

New Light on the Yün-nan 雲南 Rebellion and the Panthay Mission

By T' IEN Ju-K'ang

The Moslem Rebellion which broke out in 1855 in Yün-nan 雲南 Province, southwestern China, was undoubtedly one of the most protracted and brutal rebellions, not only in nineteenth century China, but in the whole of Chinese history. For eighteen years the rebellion ravaged the province, larger than the two Germanys put together, until most of it was laid waste and, according to one account, five million inhabitants, out of a population of eight millions, perished.¹⁾

On the fall of the last stronghold of the rebels, twenty thousand men, women and children were said to have been put to the sword.²⁾ Photographs taken by the French, whose supply of modern weapons to the government forces was one of the main causes of the rebels' defeat, speak vividly of the cruelty and enormity of this upheaval of just over one hundred years ago.³⁾ To this day, some localities near the city of Ta-li 大理, for sixteen years the rebel headquarters, and other centers of Moslem resistance, are still known as the Grave of Thousands 千人塚, and the Grave of Ten-thousands 萬人塚.

The culmination of an antipathy between Moslems and Han Chinese rooted in long-standing political and economic discrimination accounted for this serious rebellion, but the immediate causes of the spontaneous uprising in 1855 are to be found in disputes involving land, mines, and indirectly, overland trade. As early colonists, the Moslems naturally enough, established their farms wherever possible within easy reach of the water supply.⁴⁾ Moslem traders also invested their profits in such land. This rankled with many Han Chinese who, with their traditional chauvinism, regarded their Moslem compatriots as they would alien intruders, though they themselves, were even more recent newcomers to Yün-nan.⁵⁾ With the connivance or active support of local Han officials, efforts were made to dislodge the Moslems from their possessions, both farming land and mines.⁶⁾ This explains why ethnic conflicts occurred more often than not in the fertile plains. In essence the revolts by the Yün-nan Moslems were as much struggles against economic persecution as for ethnic survival.

These features have long been recognised by Chinese historians who, whatever their political persuasion, blamed the Yün-nan Rebellion on the

Ch'ing 清 government's discriminatory and oppressive racial policy. At first, historians in the Peoples' Republic went even further, and acknowledged the rebel leaders as heroes, awarding them, along with the leaders of rebellions elsewhere, an honoured place in the pantheon of national worthies.⁷⁾

But all this suddenly changed in 1955, a century after the outbreak of the rebellion. A revised version of the events made by a leading and respected historian of Modern China alleged that the hitherto revered leader of the Yün-nan Rebellion, Tu Wên-hsiu 杜文秀, was in fact a traitor. According to this version, the British government, which had been attempting to invade Yün-nan by way of Burma since 1858, sent spies to Ta-li to conspire with Tu Wên-hsiu. In 1871, Tu Wên-hsiu sent his adopted son, Ai-shan 艾山, to London with a view to betraying Yün-nan. Making use of the reactionary banner of 'Pan-Islamism,' the British government directed Ai-shan to Turkey to work out the concrete conditions of the betrayal, but thanks to an all-out offensive by the Ch'ing army, the plan was frustrated in time. Tu Wên-hsiu was a Chinese, it is said, yet conspired against the motherland, the province and the different groups of nationalities of Yün-nan; so, from the day he colluded with the British aggressors, he was no longer the representative of the forces of a righteous cause, but a traitor to his country and that cause. The rebel forces had, on this account, been manipulated by Tu Wên-hsiu, if they suffered massacre at the hands of the Ch'ing army, they deserved their defeat—though their fate may deserve our sympathy.⁸⁾

An accusation of this kind is serious at any time. Exhibits in praise of the heroic deeds of the rebels were hastily withdrawn and the event of the Moslem Rebellion in Yün-nan was completely obliterated from most Chinese historical books. This has been very embarrassing for a quarter of a million Moslems in Yün-nan and was one of the reasons of the tragic event of 1975, which resulted in the death of thousands of Moslems.⁹⁾ Was Tu Wên-hsiu really a traitor? If not, what were the real facts? I have already contributed something to this debate¹⁰⁾ and I hope the details of my recent findings will further help towards a solution of this controversy. Since the accusation against Tu Wên-hsiu and the rebellion he led arose out of the problems of foreign relations, I shall try to clarify very briefly the following questions: What kind of contact did Tu Wên-hsiu make with the British and the French? What were the consequences? Why did *Ta-ssü-k'ung* 大司空, the Moslem Governor of the town of T'êng-yüeh 騰越 near the Burmese border, receive the British expedition led by Captain Sladen? Did the Yün-nan Moslems actually establish the alleged '*Hui-chiao Kuo* 回教國'—the Islamic Kingdom? What was the real state of affairs of the mission to London, better known as the Panthay Mission,¹¹⁾ led by Tu Wên-hsiu's supposedly adopted son Liu Tao-hêng 劉道衡?

Contacts Between Tu Wên-hsiu and the British and French

From 1855 to 1871, Tu Wên-hsiu had never established any kind of relationship with foreign governments. Only once did *Ta-ssü-k'ung*, the Moslem Governor of T'êng-yüeh hold a trading talk with the British delegate Captain Sladen in 1868. A French party under Captain Garnier were the only foreigners who had ever reached Ta-li, but they were warned by Tu Wên-hsiu to leave at once. Apparently, as a result of the Yün-nan Rebellion, whether because of Tu Wên-hsiu's opposition or because of the situation created by the revolt, the attempt of foreign powers to penetrate Yün-nan was frustrated with the result that the threat of encroachment there was delayed for eighteen years.¹²⁾

Yün-nan lay across the path to the interior of China—that Xanadu of limitless commercial possibilities. It was all-important in the schemes of the two Western Powers, Britain and France, who were becoming increasingly active at about the time the Yün-nan Rebellion broke out. The British attempt to penetrate Yün-nan had a long history. At first, their plan was to use Assam and Upper Burma as bases for exploring the lines of overland communication between India and China. In 1826, after the first Burmese war, having gained control over this trade route, the British Indian government sent out various expeditions to penetrate Yün-nan. Before 1868, eight parties were sent to explore the areas between Burma and Assam, nine parties to explore the areas between Burma and Yün-nan. However, all these attempts failed. Those from Assam were forced to turn back because of either the physical difficulties of travel or the hostility of the indigenous inhabitants they encountered.¹³⁾ Those from Burma managed to reach T'êng-yüeh but the destruction of the suspension bridges over the Salween and Irrawaddy rivers prevented them from proceeding up to their destination—Ta-li.¹⁴⁾ All these early endeavours were uniformly regarded as failures.¹⁵⁾

After the second Burmese war of 1852, the British succeeded in occupying Lower Burma, whereupon the subjugation of the whole of Burma was merely a matter of time. By the 1860s, the British needed, even more than before, to force their way through Burma to Yün-nan, both in order to understand the real situation of the rebel-held territory and to prepare the next step for the opening of the market in Yün-nan. In their turn, after the treaty of Saigon in 1862 the French also developed ambitions in Yün-nan. Thus 1867–1868 was the period when both British and French activities of exploration reached unprecedented heights, and also when Tu Wên-hsiu started to have contact with the foreigners.

The Ch'ing governor of Yün-nan, Ts'ên Yü-ying 岑毓英, and Ma Ju-lung 馬如龍, a rebel general who had surrendered, were relying on French military support in suppressing the Moslems. The French Vicaire Apostolique, P.

Fenouil, was the first to establish a gunpowder factory in support of the government forces,¹⁶⁾ as reported by French Captain Garnier who saw some cannon in K'un-ming 昆明 inscribed with a cross and the device JHS (Jesus Hominum Salvator) in 1868.¹⁷⁾ At about the same time, a French adventurer, M. Dupuis, who operated ammunition warehouses in Shang-hai 上海 and Han-k'ou 漢口, succeeded in persuading Ts'ên and Ma to purchase firearms from France and transport them to Yün-nan via the Red River. As a reward he was given not only a permit to draw from the Kuang-tung 廣東 provincial treasury an amount from the subsidy allotted to Yün-nan to cover the cost of the arms required and the salaries for French mercenary officers, but also a share in the exploitation of copper and other deposits in Yün-nan.¹⁸⁾

We do not know the amount of profit gained by Dupuis from this deal or the quantity of weapons and metals involved. We do know, however, that when Ma Fou-ch'u 馬復初, one of the Moslem leaders who defected, was treacherously executed after the rebellion had been suppressed, it was discovered that he had hidden away in various places large quantities of French arms which he had bought from Dupuis on behalf of the Ch'ing generals, including 37 big cannons, 54 guns of breech loaders, 710 rifles, 10,000 artillery shells, 10,000 catties of gunpowder; and so on.¹⁹⁾ As a result of the French support, the Ch'ing forces were able to 'pacify Yün-nan within three years' as Dupuis had guaranteed.²⁰⁾ Both the Imperial government officers and the defected Moslem leaders admitted that the French cannon together with the French artillery operations were the main factors in the capture of the last Moslem stronghold—Ta-li—in 1872.²¹⁾

The Ch'ing government officials maintained that there were quite a number of Europeans involved with the rebel forces, and various rumours spread through Yün-nan. According to Garnier, in 1868, sixteen Europeans and four Malaysians had been employed by the Moslems in Ta-li to help in the manufacture of artillery shells, and because they had failed in this work, all the Europeans had been executed and the Malaysians sent to jail.²²⁾ T. T. Cooper even heard that in the same year five Europeans, said to be physically very much like himself, were already in Ta-li, three engaged in casting guns and two as teachers of the Koran.²³⁾ However, all these rumours proved to be groundless, and only the information given by Père Leguicher, a French missionary who remained at his post in the Ta-li area during the rebellion, was considered reliable. To his knowledge, there were no foreigners in Ta-li except a few who came from Rangoon and who could only speak a few words, such as Padre and Capitan in European languages.²⁴⁾ From de Carne's point of view, the Chinese at that time had a tendency to label all foreigners "Europeans" and as the men rumoured to have been killed all had dark skin it was quite likely that they were in fact either Burmese or Hindus.²⁵⁾

In 1868, when the French expedition under Captain Garnier made its

appearance in K'un-ming, its members were warmly welcomed by the defected Moslem leader, Ma Ju-lung, who entertained them to an elaborate Chinese feast and offered to give them 1,000 or 10,000 taels or whatever amount they wished in return for French rifles, remarking laughingly that money was no problem at all in dealing with this matter. The defected Moslem spiritual leader, Ma Fou-ch'ü, even claimed that he knew more than anyone else about the scientific aim of this expedition and he wrote a letter of introduction in Arabic for them, boasting that 'With one word from me you can travel freely through the whole land and you will be able to penetrate, if necessary, even to Ta-li.'²⁶⁾ Nevertheless, when Garnier reached Ta-li, Tu Wên-hsiu, by contrast, was not eager to clutch at the prospect of European aid. He drove away the French expedition from Ta-li, warning them 'They [the French] could take all the country watered by Lan-ts'ang Chiang 瀾滄江 [Mekong] from the sea as far as Yün-nan, but they would have to stop there. Even if they had conquered the whole of China, the Invincible Kingdom of Ta-li would still prove to be an insurmountable barrier to their ambition.'²⁷⁾ This rebuke undoubtedly helped to turn the French further against the rebels and induced them to pour in military equipment in support of the government forces.

In the same year, T. T. Cooper, described as 'one of the most adventurous travellers of our time,' made an attempt to penetrate Yün-nan from another route. He was originally a sergeant in the Indian army²⁸⁾ and he firmly believed that 'the extension of British commerce in China alone could lead to the establishment of industrial progress which is required to save China from decay as a nation.'²⁹⁾ His daring project was tacitly supported by the government of British India and the British Minister in Pei-ching 北京, but Lord Mayo, the viceroy of India, although displaying the warmest interest in an attempt to penetrate Tibet from Assam in the hope of opening a new route for British commerce in China, expressed his regrets that the Indian government could not identify itself with the scheme.³⁰⁾ Consequently, Cooper carried out his activities as the representative of the British Chamber of Commerce in Shang-hai. Cooper's first adventure was an attempt to visit the southwest frontier of China in order to discover the possibilities for extending British trade to the great markets of the interior provinces.³¹⁾ He managed to reach Wei-hsi 維西, the most northern town of Yün-nan, but was unable to proceed further because of the disorderly situation there.³²⁾

The Moslem Rebellion in Yün-nan prevented the entrance of adventurers and would-be travellers into that province and was one of the chief causes for the delay of its exploration. For example, Baron von Richthofen, having completed his geographical survey in China, sent some very interesting information about Yün-nan, which he collected from Ssü-ch'uan 四川, to the British Chamber of Commerce in 1872. He had tried to penetrate into

Yün-nan from the north but the rebellion stood in his way.³³⁾

The situation changed completely after the suppression of the rebellion in 1872. As the leading article of *the Geographical Magazine* in London pointed out: 'The Chinese had just given the finishing stroke to the Moslem Rebellion and had no grounds for refusal on the pleas of danger from Rebels, or want of authority.³⁴⁾ A new trade route through Yün-nan would place 50 millions of the most flourishing and active inhabitants of China within a fortnight or three weeks reach of the Gulf of Bengal, thus diminishing by one-fifth the time and labour consumed in bringing Chinese products out through the Chinese coastal ports.³⁵⁾ Thus, the dream of penetrating Yün-nan, which had remained almost dormant throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, became fashionable once again, especially after the Margery Affair in 1875.

