

# Thoughts on the Understanding of the Han and the Six Dynasties

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## Preface

In the transition from the Han 漢 period to those of Wei 魏, Chin 晉 and the division between North and South (hereafter referred to as the Six Dynasties 六朝), was there, broadly, a take-over of the former by the latter, or was a large place occupied in the latter by the emergence and development of a new epoch? It may be said that at present there are two mutually conflicting views, the one favouring take-over, the other, the emergence and development of new things. I myself think that, while there was a rather considerable essential difference between the Former Han period and the Six Dynasties, after the transition from the Former Han to the Later Han, one can point to seeds of change towards the characteristics of the Six Dynasties period.

In this article I mean to set out something of my views on this topic through a number of historical phenomena with which I shall deal. In so doing, I shall be touching, however faintly and in spite of my own inadequacy, on the question of what place should be given to the Han- Six Dynasties period in the history of China. But historical phenomena do not necessarily show clear-cut changes according to, or corresponding to, the alternation and emergence of dynasties. In this sense, it is not necessarily appropriate to discuss these matters under the heading of a particular dynastic name or of a collective name of a number of dynasties. However, in a general way in this article, periods will be treated, for the sake of convenience, as those designated by the usual dynastic names. The argument will proceed to some extent schematically. There are differences between what I say in this article and views I have previously published, my former views being amended in the sense of this article. In view of the character of this article, which gives an outline, and considerations of space, I do not cite the names of my previously published articles at each point. And I also restrict to the minimum my citations of the articles of other scholars. (Also in what follows, when dealing with the aristocracy or the powerful clans as classes, I omit, except in cases of special necessity, the expression "class").

### 1. Close kinship groups, the question of the family

The period covered in this article is generally limited to the period from the *Ch'un-ch'iu* 春秋 to the Six Dynasties, and deal with the fraternal group regarded as the male line kinship groups (including spouses) of the *Ch'un-ch'iu* period and (using the contemporary word) the family (家) from the period of the Warring States 戰國 on. Further, the word "family" (to use the contemporary word) since the Warring States period sometimes indicates only the human relationships, but in this article I intend to deal with the concomitant economic usage.

We may consider that it was the fraternal group system which provided the nucleus of the social system of the *Ch'un-ch'iu*. What is here called the fraternal group system is a close kinship group system of which the basis is brothers. The brothers with their respective wives (including children), lived under independent roofs or houses and carried on their daily lives, with ultimately communal resources forming the fraternal group (in what follows, "communal resources" does not refer only to the sharing of property but ultimately to the sharing of daily life). And the members of the fraternal group lived within a specific area (known in later times as living "within the great gate"). When all the brother members of a fraternal group died, the group split into groups of brother sons whose fathers were the original brothers. To the extent that the fraternal group was such, its structure took the form that (though a brother was a father, that) father was the basis and the child was included, and the child of the child (the grandchild, in short) though sharing its life with its father, did not possess the "qualifications" of a basic constituent member of the fraternal group. This meant that only when brothers who were fathers (regarded as occupying the position of fathers) formed a fraternal group, were the qualifications for basic constituent membership of a fraternal group acquired.

As the above fraternal group system collapsed in the middle and final *Ch'un-ch'iu* period, a new close kinship emerged in the period of the Warring States. This was something that appeared within the collapse of the fraternal group, and this close kinship group had two characteristics. The first of these was that, basically husband and wife, irrespective of whether they were old or able-bodied, formed a unit of communal resources. The second was that, between such there was (in theory, at least) a relationship of economic support or economic mutual help. (This economic mutual help does not become a relationship of future loans). Having first mentioned the second, I will return to the first. When the fraternal groups collapsed, there came into being, schematically speaking, depending on the age of the brothers, either groups of able-bodied husband and wife, or groups of (old) father and son. In the former case, each fraternally related husband and wife formed a unit of communal resources, and there is historical evidence for presuming

that at the same time there was ordinarily an obligation of some degree of economic mutual help between them. In the latter case, the father-son group probably also had communal resources, but in general the unit of communal resources was constituted by the able-bodied son and his wife, and such an able-bodied son equally supported his old father, or so at least was held to be the case in theory. (As I will explain later, an old couple also basically constituted a unit of communal resources, but I will leave this point for the present). On such an occasion the old father would share the dwelling of one (the oldest?) of his sons. The *ching-t'ien* (井田) peasants shown us by Mencius had such father-son groups. (In what follows, such father-son groups are referred to as father-son 'groups'). (The fraternal groups above were not said to constitute a family (家), but) the able-bodied couple of the fraternally related in the former case above, and the able-bodied couple who formed a father-son "group" in the latter case was said to constitute a family (家). The able-bodied couple in the former came in due course, with its children, to take on the form of the latter. But along with this, the brothers being old, the sons growing to manhood would severally carry on the economic activity of husband-wife unit. And when this happened, it may be supposed that, as a prolongation of the economic mutual help between the brothers when they were able-bodied, they (the cousins), who would have been mainly contributing to the actual economic activity, would also have some degree of a relationship of economic mutual help. The ideal of the family as seen above extended into the Han period, but then, even in case of members of the same clan, there are more powerful links extended to cousins than to second cousins and beyond. This was doubtless based on human nature, but it is perfectly possible to suppose that it emerged in the manner described above.

From the end of the Later Han period, the expression, "a hundred mouths" (百口) becomes current. One usage indicated simply a large number of people, and another usage a family of large numbers, including slaves, and so on. But basically the expression seems to have come into being on the background that cousins, however theoretically (grandfathers and fathers being included in their lifetime, of course, but also even after death) formed a social group. It is not clear whether this development is directly connected with the schematization described above. However that may be, it should be noticed that its scope is much the same as that already described.<sup>(1)</sup>

It may be remarked that, under the law of the Rites which was established in the Former Han period at the latest, there were two groupings: that which followed on the fraternal grouping system, and the three clan system of father-son communal resources, which we suppose to have appeared after the collapse of the former and to have been an adaptation of it. (Mencius de-

(1) When in a father-son group the able bodied husband and wife and the old father (mother) shared a dwelling, they were held to constitute one family.

scribes groups of father and son after the collapse of the fraternal group system, but that is not the same as this). While it belongs in the line of the latter, there are communal resource relationships which seem to extend to cousins. In spite of the discrepancies with the facts, it should be noticed that there is a distinction, economically speaking, between the grouping on cousin relationship in the system of the rites and that which went further.

We will now take the first. We can point to the existence of many families with completely communal resources, made by old or able-bodied couples at the beginning of the Han period. But from that period on, the power of the state tended, on the one hand to encourage the families which should replace the vertical father-son "groups". On the other hand they formed the households under the household register system, which similarly formed the fraternal groups in the fraternal group system, and frequently constituted the unit for taxation. (In what follows, the household (戸), in the household register system, will be taken, in normal usage, as household (戸)=family (家). Thus closely related persons are handled in their horizontal fraternal relationships, not as in the cases of father-son "groups". At this point it seems that we have to suppose that the state intended to expect mutual economic help between brothers (this including help between able-bodied brothers, extending to the able-bodied children of old brothers and thence eventually to cousins). Moreover, the *Po-hu-t'ung* 白虎通, written in the Later Han period, deals with the relations within clans, and holds that there should be relationships of self-help between brothers and cousins and further. The *Po-hu-t'ung* having the character it has, it would mean that the Han state would expect that there should be relationship of mutual self-help. Groupings based mainly on vertical relationships and those based mainly on horizontal relationships are of a basically different character, and the former continued to "negate" the latter over a long period, but we should now see if there was a time in the Han period when the two coexisted. One key to this question is provided by the *Po-hu-t'ung*. This is the point that, as between husband and wife, the wife is held to possess her individual assets as distinct from those of the family (which appears as the property of the husband). In my view, in the case of a family of which the husband and wife form the nucleus, the assets of that family were not "held in common" with children under age, nor were they of a character to be inherited by all the children. Basically they were limited to the single generation of the husband and wife. All the more so that the assets brought with her by the wife (as in the case wife = mother in a family where father and children had common resources) were not essentially of a character to be combined with the assets of the family, of which the head was held to be the husband (= father), and inherited by the children. (On the fusion of wife's assets in a family where father and children had common resources, see SHIGA Shūzō 滋賀秀三, *Chūgoku Kazoku-hō no Genri* 中國家族法の原理). Thus generally speaking, it was basic

that a wife could own her individual assets separate from those of the family. To the extent that things were thus, the old father in a father-son "group" would share the family dwelling with one of his sons and receive the (moral and) economic support of all his sons, but resources were not fully held in common by father and sons, they being essentially, theoretically, separate units of common resources. The centrality of old or able-bodied husband and wife found in the vertical father-son relationship, could naturally also arise in horizontal fraternal relationships. Thus the coexistence of the two, of which it was question, would seem to have been possible.

When the above sort of family of husband and wife with communal resources made its appearance in the period of the Warring States, a very important factor in its emergence must have been that the feudal lords, each aiming at supreme power, tried to lay their hands on people individually, to use as officials or warriors. But it is to be supposed that, generally speaking, the feudal lords also aimed, at the same time, at the form of the father-son 'group'. This is connected with the fact that, for all the rise in agricultural productivity compared with former times, the economic independence of a family centred on a husband and wife, was not yet fully possible to be established firmly. Moreover, at the beginning of the Han, the pattern of alternation of husband-wife families of completely common resources and father-son families of completely common resources was by no means universal. (In the sense that the former was expected to be the latter in the future, both will be grouped together as father-son families in what follows).

With agricultural productivity low and the populace poor, the various relationships of economic mutual help in which the husband-wife centred family was involved could be said from another point of view, to signify the homogeneous existence of everyone. The control of the populace by the state power of the Han was ingenious, and the more so for being complicated; advantage was taken of the aspect of the homogeneity of everyone in the application to the populace of the forced labour levy and the poll tax. The forced labour levied on the populace in the Han period consisted of frontier garrison service (*shu-pien* 戍邊) in the narrow sense of military service, regular service (*chéng* 正) in the broad sense of military service and miscellaneous regional services (*kéng-tsu* 更卒). These (in Wu-ti's 武帝 time) in principle involved every adult male equally in an obligation of 30 days each. In fact, not every adult male required actually to serve every year, and there were many cases of 300 cash (*ch'ien* 錢) being paid as 'in lieu of service money' (代役錢) for 30 days, and no actual service being done. (It is supposed that the official wage for one month in the Han period was 300 cash, but there are sources indicating 1,000 a month in cases of private employment). Then as the poll tax in the Han period there was the individual tax (*hsüan-fu* 算賦) attracted by males and females from the age of 15 to 56 (120 cash per head. Male and female slaves and employees, double). As a further supplement

there was the personal money (*k'ou-ch'ien* 口錢) attracted by males and females from the age of 7 to 14 (23 cash from Wu-ti on). However, as will be mentioned later, land taxes in Han times were extremely low. The more so that these others, especially the forced labour were very heavy burdens inflicted on the people by the state. In this connection we should no doubt note the homogeneity already mentioned.

However, the control of the state over the populace under the Han took another form apart from the direct one described above; this was control through the hierarchy in settlements. Let us now consider this point. One characteristic of the transfer of assets in the Han period was the great frequency of cases in which a family's assets were given away to the same clan or to the community embracing it, to the point of total exhaustion of the assets. This gave rise to the idea that any surplus assets ought to be given away, and the idea that the possession of surplus assets would invite popular enmity. No idea of how to control members of one clan or settlement by economic power emerged at that juncture. This state of affairs may be taken to embody the character of the period as it arose from the economic mutual help between all the members of one clan or settlement, and the reverse relationship of general popular homogeneity. Moreover, in such a situation as the above, the power of the father and head of the family did not exist (except for the father-son family which we believe to have barely existed from the first). In the situation we have just looked at, the pivot of society was agriculture, and age and experience were valued in it so much the more, and this, combined with the tendency to respect the oldest (individuals) led to the birth of a particular kind of hierarchy according to age in villages or other settlements. Let us now consider this point. In the course of the period from the Warring States to the Han, we may suppose that there were settlements formed of one clan and others formed of several clans. In the case of the former two types are to be distinguished: those which functioned as consanguineous groups of single (whole) clans, and those which functioned as cooperative bodies of the settlement (to be dealt with below). But since both were considered as functional, age ordering of the males came into being. This is not to say, of course, that this was absolutely pure; in practice such considerations as individual ability or wealth would frequently have played their part. Even so, however this may be, the emergence of age ordering as the particular basis of settlement hierarchies is itself worthy of attention. (Settlements are dealt with in Section 3, below.)

It may be remarked that one might venture to say that there were two ways of living for those who lost protection under the clan system. The first of these was a tie between individuals based on benefaction and its requital. This is even to be found in official circles. (MASUBUCHI Tatsuo 増淵龍夫, *Chūgoku Kodai no Shakai to Kokka* 中國古代の社會と國家). The tie between the two sometimes went on to the descendants, but this was an extension of

what was from first to last a tie between individuals. The other way of living was a tie based on age within a settlement. In both cases the unit is the individual, but in the former case there is severance from the settlement, whereas the latter, on the contrary, is based on the settlement. This is the more true in that even when the character of settlements changed, the former continued in existence unaffected, while the shadow of the latter grew shorter when change in the character of settlements came about.

The maintenance of the age precedence in the settlements of the period of the Warring States was understood as being the maintenance of the virtue of the respect of the younger brother for his elder brother. But in the time of Wên-ti 文帝 of the Han, the *san-lao* (三老), who were held to be at the top of the age precedence of a village were considered as the fathers of the village, and at this same time there was struck out the model whereby the *san-lao* of the village led the people by way of filial piety. The filial piety surrounding these three village elders was ultimately a conceptualisation ('service of the father leads to service of the sovereign') which came to be bound up with loyalty to the emperor. (In the past there was the classification of *kung* 公, *ch'ing* 卿, *ta-fu* 大夫, *shih* 士 and *shu* 庶, but here the *shih* = warrior. Even the *shu*, whose business was agriculture, became warriors from the beginning of the period of the Warring States, and in the Han period these people were considered *shih* with this for precedent. The filial piety above was the filial piety of the *shih* within the classification of *kung*, *ch'ing*, *ta-fu*, *shih* and *shu*, but, when this filial piety was widely adopted, it should probably be considered in conjunction with this new conception of the above kind of *shih*.) The filial piety thus surrounding the *san-lao*, though existing towards headmen, should probably be regarded as of the same nature. (But the above was based on the absolutely individual and homogeneous existence of everyone, especially males. But in reality everyone was within the *framework* of the *raw* father-son relationship. There is a contradiction here, but it is a point I will touch on later.) State control of the people under the Han, as we have seen above, involved emphasis on filial piety, but it also involved a tendency to negate this because of the blocked nature of the father-son family. This was the more so that the existence of the father-son 'group' was a precondition for its maintenance.<sup>(2)</sup>

I next propose to discuss what were known as popular peerages (民爵). These were conferred on males from the age of fifteen. (For these popular peerages, see NISHIJIMA Sadao 西嶋定生, *Chūgoku Kodai Teikoku no Keisei to Kōzō* 中國古代帝國の形成と構造). These may be understood as intended to

(2) The direct linking, in family morality, with the state and the sovereign, was in a sense Confucian theory; the two were in fact of a different nature. (On such points see MIYAKAWA Hisayuki 宮川尙志, 'Sangoku Jidai no Kokka Kannen to Kahō no Sonchō' 三國時代の國家觀念と科法の尊重 in *Kamata Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Rekishigaku Ronshū* 鎌田博士還暦記念歴史學論叢).

show the design of the Han sovereign to hold, ideally, all (male) members of the population individually. However, neither the people's actual mode of living, nor the manner of the state's hold of them, were complete only individually. This was the more so that account was taken of kinship groups in the conferment of peerages. In the time of Hui-ti 惠帝 and the Empress Lü 呂, peerage was conferred on the household = family as recipient. This household = family equation may perhaps have been established in Hui-ti's time, but the conferment of peerage on the household = family as recipient meant in practice conferment on the eldest brother. This should probably be regarded ultimately as having a strong, however indirect, connection with the state authority at that time expecting economic mutual help between all the components within its scope. Next, in Wên-ti's time, conferment of rank was made to males (above a specified age, and, at the same time, in settlement (village) units, gifts of oxen and liquor were made to females. Conferment of peerage was particularly made on eldest sons who would succeed their fathers. It should probably be supposed that these three systems persisted (were not negated) throughout the Han period. There is obscurity surrounding the principle of conferment of peerage on households, but I think we may look at the first and third cases above in the following way. As has already been described, in Wên-ti's time, the existence of age precedence in settlements led to the emergence of the pattern, 'filial piety = loyalty'. For this age precedence to function as itself in complete form, it was held to be essential that males should break out of the *framework* of household = family and the father-son relationship, and function as individuals. The first case had its origin in this way. On the other hand, the filial piety bound up with the age precedence, the particularly *raw* filial piety, necessitated the strengthening of the tie between father and son. These two are basically incompatible, but in practice a 'compromise' was contrived, and the father-son 'group' floated to the surface. However, whether in this father-son 'group' (or in the father-son family) there existed no position of special rights for the eldest son in the father-son relationship. And this means that a different principle must have been present from that which involved conferment of peerage particularly on the eldest son in the third case above. Even so, the peerages of the feudal lords, and such, in the Han period, went to the eldest legitimate descendants. Generally speaking, the primogenital system arose, as among the feudal lords, among those of the political rulers who possessed some territory. In such cases, the various special rights of the father (including concomitant duties) and assets were inherited from the eldest son by his eldest son (the grandson, in fact). To establish that it should be the eldest son, who, as the successor to his father, should be the recipient of the popular peerage, there was the primogenital system relating to the inheritance of the ranks of feudal lords and so on (having territory), and it seems that the point that the eldest son should inherit peerage was extracted



from that system and connected with the father-son relationship. In fact, there is a contradiction between all males being the objects of conferment of peerage, and the conferment of peerage on eldest sons, by virtue of their being their fathers' successors, and there is no straight-forward solution of this contradiction. However, from Later Han times, when the highest popular peerage (*kung-ch'êng* 公乘) was passed, it became possible to transfer grants of popular peerage to the holder's sons, brothers or nephews. One would probably not be far wrong in supposing that the strengthening of the social relationship between father and son introduced a change into the legal relationship between father and son and between father, son and grandson, which has hitherto been mentioned in detail. In the context of the grant of peerage this was what might be called a secondary matter, but however that may be, there is a clear contradiction between the conferment of peerage on all males and special conferment of peerage on eldest sons.

There was, then, a relationship of mutual contradiction between the three principles of grant of popular titles: to all males, to eldest sons in particular, and to children in general, and it was impossible to resolve this contradiction up to the end of the Han period. Then, with the foundation of the Wei, the system of popular peerages became skeletal in actual practice, with the grant of one peerage to all males and two peerages to eldest sons, and so what might be called a negative solution was reached.

So far we have mentioned the existence of father-son 'groups' (and the lateral ties between brothers) and hardly examined the family of father and son(s). However, in North China during the Han period, the father-son family slowly sprouted, (once more) to become universal, and this process continued on an ever larger scale. The universalisation of the father-son family was, one may suppose, connected with the development of the dry land farming system which accompanied ploughing with oxen. Ploughing with oxen had already begun in the period of the Warring States, but it is not definitely clear just how many oxen and how many able-bodied males constituted a group for ploughing. In the new system of cultivation in operation in the last years of Wu-ti of the Han, a group was formed of two oxen and five able-bodied males. Later there developed, in North China (and the north-western region), a system of dry land farming which more or less corresponded to the agricultural system set forth in the *Ch'i-min yao-shu* (齊民要術—The essential skills of the people) (which was compiled in the Northern Wei period); here it was nearly general that a group was formed of 2-4 oxen and three able-bodied males (of whom one might be a woman). (For the dry land farming system, see AMANO Motonosuke 天野元之助, *Chūgoku Nōgyō-shi Kenkyū* 中國農業史研究, and WATANABE Shinichirō 渡邊信一郎, 'Kan-Rikuchō-ki ni okeru Daitochi Shoyū to Keiei' 漢六朝期における大土地所有と經營, *Tōyō-shi Kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 33, 1 and 2.). In response to this situation, it was natural that close kinship groups, owning oxen and owning land, should

form father-son families. Then there was operated an exchange of labour, whereby close kinship groups who owned land and no (or few) oxen, would borrow oxen of families owning a number of them for the sowing, and then supply manpower for the superintendence (after the sowing), and this led to the conjuncture whereby father-son families became general. (One may suppose that there was less necessity for the generalisation of father-son families among the labourers employed by powerful people and the small cultivators (who had no oxen)).<sup>(3) (4)</sup>

With the period of the Six Dynasties, the father-son family became, in the case of North China, gradually universalised. The Ts'ao house of Wei had already instituted father-son families under a system whereby father and son(s) were forbidden to have separate assets. (However, we do not know whether or not such a system persisted subsequently.) Finally, the old household register system was abolished under the Sui, and under the T'ang, the father-son family became the family = household in the household register system. Insofar as this system was instituted by a regime which had unified China, its operation was extended south of the Yangtse also.

In the father-son family what may be called father-son nucleism appeared. This is represented by the attitude to the produce of the father-son family. In such a family, the father alone had prime rights over the produce of the family, but on his death this reverted in equal parts to his children. (In this sense, the children's expectations on inheritance extended to all the assets of the family.) In the father's lifetime, even the birth of a son's son (grandson,

(3) In regard to the form of ploughing with oxen, there was no basic difference between the large landowners (magnates) and others agriculturally, there must simply have been differences in the manner of management. (Large landowners had a number of teams of oxen and manpower.) However, agricultural activity carried out only by hand existed alongside.

