (*Shih-ching* 詩經) celebrates the achievements of the ancestors of the House of Chou, but, when we read this, we find it repeatedly explained that Chou's receipt of the mandate and accession to the throne were the result of the accumulation of virtue by saintly men over several hundred years subsequent to Houchi 后稷, by no means the achievement of one day to the next. This shows that it is no easy matter to receive the mandate of Heaven, and, insofar as this shows that a new dynasty does not easily arise, and an old dynasty does not easily perish, it constitutes no less than the concept of the avoidance of change of the mandate. This tells us also that the concept of the avoidance of change of the mandate is to be found in the Confucian canon.

Confucius does not speak of the receipt of the mandate and the change of the mandate. He had a nostalgic longing for the Duke of Chou; in speaking of the 'harmonious', the music of Shun, he said it was utterly beautiful and utterly good; in speaking of the 'military', the music of King Wu, he said that, though utterly beautiful, it was not utterly good. If we consider these points, it is clear that, although he did not like change of the mandate, especially if it involved 'forceful punishment', he did not, even so, repudiate it. We are not therefore in a position to obtain any explicit criticism of the change of the mandate from Confucius.

This being so, how did the other schools of thought, apart from the Confucians, view this question? The legalists 法家 emerged during the period of the Warring States, especially at the end of that period; this school did not acknowledge the mandate of Heaven, and, consequently, did not acknowledge either its receipt or its change. They maintained the immutability of the relations of obligation between sovereign and minister. Han Fei, who summed up the thought of the legalist school, said:

“Perhaps because they acted contrary to the obligations between sovereign and minister, Yao, Shun, T'ang and Wu confused the doctrines of posterity. Yao was a sovereign and made his minister sovereign. Shun was a minister and made his sovereign his minister.

T'ang and Wu were ministers who assassinated their masters and mutilated their corpses. But the world approved these men, and this is why the world is ungoverned up to the present time."

This passage is in the section on loyalty and filial piety in the *Han-fei-tzū*, and it condemns the methods of changes of the mandate, but, examined more closely, it condemns both the change of mandate itself and the alternation of dynasties. The celebrated story of Po-i 伯夷 and Shu-ch'i 叔齊 is also connected with these ideas of the legalists. The story is to be found in various works; the following is based on the Life of Po I in the *Shih-chi*:

"Po I and Shu Ch'i were the sons of the prince of Ku-chu. They yielded the kingdom to a younger brother and went into retirement. Hearing that Ch'ang, Chief of the West, was good in caring for the old, they proposed to go and join him. But when they reached there, the Chief of the West was dead. His son, king Wu, was intending to go east and attack Chou 紂. Po I and Shu Ch'i whipped up their horses and remonstrated with him, saying, "The mourning for your father is not yet done, and here you are taking up arms. Can this be called filial? A sovereign is to be assassinated by a minister—can this be called humane?" The attendants were going to attack them, but T'ai-kung said, "These are righteous men," and he helped them to take their departure. Later king Wu destroyed the Yin and became sovereign of the world. Po I and Shu Ch'i were righteous and would not eat the grain of the Chou. They retired to Mount Shou-yang, and died of starvation."

Here the change of the mandate from the Yin to the Chou is criticised through Po I and Shu Ch'i, and this condemnation of the conduct of king Wu of the Chou is identical with the thought of the *legalists*. The *Shih-chi* also records the story of the argument between Yüan Ku-sheng 轅固生 and Huang Sheng 黃生 on the rights and wrongs of the T'ang and Wu changes of the mandate, in the time of Ching-ti of the Han. The two men were famous scholars of the time and conducted their argument in the presence of Ching-ti.

Huang Sheng said, "T'ang and Wu did not receive the mandate. It was assassination." Yüan Ku-sheng said, "Not so. Chieh and Chou were cruel and tyrannical, and the heart of the world belonged to T'ang and Wu. . . . The accessions of T'ang and Wu were inevitable. If they did not receive the mandate, what else could they do?"

Huang Sheng said, "Though a cap be worn out, it must go on the head. Though shoes be new, they must go on the feet. Whatever the case, there is distinction between upper and lower. Now, though Chieh

and Chou had lost the Way, they were nonetheless sovereigns. Though T'ang and Wu were saintly men, they were nonetheless ministers. Being unable as ministers to respect the Son of Heaven by plain speaking and correcting his faults, in each case, they instead killed him because of his faults, set themselves up in his stead and faced the South. If this was not assassination, what was it?"

