

Prices Levied by the Ch'ing Victors for the Redemption of Korean Prisoners of War

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Introduction

The Chinese character *sok* 贖, meaning basically 'to produce money for the payment of a person's freedom or for the restitution for some wrongdoing', appears in the compound *sokhwan* 贖還 to mean 'redemption payments for the return of a country's citizens captured during wartime'. However, as a legal term, *sokhwan* is historically much more recent than such terms as *soksin* 贖身 (buy back of an indentured slave), *songnyang* 贖良 (buy freedom for a slave), *sokchoc* 贖罪 (expiation) and *sokhyŏng* 贖刑 (payment in lieu of punishment).

The problem of buying back war prisoners arose in 1627 (the fifth year of Injo 仁祖) just after Korea surrendered to the invading Chin 金 army (later the Ch'ing 清 army) resulting in the establishment of a peace bringing together the two countries into a mutually sovereign-fraternal alliance. It occurred when the Chin dynasty replied to the Korean demand for the return of war prisoners by attempting to set stipulations for allowing the buy back of prisoners through the opening of a market, in which materials (other than persons) would be exchanged for captive returns. The Koreans accepted all conditions concerning market relations, time and location, thus initiating redemption activities. However, later, in the wake of social changes which occurred during the transition from the Chin to the Ch'ing dynasties, certain objections were registered by Korea against the Ch'ing out of Korea's obligatory gratitude toward their former suzerain, the Ming; and as the diplomatic atmosphere worsened between the two countries, redemption activities temporarily came to a halt.

Then, during the years 1636-37 (the fourteenth and fifteenth years of Injo) the Ch'ing army launched a second invasion of Korea, resulting in a conquered Korean court who was forced into the status of subjected nation to serve the Ch'ing in the role of tributary. It was during this conflict that Korea suffered even greater losses in terms of capture as large numbers of prisoners were taken from groups spanning all social classes. For this reason, negotiations involving war prisoner returns following this invasion took on a more desperate tone. One article contained in the conditions of surrender

stipulated that captives would be bought back from individual captors, which included Ch'ing aristocrats and military officers, in units based on the value of silver. All returns would be carried out in Shenyang 瀋陽 within a span of ten years; however, with the move of the Ch'ing capital city to Peking, the time limitation was shortened to eight years. It was in this way that the word *sokhwan* became a widely used political term during Korea's Injo era, especially during the time following the second invasion by the Ch'ing.

Of course, this is by no means the first time we can see the sale and purchase of war captives taking place in Korean history; but never before did the problem become such an important national issue, never before did redemption span so long a period of time, and never before did the number of prisoners redeemed reach such proportions. The Injo redemptions present vast and vexing problems, the solutions to which would greatly influence both Korean statecraft and society.

In my previous work on the war captive redemption issue, I dealt mainly with the conditions surrounding the full period of buy-back negotiations following the Korean surrender of 1636–37. Published results of this research included a paper on redemption periodization and procedure in the *Chōsen Gakuhō* 朝鮮學報, no. 109 (October 1983) and a paper on the various types of redemption in the *Tōyō Gakuhō* 東洋學報, vol. 65, nos. 1 and 2 (November 1984). In the present paper I would like to take up the major element determining whether or not captives would be returned, that is, the ransom prices demanded for prisoners by their Ch'ing captors mainly during the late Injo era.

I. The Elements of Redemption Payments

The term *sokka* 贖價 refers to the ransom value of a war prisoner for securing his release. While prisoner redemptions following the disturbances of 1627 included payments of such commodities as cloth, rice, paper, horses and cattle, the buy-back activities which were re-opened after the second Ch'ing invasion of 1636–37 were characterized by the Ch'ing captors' demand for silver and the establishment of a redemption standard based on that precious metal. However, at that time, since silver was not a general form of currency within Korea, redemption payments had to be augmented frequently with various materials in kind. Because many of these were also sequestered by the Ch'ing conquerors in the name of tribute and military supplies, what was actually used in the redemption of war prisoners varied considerably. Top on the list of payments in kind was tobacco in various forms such as *namch'o* 南草 (tobacco) and *chisam* 枝三 (cut tobacco). Tobacco use had already been adopted from the Japanese in the early years of Kwanghae-gun's 光海君 reign (1608–22);¹⁾ and being that it was both pleasing to the Ch'ing people's taste and easily transported over long trade routes, it became