(4) There are many points still to be investigated in regard to the cooperative relationships in the farming villages of North China which followed on dry land farming. In this connection the alternation in ploughing with oxen, of ox-power and manpower, would seem to tell us that there were weaknesses in the landlord system, and in the basis of management on which large holdings were held, in sum, that the dry land farming of the time had considerable limitations. This suggests that it was difficult to make universal the decisive control over the settlements by the magnates and powerful clans, and thereby to create a new society. (Though the remark concerns a later period, it is a precious one, to the effect that, in North China where agricultural production was low, by the survival side by side, through 'cooperative relationships', of farming people of all strata, landlords, independent farmers and tenant farmers, the continued productive structure was guaranteed (UCHIYAMA Masao 内山雅生, 'Kindai Chūgoku ni okeru Jinushi-sei—Kahoku no Nōgyō Keiei o Chūshin to shite—' 近代中國における地主制—華北の農業経営を中心として—, *Rekishi Hyōron* 歴史評論 no.319). On the other hand (in the Huai river 淮水 basin and) south of the Yangtse, it is to be supposed that numerous ruined peasants entered the service of the magnates and powerful clans, thereby further serving to strengthen their control. (Doubtless the differences in strength between the clan groupings among the magnates in both north and south had some connection with the foregoing.)

in fact) did not constitute an element of constraint on the rights of the father of the family, as stated above. But in a father-son family, there was the principle that husband and wife were one flesh. This meant that during the life of the husband (from the children's viewpoint, the father), the wife was absorbed into the person of her husband. But on his death, the wife represented the person of her husband, and it was possible for her to retain the family assets as before (*Chūgoku kazoku-hō no genri, ut sup.*). Moreover, with stabilisation of family status under the Southern Court, the children of aristocratic families equally inherited the family status. (Through this inheritance, the children come to hold an equal right to become officials.) (This point is also dealt with in section 4.) But there was the system of the legitimate eldest son and grandson in opposition to the foregoing father-son nucleism; the representative feature of this was that generally speaking it involved peerage-holders who possessed territory. There are sources for the history of Chin which tell us that, in cases of persons without peerage, in the event of the death of the legitimate eldest son, the next son would generally take over and conduct the family rites. This shows that the father-son relationship had precedence in the matter of the inheritance of the 'special rights' of the father, and that the principle of the eldest legitimate son and grandson was not invoked. We can, in fact, discern there the existence of father-children nucleism. However, according to the same sources, it was held that the system of eldest legitimate son and grandson did operate in the case of the kings and princes (having territory) and those who (apart from the kings and princes) had peerage and territory. However, under the Chin, even with a system of five peerages (for those having peerage and territory), the above father-children nucleism was also involved, opposite as it was to the legitimate eldest son and grandson system. One must suppose, that is to say, that, under the Chin it was held possible that, when a legitimate eldest son, who had inherited one of the five peerages, was given a higher peerage, the previous peerage could systematically be inherited by the next son. Here, on the basis of the eldest legitimate son and grandson system, the father's rank is inherited by the eldest son. This is what is to be inherited by the eldest legitimate son of the eldest legitimate son (the grandson, in fact). This should be regarded as follows, however: When the father (previously the legitimate eldest son) is given another higher rank, his legitimate eldest son is considered the heir presumptive to that peerage, while the former peerage is dealt with only within the father-son relationship, and the custom arises (insofar as the eldest son is unable to inherit) for the second son to succeed. While at first glance confusion would seem likely to arise, we are in a position to discern here the existence of a firmly rooted father-son nucleism. (The existence of father-son nucleism is also discernible in connection with the five peerage system in the kingdoms of the Six Dynasties.) Further, from Later Han times on, public esteem was accorded to successive generations living

together in the same place. This was the system whereby father and sons had a common residence and common assets, and it remained between the sons and grandsons even after the death of the head of the family. The transference to the children of the highest popular peerages under the Later Han is in harmony with the principle of successive generations living together in the same place.

One cannot find in the section on mourning in the *I-li* (儀禮) whether or not a grandson was obliged to wear double mourning (the heaviest kind, worn for three years. This is the same as that worn by a son for his father) for his grandfather. And the point is the more obscure in that there was controversy surrounding this obligation in later times. In Chin times too all kinds of arguments were exchanged, but in the end no conclusion emerged. The section on mourning in the *I-li* includes rites originating in the state of things in the period of the fraternal group system, and rites originating in the state of things in the period of the *san-tsu* (三族) system, which we suppose to have emerged after the period of the fraternal group system (this would take in the father-son communal assets system). (There are contradictions in the system of rites between the two.) If one assumes that the relevant portion was so arranged that the period of the former was treated first, it is natural that there should be no mention of the grandson wearing the deepest mourning for his grandfather. If, on the other hand, one assumes that the latter period was treated first, it becomes possible also to conjecture that even under the *san-tsu* system it was not possible to cut through the father-son nucleism, to which we have referred, in the field of ritual. The wearing of deepest mourning by a grandchild is admitted as a rule in the *Ta-t'ang kai-yüan li* 大唐開元禮 (Rites of the *Kai-yüan* period—713–741—of the T'ang). But that would probably be best described as no more than a 'change' in the mourning system.

The authority of the head of the family is bound up, in the case of the feudal lords of the Warring States, with the system of primogeniture. This being ultimately an extremely idealised form of authority of the head of the family, it is difficult to imagine its being able to make much progress in the case of the father-son nucleic family, as even a glance at the character of the family assets, described above, suggests. With father-son nucleism functioning, though there was such a thing as boasting of the so-called power of a powerful clan, embracing the whole of one clan, gradual accumulation was rather difficult, since the power of the head of the family in each noble and powerful family was centred on the lineage of a particular family (the line of the eldest son, in fact). We may perhaps look here for one item in the historical background to the fact that the so-called political unions of powerful clans, which the Chinese people formed during the Six Dynasties, never attained to state power. (By powerful clan or magnate (豪族) is not meant simply a particular man with the power of wealth and ownership of large estates; it refers to one,

whose clan numbers many members, who, through interdependence, possess power over the society and official circles of a region, while also owning large tracts of land as a whole of the clan. Again, we saw above that the family status of the aristocratic clans under the Southern Dynasty was uniformly inherited by the son, and this gave rise to a dispersive tendency as to the power of the aristocratic clans, and this in its turn became an element of weakness in the aristocratic clan vis-à-vis the authority of the emperor. (This matter will be touched on again in section 4.)<sup>(5)</sup>

In the fraternal group system there were the three duties of the woman. According to this, a woman, while unmarried, served her father, on marriage served her husband, and, on the death of her husband, served her children. On the other hand, as was mentioned above, in a father-son family there was the principle of husband and wife being one flesh. In that case the principle of the three duties of a woman did not exist. However, in the household = family, which started in the Han period, the fraternal group system remained, however vestigially. To that extent the three duties of a woman also had (on occasion) legal force. However, one opinion was offered to negative it in the early period of the Southern Court, which adopted the same household register system as the Han, and the view was advanced that the principle of man and wife being one flesh should be adopted. The result is not known, nor does this mean the imminent generalisation of the father-son family under the Southern Court, but even so, on a long view of the historical fluctuations of the family, we should probably here discern the genesis of the emergence of the father-son family.

Further, the general spread of ploughing with oxen brought with it an increase in the amount of production per *mou* (畝) and an enlargement of the areas ploughed, but following on this there arose, in the settlements, the domination of families, owning land but without oxen, by the noble and powerful who had become the more rich and powerful through the possession of large numbers of oxen; and this combined with the seizure of the common land indispensable to the life of the people of the settlements, brought about control of single or several settlements by powerful elements. A new order in settlements thus came into being, of which the central cause was the control by the powerful. However, the authority of the Han state did not accept that the poor masses be entrusted to magnates, who should be responsible for managing their lives, cut off from the control of the authority of the state. Depending on one's point of view, one might call this an attempt to arrest the trend of the times, but in the circumstances dissension arose between a part of officialdom, who truly tried to apply the intentions of the Han state, as just stated, and the magnates. (The authority of the state began to take on a political structure, in some degree of response to new movements, with the coming of the Wei in the Six Dynasties.) Moreover, it was generally the

(5) Naturally the adherents of the powerful clans were of various kinds and appellations.

case that in the wet rice area south of the Yangtse relationships of economic mutual help did not exist either between fathers and sons or brothers. In that area the father-son family continued not to become general until Sui times. To the extent that this was the case, the ruin of poor peasants south of the Yangtse became more severe than ever.

It may be remarked that, in the period of confusion at the end of the Later Han, contempt for wealth and doing charity became one way of winning people's hearts. To such an extent was this so that magnates in many cases went in for contempt of wealth and doing charity in order to extend their (individual) control into the villages. But in most cases this was only in name, not in reality. Also—this was after the beginning of the Six Dynasties—house rules came into being (covering the whole of a clan) prohibiting excessive charitable donations.

## 2. The question of domestics (k'o 客)

There were domestics of many kinds in the time of the Han and the Six Dynasties, among them the domestics (hereafter, 'domestics') who came into being under the Six Dynasties and were noted in the register of their masters' household registers as 'domestics'. It may probably be said that discussion of these 'domestics' hitherto has generally been confined to stressing such points as their not having their own household registers and so were perhaps to be considered humble or perhaps (persons in the nature of) agricultural slaves. The present writer considers that 'domestics' who contributed to the agricultural production of the master family were serfs, and that others were, in point of status and economic position, the equals of the master family. There are other questions about 'domestics', apart from the above, where 'domestics' appear in the historical background, such as their being systematically denied under the Northern Wei. In this section, I start by considering them in relation to the development of society and (what to some extent from time to time corresponded to this) the idea of the power of the state, and in the course of this I consider the fact that a certain development took place in society under the Six Dynasties as compared with the Han period. (In this article, the term 'domestic' includes females.)

Before continuing the argument, certain matters should be established. The first concerns the appearance of male slaves and female slaves in the legal field (hereafter, these will be respectively referred to as 'male slaves' and 'female slaves', and, when taken together, as 'male and female slaves'). In Chêng Hsüan's 鄭玄 commentary on the *Ch'iu-kuan* 秋官 Treatise in the *Chou-li* 周禮, there is: 'Present male and female slaves are former criminals.' 今之奴婢, 古之罪人也. And in the Biography of Mao Chieh 毛玠 in the *Wei-chih* 魏志, there is: 'Han statutes provided that criminals and their wives and children be seized and become male and female slaves, and their faces

branded.' 漢律, 罪人妻子沒爲奴婢, 黥面. These show that, in the Han period, 'male and female slaves' were criminals who had been officially seized. On this point there was no subsequent change. Next, in K'ung Ch'ao's 孔晁 commentary on the *I-chou-shu-tso-lo* 逸周書作雒 there is: 'prisoners become slaves,' 俘因爲奴. which suggest that some prisoners of war were also regarded as 'male and female slaves'. The descendants of such 'male and female slaves' also naturally became 'male and female slaves'. The 'male and female slaves' could be acquired by private families through official bestowal or purchase. (Before the T'ang period) 'male and female slaves' had a character half-human, half-chattel; when considering the human half, we would do well not to ignore their origin, described above. Further, on the character for 'slave' (*nu* 奴) the *Shuo-wen* has, 'males who are guilty of crime become slaves (奴); called *t'ung* (僮)' 男有罪爲奴, 曰僮, which shows that the word for *t'ung* was also used. (TAMAI Zehaku 玉井是博, 'Tō no Senmin Seido to sono Yurai' 唐の賤民制度とその由來, in *Shina shakai keizai shi kenkyū* 支那社會經濟史研究).

Their origin having been as above, one may reflect that 'male and female slaves' were not necessarily the principal manpower for agricultural production, but, in this connection, there existed also the view that 'male and female slaves' simply did not exist in China in the Han period. In a fragment of the *Fêng-su t'ung-i* 風俗通義 there is: 'In the ancient system there were basically no male or female slaves. Male and female slaves were all people who had committed crimes...' 古制本無奴婢. 奴婢皆是犯事者... There is no sign here of prisoners of war as the origin of 'male and female slaves', but it is worth noting that, however this may be, the foregoing shows that there was the view that basically there were no 'male and female slaves' in China.

Looking at the matter in this way, then, we again encounter the question as to who in fact did provide the labour for agricultural production from the time of the clan system. I touch on the clan system (especially in the Chou period) in section 3. We will now consider this from the period of the Warring States on. Where a man held too much land for his own labour, it was usual, on a small scale, to hire labour, or, on a large scale, to put land out to tenants; the latter practice was frequent and became gradually very general in the Han period (MIYAZAKI Ichisada 宮崎市定, 'Tōyō-teki Kodai 東洋の古代 (jō 上)', *Tōyō Gakuhō* 東洋學報, 48, 2.). However, in North China in the Han period, the system of dry land farming gradually became general, and it is to be supposed that, when the revenues drawn from the land became considerable, there would have been many cases in which private 'male and female slaves' were concerned. It would seem that when private 'male and female slaves' were engaged in agriculture in the Han period, their principal roles would have been preparatory work for ploughing during the slack seasons, and basic labour designed to make the farm work run smoothly. (FUJIE Reinosuke 藤家禮之助, 'Kandai Gōzoku no Daitochi Keiei ni tsuite'

漢代豪族の大土地經營について, *Gendai Chūgoku to Rekishi-zō* 現代中國と歴史像). With the introduction of the *chün-t'ien* system ('equal land system') under the Northern Wei, in the Six Dynasties period, the allocation of land to private 'male and female slaves' is enough to suggest to us how rather large a role they played in the system of dry land farming at that time. (In this case it seems likely that private 'male and female slaves' took part in the whole agricultural process.) Also, the use of 'male and female slaves' in agriculture was also becoming widespread south of the Yangtse. In the Biography of Shên Ch'ing-chih 沈慶之 in the *Sung-shu* 宋書 we find: 'Governing a country is like governing a family. For ploughing you apply to the male slaves. For weaving, you call on the female slaves.' 治國, 譬如治家. 耕當問奴. 織當訪婢. Here no doubt there is general reference to the private service of servants attending to the farming and weaving in their master's house, but it is probably right to take it that 'male and female slaves' cover a wide field. Under this view, the widespread use of private 'male and female slaves' in agriculture should be regarded as one link in social development under the Six Dynasties. Moreover, it appears as self-evident that under the Han 'male and female slaves' contributed to the agricultural production of masters' houses. But sources showing such a fact are extremely rare. At the time official 'male and female slaves' did not engage in ordinary agriculture, and, in that sense, seem to have been consumers. And there are numerous records showing that private 'male and female slaves' also engaged in other work than agriculture (mining etc.) (Miyazaki, *op. cit.*)

It may be remarked that the characters *nu* (奴), *p'u* (僕) and *k'o* (客) did not necessarily indicate 'male slave' (*nu* 奴). There are also many cases whether they indicate economically dependent persons who enter a private household and work there, engaged on a variety of tasks. (KUSANO Yasushi 草野靖, 'Tōritsu ni mieru Shisen-min Nuhi Bukyoku ni tsuite no Ichi Kōsatsu' 唐律にみえる私賤民奴婢・部曲に就いての一考察 in *Shigematsu Sensei Koki Kinen Kyūshū Daigaku Tōyō-shi Ronsō* 重松先生古稀記念九州大學東洋史論叢). To this extent, then, it is dangerous immediately to regard the appearances of the expressions *nu-pei* (奴婢), *p'u* (僕) and *k'o* (客) in sources for the periods of the Warring States, Ch'in, Han and the Six Dynasties, as meaning 'slaves' or 'male and female slaves'. Further, there is the following passage in the life of Mao Chieh in the *Wei-chih*: 'The true male and female slaves now are those whose ancestors were guilty of crime. Even after a hundred years pass, their descendants have their faces tattooed and are forced to do slave work at governmental offices!' 今眞奴婢, 祖先有罪, 雖歷百世, 猶有黥面供官. The original meaning of 'male and female slaves' is here expressed as 'true male and female slaves'.

In the Han period, in respect of common people who had become unregistered male and female slaves (奴婢) (in the contemporary expression) of private houses, whether through self-sale or seizure, the state would exempt



them from their status as male and female slaves (奴婢), and treat them once more as common people (庶民). These common people were the commoners in the state hierarchy of *kung*, *ch'ing*, *ta-fu*, *shih* and *shu*. (There were in practice various conceptions of *shih* and *shu* in the Han period. We will do best to regard these *shih* and *shu*, like those previously mentioned in Section 1, as fitting into the division, *kung*, *ch'ing*, *ta-fu*, *shih* and *shu*, but there is an essential difference.) In the Han period, one aspect of this situation was the understanding that *ta-fu*, *shih* and *shu* were all *shu*, and that, though they might become *ta-fu* or *shih*, this was not hereditary, not a birthright. This is related to the intention of treating everybody on an equal footing so far as possible. The above expression, *shu*, would seem to fit into such an atmosphere. (At least, this can probably be said when one is considering the expression in contrast to that of 'good citizens' (*liang-min* 良民), which we will next be looking at.) Further, in the Han period, the *shu* became the object of ritual requirements which had not hitherto extended to them; and one element which caused this to happen was the understanding and treatment described above. Under the Six Dynasties the *shu* is referred to as good citizens. (OGATA Isamu 尾形勇, 'Ryōsen-sei no Keisei to Tenkai' 良賤制の形成と展開 in *Iwanami Kōza Sekai Rekishi* 岩波講座世界歴史 5.) These good citizens came to be contrasted with the base (*chien* 賤), but the status of good or base was acquired at birth and unalterable. This new interpretation of good citizens seems to have emerged at a point when, in response to social change, there was acceptance of upper and lower social status; and this soon strengthened the tendency towards hereditary status, and, in this sense, there was the contrast with base. Such expressions as 'permitted to be *shu*' 免爲庶民 or 'permitted to be good citizen' 免爲良人 do not refer to those who, having become (legally) base people (i.e. 'male or female' slaves) are permitted to be regarded as *shu* or good citizens; they refer to those who, because they had become unregistered slaves of private families, had a defect in their claim to be true *shu* or good citizens, were, through the intervention of the state, excused from being private slaves and recognised as having the status of *shu* or good citizens in its full form. (In practical terms, this meant that they were placed on separate registers and became subject to state taxes and corvées.) Depending on the view point it could also be said that they too were common people or good citizens from first to last. Under the Eastern Chin 東晉, there are mentions of 'good person exempt from being a slave' 免良人奴 when good citizens were exempted from becoming unregistered private slaves and called up as soldiers; and 'good person' is used to indicate one who is yet in the condition of an unregistered slave of a private family; and calling up as a soldier is indicated as 'recruitment of good person': all these should be regarded in the same way as the preceding expressions.

Let us proceed with the discussion. There are 'domestics' of private families in private service, who did not exist in the Han period, and first

make their appearance under the Six Dynasties. (Domestics in this context has the sense of dependents.) Let us first consider the legal status held by these 'domestics'. At the time of the series of revolutions in Northern Wei round about *T'ai-ho* 太和 10 (486) (hereafter referred to as the 'revolutions' of the Northern Wei 北魏), the existence of 'domestics' was denied. However, under the Northern Chou (the successors of the Western Wei) they were 'resurrected' as 'dependents' (*pu-ch'ü* 部曲). This is referred to under the 11th month of *Chien-tê* 建德 6 (577) in the chronicle of Wu-ti 武帝 in the *Pei-chou-shu* 北周書: 'Edict: (A) all those people of the eastern territories who, between the 7th month of *Yung-hsi* 永熙 3 (534) and the 10th month of last year (576), were taken captive and incorporated as slaves, and (B) those good citizens who were made slaves after the subjugation of Chiang-ling 江陵, (C) shall all be freed. Their registration shall be the same as that of all the people. (D) If any former master still wishes to continue their common residence, they will be permitted to remain as dependents and female domestics'. 詔 (A) 自永熙三年 (534 年) 七月已來, 去年 (576 年) 十月已前, 東土之民, 被抄略在化內爲奴婢者, (B) 及平江陵之後, 良人沒爲奴婢者, (C) 並宜放免. 所在附籍, 一同民伍. (D) 若舊主人猶須共居, 聽留部曲及客女. (*Yung-hsi* is the last reign period of the Northern Wei.) These dependents are in contrast to the female domestics and are domestics (referred to as 'domestics' in this article). Let us now consider the legal character of these dependents and female domestics, using the foregoing passage as a clue. The Northern Chou 北周 destroyed the Northern Ch'i 北齊 in 577. Under the 2nd month of that year in the chronicle of Wu-ti in the *Pei-chou-shu*, there is the following: 'Edict: all those people of the provinces south of the Yellow River who were taken captive by the pretender Ch'i since the 3rd year of the spurious *Wu-p'ing* 武平 reign period (572), shall be freed, whether owned by officials or by private persons . . .' 詔曰, … 自僞武平三年 (572 年) 以來, 河南諸州之民, 僞齊被掠爲奴婢者, 不問客私, 並宜放免. …… (下略) The statutes on banditry of the Northern Wei provide death for those who seize people (good citizens), for those who seize and sell people (good citizens) (as in the case of 'male and female slaves') and in so doing make them slaves (treat them as 'male and female slaves'). (UCHIDA Ginpū 内田吟風, 'Gisho Keibatsu-shi Ketsuyō-kō' 魏書刑罰志缺葉考 in *Kita-Ajia-shi Kenkyū Senpi Jūzen Tokketsuhen* 北アジア史研究鮮卑柔然突厥篇). It is clear that, from Han times, it was not permissible to make one who was not base a 'male or female slave' (without connection with a criminal offence); it is, then, almost certain that the main intention of the above law, leaving aside whether the death penalty was involved or not, passed (by way of the Western Wei 西魏) to the Northern Chou. If we read the above edict of the 2nd month of the 6th year of *Chien-tê* with this sort of thing in mind, we can interpret it as meaning that those good citizens of the provinces south of the Yellow River in the territory of the former Northern Ch'i, who had been captured and treated as 'male

and female slaves', were to be freed, order being given that they were to revert to the original status of good citizen in the full sense of the term. Passages A and C of the edict of the 11th month of *Chien-tê* 6 quoted above are connected with this. It would seem, that is to say, that the period covered by the above measures was extended, and the region affected became the whole territory of what was then Northern Chou. The people referred to in B, which is to be coupled with A, as good citizens who were degraded into slaves, probably mean unregistered people who, though originally good citizens, were being treated in practice as 'male and female slaves'. It would probably be right to sum up that B and C mean that all those who, after the capture of Chiang-ling, had become unregistered slaves and were being treated in practice as 'male and female slaves', though originally good citizens were to be set free and regarded as good citizens in the full sense of the term. Further, when the army of Western Wei attacked Chiang-ling and killed Yüan-ti 元帝 of the Liang 梁, they took prisoner the officials and people. They numbered up to several hundred thousand and were regarded as 'male and female slaves'. In *Pao-ting* 保定 5 (565), those who had become official 'male and female slaves' among these and who were 65 years old or more were held to be good citizens, but the above were of a character different from such 'male and female slaves'. (Under the 3rd month of the 1st year of *Hsüan-chêng* 宣政 (578) in the chronicle of Wu-ti in the *Pei-chou-shu*, there is the following edict: 'All those people who became personal slaves in several places shall be freed on the model of Chiang-ling.' . . . 所有民庶爲人奴婢者, 悉依江陵放免. This means that all those who, though originally good citizens, had, as we saw above, become private slaves in the *confusion* which accompanies military action, were to be freed and held to be good citizens in the full sense of the term; 'on the model of Chiang-ling' 依江陵 is probably a reference to B, C (and D?) above.)