Yüan Ku-sheng said, "If it must be as you say, does this mean that Kao-ti's accession to the throne as Son of Heaven in place of the Ch'in was wrong?"

At this point, Ching-ti said, "Though we do not eat horse's liver when we eat meat, this does not mean that we do not know its taste. If none of those who discuss scholarship discuss the receipt of the mandate by T'ang and Wu, this does not make them stupid." And there it ended. Henceforth no scholar ventured to elucidate the question of the receipt of the mandate through banishment or assassination. Etcetera.

Yüan Ku-sheng was a Confucian, Huang Sheng a Taoist. What Huang Sheng said was nothing less than the Taoist critique of the matter of the change of the mandate. The legalists and the Taoists were extremely close on certain points, and in their critique of this matter their positions were identical: in not recognising the mandate of Heaven and so not recognising the distinction between abdication and 'forceful punishment', legalists and Taoists were at one.

From the period of the Warring States and on through Ch'in and Han, the theory of the Sequence of the Five Virtues was prevalent. The five virtues were the virtues of the five elements, and these were:

Earth Wood Metal Fire Water

These five kinds of essence (power) move in sequence throughout nature and through the human world. The outstanding case is that of the virtue of the sovereign, and this manifests itself in the alternation of dynasties. This theory was first put forward by Chou Yen 騶衍 of Ch'i in the middle period of the Warring States; then, when Shih-huang-ti of Ch'in united all within the seas, scholars of this school made a submission to the emperor whereby Ch'in was the dynasty of the water virtue. Shih-huang-ti adopted the theory, and made the following pairings:

The Yellow Emperor	earth
The Hsia	wood
The Yin	metal
The Chou	fire
The Ch'in	water

and, taking the Ch'in to be the dynasty of the water virtue, he reformed a number of systems to conform with the water virtue. (For example, black was the esteemed colour, six was made the standard number.) This attribution of the water virtue to the Ch'in was not the result of random

allocation of the five elements to the previous ancient dynasties. It seemed that there had been only one cycle of the five virtues since the remotest antiquity, and so it was with the Ch'in that the water virtue appeared for the first time, the attribution of the water virtue implying profound significance. In relation to the points of the compass, water was the North. The North, in Heaven, was the position of the pole star, on Earth the position of the residence of the sovereign (the position from which, facing the South, he ruled the world), in short, no less than the symbol of the true sovereign. This implied that the rise of the dynasties of earth virtue, wood virtue, metal virtue, fire virtue, that is to say, of the Yellow Emperor, the Hsia, the Yin, the Chou, was no more than a series of precursors to the emergence of the Ch'in dynasty, the true sovereigns, preparations for it. The theory whereby the Ch'in were identified with the water virtue truly signified that with the establishment of the Ch'in dynasty the sequence of the five virtues came to an end, that the dynasty of the water virtue would rule for evermore, and that a change of the mandate would never again occur. This is not explicitly stated in the Annals of Shih-huang-ti or the Treatise on imperial worship in the *Shih-chi*. But scrutiny of the meaning of the water virtue and of the structure of the theory of the five virtues renders such an interpretation as the foregoing inescapable. And such an interpretation is in accord with the aspiration that the Ch'in dynasty should be made to last for ever, first expressed by Shih-huang-ti, when he renounced a posthumous name, and said,

"I shall be Shih-huang-ti [=The First Emperor] and this title will be handed down for ever, from the second and third generations to the tenth thousandth."

The Ch'in did not accept Confucianism, and made the theories of the legalists the basic principle of their policies, but it was not possible to explain Ch'in's replacement of the Chou and its establishment of a new dynasty by the legalist school. Accordingly, the essential character of the Ch'in dynasty was explained as above, by the Chou Yen school's theory of the five virtues, and it was clearly enunciated at the same time that there could be no further change of the mandate. Even so, it is impossible to shackle social movement with such vague and empty reasonings, such academic theories. A few years after the death of Shih-huang-ti, the Ch'in perished. And the Han arose.