Trade Between Burma and Yün-nan

In 1868 *Ta-ssü-k'ung* Li Kuo-lun 李國綸, the rebel governor of T'êng-yüeh, gave a very warm reception to the British expedition led by Captain Sladen and expressed his wish to enter into commercial relations with the government of British India. This was the only foreign expedition that had ever been allowed to enter into the dominion of Ta-li Moslem government and it was the only time when any official relationship had ever been established between the Moslems and the British representatives. According to Sladen's account, the reason why Sladen and his expedition were allowed to enter Yün-nan was because the British maintained a neutral attitude between the two contending parties and did not travel under Pei-ching passports.³⁶⁾ This might account for Sladen's personal success, but the main reason behind it is to be found in the significance of Burma trade to the Moslems in Yün-nan.

For centuries past, there had been extensive trade between Burma and Yün-nan. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, nearly half of the Chinese merchants trading with Burma were Chinese Moslems from T'êng-yüeh, especially those living in the city and the nearby villages of Ma 馬家村 and Wu-so 烏索.³⁷⁾ As Colonel Burney related, in the year 1831 almost all the Chinese traders who visited the Burmese capital were Moslems, a circumstance that struck him as very extraordinary.³⁸⁾ The principal item of export from Burma was cotton, which was sent up the Irrawaddy in large boats as far as Mandalay, where it was traded with the Chinese at Madah, thirteen miles north of Umerapoora. A merchant in Mandalay was informed by a Burmese collector that about thirty million pounds of cotton were sent up the Irrawaddy annually to China.³⁹⁾ Amber, ivory, precious stones, beetle nut and bird nests brought from Malay Archipelago were also articles of commerce.⁴⁰⁾ In return, the Moslems procured orpiment, copper, iron pans, elephant tusks, hide, jade stone, fruits, and large quantities of

raw and wrought silk from Ssü-ch'uan, and yellow arsenic from Ta-li.⁴¹⁾ The trade between China and Burma via Bhamo (Pa-mo 八莫), in 1854, one year before the Yün-nan Moslem Rebellion, amounted to half a million pounds sterling.⁴²⁾ But, after 1855, the local militia who were loyal to the Ch'ing government, tried to harass the Moslems by putting an embargo on the caravans in order to prevent the Burmese from supplying the Chinese Moslems with provisions. As a result, the trade became quite irregular, sometimes stopping altogether.⁴³⁾ This interference cut short the supply of Burmese cotton to the western part of Yün-nan. In 1868, Garnier noticed that Ta-li was supplied with cotton from Ssü-ch'uan in place of Burmese cotton, and people were planting kapok (silk cotton) in warm districts as a substitute for cotton.⁴⁴⁾

The export of cotton was a royal monopoly, closely guarded to ensure that all the profits went to the Burmese king. Due to the cessation of the Burma—Yün-nan trade, the Burmese royal cotton shed, full of cotton, stood out prominently and bore a business-like appearance.⁴⁵⁾ As the king's cotton was accumulating for sale, new godowns had to be built by forced labour. The king of Burma, lacking cash, was forced to distribute piece-goods to the troops in lieu of their salary.⁴⁶⁾ Moreover, the Kachins of the border regions were used to levying tolls on cotton trade in order to raise revenue, so the disruption of the trans-border trade also led to a crisis in relations between the Burmese authorities and the Kachins.⁴⁷⁾ Thus, in the year 1868, the resuscitation of trade via Bhamo became a matter of utmost concern for the various parties involved.

Since the caravan trade with Burma was of such vital importance to the border town of T'êng-yüeh, its significance became even more prominent during the time of war. In order to secure provisions and pay for the soldiers, both the Ch'ing militia and the Moslem rebels were enthusiastic about the trading business. At one time in 1862, this induced the two belligerent parties to reach an agreement to give the respective caravans safe conduct through the battle ground.⁴⁸⁾ Although the local militia intended to cut off the Moslems from their traditional supply from Burma, they never lost a chance to organise their own caravans to enrich themselves. The Burmese king and his court were naturally on their side.⁴⁹⁾ Tu Wên-hsiu, coming from a family of traders regarded this commerce as one of the main sources of government revenue. Under his encouragement, the Han and Moslem merchants managed to carry on their business by using certain arduous and expensive alternative ways of reaching Mandalay. Tu Wên-hsiu had his agents in Mandalay; so had the Moslem generals of T'êng-yüeh. It was said that a Yunnanese Moslem, Mah-too-too, had been in Mandalay since 1868, purchasing cotton for the Moslem leader.⁵⁰⁾ About the year 1862, Tu Wên-hsiu appointed five Han merchants trading in Mandalay to act as his agents in the transaction of mercantile speculations. The reason given for these

appointments was that they were supposed to be friendly with the Burmese prime minister. No Moslem in Yün-nan would have the slightest hope of establishing a contact like that.⁵¹⁾ Syed Abdoolah, an old Moslem living in or near the Chinese Moslem Mosque in Mandalay, was an important agent of Ta-li for political affairs. He was regarded as a possible channel for opening communication with the Moslems in India.⁵²⁾ *Ta-ssü-k'ung*, the governor of T'êng-yüeh, frequently sent an agent to Mandalay to collect money which was in the hands of a Moslem there.⁵³⁾ It was, therefore, no wonder that a district governor could afford to give the British party under Captain Sladen, a present of 40,000 rupees in cash, an amount which was more than the whole budget approved for the expedition.⁵⁴⁾ Moslem general, Liu T'ieh-san 柳鐵三 (called Liu San-yeh 柳三爺 or Syed Dawood by the British) of Wu-so, a stockaded village in T'êng-yüeh, also had several agents in Mandalay.⁵⁵⁾ When the county town of T'êng-yüeh was surrounded by the Ch'ing army and the position of Wu-so was becoming increasingly precarious, the connection between Liu T'ieh-san and his agents in Mandalay continued uninterrupted.⁵⁶⁾

The expedition under Captain Sladen was sent by the government of British Burma in 1868 with the aim of investigating the causes of the cessation of trade between Burma and Yün-nan and obtaining as much information as possible in regard to the Moslem dominion in Yün-nan.⁵⁷⁾ The mission stayed at T'êng-yüeh from 28 May until 13 July and was warmly received by *Ta-ssü-k'ung* Li Kuo-lun, with some reservations. He invited Sladen and the other members to visit his private home, a most unusual relaxation of normal etiquette at that time, but did not disclose any political information.⁵⁸⁾ The major item among the presents given by *Ta-ssü-k'ung* to his guests was 40,000 Indian rupees, but not a single copy of the local gazette was given, because that was still considered to be a secret document unsuitable for foreigners.⁵⁹⁾ In order to satisfy the British mission's thirst for information, a big public proclamation, several feet in length, which had been posted on the city wall, was sent to Sladen as an official announcement of the Moslem success in Yün-nan, including the capture of the provincial city, but, unfortunately, it was at variance with what had actually happened.⁶⁰⁾ At an opera performance, the guests were entertained with a specially arranged programme, showing General Wu Han 吳漢 forcing his wife, who came from an enemy family, to commit suicide in order to show his loyalty to his rulers. The British officers were puzzled about the story and admitted: 'Unless we interpret it by that contradictory element in the Chinese character which makes their civilisation a mystery to science, we cannot understand it.'⁶¹⁾ Despite or perhaps because of all this, the Moslem governor eventually won the support of the British for their cause.

During Sladen's sixteen-day sojourn in T'êng-yüeh, it was impossible for *Ta-ssü-k'ung* to get in touch with Tu Wên-hsiu in Ta-li, because as early as

the previous May, the militia leaders, under Wang Chêng-k'ai 王正開, who were loyal to the Ch'ing government, had already occupied the Lu-chiang 潞江 (Salween) Valley 潞江壩, cutting communications between T'êng-yüeh and Yung-ch'ang 永昌.⁶²⁾ Anyone who is familiar with the geographical situation of the western part of Yün-nan will know that Ta-li and T'êng-yüeh are separated by two big rivers, (Irrawaddy and Salween) with turbulent currents situated between steep gorges. Communication at that time was entirely dependent on two iron-chain bridges 鐵索橋. Once the iron-chain bridges were taken by the enemy forces, the crossing of these two big rivers became extremely difficult, if not impossible. Of course, one could travel by a roundabout route, but the time required would be many times longer. Even if it had been possible to cross the bridge freely at Lu-chiang, it would have taken at least thirteen days to reach Ta-li from T'êng-yüeh,⁶³⁾ and in any case three days before Sladen reached T'êng-yüeh, another Han militia leader, Liu Kuang-huan 劉光煥, had already occupied the passage leading to the bridge over the Irrawaddy River. The neighbouring city of Lung-ling 龍陵 (one and a half days journey from T'êng-yüeh) began to be attacked from all sides by the pro-Ch'ing forces. The Moslem army of T'êng-yüeh 'was tired out by too much running around 疲于奔救'⁶⁴⁾ and *Ta-ssü-k'ung* had completely lost contact with his headquarters in Ta-li. When on 6 July *Ta-ssü-k'ung* told Sladen that his present had already safely reached Ta-li and that Tu Wên-hsiu's reply together with his present to the British mission, had been hindered on the way by the Ch'ing army,⁶⁵⁾ he could only have been expressing courtesy not describing facts because, even at the present day, it is difficult to go from T'êng-yüeh to Ta-li along the highway within ten days, not to say the unusual circumstances at that time.

The British officials, both in British Burma and in India, knew very little about the situation in Yün-nan and the real state of the rebellion. Amid warm hospitality, Sladen was optimistic about prospects of opening a 'gold and silver road' which would render Burma the most flourishing province in the Empire of British India,⁶⁶⁾ and therefore he pressed the Moslem governor to talk in detail about the duties leviable within the Moslem dominion. *Ta-ssü-k'ung* pretended to be very serious about the negotiations but failed to conceal his worries from time to time. In a letter addressed to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, he wrote: 'the continuation of hostilities in Yün-nan has rendered it expedient to prohibit foreigners and traders from entering the country during the present disturbances.' At the same time, he stated: 'It is our sincere wish to open our country to trade, and to encourage commercial relations with other governments, as soon as the country is sufficiently settled for that purpose,' and when the time comes,

It is our intention to dispatch an Envoy with letters to confirm and

perpetuate our present friendly relations with your government. But as war is still being carried on throughout the country and along all the several roads by which Captain Sladen and his party would have to pass, we have deemed it right to caution him against being in too great a hurry to enter Yün-nan, and have been induced in our anxiety to protect him against all harm, to advise return for the present, without continuing his journey beyond Momein.⁶⁷⁾

The Moslem governor told Captain Sladen straightforwardly that it was premature at that time to calculate upon setting up an established trade, and that they would have to wait until a definite understanding had been reached between the Moslem and the Ch'ing governments. In Captain Sladen's interpretation, this meant that unless an unofficial agreement or understanding was achieved between the Moslem government and the leaders of the local militia in T'êng-yüeh, there was no possibility of negotiations about the trade problem.⁶⁸⁾

Ta-ssü-k'ung 大司空 foresaw dark clouds gathering about his head and knew quite well that his relationship with the government of Britain Burma was a complicated one. He took such precautions as he deemed necessary against possible counterfeit or tampering with any future correspondence by exchanging seals with Captain Sladen,⁶⁹⁾ which, in the event, was to prove inadequate.

Problem of the Alleged Existence of 'Hui-chiao Kuo' 回教國 —The Islamic Kingdom

According to Chinese sources the European belief in existence of an alleged '*Hui-chiao Kuo*,' Islamic Kingdom, was utterly groundless. The judicial and administrative measures of the Ta-li government were not guided by the Koran. No document had ever indicated the existence of religious controversy. There was no evidence that the Imam had occupied any position in the administration, or that privileged treatment had been given to the Moslems. After careful and repeated investigation, the British Embassy people considered the alleged '*Hui-chiao Kuo*' in Ta-li nonexistent.⁷⁰⁾

The origin of the notion of such a kingdom came from a proclamation in Arabic, several copies of which were said to have reached Colonel George Ramsay, a British resident in Nepal, who obtained them from the Nepalese Envoy stationed at Lhasa. A copy was given to Colonel Henry Yule by J. W. Wyllie, and it was printed in Francis Garnier's '*Voyage d'Exploration*' as one of the appendices.⁷¹⁾ The first report about this Arabic proclamation was published in *the Russian Military Journal* in August 1866, entitled 'Rising of the Dungen (Tung-kan 東干 or Moslem Population in Western China.' Afterwards it was translated by O. K. Hein and appeared in *the Edinburgh Review* in April 1868.⁷²⁾ This Arabic proclamation was not dated

and not signed. It mentioned the establishment of an Islamic kingdom, but made no reference to Yün-nan or Ta-li; nor did the title of Sultan Suliman refer to Tu Wên-hsiu. Furthermore, 'Dungens' was a term specifically applied to the Chinese Moslems in the *northeast* part of China. The identification of the alleged Islamic kingdom with the *southwestern* district of Ta-li and the title of Suliman with Tu Wên-hsiu, was given by O. K. Hein in one of the notes of the article he translated. Therefore, whether or not this Arabic proclamation really had any connection with Tu Wên-hsiu is still an open question.