C and D both follow on A and B, but, while in C people without registers who, though originally good citizens, had been treated like 'male and female slaves', were to be regarded as good citizens in the full meaning of the term, it is not to be supposed that those concerned in D were degraded to base people like 'male and female slaves'. One should probably conclude that the dependents and female domestics, who appear in D, had no registration of their own and so were noted on the registers of their masters' households, but that they continued to possess the status of good citizens. (In what follows, dependents and female domestics are referred to together as 'dependents'.) Moreover, under the T'ang, while 'dependents' were noted on the register of the master's household, a male could marry a good citizen (of an ordinary registered household), and this is one proof that 'dependents' retained their status of good citizens. Then in the *T'ang-lü su-i shih-wên* 唐律疏議釋文, there is the following: "Those who have no home in childhood, hand themselves over for clothing and food, and their master rears them as

slaves. When they are adult, they may marry. The domicile of such persons is that of their master, and they have no separate registration. This class of person is known as 'dependent'. 'Female slaves' who have been liberated to become good citizens and those who marry are known as female domestics." 自幼無歸，投身衣飯(食)，其主以奴畜之。及其長成，因娶妻。此等之人，隨主屬貫，又別無戶籍。若此之類，名爲部曲。婢經放爲良，並出妻者，名爲客女。 From this we may perceive that, in the T'ang period, 'dependents', while noted on their master's register, had in one aspect the status of good citizens. According to Hori Toshikazu, the following appears in the *Liang-ch'u ch'ing-chung i* 量處輕重儀 by the early T'ang Buddhist, Hsüan-tao 宣道: 'Dependents are originally base; they are given a surname and serve good citizens, without ever leaving their original master. Should their original master die, they may go into *ch'ang-chu* (常住) (HORI Toshikazu 堀敏一, 'Kinden-sei to Ryösen-sei' 均田制と良賤制 in *Zenkindai Ajia no Hō to Shakai* 前近代アジアの法と社會). The passage is concerned with those who have been 'slaves' coming to be held to be 'dependents', but it speaks of their possibly being regarded as good citizens and of their having their own surname as 'dependents'. It would seem that this means that 'dependents' (not those who were brought up as orphans and so regarded as 'dependents', who appear in the *shih-wên* (釋文) above, but even so) (in one aspect) were good citizens. But there was also a base aspect to dependents. I shall have more to say about this later, but, briefly, what I would like to draw attention to at this point is that 'dependents' and 'domestics', who did not have their own registers, possessed the status of good citizens in one aspect.

An edict appears in the Chronicle of Hsüan-ti 宣帝 in the *Ch'ên-shu* 陳書 which says: "There are ingenious multiple entries in the registers. Where the kings, dukes and officials have improperly taken people under their protection, they should be returned to their original domicile." 其籍有巧隱并，王公百司輒受民爲程蔭解還本屬。 That edict means that kings, dukes and officials can, according to their standing in the hierarchy, make people (i.e. good people) their protégés up to certain limits, and enter them on their registers (to put it the other way round, those who were numbered among the protégés, in the sense that they lost their own registration, became unregistered); but the kings, dukes and officials had abused the system, and had made large numbers of concealed entries of good citizens in excess of the permitted number of protégés: these were now to be removed from their registers and restored each to his own register. It is not for a moment to be supposed that the people regarded as the protégés of the kings, dukes and officials were private 'slaves'. From what we have seen so far, these people were basically good citizens and so should probably be regarded as 'domestics' (or something of the same quality as 'domestics'). Moreover, at the beginning of the Eastern Chin period, there was 'the system of the grant of domestics' (*chi-k'o chih-tu* 給客制度), whereby good citizens without registration entered the service of

magnates and were recognised as being domestics, and these domestics, too, should be regarded as 'domestics'. Also, in the Treatise on Food and Money in the *Sui-shu* 隋書, we find, 'domestics are all entered on the family register' 客皆注家籍 which we can take to be telling us that 'domestics' were entered on the family register (i.e. household register) of the master family.

Let us next examine the economic relationship between the master family and 'domestics' or 'dependents'. In the *T'ang-lü su-i* 唐律疏議, we find, 'good citizens and dependents both have assets'. 良人部曲, 含有資財. This shows that under the T'ang Statutes the good citizens of a registered household and 'dependents' could possess assets. The economic relationship between master families and such 'dependents' was greatly different from the case of 'male and female slaves' and was terminated by discharge of debts, but, in this case, 'dependents' could be exempted by going through a fixed legal procedure. Also, in the T'ang period, a master family could not sell 'dependents', though it was possible to transfer them to another family. When this happened, the new master had to calculate and pay to the old master what the 'dependent' was owing the old master for the cost of food and clothing (living expenses). This probably meant, in the case of an adopted child (*yang-tzū* 養子), the difference between the living expenses paid out by the master during the child's minority and what the man paid the master on becoming adult. (This difference, in the general way, became smaller as the 'dependent' grew older, provided he could work.) One might say this amounted to the new master *underwriting* the liabilities of the 'dependent'. This sort of thing would seem to suggest that, in reverse, the 'domestic' was a serf (or led a serf-like existence) of the master family. Among 'domestics' under the Wei and Chin and the Southern Court, there were, in addition to adopted children, hired hands (*tien-k'ò* 佃客) and managers (*tien-chi* 典計). According to the Treatise on Food and Money in the *Sui-shu*, these hired hands shared the harvest with the great family (i.e. the master-family). This tells us that 'domestics', unlike 'male and female slaves' had their own means of subsistence. This is enough for us to conjecture that peasants who became the 'domestics' of magnates discharged their obligations by their capacity to work. However, in the biography of Wang Tun 王敦 in the *Chin-shu* 晉書 there is the following, for *T'ai-hsing* 太興 4 (321) in the early period of the Eastern Chin, in connection with the time when slave-soldiers were conscripted: 'By the help of entry-books, everyone of the former domestics was taken. It was a long time ago; years had elapsed. Some had died; some had redeemed themselves, obtained exemption. Some had been released. In some cases it was a matter of the time of their fathers and elder brothers, with which they themselves had nothing to do. If any could not be obtained, their master was at once accused.' 復依舊名, 普取出客. 從來久遠, 經涉年載. 或死亡滅絕, 或自贖得免. 或見放遣. 或父兄時事, 身所不及. 有所不得, 輒罪本主. All this would seem to have the following meaning: all those who, according to the old registers of 'domestics',

had once had the status of 'domestic' were taken as soldiers. To the extent that the registers referred to were old and a lot of time had elapsed since their compilation, there were discrepancies with the actual state of affairs. 'Domestics', who had been entered on the registers at the time, were in some cases dead, or had redeemed themselves and been released from their status, or they had been released and dismissed by their masters, or the fact that they were 'domestics' dated from the time of their fathers and elder brothers, and they themselves had no direct involvement; but, when they wished to make a soldier of someone shown on the register and they were unable to do so, the owner shown on the register was found guilty. Here, the matter of redeeming himself and being released tells us that, insofar as the relation between master and domestic was economic, the domestic could return to his master what should be regarded as his earnings and provide such labouring power of which he was capable to repay his obligations, and thus be released from his status of 'domestic'. Further, there is a debate on the *t'ung-wu-fan* (同伍犯) which took place early in the Sung period and is recorded in the Biography of Wang Hung 王弘 in the *Sung-shu*. This contains all the following expressions in relation to 'domestics': *nu* (奴), *nu-k'o* (奴客), *tien-chi* (典計), *p'u-li* (僕隸), *ssü-chien* (私賤), *t'ung* (僮), *p'u* (僕), *nu-p'u* (奴僕), *yang-tzū* (養子); all these expressions indicated people of slender resources. And in this context (all) 'domestics' were represented by the two expressions, *yang-tzū* and *tien-chi*. Here 'domestics' (apart from children of 'domestics' and those who were 'male and female slaves' and became considered as 'domestics' instead) were orphans and poor peasants principally who had become 'domestics', the general appellation of the former appearing as *yang-tzū* and of the latter, as *tien-chi*. (As to the origin of 'dependents', we may suppose that this lay in the children of 'dependents' who had been 'male and female slaves' and become once more considered as 'dependents', those who had been brought up as orphans and considered as 'dependents', and those who, as poor peasants, became 'dependents'. It may be remarked that one finds in the Biography of Mi Tu 麋竺 in the *Shu-chih* 蜀志, that Mi Tu handed over *nu-k'o* among his domestics to somebody else. Just what was the character of this domestic is not clear, but it would seem that, if he was not a 'slave', any indebtedness to Mi Tu would in theory be *underwritten* for the one handed over.

In the light of all this, we may probably take it that those among the 'domestics' and 'dependents' who were engaged with their master's agricultural production were serfs, and that the status of the others, economically speaking, was on a par with the former. Under the Wei and the Western Chin there was a situation in which good citizens of registered households were literally supplied as 'domestics' to officials in accordance with their standing in the hierarchy. These too (as farmers) shared the produce with their masters, but there seem also to have been cases in which, from the point of view of the

masters, it was preferable to have slaves (who could even be bought and sold) rather than to have such 'domestics'. (The *i-shih-k'o* (衣食客) referred to in the Treatise on Food and Money in the *Sui-shu* mean 'domestics' who attended to the food and clothing and other personal matters of their masters, while the expression 'cost of food and clothing' (衣食之價) used in the *T'ang-lü su-i* with reference to 'domestics' is the living expenses of 'dependents'; though 'food and clothing (衣食) . . .' appears in both, the food and clothing (衣食) are of a different nature.)

We will next look at the historical changes in 'domestics' which tell of a tendency for them to be gradually debased. At the end of the Later Han Ts'ao Ts'ao 曹操 seized the real power of the Han dynasty and took a step on the road which would lead to the establishment of a new dynasty of the Ts'ao family; he put large scale military colonies in operation, and for the further strengthening of his military power, he created the system of warrior families (later generally called military households). The domestics responsible for the farm work of the military colonies were good citizens but not registered households. The warrior families also were good citizens but not registered households. These systems were continued under the Wei dynasty. Both the domestics and the warrior families (i.e. military households) might be called the private people of Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Wei sovereigns, and it would seem that in the Wei period the total number of the two was greater than that of the registered households. When Ts'ao Ts'ao established the above system of military colonies and the system of warrior families, it would seem that he was prompted, in respect of the system of military colonies, by a number of considerations. There were the lack of a smoothly working economy as a result of the exhaustion brought about by the confusions of warfare, and the impossibility of hoping to bring in money from the various taxes on the rural community. There was the fact that, while since the time of Wu-ti of the Former Han the tax on land had been about 1%, the peasants were now worn out by the long period of hostilities, making a large rise in the rate out of the question. There was finally the fact that the reduction in the rate of land tax in the Han period was in some cases related to gains made by the operation of military colonies. In the light of all this he would seem to have intended to bring an independent source of wealth into his own hands. But it cannot be denied that, throughout the creation and continuance of the two systems, the control of the rural community by great and small magnates was very closely involved. In fact, in North China at this time the magnates held their power in the villages through ploughing with oxen, and Ts'ao Ts'ao could not but recognise their control to some extent, all the more, it may be thought, because of the necessity of ensuring his finances and military strength in his own hands from places other than the settlements. The control of the magnates over the settlements aimed at cutting off the state control (in concrete terms, the imposition of the *corvée*),

and so gaining power over good citizens. In the face of this, Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Wei sovereigns recognised that the magnates, according to their status as officers of state should have control of (some) good citizens as 'domestics' (i.e. private people). In this light, the emergence of 'domestics' originated in a new social development, and it would seem that (originating in the military colony system and the military household system) they were once a response to a new political structure. (Even if 'domestics' were once the hired hands or small cultivators of registered households, this does not invalidate the foregoing argument.)

Further, the unit of 'domestics' was the married couple. In so far as ruined peasants or orphans could not succeed in forming the father-son family to take advantage of the generalization of ploughing with oxen, this may be regarded as natural. However, it may be that in the first place 'domestics' had a registration. But at this point the first important consideration is precisely the fact that the system was recognised whereby the magnates possessed good citizens regarded as private people cut off from the corvées of the state. The fact that in the early Six Dynasties period 'domestics' were entered on the register of the master family means that, whenever it began, this had become the regular thing. Further, it seems that there were both officials, who in practice had no power in the settlements, who had 'domestics', and, in reverse, magnates in respect of whom, because they were not officials, the right to possess 'domestics' according to the system was not recognised. But such discrepancies were inevitable in the 'domestic' system to the extent that measures were taken to replace the magnates by officials. Here we only need to look at the matter in general terms.

In the middle period of the Wei, control of the domestics, who farmed the military colonies, and of the military households, was seized by the powerful minister, Ssü-ma I 司馬懿, and that of the Ts'ao family as sovereigns collapsed, but the authority of the state itself persisted as before. However, Ssü-ma Chao 司馬昭 (son of I) started the idea of abolishing the *tien-nung* (典農) colony, which had already ceased to be military colony then, bringing their land into state ownership and returning their onetime cultivators to ordinary household registration; and his son, Ssü-ma Yen 司馬炎 (Wu-ti on his accession to the throne) completed the process after the abdication of his predecessor. With the coming of the Western Chin 西晉, Wu-ti, having unified the empire, abolished the *tu-chih* (度支) colony, which was then the only military colony, bringing their land under state ownership and returning their former cultivators to ordinary household registration. The land of the former military colonies thus became *k'o-t'ien* (課田). Through the abolition of the system of *tu-chih* colonies the number of registered households rose at a stroke from 2,450,000 to 3,770,000. It is true that the Wu sovereigns had the military colony people and the military households as private people, but the figure of 3,770,000 households includes these military



colony people as registered households. But the military households remained as the sovereigns' private people. In my view, the fact that, at the same time as the sovereign possessed private people (who were good citizens), the magnates were recognised as possessing private people ('domestics') (who were good citizens, according to their official standing) signified a shift towards feudalism. However, the government departments which held the key positions in the administration exercised concentrated central power; and control over human affairs was strengthened, with the nine-grade official system called the *chiu-p'in kuan-jên* (九品官人) having as its object the maintenance of good talent in the central official circles during the period of the *chung-chêng* (中正), and (after the middle Wei period) national unification following on the systematic introduction of the system of the *ta-chung-chêng* (大中正) in the provinces. In the light of such developments as these, dissociation of the central state power was an impossibility. We may consider this situation along with the fact that a sovereign limited the number of private people (i.e. 'domestics') that magnates could possess in their official capacity, and the fact that the revenue from the military colonies was made the fundamental source of state revenue, while the military households formed the backbone of the state army; then however much the sovereign strove to maintain the (organisationally unified) state power, he could but rely on possession of the domestics who worked the military colonies and military households as his private people, in order to counter both the general situation inherent in the rivalry of different war-lords and the triangular opposition of the three kingdoms, as well as the emergence of control of settlements by magnates. However, with what was called the destruction of Shu and the unification of the empire, the necessity for the adoption of the foregoing 'special' political structure was, in spite of the survival of control of settlements by magnates, considerably diminished. And we may surmise that the various foregoing measures were in fact adopted in response to the destruction of Shu and the unification of the empire. (The limitation on the number of domestics held immediately after the unification of the empire should be seen in this context.) (From the point of view of social history, one may consider the father-son nucleism, as a prime factor in halting feudalism, to have negative effect of such measures on the tendency for magnates to accumulate land over successive generations.)

After the great confusion at the end of the Western Chin the military household system became vestigial, and thus the power of the state became obliged to base itself more than ever on the registered households. So far as 'domestics' were concerned, they lost their significance as an element in the political structure, coming to mean only those who became the private following of magnate officials.

The fact that 'domestics' came to be only those who were the private followers of officials brought with it a lowering of the political status of

'domestics' (or 'dependents'). It came about that in the regulation on clothing in the Sung period *i-shih-k'ò* (a sort of 'domestics') was included in the same *framework* as 'male and female slaves', and this is an indication of the increasingly base quality of 'domestics'. Again, in the T'ang statutes 'dependents' (whether or not they had a master) are referred to, together with 'slaves', as base, and one could make a similar remark about this. It can thus be said that the status of 'domestics' and 'dependents' became increasingly base, apart from those who were good citizens. Further, from the Eastern Chin on, troops were conscripted, with some difficulty, from registered households, and these should form the nucleus of the armed forces, but this fact together with the inclusion of soldiers undergoing punishment in the registered military households led naturally to a lowering of the political status of military households also. It is to be thought that in the Western Chin period heroes of military households could even take women of illustrious families in marriage, but, with the coming of the Southern Court, military households were considered a grade inferior to ordinary registered households, to such a point that the expression *ping ssü* (兵廝) is even used of them in edicts. (HAMAGUCHI Shigekuni 濱口重國, 'Gi-Shin Nan-chō no Heiko Seido no Kenkyū 魏晉南朝の兵戸制度の研究 in *Shin Kan Zui Tō shi no kenkyū* 秦漢隋唐史の研究, vol. I).

Under the Northern Court, at the time of the Northern Wei 'revolution', the existence of 'domestics' was systematically negated. However, in that 'revolution', hands were not laid on the magnates' privately owned land. This means that it was considered that the man-power (or oxen-power) of the magnates, that had hitherto existed, was necessary. 'Domestics' were, (in practice), without land and without oxen, and it was quite unthinkable that there should be land allotments, according to the regulations, for those who had become registered households, nor was there, from the start, any grant of oxen to them. And although it was the case that some of those who, at the time of the 'revolution', had left their domiciles and entered the service of magnates as 'domestics', did return to their homes, we may conjecture that, even after the 'revolution', the greater part of the 'domestics' remained as before under their masters (magnates). A point in which they had changed from their original state was that they had become serfs of registered families, and at the same time subject to state taxation. This meant that, looked at on a large scale, the role that 'domestics' had hitherto held in the agricultural production of the magnates had become, instead, that of serfs for registered households. (It is to be supposed that, under the Northern Court, there were no regulations corresponding to their official status, when magnates possessed 'domestics' or 'dependents'.) We may also suppose that even under the Southern Court there existed (setting aside 'domestics') very many serfs belonging to registered households. (See the Biography of Shên Chung 沈衆 in the *Ch'ên-shu* etc.) It would seem that, over a long period, the serfs of registered

households had 'consolidated' their position as those responsible for their masters' agricultural production, and in this sense had come to dominate the 'male and female slaves' ('domestics' and) 'dependents'. (Those later called *tien-hu* (佃戶) correspond to these.)

The 'domestics' who were, in the Northern Court, eliminated on the occasion of the 'revolution' of the Northern Wei, were 'resurrected' as 'dependents' under the Northern Chou, as we have already seen. This was ultimately a manifestation of the desire to appease the magnates in the territory of what had become the former Northern Ch'i, and the desire to appease the magnates in the territory of the corresponding former Northern Chou. The 'dependents' there were no more than private followers. We may suppose this to have been the more so in that their down-grading (connected with the fact that they did not have their own independent registration) had been confirmed. The very rare appearance of 'dependents' in T'ang historical materials would also seem to tell us that the historical role of 'dependents' was virtually at an end.

In connection with the allocation of land for 'male and female slaves' under the Northern Wei 'revolution', 'domestics' under the 'revolution' were once more considered as registered good citizens and bore the tax and corvée burdens levied by the state; thus, though they were still serfs as before, the 'control' of the magnates was naturally weakened. We may conjecture that the allocation of land for 'male and female slaves' was bound up with such matters as the assuagement of the magnates' dissatisfaction in the face of the circumstances just described, the impossibility of completely controlling 'male and female slaves', who were base, and the fact that 'male and female slaves' continued to perform a rather important role in the magnates' agricultural production. Again, it is to be supposed that allocation of land was made also to the 'domestics' 'resurrected' as 'dependents' under the Northern Chou, but, under the *chün-t'ien* system at the beginning of the Sui, allocation of land to 'dependents' and 'male and female slaves' disappeared. On a large view it would seem that this should be interpreted as a diminution of the role of 'dependents' and 'male and female slaves'. (In this connection there is the question of how to look at the *chün-t'ien* system under the Sui and T'ang, but I will not go into that here.)

I will now describe schematically my own view on how the burden of agricultural production was born (apart from cases of self-support). As I shall explain in the next section, agricultural production was carried out, in the period of the clan system, within a structure where, it might be said, clans controlled clans, by the clans who were controlled. (A somewhat subsidiary point is that there were also some among the controlling clans who, in order to earn their living, themselves cultivated the clan's land—public field—*kung-t'ien* 公田 etc.) Next, in the period of the Warring States, the part that a family could not cover by its own labour was done by hired labour

or small tenant farmers. In the Han period there was a turn towards private 'male and female slaves' for agricultural purposes, and in the period of the Six Dynasties agriculture by serfs became the order of the day. There 'male and female slaves' were also used. (The cultivation of a master's land by private 'slaves' becomes a somewhat suprahistorical matter.)

