

Kiangsu 江蘇 Local Finance and

Li Hung-chang 李鴻章

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Introduction

Scholars of modern Chinese history have been quick to point out the increasing decentralization of power after the Taiping Rebellion.¹⁾ In this process the Governor (*hsün-fu* 巡撫) and Governor General (*tsung-tu* 總督) serving as regional officials gained control over the powers of government finance and the military building on the support they had won from the regional gentry, thus consolidating their power vis-à-vis the central government. Previous scholarship has suggested various approaches to this problem. The first treats the consolidation of the power of the Governor and Governor General, especially the strengthening of their control over military affairs, stressing the formation and nature of the Hsiang 湘 army and the Huai 淮 army as illustrations.²⁾ The second treats the consolidation of their financial power during the late Ch'ing 清 period analyzing changes in the financial system.³⁾ The third treats the role reformist, mostly local officials, played in the building of capitalism in China.⁴⁾ The fourth treats the gentry's role in regional government, stressing the changes in their ability and position within the ruling structure.⁵⁾ To clarify the process of consolidation of power, the following two questions need to be considered.

What concrete policies did provincial governments implement to bolster their financial power, and what changes did such measures bring to the structure of regional and central bureaucratic governments including the existing financial system? Second, though a co-operative relationship existed between the gentry and the Governor and Governor General, how did the gentry actually participate in regional government and what was the nature of their co-operation?

This article will consider these questions through an examination of local financial problems in Kiangsu province before the Taiping Rebellion and Li Hung-chang's 李鴻章 financial policy in that province during and directly after the Taiping Rebellion. First we will look at Li's policy toward military expenses during the emergency period when Taiping forces invaded Kiangsu province. Second, we will consider his land tax reform. Since many studies have dealt with the second point,⁶⁾ this article will primarily con-

centrate on the former point, Li Hung-chang's policy toward military expenses.

I. Local Finance in Kiangsu before the Taiping Rebellion

It was imperative for Li Hung-chang to win support from the Suchou 蘇州 gentry to implement his financial policy in Kiangsu province. The Suchou gentry for their part were also anxious to ingratiate themselves with Li Hung-chang and the Hsiang army officials in an effort to get him to carry out changes in the financial system which they themselves had been promoting even prior to the Taiping invasion. To understand why the financial policies proposed by the Suchou gentry and the Governor and Governor General met with failure, we need to first examine in some detail local finance in the pre-Taiping period.

(1) Financial Problems

Local finance in the Suchou region⁷⁾ showed a gradual increase in expenditure beginning in the Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶 period [1796-1820], and getting more pronounced after the mid-Tao-kuang 道光 period [1821-50] the situation finally becoming so serious that the amount of tribute grain sent to the central government decreased. The basic reason for this financial crisis was the increase in the expense of sending tribute grain to the central government, which had to be met out of funds held by department and county governments. The greatest expense involved was the cost of canal transport (*pang-fei* 幫費).

In Kiangsu province during the early Ch'ing period three kinds of funds were allocated to cover the costs of transporting tribute grain: revenue from military colony land (*t'un-t'ien* 屯田) under the control of each garrison station (*wei-so* 衛所), rice collected in addition to tribute grain, and silver collected to cover the costs of delivering tribute grain (*ts'ao-hsiang-yin* 漕項銀). But during the Yung-chêng 雍正 period [1722-35], with the increase in the cost of troop transport (*yün-chün* 運軍), transport expenses were supplemented with funds from the counties. The rise in the cost of canal transport led to an increase in surcharge assessment (*fu-shou* 浮收). An Imperial Edict of November 1799 had raised the question of a reform of the surcharge assessment. However, the reform was blocked by opposition from the Transport General (*ts'ao-yün tsung-tu* 漕運總督), Chiang Chao-k'uei 蔣兆奎, who claimed that it was impossible to reduce the cost of canal transport due to an increase in expenditures which was the result of price-rises.⁸⁾ During the Tao-kuang period, such people as Yao Wên-t'ien 姚文田, T'ang Chin-chao 湯金釗 and Wang Chia-hsiang 王家相 repeatedly discussed the need to reform surcharge assessments which had increased because of the rise in the cost of canal transport and other customary fees (*lou-kuei* 陋規) related to tribute grain transportation.⁹⁾

Table A. Shift in Cost of Canal Transport

Year	Cost of Canal Transport per Ship
Pre 1809	100-200-300 taels ①
1809	500-600-700-800 taels ①
1821	below 500-600 dollars ②
1827	1,000 taels ③
1831-33	Suchou 蘇州 prefecture 1,400-1,500 dollars ② Sungkiang 松江 prefecture 1,400-1,500 dollars ②

Sources: ① *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsuan* 皇朝政典類纂, 49: 3a.
 ② *Wei Yüan chi* 魏源集, (Peking: 中華書局, 1975.) Bk. 1, pp. 425-426.
 ③ *T'ao Wên-yi kung ch'üan-chi* 陶文毅公全集, 7: 30a.

Table B. Shift in Cost of Canal Transport of Tribute Grain per Picul

Year	Cost of Canal Transport of Tribute Grain per Picul
Chia-ch'ing period (1796-1820)	1 ts'ao-p'ing tael ① 18 taels ②
Pre mid-Tao-kuang period (1821-1850)	4 taels ③
1846	over 6 dollars (=5.5 taels) ④
1851	1 picul ⑤

Sources: ① *Ts'ui-tsu hsing* 催租行; quoted in Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫: *Min Shin Jidai Kôtsū-shi no Kenkyū* 明清時代交通史の研究 (Studies on the History of Transport during the Ming and Ch'ing Periods), Tokyo: 山川出版社, 1971, pp. 336-350. In *Hsiao-pin-lu k'ang-yi* 校邠廬抗議, p. 30a, Fêng Kuei-fên wrote the regular sum had been 1 tael. ② *Hsiao-pin-lu k'ang-yi*, p. 30b. ③ Based on Wei Yüan's 魏源 view given in *Hsiao-pin-lu k'ang-yi*, p. 30b. ④ In the *An-Wu ssū-chung* 安吳四種, 7: 6b Pao Shih-ch'en 包世臣 stated that the cost for an administrator to deliver tribute grain to a transport ship was 8 dollars per picul of rice. At that time the price of rice did not exceed 2 dollars per picul, so the cost of canal transport amounted to more than 6 dollars per picul. ⑤ *TWCKCC, tsou-kao* 奏稿, pp. 15-16.

Table A indicates the increase in the cost of canal transport from the Chia-ch'ing period on showing the cost per transport ship (*pang-ch'üan* 幫船). Table B indicates the shift in the cost of canal transport per picul (*tan* 石) of tribute grain. Total costs of collection including transport expenses amounted to more than three times the regular sum after the mid-Tao-kuang period.

Contemporaries gave a number of reasons for the increase in the cost of canal transport. Yao Wên-t'ien pointed to the following two factors in his memorial of 1821. First there was an across the board increase in all expenses concerning local finance due to the rise in prices, and second there was a

need to supplement income because of the decrease in the additional income derived from shipping private goods on the grain transport ships, which accompanied the decline in commerce. Before the early Tao-kuang period many others beside Yao attributed the cause to price-rises. Rice prices rose from the mid-Chia-ch'ing period to the beginning of the Tao-kuang period and fell thereafter,¹⁰⁾ but the prices of other commodities, especially the prices of non-agricultural products, seemed to continue to rise after 1823.¹¹⁾ Wei Yüan 魏源 writes that in the beginning county governments used copper cash to pay for troop transport but later changed to using silver dollars as they proved more economical. In the course of time the exchange rate of silver dollars became pegged to copper cash and the rise in the value of silver dollars led to an increase in the cost of canal transport.¹²⁾ Moreover, Lin Tse-hsi 林則徐 reported that each transport ship exchanged silver dollars for silver taels before leaving Kiangnan ports because silver dollars were not in circulation north of the Yellow River. The commission on the currency exchange taken by merchants was initially paid by the ship which was later reimbursed by the county governments. Lin stressed that the burden of paying these commission expenses had been shifted to the county governments.¹³⁾ Both these opinions shared the commonly held view attributing the increase in the cost of canal transport to problems in monetary circulation.

The second reason for the crisis in local finance was the increase in expenses in county governments brought about by the communication of the rice tax from collection in kind to payment in silver taels. The commutation of the rice tax to silver taels or copper cash was practiced on a permanent basis in many areas of China; in other areas, commutation was used in years of poor harvest and in areas like T'ai-ts'ang 太倉 department which produced little rice.¹⁴⁾ Local officials took measures to use the silver taels collected to buy rice to send to the central government. However, as the expenses connected with transporting it increased and the price the county governments paid to buy rice from merchants rose, the difference between the expenses incurred and the amount collected based on the official conversion rate (*chê-chia* 折價) decided by county governments widened, and county governments had to make up the difference.¹⁵⁾

County governments tried to solve the problem by shifting the burden of such increases to the tax-payers in the form of a surcharge assessment and an excessively high conversion rate (*lo-chê* 勒折) on the rice tax.¹⁶⁾ These two factors were frequently singled out as being the source of the problem, because the transportation of tribute grain seemed to be the basic reason for the financial difficulties confronting county governments. The details of the increase in the surcharge assessment and the excessively high conversion rate on the rice tax are given below.

First let us consider the increase in the surcharge assessment. The memorial by Yao Wên-t'ien of 1821 mentioned above stated that the surcharge assess-

ment on the rice tax was not implemented before 1764. After that date the corrupt practice of surcharge assessment was introduced as the population grew and finance became increasingly difficult. At first this practice was included in the *hu-mien* 斛面 surcharge assessment (*lin-chien* 淋尖 lit. to heap up rice when measured by picul-measure, and *t'i-hu* 踢斛 lit. to push rice into picul-measure). Later when *chê-k'ou* 折扣 was first implemented some *shêng* 升 were added per picul as a surcharge to cover the costs of wastage (*hao-mi* 耗米), and this surcharge increased finally reaching 0.4 or 0.5 piculs.¹⁷⁾ Later on a reform in 1846 in Ch'ang-shu 常熟 and Chao-wên 昭文 counties decreed that when paying the rice tax in kind, an extra 1.6–1.7 piculs should be added for each picul.¹⁸⁾ Fêng Kuei-fên 馮桂芬 stated in a letter to the Kiangsu Governor. Hsü Nai-chao 許乃釗, that to realize 1 picul it was necessary to collect an extra 1.5–1.6 piculs.¹⁹⁾ Hence, when rice tax was paid in kind, the surcharge assessment gradually increased, the amount rising to an extra 2 piculs per picul.

Next let us examine the details of the excessively high conversion rate on the rice tax. The commuted rice tax was called *yung-chê-mi* 永折米, and the rate had been constant since the Ming, at 0.7 *ts'ao-p'ing* 漕平 taels per picul, in a cotton producing region like T'ai-ts'ang department. In other areas of Kiangsu province, the rice tax was collected in other forms such as silver taels in lean years. For example, in 1755 the conversion rate was regulated at 1 *ts'ao-p'ing* tael per picul of *ching-mi* 粳米 and 0.75 *ts'ao-p'ing* taels per picul of *su-mi* 粟米.²⁰⁾ Later, the collection of the rice tax in silver was often prohibited for example in 1816 and 1822 in areas other than T'ai-ts'ang department in order to reduce the tax-payer's burden which had increased due to the fall in the price of rice.²¹⁾ But the enforcement of this prohibition seems to have been generally left to the discretion of individual county magistrates. At the beginning of the Tao-kuang period, Wang Chia-hsiang questioned the corrupt practice of collecting rice tax in silver, and Yü Tê-yüan 俞德淵 remarked that a high rate (*ch'ang-chia* 長價) was paid by poor and minor households, at 4 taels per picul, and that a low rate (*tuan-chia* 短價) was paid by rich and influential households, at 2 or 3 taels per picul.²²⁾ Moreover, in 1849 Li Hsing-yüan 李星沅 and Lu Chien-ying 陸建瀛 memorialized the throne asking for a prohibition on the excessively high conversion rate used when collecting the tax in money.²³⁾

A more important cause of the excessively high official conversion rate was the conversion into copper cash. When the rice tax was collected in copper cash, the amount was not linked to the market price of rice but to the silver tael, the conversion rate of which was adjusted to the price of rice. Since the market exchange rate between copper cash and silver taels was not officially regulated, county governments had to introduce additional taxes to deal with the financial crises.