In O. K. Hein's own description, 'This very curious document is written in remarkably good Arabic' and 'is pervaded throughout by a cant of religious motives and divine favour, such as could not be surpassed even in a despatch from the Wabbabbe court of Nejed.'⁷⁸) The whole document contains about 500 words, divided into nine paragraphs. The first three paragraphs consist of quotations from the Koran, but the fourth declares: 'God has granted us the country of China, and has appointed us to rule in China. Formerly we were under the yoke of the Chinese, but now they are subject to us, and have no power to oppose us.' Without this paragraph, we would not be able to ascertain anything about the whereabouts of this alleged Islamic kingdom, because China is not mentioned again anywhere in the rest of the document, where the terms 'Idolaters' and 'Infidels' are used to describe any and all opponents of the Moslems. The fifth paragraph states emphatically that 'The cause of the dispute was that the Idolaters and their chiefs assembled together to kill the Moslems, and began to insult their religion.' The sixth paragraph contains the classical Moslem panegyric in praise of the leader who conducts the war (and consequently was set up as a Moslem sultan). However, it said in a very typical Indian manner of expression:

He administers justice according to the dictates of the Koran and the Traditions. Since we have made him our Imam we have been by the decree of God, very victorious. We have conquered territory to the distance of two months' journey. Many kings have tendered their submission to our Imam, and have offered him precious gems and tribute.

The seventh, eighth and ninth paragraphs load the Imam with fancy and inflated phrases: 'He has sent ministers throughout the country, and has appointed officers to every town for the government of the Infidels,' and 'The Ministers and chiefs under our Imam are as single-hearted as Abu-Bekr, as bold as Ali. None can face them in battle. They are imperious to the Infidel but meek to the Moslem. The metropolis of Infidelity has become a city of Islam!' Since the holy war has triumphed over the Infidels, there is no need for the Sultan to ask for assistance or response to his call. The ninth para-

graph concludes with valedictory remarks: 'O Moslems! offer your prayers to the Almighty for our victory and for the rule of our Imam. For our own part we pray that, by the grace of God, you may enjoy peace, health, and happiness, and that God may be your helper!' The signature is simply: 'The salutation of the Sultan to all learned Moslem doctors.'⁷⁴⁾

Not a single word of this proclamation refers to any concrete event, place, time, or personage. The whole content can be regarded as a prophecy, of a kind of divinatory nature, mixed with the touch and tone of an Indian saga. It is no wonder that this Arabic proclamation was described as a 'curious document.' As early as 1877, E. C. Baber, the British consul at Ch'ung-ch'ing 重慶,⁷⁵⁾ had already made enquiries of the residents in Ta-li about it. He found that the title 'Sultan' was absolutely foreign to the ordinary Chinese and was never applied to their ruler, except perhaps by two or three Hajis among themselves. The word 'Suliman' was also unknown.⁷⁶⁾ In 1883 A. R. Coloquhoun made another investigation in Ta-li and its environs, and reached the same conclusion that the 'Sultan' seemed to have been created by certain English writers, and to have received a seal of confirmation from the British Mission of 1868, which only reached T'êng-yüeh, some seven stages from Bhamo.⁷⁷⁾ Baber eventually maintained that the Moslems of Yün-nan were precisely the same race as their Confucian or Buddhist countrymen and therefore 'let us cease to cite their short-lived rule as an instance of the 'Great Moslem Revival'.⁷⁸⁾

On Liu Tao-hêng 劉道衡

Central to the recent denunciation of Tu Wên-hsiu has been a mission to London by a man called Liu Tao-hêng and consideration of this is crucial to an objective appraisal of him. In order to clarify the point at issue, we shall have to find out who was this man, Liu Tao-hêng. Fortunately, the documents kept in the India Office Library and Records will be able to give us some information in this respect.

When Liu Tao-hêng reached London in May 1872, the India Office, with the help of the Foreign Office, sent the competent W. C. King, British consul at Chiu-chiang 九江, who was proficient in the Chinese language and familiar with the etiquette of the Chinese official circles, to put Liu through a catechism. The result, as recorded in the memoir of General Albert Fytche, then the chief high commissioner of British Burma, was as follows:

In 1872 an Embassy headed by Hassan, the son of the Sultan of Yün-nan, as he was styled, arrived in Rangoon. Help was wanted against the Chinese. The Embassy was very favourably received both at Rangoon and Calcutta, and sent on to England—but *there its status was fully understood, and at once shown to be false.*⁷⁹⁾

As the head of the government of British Burma, Fytche's narration has to be respected, especially as his memoir was published only six years after Liu Tao-hêng's visit. What is the truth of this matter? The memorandum submitted by W. C. King to Sir John Kaye, the British Secretary of the India Office, gives a clue to this mystery:

The two chief persons of this party introduced to me as Prince Hassan and his secretary are, as may be seen from their appearance and language, Chinese pure and simple. They also presented themselves as purely Chinese by origin, but now independent.

Their appearance and dress, manner, mode of expressing themselves and general demeanour, are all indicative of Chinese of low extraction and education or at least well below that of the ordinary Chinese gentry. In the course of conversation I used naturally technical terms of official usage . . . and social civilities or compliments and in neither of these did I find my meaning readily understood, though always so when I employed commoner terms. I regret that I did not have the opportunity of seeing a copy of the message asked for by Sir John Kaye, as writing, always a great point in Chinese locution, would have afforded evidence on this point. During the short absence of Sir John Kaye from the room I asked the chief envoy several questions, some of them the stereotyped complimentary catechism asking his name, age, literary rank, and others to facilitate the conversation when it should be renewed, such as by what title I ought to speak of his father and address myself. From these I learnt that his father was styled Commander in Chief only (with this difference that he was Commander in Chief of his own army); that he occupied the post of secretary to his father and had no particular title; and it was especially in this conversation that I noticed a want of familiarity with official and complimentary terms.

The manner of the two Chinese was strikingly humble, almost timorous at times. The highest wish expressed was to have speech with the chief Secretary of State for India, but this was always mentioned in an apologetic way as if considered by no means to be claimed of right. *No higher favour was in any way asked for, referred to, or implied.*⁸⁰⁾

From the above description, Liu Tao-hêng was quite unlike a gallant man who 'had been constantly on the move, taking a thirty thousand *li*'s journey to travel China's southern and eastern provinces 五歲之間, 周歷三萬餘里' as he had mentioned in his memorial supposed to have been submitted to Tu Wên-hsiu.⁸¹⁾ Of course, we should not accept King's statement without reservation. It was possible that Liu Tao-hêng could have become timid in front of the foreigners; or that language barriers and unfamiliarity in meeting foreigners for the first time could have been the main factors. But, if we

compare the report from the British officials in Rangoon, we would be very much puzzled. It stated: 'Hassan has already been sent on a confidential mission to every part of China. He has visited all the chief towns on the coast, and has seen various English officers, but without making himself known to them.'⁸²⁾ If Liu Tao-hêng was used to having contacts with British officers, why should he become so nervous on that particular occasion? Whatever the explanation, this should serve as a warning in regard to the authenticity of Liu Tao-hêng's memorial to Tu Wên-hsiu, and the best way to clarify the problem of the Mission to England is to trace the whereabouts of Liu Tao-hêng *during that period*.

A Tortuous Process

In the years 1871–1873, the diary of the British political agents in Bhamo and Mandalay kept a record of some of Liu Tao-hêng's movements, arranged in order of time, showing how and when the Mission to England originated. First of all, however, we should clarify the fact that Liu was not an adopted son of Tu Wên-hsiu. He was, actually, a kind of adopted son of General Liu T'ieh-san 柳鐵三 of T'êng-yüeh. Therefore, it is necessary to begin with the role played by this Moslem general.

From 1856 when the revolt broke out in T'êng-yüeh, a village on hilly land, called Wu-so, about 150 *li* northwest of the country town, was the most active force of the whole region.⁸³⁾ This stockaded village had a thousand households of Moslems and other minorities, living in brick houses. It was surrounded on three sides by stone walls, 18–20ft. thick, with one side by a lake, and was considered to be even richer than the county town of T'êng-yüeh.⁸⁴⁾ The village leader, Liu T'ieh-san or Liu Ying-ts'ang 柳映蒼 (called Liu San-yeh 柳三爺 'the third grand uncle of Liu' or Syed Dawood by the British), was a very daring person. Liu Tao-hêng's own statement was that he was related to this Syed Dawood and had been reared by him, and had served him like a father for many years. This could mean that Liu Tao-hêng might have been Syed Dawood's adopted son. From Liu Tao-hêng's description, Syed Dawood was very pragmatic in character—'a great man of the time with vigor and courage, but was inadequate to the great purpose and inferior in knowledge to understand thoroughly a hero's clever strategy 亦一時偉丈夫也，可惜志小識卑，不足以明英雄之大略.'⁸⁵⁾

Between 1856 and 1865 Syed Dawood and his troops had been engaging in military activities in all directions but without much success, and so no great responsibility had ever been granted to him by the government in Ta-li. When *Ta-ssü-k'ung* was appointed governor of that region in 1866, Syed Dawood was suddenly withdrawn from the battlefield.⁸⁶⁾ The information collected by the British political agents at Bhamo shows that he was not on good terms with *Ta-ssü-k'ung* and was somewhat lukewarm in his

endeavours to resist the Ch'ing militia. His official title was 'Grand General of Southern Tranquility 寧南大將軍' a grade lower than that of *Ta-ssü-k'ung* but he was called, probably self-styled, *Ta-t'ai-K'ung* 大太空,⁸⁷⁾ a title which never appeared in the official list of the Ta-li government, the literal meaning of which was higher than that of *Ta-ssü-k'ung*. It was also said that Syed Dawood gave little or no aid to the Governor of T'êng-yüeh in time of emergency. Judging from the frequency of the appearance of Syed Dawood's messengers in Mandalay, he must have been devoting his whole effort since 1868 to trading with Burma.⁸⁸⁾

From the year 1870, the power of the Ta-li government began to decline. The territory of forty-one prefectures and districts shrank to nine, forced into one relatively poor and mountainous corner.⁸⁹⁾ As a result, especially after the fall of Yung-ch'ang 永昌 (present Pao-shan 保山) on 7 September 1871, T'êng-yüeh was almost completely cut off from communication with the rest of the remaining rebel-held territory. Without foreign assistance, the rebel's position was becoming increasingly precarious. It was in such a situation that Syed Dawood sent Liu Tao-hêng, who happened to know a little about foreign countries, to accompany his father-in-law, Ma Ssü-lung 馬似龍, to Burma.

In the administration diary, it was recorded that between September and 15 November, two Moslem officers ('apparently the persons who are now coming to Calcutta') came to see the British agent at Bhamo and talked with him several hours every day.⁹⁰⁾ The prolonged discussions, lasting one and a half months, were concentrated on the reopening of the Northern Road, if necessary by military force, for trade. Since the traditional road, called 'Embassy Road' or 'Gold and Silver Road,' following the T'ai-p'ing River 太平江, was short and convenient, the reasons given for a sudden change to the 'Northern Road,' which started from the Nanthabet River (Nan-t'ai-pai-jiang 南太白江 *Ta-pa-jiang* (大巴江)), a tributary of the Irrawaddy River, a hundred miles north of Bhamo, did not carry any conviction whatsoever.⁹¹⁾ Moreover, it was futile to hope for British assistance because the British endeavour to open the trade route was guided only by their commercial interest and would not interfere in the least with the fighting between the Moslems and the Ch'ing government. All through the conversations, the British agent, Captain Spearman, constantly mentioned 'trade' but avoided any allusion as to with whom the trade was to be. This meant that the British cared very little whether the route was opened by the Moslems or by the Ch'ing government; but it was not easy for Captain Spearman to find a roundabout way of conveying such unpalatable information to the two Moslem officers.⁹²⁾ As the talks dragged on without result, Ma Ssü-lung wrote to the British agent in Mandalay expressing his desire to see him. Consequently, Captain Spearman sent an official Chinese interpreter to accompany Ma Ssü-lung and Liu Tao-hêng to Mandalay.⁹³⁾

There Ma Ssü-lung had a long conversation with the British agent, Captain Stover, but also without result. It was from subsequent enquiries that Stover began to realise that Ma wanted to open the Nanthabet route because it would lead to his own village, Wu-so. Ma Ssü-lung tried to lure Stover by offering to make arrangements with the different Sawbwas and asked the British agent to send men to report upon the route. Ma even said that some kind of compromise had been made between the Moslems and the Hans in the town of Yung-ch'ang, and that they were both living peacefully inside the town. Hazy though this offer was, it puzzled Stover, but revealed to him that Syed Dawood was ready to contemplate crossing over to the side of the Ch'ing government. However, Stover's reply was exactly the same as Spearman's and so, though he had spoken more openly on his offer than he had done at Bhamo, Ma Ssü-lung discovered how firm and unshakable was the British policy.⁹⁴⁾ Thereupon he returned to Bhamo, leaving Liu Tao-hêng behind in Mandalay.