### 3. Questions of Settlements

There are at present at least two questions concerning settlements in the Han—Six Dynasties period. The first of these is whether or not settlements of the common people existed outside city walls in ancient times. Investigation of this point will involve the question as to whether any chronological changes are to be found between the periods of the Han and the Six Dynasties. The second question involves the change in the nature of governmental authority, linked with which is the fact that the state became the sole landlord, and the influence that this had on the life of the settlements or of the people of the settlements. In this section I deal with these two questions and also, by the way, with the aristocracy's becoming a parasitic bureaucracy.

First, as regards the location of settlements. Those who lived within the city walls of the various states in the Western Chou and Ch'un-ch'iu periods were the ruling classes, from *shih* upwards together with artisans and merchants, while the ordinary people (the peasantry) lived in settlements which they formed outside the walls. Later, with the coming of the period of the Warring States, the city walls were on a larger scale and the peasants also came to live inside them. On the other hand, with the extension of the area of land under cultivation as the result of the emergence of iron implements and so on, there also arose a tendency to create new settlements outside city walls. As I shall mention later, the peasants of the *ching-t'ien* system described by Mencius 孟子 also lived on uncultivated land outside city walls. Peasants living both inside and outside city walls (great or small) persisted into the Han period. It may be supposed that the 'small states without walled capitals' 小國無城郭者, which appear in the Biography of Wang Mang 王莽 in the *Han-shu* belonged in fact to the lower of fifth-class feudal lords who regarded a small town or village or even a grouping as their fief, and did not have a walled town for their seat of government. This, it would seem, can be taken to indicate that there were peasants in Han times who lived on uncultivated land outside city walls. Then, in the Biography of T'u Lin 杜林 in the *Tung-kuan Han-chi* 東觀漢記 there is: 'At the beginning of the Han . . . Powerful clans of the former six states were made rather weak. There were no families ruling weaker ones in the fields outside the city walls. There was control over a myriad miles, and within the country under the rule of the emperor all was peace.' 及漢初興……以稍弱六國強宗。邑里無營利之家，野澤無兼井之民。萬里之統，海內賴安。 This quotation is probably enough to enable

us to perceive that at the beginning of the Han the people lived both inside and outside city walls. There is also a number of items to suggest that, also falling within our interpretation of the peasants of the *ching-t'ien* system in the Han period, peasants also lived outside city walls. Moreover, there are the two phrases in the *Fêng-su-t'ung* 風俗通, the connection between which has long been a matter of controversy: 'ta-lü shih-li i-t'ing' 大率十里一亭 and 'ta-lü shih-li i-hsiang' 大率十里一鄉; but it is possible to interpret them without contradiction if the *li* in the former is taken to be a measure of distance [360 paces], and the *li* in the latter, a settlement. They would then mean, 'At the high rate, every 10 *li* a halting place', and 'At the high rate, every 10 settlements a district'. It is, further, universally known that in the Six Dynasties period there were peasant settlements both inside and outside city walls. (The 'streets' (*li* 里) inside city walls started as artificial administrative settlements with fixed area and number of households, but they later came to have the character of natural settlements. On the other hand the 'streets' outside city walls were 'streets' as administrative settlements covering natural settlements. Again, 'districts' (*hsiang* 鄉) within city walls grouped a certain number of streets within city walls, while those outside did, *mutatis mutandis*, the same. In the former districts, too, the function of natural settlements persisted. In the case of the latter districts, it would seem that many had no regional unit, but it also seems that there, too, the function of natural settlements persisted to a certain extent.)

If the above interpretation is accepted as largely correct, it would seem that we can say that it would be unwarrantable to hold that there was change as between the Han and Six Dynasties periods in respect of the location of settlements.

Next, there was a change in the ruling authority, one aspect of which was that the state became the sole landlord, and we will now deal with the influence of this on the life of the inhabitants of the settlements. (Before the Six Dynasties) the settlements functioned as village cooperatives. What are here referred to as village cooperatives represented a system whereby, without the members' intervention, production or further production was impossible without subjection to rules imposed for cooperative use of land and irrigation, and so on, and it may further be said that the various conditions of this sort of production were under the management of a responsible person chosen according to a certain number of rules by the members. There also existed, of course, independent farmers. (On village cooperatives, see TANAKA Masatoshi 田中正俊, 'Chūgoku no Henkaku to Hōken-seido-kenkyū no Kaidai (1)' 中國の變革と封建制度研究の課題, *Rekishi Hyōron* 歴史評論 no. 271). There does seem to be a tendency, moreover, to understand village cooperatives as consanguineous cooperatives. However, even if the cooperative functioning of a village arose only from consanguinity of the villagers in the male line (and their spouses and children born to them), the effect between consan-

guineous people would naturally be another matter. By way of conclusion, hills and rivers, thickets and marshlands and forests (referred to below as 'thickets and marshlands' 藪澤) at first formed part of what was managed by the village cooperatives, but when later on magnates came to occupy a position of control over the village cooperatives (especially in the periods of the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court), 'thickets and marshlands' sometimes came under the control of an individual magnate, within the framework of ownership of land by the authority of the state, and this further strengthened their control. This (the change in the nature of the village cooperatives) signifies a change in the settlements.

In what follows I propose to proceed with my argument from the foregoing point of view bearing 'thickets and marshlands' in mind. The first period with which we are concerned extends (from Western Chou 西周) to about the middle of the *Ch'un-ch'iu* period, when the feudal lords exercised control from a 'point' of which the focus was the state capital, and at this time control was exercised by clans. At this time the feudal lords located their altars within the walls of the capital, and there worshipped their ancestral gods and gods of nature (of mountains and rivers and so on, but these altars were linked with some large expanse of 'thickets and marshlands' outside the walls (such as the *sang-lin* 桑林 of Sung 宋 or the *yün-mêng* 雲夢 of Ch'u 楚). The feudal lords combined military exercises with the provision of offerings of game to the gods of the altars, for which purpose they engaged *ta-fu* and *shih* of their own clan in the hunt. (The hides of the game killed here were used as military supplies, but it is to be supposed that some of the game also provided food for the feudal lords and the members of the same clans.) At this time the feudal lords first offered (part of) the harvest of the public fields to the gods of the altars, after which they provided for their own livelihood. (*Ta-fu* had private land, but I am omitting examination of high officials including this point. Also, a part of the public fields was given to *shih* of the same clan as the feudal lord.) Also, the feudal lords cultivated the fields for the ancestors with members of their clan. These harvests were probably from the first all offered to the gods of the altars. At this time the peasants made settlements of members of the same clan outside the city walls, and would kill their livestock to offer to the gods. This suggests that their lives were centred on the altar at which they worshipped their ancestral gods. It is also to be supposed that, apart from providing labour for the public fields, they cultivated their own fields under a cooperative system, and put all the harvest to their own use. This means that direct control by the feudal lord did not yet extend to such fields. It is not clear whether there existed any definite form of link between the 'thickets and marshlands' and the peasant settlements, but, on our present view, we may conjecture that the 'thickets and marshlands' were not under the direct control of the feudal lord, that there was a link in

some form with their ancestral gods, and that, further, it supported the cooperative functioning of the settlements.

The next period is from about the end of the *Ch'un-ch'iu*, when the whole of the territory became the object of the exercise of the feudal lords' rule, and it was then that emerged the state as the family estate of the feudal lord. With the extension of the feudal lords' direct control to the whole of their territories, the gods of their altars became the territorial (natural) deities of their entire territories. (At this time the peasants also became involved in direct military duties but) the feudal lords combined military exercises with leading all adult males within their territories on hunting expeditions, and they offered the spoils to the gods described above. Also, the peasants' fields that had not hitherto been under the feudal lords' direct control were now subjected to taxation, and the feudal lords arranged that (a part of) the harvest of such fields be handed over in order to make offerings to the gods of their altars. Further, the ancestral gods of the feudal lords to whom prayers had hitherto been offered at the altars now came to be worshipped in family shrines, and the first harvest of the fields cultivated for the ancestors (taking the case of the emperor into account at the same time) came to be an offering to that shrine, and we may further conjecture that the ordinary people bore the responsibility for cultivating these fields. We may then suppose that the gods of the altars that succeeded to the peasants' altars became territorial gods of a definite area, and, further, came to occupy a status inferior to that of the altars of the feudal lords. Such altars should be understood as being the origin of the later village altars. (I do not go into the question of altars at which worshipped members of the ruling class of a different family from the feudal lords, inside the feudal lords' capitals.)

Roughly corresponding to such changes as those above, the 'thickets and marshlands' of the whole territory also became the object of taxation. But this is not to say that the feudal lords taxed all 'thickets and marshlands'. The meaning was that the right to tax had been reached. One further imagines that the 'thickets and marshlands', not hitherto directly linked with the altars of the feudal lords, gave rise to a new basis for their authority. To express this in a different way, the feudal lords had the right of possession, as sole landlords, in respect of their whole territory, and (altering the long-standing right of possession of land of peasants and others) operated so as to give themselves the usufruct. Further, by directly enclosing wide expanses of 'thickets and marshlands' for themselves, they would turn them into their own pleasure gardens or use them for hunts and excursions, or lease a part to the poor, who would be made to cultivate them. This meant that, at the same time as holding the right of ownership over the whole of their territory, they fixed the part of it over which they held the usufruct. The Confucians of the period of the Warring States 戰國 were against this

way of proceeding; they argued that frontiers and markets should be free of taxation, and they argued that it should be recognized that the people make use of the feudal lords' parks. That is to say, the feudal lords had hitherto regarded the 'thickets and marshlands', which were linked with their altars, as land for the cooperative (in the widest sense) use of themselves and members of their clan (and the peasants had regarded the 'thickets and swamps' linked to their clan settlements as land for their own cooperative use); but the nature of the feudal lords' altars changed, and, in the light of the change in the times, whereby the feudal lords had, as it were, individual ownership of the 'thickets and marshlands' of their whole territories, and even come to hold the usufruct of a part of them, the Confucians of the period of the Warring States held that the feudal lords' 'thickets and marshlands' should be regarded as land for the cooperative use of all the people. Which means that they were the more opposed to the feudal lords taxing the circulation of earnings there made or produce there grown, or enclosing their parks. Moreover, for one of the Confucians of the period of the Warring States, Mencius, the uncultivated land ('thickets and marshlands') outside the city walls should be opened up and the *ching-t'ien* system established; the peasants (forming cooperative bodies) provided the labour for the cultivation of the public field. (Private (私) as opposed to public (公) had hitherto applied to *ta-fu* and below, but here *private field* (私田) is a peasant's *personal* land), and it seems that the explanation given of the *ching-t'ien* system is such that the crop of private land belonged to the individual himself. When, in this *ching-t'ien* system, the units were regarded as fixed (900 *mou*), the feudal lords (public) and the peasants shared the profits (i.e. the crop). This is an adaptation of the conception that the whole of the 'thickets and marshlands' were used, and their profits shared, in common by the feudal lords and the peasants, and such a conception is to be found among other Confucians of the period of the Warring States. Moreover, since the revenues of the feudal lords were thus augmented and the livelihood of the peasants, who were to form their troops was thus ensured, this became a policy for a thriving state and a powerful army for the feudal lords of the Warring States. Moreover, thus was 'resurrected' the former system whereby the peasants had provided the labour for the cultivation of their lords' land, while their own land was untaxed.

From the middle or late *Ch'un-ch'iu* period, then, the feudal lords had individual control of adult males, as officials or warriors, and at the same time exercised direct control over the whole of their territories (including 'thickets and marshlands'), which means that they made states based on family fortunes (the prince being as the paternal head of the family). (Thereupon, arose the rivalries of *ta-fu* of the same clan, aiming like the feudal lords to be paternalistic princes, the struggles, the subjugations.) With



these family states, we also see the development of large scale irrigation works as a result of the spread of iron tools. (The above paternalistic prince is what is generally styled despotic prince.) Conspicuous among the irrigation works of the feudal lords of the Warring States is the case of the king of Ch'in, who made the 'thickets and marshlands' his family property, irrigated them and made the canal of the state of Ch'eng, directly subordinate to his house. This only brought riches and strength with the destruction of the six states. (MASUBUCHI Tatsuo, 'Kodai Sensei-shugi no Seiritu to sono Keizaiteki Kiban' 古代専制主義の成立とその経済的基盤, in *Chūgoku Kodai no Shankai to Kokka.*)

Even with the unification of the empire by the Ch'in, it would seem that the above conception of sovereign control underwent no change. And even at the beginning of the Han, the emperor's *individual* paternalistic control remained to some extent the basis of his government. Throughout the life of Kao-tsu 高祖 (Liu Pang 劉邦) the individual or personal relationships of trust between Kao-tsu and the loyal servants who had assisted in the foundation of the dynasty were of very great effect, as is suggested by the fact that, after the death of Kao-tsu, the broad lines of the legal system laid down on the basis of the foregoing were adhered to as having authority (MASUBUCHI Tatsuo, 'Kandai ni okeru Kokka Chitsujo no Kōzō to Kanryō' 漢代における國家秩序の構造と官僚, in *Chūgoku Kodai no Shankai to Kokka.*) However, this sort of family state control, paternalistic control, on the part of the emperor could not go on for ever, and the need arose for the formation of a state with an organised power structure, the consolidation and strengthening of the bureaucratic organisation, with the emperor at the apex. Further, more or less in conformity with this, there came into being the understanding, and a movement based on it, that the state be regarded as the sole landlord (owner) and that the emperor possessed all other usufructs. Thus the strengthening or change in the essence of the state (authority) became gradually clearer over the course of many years, and it might be said that strictly speaking, the process was first brought to completion under the Sui and T'ang. But even in the Han period there was still, on the large view, some progress. Let us now look at one or two aspects of the change in the essence of the state (authority).

First, the bureaucratic organisation. Accompanying the consolidation and strengthening of each bureaucratic organisation under the Han, there came to be, in each case, a structure which possessed its own 'intent', which involved a character of autonomy. Here, there arose between the chief official and his subordinates the relationship of prince and ministers, and as an extension of this, there arose the relationship of prince and ministers also between the former chief officials and the old subordinates (the original subordinate officials). In particular, the former prince-minister relationship had essentially the same aspect as the prince-minister relationship between

the emperor and the chief officials. In this situation it was not possible for the emperor to exercise individual control over the whole bureaucracy as in the past; he was regarded as the apex of the bureaucratic organisation, and through his control over the chief official of each bureaucratic organisation was in a position to control (as vassals) the officials of the various organisations. The control that the emperor could exercise thus seems at first sight to be at a remove. But on a general view the strengthening of the state (authority) as above meant a strengthening (in terms of structure) of the emperor's power of control. Moreover, in this connection the Han emperor devised two measures. The first was to consolidate and strengthen the organisation of the inspectorate (the Censorate 御史臺). The second was the conceptualisation of filial piety (孝) and its linking with loyalty (忠). Thus, in the official milieu, the sovereign-minister relationship between chief official and subordinates was likened to the filial piety between father and children, and the 'loyalty = filial piety' of the subordinates, with which they were endowed as an immovable essential of human nature, serving as an intermediary of the 'loyalty = filial piety' between the emperor and his chief officials, linked them to the emperor. (There also arose a colouring of the Legalist school in the Confucianism with whose views on state government the above is to be associated.)

We are next concerned with the state becoming the sole landlord. The Former Han was the period in which the direction was first taken, the Later Han that in which it was to some extent established. Let us now consider this, bearing 'thickets and marshlands' in mind. In the matter of state income and expenditure in the Former Han period, there was a distinction between state finance and the finances of the royal house, the private property of the emperor. The principal sources of revenue for the state finances were the land tax (田租), the poll tax (算賦) and the corvée (更賦). For the revenue of the finances of the imperial house the principal source was the taxes derived from the 'thickets and marshlands', parklands and lakes, and market places, and transit taxes, where the land was under the immediate control of the imperial house. But there was a noteworthy development whereby the source of income for the finances of the imperial house in the Former Han period was transferred to the source of income for the state finances. Let us look into this. The *Shih-chi p'ing-chun-shu* 史記平準書 says: 'Tax revenue from hills and rivers, parklands and lakes, and markets, from the emperor down to the feudal lords, having fiefs in the name of health resorts, was all for the private provision, and not to be received into the public funds.' 山川園池市川租稅之入, 自天子以至封君湯沐邑, 皆各爲私奉養焉. 不領於天下之經費. This refers directly to the reigns of Kao-tsu and Hui-ti, but we may suppose it to have persisted largely unchanged throughout the period of the Former Han. In short, the emperors of the Former Han dynasty gathered taxes from the hills and marshlands ('thickets

and marshlands' in the present article), parklands and lakes (made on the 'thickets and marshlands') and markets, which were under their immediate control, and held them to be revenue for the finances of the imperial house, while fieldholders were treated on the same basis. This means, in fact, that, in regard to the control of 'thickets and marshlands' and markets and so on, where they were land immediately held by the emperor and others, there was a 'survival' of the form of family control formerly exercised by the feudal lords of the period of the Warring States. At one time, it is to be supposed, the tax on salt and iron in land immediately under the emperor's control was paid, as the heaviest of the taxes on hills and marshlands ('thickets and marshlands' in the present article) into the Secretariat of the Privy Purse (*shao-fu* 少府) (which was in charge of the finances of the Imperial house). However, the *Shih-chi p'ing-chun-shu* gives the following as the memorials of K'ung Chin 孔僅 and others concerning the time of Wu-ti: 'The mountains and seas are the storehouse of heaven and earth, that is to say, of the son of heaven, and therefore revenues therefrom should belong to the privy purse. In spite of this, His Majesty (Wu-ti) would not have them private but had them attached to the Ministry of Agriculture (which controlled the national finances) and caused the revenues therefrom to help the national finances.' The record goes on to say that they wished by this brilliant device to change the system that had hitherto prevailed and exercise a [state] monopoly of the two products. And in Wu-ti's time the salt and iron taxes were transferred from the Privy Purse to the Ministry of Agriculture, and at the same time a salt and iron monopoly was operated, the profits from which were also paid to the Ministry of Agriculture (KATŌ Shigeshi 加藤繁, 'Kandai ni okeru Kokka Zaisei to Teishitsu Zaisei to no Kubetsu narabi ni Teishitsu Zaisei Ippan' 漢代に於ける國家財政と帝室財政との區別並に帝室財政一斑, in *Shina Keizaishi Kōshō jō* 支那經濟史考證上).

We should probably interpret the reform carried out by Wu-ti in respect of the salt and iron taxes from the following viewpoint: Already in Wu-ti's time the firm establishment of the power of the state took first place, and among the measures to be taken in priority were such as to strengthen the emperor's power of control and render it almost immovable, and among these was the measure whereby the salt and iron taxes, which were the heaviest levied on the 'thickets and marshlands' immediately controlled by the emperor, were made to contribute to the national finances. (On the national financial revenues in Wu-ti's reign, see KAMIYA Masakazu 紙屋正和, 'Kandai Shishi no Setchi ni tsuite' 漢代刺史の設置について, *Tōyō-shi Kenkyū* 33, 2.). Even so, after Wu-ti's time too, the revenues of the Privy Purse increased. This was doubtless due to the establishment of much public field and hatcheries (attached to the Privy Purse) and to the increase in revenue from market taxes, mining taxes, fishing taxes and so on, which accompanied the general economic development. But what comes in question here is

quality rather than quantity. In short, the tendency had arisen for the national finances to be regarded as of greater importance than those of the imperial house. Moreover, under this view, it would not seem, at least, that the emperors of the Former Han, from Wu-ti on, possessing 'thickets and marshlands' and being able to derive revenue from them, should be regarded as any part of an ambition on the part of the emperor towards a family state. (In the Former Han period, with the continued existence of the feudal lords, the possession of 'thickets and marshlands' did serve to strengthen the power in such a case as that of king P'i 濞 of Wu, one of the kings who raised the rebellion of the *Wu-ch'u ch'i-kuo* 吳楚七國 in the time of Ching-ti. But this sort of thing ceased to be after the rebellion of the *Wu-ch'u ch'i-kuo*.)<sup>(6)</sup>

The debate about salt and iron which was carried on in the time of Wu-ti's successor, Chao-ti, was brought to a conclusion by Huan K'uan 桓寬 a man of the time of Hsüan-ti. In the section on parklands in this work there are mentions of parks, lakes and public fields. It is difficult to understand, but Hiranaka Reiji's interpretation would seem to shoot closest to the mark, and we will follow him in our consideration of this. (HIRANAKA Reiji 平中荅次, 'Kandai no Kōden no "Ka"—Entetsu-ron Enchi-hen no Kisai ni tsuite' 漢代の公田の「假」——鹽鐵論園地篇の記載について in *Chūgoku Kodai no Densetsu to Zeihō* 中國古代の田制と税法). The literary official says: 'The emperor held the usufruct of much parkland and public fields, and nominally had the right to take rent from those who used them, but in practice the profits reverted to influential families. (In practice the emperor did get the rents.) Particularly in *san-fu* 三輔 the public fields reverted in practice to the hands of influential families, and these influential families (improperly) took rent from those who made use of it. So apart from the parks and hatcheries established by Wu-ti, the usufruct of the public fields was given to the people in general, and the government was intended to take land-tax on it. Though there was a nominal differentiation between rent (假) and tax (稅), they were essentially of the same nature.' Presumably, then, the above parklands, lakes and marshlands (hatcheries) were made on 'thickets and marshlands' of which the emperor held the usufruct, and the emperor held the usufruct of the public fields. If the opinion of the literary officials was put into operation, the (public fields considered as) land of which the emperor held the usufruct would be detached from the emperor and put into the hands of the general public, and their holding of the usufruct would incur tax which would contribute to the national finances. The foregoing opinion was not put into operation, but, even so, there is enough here to enable one to perceive that, even without 'thickets and marshlands' and public fields, the emperor's authority could already exist fully; or, to put it

(6) It is to be supposed that the war against the Hsiung-nu 匈奴 in Wu-ti's reign required a qualitative organizational strengthening of the state power.

the other way round, that a stage had been reached whereby the emperor's power of control was reinforced in the context of the putting in order of the authority of the state.