Next let us to survey the actual movement in the tax conversion rate in Ch'ang-shu county. On the basis of both the official conversion rate of the

rice tax to silver dollars and the market exchange rate of silver dollars to copper cash given in the *Lou-wang yung-yü chi*, we can assume that the stipulated amount was as follows; in 1836 about 7,400 cash per picul, in 1838 about 9,000 cash, after that about 10,000 cash, in 1846 as the result of a reform it was about 2.5 or 2.6 piculs when paying in kind and about 5,000 cash per picul when paying in cash, and in 1851 about 6,500 cash.²⁴⁾ With regard to this, Fêng Kuei-fên noted that the conversion rate of the rice tax was 8,000 cash to 9,000 cash per picul in 1849 and 1853.²⁵⁾ Wu Yün 吳雲 stated that it was 8,000 cash to over 10,000 cash per picul in 1856.²⁶⁾

As for the silver tax, after the assessment of wastage surcharges which had been collected arbitrarily by counties was turned into *kung-hsiang* 公項 in the Yung-chêng period, non-regulated additional-tax items calculated in units of *ku-p'ing* 庫平 taels were gradually added to the stipulated amount. As payment in copper cash spread tax revenues were increased by manipulation of the conversion rate which was set higher than the market exchange rate; during the Tao-kuang period the conversion rate came to be double the market exchange rate (see Table C). Furthermore during this same period irregular tax items designed to cover local expenses were collected in copper cash.²⁷⁾

Table C. Shift in Market Exchange Rate and Official Conversion Rate of Silver Tax between Copper Cash and Silver Taels

(Units: cash per tael)

Year	Market Exchange Rate	Official Conversion Rate
1759	820 ①	880 ①
1821	1,270-1,280 ②	
1822		2,000-3,000 ③
1832	1,100-1,300 ④⑤	2,400-2,500 ④
1836	1,200-1,300 ⑥	2,400 ⑦
1840	1,500-1,600 ⑧	2,900 ⑦
1843	1,500-1,600 ⑥	
1845	2,200-2,300 ⑨	3,300 ⑦
1846	1,800-1,900 ⑩	3,300 (January) ⑦ 2,350 (April) ⑦
1853	2,000 ⑪	2,800-2,900 ⑫

Sources: ① *Sungkiang fu-chih* 松江府志 (compiled in Chia-ch'ing period), 21: 42a. ② *HCCSWHP*, 36: 5b. ③ *HCCSWHP*, 38: 5b. ④ *Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* 大清宣宗實錄, 214: 3a. ⑤ *HCTC*, 11: 31b. ⑥ *Ch'ou-p'an yi-wu shih-mo* 籌辦夷務始末, 1: 4b. ⑦ *LWYYC*, p. 3, 4, 6, 7. ⑧ *Yi-p'an lu* 一斑錄, *tsa-shu* 雜述, 6: 44b. ⑨ *HCCSWHP*, 58: 31b. ⑩ *Li Wên-kung yi-chi* 李文恭公遺集, *tsou-yi* 奏議, 10: 52a. ⑪ *HCTC*, 5: 44a. ⑫ *HCTC*, 5: 33b, 10: 2a.

As explained above the surcharge assessment and excessively high conversion rate combined with the depreciation of rice prices during the Tao-kuang period²⁸⁾ and the rise in the exchange rate of silver in relation to copper cash on the exchange market after the 1840's, to increase the tax-payers' burden²⁹⁾ and encourage them to resist payment or participate in what are generally known as tax resistance struggles. County governments, realizing that it was impossible to cope with the increase in expenses with surcharge assessment and excessively high conversion rate alone, balanced their books by adopting temporary remedies such as making up for the deficiency by using income gained from other sources (*kuan-tian min-ch'ien* 官墊民欠) or by requesting exemption from tax for a year because of a natural disaster even when there was none.³⁰⁾

However, by the late Tao-kuang period, local finance was so bankrupt that the situation could not be controlled by county governments.

(2) Measures to Solve the Financial Problem

To save the situation local officials, such as the Governor and Governor General, and the Suchou gentry as well insisted on adopting the following two measures. The first measure consisted of (i) a plan for switching from canal shipment to sea shipment to reduce transport expenses, and (ii) a proposal to send the tribute grain to Peking in the form of silver taels instead of grain.

The plan to change the transportation route of tribute grain had been proposed by Wei Yüan in 1827 as a method for reducing expenditures but was not implemented at the time.³¹⁾ In 1845 canal shipment became physically impossible due to the overflow of the Yellow River which silted up the Grand Canal. In 1847 the Kiangsu Governor Lu Chien-ying memorialized the throne to change the transportation route for tribute grain from Suchow and Sungkiang 松江 prefectures to sea shipment, and this plan was implemented in the following year.³²⁾ After 1851 Ch'angchou 常州 prefecture and T'ai-ts'ang department implemented sea shipment as well. In unison with this, P'êng Yün-chang's 彭蘊章 memorial requesting a reduction in the cost of canal transport was given Imperial sanction in 1848³³⁾ and except for 1849 and 1850 this measure was enforced.³⁴⁾ But with this change in route, the old account for canal shipment was not abolished, but allocated to the general account (*gung-fei* 公費) since such abandonment of canal transport was regarded as an emergency measure.³⁵⁾

The expenses for sea shipment were to be borne by county governments. They allocated the money solicited in exchange for the sale of official rank to meet these expenses, but after 1854 this money was insufficient for such purposes and this source was supplemented by funds from the cost of canal transport which came from the general account as well as money deriving from other expense items.³⁶⁾ Since canal transport fees were still collected,

as well as the new fees for sea transport, the result was an overall increase in the cost of transportation which became the main cause for a surcharge assessment and an excessively high conversion rate.³⁷⁾

As for (ii), an Imperial Edict prohibiting the collection of rice tax in silver taels was issued in 1849³⁸⁾ in response to the Liang-kiang 兩江 Governor General Li Hsing-yüan's memorial. In spite of this, collection was made in silver taels, and in 1851 the Liang-kiang Governor General Lu Chien-ying memorialized the throne requesting that the tribute grain of T'ai-ts'ang department and other places be transported in silver taels.³⁹⁾ But this measure was not realized because of the Taiping invasion.

The second measure included the correction of the unequal assessment of taxes between influential households (*ta-hu* 大戶) and minor households (*hsiao-hu* 小戶), reduction of the surcharge assessment, and devaluation of the conversion rate, all of which were part of the policy to equalize taxes (*chün-fu* 均賦) put forward by Fêng Kuei-fên.

The substantial increase in actual tax-assessment through the surcharge assessment and an excessively high conversion rate initiated by local governments was not divided equally among all households resulting in unequal tax-assessment.

Next let us look at the structure of unequal tax-assessment. First the relations between the collection of silver tax and the distinction between influential and minor households have to be considered. Before the Ch'ing the "influential household" was not only employed to indicate general social and economic capabilities unconnected with the structure of tax collection, but also as a name for households responsible for providing compulsory labor (*yao-yi* 徭役) during the Ming period.⁴⁰⁾ This category appears quite frequently in many Ch'ing period archival materials which prohibit proxy remittance (*pao-lan* 包攬) by influential households especially during the K'ang-hsi 康熙 period. But at the same time, before the Yung-chêng reform when the Ch'ing government distinguished between gentry households (*shên-hu* 紳戶) and commoner households (*min-hu* 民戶), the term influential household (*ta-hu* 大戶) indicated discrimination by rank. Though in a regulation about collecting the silver tax in copper cash issued in 1733 the terms "influential households" and "minor households (*hsiao-hu* 小戶)" were used to indicate people who paid large amounts of tax and those who paid small amounts respectively,⁴¹⁾ after that there was no clear legal distinction between these groups.

However in 1856 Fêng Kuei-fên suggested doing away with this distinction⁴²⁾ and in 1865 an Imperial Edict prohibited the use of these terms in the counties of Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures.⁴³⁾ Moreover during the T'ung-chih 同治 and Kuang-hsü 光緒 periods, at least in some parts of Hupei province and other areas a fixed amount of silver tax-assessment was used as an index to determine "influential households" and "minor households."⁴⁴⁾ According to the 1876 *Shên-pao* 申報, in Hua-ting 華亭 and Lou 婁 counties of Sungkiang

prefecture influential households did not pay the silver tax in copper cash but paid it and a ten or twenty percent surcharge in the name of public expenses in *ku'-p'ing* taels. This kind of silver tax was called gentry household silver (*shên-hu yin* 紳戶銀).⁴⁵⁾ At the beginning of the Kuang-hsü period in these regions, influential households held the privilege of paying these silver taels. In Kuanghsi 廣西, Fukien 福建 and Anhui 安徽 provinces after the T'ung-chih period the amount of conversion rate was regulated so that influential households had to pay little and minor had to pay much.⁴⁶⁾ The change in the use of the terms of influential household and minor household can be explained by the change in the structure of tax collection in the years from the beginning of the Ch'ing to the T'ung-chih reform. During the Ch'ing period as a rule the tax payment system known as *tzü-fêng t'ou-kuei* 自封投櫃 (lit. sealing envelopes containing tax money and personally putting them into silver chests at the county seat) was used. This system required individual tax-payers to present their taxes personally at the county seat to avoid proxy remittance by influential households. Nevertheless due to differing circumstances in various regions, in some areas influential households were able to continue proxy remittance. As a result, during the K'ang-hsi period prohibitions on proxy remittance by influential households were often issued. However, after the Yung-chêng reforms proxy remittance, especially for collecting but not remittance (*pao-ch'ien* 包欠) by clerks (*hsü-li* 胥吏) or runners (*ch'ai-yi* 差役), gave rise to public discussion on the corrupt practice caused by the contracting of tax collection or payment which is reflected in many archival source materials. These archival materials indicate that proxy remittance by clerks or runners was more important than that by influential households. At the beginning of the Kuang-hsü period, T'ao Hsü 陶煦 stated that though tax reform in the T'ung-chih period prohibited the distinction between influential and minor households actually there were two kinds of silver chests, and that the powerful (i.e. the gentry or wealthy) put their envelopes into inner-chests while the others put theirs into the expensive outer-chests.⁴⁷⁾ Placing tax money into outer-chests indicates payment of a commission to the intermediary clerks and runners.

From the above we are able to draw the following conclusions. As a result of the Yung-chêng reforms and official encouragement to make tax payments personally at county seats, the privilege of influential households changed from that of a legal one based on rank to a substantial one of putting tax money into inner-chests. At this stage, the distinction between influential and minor households in the tax system changed from one in which the distinction was based on local prestige to one based on the tax-register.

On the other hand, in the case of the rice tax, at least in Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures, references to influential and minor households as a term based on local prestige in archival sources concerning the regulation of rice tax payment are only used as a term based on local prestige on the basis

of the amount of tax-assessment, except in the case of measures to postpone payment and to reduce tax payments in times of disaster or bad harvest. Contemporaries pointed out the inequality among tax-payers using such expressions as households paying a high rate (*ch'ang-chia* 長價) and households paying a low rate (*tuan-chia* 短價) of tax. At the same time they also drew attention to the excessive conversion rate for collecting rice tax in copper cash.

Next let us examine what regulations were adopted in regard to collecting the rice tax in money. In the *Kiangsu shêng ts'ai-chêngchü shuo-ming shu* 江蘇省財政局說明書 (A guide to Kiangsu province financial bureau) compiled in the Kuang-hsü period, *ts'ao-mi* 漕米 i.e. tribute grain was classified into the following two categories: *ts'ao-liang* 漕糧 (*ts'ao-liang* 漕糧, *pai-liang* 白糧, *hei-tou* 黑豆) and *ts'ao-chê* 漕折 or *ts'ao-liang chê-sé* 漕糧折色 (*chê-ts'ao* 折漕, *nan-mi* 南米, *chü-liang mi-chia* 局糧米價, *hsü-mi yü-shêng* 恤米餘剩, *chieh-shêng hsing-yüeh mi-chia* 節省行月米價). The former *ts'ao-liang* was delivered to the central government and was collected in kind, and the latter *ts'ao-chê* was collected in copper cash and put into local revenue including the one for transporting to local granaries except for the *chê-ts'ao* category of tribute grain. This regulation was limited in its efficacy. From the beginning of the Ch'ing period *ts'ao-liang* was collected in kind and *hsiang-liang* 餉糧 (i.e. rations delivered to troop stations) was collected in money.⁴⁸⁾ Judging from the tax-reform of 1865 and 1866, at this point of time presumably the rate of collecting in money among the total sum of collection at the level of county finance was officially regulated.⁴⁹⁾

Now if the regulated ratio of the financial items listed in the above paragraph was equally applied to each tax-payer, inequality in the collection of the rice tax was hardly likely to arise. But actually, as we can see from an entry for 1846 in the *Lou-wang yung-yü chi* people paying the rice tax were divided into those who paid in rice and those who paid in money. Moreover Fêng Kuei-fên stated in his 1849 letter to Lu Chien-ying that the actual condition of surcharge assessment was not regulated quantitatively among provinces, among counties in a province, and among households in a county, and in his home area between influential and minor households, among influential households and among minor households, and that an extra 2 or 3 piculs for every picul was paid in copper cash at a maximum, 1.5 piculs was paid in kind at a minimum, and 1 picul was paid at Chang-lien t'ang 章練塘 in Yüan-hê 元和 county at a minimum. He also stated in his 1853 proposal for equal tax-assessment that most gentry households paid in silver taels, at the rate of about 1.2 or 1.3 piculs for every picul at a minimum and two times of this at a maximum. Weak and commoner households paid in silver taels, at the rate of 3 or 4 piculs for every picul, and the stronger of them paid in rice, more than 2 piculs for every picul, the strongest of them paid less than 2 piculs. The sum and the way of tax paying by each tax-payer varied according to his geographical and social position.⁵⁰⁾

How were the differences between paying in rice and in money created? In Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures, the rate of land tax per *mou* 畝 was mostly less than 0.2 piculs.⁵¹⁾ Around 1846, the rice price was 2,000 or 3,000 cash per picul and conversion rate of tax was 10,000 or 12,000 cash per picul, to pay 0.2 of a picul one needed to have more than 0.6 or 1.2 piculs of rice. So if an extra 1.6 or 1.7 piculs for every picul was collected, including rice for wastage surcharges, payment in rice was far more advantageous than in copper cash. But the average tax-payers could not pay in rice. Fêng Kuei-fên stated in his proposal that households in the countryside who paid the low tax rate and moreover paid it all in rice (*wan-mi tuan-ciha* 完米短價) were in a strong position to refuse to pay tax and to participate in mob violence to storm the granaries (*nao-ts'ao hui-ts'ang* 鬧漕毀倉). He also stated that in Chang-lien t'ang of Yüan-hê county which paid a relatively smaller amount of rice, tax-payers won a rate reduction to 1.6 or 1.7 piculs for every picul after tax struggles in winter.⁵²⁾ From these statements, presumably payment in rice with only some rice for wastage surcharges was gained through tax resistance struggles.