Frustrated by four months of fruitless negotiations at Bhamo and Mandalay, Ma Ssü-lung, together with another Moslem officer whom he had picked up in Mandalay, was now anxious to enlist Captain Spearman's help for his return journey to Wu-so. At first, Ma wanted to leave without waiting for Lawkon Sawbwa, a Kachin chief, who had previously taken Ma and Liu to Bhamo and had promised to come and fetch them when they wanted to go back. However, because of the very disturbed situation along the route, Spearman induced Ma to wait for the coming of Lawkon Sawbwa.⁹⁵⁾ A month later, on 26 January 1872, Ma and the other Moslem officer, accompanied by their servants and the Kachin guards who had come from T'êng-yüeh ten days earlier, together with Lawkon Sawbwa who had come to fetch them, left by boat for Nanthabet—the northern route to T'êng-yüeh 騰越 suggested by Ma. As this was the first mission sent by Syed Dawood, Captain Spearman sent him a present of a small pocket revolver. To Ma and the other Moslem officer, Spearman gave additional presents of a handsome velvet pile rug and a piece of long cloth each. Spearman also used this opportunity to send the two breech loading guns and ammunition which the government of British India had despatched for *Ta-ssü-k'ung* nearly two years previously.⁹⁶⁾ Evidently, since Sladen's return, *Ta-ssü-k'ung* had not sent any representative to Burma and the British authorities had not helped the Moslem Rebels either with men or arms.

The day after Ma Ssü-lung's departure, two more Chinese Moslems from T'êng-yüeh arrived in Bhamo. They must have heard about the guns being sent off by Spearman the day before, and, knowing the unfriendly relationship between Syed Dawood and *Ta-ssü-k'ung*, they felt uneasy about their delivery and wanted to see the guns themselves. Spearman, therefore, sent one man off in a small boat to overtake Ma Ssü-lung and made arrangements for another to go down to Mandalay by the steamer to collect some money,

supposedly in the hands of a Moslem there for *Ta-ssü-k'ung*. It was recorded:

The Moslem in Mandalay who is the agent of the Panthays, as far as they require any agency work done, is one Syed Abdoolah, an old man living in or near the Chinese Moslem Mosque in that town. Possibly through him the Panthay government may open communication with the Moslems of India. I propose, therefore, to furnish the Panthay who is going down with a free passage and a letter to Captain Strover so that he may be sure to visit the political Agent, and thus be easily placed under such surveillance as that officer may consider necessary.⁹⁷⁾

With regard to the happenings after Ma Ssü-lung's return to Wu-so, the administration diary of Bhamo has a detailed record:

10th April 1872. A Burman came in with letters from Wu-sao and Chan-hsi 蠶西. He was up in the Lawkon Hills trading, and when he was coming down the Lawkon Sawbwa asked him to bring me the letters which had just arrived. Four only were in Chinese of which one was addressed to me and one to the Panthay who lately came from Tahseekon, the other two being for Panthays in Mandalay. Owing to the absence of the Arabic interpreter, I am unable to get the addresses of the Arabic letters translated. The Chinese letter to my address is from the Panthay Envoy who came in last year and went down to Mandalay. It contains no information regarding the state of affairs in Yün-nan; but simply informs me that the party had arrived safely in Wu-so and had sent thence to Tahseekon the two breech loading guns. I had already heard that the guns had reached Momein, but my informant, one Mwanlootwon, a Kakhyen in Tahseekon's employ, said the guns had been sent from Chan-hsi, and that he himself went with them, the Panthays going on to Wu-so. I have written to Tahseekon and his reply will probably explain matters. In the letter to the Panthay here, it is said that another mission is coming from Wu-so in about 4 months, in reality after the rain was over I fancy. From all that I hear I gather that Tahseekon and the Panthay Governor of Wu-so are not on the best terms, the latter being somewhat lukewarm in his endeavour to resist the Chinese.⁹⁸⁾

On 28 August 1872, Spearman received the reply from *Ta-ssü-k'ung*, acknowledging receipt of the two breech loading guns sent to him. At the same time, Spearman was informed that two messengers were going to Mandalay to visit the Panthay agent, and would bring back a fresh seal for him to use when writing to *Ta-ssü-k'ung*.⁹⁹⁾ This change to a new seal could possibly be interpreted as an indication of *Ta-ssü-k'ung*'s losing faith in Syed Dawood.

To summarise all the entries of the administration diary cited above, a

conclusion may be reached as follows:

(1) In September 1871, a Mission from the Moslem stronghold of Wu-so appeared in Burma. The head of this Mission was Ma Ssü-lung, 'a fine looking old gentleman,' father-in-law of Syed Dawood. He was accompanied by a young man. The British political agent pointed out in his diary, which was submitted to the India Office for reference, that they were 'apparently the persons who are now coming to Calcutta.' This was in confirmity with the 'Letter of Allegiance' to Queen Victoria which described the two emissaries as Tu Wên-hsiu's wife's uncle, Ma Ssü-lung, and adopted son, Liu Tao-hêng, although Ma Ssü-lung had returned to Wu-so and absented himself from the Mission to England.

(2) The Mission stayed in Burma almost five months. When Ma Ssü-lung went back to Wu-so, he was with another Moslem officer 'whom he picked up in Mandalay.' This makes it certain that Liu Tao-hêng remained in Mandalay.

(3) The Mission was Syed Dawood's personal affair and had no connection with either *Ta-ssü-k'ung* or Tu Wên-hsiu.

Now the main point of interest is how did Liu Tao-hêng suddenly secure such warm endorsement of the British India Government that he was helped to reach London in the summer of 1872? However, before discussing the sources connected with this issue, it is necessary to become somewhat acquainted with Liu Tao-hêng and to ascertain the role he played in the Mission to London.

Scrutiny of Two Documents

Nothing is known of Liu Tao-hêng, beyond the little that can be found from the records the British kept in Burma, and from one document said to have been a memorial he submitted to Tu Wên-hsiu in October 1870.¹⁰⁰ In that document Liu is shown to be a self-made man of humble origin. It seems that this young man in his late twenties, lived in a world of fantasies. He was very conceited and was under the illusion that he could apply all the crafty schemes he learnt from popular old Chinese novels to international affairs, the idea of which was, as Sir John Kaye of the India Office commented, 'simply preposterous.' He had also been deeply impressed by the Anglo-French invaders, who, having won the war of 1856-1857, had advanced towards the north, stormed and occupied the Chinese capital in 1860 and there imposed on the Chinese government a series of conditions which would enable the two Western powers to destroy the Ch'ing government at any time. In Liu's opinion, the Anglo-French hesitation in taking over the whole of China was due to their lack of internal allies in China, because the Moslems of northwest China, the largest and the most powerful community of Moslems in all China, had not made their attitude known. Therefore Liu suggested to Tu Wên-hsiu that he should seize an opportune moment

to entice to his side the two Western powers with their superior modern weaponry so that, together, they could overthrow the Ch'ing government. Then, while the Ch'ing government was being crushed and China was in a chaotic state, the Yün-nan Moslems would be able to fish in troubled waters and to take over China themselves with very little effort.

The way to invite the British and the French in, Liu proposed, was simply to forge a letter on behalf of the Moslem leaders of the northwest part of China, expressing their wishes through Tu Wên-hsiu, in order to induce the two Western powers to replace the Ch'ing dynasty as rulers of China. The next step would be for Tu Wên-hsiu to draft a letter based on this forged document and adding some tempting offers and then send it to the respective governments by a special envoy. To that end, Liu offered himself as Tu Wên-hsiu's emissary to Britain and France.

We do not know when, or even if, the memorial to the above effect was actually submitted to Tu Wên-hsiu, or the whereabouts of Liu Tao-hêng at that time. The document does, however, carry a marginal note, allegedly by Tu Wên-hsiu, praising the author's literary style, which, it avers, could not have been that of an 'ordinary pedantic scholar 書生俗儒', and lauding him as 'a rare talent in troubled times 亂世奇士'. But it made no comment on the proposal itself. The marginal note, therefore, cannot be shown to be more than a fabrication; some Chinese scholars have even repudiated it as an absurd fake.¹⁰¹⁾

Liu's memorial is a copied manuscript, and its authenticity and reliability are still in doubt. After careful examination, it can be stated there are indications that this document has been greatly altered either by the author himself or by someone else, through a period of many years. For example, the significant measure to implement Liu's machiavellian design was to forge a letter sounding like the opinion and political inclination of the Moslem population throughout the north and west of China, without which, as Liu pointed out, it would not be possible to lure the Western powers into the trap. But this essential design is missing both in the 'Letter of Allegiance' and in Liu's activities in London. Why? The only explanation must be that, after recalling his painful experience in London, Liu Tao-hêng attributed the failure of his mission to the fact that the British regarded the Yün-nan rebels not strong enough to enter into alliance with Great Britain. Therefore, the present version of Liu's 'memorial' to Tu Wên-hsiu, being, like most autobiographies, self-justification and glorification, was a piece of work re-written at a later date, and should not be regarded as a reliable document for consultation.

It is clear that from the very beginning Syed Dawood did not approve Liu's unrealistic project. Thus Liu made a draft of his memorial with the aim of turning to Tu Wên-hsiu. We do not know whether Liu's memorial was despatched or not, but it is certain that Liu stayed in Wu-so until

he was sent to accompany Ma Ssü-lung to Burma. Perhaps, after the prolonged and fruitless talks in Bhamo, Liu Tao-hêng once more toyed with the proposal he had made to Tu Wên-hsiu the previous year. At that time, before he knew the British policy, Ma Ssü-lung made a miscalculation. Thinking that the higher authorities might be easier to deal with than the local agent, he wrote to Mandalay. It is possible that he might also have agreed with Liu Tao-hêng's idea of appealing to London for help if the negotiations in Burma failed. This would explain why it was that Ma Ssü-lung appeared in the 'Letter of Allegiance' as the senior representative of the Mission. It is my interpretation that the 'Letter of Allegiance' to Queen Victoria was made under such circumstances. I shall try to point out the facts as I see them.

First of all, careful examination of the four personal letters by Liu Tao-hêng kept in India Office Library and Records¹⁰²⁾ shows that the alleged "Letter of Allegiance" to Queen Victoria was not in his handwriting. The style of the writing of the character 'lung 龍' (dragon) in the name of Ma Ssü-lung gives a strong indication of its being written by someone whose name contained the same character, because one stroke is intentionally omitted from the character used for the name, through which the writer avoids giving the impression of claiming resemblance between himself and the dragons which were the Chinese symbol of the Emperor. (See Chang Wei-hsiang 張惟驥, *Li-tai Hui-tzŭ P'u 歷代諱字譜 (Dictionary of Prohibited Characters of Successive Generations)*, 1868, part II, Vol. 6, p. 1a). The omission was not a slip of the pen but a taboo which was strictly observed by those who attended the civil service examination in the old days. Can we assume it was the handwriting of Ma Ssü-lung 'the fair-looking old gentleman' in the British Agent's description?

The 'Letter of Allegiance' from Tu Wên-hsiu to Queen Victoria was dated in the lunar calendar 13 November (eleventh month) to 11 December (twelfth month) 1871. This was the time when Ma Ssü-lung and Liu Tao-hêng were in Burma, the period between the Moslem Mission's journey to Mandalay after their fruitless talks at Bhamo and their preparation for departure from Mandalay when the talks there failed to reach any conclusion either—a period when Ma and Liu underwent a series of great frustrations.

The seal stamped on the 'Letter of Allegiance' is different from the seal described by Emile Rocher, who had the opportunity of seeing the state seal of Ta-li dominion personally.¹⁰³⁾ We take it for granted that there were many seals used by Tu Wên-hsiu, but it is still worth noticing that it was easy to find an excellent seal-engraver in Burma, particularly in Mandalay; the reason for this could have been due to the fact that the jade carvers there were mostly Chinese Moslems. As mentioned earlier, Mandalay was the place where in August 1872, the messengers from *Ta-ssü-k'ung* had obtained a new seal for Captain Spearman to use when writing to T'êng-yüeh.¹⁰⁴⁾

On 13 February 1873, when, on his return to Rangoon, Liu Tao-hêng wrote to the Duke of Argyll and Sir John Kaye, he used yet another seal, newly engraved in both Chinese and Arabic. At this time, no longer content with the label of adopted son of Tu Wên-hsiu under which he had gone to London, Liu now assumed the title of 'the Great Councillor of Superintending the Military Affairs and the Weighty Matter of the State of Ta-li 大理國總理軍機偉畧大將軍'—a post equivalent to that of the first deputy prime minister.¹⁰⁵⁾ (It was ironical that, owing to the difficulty of communication, he did not know that Tu Wên-hsiu had died by poisoning himself two months previously upon the fall of Ta-li.) We can see then, that the 'Letter of Allegiance' could have been faked quite easily in Mandalay, since seals could be made there and it was easy to secure the pen brush, ink-stick, ink-stand, and the yellow linen fabric used for Kaṣāya (the dress worn by Buddhist monks) on which it was written.