one of the most popular instruments offered by the Koreans in buying back their war captives. On the Ch'ing side, however, the emperor had denounced tobacco as a harmful substance of no redeeming social value and had prohibited its entry into China. Furthermore, any attempt to smuggle it into the country would be met upon discovery with such measures as immediate incineration of the goods and the severest reprisals against its carrier. Despite the occurrence of a few incidents involving such punishment of smugglers, all in all it was understood that without the presentation of tobacco, redemption negotiations would never get off the ground. Therefore, a steady stream of tobacco-carrying Koreans continued to flow into China throughout the entire war captive redemption period. Eventually even the Ch'ing state was forced by the overpowering desire for the stimulant by its citizens to slowly relax its prohibitions. While we do see an item in the Korean literature dated II/Injo 17 (1639)* commenting that "the Ch'ing have never prohibited it,"²⁾ the Ch'ing government in actuality abhorred its use for private gain and thus outlawed all government functionaries from transporting quantities of the substance privately. Rather it was decreed that traders, after going through the proper procedures, would be allowed to come to Shenyang to deal in tobacco. Furthermore, in the nineteenth year of Injo (1641) the emperor handed down an order which established the price of one catty (*chin*) 斤 of tobacco at three copper cash (*chien*) 錢 in all public places of sale.³⁾ However, with respect to the redemption price of war captives, this officially established price would be unthinkable in such negotiations. Probably the main reason why the government did not elect to ban tobacco outright lay in the fact that there were many smokers among the Ch'ing aristocratic elite itself as the following anecdote shows. In a report sent to Korea on the occasion of the winter solstice of the twenty-fourth year of Injo (1646), emissary I Kijo 李基祚 tells of a gift to Dorgon (多爾袞 = 九王) for its leniency in reducing the amount of rice to be delivered to Tungchou 通州 on account of the poor crop in Korea. I Kijo comments:

General Ingyrdai said to me secretly, "... Dorgon is very fond of tobacco and always has an eye out for excellent hunting falcons. A gift containing both of these delectables would surely express the gratitude which you now feel."⁴⁾

It was no doubt this insatiable demand for and general popularity of tobacco throughout the Ch'ing empire that provided the only way for those Korean commoners, unable to meet the silver price of redemption, to buy back their friends and loved ones taken prisoner in the invasion. We do see many

* When a date is mentioned by the lunar calendar and the Korean reign title, it is described as "2/II/Injo 15 (1637)", that is, "the second day of the second month of the fifteenth year of Injo reign" together with the solar calendar year 1637 in parentheses; and "II/Injo 17 (1639)", "the second month of the seventeenth year of Injo reign".

records referring to those who did secretly load themselves with tobacco and enter Shenyang in the hope that the stimulant would better their chances of coming to reasonable terms with the Ch'ing captors; but as we can imagine, there is probably an even greater role being played by tobacco than meets the eye. Also, in a way similar to what followed the first series of disturbances in 1627, such products as paper and animal fur were also demanded in many a redemption bargaining session. All of these articles in kind were carried by the Koreans in order to either offset insufficiencies in meeting silver redemption prices or to cover themselves in the case any sudden price hiking took place. Also, these materials were all selected on the basis of how they would suit the particular tastes of their Ch'ing counterparts. At the same time there were cases in which those who held Koreans captive actually indicated beforehand to those who would come to bargain what items beside silver they desired. Therefore, while the major medium of prisoner redemption was, on the surface, silver specie, we can only conclude that prisoners were actually returned on the strength of silver *plus* articles of trade in kind.

While fearing redundancy, I feel it proper to consider once more what constituted the determination of those redemption prices, which made it possible for Korean war captives to be returned home.