Formerly, under the Ch'in 秦, the poll tax went into the Privy Purse. Under the Han (although the poll tax (*suan-fu* 算賦) levied on adults went into the revenues of the national finances from an early period) the poll tax (*k'ou-ch'ien* 口錢) went on going into the Privy Purse. But the increased portion in Wu-ti's time went into the revenues of the national finances.

We come next to the expenditure of the national finances in the Former Han period. The principal items were: sacrifices, presentations to the emperor, construction of palaces, salaries, rewards, military expenses. Among these, sacrifices, construction of palaces, salaries and military expenses concerned the public purse, while only presentations and ordinary rewards involved the finances of the imperial house. This should surely lead one to suppose that the emperor, apex as he was of the structure, was *contriving*, by way of his plans, to strengthen the authority of the state, to strengthen his personal position.

With the Later Han, the distinction between the national finances and those of the imperial house disappeared, and the taxes from the hills and marshlands and artificial lakes that had previously been under the control of the secretariat of the Privy Purse were all transferred to that of the Ministry of Agriculture (大司農), which was in charge of the national finances. The Secretariat of the Privy Purse thus became a small office in charge of miscellaneous duties for the palace. The idea that the state was the sole landlord appeared (embryonically) in the *Po-hu-t'ung* which was written in the Later Han period. That is to say, in the *Po-hu-t'ung* there are at least two meanings of 'king', as the word appears in relation to land. One is the king who 'represents' the authority of the state. The other is, as one might say, a human king (with his clan) who is the emperor. In this situation, the king in the equation state = king is the sole landlord, and in the equation king = emperor he has the usufruct of the land. Such an idea developed in relation to the actual situation; in the Six Dynasties period the state was the sole landlord, and, what is more, the fact that ownership of land meant possession of the usufruct acted to produce real political measures. It is precisely from this point of view that the *chün-t'ien* (均田) system of the Northern Court, dealt with in Section 5, should be regarded, and the land allocation there may be understood as a partition of the usufruct. And the emperor's military colonies in the Wei and Western Chin periods as well as the privately held land of magnates and others, when regarded in this light, all depend simply on possession of the usufruct. In the case of thickets and marshlands too, the right of possession belonged to the state, and the usufruct also (the same applies to land that became ownerless) should be regarded as fundamentally belonging to the state. (However, in the con-

siderations that follow, the foregoing usufruct is to be taken as expressing, except where the contrary is necessary, the right of ownership of land.)

Let us proceed with the argument. At the end of the Western Chin period, the incursions of the northern peoples south of the Yangtse were held in check by the activities of *pei-jên wu-chu* 北人塢主 who looked up to Ssü-ma Jui 司馬睿 (later Yüan-ti, founder of the kingdom of Eastern Chin), on the line of demarcation between the forces of north and south, as his sovereign. On the one hand, the territorial magnates south of the Yangtse had their private troops, but they were opposed to the idea of letting these troops out of their own hands and having them thrown into territory with which they had no connection; moreover, they were, in spite of this, incapable of grouping together and forming a permanent military organisation south of the Yangtse. In fact, the southern magnates were fundamentally incapable of the task of warding off the incursions of the northern peoples south of the Yangtse. From this point of view it may be said that Ssü-ma Jui was the only person capable of somehow or other controlling a military force which should afford protection against the incursions of the northern peoples south of the Yangtse. Ever since the complications of the subjugation of Wu, the southern magnates had detested the northern aristocrats, but in view of the situation described above, they could not but strive for the creation of the Eastern Chin state relying on the structure and power south of the Yangtse which had been wielded by the Chin kingdom, which had previously unified the empire. This was bound up with their recognition of the dominant position of the northern aristocrats. (In the period of the Eastern Chin, once the power of *pei-jên wu-chu* had collapsed, there were cases of the northern aristocrats making expeditions into central China as a step to achieving their ambitions; this is just the obverse of the fact that in the general context of the confrontation between north and south, the maintenance of the power was dependent first and foremost on military power.)

For Ssü-ma Jui as king of Chin, the state was the sole landlord, and he relaxed the interdictions in respect of thickets and marshlands, over which possession of the usufruct had previously been postulated. In practice, this meant the grant of the usufruct of 'thickets and marshlands' to the northern aristocrats and southern magnates (part of whom later became aristocrats) which they had seized for themselves; this sort of thing rather confirmed the installation of Ssü-ma Jui on the part of the northern aristocrats and the southern magnates, and this, with Ssü-ma Jui and them as principal organisers, hastened the establishment of the Eastern Chin kingdom. But this gave rise to the destruction of the old village cooperative bodies and the impoverishment of the settlers, or to the strengthening of the magnates' control of the settlements through the control of the village cooperative bodies. (Already in cases connected with the system at the beginning of the Eastern Chin, there were cases of the various settlements

being described as 'ts'un' (村); when one considers the use of the word 'ts'un' adapted to the control of settlements by the magnates, this may be thought extremely suggestive.) It was not easy for the migrant northern aristocrats to acquire new land, and in fact quite a number of them seem to have remained landless for a long time afterwards. However, to the extent that the actual situation was as described above, even if the northern aristocrats were in practice landless, they came in for the distribution of the usufruct (or retained the profits) of the 'thickets and marshlands' held by the state, as constituent members (high-ranking officials) of the state authority. There were also northern aristocrats who were given possession of 'thickets and marshlands' on a large scale. In this sense, too, it may be said to be unreasonable to define them as simply parasitic officials. Further, in the 2nd year of *Hsien-kang* 咸康 of the Eastern Chin (336) there was strict prohibition of the possession of 'thickets and marshlands', but the order making the prohibition was simply a dead letter. In this connection one should probably think in the following way. At the beginning of *Hsien-ho* 咸和 (326-334) the rebellion of Su Shun 蘇峻 and Tsu Yüeh 祖約 broke out, and the state power was momentarily shaken, but once this rebellion had been put down, a fairly accurate family registers began to be made, starting in 328, and a system of land measurement and tax collection was put into operation in 330. This involved calculating the size of fields and levying a field tax; the state had direct control over the actual condition of fields, as a result of which its direct control of the 'thickets and marshlands' was enhanced, bringing naturally with it a knowledge of their actual condition. Then, at the beginning of *Hsien-kang* there was a famine year as a result of which there was a lapse in tax collection in the system of field measurement; and we may conjecture, following this line of thought, that, as well as a supplement for the gap in the year's harvest, there would have to have been contrived an increased revenue from 'thickets and marshlands'. (In 337 there was something of a falling off in political peace in Eastern Chin.) Presumably it was from such a situation as this that the prohibition on the possession of 'thickets and marshlands' was thought out. But it was not put into operation. (Even under the Han the possession of 'thickets and marshlands' by magnates had made considerable progress.)

At the end of the Eastern Chin, there was a prohibition of magnates possession of 'thickets and marshlands' by Liu Yü 劉裕 (later Wu-ti, founder of the Sung kingdom), but with the coming of the Southern Court, powerful persons took possession of 'thickets and marshlands', either as individuals or through the machinery of the state power. But a matter to be noticed appears here. In respect of the former, official recognition was given to the possession of 'thickets and marshlands' at the beginning of the *Ta-ming* 大明 period of the Sung according to official status, and such holdings were assessed for tax. At this juncture those who had long been in possession

were confirmed in their holdings. In practice this meant distribution of the usufruct of 'thickets and marshlands' so held, but it also amounted at the same time to *de facto* recognition of the magnates' control of settlements through 'thickets and marshlands'. However, at this point, the common people also were permitted to hold one *ching* (頃). At this time a newly arisen class of minor magnates was raising its head in the rural communities, and its members made their way into the lower échelons of officialdom; and this means that the state distributed 'thickets and marshlands' to such people too. (The reforms of *T'ien-chien* 天監 of the Liang deprived them of their special rights as officials, but this probably did not go so far as to annul their holdings of 'thickets and marshlands'.) Next, as regards the latter, these established *t'un* (屯), *ti* (邸) etc., and by this means held their 'thickets and marshlands'. This sort of thing was also subjected to some limitation in the *Ta-t'ung* 大同 period of the Liang (535-545) but it came to be accepted once more. In such general conditions as the foregoing, the poor became more and more impoverished, and they would sometimes enter the service of kings and princes or military leaders. Looking at the time of the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court, we find very few state-registered households; the number might be put at about 500,000 or 1,000,000 at the outside; and we should probably not overlook the question of 'thickets and marshlands' as we have seen it above, as one of the reasons that gave rise to this situation. (There were the cases of the relaxation of prohibition in respect of 'thickets and marshlands', which meant that the state in effect distributed the usufruct of the 'thickets and marshlands' that it owned, and there were the cases which meant that the magnates were prevented from possessing 'thickets and marshlands' and so forbidding the people to make use of them, so that the people were enabled to make use of them. Each instance must be scrutinised individually to determine which is applicable. In the latter cases, the argument of the Confucians of the Warring States to the effect that 'thickets and marshlands' were for cooperative use is also to be adduced.) (In the early period of the Six Dynasties tax was levied on the people's use of 'thickets and marshlands; this was a tax levied by the state on them as the holders of the usufruct of that land. I shall have something more to say about 'thickets and marshlands' under the Northern Court in Section 5.)

#### 4. Questions of the Aristocratic System in the Wei, Chin and Southern Court Periods

In discussion of the aristocrats (貴族) (or magnates (豪族)) in the periods of Wei, Chin and the Southern Court (hereafter referred to as the Six Dynasties) in Japan at present, the basis is sometimes the contemporary usage of aristocrat (or magnate), sometimes our own historical feelings, sometimes a conflation of the two. The question of the contemporary



meaning of the word (or expression) aristocrat (or magnate) is important in itself, and elucidation of the truth of the matter is essential for future studies of the history of the Six Dynasties; but at present in Japan, the word aristocrat (or magnate) as used in scholarly circles generally refers, with certain divergences, to a certain class of society, and the aristocratic class (with reference to the periods of the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court) would generally cover families of a standing of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* (門地二品). Such is the meaning attached to aristocrat in this article. (In Section I I gave a fixed meaning to magnate or powerful clan, and the magnates too are a social class in the apprehension of our historical perceptions.) The characteristics of these aristocrats were a family rank derived from a traditional standing and a high level of culture, and the fact that in the past they had played important roles both politically and socially. They functioned, internally speaking, through a shared consciousness, of which the concrete manifestation was, in a general way, their formation of a single closed circle of intermarriage. (However, in the Eastern Chin and Southern Court periods, there were too such closed circles of intermarriage, without intercourse between them.) There were, moreover, always cases of people of the same clan as the aristocrats, and belonging to a 'class' next to those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in*, marrying into the aristocracy, but in such cases an aristocratic go-between seems almost always to have been involved. Such, if one is to give an abstract account, were the aristocrats of the 'Six Dynasties', but aristocracies based on family status, education, political and social standing, and a shared consciousness existed in other periods too. They were not specially limited to the 'Six Dynasties'. Let us take a further step in respect of the special historical character of the aristocracy of the 'Six Dynasties': we should probably look here at the actual relationship between the aristocracy, whose special character has just been described, and the emperors, non-aristocratic officials and the common people. In short the emperors, aristocrats and non-aristocratic officials of the time each had a particular existential significance which they could not exchange for another; and the three of them formed the controlling class in the state power, which manifested from time to time various adjustments or reactions between them, while they stood in opposition to the common people. In this section, I consider that the concrete significance and function of the aristocracy, seen in their political and social aspects, is the basic keynote of the aristocracy of the 'Six Dynasties', and it is with this that I propose to deal.

At this point, as a preliminary to the study that follows, I will state my own opinion as to the particularity and independent nature of the emperor and the ruling classes under him, and the nature of the gentry under the 'Six Dynasties'. As for the emperor, his sovereignty was not complete, but even so, he stood (organisationally) at the apex of the state power, and he also occupied the position of possessor of military power (as a constituent

of state power) or was at least the one in a position to control military power. In practice, the ruling power of the emperor rose and fell, but its basic character remained unchanged.

In the case of the aristocracy there were quite considerable differences according to the vicissitudes of the nature of the state power. In the Han period, and especially that of the Former Han, the people of the settlements led what might be called an egalitarian existence; to this extent that, in principle, nobody of a particular family line would automatically become a member of the gentry (in respect of social standing) nor was there any guarantee of anyone coming to be rated as a high official; the situation was such that an individual's ability and capacity determined his standing, his status and his valuation. It was within this sort of homogeneity that the opinion of the villagers (rural opinion) had to function. In such a situation aristocrats or aristocracy did not exist. But in the course of time this homogeneity of all the people of the settlements was lost, and rural opinion came to be falsified by the magnates to their advantage. But under the law of officials of nine degrees, called the *chiu-p'in kuan-jên* in the 'Six Dynasties' period, the policy was adopted, in the beginning, of accepting rural opinion (*hsiang-lun* 鄉論) (as in the past), determining local degrees (*hsiang-p'in* 鄉品) (essential for anyone to become a civil official) in accordance with it and so controlling official ranking. It would seem, moreover, that these local degrees extended also to the class of the headmen in the settlements. The status of aristocrats (status of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* having local second degree) thus became for the time being secured on a nation-wide *plan*. But in order that the aristocrats should be able to preserve their family standing and be able automatically to become officials of high rank, it was necessary there be a *plan* making it possible for their ranks to become hereditary within the law of officials of nine degrees. Thus there was a difference in practice from the local degrees, based uprightly on rural opinion throughout the country, such as we saw above, and it came to be a means of maintaining family standing hereditarily. In this way the aristocracy came to rely on family standing and education, and to exist independently of rural opinion in its true sense. It is in the Eastern Chin period that this becomes fairly apparent, but with the coming of the Southern Court it becomes more and more definite. Moreover, if the aristocrats were men of high family standing and pure and incorruptible in their financial dealings, they would no doubt obtain the support of rural opinion. But it would be wrong, generally speaking, to imagine that the aristocrats were like this. For example, Wang Hung of the early Sung was regarded as a model by posterity, but he was hasty, and lacking in much dignity or liberality. It must also be taken into account at this point that, since the aristocrats had become incompetent as civil officials, the emperors of the Southern Court came to alter their mode of administering the country. Under the 'Six Dynasties', it was the chancellor

(*Shang-shu-shêng* 尚書省) that controlled the most important offices of state, and the eight bureaus in it which were responsible for drafting policy, making memorials to the throne and so forth, were the monopoly of aristocrats (and people corresponding to aristocrats). But the emperor Ming-ti of Ch'i took the jurisdiction over the registers (which constituted the tax and corvée ledgers) (which in turn meant jurisdiction over matters of tax and corvée based on these) away from the chancellery, and transferred it to a central secretariat formed by humble retainers close to his person; and the Ch'ên emperors finally went so far as to regard the central secretariat as a superior organ to the chancellery and caused it to take charge of all important matters of government. (NODA Toshiaki 野田俊昭, 'Tōshin Nanchō ni okeru Tenshi no Shihai-kenryoku to Shōsho' 東晉南朝における天子の支配権力と尚書, *Kyūshū Daigaku Tōyō-shi Ronshū* 九州大學東洋史論集 5) This movement towards the emperor's person was bound up with the insecurity of the political situation and so on, and it might be said to have rendered the increasing incapacity of the aristocracy yet more severe (here the emperor's mode of carrying on his administration and the increasing in capacity of the aristocracy as officials formed a vicious circle). Further, late though it was, in the time of Wu-ti of Ch'i the offices of *Ling-chün* General (領軍將軍) and *Hu-chün* General (護軍將軍) (responsible for all military matters in the empire) were dismantled, their jurisdiction over arms, military service and military expeditions was removed and handed over to the *wai-chien* (外監) and *chih-chü-chien* (制局監) manned by humble retainers close to the emperor. The activities of humble retainers close to the emperor under the Southern Court were frequently deleterious to the regular operation of the administration, but it is to be noticed, in spite of this questionable aspect, that such 'reforms' as the above were carried out. However, since the particularity and independent character of the aristocracy stemmed from their family standing and education, they continued in existence unaffected by dynastic changes. But this was from first to last a matter of being recognised by their fellows. To the extent that the rebellion of Hou Ching 侯景 at the end of the Liang or the barbarian raids under the Western Wei were provoked by non-recognition of the value of the aristocracy under the Southern Court, they brought about the dismantling of the aristocracy and the aristocratic system. It was the measures of the Ch'ên emperors described above which gave the *coup de grâce*. (They had 'domestics' but they lacked the energy to use this as a breakthrough to the construction of a new society.)<sup>(7)</sup>

Further, even if the particularity and independence of the aristocracy derived from their family standing and education, education was something

(7) Under the Southern Court the prime minister (*tsai-hsiang* 宰相) (and occasionally *shih-chung* 侍中) were generally head of the Chancellery (*Shang-shu-shêng* 尚書省). Thus the curtailment of the authority of the Chancellery may be understood as a further reduction of the power of the prime minister.

that those outside the aristocracy could acquire. It was, then, the family standing itself which was the true support of their particularity and independence. There were cases under the Sung and Ch'i of emperors trying to meddle with that family standing, but the aristocrats naturally repelled these attempts. Even the emperors could not but withdraw to the extent that the matter was, so to speak, outside their territory. But here the question remains as to why the emperors ventured to take such a matter up. This point will be dealt with later.

What is to be noticed in all the above is that aristocrats had no intentions or movements within the state power of placing restraint on the emperor's power to rule by establishing their own power system. What especially shows their prosperity, as aristocrats, under the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court, is that they took up posts as incorruptible officials in the emperor's entourage, yet these incorruptible officials were not of a character to construct a new power base within the political power.

The next matter to be dealt with is their political status and corresponding social position. There was not necessarily correspondence in such matters with the extent of land ownership or the greater or less power of magnates. As a general consideration, it is not on the whole justifiable to hold that the aristocrats under the Western Chin were large landholders and great clans, and that the non-aristocratic officials were medium or small landholders and only moderately great clans. In particular, in the case of the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court, it cannot be said that the aristocrats were (for their class) large landholders. On the other hand, it is to be supposed that in classes inferior to the aristocracy there were quite a number who enjoyed considerable wealth. In short, there was no necessary correspondence between relative political status and social position on the one hand and the degree of economic power, clan power, on the other. But in the matter of the aristocracy, there were many points in respect of their economic existence which stemmed from the fact that they were constituent members of the state power. Commercial activity on their part by legal or illegal means was not possible for them as individuals, and only became so for them as constituent members of the state power. It was the same when as teachers they collected disciples and took fees from them (in respect of the partial exemption from the *corvée* allowed to such disciples), or in the matter of their possession of 'thickets and marshlands', described in Section 3 (and in the matter of their retention of that possibility). In short, the aristocrats now under discussion had a particularity as being high-ranking officials in the state, and their economic existence was more or less thereby guaranteed. However incompetent they might be as officials or however much they might be in the course of losing real political power, their situation as just described was not in the least essentially negated. To this extent, it could probably not be prescribed that they were parasitic officials, either in the sense that

they existed as parasites on the emperor's power to rule, or in the sense that many, being landless, lived on salaries.

If there were among the aristocracy those who boasted a pedigree from Han times, there were others who entered on the road of aristocratization with the coming of the Southern Court. However, at least within the limits of the interpretation given above, in whatever case the aristocrats were basically of the same nature, and it was not a question of so much importance whether the pedigree started under the Han, Wei, Chin or (the earlier period of) the Southern Court.