Now, why did Ma Ssü-lung return to Wu-so instead of joining the mission to England? The answer is very simple. After repeated frustrations, Ma Ssü-lung fully anticipated what would happen in London, and therefore rejected the idea of going to Europe. Perhaps this old man even repented of his coming to Burma in furtherance of the schemes of his reckless young companion. It is evident that the last several paragraphs of Liu's letter to Tu Wên-hsiu,¹⁰⁶⁾ with the obvious insertion of critical remarks on his proposed mission to Europe, were directed at Ma Ssü-lung, because in his opinion, 'if a mission was to be sent to Britain and France, it was necessary to go to Turkey first, seeking help and letters of introduction from the Sultan 通英法之使, 宜先至土耳其, 諸回回國王加函而後進.' The attempt 'to let a wild young man (like Liu), unable to speak, read or write foreign languages, go to Europe, would undoubtedly prove to be futile and in the end he would be bound to come back empty-handed, having exhausted his cleverness and imposture 以狂生適異域, 文字不通, 言語不達, 則將智窮術盡而思歸矣.' It seems highly probably that Ma Ssü-lung regarded Liu Tao-hêng as a reckless fellow trying to trick people with exaggerated talk. Any or all of these points may explain his refusal to go to Europe with him.

In one of the letters sent from Wu-so to Bhamo on 10 April 1872, Ma Ssü-lung said that another mission would be coming in about four months time.¹⁰⁷⁾ The other two letters to the Chinese Moslems in Mandalay would have contained some new instructions for Liu Tao-hêng, but, unexpectedly, he had already gone to Calcutta and was preparing to sail for England. That this had occurred is connected with the fact that, it so happened that during the period after Ma Ssü-lung's return to Wu-so, the insistence of Mindon, King of Burma, on sending a mission to Britain, irritated the government of British Burma to such an extent, that suddenly, the 'Panthay Embassy' to Britain, the idea of which originated with Liu Tao-hêng, was seized upon by the British as an effective means of fore-

stalling the Burmese Embassy.

New Situation

When Mindon had first sent an exploratory mission to England in April 1870, led by Pandee Wundauk, the government of British Burma was very much annoyed, considering that an embassy sent directly to the court of London was a deliberate attempt to show contempt for the British representatives in Mandalay. The British agent, McMahan, was reprimanded for exhibiting 'strange ignorance and want of tact,' when General Fytche learnt that it was he who had given assistance to the Burmese court concerning diplomatic procedures. After Pandee Wundauk had left on 28 July 1870, Fytche's secretary wrote to the governor-general of Calcutta:

Had General Fytche not been unfortunately absent from Rangoon at the time on privilege leave, he could have prevented the departure of the two Burmese to Europe, as it will be seen from the correspondence noted in the margin that he succeeded in preventing a similar attempt to send a mission to France in 1867.¹⁰⁸⁾

At the end of 1871, Mindon was planning to send another mission to Queen Victoria with the aim of obtaining for Burma recognition as a fully established sovereign state. The mission was to be led by Kinkun Mingyi, minister of guard posts and the most experienced and respected person at the Burmese court, assisted by Pandee Wundauk, who spoke English well and already had experience of visiting England. The whole party was to comprise more than thirty people.¹⁰⁹⁾ In addition, Mindon had been engaging in a series of activities which were regarded as very provocative to the British authorities. For example, eleven regular gunboats were being built for Burma in Glasgow.¹¹⁰⁾ In August 1870, Mindon wished to purchase 10,000 Enfield rifles from England, and asked that the arms be allowed to come through the British frontier on the Irrawaddy.¹¹¹⁾ It was also rumoured that three cannons had been purchased for Mindon by a Burmese youth studying in England.¹¹²⁾ All these matters led to a deterioration in the already strained relationship between the British authorities and the Burmese king. However, no matter how angry the British authorities were, Upper Burma was still nominally an independent country even after the annexation of Lower Burma, and although of course, Ashley Eden could ask the London government to refuse the Burmese application to import the arms and military equipments in question, such an act would constitute a clear breach of faith and a gross violation of the new Commercial Treaty of 1867, which had been negotiated and signed by General Fytche himself.¹¹³⁾ Meanwhile, too, Mindon had received a letter from Queen Victoria, expressing the hope

that he would be able to visit England.¹¹⁴⁾

Under these circumstances it would have been inappropriate for the British in Burma to discourage the despatch of the Burmese mission directly. An indirect approach was therefore needed. As there was already some enmity between the Yün-nan Moslems and the King of Burma over Burmese support of the Ch'ing government,¹¹⁵⁾ one way of diminishing the significance of the Burmese Mission would be to make use of Liu Tao-hêng (who had been hanging around and bothering them) to outshine the Burmese by setting him up as the head of a rival mission to London. At the end of Liu Tao-hêng's visit in London, the correspondent of *the London Times* sent the following report from Calcutta:

It was understood that the Panthays had an Embassy on the way to England, the King of Burma at once took alarm, and the Panthays were contended carefully and successfully . . . that the King has proved himself capable of reaching to London, and defeating his enemies there.¹¹⁶⁾

A leading article of the same newspaper even stated, 'Mindon may feel jealous of a young, self-reliant Moslem power on his frontier.'¹¹⁷⁾ A statement like this was absolutely at variance with the actual state of affairs. There is no evidence that Mindon knew anything about the Panthay Mission beforehand or about their intention of outshining the Burmese. On the contrary the Burmese historians were even of the opinion that 'the Panthay Embassy was able to reach London only because they were given safe conduct through Burmese territory by King Mindon at the risk of angering China.'¹¹⁸⁾ In fact, it was the government of British Burma who wanted to use Liu Tao-hêng's mission as a trump card to frustrate Mindon in his efforts.

It may be that it was because of the fact that from then on Liu Tao-hêng's intended mission began to be linked with Mindon's despatch of a Burmese Embassy to England that the measures taken by the British officials to deal with the two matters were 'communicated separately' and not further alluded to in the official diary. There is a gap. We do not know when the messenger sent by *Ta-ssü-k'ung* reached Mandalay, how he got in touch with Syed Abdoolah, or what where the plans the old Moslem agent made for the Panthays to establish relations with the outside world.

On 24 February (a month after Ma Ssü-lung returned to Wu-so), Captain Strover was visited by three Panthay gentlemen, presumably from Ta-li; one of them paraded himself ostentatiously as a 'Wayer' or Minister,¹¹⁹⁾ one was an interpreter who could speak Hindustani, and the other was said to be a Han Chinese who had come to look after Tu Wên-hsiu's trading business in Mandalay.¹²⁰⁾ They claimed to have come by the Thennie route,¹²¹⁾ and wanted to proceed to Rangoon in the course of a few days, and from there to Calcutta, Bombay and Mecca. Unexpectedly, four days

later, for some unknown reason, Strover began to be doubtful about this 'Wayeer.' It was recorded in his official diary:

The Panthay "Wayeer" or rather the man who states he is a Wayeer, for there is nothing tangible to show that he is such beyond his words, starts by the next steamer for Rangoon, and I propose to give him a letter of introduction to the Chief Commissioner. He appears to be a very respectable man.¹²²⁾

That happened two days before the Burmese Embassy left for Rangoon, on the royal steamer 'The Celestial Flying Vehicle.'¹²³⁾

The Panthay 'Wayeer' stayed in Rangoon for about a fortnight. On 31 March, a week after the Burmese Embassy had sailed for Europe,¹²⁴⁾ when the government of British Burma was raging against Mindon about the Burmese Mission to London,¹²⁵⁾ new chief commissioner, Ashley Eden, who had the same attitude as Fytche, made arrangements for the Panthay Mission to sail to Calcutta.¹²⁶⁾ In the despatch to Fort William, the mission was reorganised. According to the 'Letter of Allegiance' to Queen Victoria, which also provided their credentials, the two emissaries, Ma Ssü-lung and Liu Tao-hêng, were described respectively as Tu Wen-hsiu's wife's uncle and adopted son. Since Ma Ssü-lung had gone back to Wu-so and absented himself from the mission, Liu Tao-hêng unofficially took Ma Ssü-lung's place as head of the mission, while his own was filled by another young man supposed to be the nephew of Tu Wên-hsiu. It is interesting to note that the names of the mission were completely Arabised to suit the special purpose. Liu Tao-hêng assumed the title of Prince Hassan, the other young man that of Prince Yussuf, and even the interpreter was renamed Ibrahim Khan. The reason for this could be that the officials of British Burma who sponsored this mission thought it might otherwise sound too ordinary to attract the necessary attention of the men in Whitehall, or, indeed, even to justify their being despatched all the way to London at government expense. All these Arabic names, however, were purely for official use by the British officials. Liu Tao-hêng never used his Arabic title in signing any of the documents preserved in the India Office Library and Records.

At the same time, every possible explanation was given to emphasise the significance of this mission. Eden admitted in his letter to Fort William that Liu's proposal was out of the question, yet he ventured to point out that the Panthay element was very powerful in China, and that the time might arrive when the proposition would assume a very different aspect from that which it bore under the existing circumstances, and that events in Burma and China might at any time render it very useful for the British government to be on friendly relations with the Moslems in China. Eden went on to suggest that the mission should be assisted and provided with

a free passage to Europe. In addition, a printed extract of the administration diary record of Captain Sladen's visit to T'êng-yüeh and Ma Ssü-lung's negotiations in Burma, entitled 'State of Matters in Yün-nan' was appended to the despatch for reference on the background of this mission. The government of British India was fully on the side of Ashley Eden, expedient measures were made for the mission to continue its journey to London without prior approval from the India Office. R. Towers, Assistant Magistrate to Napier of Bengal, and H. d'Orville, an Eurasian, were assigned to accompany the Embassy, and an enthusiastic letter announcing the coming of the Mission was despatched immediately the day after Liu had sailed from Calcutta, expressing 'a hope that they may be treated in England with the same degree of attention as that which they have received in Calcutta.'¹²⁷ Leaving Calcutta on 25 April, the Mission duly reached the British capital on the last day of May, four days in advance of the Burmese Embassy.¹²⁸

Reception in London

As General Fytche later pointed out in his memoirs 'while the Burmese Embassy was somewhat snubbed in Rangoon, as compared with the reception of the Panthay Embassy, the positions of the two Embassies, however, were, very properly, entirely reversed on their arrival in England.'¹²⁹

Owing to the difference in standpoint on policy and strategy between the local government and the London government, the India Office totally disapproved of such an envoy being sent to London and felt surprised that it should have been encouraged by the government of India to proceed further than Calcutta. The Duke of Argyll, who was secretary of State for India was furious and refused to receive the Mission. Sir John Kaye, the Under-Secretary of State at the India Office, was instructed by the Duke of Argyll, while on holiday at Inverary, by telegram, 'You may receive the Panthay Mission and do your best to provide lodging at reasonable cost.'¹³⁰ As a result, the whole delegation was lodged while in London on the attic floor of the Charing Cross Hotel on the Strand, in very poor accommodation. Nevertheless, the Duke of Argyll still considered 'these expenses are larger than they might be for two envoys lodged at the top of the house' and at his personal insistence, the total weekly allowance was reduced from £73.16.0 to £61.8.9.¹³¹ Indeed, the bulk of the archives on this mission are concerned with how best to end it and how to reduce the cost of its upkeep until this could be effected.

On 11 June, after an elaborate exchange of views behind the scenes among the various government departments concerned, Liu Tao-hêng was received by Sir John Kaye to whom he presented the 'Letter of Allegiance.' In this the so-called 'Generalissimo of the Chinese forces' proposed that 'if our entreaty be graciously accepted and a force of her Majesty's troops, like

unto flying dragons [i.e., irresistible] be despatched, we are willing to do service in the vanguard of battle and to assist in the work of achieving the conquest of the "Ch'ing" dynasty 如蒙俯納，發飛龍之師，願效前驅，勦成逐鹿之志'.¹³²⁾ Three days after the interview, Liu Tao-hêng, feeling that he had not yet presented his case in full, decided to write two up-to-date letters and send them to Kaye. The first was a request for British military and financial support, in return for which Liu pledged the allegiance of the Moslem government in Ta-li. He asked that two British officers be sent from Burma to Ta-li to see the situation for themselves. Were they to find cooperation impossible, they could just leave. Should they suspect any trickery on his part, the British government could detain Liu himself as a hostage, until the British officers had had a chance to verify the truth in Ta-li.¹³³⁾ The second letter explained the significance of the offering of four cases of Ta-li marble, which were being presented as a token of allegiance.¹³⁴⁾

Liu Tao-hêng's naivety brought nothing but embarrassment to the British government. After reading these letters, Kaye suggested to the Duke of Argyll 'that the case of the Panthay Mission should be taken into immediate consideration, with a view to the dismissal of the envoys at the earliest possible time.'¹³⁵⁾ He asked his superior, the Duke of Argyll, 'Shall we send them off at once, or detain them, so as to arrive in Calcutta when the Viceroy has returned?' Argyll's reply was, 'At once or as soon as they get ready.'¹³⁶⁾ However, through the advice of some of the diplomats and influential people in commercial circles, Liu Tao-hêng avoided being sent away on the instant.