As noted above, in the case of the rice tax, before the T'ung-chih reform, there was no discrimination in payment by the distinction between influential households and minor households on the regulations. But when famines were reported to the central government (*chu-huang* 註荒), there was a difference in the rate of reduction among households. According to the *Lou-wang yung-yü chi*, the situation in Ch'ang-shu county at the end of the Tao-kuang period was as follows; if the total amount of the land tax actually collected was reduced, the county governments had to adopt measures to rectify the situation. What they did was to submit a report of a fictive bad harvest brought on by disaster, actually a false disaster, and asked for a reduction in the amount of tribute grain to be sent to the central government. In this case, in principle the ratio of reduction should have been an equal-ratio without distinction between households. The county governments found that they had to give influential households a much larger tax reduction than minor households when false harvest failures were reported. Even in years when there was actually a bad harvest this unequal ratio was employed.⁵³⁾

As shown above, in the case of the rice tax, the inequality among tax-payers was supported by the system of control in the countryside, as in the case of the silver tax. This is illustrated by the example of Chao-wên county in Suchou prefecture, in 1846 tax-payers entrusted the payment of their rice tax to powerful people who were connected to the local government for a commission paid in copper cash.⁵⁴⁾ As in the case of the silver tax, this led to inequality. Moreover, in Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures the inequality was far more obvious when compared with the silver tax for the following reasons: the relative abundance of surcharge assessments basically due to the increase in the cost of canal transport, the tax-payers burden of the rice tax

per mou was absolutely higher than silver tax, and the noticeable shift of the burden to minor households because the regulation relating to the method of rice tax collection was not clearly stipulated for the silver tax. The actual method of collecting the tax and decisions as to the official conversion rate were left to the discretion of the county governments.

From 1853 and thereafter Fêng Kuei-fên repeatedly insisted on a reduction in the surcharges assessment and a reduction of the official conversion rate, to about 1 picul for every picul in the case of payment in rice and to 4,000 or 4,052 cash for every picul in the case of payment in copper cash. Fêng also suggested that the urban households paying a low rate of tax should pay more while rural households paying a low rate of tax in rice should be exempted from such increases. He further argued for a reform of the procedures for tax collection.⁵⁵⁾

To sum up, the first measure outlined earlier (on p. 79) to solve the financial problem had the object of reducing the county governments expenses and it affected the relations between the central government and provincial governments. In contrast to this, the tax equalization policy advocated by Fêng Kuei-fên had the following two objects. First it aimed to reduce the tax burden and ensure that the burden of poor and minor households unable to meet tax obligations was lightened and that of influential households was increased. By this method he hoped to obtain a stable revenue. Second it increased revenue and bolstered provincial government finance by rationalizing the method of tax collection which formerly centered around county officials and clerks under them and putting it under the strong auspices of provincial government. Local administration by provincial government that Fêng advocated seemed to be a system in which the gentry participated in a positive, institutional and legal fashion.⁵⁶⁾

In the end Fêng's policy of tax equalization failed due to opposition from a member of one of the influential households who held high office.⁵⁷⁾

Despite the poor reception Fêng's policy proposals received, they were nevertheless significant because they advocated the same stance vis-à-vis the central government as that later adopted by the Hsiang army bureaucrats, namely that provincial officials should have greater freedom in administering local provincial government affairs. This common stance probably created the conditions which allowed Fêng Kuei-fên, the Suchou gentry and the Hsiang army bureaucrats to come closer together.

II. Li Hung-chang's Arrival in Shanghai 上海 and the Seizure of Financial Control

(1) Li Hung-chang's Arrival in Shanghai

In April 1854, Suchou city fell to the Taiping forces and the Kiangsu Governor Hsü Yu-jên 徐有壬 died in battle. At this time the Liang-kiang

Governor General Hê Kuei-ch'ing 何桂清 escaped, abandoning Hsü and was subsequently removed from his post for this act. On June 24, Tsêng Kuo-fan 曾國藩 was appointed as Liang-kiang Governor General. But the Suchou Provincial Treasurer (*pu-chêng shih* 布政使) Hsüeh Huan 薛煥, who had connections with Hê Kuei-ch'ing and filled in as acting Liang-kiang Governor General after Hê retired, was appointed as Kiangsu General after May. These personal connections meant that Hsüeh was not a trustworthy person for either the Hsiang army officials or the Suchou gentry.

The urgent task for the Suchou gentry was to secure an army capable of fighting and a sufficient supply of military funds. The Suchou gentry provided for the defense against the Taiping forces by organizing the Shanghai Joint Defence Bureau (*hui-fang chü* 會防局) and requested Tsêng Kuo-fan to come to Shanghai. Tsêng promised to dispatch Li Hung-chang and others under his command.⁵⁸⁾

In order to secure military supplies, there was no alternative but to use the revenue from custom duties (*kuang-shui* 關稅), likin and donations in Shanghai when the Chêkiang 浙江 merchants took an active part, because the military supplies stored in Suchou city had been lost when that city fell and regular tax collection had become impossible after the Taiping forces occupied much of the rural countryside in the Suchou region. In May the Suchou gentry asked the Customs Taotai (*Su-Sung-T'ai tao* 蘇松太道) Wu Hsü 吳煦, the official in charge of customs at Shanghai, to serve as the acting Suchou Provincial Treasurer and to take charge of finance; this appeal was made through his relative Wu Yün 吳雲, one of the leading members of the Shanghai Joint Defence Bureau. Wu Hsü seems to have been selected because he was on good terms with Yang Fang 楊坊, a wealthy comprador merchant from Ningpo 寧波, and was in a good position to receive assistance from foreigners because of his acquaintance with foreigners through Wu Hsü. Later, however, Wu Hsü was to become an obstacle to Li Hung-chang's seizure of financial power.

(2) The Seizure of Financial Control by Li Hung-chang

On arriving in Shanghai on March 10, 1862, Li Hung-chang gained control over finances through personnel manipulation. Personnel manipulation involved the use of both official personnel and private secretaries (*mu-yu* 幕友); with regard to official personnel, Li dismissed those in charge of responsible posts before his arrival and replaced them with Hsiang army officials and with private secretaries personnel, he tried to maintain co-operative relations with the Suchou gentry and to keep some of them under his command. Responsibility for important tasks was given to his confidants from Anhui. This section considers in detail his manipulation of personnel and the responses to it of the Suchou gentry.

As for the official personnel, Li first planned to remove the Kiangsu

Governor Hsüeh Huan. Hsüeh Huan had tried to create a situation whereby it would not be necessary for Tsêng Kuo-fan to come to Shanghai, going so far as to dispatch an agent to Hunan 湖南 and Hupei provinces to raise troops.⁵⁹⁾ When Tsêng sent his subordinate Li to Shanghai the two did not get on well. Li called for Hsüeh Huan's dismissal, insisting that he was incompetent as a commander⁶⁰⁾ and showed a lack in intimate and harmonious relations with foreigners, as well as with officials and Suchou gentry.⁶¹⁾ Li Hung-chang served as acting Kiangsu Governor in place of Hsüeh Huan and later formally assumed the post on October 12.⁶²⁾

With this accomplished the problem confronting Li Hung-chang was how to bring the powers of finance under his own control. At first Li tried to replace Wu Hsü with Kuo Sung-t'ao 郭嵩燾 from the Hsiang army as the Kiangsu Provincial Treasurer and at the same time also give Kuo the post of Su-Sung 蘇松 Grain Intendant (*liang-tao* 糧道); this would allow him to share control over Shanghai finances with Huang Fang 黃芳 from Hunan province who was closely connected with the Hsiang army.⁶³⁾ It was for this purpose that Li asked Tsêng to invite Kuo and Huang to eliminate the deep rooted evils practiced by wicked officials (*lieh-yüan* 劣員) involved with the collection of taxation, donation and likin at Shanghai.⁶⁴⁾ On May 20, the criticism levelled against Wu Hsü by the Supervisor of the Imperial Supervisorate of Instruction (*chan-shih fu chan-shih* 詹事府詹事) Yin Chao-yung 殷兆鏞,⁶⁵⁾ who was back in his native place, Wu-kiang 吳江 county in Suchou prefecture for mourning at that time, reached Tsêng Kuo-fan. In his memorial Yin reported that Yü Pin 俞斌 together with Wu Hsü's subordinate Chin Hung-pao 金鴻保 were monopolizing the Donation Bureaus (*chüan chü* 捐局), and that Wu Hsü was also engaging in evil activities.⁶⁶⁾ Li Hung-chang tried to draw the Suchou gentry supporting Wu Hsü onto his side by employing them as private secretaries in order to get rid of Wu Hsü and his subordinates.⁶⁷⁾ The subsequent investigation into the matter by Li revealed that Chin Hung-pao controlled Yü Pin,⁶⁸⁾ and that Wu Hsü had been pursuing his own private profit in opening a bank (*yin-hao* 銀號) and purchasing ships.⁶⁹⁾ But Li Hung-chang was not able to immediately dismiss Chin Hung-pao who was well acquainted with the situation of the Donation and Likin Bureaus in Shanghai.⁷⁰⁾ As for donation and likin, Li dispatched his confidant Anhui Candidate Taotai (*hou-pu tao* 候補道) Wang Ta-ching 王大經 and others to report on the situation,⁷¹⁾ and waited for an opportunity to dismiss Wu Hsü.

Aggression by the Taiping forces in September provided Li Hung-chang with an opportunity to dismiss Wu Hsü. Li dispatched Wu Hsü to Nanking to lead the Ever-victorious army (*ch'ang-shêng chün* 常勝軍) under the command of H. A. Burgevine, and appointed Huang Fang to the position of acting Customs Taotai and the Provincial Judge (*an-ch'a shih* 按察使) Liu Hsün-kao 劉郇膏 as a proxy of the acting Provincial Treasurer.⁷²⁾ Li Hung-

chang held Wu Hsü and Yang Fang responsible for the incident in November in which H. A. Burgevine returned to Shanghai and violently robbed 40,000 taels for military expenses from the comprador merchant Yang Fang, and dismissed Wu Hsü. Moreover Li made them compensate for the money borrowed from some foreign hong (yang-hang 洋行) to cover military expenditures.⁷³⁾ This is how he succeeded in getting rid of Wu Hsü.

In 1863 a proxy of the acting Provincial Treasurer Liu Hsün-kao 劉郇膏 was installed formally as the regular Provincial Treasurer to succeed Wu Hsü. Li Hung-chang did not take Liu on because he thought Liu was unsuitable.⁷⁴⁾ Li feared that the monopoly the Hsiang army officials such as Kuo Sung-t'ao held over responsible posts would produce opposition to himself.⁷⁵⁾ Hence, Li Hung-chang was not able to realize all the personnel changes he originally planned.