II. Varieties of Redemption Payments

Payments for the return of war captives not only differed according to the social status, wealth, gender and the age of the captive, but were also dependent on the social position of the Ch'ing captors within the Ch'ing state.⁵⁾ Usually the value of those prisoners of high ranking, substantial wealth or held by Ch'ing citizens of importance was high, while commoner captives were returned relatively cheaply. Among commoners, those demanding the highest ransoms were able-bodied men valued for their labor power and skills. Less expensive were less productive persons like the elderly and infirmed, women and children. Even though, generally speaking, buy-back prices were set in proportion to a particular captive's status, wealth, gender and work capability, there were a great many exceptions. For example, whenever it was known that the applicant for the return of a captive was either of that person's parents, regardless of the health or age of the captive, the redemption price would be automatically increased ten times.⁶⁾ Also, the price demanded tended to fluctuate during the actual negotiation session depending on the emotional feelings of the applicant and whether or not a bribe was offered. Of course, there were differences depending on whether the application was made by the Korean government or a private person; and if the prisoner in question fell either within the categories of agricultural laborers *mongkun* 農軍 or any other such occupational category especially useful to

his Ch'ing captor, his redemption price was relatively low, but he was kept as a laborer by the Ch'ing and was not permitted to return to Korea.

Two more cases which defied the usual rules for negotiating redemption value were known as *noksok* 勒贖 and *nokjing* 勒徵. In the practice of *noksok*, Ch'ing aristocrats or other persons of high position would secure for their own use prisoners with productive value, then attempt to sell the elderly, the infirmed, women and children at exorbitant prices. The Ch'ing captors would give their Korean counterparts no room for either negotiation or concession by naming a redemption price which they had already figured relatives of the captive could not possibly afford. After blocking off such possibilities, the captors would then force these useless prisoners directly onto the Korean embassy in Shenyang for greatly inflated prices. In the practice of *nokjing*, Ch'ing captors would force the Korean embassy in Shenyang either to pay stiff monetary penalties for private contract infractions or to make good on any personal defaults in rendering the contracted redemption price itself.

In summary, the determination of ransom value was by no means fixed, and had virtually no other standard than the whims and desires of each individual captor; and it was such chaotic price fixing and hiking that resulted in the exasperation and despair which the Koreans came to feel concerning their nationwide efforts and well-laid plans to buy back their fellow countrymen held captive by the Ch'ing conquerers.

III. Source Materials Related to War Prisoner Redemption

It would be very difficult to try to estimate exactly how many cases of such unreasonable demands really occurred during the war captive redemption negotiations. However, there are a few reliable source materials by which we can capture the general situation and the actual amounts of such bad faith redemption payments.

What the examples of *noksok*-type forced buy-back methods record for us is the extremely individual nature of price setting; for as we mentioned previously, because the ransom demanded was based on the face value of the silver which a particular captor needed at the moment rather than being based on the background and ability of the captive in question, all such cases are unique with respect to time and conditions under which redemption was carried out. On the other hand, sources describing actual cases of *nokjing*-type coerced collection of unpaid ransoms gives us a relatively large number of prices. Also valuable is the separate listing of original prices and added penalties, as well as the rare appearance of prisoner ransoms levied on commoners.

Examples of prisoner ransom payments made by the Korean royal family and government officials from state funds (the practice of *chegûp* 題給) do

often disclose actual prices paid, but there is one case recorded where a previously negotiated price of 80 *yang* 兩 was unduly increased to 200 兩 at the actual point of the prisoner's return.⁷⁾ Also recorded are a number of partial payments, which may not be of much help in trying to determine exact prices. However, because these records tell us that all hostages related to the royal family were in fact redeemed, we can at least get a general idea of the amount of actual prices paid on the return of such persons.

Another interesting aspects of *chegŭp*-related sources are the various circumstances surrounding those applying under this category of payment. Essentially those desiring hostage return through government funding were ordinarily persons of high rank and governmental responsibility; but if they were not blessed with appreciable personal wealth, they would have no doubt been unable to meet the redemption prices required. Inversely speaking, there were many cases in which persons, who would be eligible to apply for buying back their loved ones through the practice of official redemption, *chegŭp*, but who were in fact economically well off, spent their own personal funds to redeem relatives through the much quicker process of private redemption negotiations, *sadok* 私贖. However, actual examples of such private redemption attempts are seldom well documented. Still, what is made very clear in such cases is the fact that those applicants, including rich aristocrats and privately wealthy citizens, who were willing to use their personal wherewithal to redeem their loved ones, definitely held advantageous positions in the negotiation process—which goes to show that in the successful buy back of war captives, the most important factor (with the possible exception of social position) may have very well been the economic strength of the particular applicant.