Thomas Wade, the British minister in Pei-ching, did not hear of the Panthay Mission until June. His first reaction was to express doubts about Liu Tao-hêng's official status. He pointed out in his despatch: 'We have styled him Prince Hassan but he does not appear to have claimed any title so high sounding.'¹³⁷⁾ Nevertheless, Wade saw the possibility of a bargain with the Ch'ing government, using the Panthay Mission as a lever for extracting from the Mandarin's concessions in Tibet. He requested the authorities from the Foreign Office 'to tell the Chinese that if they will assist us in opening trade with, or through, Tibet, we shall not encourage the Moslems of Ta-li in their proposed treaty relations.'¹³⁸⁾ As early as 1852, the Chambers of Commerce of Leeds, Bradford, Halifax and other industrial centres, had been interested in the idea that the foreign trade of England might be extended from Burma and Siam into the western part of China. Now that the opportunity had presented itself, it was firmly believed among some of the British officials in Burma, that the establishment of a friendly Panthay power in Yün-nan would solve the great problem of reopening the traditional profitable trade with western Yün-nan. For this reason, Liu Tao-hêng was said to have been welcomed by almost every Chamber of Commerce in England, and he was invited to visit Manchester, where a warm reception

was given to him.¹³⁹⁾ All these matters caused delay in sending him away.

The quickest way to get rid of the emissaries would have been to send them back by the way they had come, but Liu Tao-hêng, sensing perhaps the government's impatience to see them go, insisted on returning via Turkey at the British government's expense, and the British reluctantly acceded to his request.¹⁴⁰⁾ It seems very likely that Liu had in his luggage another 'Memorial' addressed to Sultan Abd. Alnaz. Unfortunately for him, the Sultan of Turkey also refused to receive the Mission. So after two fruitless weeks, during which time the otherwise luckless emissaries enjoyed a most luxurious life with twelve servants waiting on them,¹⁴¹⁾ an advance in the form of a loan, with the British serving as guarantor, had to be made by a bank in Constantinople for their fares back to Rangoon via Bombay and Calcutta.¹⁴²⁾ (After some squabbles between the Foreign Office and the India Office, this loan was eventually repaid by the India Office.¹⁴³⁾

Starting from the day before Liu Tao-hêng's departure from England, *the London Times* successively published two reports on the Panthay Mission from its correspondent in Calcutta, together with a leading article and a letter to the editor, which fully expressed the grievance and anger of the government of British Burma and criticised Whitehall for failing to appreciate the importance of reopening the Yün-nan trade route. The failure of the Panthay Mission, the letter stated, was to be attributed to the fact that in London 'the Panthay envoys have to encounter a very formidable rivalry in the Burmese Embassy, the magnificence of which must throw into the shade the less splendid representatives of the Panthay power.' It blamed the Home government, claiming that 'the reception of the Burmese has been so different from that of the Panthays; yet there are people well acquainted both with Burma and the debatable land beyond it who believe that the friendship of the Panthays is much more important to us the great Asiatic power than that of the King, their neighbour.'¹⁴⁴⁾ The newspaper also pointed out that 'Our readers have probably been at a loss to understand how the communication between a semi-barbarous Asiatic tribe and the English government can have become, as we have lately been reminded, a subject of serious controversy in India.'¹⁴⁵⁾ We should not, therefore, underestimate the role Liu Tao-hêng played in this comic incident; the failure of his mission was, in fact, the failure of the government of British Burma.

The Final Episode

Five days after Liu Tao-hêng got back to Bombay, Ta-li fell into the hands of the Ch'ing army, but it took more than three months for the news to reach Mandalay. It is worth pondering over the fact that when Liu Tao-hêng reached Rangoon this time, he was no longer eager to seek military aid from the British, but was instead busy with problems of money.

He asked T. T. Cooper, the escort of his journey home, to write to Eden, requesting assistance from the government of British Burma to get some money back from Tu Wên-hsiu's commercial agents in Mandalay. He claimed that two firms trading under the names *Yüan-fa Hao* 元發號 and *Yüan-hsing Hao* 元興號, had withheld a sum of money amounting to 900,000 rupees, belonging to Tu Wên-hsiu;¹⁴⁶⁾ but Cooper stated in his letter that the money, totalling £900,000 was Liu Tao-hêng's own money.¹⁴⁷⁾

The government of British Burma referred this request to Wade, the British minister in Pei-ching, for investigation.¹⁴⁸⁾ At the same time, Eden asked Strover, the British agent in Mandalay, to ascertain by careful private enquiry, whether the money belonged to Tu Wên-hsiu's private purse or was a part of the revenue of the state. According to Strover's report:¹⁴⁹⁾

I have this day had an interview with the principal merchants of the Chinese firms alluded to and have elicited the fact that they are indebted to Tu Wên-hsiu in considerable amount but far less than is stated in Cooper's letter. They, moreover, promptly refuse to recognize the Panthay in any manner, and argue that Prince Hassan is not a son of the Sultan Suliman. They have refused to receive his letter to them and say that they know nothing about him and will have nothing to do with him. The account of silver and produce received by them from the Sultan in the letter are [sic] all made up. The balance in his favour they hold now is the property of the Imperial Chinese government and [they] will only give it over on receiving word from the Chinese government at Yan-nan-sing, a town about fifteen days march to the northeast of Ta-li. I explained in a friendly way the difference between private property and property of the state but could ascertain nothing further than that they now considered the money due by them as belonging to the Chinese government. The merchants appeared to be much annoyed with Prince Hassan's letters. It appears from what they said that the Panthay would soon overthrow the Chinese, and it would therefore be in their interests to settle accounts with him without delay.

Apparently, Liu Tao-hêng became very conceited after his visit to London, thinking that the influence of the India Office and the power of the government of British Burma would be able to make him the 'legitimate' heir to inherit the money Tu Wên-hsiu had invested in Mandalay, although he knew quite well that some of the merchants were supposed to be friendly with the Burmese prime minister. He was even led to imagine that his political backing was strong enough to obtain the money by force.

Not long afterwards, the Ch'ing governor of Yün-nan, Ts'ên Yü-ying 岑毓英, twice sent *Tu-ssü* 都司 (captain) T'ien Ch'un-fang 田春芳, *Ch'ien-tsung* 千總 (lieutenant), Yao Kuei-lin 姚桂林, and the defected Moslem general

Ma Shuang-yüan 馬双元, to Mandalay, to confiscate the two Chinese firms which had connections with Tu Wên-hsiu. By the estimate of the British political agent, the total amount of money involved was about 200,000 rupees. As the King of Burma was 'mixed up in it,'¹⁵⁰⁾ the amount actually received by the Ch'ing officers was no more than 33,000 taels of silver.¹⁵¹⁾ Captain T'ien Ch'un-fang complained furiously about this deceit to Captain T. Lowndes, the British political agent at Bhamo, saying Mindon 'had taken a lion's share of the Panthay money.'¹⁵²⁾

When Liu Tao-hêng first came back to Burma, the government of British Burma, expecting that he might be useful to them in the future, spared no expense to keep him in Rangoon. Eden even had the idea of sending him to England again to acquire a thorough knowledge of English in order to employ him on duty at the northeast frontier of India where the Moslem Movements were increasingly attracting public notice, but this was discouraged by the Secretary of State.¹⁵³⁾ It must be emphasised here that one of the main reasons why the British concerned themselves so much with the Panthay affair, was their desire to resuscitate their trade relations with Yün-nan. That they were not interested in supporting Moslem movements as such, is proven by a statement at the time that 'for the sake of trade, it is to be hoped that Ta-li has fallen, for the Panthays are useless. . . .'¹⁵⁴⁾ Subsequently, when the British political agent started to entertain the imperial officers of the Ch'ing government with champagne and refreshments in Mandalay, Liu Tao-hêng's presence in Rangoon became 'an embarrassment' to his hosts.¹⁵⁵⁾

As we may see, Liu Tao-hêng was adept in the art of securing personal gain. His subsequent history shows this again, for only four years later he suddenly changed his role and 'became' the grandson-in-law of Bahadur Shah, the deposed king of Delhi. But though it was possible for him to defend himself by saying that the title of Prince Hassan had been imposed on him by the government of British Burma, he could never be able to explain away his dubious intentions to secure fortune through this sudden marriage.

It happened thus: After the defeat of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the last king of the Mogul empire, Bahadur Shah and his family, were banished from India and detained in Rangoon. Bahadur Shah died in 1866, and his family stayed on in Rangoon. According to the then Indian custom, Bahadur Shah's granddaughter, Rownuck, had to be married when she reached the age of twelve. However, Rownuck's father, Jewan Bakht, was a Sunni, while her mother, Zumanee Begun, of Persian origin, was a Shiah. Parental religious differences made it difficult to find someone suitable for Rownuck, especially as the approval by ballot of the council of twenty elders was also required. Rownuck's poor mother, blind and weak, was therefore obliged to ask for permission to travel to Calcutta, Delhi, Benares and Lucknow, in search of a suitable son-in-law.¹⁵⁶⁾

In 1877, through an official go-between, Liu Tao-hêng accepted the proposal and promised to conclude the marriage. However, he then tried deliberately to delay the wedding ceremony, as he intended to use this marriage in his campaign to get the British government to accede to his demands. Although Rownuck had received a grant of 10,000 rupees for her dowry, Liu insisted that unless a house was provided and an allowance granted for himself and his intended wife, the marriage would not take place. He admitted that he had originally agreed to the marriage because he thought that by doing so he would meet with the approval of the government and thus secure for himself a permanent allowance, and stated that he was still quite willing to fulfil this engagement if a suitable allowance were permanently sanctioned and a house provided. He said to the chief commissioner that in case the government of India declined his request, he would ask to be supplied with the means to go to Constantinople, in the hope of receiving some assistance from the Sultan of Turkey, and then proceed to Kashgar, where many of his countrymen would be glad to offer him some kind of employment.

The government of British Burma, deeply angered by this attempt at extortion wrote to Fort William about their proposition:

I am desired by the Chief Commissioner to say that he has more than once during the last few years pressed upon Prince Hassan the desirability of his taking to agricultural pursuits or adapting some profession which would make him independent of his reliance upon the government bounty for his support, but without effect. Though courteous and gentlemanly in his demeanour, Prince Hassan is by nature extremely apathetic and indolent, and he would like nothing so much as to be left in his present position as a pensioner of the government. He certainly has no claims of the kind upon the government, and except for his quiet and unobtrusive bearing, his presence in Burma might be politically a disadvantage. There are no circumstances or directions in the Chief Commissioner's opinion in which his service could be locally utilised. Mr. Rivers Thompson [the chief commissioner] is reluctant therefore to recommend that the arrangement which Prince Hassan asks for, and upon which his marriage is apparently dependent, should be complied with. He thinks it would be better if a grant of rupees 2,000 could be sanctioned to enable Prince Hassan to find his way to Kashgar, if political considerations do not effect such a proceeding.¹⁵⁷⁾

Naturally, the government of India was not anxious to allow Liu Tao-hêng to drive a hard bargain over this marriage, but they had to consider carefully the problems concerning Zumanee Begun,¹⁵⁸⁾ not to mention the fact that the marriage of Rownuck had already been delayed for too long.

The governor-general of India therefore commented that 'the marriage of this young lady should not lightly be broken off, and as the chief obstacles in the way of the marriage appear to be pecuniary, the governor-general in council is prepared to make arrangements which in his opinion ought to satisfy all reasonable requirements.' As a result, an allowance of 450 rupees per mensem was granted to Liu Tao-hêng and Rownuck together with a residence in Rangoon,¹⁵⁹⁾ and after more than a year's delay, the marriage eventually took place on 12 October 1878.¹⁶⁰⁾

So the so-called Panthay mission, which was central to the case against Tu Wên-hsiu, was in fact initiated not by Tu but by Syed Dawood of Wu-so. The chief role in it was later taken over by the adventurer, Liu Tao-hêng, who had only the most tenuous connections with the Ta-li rebels, if indeed he had any at all. Finally, much of what prominence the mission gained was due more to political manoeuvrings by the British authorities in Burma and India than to any role it had in Chinese affairs.

Without the Panthay mission and Liu Tao-hêng's memorial, the case against Tu Wên-hsiu collapses. In fact, as we have seen, Tu resisted foreign intervention in the Moslem rebellion and expelled foreign expeditions from rebel-held territory. We must therefore conclude that Tu Wên-hsiu was no traitor to Yün-nan or to China, but rather deserves his place among the heroes of the province and the country.