As for private secretaries in charge of finance, Li Hung-chang took on Wang Ta-ching, Yên Wei 閻偉 and Hsüeh Shih-yü 薛時雨, who were Li's confidants from Anhui, as private secretaries and invited Fêng Kuei-fên and Ch'ien Ting-ming 錢鼎銘 from the Suchou gentry to serve on his staff.⁷⁶⁾ Making Fêng and Ch'ien private secretaries was a move designed to win co-operation from the Suchou gentry. This desire, as will be shown later, can also be seen in Li Hung-chang's approval of the plan to establish the Rent Collection Bureau (*shou-tsu chü* 收租局) put forward by Pan Tsêng-wei 潘曾瑋, the son of a former Minister of Military Secret (*chün-chi ta-chên* 軍機大臣) Pan Shih-ên 潘世恩, and by entrusting the responsibility for its control to Pan Tsêng-wei after the restoration of Suchou city. From these personnel moves we are able to see that Li intended to draw them onto his side in order to secure military supplies as well as to simply make use of their knowledge about financial administration in Kiangsu province. Li recognized that it was impossible to neglect or exclude the Suchou gentry from his plans. Nevertheless, though he did use some members of the Suchou gentry, Li actually assigned confidants from Anhui to undertake main tasks such as serving on the committee in charge of Likin Bureaus (*li chü* 釐局).

How did the Suchou gentry respond to Li's moves? On gentry member made the following criticism of Pan Tsêng-wei, the most active member of the Suchou gentry, in the *Shêng-ch'üan pai-ch'êng* 盛川稗乘:

The Kiangsu Governor Li Hung-chang, the Provincial Treasurer Liu Hsün-kao, the Provincial Judge Kuo Po-yin 郭柏蔭 and the Prefecture Magistrate Li Ming-wan 李銘皖 are all pupils of Pan Shih-ên's.⁷⁷⁾ Pan Tsêng-wei controls military matters and abuses authority. He recommends people by accepting money, exacts rent by force and enforces new policies. These are all in the manner of the deep-rooted cruel evils done by the Taiping forces. His influence spreads vigorously and shakes all over Kiangnan.⁷⁸⁾

Another passage reads as follows:

Shên Chih-shan 沈枝珊, conspiring with a wicked member of the gentry Pan Tsêng-wei opened silk textiles, money changing, cotton fabric and soya sauce shops, with a capital of over 100,000 taels, all of which was written down as capital paid up by Pan Tsêng-wei. Soon, Pan recommended Tao Yün-t'ing 陶雲亭 as the Even Months Assistant County Magistrate (*shuang-yüeh Hsien-ch'êng* 雙月縣丞) and employed him as general manager of the cotton fabric shop in Suchou city, so Tao was able to enter the service as a manager. Afterwards, from what I have heard, all the shops opened by Tao used Pan's name, so, Tao probably did not dare to struggle with Pan, when the latter appropriated this property.⁷⁹⁾

The same source also writes:

Pan Tsêng-wei's younger brother-in-law Wang Hsi-kuei 王錫珪, with the aid of Pan's influence, deceitfully gained gentry rank, has the run of the public office, manages litigations, controls official affairs and has greedily amassed a big fortune.⁸⁰⁾

The above passages show that Pan Tsêng-wei put people connected with him into official service and had them work to advance his interests. But at the same time, it also shows that the room for gentry participation in administration was limited to the lowest levels of administration; at that level administration was conducted irrationally according to favoritism.

But the behavior of such gentry was not in accord with Fêng Kuei-fên's ideas. Because Fêng thought that local government should be administered by the regional gentry strata and not by the officials, and that administration should be organized, institutionalized and rationalized on this basis, he assumed the regional gentry to be the strata at which the policy of tax equalization was aimed.⁸¹⁾ Hence it may safely be said that Fêng Kuei-fên's ideas were not put into effect by Li Hung-chang and that the gentry's response resulted from that.

As shown above, Li Hung-chang seized control of finances in Kiangsu province by appointing officials with whom he had connections and using a limited number of private secretaries from the Suchou gentry. He used this as the basis for implementing his own policy toward military revenue and expenditure.

III. Li Hung-chang's Policy toward Military Expenses

(1) Measures for Military Expenses

Li Hung-chang, in parallel with the seizure of financial power, confirmed

the condition of military revenue and expenditure in Kiangsu province in 1862, and submitted the following memorial in May of the same year:

According to existing statistics, the custom revenue is only 2,000,000 odd taels every year, which amounts to 200,000 odd taels per month. Twenty percent of this goes to pay, the indemnities to England and France respectively, so the [real] revenue per month is a mere 100,000 odd taels. This revenue includes proxy-collection of customs from Hank'ou 漢口 and Kiukiang 九江 customs, so it is only 200,000 odd taels and includes the revenue from likin donation (*li-chüan* 釐捐). On the other hand, 300,000 odd taels goes to soldiers' pay and rations and acquisition of weapons every month, and in addition to this military supplies bound for Chênkiang 鎮江, salaries in this province, and soldiers' rations have to be paid. Moreover, the expenses for sending emergency resources to regions other than Peking have to be collected from taxes and donation. So the existing revenue is not sufficient to meet expenditure. Therefore, until now the revenue has been in deficit.⁸²⁾

Li continued on to say that the deficit amounted to more than 10,000 taels per month.

In July he reported that the situation would worsen further. He argued that if a customs house was established in Hank'ou, the maritime custom revenue would drop to a mere 50,000 or 60,000 taels per month.⁸³⁾ In July 26, he also reported that the money diverted from other items in 1862 was 16,000,000 odd taels.⁸⁴⁾

Faced with this serious situation, Li Hung-chang worked out a financial policy, the prototype of subsequent policies toward revenue and expenditure. It aimed first at an overall reduction in expenditure, and second at increasing revenue. This policy was designed to evade responsibility for sending some supplies to the central government and at turning aside all requests to send military supplies to other regions and tried to increase revenue through the likin donation.

First in decreasing the amount of rice delivered to the central government he only bought and sent 94,000 odd piculs in response to the request for 113,000 piculs.⁸⁵⁾ With regard to subsequent requests to send 200,000 piculs of rice to Peking, on January 1863 he replied as follows: to buy 200,000 piculs of rice required 1,000,000 taels, but the maritime custom revenue was less than 100,000 taels every month and revenue from the likin donation was only 200,000 taels, and in contrast to this military expenses were 50,000 taels for the Ever-victorious army, military supplies 30,000 taels for Chênkiang, armor making expenses 20,000 taels, expenses for foreign soldiers some 10,000 taels, Li Hung-chang's army and navy expenses more than 100,000 taels, and Sungkiang and Shanghai former military station expenses, several troop

stations expenses 100,000 taels, so it was impossible to send rice to Peking.⁸⁶⁾ Finally he sent only 30,000 piculs by collecting donations from merchants in April.⁸⁷⁾

As shown above, Li Hung-chang stressed the extreme difficulty of sending rice to Peking on the one hand, and memorialized requesting exemption from tribute grain for one year and a reduction of it for one or two year at T'ai-ts'ang department, Chên-yang 鎮洋, Ch'ang-shu, Chao-wên, K'un-shan 崑山 and Hsin-yang 新陽 counties newly recovered from the Taipings, and Chia-ting 嘉定 and Chin-shan 金山 counties which had suffered heavy damage.⁸⁸⁾ Next in May after the war situation had changed for the better in April and the recovery of Suchou city was in sight, he memorialized the throne requesting a reduction in the regulated tax, that is a policy of reducing tax and surcharge assessment to correct inequalities in the burden among households.⁸⁹⁾ This tax reform, from the point of view of his financial policy, seems to indicate precautions taken to combat the predictable request for rice from the central government after the recovery of Suchou city.

After the above memorial, he did send some rice in response to requests for military supplies from Tsêng Kuo-fan et al., at the same time stressing the financial difficulties in Kiangsu province. In April, Li promised to send Tsêng Kuo-fan 60,000 taels including 20,000 taels' donation for buying rice bound for Peking.⁹⁰⁾ Later though the revenue from the likin donation was reduced by half due to the decline of market towns, in July and August respectively he sent 40,000 taels to Tsêng Kuo-fan and Tsêng Kuo-ch'üan 曾國荃 in expectation of an increase in silver revenue from the newly established Likin Bureau and from increased donations from moneylenders in Shanghai.⁹¹⁾ In September he sent a further 30,000 taels to Tsêng Kuo-ch'üan and over 5,000,000 cash to Tsêng Kuo-fan,⁹²⁾ and in October 30,000 taels to Tsêng Kuo-ch'üan.⁹³⁾

Though Suchou city was recaptured in October 1863 and Wuhsi 無錫 in November, the financial difficulty continued. First only 40,000 piculs of rice, 100,000 odd piculs paddy and about 400,000,000 cash materials were left in Suchou city,⁹⁴⁾ and second the likin donation in Shanghai was heavy and trading vessels avoided the Likin Bureau because of the over-establishment of likin stations, so that the likin donation revenue was reduced.⁹⁵⁾

A new way of securing revenue to relieve this financial crisis was devised. It was the collection of rent donation (*tsu-chüan* 租捐) by the Rent Collection Bureau that had been set up during the Taiping occupation. It was established on the basis of the proposal by Pan Tsêng-wei as a transitional measure until land tax collection was possible. Rent donation was determined at 0.6 piculs per *mou*, to be collected by the General Bureau (*tsung-chü* 總局). Of this 0.6 piculs, 0.2 piculs were to be allocated for military rations, 0.14 piculs for relief and 0.01 piculs for public expenditure, and 0.25 piculs to landowners. Next in 1864, as rice production recovered, rent

donation was regulated to collect 800 cash per picul in Wu 吳, Ch'ang-chou 長洲 and Yüan-hê counties, and 870 cash per picul including expenses for repairing the Confucian temples in Wu-kiang and Chên-tsê 震澤 counties.⁹⁶⁾

On the other hand, accompanying the restoration of Suchou city, there were many requests from Peking and other regions for an increase in the amount of revenue to be sent outside the region. In the autumn of 1863 Tsêng Kuo-fan asked for 40,000 taels. Li delayed transportation of the funds and by March 1864 had only sent 30,000 taels.⁹⁷⁾ As a result, the Yamen in General Control of Matters Concerning Foreign Nations (*tsung-li ya-mên* 總理衙門) urged Li Hung-chang to send military supplies from within the transporting expenses. Li sent 50,000 taels to Pao Ch'ao's 鮑超 army, 40,000 taels to the An-ch'ing 安慶 Grain Intendant (*liang-t'ai* 糧臺) and 130,000 taels to the Chin-ling 金陵 Garrison (*ta-ying* 大營).⁹⁸⁾

The recapture of Nanking in June 1864 weakened the grounds for continuing the emergency military expenditure policy, so the central government declared an end to the emergency situation in Kiangsu province and requested that silver tax be sent to Peking. Li responded to these requests by continuing on former measures claiming that the emergency situation still existed. He memorialized asking for a reduction in the amount of revenue from customs and salt-likin and other sources that were to be sent to Peking in addition to his petition of November 1864 requesting an exemption from making good the unpaid amount of the equally apportioned donation (*t'an-chüan* 攤捐) which had to be sent to Peking.⁹⁹⁾ The first reason Li gave for not sending custom revenue to Peking was the fact that funds were needed to suppress the Moslem (*hui-min* 回民) and the *Nien* 捻 rebellions, and to make up for the deficit in required military supplies accumulated during the fight against the Taiping forces.¹⁰⁰⁾ In short he stressed the great need for military supplies. The reason he gave for requesting a reduction in the amount to be sent from the customs revenue was as follows: since likin donation and customs tax are paid by the same people, to be able to collect customs tax in a meaningful manner the likin donation needs to be abolished, and it would be far too costly and cause extortion on the part of clerks to do so.¹⁰¹⁾

As shown above, Li Hung-chang consistently responded to the requests from Peking and other regions by asking for a reduction of funds to be sent out of Kiangsu province claiming financial difficulties, and at the same time, continued to implement measures devised to increase the revenue derived from likin donation.

(2) The Significance of Li Hung-chang's Report on Military Revenue and Expenditure

How did Li Hung-chang report the measures he proposed to adopt toward military expenses to the central government? And what significance did it have? In considering these questions let us take up the report on closing

accounts of military revenue and expenditure for 1865.