Despite the fact that it is at this time impossible to accurately estimate the number of and describe the actual situation surrounding redemption prices and demands for exorbitant payments, the above-mentioned examples seen in the historical sources have at least provided us with a small sampling of actual prices paid and what it took to pay them—which should be sufficient to enable us to conjecture confidently on at least the general conditions surrounding the negotiation process and the pains which the Koreans experienced at that time. Also, with respect to those items in kind which were used as either substitutes for or increments to redemption prices, the evaluation of these products in terms of silver specie is hardly accurate as their values fluctuated with the level of demand. This extremely complicated and uncertain set of affairs has forced this author to ignore in this particular paper payments in kind altogether and to deal exclusively with prices laid out in terms of silver.

IV. A Periodization of Redemption Payments

1. The Early Period

A. Freely Negotiated Exchanges

While the war prisoner redemption price per person following the war of 1627 was paid in blue cloth (*changp'o*) 青布 at continually inflated prices of from 10 to 65 bolts (*p'i*) 匹, 疋⁹⁾, the ransoms following the disturbances of 1636-37 were paid mainly in terms of silver amounts (*ŭnnyang*) 銀兩. In the item dated 2/II Injo 15 (1637) in the *Sok Nanjung chamnok* (Random records of recent disturbances, continued) 續亂中雜錄, there is the passage:

The Ch'ing forces have set up operational headquarters in the Mohwawwan 慕華館 [inside the palace's southern main gate] and have pitched camp on the banks of the river Sokang 西江. Only a mere one thousand guards guard the palace. Many of these military people have begun to put out for sale those captives which they personally took in the war. The redemption prices include five 兩 of white gold (*paekkkŭm*) 白金 for males and three 兩 for females. Those who are unable to immediately pay the amounts signed contracts promising to render these prices at a later date.

"White gold" here obviously refers to silver; and we can see that prices ranged from three 兩 for women to five 兩 for men. The major terms to be included in all contracts guaranteeing redemption payment and return of prisoners had already been established in the first month of Injo 15; however, in the fourth month of the same year one more condition was added requiring that "all returns of captives shall be made in Shenyang after the withdrawal of all Ch'ing forces." Therefore, the previous item from the *Sok Nanjung chamnok* marks the first source material on redemption prices following the second Sino-Korean conflict of the Injo period and shows that the Ch'ing militia was already privately carrying on prisoner ransoming even before the establishment of officially sponsored exchanges in the war prisoner redemption market at Shenyang.

Also, Ch'oe Myonggil 崔鳴吉 comments on redemption activities as follows:

I heard at the time that Commandant of P'yŏnganto *P'yŏngan-pyŏngsa* Yu Rim 平安兵使柳琳 concluded a contract with Kung 孔 and Kêng 耿 to pay ten 兩 in redemption money. This goes to show that redemption prices determined by the Ch'ing were originally not as high as they would become at a later time.¹⁰⁾

The two Chinese personages mentioned here refer to Kung Yu-tê 孔有德 and

Kêng Chung-ming 耿仲明, two former rebellious Ming generals under the command of Mao Wên-lung 毛文龍. These two figures had capitulated to the Ch'ing in the eleventh year of Injo (1633), and thereafter were given the important military posts of commander-in-chief (*Tu yuan-shuai* 都元帥) and regional commander (*Tsung-ping-kuan* 總兵官) respectively. Their exploits included not only the successful conquest and occupation of Korea, but also later victories which secured the provinces of Chinchou 錦州, Sungshan 松山 and Hsingshan 杏山 from the Ming forces. Such military success brought these two generals the honor of entry into Peking with Dorgon. Because they were already on their way west to fight the Ming by the sixteenth year of Injo (1638), the price of ten 兩 which they negotiated with Yu Rim must have been prior to that time and, therefore, may be taken as one more example of the level of redemption payments immediately after the end of hostilities. While there are no other sources of this period relating that a price of ten 兩 was contracted, there is one indirect piece of evidence contained in a memorial to the Korean monarch (*chi* 啓) by the Bureau of Frontier Defence (*Piguk* or *Pibyōnsa*) 備局 or 備邊司 dated 21/posterior IV/Injo 15 (1637):