NOTES

- 1) Yen Chung-p'ing 嚴仲平, *Chung-kuo Chin-tai Ching-chi Shih T'ung-chi Tzŭ-liao Hsüan-chi* 中國近代經濟史統計資料選輯, Pei-ching 北京, 1955, p. 367; *Hsü Yün-nan T'ung-chih Kuo* 續雲南通志稿, K'un-ming 昆明, 1901, Ch. 35, pp. 4-13.
- 2) *Chin-tai Shih Tsu-liao* 近代史資料, Vol. 3, Pei-ching, 1958, p. 27.
- 3) Doudart de Lagree and Francis Garnier, *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine Effectué Pendant les Années 1866, 1867 et 1868*, Vol. 1, Paris, 1873, pp. 455-457.
- 4) Pai Shou-i 白壽彝, *Hui-hui Min-tsu té Hsin-shêng* 回回民族的新生, Pei-ching, 1951, p. 20.
- 5) *Têng-ch'uan Hsien-chih* 鄧川縣志, 1854 edition, Ch. 4, pp. 1-2.
- 6) *Hui-min Ch'i-i* 回民起義, Book 1, Shang-hai, 1953, pp. 7, 251-252, 305; M. de Thiersant, *Le Mahométisme en Chine*, Vol. 1, Paris, 1878, p. 122; Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China, A Neglected Problem*, London, 1910, p. 129.
- 7) *Hui-hui Min-tsu té Hsin-shêng* 回回民族的新生, pp. 53-63.
- 8) Fan Wên-lan 范文瀾, *Chung-kuo Chin-tai Shih* 中國近代史, Book 1, Pei-ching, 1955, p. 162; Lin Tsêng-p'ing 林增平, *Chung-kuo Chin-tai Shih* 中國近代史, Book 1, 1979, p. 229.
- 9) *Yün-nan Jih-pao* 雲南日報, 11 September 1979, p. 1.
- 10) 關於杜文秀對外關係的幾個問題 'Some Problems Concerning Tu Wên-hsiu's Foreign Relations,' *Li-shih Yen-chiu* 歷史研究, 1963, no. 4, pp. 141-150.
- 11) Panthay was the term used by the Burmese when referring to Chinese Moslems in Yün-nan, see Albert Fytche, 'Memorandum of the Panthays, or Mohammedan Population of Yün-nan,' *Burma Past and Present with Personal Reminiscences of the Country*, Vol. II, London, 1878, Appendix E, p. 297; Henry Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, London, 1903, p. 669.
- 12) Arthur Pardy Stout, 'The Penetration of Yün-nan,' *The Bulletin of the Geographical*

- Society of Philadelphia*, Vol. X, no. 1 (January, 1912), p. 10 note.
- 13) *Selections of Papers Regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burma, and on the Upper Brahmaputra*, Calcutta, 1873, pp. 1, 83, 134.
 - 14) Hugh Clifford, *Further India*, London, 1905, pp. 255-276.
 - 15) *The Penetration of Yün-nan*, p. 10.
 - 16) George Ernest Morrison, *An Australian in China*, London, 1902, pp. 171-172; *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 1, pp. 458-459.
 - 17) Louis de Carne, *Travels in Indo-China and the Chinese Empire* (translated from French), London, 1872, p. 277.
 - 18) Jean Dupuis, *L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au Commerce et 'Événements du Tong-Kin*, Paris, 1879, p. 72; Jules Gros, *Origines de la Conquête du Tong-Kin*, Paris, 1878, p. 85.
 - 19) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 1, p. 527.
 - 20) Henry McAleavy, *Black Flags in Vietnam*, London, 1968, p. 94.
 - 21) "The commandant of our Chinese escort, whose name, by the way, translated according to the approved method of Abbe Hue, is not inappropriate to his profession, "Hill-echoing Thunder," narrated to us how he conveyed with exceeding difficulty four foreign guns, "pieces de cinq" only, as we ascertained from a missionary, over the rugged route from Yün-nan-fu, and now the capture of the city was to be attributed solely to his own exertion. One gun was irreparably damaged en route, but the surviving three, laid and pointed by himself, according to his account, terminated the rebellion.' See *Report by Mr. Baber of the Route followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission between Ta-li-fu and Momein, Parliamentary Paper*, China, N3, 1878, p. 5. 'L'armée imperiale se mettra en marche pour aller assiéger Ta-ly; on présume qu'à l'aide d'une batterie de dix canons rayés, cette ville sera prise assez facilement. Le nouveau roi épouvante, dit-on demande la paix, mais le gouvernement de Peking n'y consent point.' 'Lettre de M^{re} Ponsot, de la Société des Missions—Etrangers, Vicaire Apostolique du Yun-nan, *Annales de la Propagation de la Foi*, Vol. 43 (1871), p. 103. Also, British India Office, *Diary of the Official Assistant Political Agent, Bhamo* (hereafter cited as *Diary of Bhamo*), 8 May 1873; *Secret Letters from India*, Vol. 4, p. 725.
 - 22) *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 1, p. 511.
 - 23) T. T. Cooper, *Travels of a Pioneer of Commerce in Pigtail and Petticoats*, London, 1871, p. 331.
 - 24) William Gill, *The River of Golden Sand. The Narrative of a Journey through China and Eastern Tibet to Burmah*, Vol. 1, 1880, p. 304; J. Bueot, *Dans les Marches Tibétaines*, Paris, 1909, p. 4.
 - 25) *Travels in Indo-China*, p. 324.
 - 26) *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 1, pp. 446, 489, 490-491; *Travel in Indo-China*, p. 276; *Further India*, p. 45.
 - 27) *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 1, p. 513; *Travels in Indo-China*, p. 326.
 - 28) *The Geographical Magazine*, London, June 1878, p. 162; Adrian Launey, *Histoire de la Mission du Thibet*, Vol. 2, 1904, p. 85.
 - 29) C. C. Cooper, *Mishme Hills*, London, 1873, p. 1.
 - 30) *Ibid.*, p. 15.
 - 31) *Travels of a Pioneer of Commerce*, p. 2.
 - 32) *Ibid.*, pp. 341-354; Henry Yule, An Essay Introductory to Captain Gills's Journey entitled *The River of Golden Sand*, Vol. 1, p. 54.
 - 33) *Baron Richthofen's Letters 1870-1872*, Vol. 2, 1903, p. 188.
 - 34) Henry Yule, Trade Routes to Western China, *The Geographical Magazine*, April 1875, p. 100.
 - 35) *Daily Telegraph*, London, 21 April 1870.
 - 36) T'êng-yüe was known as Momein to the English. The Shan called T'êng-yüe Mong-Myen. Momein is merely a Burmese corruption of this. H. R. Davis, *Yün-nan, the Link Between India and the Yangtze*, Cambridge, 1909, p. 45; John Anderson, *Mandalay to*

- Momein, *A Narrative of Two Expeditions to Western China of 1868 and 1873*, London, 1876, p. 240.
- 37) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 219.
- 38) *Mandalay to Momein*, p. 231.
- 39) Howard Malcon, *Travels in South-eastern Asia, Embracing Hindustan, Malaya, Siam and China*, Vol. 1, Boston, 1838, p. 265.
- 40) Michael Symes, *An Account of an Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, sent by the Governor-General of India in the Year of 1795*, London, 1800, p. 325.
- 41) India Office Library and Record, *Diary of Bhamo*, 14 September 1873; *Diary of the Political Agent, Mandalay* (hereafter cited as *Diary of Mandalay*), 1 August 1873. See *Proceedings in the Foreign Department, Political* (hereafter cited as *Political Proceedings*), January 1874, nos. 61, 97
- 42) *Burma Past and Present*, Vol. II, p. 302, Appendix E. In the old days, the small caravans began to arrive at Ava from Yün-nan in December. About 1 February, the Great caravans arrived, and afterwards the smaller ones, until 1 March. The smaller caravans consisted of about fifty, a hundred, or two hundred men, and the big ones of about one thousand. Each man took care of several ponies or mules, sometimes even up to fifteen or twenty in number, which carried, in panniers, a load of from one to two hundred pounds of goods. The Chinese Mart, where the caravans stopped, was at Madah, thirteen miles north of Umerapooora, the former Metropolis of Burma, with a population of about ten thousand Chinese, mostly married to Burmese women. Extensive enclosures were built, where the fairs were held, while the cattle were sent to graze. *Travels in Southeastern Asia*, Vol. 1, p. 225; Vol. 2, p. 178.
- 43) In the Chinese Bazaars at Bhamo, 'No Chinese goods are to be seen, save a few medicines.' 'Chinamen had then large godowns, and dealt in nothing but Chinese goods, and those for export to China; but now (the route being closed) they had been compelled to become general shopkeepers.' Chinamen said: 'No! All the routes are practically closed, we used to wear cloth jackets that came from Canton overland, and use everything from China; now we get all from below, even our teas. This lasting of our jackets (of Leeds manufacture) comes by ship from Canton. Formerly we would not have worn it; now cloth is scarce, and we must wear what we can get.' Clement Williams: *Through Burma to Western China*, London, 1868, pp. 82-85.
- 44) *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 1, p. 531.
- 45) *Diary of Mandalay*, 28 July 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, January 1873, no. 91.
- 46) *Diary of Bhamo*, 20 January 1871, and *Diary of Mandalay*, 26 November 1873. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1872, no. 116, and June 1872, no. 442.
- 47) E. R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, London, 1954, p. 242; *Diary of Bhamo*, 7 November 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1872, no. 281.
- 48) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 227.
- 49) The notorious leader of the pro-Ch'ing militia was Li Chên-kuo 李珍国, known as Li Ssü Ta-jên 李四大人, to the British. He was a half Burmese and had several Burmese in his service. Originally, Li Chên-kuo opened a jade firm in Umerapooora. After joining the Ch'ing army in T'êng-yüe, he entrusted his firm to his brother's care and relied on this jade business in Burma as one of the sources of financial support for his army. See Wang Chih 王芝, *Hai-k'ê Jih-t'an* 海客日譚, Nan-ching, 1876, Vol. 2, pp. 2a & 9b. In 1873, he 'hoodwinked King Mindon with a story of Panthay oppression, represented himself as a distinguished patriot of high rank and obtained from the King a gift of 20,000 viss (a Burmese weight of 3 3/5 lbs) of royal cotton then lying at Bhamo,' with which as rewards, the anti-Panthay forces eventually got the upper hand over the rebels. See C. W. Dawson, *Burma Gazetteer—the Bhamo District*, Rangoon, 1960, p. 20; *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 233; *Diary of Bhamo*, 15 November 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1872, no. 281.
- 50) *Diary of Mandalay*, 16 February 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1872, no. 116.

- 51) India Office Library and Record, Political and Secret Department, *Letters to India, Madras, Bombay, Aden, Persian Gulf and Zanzibar* (hereafter cited as *Letters to India*), Vol. 16, October-December 1873, no. 171.
- 52) *Diary of Bhamo*, 31 January 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June 1872, no. 442.
- 53) *Ibid.*, 27 January 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June 1872, no. 442.
- 54) *Mandalay to Momein*, p. 195; Edward B. Sladen, *Official Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo* (hereafter cited as *Exploration of the Trade Routes to China*), Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign Department, no. 79, Calcutta, 1879, p. 120.
- 55) *Diary of Bhamo*, 16 January 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June 1872, no. 442.
- 56) *Diary of Bhamo*, 8 December 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, April 1873, no. 148.
- 57) *Burma Past and Present*, Vol. 2, p. 98.
- 58) *Mandalay to Momein*, p. 185; *Exploration of the Trade Routes to China*, p. 136.
- 59) *Exploration of the Trade Routes to China*, p. 135.
- 60) *Ibid.*, p. 147.
- 61) *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126; *Mandalay to Momein*, p. 198.
- 62) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 230.
- 63) *The River of Golden Sand*, Vol. 2, Appendix 1, pp. 424-425.
- 64) *Ts'en Hsiang-ch'in Kung Nien-p'u* 岑襄勤公年譜, Ch. 2, p. 186.
- 65) *Exploration of the Trade Routes to China*, Appendix, pp. 141-142.
- 66) *Burma Past and Present*, Vol. 2, p. 98.
- 67) *Exploration of the Trade Routes to China*, Appendix, pp. 11-13.
- 68) *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185, Appendix, pp. 12-13.
- 69) *Mandalay to Momein*, p. 246; John Anderson, *A Report of the Expedition to Western Yunnan via Bhamo*, Calcutta, 1871, p. 338.
- 70) *Report by Mr. Baber of the Route followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission between Ta-li-fu and Momein*, p. 7.
- 71) Henry Yule, An Essay Introductory to Captain Gill's Journey entitled *The River of Golden Sand*, Vol. 1, p. 52 note.
- 72) O. K. Hein, Rising of the Dungens or Mussulman in Western China, translated from the *Russian Military Journal*, August 1866, *Edinburgh Reviews*, April 1868, p. 363 note.
- 73) *Ibid.*
- 74) *Voyage d'Exploration en Indo-Chine*, Vol. 2, Appendix, pp. 564-565.
- 75) F. M. Roberts, *Western Travellers to China*, London, 1932, p. 80.
- 76) *Report by Mr. Baber of the Routes followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission between Ta-li-fu and Momein*, p. 6.
- 77) Archibald R. Colquhoun, *Accross Chryse*, London, 1883, Vol. 2, p. 245.
- 78) *Ibid.*, note 70.
- 79) *Burma Past and Present*, Vol. 2, p. 115.
- 80) A Memorandum from Walter B. King, *Letter to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 271.
- 81) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 170.
- 82) Tallboy Wheelers, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma to C. Aitchison, Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 272D, enclosure 1.
- 83) *British Parliamentary Papers Connected with the Development of Trade between British Burma and Western China with the Mission to Yunnan of 1874-5*, 1876, pp. 6, 7.
- 84) *Diary of Bhamo*, 10 April and 27 August 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June-August 1872, no. 212; January 1873, no. 59.
- 85) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, p. 170.
- 86) *Ibid.*, pp. 219-229.
- 87) *Ibid.*, note 84; *Diary of Mandalay*, 26 December 1871 and 8 December 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1872, no. 116 and April 1873, no. 150.
- 88) *Diary of Bhamo*, 8 December 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, April 1873, no. 150.