In the case of non-aristocratic officials, they were broadly divided between gentry in humble circumstances and, inferior to these, non-gentry in humble circumstances. In respect of the period before the *T'ien-chien* reforms of the Liang, the former were officials of middle rank, the latter officials of low rank. After the reform, the latter were further lowered to the menial class (persons who were liable to the *corvée*). Though it is unfortunately a digression in our argument, let us now consider the gentry and commonalty under the 'Six Dynasties'. As has already been mentioned in Sections 1 and 2, the terms *shih* (士) and *shu* (庶) had several meanings in the Han period. To the extent that they had several meanings under the 'Six Dynasties' also, the situation is the same, but broadly speaking there is a twofold division. The first was the division between those who were regarded as gentry on account of their shared consciousness, and those who, because they were not included here, were regarded as common people. (There was this kind of distinction between the gentry and common people in the Han period also; there the shared consciousness that constituted the gentry lay in their all equally having the same scholarship and knowledge.) Under the 'Six Dynasties', the principal point of the shared consciousness gradually came to be their having the same family standing and education. Then, under the 'Six Dynasties' there was first the territorial question of gentry being in such and such a place, and it was also the fact that the same person was a gentleman at the capital and a commoner in the country. But later there was common usage throughout the country as to what constituted gentry, and the distinction between gentle and common came to be made (throughout the country) on the basis of representative gentry. But the line of demarcation between gentry and commonalty became vague, and there were cases where it was impossible to distinguish clearly whether a person were gentle or common. However, towards the end of the Western Chin the following system came into being: those who held 2nd local degree and were first appointed 5th or 6th degree officials were called 'senior clans' (*chia-tsu* 甲族); those who held 3rd, 4th or 5th local degrees and were first made 7th, 8th or 9th degree officials were called 'secondary houses' (*tzü-mên* 次門); those who held 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th local degrees and became outer officials were called 'junior houses' (*hou-mên* 後門); and those who held no local degree

were called 'fourth houses' (*san-wu-mên* 三五門). (Hereafter this system of family ranking will be referred to as the 'clan and house system'.) This is systematic, and the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* respected a social reality, but in practice the senior class and the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* were almost the same thing. Schematically speaking, the senior clans were high class gentry (*shih*), the secondary houses were low class gentry (*shih*), and the junior and fourth houses were commoners (*shu*), but in the beginning there were cases of gentry (*shih*) being included in junior houses. Humble gentry were regarded as low class gentry (secondary houses). The other division is in the distinction between *kung*, *ch'ing*, *ta-fu*, *shih* and *shu*, where those serving as 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th degree officials were regarded as *shih*. Many junior houses formed this gentry. As a phenomenon, at least, the two kinds of gentry are not of major importance. One of the big questions in present studies of the history of the Southern Court is the elucidation of the links and changes through which these two kinds of gentry (*shih*) passed; in respect of the former, the distinction between gentry and commoners (not even mentioned in the statutes), which was originally a social reality, was gradually systematized by the state, and one may say that to follow up the way in which only the gentry systematically became administrators would be one way of throwing light on the true situation of the aristocrats and the aristocratic system under the Southern Court. (In what follows the latter kind of gentry appear as 'gentry', and of common people, as 'commoners'.) In the case of humble gentry, they were sometimes large landowners or magnates. In a general way, large landowners or magnates were connected with the political power, and aimed at maintaining their own influence by making use of this; and on the other hand, the emperor could not but make use of the power they possessed. One example of this use of them under the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court was that they were appointed as the permanent chief regional officials. (Aristocrats who were magnates were also sometimes appointed as permanent chief regional officials.) Their power was also an important question in the *T'ien-chien* reforms of the Liang, and use was made of it. Their particularity and independent character may well be said to have been grounded in this sort of local character. However, in the Liang period, with Wu-ti's emphasis on talent and value for the able humble gentry, they mostly gathered at the capital and engaged in the struggle for office. Thus the local character of the humble gentry and, in their turn, their particularity and independent character, were largely lost. Under the Ch'ên, which passed through the great upheaval of the end of the Liang, (the descendants of) the former aristocrats, humble gentry, who had obtained power under the Liang, soon had almost no power at all. And there began to arise (a part of) a stalwart class of those who had once belonged among the humble gentry and certainly not been highly valued, living in the country (having a local character) without connection with the capital, and this was,

systematically, a step on the road to a new aristocracy. However, in point of education, knowledge and self-confidence, there was a line to be drawn between them and not only the former aristocracy but also the humble gentry who had previously been bathed in the limelight. This was the more so in that, speaking very broadly indeed, one might say that, from the end of the Liang, the particularity and independent character of the aristocracy and humble *shih* who previously had constituted the state power, were destroyed with their own destruction.<sup>(8)</sup>

For humble persons, there are two divisions to be made. The first are those who maintained their status over successive generations as junior officials, expert in their duties in the official circles of the centre and the regions, who actually supported the official milieu. They were not necessarily landowners, but some were, among the more powerful of the common people in rural communities. They had a particularity and independent character as a certain political and social class, but they did not form any particular new historical current. It is to be supposed that the offices to which they were destined were made corvée under the *T'ien-chien* reforms of the Liang. The other division is of those who originally led an existence without connection with official circles (fourth houses, in short) but who, in the Eastern Chin, Sung and Ch'i periods, either became junior officials on the strength of their wealth or aspired so to do. They did not negate the former state power; they rather attempted, by making their way into it, to become a class with special political and social rights. But this activity on their part resulted in a diminution of the amount of labour available to the state, and, moreover, there followed a vagueness in the social order. However, although their rise was a social phenomenon, it was not the result of the concentration of a single class. Under the Ch'i a part of them raised the rebellion of T'ang Yü-chih (唐寓之) against the oppression with which their political and social rise met, but the foregoing statement is proved by the fact that a nation-wide solidarity was not called into being. The *T'ien-chien* reforms of the Liang put a check on their political and social rise, and even those who had become junior officials were once more made liable to the corvée. In the face of this they contrived their individual ways of evasion. This was the more so in that even after the reform they proved unable to become a motive force for the emergence of a new social power in the rural areas. Further, there had emerged among both the former and the latter humble persons those who, by reason of their talents and other qualities, had found

(8) Under the Eastern Chin and the Southern Court, the powerful clans, being unable to resolve the tensions and rivalries between them resulting from their livelihood through the agriculture of their regions, looked to the state for the functions of mediator and arbitrator. The fact was that while the powerful clans had progressed as rulers of regional societies, there were limits. Nor should be probably overlook the relevance of such considerations when, in the Liang period, the powerful clans gathered at the capital competing for offices.

favour with the emperor and had obtained a certain authority in the *Chung-shu-shê-jên-shêng* 中書舍人省 and so on, but this authority was destined to cease with the abolition of the central secretariat, as a result of the destruction of the Southern Court.

Let us proceed with our argument. At the end of the Later Han period, Ts'ao Ts'ao took all men of good reputation everywhere under his umbrella. If those of good reputation at this time ranged from village headmen (*wu-chu* 塢主) to those who were backed up by the power of those we call magnates; they were above all to be found among the gentry of the time. Ts'ao Ts'ao took such men of good reputation under his umbrella as a means of strengthening his own position. In cases of particularly able and talented people, Ts'ao Ts'ao would employ them even if they lacked a sound Confucian reputation. On reflection, one sees that the gentry of the final period of the Later Han assumed the existence of the Later Han dynasty and carried on the political fight, principally against the eunuchs, within its *framework*. Their ultimate objective was to obtain the advance of men of high reputation in order to realise their political ambitions, but in their actual activities there were necessarily elements that could not be called clean. Their power as a group was destroyed by the *tang-ku* 黨錮, but even after that they went on hoping individually for the continued existence of the Later Han dynasty. But the 'suicide' of Hsün Yü 荀彧 in *Chien-an* 建安 18 (213) meant that Ts'ao Ts'ao's power had cut them off from further hope of the continued existence of the Later Han dynasty. Thereafter the gentry under the political power of the house of Ts'ao endeavoured to give a genuinely official character to the accomplishment of the aims of the house of Ts'ao. On the other hand there were gentry who were dissatisfied with the activities of those who had carried on the political struggle mentioned above, and did not act with them. They had all kinds of activities and aims, but this did not necessarily mean that they all pinned their hopes on the Later Han dynasty right up to the end, and there were some among such groups of gentry who placed themselves under Ts'ao Ts'ao's authority. But it may be said that they did not in this position take any particular action in regard to the authority of the house of Ts'ao. (For movements among the gentry at the end of the Later Han, see MASUBUCHI Tatsuo, 'Gokan Tōko-jiken no Shinhyō ni suite' 後漢黨錮事件の史評について, *Hitotsubashi Ronshō* 一橋論叢, 44, 6.)

Just before the establishment of the Wei dynasty, king P'i 丕 of Wei (later Wên-ti, founder of the Wei) ordered his chancellor Ch'ên Chün 陳群 to institute the law of officials of 9 degrees. It is to be supposed that he expected to extend its application to the whole territory after his accession. There have been many enquiries into the nature and significance of this law of officials of 9 degrees which have tended to emphasize the damage caused by the law in the Western Chin period, and then to argue back to the period of its institution. But the standpoint and advocacy of the writers are often



largely reflected and there is much divergence from the facts. Examined without such points of discrepancy, the law of the *chiu-p'in kuan-jên* would seem to have been instituted with the following objects: (1) The registrar (*chung-chêng* 中正) of each district would judge of the capacity as officials of officials (or those who intended to become officials in the future) originally domiciled in his district, and would record this on a document. Both the man's moral conduct and his capacity as an official were recorded on the document, but greater weight was given to the latter. (2) Private feelings should, as far as possible, be prevented from getting into the official milieu, as was often the case under the existing system of selection. This was based on consideration of the fact that under the system of *ch'a-chü* 察舉 under the Later Han, there arose private bonds between selectors and selected (as individuals) and between a selector and all those selected by him, and as a result there was political chaos under the Later Han dynasty. (3) A connection was to be made with the theoretical basis for the king of Wei's accession. The king of Wei possessed at the time both great military power and economic power (based on the management of military colonies) but, when it came to accession, he held that a theoretical basis was necessary. The theoretical basis of accession had come to be that it should satisfy the hopes of heaven and of the people, but it had an outer aspect which every official should satisfy the hopes of the people, thus securing the position. This had to take the form of the district registrars seeking out public opinion concerning the officials originally domiciled in their districts, and settling the official order on the basis of this. This should be taken to mean that there existed the understanding that those who were reputed in the rural areas for their filial conduct, their benevolence and their sense of justice would be true and capable as officials.

It may be remarked that, with the coming of the Chin period, there appears this understanding of something like the rural promotion and village selection (*hsiang-chü li-hsüan* 鄉舉里選) which operated in the Chou period. Basically, rural promotion and village selection was intended for the feudal lords, the despotic rulers of the period of the Warring States, as an element to strengthen their power, whereby they might employ as *ta-fu* or *shih* one who might be no more than a peasant if he had ability, and this came to cast a shadow on (a part of) the system of authority of the emperor. This appears in the Wang-chih 王制 Treatise in the *Li-chi* 禮記 and so on, but such a system did not necessarily operate on the Chou social structure. There also appeared in the Chin period the idea that this was the (sort of) rural promotion and village selection which operated in the Han period, but this meant principally investigation and promotion on the part of the chief regional officials. But in the Han period there was also such an important method of selection and promotion as the summons to court (*p'i-chao* 辟召). In fact the (kind of) rural promotion and village selection which amounted

to investigation and promotion cannot be taken to be the representative method of selection and promotion in the Han period.

Among the three objects of the system of the law of officials of nine degrees, (1) and (2) could be attained without conflict, but there were points of mutual opposition in practice between (3) and the other two. In short it was out of the question that virtuous conduct, involving filial piety, benevolence, a sense of justice and so on in the rural areas should invariably correspond fully with the talents required for an official in practice. Again, it is to be thought that the hereditarily powerful families had gradually come to possession of learning, knowledge and culture, but they had been forming groups of gentry with the districts as the unit. They would then take obscure and solitary persons, irrespective of whether they had any ability or not, and separate them from their fellows. And there were many cases where the reputations of these people in the rural areas for contempt of wealth and liking for generosity were fabricated (contrary to the truth) for the sake of good fame. (And this gave rise to those who, though practising most strict Confucian principles, did not meet with politeness from others in cases where they were of obscure and humble origin and did not themselves seek the good repute of their villages.) So when the district registrars listened to public opinion (which was controlled by the above gentry) and the order of the officials was determined in the Chancellery on this basis, the position was rather the reverse of the system of promoting talent that the house of Ts'ao hoped for. However, Ch'ên Chün did all that could be done by practical measures to do away with this evil. Putting the talents, that is to say capacity as an official, which appeared on the document established by the district registrar (郡中正), above the moral conduct was rather a negation of the theory that filial and other virtuous conduct corresponded to the qualifications of an official, but it seemed that then, in practice, promotion of talent could function on a higher level and unswayed by public opinion. Again, if the district registrars were people of the country there was the risk that they would be swayed by the views of the rural gentry and notables, whether they liked it or not; but Ch'ên Chün dealt with this too by appointing important officials from the Ts'ao's central group as district registrars.

The king of Wei acceded, and the system of the district registrars continued in existence from the time that the Wei dynasty emerged. (1) and (2) above then continued as regards their objectives. (3) later developed as some kind of a political doctrine. (I shall touch on this point later.) Probably connected with these, especially with (1) is the fact that at the beginning of Wei a man might have ability but be unable to enter the company of his fellow gentry in his home area because of his humble origin; but in spite of the inferiority complex thus engendered, there were some such who trod the path to officialdom at the centre. (This meant that there were even people who were accepted into the company of gentry at the capital but

were still not regarded as such in their home area.) (The public opinion taken into account by the district registrars was in practice the reputation at the capital, and as a result there emerged a new abuse, probably not anticipated at the outset, whereby people banded together and sold good reputations.) As described in the above, the aim was not a fixation of family status.

Thus in the period when the house of Ts'ao held the real power as emperors, the ancestors of the aristocracy of the later Chin and Southern Court became high officials and central officials, but even so it would probably be absurd to hold that there was the emergence or the germ of the emergence of an aristocracy or aristocratic system as previously provisionally defined.

The first step towards the emergence of the aristocracy or aristocratic system of the 'Six Dynasties' was taken when the house of Ssü-ma seized power in the middle Wei period. It may be said to have emerged in the Western Chin period, when the house of Ssü-ma, of the Western Chin dynasty had become emperors; one of its characteristics was that although the Ssü-ma maintained their precedence vis-à-vis the aristocracy, the former had a sense of solidarity with the latter as sharing political power. The creation of this sort of sense of solidarity was accompanied by a fixing of family status in and below the aristocracy. This will be dealt with below.

The powerful Wei minister of the middle Wei period, Ssü-ma I (grandfather of Wu-ti, founder of the Western Chin) overthrew by a coup d'état the faction of Ts'ao Shuang 曹爽, who proposed to keep the old district registrar system, and instituted that of great provincial registrars (*chou-ta-chung-chêng* 州大中正). The district registrars thereupon somewhat changed their character and became a kind of deputies to the great provincial registrars. According to the system of the great provincial registrars, the latter were intended to consult public opinion on the actual or potential officials in their respective provinces and attribute local degrees to them running from first to ninth, the individual's order in the official hierarchy being controlled in accordance with this from the time of the first appointment. (At this point the document took on a secondary existence.) The great provincial registrars for each province were appointed by the chancellery on the recommendation of high officials belonging to the Ssü-ma camp in each province, and they (usually of the 2nd local degree (鄉品二品)) almost automatically attributed the 2nd local degree to the children of high officials of the Ssü-ma camp domiciled in their province. This meant that the Ssü-ma were guaranteeing hereditary status as high-ranking officials to the senior officials of their camp. Moreover, the public opinion taken into account by the great provincial registrars was either their own or the views of representative gentry of the province, which were largely decisive, so that they were equally well placed, it would seem, to achieve the 2nd local degree. They thus achieved the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing, but at the same time the

attribution of degrees down to the class of village headman came to involve fixing the status of people below the 2nd local degree. Again, the ostensible reason for setting up the system of great provincial registrars was to ensure once more the employment of talent which had run into difficulties under the old system of district registrars. But with the limitations seen above, the old policy of employment of talent had, we must conclude, collapsed.

The establishment and operation of the above system of great provincial registrars and of the system of local degrees led to the emergence under the house of Ssü-ma in the Wei period (after the establishment of the system of great provincial registrars), and under the Ssü-ma as the emperors of the Western Chin period, of people with 2nd local degree (the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing) who had from the first been under the Ssü-ma (under their umbrella, in fact, even before the subjugation of Shu 蜀) who had a sense of solidarity as regards their political power, and I would like now to make some remarks about this. Under the system of great provincial registrars the idea was that these registrars should determine local degrees on the basis of local opinion, but the local opinion was 'pure discussion (*ch'ing-i* 清議) in the locality'. In the Chin period officials' moral conduct was also taken into account, and three kinds of case arose. Dismissal from office and disenrollment (*ch'u-ming* 除名) (and so on) were inflicted as punishment and (as punishment) provisionally suspended; dismissal from office and disenrollment (and so on) were imposed as punishment and local opinion was once more referred to; and local opinion was immediately consulted. In the first case the great provincial registrar would naturally annul the local degree, according to the punishment imposed. (There was also reduction of local degree in accordance with the nature of the punishment.) In the second case, also, the great provincial registrar would annul the local degree, according to the punishment imposed. (There was also reduction of local degree in accordance with the nature of the punishment.) In the third case the great provincial registrar might annul the local degree held or reduce it, but the person would, in the former case, be denied qualification to be regarded as an official, while being brought down in the official scale in accordance with his (new) local degree in the latter. In the first case, the matter was dealt with in the direct line of the emperor's absolute power to appoint or dismiss; in the third case it was regulated on the basis of public opinion in each province. At first sight, the two seem contradictory. However, with the insertion of the second case, it would seem possible to consider the position as a whole from some such viewpoint as: 'The emperors of the house of Ssü-ma have a feeling of solidarity with, of reliance on the class of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing as political administrators; in this sense there should be congruence between measures taken in regard to local degrees corresponding to punishments already inflicted by the great provincial registrars, themselves taken from among those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing, and

measures taken in regard to local degrees based on the result of the great provincial registrar's consultation of local opinion (the opinion of those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing in the province). But even with the emergence of the feeling of solidarity between the Ssü-ma of the Western Chin period and those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing, that is, the senior clans, as political administrators, in so far as the second and third cases, in particular, were systematically identical, the system would function even where the feeling of solidarity did not exist (for example, where southern aristocrats became great provincial registrars).

Moreover, it would seem that among the ministers at the time of the establishment of the state of Western Chin there were some who did not necessarily submit wholeheartedly to the Ssü-ma emperors. And it may be said that this made it the more necessary, from the emperor's side, to emphasize the feeling of solidarity he had, as a political expedient. Local degrees were basically assigned down to the class of village headman. Indeed, 'punishments' of reduction or annulment of degrees by the above great provincial registrars could be extended to non-gentry officials. We may conjecture that these measures of the great provincial registrars spared those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing in practice but were intended to be strictly applied to secondary houses and junior houses; the surviving material is somewhat indirect but there is evidence on the point.

During the Western Chin period (including that part of it subsequent to the institution of the system of great provincial registrars), the Ssü-ma would appoint to high office men who, though not necessarily of famous families, had talent and were loyal to themselves. They must then have naturally had appropriate local degrees assigned to them by the registrars. Also, those who graduated from the university (*t'ai-hsiao* 太學) in the Western Chin period were assigned local degrees by the registrars according to their results, and they started on their careers on this basis. Also in the Western Chin period, it was possible for the registrars to raise humble and retiring gentry of poor family and simple origin to the status of 'poor and simple' and give 2nd local degree, but the question of whether or not Huo Yüan 霍原 fitted into this category gave rise to complications. Finally Huo Yüan was fixed in this category by an edict of the emperor. Also, in the early period of the Western Chin, in cases where the registrar ventured not to raise a local degree as a result of his manipulation of local opinion (more accurately as a result of his acting in the light of *li* 禮), the emperor would issue an edict and raise a man in the official hierarchy, leaving his local degree unchanged. Though in all this the Ssü-ma were using the great provincial registrar system and the local degree system for the control of family status, it was not wholly obscured in the matter of family status, but in a sense was a reflection of their purposes as administrators.

In respect of the aristocratic system in the Eastern Chin period, great

differences arose between it and that of the Western Chin period. The first of these was the coming into being of the southern aristocracy apart from the old northern. With the establishment of the Eastern Chin state south of the Yangtse, it was held to be impossible that the aristocracy should be exclusively occupied by northern aristocrats, and, though they occupied a position inferior to that of the northern aristocrats, this brought about the emergence of the southern aristocrats. There thus came into being an aristocracy of the Eastern Chin which was formed internally of human components of two distinct qualities. This form of the aristocratic system was the same with the coming of the Southern Court, too. Second was that the feeling of solidarity between themselves and the Ssü-ma emperors, that the aristocracy had as political administrators, gradually disappeared. Previously, there was a feeling on the side of the emperors in the Western Chin period, towards the aristocracy, of solidarity with them as political administrators, and we may suppose that the aristocracy on their part had a corresponding feeling of solidarity towards the emperors. Well, it is to be supposed that between the emperors of the Eastern Chin period and the aristocracy there was hardly any feeling of solidarity, as political administrators, from the start; and, even in the case of the northern aristocracy, with the progressive fixation of family status, and bound up with such a fact that in the Eastern Chin period there was no outstanding emperor, their feeling that they shared their fate with the Ssü-ma emperors disappeared, and there arose a tendency to feel almost no sense of resistance to submitting to a state established by an emperor of whatever name, insofar as their rights (such as their special privileges as officials) were preserved. At this point, even if there were a feeling of solidarity on the emperor's side towards the northern aristocracy, it came to have no effect in practice.

Next, in connection with the aristocratic system of the Southern Court, there is one pervasive characteristic. Insofar as the emergence of the emperor who founded each dynasty depended solely on his military strength, there was a difference from the case of the house of Ssü-ma, the emperor regarding himself as supreme ruler with the new idea that he occupied a higher dimension than the aristocracy; the so-called feeling of solidarity as between political administrators was swept away, and the attempt was made to harmonize the three elements of emperor, aristocracy and nonaristocratic officials, as such. This appeared most clearly at the time of the establishment of a dynasty. Let us now consider this point. It would seem that already in the Eastern Chin period those who were in the pure discussions in the rural districts (or those involved in pure discussions themselves) were tending to become the gentry, and this point emerges clearly under the Southern Court. Under the Southern Court, at the time of accession and so on, the emperor would unilaterally restore to their former local degrees (and so on), which were 'in violation of local opinion' or 'in violation of the pure discus-

sions'. The former would seem to indicate the annulment or reduction of local degrees in the form of that operated by the provincial registrars on their own initiative on the basis of public opinion; the latter would seem to indicate the punishments, in connection with the gentry, of the foregoing first, second and third cases; but it is worth noting this as a way in which the emperors boasted of their precedence over those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing, or aristocrats.

It may be remarked in connection with the accusations of those of the *mên-ti êrh-p'in* standing brought by the chief censor (*yü-shih-chung-ch'êng* 御史中丞) and others, that, speaking generally, it may be taken that almost none of these actually seem to have resulted in punishment in the Chin period. However, with the coming of the Southern Court such results do appear. Some examples are afforded by the cases of Yen Chün 顏竣, prefect of Tan-yang 丹楊, of a distinguished Lang-hsieh 琅邪 clan, who was condemned to death as a result of the accusation of the chief censor who had followed the intention of the emperor; of Wang Sêng-ch'ien 王僧虔, governor of Huei-chi 會稽, of a distinguished Lang-hsieh clan, who was dismissed from office as a result of the accusation of the chief censor who had followed the intention of the emperor; and of Wang Liang 王亮 who was reduced to the status of a 'commoner' as a result of the accusation of the chief censor.