At the beginning of the Han there was ceaseless controversy as to whether the virtue of the Han should be regarded as that of fire or that of earth, but in the final period of the Former Han, the theory arose that it was the fire virtue and that the imperial House of Han was the successor to the emperor Yao. Mention of the Han as the successor to Yao is to be found in words of Liu Hsiang 劉向, quoted in a *tsan* 贊 in the Annals of

Kao-ti in the *Han-shu*, but it seems that the most detailed exposition is in one of the books of commentary (*wei-shu* 緯書), the *Shang-shu chung-hou* 尚書中候. This latter work is an imitation of a compilation by Confucius; it was reputed to be a compilation by Confucius covering the years from Yao to Mu-kung of Ch'in, and subsequently to have become the *Shang-shu chung-hou* with the addition of predictions up to the time of Hsiang-yü and Kao-tsu of the Han (*Shang-shu hsü-shu* 序疏; quoted by Cheng Hsüan 鄭玄 as commentary on *Shang-shu* 尚書; P'i Hsi-shui 皮錫瑞, *Shang-shu chung-hou shu-cheng* 疏證); though the date of its composition is not entirely certain, it seems to belong near the end of the Former Han period. It goes without saying that this book, as an entirety, has been lost, and it survives in part in quotation in the *I-wen lei-chi* 藝文類聚 and the *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan*. According to these works, together with the *Tien-yin* 典引 (by Pan Ku), quoted in the Life of Pan Ku in the *Hou Han-shu*, and the *Shang-shu hsüan-chi-ch'ien* 璇璣鈴, the following pairings were made:

Yao	fire virtue
Shun	earth virtue
Yü (Hsia)	metal virtue
T'ang (Yin)	water virtue
Wen-wu (Chou)	wood virtue
Han	fire virtue

This was supposed to mean that those who were given by Yao the surname and became Son of Heaven as his successors were Yao's meritorious ministers or their descendants with the fief given by Yao: it was not possible for anyone at all to become Son of Heaven and it was limited to Yao, as a man of great saintliness, and his meritorious ministers: then, when the Chou perished, the dynasties of Yao's meritorious ministers had come to the end of their mission and been destroyed, as a result of which the Han, as Yao's successor, resumed the throne. The predetermined number of mandates was thus reached, and the cycle of the five virtues, that is to say, the sequence of wood, fire, earth, metal and water, constituted simply the form of the course whereby this predetermined number of mandates was actualized. With the rise of the Han as successor to Yao and the coming of a second age of fire virtue, it was believed that there would be no further cycle of the five virtues, and that henceforth the Han dynasty would continue for all time; this belief constitutes the most important significance of the theory that the Han were the successors of Yao. On the lack of further change of the mandate and the eternal continuance of the Han, a fragment of the *Shang-shu chung-hou* says,

"The emperor Mao-chin-tao (卯金刀=the single character 劉=Liu, the surname of the Han) arises. The eternity of Yao is restored."

There is also a passage in a letter from Su Ching 蘇竟 to Liu Tzū-

hsi 劉子龔, elder brother of Liu Hsin 劉歆, in the Life of Su Ching in the *Hou Han-shu*, which says, "The fire virtue is inherited from Yao. Although it was dimmed, light had to come. The blessings of all the centuries are inherited, the auspices of eternity are grasped." These two passages confirm the point made above, and complete confirmation can be obtained if one examines the way of thinking displayed in the fragments of the *Chung-hou*. (Kuno, Shōichi, 久野昇一, *On the Reasons for Advancing the Theory of the Fire Virtue of the Han at the end of the Former Han*, *Tōyō Gakuhō*, vol. 25, no 3, May 1938). It also goes without saying that this is clearly the idea of avoidance of change of mandate. Yao and Shun were the ideal sovereigns in Confucian theory. According to this, Yao and Shun were revered, and there was no overt resistance to theories of receipt of mandate and change of mandate. Even so, they did maintain that the age in which the change of the mandate had operated had passed away, and so they held that alternation of dynasties would henceforth be excluded, in which respect they may be said to have been playing a different tune with equal skill as the proponents of the theory of the water virtue of the Ch'in. This theory was, moreover, equally ineffective in practice; there was Wang Mang's usurpation, and though this was followed by the revival of the Later Han, they too came to destruction after another 156 years.

As was said earlier, the theory of the change of the mandate arose in Chou times with the object of explaining the rational character of the rise and fall of the Yin and Chou, and it subsequently became an important tenet of the Confucians. However, they soon became somewhat dissatisfied with it, and there arose a desire to revise it and avoid any subsequent change of the mandate; and we find a similar way of thought appearing later on in Han times too. And apart from the Confucians, there was the direct confrontation of the legalists, the Taoists and the practitioners of the system of the *yin* and *yang* and the five elements. During this period there was transition in the system of government from the feudal to that of regional government, that is to say, to a kind of bureaucratic system of centralized power; but the idea of the change of the mandate, which originated in the feudal period, persisted in the period of regional government too, while the idea that change of mandate was to be rejected or avoided was also, on the whole, existent throughout the two periods, the evolution of the governmental system apparently having no great influence on these ideas. For the theory of the change of the mandate did not concern feudal lords, it concerned the dynasty. With the collapse of feudalism and the coming of regional government, the dynasty still persisted, while with the collapse of the Yin and the rise of the Chou, the collapse of the Chou and the coming of the Ch'in, then the Han, the fact of the change of the mandate continued throughout the feudal period and that of regional government. Nor were the rights and wrongs of the argument ever decided;