- 89) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 1, p. 490; *Ts'ên Hsiang-ch'in Kung Nien-p'u*, ch. 3, p. 116.
- 90) *State of Matters in Yunnan*. See *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 272HH-272KK. According to the diary of Wang Chih, who was sent by Leeseetahi (Li Ssü Ta-jên) to collect some money for him in Mandalay and at the same time to carry a message to the King of Burma, during that period (Nov. 29-Dec. 13, 1871) there was a Chinese Moslem staying on the third floor with Captain Horace Spearman, the British Political Agent at Bhamo. See *Hai-k'é Jih-t'an*, Vol. 1, p. 21b; *Diary of Bhamo*, 2nd January 1872, *Political Proceedings*, February 1872, no. 443; Haung Hün Aung, *First Burmese Mission to the court of St. James's, Kinwun Mingyi's Diary, 1872-1874*, *Journal of the Burmese Research Society*, December 1974, Vol. 57, Parts 1 and 2 (hereafter cited as *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*), pp. 21-22.
- 91) *Diary of Bhamo*, 15 November 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1872, no. 281.
- 92) *Ibid.*
- 93) *Diary of Bhamo*, 18 and 20 November 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1872, no. 283.
- 94) *Diary of Mandalay*, 26 November 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, April-June 1872, no. 289.
- 95) *Diary of Bhamo*, 28 December 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, April-June 1872, no. 287.
- 96) *Diary of Bhamo*, 26 January 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, April-June 1872, no. 442.
- 97) *Diary of Bhamo*, 27 and 31 January 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, *ibid.* Until the fall of Mandalay in 1885, the Moslems, in British Burma alone amounting to 99,846 in number, were very active in state affairs between the British and the Burmese King. See Moshe Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma* (Heidelberg, 1972), pp. 15, 115. 'The (Panthay) chiefs, the interpreter said, were anxious to have Muslims from India to assist them, it being their ultimate wish to "finish China" (this must mean Yün-nan) and then to take possession of Burma.' *Through Burma to Western China*, p. 121.
- 98) *Diary of Bhamo*, 10 April 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, July-August 1872, no. 212.
- 99) *Diary of Bhamo*, 27 August 1872, See *Political Proceedings*, January 1873, no. 57.
- 100) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, pp. 165-171.
- 101) Professor Lo Êrh-kang 羅爾綱, distinguished historian of the T'ai-p'ing Revolution, has made a careful examination of all the official replies and rescripts made by Tu Wên-hsiu 杜文秀 at that time. He noted that Tu always took matters seriously, giving conscientious attention to all the details involved. Now, all of a sudden, a memorial bearing these momentous implications was treated in a cavalier fashion, commenting on the style of composition in much the same way as an Imperial examiner would on successful 'eight legged' essay. Lu Êrh-kang, Tu Wên-hsiu 'Mai-kuo' Shuo Pien Miu 杜文秀 "賣國" 說辯謬, *Hsüeh-shu Yüeh-k'an* 學術月刊, Shang-hai, April 1980, p. 2.
- 102) Letters from Liu Tao-hêng, envoy from Ta-li. *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, pp. 235-243; India Office Library and Record, L/P&S/3/83, Folio 1369.
- 103) Emilie Rocher, *La Province Chinoise du Yunnan*, Vol. 2, Paris, 1880, p. 181; *Islam in China*, p. 141 note.
- 104) *Ibid.*, note 99
- 105) *Ibid.*, note 102.
- 106) *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, Book 2, pp. 170-171.
- 107) *Ibid.*, note 98.
- 108) *Political Proceedings*, Vol. 10, 1870, no. 438.
- 109) *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 1-11.
- 110) Captain G. A. Strover to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, 31 July 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, March 1872, no. 136.
- 111) Crawford B. Cooke, Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner to C. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 17 December 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, January 1872, nos. 26-29.
- 112) C. Aitchison to Ashley Eden, 28 March 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June 1872,

- nos. 498-500.
- 113) *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 14-16.
- 114) His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to his King of Burma, 1 March 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, June 1872, nos. 2-4; *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, p. 26.
- 115) 'His Majesty entered fully into the subject of trade of China and hostilities between the Chinese and the Panthay, saying that his sympathies were with the former, and that if he had to give assistance to one side or the other, that assistance should be given to the Chinese, but that he had no intention of siding with either party and would remain strictly neutral.' *Diary of Mandalay*, 6 August 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, March 1873, no. 93. 'The (Burmese) authorities at Bhamo are always anxious to send down reports favourable to the Chinese and which reports they know will please the Royal ears.' *Diary of Mandalay*, 19 October 1871. See *Political Proceedings*, January 1872, no. 114. 'His Majesty the King of Burma himself, who is strongly inimical to the Panthay rule, would be glad to see it crushed,' *Diary of Bhamo*, 17 March 1879, *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, p. 272LL.
- 116) *The London Times*, 19 September 1872, p. 10.
- 117) *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 118) *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, p. 70.
- 119) C. H. Phillips (ed.), *Handbook of Oriental History*, London, 1951, pp. 30, 78.
- 120) *Diary of Mandalay*, 16 February 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, April 1872, no. 116.
- 121) Theinne is the present Hsen-wi, called Mu-Pang 木邦 by the Chinese. It was the largest of the districts governed by the Sawbwa of Theinne. *Yün-nan, the Link between India and the Yangtze*, pp. 20, 132 note 1.) Since October, 1871, the Theinne route leading to Ta-li was interrupted in consequence of the Shan Rebellion. The Sawbwa of Theinne, Nga Sinecheer, was able to collect several thousand men on the hills near Theinne, and was later joined by some other Shan Sawbwas. Eventually, the disturbance spread over to the border of Yün-nan, cutting off the route completely. The day before the arrival of this Panthay 'Wayeer,' there seemed to have been some uneasiness among the people at Bhamo and active preparations were being made for defensive or offensive purposes. (*Diary of Mandalay*, 19 October 1871 and 23, 24 and 26 February 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, January 1872, no. 114 and April-June 1872, no. 116.) At the same time, as recorded by Kinwan Mingyi, 'The envoys from the Chinese Muslims of Yün-nan came and saw the Burmese envoys at the hotel (in London)... They had come by way of Bhamo and then down the Irrawaddy, and they would return by the same route. On their way to Rangoon, they had stopped at the Golden City (Mandalay) to pay their respects to the King of Sunrise (Mindon), who graciously gave them audience, and they would pay their respects again on their way back.' (*Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 70-71.) Kinwan Mingyi, being responsible for administrating the frontier region between the Kingdom of Burma and British Burma, knew well about the movements of the Panthay Mission. The statement that the Panthay 'Wayeer' had come by the Theinne route, was, apparently, no more than a little trick to deceive Captain Stover. Since communications between Ta-li and T'êng-yüeh were closed as a result of the fall of Yung-ch'ang to the Ch'ing army, the only answer that seemed feasible was to say 'by way of Theinne,' in order to make it seem that the 'Wayeer' was really sent from Ta-li. Therefore, once Stover had made a close scrutiny of the statement, his doubtful comments on the 'Wayeer' were inevitable.
- 122) *Diary of Mandalay*, 28 February 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, April-June 1872, no. 116.
- 123) *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 12, 18.
- 124) *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 125) His Excellency the Pakhan Mengyee, Prime Minister of Burma, to Ashley Eden, 31 March 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1872, no. 123.

- 126) Tallboy Wheelers, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma to C. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 30 March 1872, *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 272D, enclosure 1.
- 127) Government of India to the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India, 26 April 1872, *Secret Letters from India*, Vol. 2, 1872, no. 1964.
- 128) *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, p. 43; *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 272A.
- 129) 'The English officials at Rangoon were angry over the proposal of the envoys to proceed to England and so they were now plotting and scheming to prevent them from going by placing all kinds of difficulties and hindrances in their way. Even if they could not actually stop the envoys leaving Rangoon for London, those English officials were determined to delay the envoys departure as long as possible.' A fine of 1,500 Kyats was imposed on the Burmese Consul for not having declared the arms on board the ship immediately on arrival. The Burmese royal ship was detained under maritime law and the Burmese envoys had to transfer to a regular passenger boat 'Tenasserim' to sail for England. Meanwhile, the pilot, Wise, was instructed to obtain a copy of the King's letter to Queen Victoria for submission to Eden, otherwise he would be prohibited to take 'Tenasserim' out to the sea. But this was ignored. *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 27-29.
- 130) *Letters to India*, Vol. 4, 1872, no. 272C.
- 131) Ibid., nos. 272X, 272Y, 272Z. In contrast, the Burmese envoys stayed at the Grosvenor Hotel. The expenses of this mission exceeded ten lakhs of Kyats or £100,000, not including the presents to Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales, the value of which was assessed by the English themselves at £280,000. *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 44, 141; *Diary of Mandalay*, 8 May 1873. See *Secret Letters from India*, part 4, 1873, no. 128, enclosure 3.
- 132) Ibid., no. 217.
- 133) Ibid., no. 235.
- 134) Ibid., no. 243.
- 135) Memorandum to the Duke of Argyll from Sir John Kaye, *Letters to India*, no. 209.
- 136) Sir John Kaye to the Duke of Argyll, *ibid.*, no. 272.
- 137) Thomas F. Wade to Earl Granville, 23 June 1872, F.O. 17/672, Folio 158.
- 138) Thomas F. Wade to Earl Granville, 17 August 1872, F.O. 17/631, Folio 139.
- 139) *Letters to India*, nos. 272WW, 272YY; *Diary of the Burmese Mission to England*, pp. 69-70.
- 140) *Letters to India*, nos. 272, 272SS, 272YY.
- 141) Ibid., attached Bill.
- 142) Ibid., nos. 273A, 273E-F.
- 143) Ibid., nos. 273B, 273P.
- 144) *The London Times*, 19 September 1872, p. 10.
- 145) Ibid., 24 September 1872, p. 9.
- 146) *Letters from India*, Vol. 16, 1873, no. 171.
- 147) T. T. Cooper to Sir John Kaye, 15 June 1873. See *Home Correspondence*, Vol. 74, no. 85.
- 148) Foreign Office to Thomas F. Wade, 7 November 1873, F.O. 17/657, no. 93.
- 149) *Diary of Mandalay*, 12 January 1873. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1873, no. 148.
- 150) *Diary of Mandalay*, 20 April and 7 May 1873. See *Secret Letters from India*, Vol. 14, no. 421 and Appendix 3; *Diary of Bhamo*, 31 May and 23 June. See *Secret Letters from India*, Vol. 14, Appendix 4, pp. 143-147.
- 151) *Ts'ên Hsiang-ch'in Kung Tsou-kao* 岑襄勤公奏稿, Ch. 9; *Ts'ên Hsiang-chin Kung I-kao* 岑襄勤公遺稿, Ch. 3.
- 152) *Diary of Mandalay*, 7 May 1873. See *Secret Letters from India*, vol. 14, Appendix 3; *Diary of Bhamo*, 10 December 1873. See *Political Proceedings*, April 1874, no. 107.
- 153) At first, when Liu Tao-hêng arrived in Rangoon from England, he was lodged in the Government Guest House, with a daily allowance of five rupees granted for himself

- and his followers. A carriage was hired for his use, at ninety rupees a month, and a few house-servants provided. (The Chief Commissioner of British Burma to the Government of India, 22 October 1873. See *Political Proceedings*, January–April 1874, no. 93.) Afterwards, he was dependent upon the government for allowances, which, including house rent and establishment, amounted to 347 rupees per mensem. This was understood to be a temporary concession. (Major C. W. Street, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma to C. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1878, no. 164.)
- 154) *Diary of Mandalay*, 7 May 1872. See *Secret Letters from India*, Vol. 14, Appendix 3.
- 155) *Diary of Bhamo*, 10 December 1873. See *Political Proceedings*, May 1874, no. 107.
- 156) Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Office, 30 July 1872. See *Political Proceedings*, October 1872, no. 55.
- 157) Major C. W. Street, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, to C. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 24 November 1877. See *Political Proceedings*, January 1878, no. 164.
- 158) When Zumanee became a queen, she had been dowried with *jagheres* yielding a large yearly revenue and possessed jewels valued at several lakhs, but after the Mutiny her estates were confiscated and her jewels seized as prizes of war. *Ibid.*, note 156.
- 159) C. Aitchison to A. Rivers Thompson, the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, 18 January 1878. See *Political Proceedings*, February 1878, no. 165.
- 160) Major C. W. Street to A. C. Lyall, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 26 October 1878. See *Political Proceedings*, September–December 1878, no. 89.