I would here like to examine the historical background to the way in which the emperors, especially after the Southern Court came into being, demonstrated their precedence as mentioned above. In the first place, with the stabilization of their family status, the aristocracy lived quietly and lacked the power of senior officials primarily interested in political decision making. Then from the time of Hsiao-wu-ti 孝武帝 of the Sung (leaving aside the Liang for the time being) the ground was prepared for the activities of the humble persons close to the emperor, but the situation described in itself functioned so as to strengthen the emperor's precedence vis-à-vis the aristocracy. In the second place, the aristocracy was totally without military power. At the time of the institution of the great provincial registrar system, the fact that there were generals who did not whole-heartedly submit to the Ssü-ma no doubt had some influence, but generals were held to be unconnected with the local degree system. And this continued to be the case subsequently. Doubtless this sort of situation was not unconnected with the fact that, even in spite of the fact of the stern confrontation between north and south, the aristocracy were quite powerless militarily. It may be said to have thus been all the more natural that, with a succession of founders of dynasties emerging through military power, the emperors should boast of the precedence of their power vis-à-vis the aristocracy. In the third place, the family status of the aristocracy, on account of their father-son nucleism, descended to the children homogeneously. There thus arose no tendency for particular important or high office to be inherited in a particular aristocratic

line. So the emperor's inclinations entered more and more into appointments to important or high office. (Individuals' order in the official hierarchy was, as their careers show, within quite a wide *framework*, and so, for example, there might be great differences between brothers.) A young aristocrat's period in a particular office was short; moreover, no young aristocrat failed to take some office or other (comparatively low) suitable for the aristocracy; but since cases of adult aristocrats acceding to high offices were in themselves few, and, moreover, each individual's period in his post was not necessarily short, the foregoing relationships meant that appointments to important or high offices based on the emperor's inclination, and the exercise of the emperor's individual authority, came to raise their head. (The flight of the aristocracy from actual political activity, and their thoroughgoing political enfeeblement, were developments which rather accompanied the strengthening of the emperor's power over the aristocracy.)

In the foregoing we have seen the background to the grip over the aristocracy throughout, one might say, the whole period of the Southern Court, and the emergence there of the emperor, as a ruler, in an altogether higher dimension than the aristocracy. In what follows we will see how to some extent as time went on the fragility of the aristocratic system increased. We are first concerned with Sung and Ch'i, but, within the development of the region south of the Yangtse, into which a large number of displaced persons had found their way in the Eastern Chin period, a part of these gradually began to emerge as wealthy fourth houses ('commoners') and some of these came to take 9th degree offices (*chiu-p'in-kuan* 九品官). Originally, in the case of fourth houses, a man might take a 9th degree office but, once he had left it, he had no right to exemption from service. However, under the so-called 7-point corvée (*ch'i-t'iao chêng-fa* 七條徵發) of *Yüan-chia* 元嘉 27 (450) of the Sung, in the case of fourth houses of some regions, those who took some particular 9th degree offices and their near relations, were granted the right to exemption from service. (To be precise, one should probably say that this right was acquired by their own merits.) Several years later the accession to 9th degree office by fourth houses throughout the country was recorded on the registers, and this subsequently developed into a system whereby, on this basis, the individual concerned was guaranteed exemption from service. Thereupon, claims on the part of fourth houses to 'acquisition of the right to exemption from service' came to be based on the records on the registers. In such cases fourth houses should be understood to have become 'gentry' (*shih*) (or *ta-fu*). (When one surveys the periods of the Eastern Chin, Sung and Ch'i, one finds that there were broadly three methods by which the fourth houses systematically entered the official world. The first was by their becoming *ch'ih-li* 勅吏, the second by *ming-i* 命議, the third by their acquiring military merit and being granted 9th degree office by the board of *Li-pu* 吏部). These 9th degree offices may be supposed to be those



offices which junior houses might take, for which local degrees were held to be necessary, and military offices for which local degrees were not held to be necessary. Under the Sung there were the successive reign periods of *Yüan-chia* (424–453), *Hsiao-chien* (454–456) and *Ta-ming* (456–464), and in the *Ta-ming* period it was recognised that not only 9th degree officials but also farmers (not 9th degree officials) in practice occupied 'thickets and marshlands'. It is not difficult to perceive that the rich fourth houses, who had acquired, or were acquiring, the right to exemption from service greatly added to this occupancy.

Shên Yüeh 沈約, at the beginning of the Liang, held, in a memorial to the throne, that the falsification of registers since the 7-point corvée was possible by the use of about 10,000 cash, and he went on to maintain, 'Under the Sung and Ch'i, gentry and common people were not distinguished, and the falling off in the services simply stems from this.' 宋齊二代, 士庶不分, 雜役減缺, 職由於此. Shên Yüeh adopts the standpoint from which gentry status is held to correspond to officialdom and the system (this point will be mentioned later) and in the foregoing he is saying, from such a standpoint, that, throughout the Sung and Ch'i periods since the 7-point corvée, junior houses and fourth houses had made false claims to have held offices which should be held by gentry (that is to say, offices which should be held by senior clans and secondary houses), as a result of which: (1) the distinction between gentry and (the corresponding) common people was blurred; also (2) there was a decline in the services due by junior houses after retirement from 7th, 8th or 9th degree offices (in practice this usually took the form of *hsü* 郵), and in the services due by fourth houses; and (3) such phenomena had arisen as a result of falsification of registers. (If senior clans and secondary houses took 9th degree office they were exempt both from ordinary service and miscellaneous services, after leaving office; if junior houses took 9th degree office, they were exempt from ordinary service after leaving office. Thus junior houses did not acquire the right to exemption from service in the full sense by taking a 9th degree office, but there would seem to be no objection to regarding them as having acquired such a right in practice. This is the view adopted in the present article.) Shên Yüeh maintained in his memorial above that the falsification of the registers took the form of junior and fourth houses claiming to have held offices held by (senior clans or) secondary houses, but this is an exaggeration; we would probably not be far wrong in supposing that in fact the greater part took the form of fourth houses falsely claiming to have held offices which should be held by junior houses. (This memorial of Shên Yüeh's was made with the presumption that there should be a systematic distinction between gentry and common people as one of his political aims, but there was some divergence from the facts here. If I have ventured to quote it here, it is because it shows how extensive the falsification of registers became after the

7-point corvée, and because, although, as will be described later, the distinction between gentry and common people was brought into systematic congruence of status in the *T'ien-chien* reform of the Liang, it has significance as a preliminary move in that direction.) The falsification of the registers grew more and more widespread as time went on, and it was thought at the beginning of the Ch'i that about half of those who ought originally to bear the burden of the state corvées were improperly exempted therefrom. Such a situation did not negate the old status order, but it did mean that the old correspondence between individuals and the status order was shaken by social and economic change. Moreover, this led to a sharp diminution in the number of people liable to forced labour (including military service), and this in turn shook both the authority of the state and the aristocratic system. The aristocracy, devoid of the capacity to undertake political responsibility, had neither the desire nor the capacity to counter this tendency themselves. From *Yung-ming* 永明 3 (485) to *Yung-ming* 4 (486) of Ch'i, T'ang Yü-chih was in revolt. This took place in the San-wu 三吳 area (which provided the economic base for the Eastern Chin) and the states of the Southern Court, where the fourth houses ('commoners') who had grown rich sought to obtain the right to exemption from service by falsifying the registers, and it broke out because of the attempt to suppress this. The revolt was put down by military force, but those who had grown rich were powerful and used their power to falsify the registers, and the Ch'i dynasty fell, still incapable of checking this.

It may be mentioned that, under the clan-house system, the higher the family status, the younger the age at which the official career started. At the end of the Ch'i the ages were fixed at 20 to 24 for senior clans, 25 to 29 for secondary houses, and from 30 for junior houses. But in the case of the military, military officers had no connection with local degrees, and they were called 'meritorious houses' (*hsün-mên* 勲門) and so on, being viewed differently from the preceding, but (in view of cases of their simultaneously holding civil office, for which local degrees were necessary) there were presumably quite large numbers of secondary houses among them. Since each individual's local degree had come to be determined almost automatically, what follows may well be connected with the fact that the duty of controlling local degrees had become merely vestigial in practice: with the coming of the Southern Court, the great provincial registrars came to regard as their principal duty the 'approval' of persons as provincial officials, laying great stress on their family status and official careers. This had the effect finally of maintaining the old clan-house system, leading in turn to the support of the aristocratic system. But the rise of the rich fourth houses ('commoners') had the effect of gradually shaking this from behind.

We come next to the Liang period. In the early part of his reign, Wu-ti set in motion a series of reforms culminating in the so-called *T'ien-*

*chien* reforms of *T'ien-chien* 7 (508). Here Wu-ti had two principles, which were naturally interconnected. First, he set his hand to the improvement of the quality of the aristocratic class, and planned the revival of the aristocratic system under the primacy of the emperor; second, he planned to solve the problem of the falsification of the registers by means of a new status system. In respect of the former, in order to carry these out, he held it necessary to impose at least an external correspondence to the distinction between gentry and common people in the administrative system of the state, and to establish the gentry, as such, as having an administrative role. In the early part of the *Yüan-chia* period (424-453) of the Sung there was the interdepartmental debate on the *t'ung-wu-fan* 同伍犯. In the course of the debate it was asserted that the distinction between gentry and common people was a social reality, that the distinction between gentry and common people was an 'inherent natural division' 實白天隔. In conclusion, the distinction between gentry and common people was sought directly in the interest of the management of government. Even so, the emperor did not operate, through his primacy, to contrive a congruence between the distinction between gentry and common people on the one hand, and between a systematic distinction between 'administrators' and administrated, on the other. In the *Wên-hsüan* there appears an accusation brought against Wang Yüan 王源 by the chief censor, and registrar of Wu-hsing province, Shên Yüeh. There, in his capacity as chief censor, Shên Yüeh arraigns Wang Yüan for having violated the rules of propriety in failing to observe the distinction between gentry and common people in the matter of intermarriage; he asks that the emperor should relieve Wang Yüan of his post, condemn him to life imprisonment, and urges that if in the future some office be conferred on Wang Yüan, this should be by imperial edict. This, in view of the character of the chief censor, is sufficient to enable us to perceive that at this time the emperor was seeking, with his primacy, to maintain, as it were, from outside, the above distinction between gentry and common people. It further suggests that the distinction between gentry and common people was not to stop at being simply a social reality; steps were being taken to ensure congruence with the system. The period of the Liang's *T'ien-chien* reforms contributed to the promotion of the above congruence. In his *T'ien-chien* reforms, Wu-ti used his primacy to ensure the congruence of the gentry-common people distinction with the systematic 'administrator' and 'administrated' distinction in the administrative system, and he was, moreover, attempting to manipulate the gentry class from within. That is to say, in the course of his reforms, Wu-ti produced a structure of inner and civil offices, consisting of '18 grades = 2 degrees' to which were offices open to the former senior clans, and offices open to the upper part of the former secondary houses. There were also 7 grades of outer offices below those mentioned above and they were open to the middle and lower

parts of the secondary houses. And *corvée* were, as will be described later, destined to junior houses. All this served to promote the systematic congruence between the gentry-common people distinction and the administrator-'administrated' distinction. Wu-ti laid it down that sons of secondary houses taking 12th grade or higher inner and civil offices should start their careers in the same way as in the case of the old senior clans. Here, in spite of the almost total incapacity of the old aristocracy for political responsibility, we have the fact that there were men of ability in the upper part of the secondary houses, and the further fact that the promoters of the reforms were almost entirely from the upper part of the secondary houses; these facts combined with Wu-ti's principle in favour of talent to bring about this situation. The special right of the aristocracy to be officials was revealed in their official degree at the start of their career and in the offices subsequently held by them; and the foregoing means that Wu-ti was looking to what might be called the aristocracy (the core of the gentry) to achieve, under his primacy, the improvement of the quality of the aristocracy. Next, as regards the outer offices, the structure was largely made up of those with generals' titles. Their '24 grades = 2 degrees' corresponded to inner officials' '18 grades = 2 degrees'; their 'outer 8 grades' under '24 grades' correspond to '7 grades' under '18 grades'. It seems that under this arrangement those capable warriors of the upper part of secondary houses were treated as if they were of senior clans. But the above plan for the improvement and rejuvenation of the aristocratic class, which was a success as a system, was not ultimately a complete success because of the threat it directed at the old aristocracy who relied only on their family status and education. The position of chief censor had hitherto been an office for the upper part of the secondary houses, but, with the reform it was regarded as the office of the senior holder of the inner 11th grade. Also, the promoters of the reforms had included Shên Yüeh (of the upper part of the secondary houses by birth), who was chancellor at the time, and this was the same man as the Shên Yüeh we saw earlier.

We come next to the second of Wu-ti's principal objectives. Wu-ti, who had lost his uncle in T'ang Yü-chih's rebellion, and who, moreover, as a chief regional official before his accession was well acquainted with the true state of affairs as regards the falsification of the registers, proposed to solve this problem by a different means from those used hitherto. In short, Wu-ti made the 7th, 8th and 9th degree offices, hitherto open to junior houses in 9th degree posts, into *corvée*, by this means intending automatically to increase the number of those on whom *corvées* were to be imposed. It may be imagined that, at the time when, one way or another, junior houses had been of the class of those with political power, the junior houses of the rural districts (and that part of fourth houses who were regarded as on a par with junior houses in point of eligibility for office) had, while tolerating

members of senior clans and secondary houses as superior to themselves, displayed their precedence vis-à-vis the common people inferior to them, and had thus contributed to the support of the authority of the state; but by these new measures the Liang state lost all support in the country districts. (On the basis of his principle in favour of talent, Wu-ti again produced the idea that exceptional ability among the junior and fourth houses should be promoted, but within the greater context as seen above, this produced no great results in practice.)<sup>(9)</sup>

The *T'ien-chien* reforms were intended, within the limits of the possible, to enlarge and also to maintain the state's physical grip on the common people (i.e. 'commoners'). In this way a plan was devised for assessing all the common people (i.e. 'commoners') for the corvée, and it was further decided to enforce a system of taxation on all adults, irrespective of sex (and irrespective of assets in land or otherwise). This sort of thing as well as such a factor as the wave of debased currency which swept over the vital regions of the Southern Court combined to render the life of the ordinary common people much harder. They had a feeling of no confidence in Wu-ti, and, by entering the service as domestics (warriors), whole families at a time, of kings, princes and generals, they managed in practice to avoid the corvée and other taxes. This directly brought about the decline of the power of the state. The emperor, the royal family, the aristocracy and the regional chief officials, who composed the (power of the) state, sought to counter this by means of the private management of *t'un* 屯, *ti* 邸 and so on. Such management arose in many cases from the already established enclosure of 'thickets and marshlands', but Wu-ti's case differed from the management of the military colonies by the 'sovereign' in the Wei and Western Chin periods; in this case it was purely private management by the emperor of what could not hitherto have depended on the state finances, and this was enough to destroy orthodox state management. Much the same can be said of the management by the royal family, the aristocracy and the regional chief officials. (In this connection, it may be noted that officials of the 2nd degrees, whether civil or military, were exempt from transit and market taxes.) In the light of this we may consider that the aristocrats—the aristocratic system—, which was superficially and according to the system valued in the Liang period (from the time of the *T'ien-chien* reforms), was greatly declining even before the disturbances at the end of the Liang.<sup>(10)</sup>

We should note that, according to the rule of 'diminished respect' (*tsun-chiang* 尊降), the emperor and the feudal lords did not wear mourning for their concubines or the issue of their concubines. Children, then, could

(9) It is to be supposed that under the reform, support for the rural movements was hoped for from the secondary houses. But when later the latter gathered at the capital, they lost their local character.

(10) There also existed in the Liang period a field tax by the *mou*.

not wear mourning for those for whom their father did not wear it. Accordingly, the heir apparent and other princes could not wear mourning for their mothers who had been their fathers' concubines. This was known as the rule of 'reduced mourning' (*yen-chiang* 厭降). In the Chin period, the heir apparent and the other princes could not wear mourning for their mothers who had been the emperor's concubines, and this was because of the operation of the rule of 'reduced mourning' in connection with the emperor at the time. This tells us that the emperor, heir apparent and princes formed a single body, that the emperor in fact was homogeneous with the heir apparent and the princes. In the Chin period, the prime ministers and other ministers in the states of the feudal kings and lords, chosen by the emperor himself, were considered as vassal ministers to the emperor and direct ministers of their respective feudal princes; the emperor had naturally a feeling of solidarity with the nucleus formed by the feudal lords of his own clan and the nucleus of the aristocracy in their capacity as political rulers, and the existence of their system of feudatory states contributed to the strengthening of the authority of the Chin state. In *Yüan-chia* 29 (452) of Wên-ti of the Sung, the system of reduced mourning, though still in operation for the heir apparent, was not followed by the other princes. This was because the understanding was that, while the emperor and the heir apparent (following the rule of the eldest legitimate son) were to be regarded as forming one body, the emperor's relationship with the other princes was regarded as being that of sovereign and ministers. Again, Hsiao-wu-ti, who followed Wên-ti on the throne, two years after his succession abolished the system whereby the officials chosen by the emperors themselves were called 'minister' (*ch'ên* 臣) by their feudal princes. (This also meant that the premiers and their juniors did not wear mourning for their feudal lords.) This meant that the emperor was making an exaggerated claim to be regarded as an absolute being on a different dimension from the princes and other members of the clan or the feudal lords of different families. It is to be supposed that the above kind of relationship continued in existence, and did not even change at the time of the *T'ien-chien* reforms of the Liang. In the Liang period there were premiers in the states of the feudal princes chosen by the emperor himself. And these premiers were considered as vassal ministers of the emperor and direct ministers of their feudal princes. This was not the previous schematization. In this connection, Wu-ti regarded himself as a ruler of a different dimension from the princes and the rest of his clan and the aristocracy of other families, and the feeling of solidarity with them did not exist, but we would probably not be greatly mistaken in finding here the suggestion that the emperor's own clan and the aristocracy of different families were regarded as being of distinct classes, and that there was something close to a feeling of solidarity towards the members of the imperial clan. However this may be, on a large view, the

relationship between the emperor and the aristocracy would seem to have been on the lines outlined so far.

Let us now deal with the usage of 'expectation' (*wang* 望) under the 'Six Dynasties' in connection with what we have seen above. Under the 'Six Dynasties', as has already been described in part, there was the political idea whereby, from the emperor to the body of the bureaucracy, the position and status were determined by public opinion. Hereby the emperor (the Son of Heaven) acquired his position and status according to the hope and opinion that he should be between Heaven and the people, but there was accord between the hope of Heaven and the hope or opinion of the people. There was then no necessary absolute division in status between the emperor and his officials, rather a sort of continuity. This being so, the object of public opinion was expectation, and, from this point of view, the measure of local degrees under the law of the officials of 9 degrees was ultimately to be determined, it may be said, by the measure of expectation. Whether or not there was expectation in regard to a given individual, and the extent of it, could constitute a large question, expectation might be felt in regard to important offices themselves, or in regard to the dynasty or the court—all must be regarded as bound up with the above political idea of this usage of expectation. In particular, from the middle period of the 'Six Dynasties' a usage came into being still more intimately connected with society as it was. Meanwhile, among the conditions for becoming an official, expectation (and talent) were lightly regarded, while position in the hierarchy and reputation were held to be important. This was because in the general context of the stabilization of family status, expectation was still recognized in accordance with the old political idea, but its significance had come to be slighter. On the other hand, there is something that shows what was based on it when family status was high. (There also arose the notion that when the emperor appointed officials on the basis of this expectation he was following the hopes of the people.) This shows that expectation, as closely bound up with the society of the time, had changed existing political ideals themselves. This perhaps leads us to perceive that there were cases where the qualification as an official was alienated from the public opinion of people in local villages, in the proper sense of the term, even from the point of view of political ideals. Moreover, there was once the expression, 'the expectation of the people' (*min-chih-wang* 民之望). This meant the object to which the people looked up and in which they reposed their hopes. In this case the matter of family standing did not enter into the question. However, with the stabilization of family status, it would seem that the expression, popular expectation (*min-wang* 民望), which probably succeeded to the previous one indicated families of high status (which meant at the same time those who should become important officials).

In the Biography of Yen Hsieh 顏協 in the *Liang-shu* we read that when,

on the accession of the Liang, Yen Chien-yüan 顏見遠 ceased to eat and followed Ho-ti 和帝 of the Ch'i 齊 in death, Wu-ti of the Liang said, 'I am answering heaven and following the people. What have I to do with all the gentry in the empire, and yet Yen Chien-yüan comes to this?' He (Wu-ti) is claiming that he has become emperor in accordance with the hopes of heaven and the people, without any connection with the gentry of the empire. In spite of which Yen Chien-yüan, of the gentry, ceased to eat and died. This is inexplicable. Such seems to be the meaning. What is important here is that while Wu-ti is following the traditional understanding that he has obtained his position and status through the hopes of heaven and the people, in claiming to have no connection with the gentry, he is striking out as it were a new kind of understanding. This is an indirect indication that the gentry's existence was isolated from that of the rest of the people. Having arrived at holding this understanding, he owed his accession to the throne in large measure to the efficiency of the chief provincial officials, and this is doubtless not unconnected with his claim not to depend on the support of the gentry class. Even so, however, the gentry at the time, especially the northern aristocracy who formed their nucleus, had a hold over rural society in practice, and represented its 'profits'; so if indeed their utterances had been in accord with the aspirations of the people, Wu-ti would almost certainly not have spoken as he did. In short, there would seem to have been some hint in the above that they had no support in the rural communities. There was thus a sharp class distinction between the gentry and the common people, and in this sense there is connection with the understanding that it would be possible to get control of the gentry as a body. Wu-ti would soon be putting his *T'ien-chien* reforms into operation; at that point he cut off the gentry from the common people and ensured that they took on a strong official character; and in thus gaining control over them systematically, the foregoing understanding of Wu-ti's was further advanced.