and the reason why even those who felt dissatisfied with theory of the change of the mandate had finally inevitably to appear to recognise it, was simply that, as a matter of actual fact, there arose and had arisen successive changes of the mandate.

I next propose to give some consideration to ways of thought on the subject of the relationship between sovereign and minister.

As I have just set forth in some detail, Confucianism early included theories about the receipt of the mandate and change of the mandate. In the Confucian canon much discussion of the Way of the Sovereign is made to accompany this theme, and there is emphasis on the necessity to do good by cultivating virtue and so make all the people happy and peaceful; but teaching on the way in which ministers should serve their sovereigns is comparatively slight, and there is no clear indication of the steps to be taken in the event of the sovereign losing the Way. Even so, the Way of the Minister, under the theory of the mandate of Heaven, is logically as follows:

While the king's virtue is abundant and he retains the mandate of Heaven, those who are his ministers have a duty of loyalty towards him. If it happens that he loses his virtue and the mandate of Heaven is taken from him, his ministers no longer have the duty of loyalty towards him, and at the same time they come to owe a duty of loyalty to a new sovereign who has newly received the mandate of Heaven.

The first of the Yin, T'ang, was originally a minister of the Hsia sovereign, Chieh, but when Chieh lost the Way, T'ang attacked and destroyed him, and became sovereign in his place; king Wu of Chou was originally a minister of Chou of the Yin, but when Chou lost the Way, he too was destroyed by Wu, who became sovereign in his place. In spite of the fact that T'ang and Wu destroyed their predecessors, their conduct was considered righteous, because they received the mandate of Heaven. This is why, when Chou and Chieh lost the Way, those who, apart from T'ang and Wu, had hitherto served them, were naturally obliged to abandon their sovereigns, Chou and Chieh, and give their loyalty to T'ang and Wu. Thus in the theory of the mandate of Heaven, the moral duties of sovereign and minister were not fixed and unalterable, but changed with the operation of the mandate of Heaven; the obligation of the minister to be loyal to the sovereign existing only so long as the sovereign had not lost virtue and still retained the mandate of Heaven. But when it comes to considering this in actual cases, on what basis was it to be judged that, the sovereign's conduct being unvirtuous, he had or had not lost the mandate of Heaven? Further, those who were ministers had a duty to help the sovereign to accumulate virtue and do good. If the sovereign's conduct was unvirtuous, the ministers could not shirk their share of the responsibility. Was it pos-

sible for them to ignore this and abandon the sovereign because they thought the mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn? According to this way of thinking, it was right to be loyal while the mandate was present and not to be loyal when the mandate was withdrawn; in actual practice, in terms of practical morality, this principle was so extremely obscure that it cannot but be said that there was no definite criterion, and that it was impossible to construct a complete Way of the Minister. This being so, there were not a few to have doubts on this subject; one may instance the story of Po I and Shu Ch'i, whipping up their horses and remonstrating, or the dispute between Huang Sheng and Yüan Ku-sheng.

How did Confucius think on this question? Confucius' teaching is the soundest of the various Chinese schools of thought, and it gives the feeling of dealing exhaustively with the ethics of the family and society. But there are inadequacies in Confucius' thought on the relationship between sovereign and minister. In the *Analects* we read:

“In employing a minister, the sovereign acts according to the rites. In serving the sovereign, a minister acts with loyalty.” (Book 3)

“He who knows how to put all his strength into serving his father and mother, who can give his life in the service of his sovereign” (Book 1)

There is no difference between these precepts and teaching that a sovereign should be served with all one's strength. But, on the other hand, he taught that, when a state was in disorder and the Way not being followed, one should abandon office and keep oneself pure in retirement. He says:

“Do not enter a state in danger; do not stay in a state in disorder. When the Way prevails in the world, let yourself be seen; when it does not, withdraw” (Book 8)

“What a gentleman is Chü Po Yü. When the Way prevailed in his state, he served. When the Way did not prevail, he was able to wrap up [his talent] and hide it in his bosom.” (Book 15)