The conventional practice with regard to reporting on financial revenue and expenditure of province was that the Provincial Treasurer drew up a register (*ch'ing-ts'ê* 清冊) which included detailed items of revenue and expenditure. The register had to be submitted either once or four times a year. It was inspected and submitted by the Governor and the Governor General as a special subject memorial (*chüan-chê chü-tsou* 專摺具奏) together with the account memos (*ch'ing-tan* 清單 lit. clean lists) which gave a brief quantitative review of past revenue and expenditure. The institution for submitting the annual memorial on every item and its account for revenue and expenditure (*tsou-hsiao* 奏銷) indicates that Ch'ing financial institutions were centralized. According to the regulations this register included not only regular items such as land tax, but emergency revenue and expenditure, and had to be authorized by the central government. This register reporting system gradually fell into disuse after the late Tao-kuang period, especially following the introduction of the regulation for raising military expenses (*ch'ou-hsiang shih-li* 籌餉事例) of 1851 and after 1853 when the Taiping invasion made it necessary for each region to supply its own military expenses.¹⁰²⁾ Owing to the situation described above, when Nanking was restored in June 1864, an Imperial Edict was issued that authorized the reporting of the total amount of revenue and expenditure in the form of a brief account memo and did not require the presentation of a register for military affairs accounts concerning Suchou and Shanghai for the period before June 1864.¹⁰³⁾

In accordance with the provisions of this Imperial Edict, the figures of every revenue and expense items were divided into regular and miscellaneous items, and submitted in two reports. The one covering the period from April 1862 to the end of June 1863 was called the first bill (*ti-yi an* 第一案), and another covering the period from July 1863 to the end of June 1864 was the second bill (*ti-êrh an* 第二案). The first bill was submitted on February 17, 1865,¹⁰⁴⁾ the second was submitted on June 1 of the same year.¹⁰⁵⁾ Subsequently the report of the figures of revenue and expense items for the period from February 1860 to October 3, 1862, already made by the former Governor General Hsüeh Huan and the former acting Provincial Treasurer Wu Hsü were revised and submitted on August 28, 1865 as well.¹⁰⁶⁾ As this revised bill originally drawn up by Wu Hsü included the account items for the period before October 3, 1862, the accounts for the period after October 3 were included in the first bill. But the figures for regular and miscellaneous expense items of several former military stations and the revenue items from Anhui before March 1862, and the revenue of the treasuries in the Suchou Provincial Treasurer office and Shanghai customhouse, and likin donation after Li Hung-chang's arrival at Shanghai were included in the first bill.¹⁰⁷⁾ The third bill (*ti-san an* 第三案) covering the period from July 1864 to May 1865 was submitted on June 29, 1869, after Li Hung-chang had left the Kiangsu Governor-

Table D. Details of the First and Second Bills and Revised Report, 1860-1864

(Units: tael, cash and picul)

	Revenue			Expenditure			Surplus or Deficit	
	Silver	Cash	Rice	Silver	Cash	Rice	Silver	Cash
First Bill	4,433,598	59,197,000		4,423,667	34,271,000		9,931	24,926,000
Second Bill	4,124,596 [4,134,528] ①	20,000,000 [44,926,000] ①		4,125,420	43,264,000		9,108	1,662,000
Revised Report	4,446,182	360,592,000	2,460	5,051,540	367,161,000	2,495	-609,582 ②	

Source: *LWCKCC*, 8; 9b, 9: 12b-13a, 41b-42a.

- ① The figures in brackets in the second bill include the surplus of the first bill.
 ② The deficit of the revised report has been converted into silver tael units. Li Hung-chang wrote concerning the deficit of the revised report that since 181,388 taels of this deficit had been covered by the raised donation later, 428,194 taels were remained now. (See, *LWCKCC*, 9: 41b-42a.)

Generalship.¹⁰⁸⁾

What then did the figures summed up in these reports of revenue and expenditure mean? From the details of the revised report, first and second bills (see, Table D), we are able to observe the following. First while revenue and expenditure increased respectively between the time of the revised report and the first bill, there was a decrease between the first bill and second bill. Li Hung-chang explained the reason for this as follows:

On assuming the post of acting Governor in April 1862 I only commanded 10,000 men in the army and navy. I therefore added the soldiers who had been under the command of Hsüeh Huan. I arranged, reduced, selected and disciplined them and the Ever-victorious army of F. T. Ward also numbered 40,000, so though the revenue was allotted to the expenses for them, the deficit did not amount to much. But after that the Maritime Customs began to levy duties at Hank'ou and Kiukiang the Maritime Custom revenue in Shanghai was gradually reduced, and the total revenue was just enough to meet the military expenses for the foreign soldiers and the army at Chênkiang. As the attack on the enemy forces by my army became increasingly successful, the number of soldiers was increased, and reached more than 70,000 in both the army and navy in the summer of 1863. Since I could not raise sufficient money to maintain this force, I had no alternative but to fall back upon the likin donation. To do so I arranged likin in Shanghai, following the method adopted by the Ch'u 楚 army in the mid-Yangtse region. After recovering a place, I set up stations (*k'a* 卡) and offices (*chü* 局) [to collect likin] to contribute to military expenses, and merchants said that government soldiers killed rebels and relieved people, so everyone was willing to pay the money. Though after having their areas ravaged, those who were fond of righteousness handed out money [to keep law and order]. The damage in

Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures was comparatively light and commerce began to greatly flourish, so many donation stations were set up, but as the damage in Ch'angchou and Chênkiang prefectures was worst, I did not set up a likin office again in Ch'angchou after the restoration of that city in April 1864.¹⁰⁹⁾

Another memorial reads as follows:

In comparison with the previous year the amount of customs and likin donation revenue obtained in the year from June 1863 to June 1864 had decreased to 1,000,000 odd taels. After the restoration of Suchou and Hangchou 杭州 merchants left for other regions so that the amount of revenue obtained from the likin donation has gradually decreased. As rent donation paid in turn from each county under Suchou prefecture and more than 800,000 taels was collected, I was able to fall back upon it and supplement the financial revenue to some slight extent. [I have tried to] cut expenses as much as possible, but the shortage of military supplies has become increasingly acute each month. Hence though the number of military stations has been gradually increasing and military supplies have been increasing day by day, the resources for supporting them has decreased by several 100,000 taels in comparison with last year, and in this situation I have endeavoured to meet military supplies from the meager funds available, but there has been no extra money to spare.¹¹⁰⁾

According to the above source the increase in revenue and expenditure between the revised report and the first bill was due to the increase in military expenses and the increase in revenue from likin donation. According to the explanation given by Li above, the decrease of revenue and expenditure between the first bill and the second bill was basically due to the decrease of revenue of customs and likin donation which accompanied the discontinuation of the establishment of likin stations and offices, and the dispersion of merchants who had gathered in Shanghai because of the restoration of Suchou and Hangchou, the decrease in expenditure which was brought on by a decrease in revenue, and the increase in military supplies.

Second, the deficit is summed up in the revised report, but the revenue and expenditure accounts balanced in the first and second bills. This corresponds to that in the report of military supplies of the Hsiang army by Tsêng Kuo-fan from May 1860 to June 1864; in that case also the revenue and expenditure accounts balanced.¹¹¹⁾

Did the increase and decrease in revenue and expenditure, and the balances of the revenue and expenditure accounts reflect the real conditions of revenue and expenditure? Did the revenue from likin donation really decrease? The source quoted above states that the amount of decrease in customs

and likin donation revenue was supplemented by rent donation money which was 200,000 taels less than the previous year. Even if the difference in the length of the period covered in the two bills, nine months for the first and in twelve months for the second, is not questioned, the difference in revenue between the first bill and the second bill was about 300,000 taels, and the remaining 100,000 taels was left unexplained. Even if it was interpreted that this 100,000 taels was less than 10,000 taels a month and indicated a general decrease, what was the condition of the revenue gained from likin donation and rent donation? Was it plausible that the revenue in the period from the first bill to the second bill decreased and the surplus was insignificant while Li Hung-chang was implementing measures to reduce expenditure and increase revenue?

Regarding the likin donation and revenue derived from other donations Yin Chao-yung and an official Wang Hsien-ch'êng 王憲成 from Ch'ang-shu county in Suchou prefecture criticized Li Hung-chang. Yin Chao-yung wrote that in addition to the donations collected by setting up the likin stations, many kinds of donations varying in amount from some 10 cash to some 1,000 cash were levied on such things as tables in eating houses and gambling establishments, and refreshments as well as from barbers, night soil transporters and prostitutes.¹¹²⁾ Wang claimed that the total amount of each donation item including likin donation and rent donation amounted to 40,000,000 taels.¹¹³⁾

In reply to this criticism Li Hung-chang stated that though donation items in Kiangsu province were complicated, the revenue was nowhere near the large amount claimed by Wang, and that the figures for revenue and expenditure items were all included in the account memo and there was no fabrication or embellishment whatsoever. In addition Li wrote:

To sum up the item of likin donation indicated in several memos, the total sum of revenue was 3,490,000 odd taels in the period from April 1862 to June 1863, and according to another memo, it was 887,000 odd taels during the period from October 1862 to June 1864, and 2,062,000 odd taels in the period from July 1863 to June 1864. These figures have already been reported to the Board of Revenue, and to sum up the likin donation amounted to 6,400,000 odd taels during this two years and constituted a large amount. The likin in Kianghsi 江西, Hunan and Hupei provinces was only 1,000,000 odd taels each year respectively, the likin donation collected within 2,000 odd *li* 里 of Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures amounted to 3,000,000 per year . . .¹¹⁴⁾

In the above passage which was intended as an apology to Yin Chao-yung and Wang Hsien-ch'eng, it must be understood that Li included other donation items as well as the likin when using the term likin donation (*li-*

chüan 釐捐) with respect to Suchou and Sungkiang prefectures. Otherwise, it would not be an apology to Yin Chao-yung's criticism. However, Li's second explanation cited on p. 94 offers the following interpretation. Likin, as Li called the likin donation, was a donation and stations were set up to collect it. Ideally the rate was to be pegged to the amount of expenditure; in years of great expenditure the likin rate would automatically be raised to meet the rise, and in time of little expenditure it would be lowered. But when in need of extra revenue or when the revenue from likin donation did not cover the expenditure for which it was allotted, it seems that other donation items were temporarily set up and collected. Therefore, in the report on revenue and expenditure briefly drawn up on the basis of the Imperial Edict which exempted the submission of registers mentioned above, it was impossible to clearly state the details of the likin donation. Even if details were given under the likin donation entry, there is no guarantee that all the donation items and the amount collected were actually entered, since there were no regulations concerning the emergency donation item. As a matter of fact, in 1863 the first memorial concerning the collection of rent donation which began soon after the restoration of Suchou city was presented on the same day as the memorial replying to the criticism by Yin and Wang, and the report of the second bill was presented. This fact seems to indicate that there was no report concerning rent donation in the first bill and that it was hurriedly memorialized to answer the criticism of Yin Chao-yung and Wang Hsien-ch'êng.¹¹⁵⁾ If Li's second explanation cited on p. 94, which appears at the end of the second bill, is interpreted as an excuse for not entering the rent donation in the first bill, the intention is clear. Li had not entered the amount of rent donation revenue in the first bill. Nevertheless, the figures of revenue and expenditure in the first bill balanced well. If the amount of customs and likin donation revenue had been as much as before and the rent donation had been added to that figure, the total figure for revenue and expenditure would not balance and the first bill would be considered to be false. So Li had to stress the decrease by 1,000,000 taels in customs and likin donation revenue. If Wang Hsien-ch'êng had not pointed out the irregularity of the rent donation revenue, Li would not have reported it and would not have had to stress the decrease in the amount of customs and likin donation.

Since the Governor and Governor General were permitted to collect donations as the need arose but were exempted from the duty of drawing up a register, the manipulation of figures became even easier than in the former institution for submitting the annual memorial on every item and its account for revenue and expenditure. If so, if the likin and other donation items reached a large sum and there was a surplus in financial revenue and expenditure, it is possible that it was not entered in a report. It seems that Li Hung-chang skillfully dodged the criticism by taking advantage of the account

memo system.

As we have seen above, the report concerning revenue and expenditure presented to the central government by Li Hung-chang is sufficient to arouse the suspicion that he concealed the existence of the surplus by taking advantage of the account memo system. Perhaps this surplus was spent on the extension and reinforcement of the Huai army and to strengthen Li Hung-chang's power base as a local official.

(3) The Actual Condition of the Policy for Military Expenses

Next let us consider how Li Hung-chang's policy was understood in those days through the above-mentioned memorial by Yin Chao-yung which criticized Li. Yin, a native of Wu-kiang county in Suchou prefecture held the important post of Chancellor of the Grand Secretaries (*nei-kê ta-hsüeh shih* 內閣大學士) in the central government, and seemed to have some understanding of actual conditions in Kiangsu province. His criticism of Li Hung-chang may be divided into two parts. First, the excessive collection of likin and other donations, and the need to abolish likin stations, and second, the arrogation of administration and personnel.