I now propose to discuss two supplementary points concerning the aristocracy and the aristocratic system under the 'Six Dynasties'. The first concerns the physical power relationship between the emperor and the aristocracy. There was the understanding, particularly under the Southern Court, that the aristocracy simply looked to the emperor or dynasty of the time for a guarantee of their rights and security, and, if this was not forthcoming they dethroned the emperor on their own initiative and brought about a change of dynasty. Changes of dynasty under the Southern Court were essentially brought to a successful conclusion by the power of the military, but in the course of events leading up to them there was what might be called the individual cooperation of a certain number of aristocrats. Also, on the occasion of the change of dynasty the aristocrats, as part of the procedure for setting up a new dynasty, would do such acts as bringing the



seal of the former emperor to the new emperor, thereby establishing the authority of the new régime. With the aristocracy being the principal constituents of the state authority at this time, this was virtually indispensable. (There was also such a case as that of the change from Sung to Ch'i when such a man as Hsieh K'u 謝朓 refused to take the seal to the new emperor and another aristocrat did it instead.) But it would be erroneous to say that in the above sort of way the aristocracy accomplished changes of dynasty for the sake of their interests. We are next concerned with the deposition of a cruel young emperor and the support of the next emperor within one dynasty. Let us now consider the Sung, Ch'i and Liang dynasties, in which the aristocracy had the 'power of life'. In the case of the Sung, there were the deposition of Shao-ti 少帝, the support of Wên-ti, the deposition of the First Fei-ti 前廢帝, the support of Ming-ti 明帝, the deposition of the Second Fei-ti 後廢帝 and the support of Hsün-ti 順帝. In the case of the Ch'i, there were the deposition of the king of Yü-lin 鬱林王, the support and deposition of the king of Hai-ling 海陵王 and the accession of Ming-ti 明帝. There was nothing of this kind under the Liang. It is the fact that the deposition of Shao-ti of the Sung and the support of Wên-ti were the result of the decisive action of a part (but not the first rank) of the aristocracy. But this was definitely not carried out on behalf of the power and authority of the aristocracy as a whole; it took the form that existed at any period in Chinese history of overthrowing by one's own greater efficiency something against one's own interests, and it is difficult to discover any particular characteristic here. Also, the deposition of the first Fei-ti of the Sung and the support of Ming-ti were the work of humble persons close to the first Fei-ti and king Yü 彧 of Hsiang-tung 湘東 (later Ming-ti), and the aristocracy were not directly involved. Again, the deposition of the second Fei-ti of the Sung and the support of Hsün-ti were not carried out on the initiative of the aristocracy. And again, in the deposition of the king of Yü-lin of the Ch'i, the support and deposition of the king of Hai-ling and the accession of Ming-ti, it was the ideas of Luan 鸞, marquis of Hsi-ch'ang 西昌侯 that were at work, and the aristocracy neither decided nor took action. (It may well be that in the matter of depositions in particular there may have been many cases where the hopes of the aristocracy as a whole were covertly made known, but this is quite another thing from the aristocracy taking the action on their own initiative.) Moreover, if we are to consider the physical power relationship between emperor and aristocracy within a dynasty, we should look at the relationship between rather elderly emperors and the aristocracy. If we do this we should probably attach importance to such matters as the execution by the emperor of an aristocrat like Wang Sêng-ta 王僧達 who did not welcome his ideas, or the dismissal and reduction to 'commoner status' of a man like Wang Liang, the emperor taking thought so that after his death the highest clans, and his empress' brother should have the power to

execute Wang Ching-wên 王景文, or, as has already been described, the unilateral pardoning by the emperor of violations of local opinion and pure discussions, and so on. (See p. 110-111.)

The second topic concerns two points: the first is that when Wên-ti of the Sung wished to make Hsü Yüan 徐爰 and Wang Hung, *chung-shu-shê-jên*, this move was countered by, respectively, Wang Ch'iu 王球 and Yin Ching-jên 殷景仁, both representative members of the aristocracy; the second, when Wu-ti of Ch'i wished to make Chi Sêng-Chên 紀僧眞, *chung-shu-shê-jên*, this was countered by Chiang Hsiao 江斆, a representative member of the aristocracy. If we look here simply at the emperor's withdrawal, we merely find that in connection with the distinction between gentry and common people their power did not extend to the gentry. But the questions are, rather, first, where should we look for the historical background to the emperors reaching the point of venturing to try to behave like this; and, second, after the withdrawal of the Sung and Ch'i emperors, how did the movement on the part of the emperors to concern themselves with the internal affairs of the gentry proceed. With regard to the first question: already in the time of Wên-ti's father, Wu-ti, the emperor's power had entered, however partially, into the question of the gentry themselves, in the form of restoring to their former state local degrees (and so on) that were 'in violation of local opinion' or 'in violation of pure discussions'; and also, in Wu-ti's time, decisions were made by the emperor on clans and houses below secondary houses. Again, as I have said more than once, the distinction between gentry and common people was gradually systematized by the state, and only the resultant gentry came to be, systematically, political administrators; but it is in the early part of *Yüan-chia* (424-453) that is to be sought the period when, as a result of the debates on the *t'ung-wu-fan* carried out in the eight departments of the Chancellery, the distinction between gentry and common people was directly applied to the management of the state. Further, taking rather a long view, the Hsü 徐 family of Tung-hai 東海 and the Hsiao 蕭 family of Nan-lan-ling 南蘭陵, which arose at the same time as the Sung kingdom, also intermarried with the aristocracy, and had become aristocrats by the time of the Ch'i. It was doubtless in the foregoing atmosphere that Wên-ti once more sought to make humble person, close to him, gentry. On the other hand, the aristocrats for their part may be supposed to have resented the fact that power be wielded by such secretaries called *chung-shu-shê-jên* close to the sovereign, and to have refused it. In the circumstances, Wên-ti was powerless in the face of this refusal. We are next concerned with a case similar to that of Wên-ti of the Sung, which arose in the time of Wu-ti of the Ch'i. As was described at the beginning of this section, in the time of Ming-ti of the Ch'i, the *Chung-shu-shê-jên-shêng* came to be charged with the custody of the registers of the whole country, while, by the time of Wu-ti of the Ch'i at the latest, the posts

of *wai-chien* 外監 and *chih-chü-chien* 制局監, which were occupied by humble persons close to the sovereign, came to have authority over weapons and soldiers. The intentions of Wu-ti of the Ch'i appear in the general context here but they seem to have come to nothing as in the time of Wên-ti of the Sung. On this occasion, Chi Sêng-chên said, 'Your majesty would make gentry'. This is very vague but it does seem that we should consider that what he had in mind here was the distinction between gentry and common people, and the system to correspond to it.

In connection with the latter point, a movement did not arise in the Liang period for common people to be regarded as gentry, under the sovereign's recognition of gentry. However, as we have already seen, at the time, there was a mutually interdependent strengthening of two factors: the attempt through systematic means to link the political authority of the sovereign rather closely with the gentry, and the systematic imposition of appropriate status to mark the distinction between gentry and common people. It should be noted at this juncture that from the time of the *T'ien-chien* reforms (up to the Ch'ên period) the *chung-shu-shê-jên* were regarded as honourable offices to be held by senior clans. These offices have a showdown with the special political rights of the aristocracy and prevented the strengthening of the political power of the sovereign. And while these dispositions ran counter, as it were, to the feelings of the gentry, we seem to be able to perceive, if only obliquely, the attempt to link the sovereign's authority intimately with the gentry.

The three questions we are considering show us, so far as can be seen, defeat for the sovereign, but, up to and including the Liang period, what we have considered appears as perhaps the forerunner of a crack in the restricted status system of the gentry. At least, we could not make a broad interpretation over this and regard this as proof that, throughout the period of the Southern Court, the authority of the sovereign could not do anything about the intentions of the gentry. (There is a connection in our investigations up to now with the question of the actual situation of the *Yüan-chia* period of the Sung, but I will not pursue that here; I will just point out in conclusion that there is no inconsistency with the results of our investigations up to this point.)

##### 5. The question of the *Chün-t'ien* system under the Northern Court

The three main props of the 'reform' of the Northern Wei were the introduction of the *chün-t'ien* system, and the new governmental organization and the tax reforms, which were its concomitants. As to the *chün-t'ien* system, there is the view that it was never put into operation in practice, as well as the understanding that it was put into operation, but even in the latter case there are many different views. The present writer has argued previously

that the system was drawn up and put into operation about *T'ai-ho* 14 (A.D. 240) (not *T'ai-ho* 9), and that it consisted of confirming large and small holdings, and, along with that, making grants of state held land. This basic understanding remains unchanged, but there were some inadequacies in the interpretation of relevant entries in the Treatise on Food and Money in the *Wei-shu* 魏書, so I will here make some corrections and add some brief investigations. The relevant entries in the Treatise on Food and Money are as follows:

- A. All males, 15 and over, receive open fields (*lou-t'ien* 露田), 40 *mou*: females, 20 *mou*: male and female slaves as for good adults: one ox receives 30 *mou*: limit, 4 oxen. Issued fields all to be doubled: another open field added to make triply confirmed fields. These doubled and triply confirmed fields are for ploughing and are to be used for purposes of adjustment. All the people received fields when they reach the age for tax and corvée. When they grow old enough to be exempt from tax and corvée or when they die, their fields are to be returned. Male and female slaves and oxen, if there be any, subject to return and receipt. 諸男夫十五以上, 受露田四十畝. 婦人二十畝. 奴婢依良丁. 牛一頭受田三十畝. 限四牛. 所授之田, 率倍之. 三易之田, 再倍之. 以供耕作(休?)及還受之盈縮. 諸民年及課, 則受田. 老免及身沒則還田, 奴婢牛, 隨有無, 以還受.
- B. Mulberry orchards are not within the limits of what is returned and received; but they enter into the portion of doubled field grants. Even if there is surplus on the portion, it cannot be employed to make up the number of open fields. Cases of deficit can be made up by double grant of open fields. 諸桑田不在還受之限. 但通入倍田分. 於分雖盈, [沒則還田] 不得以充露田之數. 不足者, 以露田充倍.
- C. Of those who receive fields for the first time, each male given 20 *mou*, and plant 50 mulberry trees, plant 5 jujube trees, and 3 elm trees. 諸初受田者, 男夫一人, 給二十畝. 課[蒔餘] 種桑五十樹棗五株榆三根.
- D. If the soil is not for mulberry trees, 1 *mou* is granted, to be sowed and planted, according to the law, elm and jujube trees. 非桑之土, 夫給一畝, 依法課蒔榆棗.
- E. Each slave as for a good person. 奴各依良.
- F. Sowing to be finished within limit of 3 years. If not finished, the unfinished land to be confiscated. 根三年種畢. 不畢, 奪其不畢之地.
- G. On portions of land for mulberry and elm trees, no prohibition on planting various other fruits or sowing more mulberry and elm trees than stipulated. 於桑榆地分, 雜蒔餘果及多種桑榆者不禁.
- H. On land to be returned, mulberry trees, elms, jujube trees, other fruit trees may not be grown. Those who do so are held in violation

of the regulations; the land is included in the returnable portion.  
 諸應還之田，不得種桑榆棗果。種者以違令論，地入還分。

- I. All mulberry orchards are permanent, not returned in the lifetime, always belonging to the person present. Where there is surplus there is no grant nor return. Where there is deficit, there will be grants for 'sowing (fields)' according to the law. Those with surplus may sell the surplus. Those with deficit may buy what they lack. Portions may not be sold, nor may more than what is sufficient be bought. 諸桑田皆世業。身終不還。恒從見口。有盈者無受無還。不足者受種如法。盈者得賣其盈。不足者得買所不足。不得賣其分。亦不得買過所足。
- J. In respect of land for hemp, when a male is rated, he is given a separate 10 *mou*, a female, 5 *mou*: male and female slaves as for good persons. All in conformity with the law of return and receipt. 諸麻布之土，男夫及課，別給麻田十畝，婦人五畝。奴婢依良。皆從還受之法。

A, B, C, E, F, G, H and I are concerned with mulberry land, and D and J are concerned with hemp land, but it may be stated generally that the following regulations concern all: (1.) Ownership of all land is vested in the state, but before the 'reform' the land was divided between land of which the state had always held the usufruct (hereafter referred to as 'state owned' fields), and land of which individuals had held the usufruct (hereafter referred to as 'privately owned' fields). (I have touched on the idea of the state as landlord in section 3; the considerations that follow here should support that.) (2.) The usufruct of 'state owned' fields is distributed on a certain basis; this includes, as regards mulberry land, both land which would eventually revert to the public domain like the open fields (for sowing cereals) which appear in A (H has reference to these open fields), and land like that in C which is principally for growing mulberry trees, and which is not taken back into the public domain (the 'sowing fields' referred to in I is in this category: hereafter referred to as 'Sowing fields'). On the other hand, 'privately owned' mulberry orchards on 'privately owned' fields fall into two portions: one is the doubled portion of open fields, the other, 'sowing fields'. (3.) In J the distribution of open fields among hemp land is the same as in the case of mulberry land; but apart from this, there is distribution of hemp land regarded as corresponding to distribution of 'sowing fields'. Now, if it may be said that there is correspondence with the case of mulberry land, the expression, hemp fields, is to be regarded as 'privately owned' fields, by contrast with mulberry orchards. But in J this is basically 'state owned' fields and should be regarded as the distribution of that usufruct. Taking it thus, a question arises. Let us now look into this. There is an account document of *Ta-t'ung* 大統 13 (547) of the Western Wei, discovered at Tun-huang, on which there is a record of a land distribution on a *chün-t'ien* system following almost the same regulations as the

Northern Wei for hemp land in congested localities. The 'regular fields' (*chêng-t'ien* 正田) recorded there were actually 'privately owned fields', used as their substitutes—the regular fields were originally open fields—and consequently amounts of the regular fields differ according to individuals. On the other hand, those hemp fields were originally 'state owned' fields and indicate the distribution of the usufruct. There each individual has almost the same amount. Moreover, in respect of the different families, those who had more than a certain amount of the above regular were superior households, those with the amount itself were medium households, and those with less than that amount (or no fields), inferior households. It is true that the regulations for congested localities were different from those for uncongested localities, but even so it is important that the hemp fields were basically 'state owned' fields and that their usufruct was distributed. Such hemp fields, where congested localities were concerned, were precisely the hemp fields of J. In which case we should probably take it that J indicates a different time from A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I, and, to be precise, a later one. Further, the 'male and female slaves as for good people' in J presumably refers to the distribution of open fields. (The records concerned with the *chün-t'ien* system in the Treatise on Food and Money in the *Wei-shu* seem at first glance to belong to the same period, but there are other discrepancies in period.)

The Treatise on Food and Money in the *Sui-shu* records the following measures of *Ho-ch'ing* 河清 3 (564) of the Northern Ch'i:

- A. When office holders and farmers request the possession of virgin land for cultivating, the land comes to be called *shou-t'ien* 受田. 職事及百姓請墾田者, 名為受田.
- B. Those outside the 100 square *li* round it and provincials, a male receives 80 *mou* of open fields, a female, 40 *mou*. Male and female slaves as for good people. . . . 其方百里外及州人, 一夫受露田八十畝, 婦四十畝. 奴婢依良人.
- C. Also, each adult is granted 20 *mou* in perpetuity as mulberry land. 50 mulberry trees, 3 elm trees, 5 jujube trees to be planted there. Not within the limits of return and receive. Apart from this land, all is in the return and receive portion. 又每丁給永業二十畝, 為桑田. 其中種桑五十根榆三根棗五根. 不在還受之限. 非此田, 悉入還受之分.
- D. Where land is unsuitable for mulberry trees, hemp land is granted. Law for mulberry land to be followed. 土不宜桑者, 給麻田, 如桑田法.

According to the view of Nishijima Sadao, the 'received land' (*shou-t'ien* 受田) in A is a mistake for 'land in perpetuity' (*yung-yeh-t'ien* 永業田) NISHIJIMA Sadao, 'Hokusei Kasei Sannen Denrei ni tsuite 北齊河清三年田令について in *Tokyo Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyū Hōkoku Chūgoku Keizaishi Kenkyū*

東京大學文學部研究報告中國經濟史研究). Thus it is clear from A that 'privately owned' fields were perpetual fields. The open fields of B were probably the regular fields with the addition of the double grant. The mulberry land of C, regarded as perpetual land, was basically 'state owned' land of which the usufruct was distributed. Taking these A, B and C into consideration with what we have already seen, the following conjecture may perhaps be made. In former mulberry land 'privately owned' perpetual land (永業田) (fields of which an individual held the usufruct in perpetuity) was called mulberry orchards (桑田) in the sense of fields of mulberry land, but those originally 'state owned' fields of which the usufruct was distributed (principally fields planted with mulberry trees) were factually perpetual land (永業田) and came to be called so. A, B and C are based on the usage of the time. Presumably, under the Northern Court, mulberry land was regarded as the principal and hemp land as subsidiary; but the hemp fields in J of the Treatise on Food and Money of the *Wei-shu* should probably be taken to correspond to the mulberry orchards of the period when mulberry orchards had come to have the meaning of mulberry orchards which were basically 'state owned' fields of which the usufruct was distributed as fields mainly planted with mulberry. (However, those mulberry orchards were perpetual fields and these hemp fields were return and receipt fields; but the words mulberry and hemp of the mulberry orchards and hemp fields indicate the nature of the plantation, so that it would not perhaps be unreasonable that there be an indication of a difference arising in the duration of the usufruct of mulberry orchards and hemp fields, in perpetuity or for one generation only.) Further, in the account documents of *Ta-t'ung* 13 of the Northern Wei, previously mentioned, 'privately owned' fields are included in the amounts of fields due to be received, and 'privately owned' fields are also included in 'fields due to be received' in documents relating to the *chün-t'ien* system under the T'ang dynasty. This was no doubt connected with the fact that to the extent that the state was the sole landlord, the (amounts of) fields were ultimately the amounts of fields of which it held the usufruct, and the further fact that the usufruct to be distributed was insufficient.

It may be remarked that under the *chün-t'ien* system of the Sui there was a distinction in 'state owned' fields between open fields and perpetual (fields), but this system followed on that of the Northern Ch'i. The regulations concerning 'privately owned' land are not known, but there is no doubt that a large amount of 'privately owned' fields existed in practice. Later, in the T'ang period, 'privately owned' fields came to be applicable both to individual allotted fields (*k'ou-fên-t'ien* 口分田) (successors to the open fields) and to perpetual fields (principally) planted with mulberries.

In the foregoing, I have considered principally the period of the enactment of the *chün-t'ien* system of the Northern Wei, taking into account at

the same time certain subsequent matters. Three principal points may be extracted: under the Northern Wei the significance of the words mulberry orchards and hemp fields underwent a change; under the regulations of the *chün-t'ien* system there existed the understanding that the state was sole landlord; since the *chün-t'ien* system affirmed the existence of 'privately owned fields', this was bound up with the distribution of the usufruct of basically 'state owned fields'. Further, the *chün-t'ien* system under the Northern Wei was directed to adult males and females and at the same time to households = families under the household register system.

Further, in the 8th month of *T'ai-ho* 6 (482), the prohibition on hills and marshlands was lifted. This meant complete recognition of the right of the people to make use of 'thickets and marshlands'. Then in the following year, with the magnates beginning to engross the hills and marshlands ('thickets and marshlands' in this article) as a principal reason for what was recognized as a rapidly precarious development in the life of the poor, the usufruct of 'state owned' fields was distributed to the people. (At this juncture no measures were taken to eliminate the seizure of the hills and marshlands by the magnates.) Thus a few years later the regulations of the *chün-t'ien* system came to be enacted, involving a combination of the distribution of the usufruct of 'state owned' fields with 'privately owned' fields; looking at the matter in this way, we see that the lifting of the prohibition on hills and marshlands in the 8th month of *T'ai-ho* 6 was intended to stabilize the people's livelihood through their cooperative bodies, but, within the power relationships, it may be taken to have brought about the result of further strengthening the control of the magnates over the settlements as a means of seizing the means of production of the village cooperative groups.

When the degree of efficacy of the system is considered, with reference to the *chün-t'ien* system of the Northern Court, the general tendency is to discuss its various historical significance. I myself am by no means reluctant to recognize the historical significance of the *chün-t'ien* system of the Northern Court, but I consider that a reexamination of the facts is necessary at present. The foregoing, as a part of such a reexamination, is a part of (the conclusion of) the basic work of ascertaining the facts.

Finally, I will just take up one or two points connected with this study up to the previous section. The three chiefs system (*san-chang-chi* 三長制) was enacted in *T'ai-ho* 10: under this 5 families constituted one *lin* 隣, 5 *lin* (25 families) one *li* 里, 5 *li* (125 families) one *tang* 黨; to these were appointed their respective *lin* chiefs, *li* chiefs, *tang* chiefs as a lower organization for governing the (lower class of) people, and the system became a *contrivance* through which the state taxes and corvées were to be ensured. It is to be supposed that the family in the three chiefs system was the household = family of which the basis was the lifelong registration of brothers



on the same register. The reason for this is probably to be understood as follows: in spite of the fact that at the time the family of father and children with common assets had become almost universal, the fact that brother families, in each of which one of the brothers was regarded as father, greatly functioned (or rather were held to function) in the state's control over the people meant that still even at that time the household = family was regarded as the limit of joint responsibility. Again, the new tax system under the reform had as its object the homogeneous control of household = family and of male and female adults in the field of taxation. (At this point the tax levying an equal amount on households = families was an extraordinarily heavy tax on poor people with few members of their households.) But the reform was carried out in such a way as to preserve in practice the power of the magnates; moreover, to the extent that the distributed fields were not necessarily sufficient, the fact that the tax was equal in fact came to invite unfairness in its levying. In the account documents of *Ta-t'ung* 13 of the Western Wei, previously mentioned, the three classes of superior, middle and inferior households are revived to correspond with the households' assets (amounts of 'privately owned' fields); and it is to be supposed that the differences in land tax amounts levied on adult males and adult females according to households signified a correction of such unfairness in levying tax. Also, under the Northern Ch'i too, Wên-hsüan-ti 文宣帝 established 9 classes of households.<sup>(11)</sup>

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(11) The Han state control over the peasantry aimed at individual control of them within the *framework* of what may be called the settlement of cooperative bodies. (This is not literally control over individual persons.) On the other hand, the control by the various states of the Northern Court over the peasants under the *chün-t'ien* system aimed at the three-fold control over households, father-son families and individuals in an intention of rather relaxing the *framework* of the cooperative bodies. (The household later gradually died away.) (When small farmers were independent, this should probably be taken to mean independence from the state and the cooperative bodies which was based on their economic independence.)