But we also find in the *Analects*, Book 5:

“The Master said, “When the Way prevailed in his state, then Ning Wu Tzū was wise. When it did not prevail, then he was stupid. Such wisdom may be attained, but not such foolishness.” ”

This is in praise of the conduct of Ning Wu Tzū, the minister of the state of Wei. The ruler of Wei at the time was Duke Ch'eng 成公. Duke Ch'eng was unvirtuous and his state in disorder. Wise officials fled well away and did not present themselves. Ning Wu Tzū tried to settle every-

thing with all his might but did not avoid trouble. In the end he was able to save his ruler. This is the reference of the remark that foolishness such as his was hardly attainable. Thus Confucius did not hold that when a state was in disorder one might immediately withdraw from it. Though there is no difference between this and teaching that one must use all one's strength and do one's utmost to bring help, in circumstances where it is absolutely impossible to give relief with one's own strength, one should appear to act as if the best course was to withdraw and keep oneself pure, and not sacrifice one's life in utter devotion to one's ruler, even unto death. (Note 1) All the above relates to service to feudal rulers, and has no connection with receipt of the mandate and change of the mandate. Moreover, the exercise of the utmost loyalty to their rulers on the part of ministers must be subject to the condition that they can act according to the Way with their own strength; if they encounter conditions in which they cannot act according to the Way, they should withdraw. Confucius' teachings constitute a splendid doctrinal structure in other fields, but on this point they are most unsatisfactory from a Japanese point of view.

In the Chinese classics there is a kind of ritual obligation to withdraw if one remonstrates three times without being heeded. We find this in the Book of Rites, and in the sections on the Hereditary Families and on the Lives of the Soothsayers in the *Shih-chi*. In the *Book of Rites* there is:

“According to the way of ministers, one does not remonstrate publicly. If one remonstrates three times without being heeded, one withdraws.”

In the section on the Hereditary Families in the *Shih-chi* there is:

“If a minister remonstrates three times without being heeded, it his duty to withdraw.”

And in the section on the Lives of the Soothsayers, there is:

“Honest remonstrations are made according to the correct conduct or way of the man of quality. If he remonstrates three times without being heeded, then he retires.”

Though this is to be regarded as a maxim of the period of the Warring States and was not confined to Confucian ideas, we can tell from its presence in the Book of Rites that it was in fact advocated by the Confucians. We may say that its import was generally in agreement with Confucius' thinking on the way of ministers.

For Confucius, head of the Confucian school, relations between parents and children were of the greatest importance of all, and so the moral relationship of son to father, the virtue of filial piety, was the virtue most

highly commended. Though other schools too had similar views on this subject, the Confucians prized this the most highly of all. The duty of filial piety was unconditional. However tyrannical might be the father, it was the son's duty to obey him and care for him to the utmost. Rather, the more tyrannical he might be, the more imperative was it that he should be obediently served. This we can see also from the story of the emperor Shun, which appears in the *Mencius*.

According to this, Shun's parents were perverse and unintelligent, they loved their younger son, Hsiang, and hated Shun. They put Shun in charge of the granary, then set fire to it, after removing the ladder. Shun shielded himself with two hats and came down, thus managing to escape death. They made him dig a well and then covered it over. Shun made a secret passage and managed to get out by the side. In spite of his parents being like this, Shun did not fail in the utmost filial care, loving them from his heart, without alteration, all his life. This is the story of Shun as it appears in the *Mencius*. (It also appears in the Annals of the Five Emperors in the *Shih-chi*.) (Note 2) The following passage in the section on Yao in the *Shu-ching* may also be pointed out, as being of similar significance:

"His father was perverse, his mother stupid, and Hsiang haughty. By his filial piety he was able to live in harmony with them, gradually improving them and causing them to cease from wickedness."

This fable is so utterly unnatural, indeed absurd, that neither Confucius nor Ts'eng-tzŭ can have said anything so remote from human nature; it was doubtless made up later by way of embellishment by some scholar of the Ts'eng-tzŭ school. Moreover, if it was made up by a scholar of the Ts'eng-tzŭ school with the object of emphasizing the absolute nature of filial piety, its unconditionality, there would, of course, have been no difference between Confucius and Ts'eng-tzŭ as to the absolute character of filial piety. Though such was the nature of filial piety, and though loyalty was invariably held to be the obligation towards the sovereign, the latter quality was, by contrast, not absolute, and, conditions being attached, not unconditional. The following appears in the Ts'eng-tzŭ's Great Filial Piety section in the *Ta-tai Li-chi* 大戴禮記 (Book of Rites):

"To serve a sovereign without loyalty is not filial. To behave to an official without respect is not filial To be in battle without valour is not filial."