With regard to the first point Yin wrote:

The Kiangsu Governor Li Hung-chang's merit is remarkable, but he lacks in care for the people and [his plans] for returning the wandering people to their own land and for their relief are inadequate as well. Reclamation of waste land is insufficient. I have never heard that he ruled over the people with benevolence, but have heard only the severe manner in which he collects [likin and donations] . . . All blame Li Hung-chang for the evils of severe and injurious [likin and donations] collection in Kiangsu.¹¹⁶⁾

In reply to these accusations Li Hung-chang argued in the following manner:

After taking up the position of Kiangsu Governor, I regained the cities under enemy's control one by one and pacified the whole province. The merit is not small. But the condition in this province was the same as starting from the beginning, and I could trust and use a comparatively large number of people so that various kinds of people became mixed together and the method of collecting military supplies varied widely, so grudges were liable to develop among the people.¹¹⁷⁾

Li Hung-chang contradicted each of Yin Chao-yung's criticism though accepting Yin's statement to some degree, and insisted that since the war was still not over, the collection of likin donation was essential to the success of

military activities, so it was impossible to abolish all the likin offices. In reply to Yin's claim that likin stations were set up every 5 or 10 *li*, that the likin was collected eight or nine times on silk piece-goods and five or six times on timber at the rate of 0.3 taels per tael from Chêkiang and Shanghai to Suchou. Li Hung-chang answered that: likin stations were only set up every 50 or 70 *li*; the rate charged was a mere 30 or 40 cash per 1,000 cash on the basis of the Shanghai regulations for the likin rate (*Shanghai ting-chang* 上海定章) and the likin donation was only charged two or three times on the same goods from Chêkiang and Shanghai to Suchou. He also explained that though Yin complained of the great number of donations in Kiangsu this was due to the fact that commerce was flourishing in this province. Moreover Li memorialized that the basic policy was to merge likin stations with customs and gradually abolish them after the region was completely pacified.¹¹⁸⁾

Yin however made the following statement about rent donation:

In Suchou rent donation in recent years has been 0.4 piculs per *mou*, while rent collected 1 picul per *mou* in years of good harvest, and donation money more than 800 cash. In severe cases unworthy officials measured land by illegal measures, thereby falsely inflating the number of *mou* and collected rice tax directly from tenants. Many non-official households suffered from clerks of all grades unlawfully seizing their rent [without their knowledge]. Even if the landowner came and asked why the tenants had not paid the rent, the tenants merely replied that they had already paid the rent to the authorities.¹¹⁹⁾

Yin concluded that Li Hung-chang went against and infringed upon the Imperial order and he had no qualms about oppressing the people because of his achievements in suppressing the Taiping rebels.¹²⁰⁾

Second as for the arrogation of administration and personnel, Yin Chao-yung pointed out that there were a myriad of donations which made life troublesome, and the relatives, private secretaries, retainers from other provinces and wicked gentry vied with each other to take up the commissioners post and arrogantly used their position to do as they pleased.¹²¹⁾ Li Hung-chang partly agreed with the veracity of this claim stating that he too was afraid that gentry managers were apt to misuse their authority to do as they pleased and he would dismiss unworthy commissioners.¹²²⁾ But he also gave the following excuse in his own defense:

The former Hupei Governor Hu Lin-yi 胡林翼 once said, "The collection of likin should be based on the method proposed by Liu Yên 劉晏, an official of the T'ang 唐 period, and that it is better to allow scholars (*shih-jên* 士人) and not clerks to take charge of the task. This method

will reduce abuses to a minimum. In order to ensure that the likin donation in Hupei and Hunan is collected separately and allotted to military supplies in Hupei and other provinces and that military supplies can be continued for the longest time possible and give the best results, we should select [talented] people and we are not entrust such work exclusively to expectant (*hou-pu* 候補) officials and county officials."

In the beginning I followed this method. No matter where they came from, I sought upright, industrious and reliable men, and employed them in the office. I did not assign relatives of officials and private secretaries to such posts, and always carefully selected staff from retainers from other provinces and gentry. After the whole province was pacified, I thought that perhaps expectant officials should be used. And at that time I would reduce the number of men from other provinces.¹²³⁾

From the above confrontation between Yin Chao-yung and Li Hung-chang, the differences between the views of the two about the way of conducting local government are sharply contrasted. In the first place Yin pointed out that Li not only tormented the people in that region by collecting excessive amounts of likin and other donations, but also arrogated to his followers the management of likin offices and donation offices, partly using local people. This shows that Yin thought that local government should be conducted on the basis of the usual bureaucratic system a process in which the local gentry participated. Li Hung-chang for his part justified the collection of likin donation on the grounds of the emergency situation, and argued that the important point in managing the likin offices and donation offices was to select and use capable men. This shows that Li aimed to establish the supremacy of the Governor and Governor General and to negate the role of county officials and clerks in local administration, and to put his confidants into positions of real power while at the same time taking advantage of the regional gentry to generally consolidate his own position.

Conclusion

After his arrival in Shanghai in March 1864, Li Hung-chang carried out personnel changes and brought finances under his control, increased the number of likin and other donation offices under the direct control of the Governor and Governor General and intensified the collection of likin donation in order to secure more funds to pay for military supplies. At the same time, as immediate steps to overcome the crisis, he devised many measures which would allow a reduction in the amount of rice and silver to be sent to Peking and other regions. He also enforced tax reform as one of his policies for the reconstruction of local finances after the restoration of order in Kiangnan.

The above consideration of Li Hung-chang's financial policy clarifies the

following two points.

First, the Governor and Governor General strengthened their control over finance. They were able to gain this control by setting up likin and other donations to pay for military supplies and administering the collection of these donations. So it was difficult for the Board of Revenue to know the real situation surrounding likin. As in the criticism of Yin Chao-yung, members of committee managing likin and donation offices were of a different nature to those set up through the usual administrative channels. The personnel working in those offices were appointed by and directly responsible to the Governor and Governor General. As for the institution of reporting accounts in detail to the throne, though reports were submitted, they were only simple memos, summarizing revenue and expenditure figures briefly, which made it easier for the provincial government to manipulate funds. It functioned as a method of securing funds for the use of the provincial government, or more accurately of the Governor and Governor General. Therefore both the continuation and expansion of the collection of likin and other donations, and the discontinuation of the usual method of reporting accounts led to the breakdown of the central financial institution, and to the relative strengthening of the power of the Governor and Governor General which changed the nature of local government administration.

Second, let look at the participation of the Suchou gentry in local government administration, as manifested in the relationship between Li Hung-chang as a local official and the regional gentry. Li Hung-chang first used the Suchou gentry to secure military supplies. Their support was essential to his plans. He took advantage of them in the course of expanding his control over financial power in Kiangsu. Many members of the Suchou gentry were installed in offices in order to engage in work relating to the Huai army. There is no doubt that this allowed them to strengthen their power relatively within the ruling structure of the Ch'ing dynasty. However, the real result of this trend was to strengthen the power of the Governor and Governor General something completely different from the system envisaged by Fêng Kuei-fên in which the gentry would organize and administer local government.

Later Li Hung-chang aimed at strengthening the power of his followers including the Huai army. It may safely be said that Li's extension of power in Kiangsu linked with the relative fortification of the power of the Governor and Governor General vis-à-vis the central government accompanied by the breakdown of centralized financial control greatly increased the power of Li Hung-chang as a local official.

ABBREVIATIONS

- TWCKCC** Tsêng Kuo-fan 曾國藩: *Tsêng Wên-chêng kung ch'üan-chi* 曾文正公全集 (Taipei: 世界書局, 1978)
- LWCKCC** Li Hung-chang 李鴻章: *Li Wên-chung kung ch'üan-chi* 李文忠公全集
- HCTC** Fêng Kuei-fên 馮桂芬: *Hsien-chih-t'ang chi* 顯志堂集
- LWYYC** K'ê Wu-ch'ih 柯悟遲: *Lou-wang yung-yü chi* 漏網鳴魚集 (Shanghai: 中華書局, 1955)
- KSSCFCA** Liu Hsün-kao 劉鄩膏 et al. comp.: *Kiangsu shêng chien-fu ch'üan-an* 江蘇省減賦全案
- HCCSWHP** Shêng Kang 盛康 comp.: *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wên hsü-pien* 皇朝經世文續編

NOTES

- 1) Ichiko Chūzō 市古宙三: *Kindai Chūgoku no Seiji to Shakai* 近代中國の政治と社會 (Modern Chinese Politics and Society), pp. 331-360, Tokyo: 東京大學出版會, 1971; Takahashi Kōsuke 高橋孝助: *Sōron* 總論 (The Synthetic Theory) in Nozawa Yutaka 野澤豐 and Tanaka Masatoshi 田中正俊 eds.: *Kōza Chūgoku Kingendaishi*, 2: *Giwadan Undō* 講座中國近代史 2, 一義和團運動一, Tokyo: 東京大學出版會, 1978, pp. 1-26; Takahashi Kōsuke: *Shinmatsu no Kokka to Minshū* 清末の國家と民衆 (State and People in the Late Ch'ing Dynasty), *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 歷史學研究, 別冊, 1978, pp. 119-127.
- 2) Ono Shinji 小野信爾: *Li Kōshō no Tōjō: Waigun no Seiritsu wo megutte* 李鴻章の登場—淮軍の成立をめぐって— (The Emergence of Li Hung-chang: The Formation of the Huai Army), *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 16-2, 1957; Spector, S.: *Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army*, University of Washington Press, 1964; Luo Êrh-kang 羅爾綱: *Hsiang-chün Hsin-chih* 湘軍新志 (The New History of the Hsiang Army), Peking: 商務印書館, 1939; Kiang Ti 江地: *Li Hung-chang chi ch'i Huai-chün* 李鴻章及其淮軍 (Li Hung-chang and His Army), in *I-hê t'uan-tung hsüeh-shu t'ao-lun hui lun-wên* 義和團運動學術討論會論文, Shanhsi: 山西大學, 1980.
- 3) P'êng Yü-hsin 彭雨新: *Ch'ing-mo Chung-yang yü Ke-shêng Ts'ai-chêng Kuan-hsi* 清末中央與各省財政關係 (Fiscal Relations between the Peking and Each Provincial Government during the Late Ch'ing), *Shê-hui k'ê-hsüeh tsai-chih* 社會科學雜誌 9-1, 1974; Hé Lie 何烈: *Ch'ing Hsien-T'ung shih-ch'i té Ts'ai-chêng* 清咸同時期的財政 (The Finance of the Hsien-fêng and T'ung-chih Periods in the Ch'ing Dynasty), Taipei: 國立編譯館中華叢書編審委員會, 1981.
- 4) For example, Kuroda Akinobu 黒田明伸: *Shinmatsu Kohoku shō niokeru Heisei Kaikaku: Keizai Sōchi toshiteno Shō Kenryoku* 清末湖北省に於ける幣制改革—經濟装置としての省權力— (Monetary Reform in Hupei Province during the Late Ch'ing: The Provincial Power as an Economic Apparatus), *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 41-3, 1982. In this article Kuroda examines the monetary system reforms implemented by Chang Chih-t'ung 張之洞 and concludes that they led to the trend of power decentralization. Recently the question of the role played by the Governor and Governor General in the Reform movement has become a subject of discussion in Japan and China.
- 5) Takahashi Kōsuke: *Dōchi ninen no Kōnan niokeru Genpūron: Taiheitengoku Senryōka no Kōnan Kyōshinsō no Ichidōkō* 同治二年の江南における減賦論—太平天國占領下の江南郷紳層の一動向— (Arguments concerning Tax Reduction at Kiangnan in the Second Year of T'ung-chih, 1863: The Kiangnan Gentry Strata during the Taiping Forces Occupation), *Miyagi kyōiku daigaku kiyō* 宮城教育大學紀要, 11, 1976; Natsui Haruki 夏井春喜: "Taiko": "Shōko" Mondai to Kinpu Genpu Seisaku 「大戸」・「小戸」問題と均賦・減賦政策 (上)・(下) (The Issue of "Influential Households" and the "Minor Households" and the Policy of Tax Equalization and Tax Reduction), *Chūgoku kindaiishi kenkyūkai tsūshin* 中國近代史研究會通信, 8-11, 1978-1979; Natsui Haruki: *Yōmu Undō*