And in the Ts'eng-tzŭ's True Filial Piety section in the *Ta-tai Li-chi*, we read:

"To remonstrate honestly is the filial piety of the courtier."

Here we see filial piety being enlarged to cover the moral relationship to the sovereign, and the attempt being made to harmonize the way of behaviour towards parents with that towards the sovereign. Even so, it does not go so far as to take the further step, to make loyalty unconditional in the same way as filial piety, and, by insisting on sacrifice of self for the sovereign, even unto death, identifying the ideal of loyalty with that of filial piety.

However, the foregoing was the Confucian way of thought, and it was not necessarily the same for the legalists and Taoists. The legalists and Jaoists, as I have already said, denied receipt of the mandate and change of the mandate; they maintained that the moral relationship between sovereign and minister was immovable, and that absolute loyalty to the sovereign was as necessary as that to the parents. This may be seen in the *World of Mankind* in the Inner Section of the *Chuang-tzū*, and in the section on Loyalty and Filial Piety in the *Han-fei-tzū*. For the idea that loyalty was to be regarded as absolute was put forward for the first time by the Taoists and Legalists in the second half of the Warring States period. However, these schools of thought were notably philosophical or political in character, inclined to theory, remote from humanity. The legalists, in particular, saw human nature as evil, held that it could not be governed by moral principles, and could only be controlled by authority; it was an extremely frigid way of thought, and, as such, was generally rejected as a doctrine for practical morality, while the way of the minister which it advocated, as well as what it advocated as to loyalty, could not become the standard of a popular morality.

Conclusion

[Conclusion in respect of the year's lectures which included this one]:

It has been my purpose in the foregoing to give a general survey of the important changes in the system from Chou to Han times, and of the development of ideas during that period. Though I shall not escape the charge of providing large branches and few leaves on them, I think that I have managed to give an outline of these matters as I see them. The Chou period was the period of feudalism. That is to say, the state was constructed on a hierarchy of sovereign, feudal lords, officers of state and common people, the principle being that all ranks were hereditary. Even, so, the alternation of rise and fall, prosperity and decay, is a constant of human society, and so these ranks were all often subject to greater or lesser disturbances, and even the principle of heredity collapsed from time to time. One of the greatest of these disturbances was the fall of a dynasty and the establishment of another. But an even more profound change was the setting up, on the collapse of the feudal system, of a kind

of bureaucratic system, a system of regional government through commanderies and prefectures.

Scholarship was basically the province of the official class, but from the Ch'un-ch'iu period to that of the Warring States it was thrown open more widely, to the ranks of the courtiers and to a part of the common people, while at the same time scholarship and ideas themselves underwent great developments. In the field of scholarship, the main developments were in ethics and politics. Studies of family and social morality made very great advances, and one feels that they reached their ultimate limits. At the heart of them was the principle of behaviour towards parents, that is to say, filial piety. The principle of behaviour towards the sovereign, loyalty, was not thought so important as filial piety; it was understood as being relative, as opposed to the absolute quality of filial piety. This was the same both under the feudal system and under that of regional government. When they entered the period of regional government, the people of China exchanged their situation of direct control by the feudal lords and indirect rule by the sovereign for a position in which all the people in the country were subject to the direct control of the emperor, and a vital and new moral relationship did not arise between the sovereign and the people. The principle of loyalty was, as before, less highly valued than filial piety, and was very much less thoroughgoing. Again, one of the greatest disturbances of the Chinese state, the collapse of a dynasty, that is to say, change of the mandate, took place both in the feudal period and that of regional government. Various views came into being on this subject: some accepted it, others rejected it; but since, as a *fact*, it took place on successive occasions, it was ultimately impossible wholly to deny it, and it had to be acknowledged, however unsatisfactory. The impossibility of denying the change of the mandate was an important reason for the concept of loyalty not being fully worked out in the field of ideas. In sum, it is a fact which should not be concealed that, while family and social morality underwent conspicuous development in ancient China, the development of moral principles in relation to the sovereign was very slight by comparison. Why was this? And to what results did it give rise? These are extraordinarily important questions, but I will not venture on them.

1. This interpretation follows Chu Hsi's commentary.
2. This passage is a conflation of the accounts in Mencius and the *Shih-chi*.