- Jiki Zeishūdatsu Taisei no Saihen: "Enshūdatsu" no Imisurumono* 洋務運動時期稅收奪體制的再編—“捐收奪”の意味するもの— (Reorganization of the Tax Collection System during the Western Affairs Movement: the Meaning of "Exploitation of Donation"), *Chūgoku kindai shi kenkyūkai tsūshin* 中國近代史研究會通信, 3, 1976; Polachek, J.: Gentry Hegemony: Soochow in the T'ung-chih Restoration, in Wakeman Jr., F. and Grant, C. eds.: *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*, University of California Press, 1975. Ocko, J. K.: *Bureaucratic Reform in Provincial China: Ting Jih-ch'ang in Restoration Kiangsu, 1867-1870*, Harvard University Press, 1983, is also an important work which examines the role of local officials and this problem.
- 6) Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉: *Kanpō ninen Kinken no Kōryō Bōdō* 咸豐二年鄞縣の抗糧暴動 (The Anti-tax Riot at Chin County in the Second Year of Hsien-fêng), *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū iinkai* 近代中國研究委員會 ed.: *Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū* 近代中國研究 5, Tokyo: 東京大學出版會, 1963; Muramatsu Yūji 村松祐次, *Fū Keifun no Kinpu Genpūron* 馮桂芬の均賦・減賦論 (Fêng Kuei-fên's Arguments for Tax Equalization and Tax Reduction), in *Kindai Kōnan no Sosan: Chūgoku Jinushisei no Kenkyū* 近代江南の租棧—中國地主制の研究— (Rent Bursaries in Modern China: A Study of the Chinese Landlord System), Tokyo: 東京大學出版會, 1970, pp. 536-549; Kobayashi Yukio 小林幸夫 *Shinmatsu no Sekkōshō niokeru Fuzei Kaikaku to Sessen Nōzei* 清末の浙江省における賦稅改革と折錢納稅 (Tax Reform and Tax Payment in Cash in Ch'iang Province during the Late Ch'ing Dynasty), *Tōyōgaku hō* 東洋學報 58-1-2, 1976; Takahashi Kōsuke: *Dōchi ninen no Kōnan niokeru Genpūron: Taiheitengoku Senryōka no Kōnan Kyōshinsō no Ichidōkō*, *op. cit.*; Natsui Haruki: "Taiko"·"Shōko" Mondai to Kinpu Genpu Seisaku, *op. cit.*; Lojewski, F. A.: The Kiangsu Tax Reduction of 1863: Ch'ing Fiscal Administration and Its Limitations, in Hou Chi-ming and Yü Tsung-shien eds.: *Modern Chinese Economic History*, Taipei: The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1977; Hsia Nai 夏鼐: *T'ai-p'ing-t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Ch'ang-kiang Kê-shêng té T'ien-fu Wên-t'i* 太平天國前後長江各省的田賦問題 (Tax Issues in the Yangtze Provinces about the Time of the Taiping Rebellion), *Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao* 清華學報 10-2, 1935; Chu Ch'ing-yung 朱慶永: *T'ung-chih êrh-nien Su-Sung êrh-fu Chien-fu chih Yüan-yin chi ch'i Ching-kuo* 同治二年蘇松二府減賦之原因及其經過 (The Cause and Process of Tax Reduction at Suchou and Sungkiang Prefectures in the Second Year of T'ung-chih), *Chêng-chih ching-chi hsüeh-pao* 政治經濟學報 3-3, 1935; Wang Yü-ch'üan 王毓銓: *Ch'ing-mo T'ien-fu yü Nung-min* 清末田賦與農民 (The Land Tax and Peasants during Late Ch'ing), *Shih-huo pan-yüeh-kan* 食貨半月刊, 3-5, 1936; Liu K'ê-hsiang 劉克祥: *Shih-chiu Shih-chi Wu-shih chih Chiu-shih Nien-tai Ch'ing Chêng-fu té Chien-fu hê Ch'ing-fu Yün-tung* 十九世紀五十至九十年代清政府的減賦和清賦運動 (Tax Reduction and Tax Settlement Movement, 1850's-1890's), *Chung-kuo shé-hui k'ê-shüeh-yüan ching-chi yen-chiu-so chi-k'an* 中國社會科學院經濟研究所集刊 7, 1985.
- 7) Kiangsu province was divided into two independent financial districts. The first comprised Suchou, Sungkiang 松江, Ch'angchou 常州, Chênkiang 鎮江 prefectures and T'ai-ts'ang 太倉 department, and the second comprised Kiangning 江寧, Yangchou 揚州, Huaian 淮安, Hsüchou 徐州 prefectures and Hai 海, T'ung 通 departments.
- 8) Later memorials to regulate the amount of surcharge assessment in counties on account of the increase of the cost of canal transport in 1809 were submitted to the throne, but were ineffective. (See, *HCCSWHP*, 36: 2a.)
- 9) *HCCSWHP*, 36: 1-15a.
- 10) Chêng Kuang-tsu 鄭光祖: *Yi-pan lu* 一斑錄, *tsa-shu* 雜述 6, p. 45b; *Hua-t'ing hsien-chih* 華亭縣志 (compiled in 1879), 23: 6a.
- 11) *HCCSWHP*, 58: 32b.
- 12) Wei Yüan 魏源: *Wei Yüan chi* 魏源集, Peking: 中華書局, 1975, pp. 429-430.
- 13) Lin Tse-hsi 林則徐: *Lin Wên-chung kung chêng-shu* 林文忠公政書, *chia-chi* 甲集, *tsou-kao* 奏稿, 8: 15b-16a.
- 14) See, Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫: *Min Shin Jidai Kōtsūshi no Kenkyū* 明清時代交通史の研究

- (Studies on the History of Transport during the Ming and Ch'ing Periods), Tokyo: 山川出版社, 1971, pp. 336-350.
- 15) For example, the conversion rate regulated by the Board of Revenue (*hu-pu* 戶部) in 1849 in the case of collection from tax-payers in silver taels was 1 or 1.5 taels per picul, but in contrast to this the county governments needed 2.4 or 2.6 taels per picul even in the case of shipment by sea to buy rice from rice merchants to transport to the central government. (See, *Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* 大清宣宗實錄 465: 10b-12a.) Conversion rate means the rate determined by officials for converting rice tax or silver tax into another article or currency for payment.
 - 16) Soon after wastage surcharge silver which had been collected arbitrarily by counties was changed into *Kung-hsiang* 公項 during the Yung-ch'eng 雍正 period, the Kiangsu Governor Yin Chi-shan 尹繼善 memorialized the throne to prohibit surcharge assessment and to reform the corrupt practice of land tax in the Kiangsu, and an Imperial Edict was issued in relation of this. (See, *HCCSWHP*, 36: 1b.) During Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶 period, some materials referred to the increase of the surcharge assessment.
 - 17) *HCCSWHP*, 36: 9a.
 - 18) *LWYYC*, p. 9.
 - 19) *HCTC*, 5: 36b.
 - 20) *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* 大清會典事例 (compiled in Kuang-hsü period), 201: 9.
 - 21) *Ibid.*, 201: 13.
 - 22) *HCCSWHP*, 36: 81a.
 - 23) *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li*, 201: 16.
 - 24) *LWYYC*, pp. 3-14.
 - 25) *HCTC*, 5: 21a.
 - 26) Wu Yün: *Liang-lei-hsüan ch'ih-tu* 兩驛軒尺牘, 5: 13b.
 - 27) Pao Shih-ch'ên 包世臣: *An-Wu ssü-chung* 安吳四種 26: 11b-12a.
 - 28) From the mid-Tao-kuang period till 1856 the price of rice increased due to dry weather, and remained between 2,000 and 3,000 cash per picul except in 1849 and 1850 when it increased rapidly to 6,000 or 7,000 cash per picul due to floods and in 1853 when it fell to 1,000 cash per picul. See, Usui Sachiko 臼井佐知子: *Shindai Fuzei kankei Sūchi no ichikentō* 清代賦稅關係數値の一検討 (An Examination of Figures Related to Land Tax during the Ch'ing Dynasty), *Chūgoku kindaiishi kenkyū* 中國近代史研究, 1, 1981, pp. 43-113.
 - 29) Whether the tax was paid in silver or copper cash, tax-payers had to sell rice on the market to obtain the necessary money. In the case of rice tax, as the conversion rate was not linked directly with the market rice price but set up through the medium of conversion rate calculated in *ts'ao-p'ing* taels, the real tax burden increased in accordance with the rise in the market exchange rate of silver taels to copper cash. In the case of the payment of rice tax in dollars, judging from the example in the *Lou-wang yung-yü chi*, the burden was nearly the same as that in the case of copper cash. In those days the payment of silver tax in dollars was not officially accepted, tax-payers could not help paying through county officials and clerks reluctantly, and the conversion rate was left to their discretion. Regards the shift in the conversion rate of rice tax and the shift in the burden for tax-payers, see, Usui Sachiko, *op. cit.*
 - 30) *KSSCFCA*, 5: 29b.
 - 31) *Wei Yüan chi*, pp. 404-414, pp. 425-430.
 - 32) *HCTC*, 4: 11; Hoshi Ayao, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-366.
 - 33) *Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 456: 2-4.
 - 34) Hoshi Ayao, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-370; translated and commented on by Hoshi Ayao in *Daiunga Hatten Shi* 大運河發展史 (The History of the Development of the Grand Canal), Tokyo: 平凡社東洋文庫, 410, 1982, pp. 345-347.
 - 35) *HCTC*, 4: 11.
 - 36) *KSSCFCA*, 2: 57.

- 37) *HCCSWHP*, 37: 46b-47a.
- 38) Hoshi Ayao: *Min Shin Jidai Kōtsushi no Kenkyū*, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
- 39) *Ta-Ch'ing Wên-tsung shih-lu* 大清文宗實錄, 46: 6.
- 40) Taniguchi Kikuo 谷口規矩雄: *Mindai Kahoku no "Taiko" nitsuite* 明代華北の「大戸」について ("Influential households" in North China during the Ming Dynasty), *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 27-4, 1969.
- 41) *Huang-ch'ao wên-hsien t'ung-k'ao* 皇朝文獻通考 3: 10a. *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li*, 171: 8b.
- 42) *HCTC*, 9: 19a.
- 43) *Hu-pu tsê-li* 戶部則例 (compiled in 1874), 19: 5-6a; *KSSCFCA*, 1: 2.
- 44) Kobayashi Yukio, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150. The *Hê-nan ts'ai-chêng shuo-ming shu* 河南財政說明書, *shang-pien* 上編, *sui-ju pu* 歲入部, 1-1-1, pp. 41-43, makes a distinction between big tax (*ta-liang* 大糧) and small tax (*hsiao-liang* 小糧).
- 45) *Shên-pao*, October 3, 1876, describes the circumstance surrounding tax reduction and tax collection.
- 46) *Kuanghsi ts'ai-chêng yen-kê li-pi shuo-ming shu* 廣西財政沿革利弊說明書, *ti-êrh-pien* 第二編, *kê-lun shang* 各論上, *shou-ju pu* 收入部, *kuo-shui chih pu* 國稅之部, *chia* 甲 *t'ien-fu lei* 田賦類, pp. 77-87, *Fuchien ts'ai-chêng shuo-ming shu* 福建財政說明書, *t'ien-fu lei yen-kê li-pi shuo-ming shu* 田賦類沿革利弊說明書, *ti-ting-yin* 地丁銀, pp. 5-8 and *Anhui ts'ai-chêng yen-kê li-pi shuo-ming shu* 安徽財政沿革利弊說明書, *sui-ju pu* 歲入部, *ti-yi-pien* 第一編 *ti-ting* 地丁, p. 16, *ti-êrh-pien* 第二編 *ts'ao-liang* 漕糧, p. 29 shows that in some counties there was a distinction between influential and commoner households, between literati (*chin* 衿) and commoner households in addition to the distinction between influential and minor households.
- 47) Tao Hsü 陶煦: *Tsu-hê* 租覈 pp. 24-25; *Fuchien ts'ai-chêng shuo-ming shu*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8 shows that there was a distinction between city-chests (*ch'eng-kuei* 城櫃) and village-chests (*hsiang-kuei* 鄉櫃).
- 48) Hsieh Mêng-chu 葉夢珠: *Yüeh-shih pien* 閩世篇 (Shanghai: 上海古籍出版社, 1981), 6: 135.
- 49) *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kaio* 奏稿, 10: 31-32; *KSSCFCA*, 1: 10.
- 50) In *HCTC* 10: 1, Fêng stated that gentry and commoner households both paid the rice tax in silver taels (*chê-yin* 折銀). But the commoner households seem to have paid the rice tax in copper cash.
- 51) *Suchou shêng fu-yi ch'üan-shu* 蘇州省賦役全書 (compiled in 1838 and 1865).
- 52) *HCTC*, 10: 1.
- 53) *LWYYC*, p. 5, p. 9.
- 54) *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 55) *HCTC*, 9: 19-20a, 10: 1-6a. Takahashi Kōsuke: *Kanpō sannnen zengo no Kōnan niokeru Kinpuron: Kindai Kyōshin no Aru Shuppatsu* 咸豐三年前後の江南における均賦論—近代郷紳のある出發— (The Argument for the Equalization of Taxes in Kiangnan around 1853: One of the Beginnings of the Modern Gentry), *Miyagi kyōiku daigaku kiyō* 宮城教育大學紀要, 10, 1975; Natsui Haruki, Muramatsu Yūji, Polachek, J. and Lojewski, F. A. *op. cit.*. The devaluation of the conversion rate of silver and rice tax was practiced in Ch'ang-shu and Chao-wên counties in 1846. See, *LWYYC*, p. 8.
- 56) *Hsiao-pin-lu k'ang-yi*, p. 6, pp. 10-12a, p. 17, p. 38a.
- 57) *HCTC*, 6: 26b.
- 58) *Ibid.*, 4: 15-18a.
- 59) *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao chüan-chi* 太平天國史料專輯 (Shanghai: 上海古籍出版社, 1979), p. 94.
- 60) *TWCKCC*, *tsou-kaio* 奏稿, pp. 436-439.
- 61) *LWCKCC*, *p'êng-liao han-kaio* 朋僚函稿, 1: 10a, 15b-16a; *TWCKCC*, *tsou-kaio*, p. 512.
- 62) In the Imperial Edict of March 1864, the main reason for Hsüeh's dismissal was that he confided in Hsü P'ei-chang 徐佩璋 and Fei Yü-tsêng 費玉曾 who betrayed the Ch'ing by going over to the Taiping forces. This Edict also recorded that Hsüeh

- hated the acting Shanghai County Administrator Liu Hsün-kao 劉郁膏 who was a man of reputation. See, *Ta-Ch'ing Mu-tsung shih-lu* 大清穆宗實錄, 22: 9.
- 63) Li intended to give Huang the post of the Customs Taotai. See, *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 1: 15b, 2: 23.
- 64) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 1: 7, 23a, and *p'êng-liao han-kao*, 1: 15a.
- 65) Yin Chao-yung urged the throne to adopt a hard-line policy, and even advocated war against Great Britain and other foreign powers in 1858, and was supported by P'eng Yün-chang. See, Banno Masataka 坂野正高: *Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaiō shi* 近代中國政治外交史 (A History of Modern China's Foreign Policy), Tokyo: 東京大學出版會, 1973, p. 248. Fêng Kuei-fên and others persuaded Yin to set up the Shanghai Joint Defence Bureau. See, *HCTC*, 4: 20a.
- 66) *TWCKCC, tsou-kao*, pp. 512-513; *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 2: 41-42a; Yin Chao-yung: *Yin P'u-ching shih-lang nien-p'u* 殷譜經侍郎年譜, p. 43b.
- 67) Ono Shinji claims that by taking Fêng Kuei-fên on as a private secretary Li Hung-chang put himself in an advantageous position with respect to Wu Hsü, because such an action indicated that the influential people in local society, namely the official gentry group had gone over to Li's side. See, Ono Shinji, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
- 68) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 2: 41b.
- 69) *TWCKCC, tsou-kao*, p. 513.
- 70) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 2: 41b.
- 71) *Ibid.*, 2: 41b-42a. Afterwards Li gave Wang Ta-ching and others the post of the person on charge of the General Donation Likin Bureau (*chüan-li tsung-chü* 捐釐總局).
- 72) *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 2: 16b-17a.
- 73) *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo tzü-liao hui-pien* 太平天國資料匯編 (Peking: 中華書局, 1979), vol. 2, *hsia* 下, p. 900; Ch'ien Hsü 錢勛: *Wu-chung p'ing-k'ou chi* 吳中平寇記, 2: 16; *Wu Hsü tang-an hsüan-pien* 吳煦檔案選編 (Kiangsu: 江蘇人民出版社, 1983), vol. 6, pp. 547-548.
- 74) In a letter to Tsêng Kuo-fan dated March 25, 1862, Li Hung-chang praised Liu for his honesty and loving care for the people, but Li stated that Liu's talent at official duties lacked sharpness and as such was competent for the post of Provincial Judge. Afterwards, Li proposed Liu's dismissal on the grounds of lack of capability. See, *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 1: 15b, 3: 14b, 35b-37.
- 75) *Ibid.*, 2: 23b.
- 76) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 1: 23.
- 77) Li Hung-chang and Liu Hsün-kao became chin-shih 進士 in 1847, Kuo Po-yin in 1837 and Li Ming-wan in 1840. The chief Examiner at the Hui-shih 會試 in these times was Pan Shih-ên.
- 78) *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi* 太平天國史料叢編簡輯, Shanghai: 中華書局, 1962, vol. 2, p. 194.
- 79) *Ibid.*, p. 196.
- 80) *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.
- 81) This theory is taken from Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武, as is generally known.
- 82) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 1: 33b.
- 83) *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 1: 40b. The customs houses at Hank'ou and Kiukiang opened in October.
- 84) *Ibid.*, 1: 49a.
- 85) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 3: 28-29a.
- 86) *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 3:2; *Ta-Ch'ing Mu-tsung shih-lu*, 53: 10b-11.
- 87) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 3: 28-29a. In his January 1863 memorial, Li also stated that merchants had been paying a large amount in donations, and that their resources were exhausted. In reply to this memorial the central government ordered Li to purchase tribute grain using revenue from the Shanghai Maritime Customs. In response to this order Li memorialized that the Shanghai Maritime Custom revenue had to be used solely for military supplies, and could not be devoted for transporting tribute

grain. See, *Ta-Ch'ing Mu-tsung shih-lu*, 53: 10b-11, 57: 16b-18a and *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 3: 71-75a.

88) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 3: 44; *Wu-chung p'ing-k'ou chi*, 3: 9-10a.

89) *KSSCFCA*, 2: 13-23. In reply to this memorial, an Imperial Edict about "tax reduction" was issued in June of the same year. This Edict reduced the former regular amount of tax by one-third in Suchou, Sungkiang prefectures and T'ai-ts'ang department, and by 10 percent in Ch'angchou and Chenkiang prefectures. Afterwards, discontented with this Edict, a memorial was submitted in May 1865 asking for a 20 percent reduction in the former regular amount of the silver tax and seeking a revision of the way in which reductions were implemented. Furthermore in September of the same year a memorial was submitted asking for a reduction in part not only of the amount to be sent to the central government but also of the rest, and asking for a larger reduction in the infertile coastal areas. In reply to these memorials, all but the reduction of the silver tax were granted. The new and old amounts of taxes are given in table (i). On the other hand, as for the reduction in the surcharge assessment

Table (i). Tax Amount before and after Tax Reduction

(Unit: picul)

Prefecture or Department	Old Amount of Rice Tax	New Amount of Rice Tax
Suchou	877, 514	550, 851
Sungkiang	427, 461	310, 726
T'ai-ts'ang	153, 432	110, 453
Ch'angchou	355, 981	322, 050
Chênkiang	214, 736	191, 094

Source: *Suchou shêng fu-yi ch'üan-shu* 蘇州省賦役全書 (compiled in 1865).

Table (ii). Reduced Amount of Surcharge Assessment of Rice Tax

(Units: picul and copper cash)

Prefecture or Department	Amount of Surcharge Assessment Rice to be Reduced	Amount of Surcharge Assessment Cash to be Reduced
Suchou	192, 800 odd	753, 500, 000 odd
Sungkiang	108, 800 odd	505, 700, 000 odd
Ch'angchou	73, 000 odd	215, 200, 000 odd
T'ai-ts'ang (T'ai-ts'ang & Chên-yang counties)		94, 000, 000 odd
T'ai-ts'ang (Chia-ting & Pao-shan counties)		107, 000, 000 odd

Source: *KSSCFCA*, 1: 10.

of the silver tax, Liu Hsün-kao reduced it in Sungkiang prefecture and T'ai-ts'ang department after the Ch'ing army recaptured those areas from the Taiping forces. (See, *KSSCFCA*, 2: 45.) Furthermore the official conversion rate per tael was reduced to 2,000 cash in Suchou, Sungkiang, Ch'angchou, Chenkiang prefectures and T'ai-ts'ang

- department, and the difference between the new conversion rate and the former conversion rate amounting to 400,000,000 cash of the total amount was reduced in December 1865. (See, *T'ung-chih Tung-hua shü-lu* 同治東華續錄, 54: 18a; *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, 10: 31-32; *KSSFCA*, 1: 10.) As for the reduction in the surcharge assessment of the rice tax, Li Hung-chang memorialized the throne in June 1866 that the official conversion rate should be 4,500 cash per picul in 1866 and 5,000 cash per picul after 1866. An Imperial Edict issued in July granted this reduction as is shown in table (ii). Thereafter it became regular procedure to officially decide the official conversion rate of rice tax by converting directly from copper cash and not using the medium of silver. (See, *KSSFCA*, 1: 10; *Shanghai hsien hsü-chih* (compiled in 1918), 6: 20b.)
- 90) *LWCKCC*, *p'êng-liao han-kao*, 3: 18b-19a.
- 91) *Ibid.*, 4: 3b-6, 12a.
- 92) *Ibid.*, 4: 12a.
- 93) *Ibid.*, 4: 19b.
- 94) *Ibid.*, 5: 2b.
- 95) *Ibid.*, 4: 31a.
- 96) *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, 9: 8-9a; *Yin P'u-ching shih-lang nien-p'u*, p. 54.
- 97) *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi*, vol. 3, p. 336; *TWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, p. 645. Military supplies for Tsêng Kuo-fan's army were to be provided for from the *Hsieh-chi* 協濟. Silver of which 50,000 taels were from Hupei, 25,000 taels from Hunan, 50,000 taels from Ssüch'üan 四川 30,000 taels from the Kianghsi 江西, Kuangtung 廣東 and Kiangsu likin revenue. But as of March 1864, the silver from Ssüch'üan and from the East Levy Bureau (*tung-chêng chü* 東征局) in Hunan had not arrived, and less than 30,000 taels had been received from Hupei and Kianghsi respectively, 20,000 taels which was part of the Kuangtung likin revenue and 30,000 taels of the 40,000 taels that supposed to be sent from Kiangsu.
- 98) *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chih*, vol. 3, pp. 338-339; *TWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, p. 653.
- 99) *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, 7: 51, 53-54, 8: 43-44, 9: 15-16, 10: 18-19a.
- 100) *Ibid.*, 8: 27-29a, 10: 28-29a.
- 101) *Ibid.*, 8: 23-24a and *p'êng-liao han-kao*, 6: 37b.
- 102) P'eng Yü-hsin, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89; Hé Lie, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-399.
- 103) *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, 7: 62. This system of rendering military supply account with exemption from drawing up the register (*chün-hsü mien-tsao-ts'é pao-hsiao an* 軍需免造冊報銷案) was put into effect all over the country.
- 104) *Ibid.*, 8: 9-10.
- 105) *Ibid.*, 9: 12-13.
- 106) *Ibid.*, 9: 44-45.
- 107) *Ibid.*, 8: 9.
- 108) A table listing the military supply expenditure for the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion by the Ch'ing army (*Ch'ing-chün chên-ya T'ai-p'ing-chün chün-fei chih-ch'u piao* 清軍鎮壓太平軍軍費支出表) is given in P'êng Tsé-yi's 彭澤益 *Ch'ing-tai Hsien-T'ung nien-chien Chün-hsü Tsou-hsiao T'ung-chi* 清代咸同年間軍需奏銷統計 (The Statistics of Memorials on Military Supply Accounts during the T'ung-chih and Hsien-fêng Periods during the Ch'ing Dynasty), *Chung-kuo shê-hui k'ê-shüeh-yüan ching-chi yen-chiu-so chi-k'an* 中國社會科學院經濟研究所集刊, 3, 1981, p. 126. In this table, the total amount of the first, second and third bills for the Suchou military supply from April 1862 to the end of May, 1865, is 12,482,703 taels. The total of the third bill has been taken from the memorial of June 29, 1869. By subtracting the first and second bill totals from the total amount indicated by this table, we can get 3,933,616 taels as the total amount of silver for the third bill.
- 109) *LWCKCC*, *tsou-kao*, 9: 2b-3a.
- 110) *Ibid.*, 9: 13a.

- 111) The figures for revenue and expenditure of military supplies by the Hsiang army under the command of Tsêng Kuo-fan from September 1853 to June 1864 were reported in February 1867 by the acting Anhui Provincial Treasurer Wu K'un-hsiu 吳坤修, the Kianghsi Provincial Treasurer Sun Ch'ang-fu 孫長紱 and the former acting Provincial Treasurer Hê Ching 何璟. See, *TWCKCC, tsou-kao*, pp. 800-802.
- 112) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 9: 3a.
- 113) *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 6: 32a.
- 114) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 9: 4b.
- 115) The first bill read "likin donation and others", but the second bill read "likin donation, donation for rations (*hsiang-chüan* 餉捐) and others".
- 116) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 9: 1a.
- 117) *Ibid.*, 9: 1.
- 118) *Ibid.*, 9: 1-3.
- 119) *Ibid.*, 9: 8a.
- 120) *LWCKCC, p'êng-liao han-kao*, 6: 34b.
- 121) *LWCKCC, tsou-kao*, 9: 1b.
- 122) *Ibid.*, 9: 1b.
- 123) *Ibid.*, 9: 3b.