The Bureau of Frontier Defence reports as follows. Those five hundred Korean prisoners of war captured in the campaign waged by Kêng Chung-ming and now being redeemed by the Commandant of P'yŏnganto Yu Rim are at the present time dispersed throughout the fortifications north of the river Chongchonkang 清川江 [in P'yŏnganto]. However, being that the ransoms have yet to be paid, these prisoners still have not been allowed to return to their homes. What should be considered here is not only the longing by each captive to return to his native land, but also the wasted funds and supplies appropriated to regionally based officials [for the care and feeding of these captives]. Because all of these captives have had most of their wealth stripped from them [on account of this war], it has become impossible for them to immediately produce the amounts demanded for their release. Being left with no other alternative, we think, in the interest of both the government and the prisoners involved, that the special appropriation of two thousand five hundred silver 兩 for military supplies should indeed be used to pay half of the redemption price for these captives; and that the other half should be taken from the fall harvests following their return home.¹¹⁾

Official funds were depleted; and both the prisoners themselves and their families lacked the wherewithal to meet ransom demands. So it was suggested that half of the amount required for redemption be appropriated by the government from a special funding for silver to purchase military food and supplies for the P'yŏnganto territories. The remaining half of the ransoms

would be rendered to the government out of the coming autumn harvest. This variation of officially sponsored redemption activities (*hongdok*) 公贖 was quickly adopted by the Korean royal command.

According to this example, the ultimate holder of the hostages was Kêng Chung-ming and the person seeking their redemption was Yu Rim. Half of the total amount demanded for the release of these five hundred hostages being two thousand five hundred 兩, we can estimate the average price per captive as approximately ten 兩 which corresponds to the figure given by Ch'oe Myonggil in his opinion on the redemption question entitled *Non sokhwan tap* 論贖還割 quoted above. Concerning the time at which these contracts were negotiated, from the passage "five hundred prisoners of war dispersed throughout the fortifications north of the river Chongchonkang," we can see that the bargaining took place for a few days just prior to 21/posterior IV/Injo 15, the date on which the report of the Bureau of Frontier Defence was sent. Also, in an item of the *Pibyōnsa tungnok* (The minutes of the Bureau of Frontier Defence) 備邊司謄錄 dated 1/posterior IV/Injo 15, which describes the actual circumstances under which the specially appropriated silver for military supplies was handed over to Yu Rim, there is the passage:

The opinion of the royal courier concerning the appropriation of five thousand 兩 of silver for military supplies for the redemption of war captives had already been approved by the monarch. Furthermore, because the party headed by Yu Rim and Im Kyōnggŏp 林慶業 will return to their appointed territories before the arrival of the redemption emissary (*sokhwan*) 贖還使, half of the military supply silver was given to them in order to guarantee the release of the war captives.

The item concludes with the passage:

This silver [two thousand five hundred 兩] is to be used for the purpose of redeeming those persons who are destitute and have no one else to depend on, and shall not be used to buy back any person who is capable of financing his own release. Therefore, because redemption prices for the destitute and forsaken are certainly not expensive, we should be able to buy back a large number of war prisoners.¹²⁾

The two thousand five hundred 兩 mentioned in the report of the Bureau of Frontier Defence constitutes half of the five thousand 兩 appropriated for the exclusive redemption of the destitute and forsaken; and this amount was entrusted to Yu Rim's party, who would return to their appointed territories earlier than the redemption emissary could arrive. In other words, the quickest possible method of securing the release of captives was chosen by the Korean state.

This item goes on to relate that the redemption emissary was headed by I Dōgin 李德仁, second in command to the emissary to pay gratitude to the emperor for authorization to the throne (*sa'insa*) 謝恩使 I Songgu 李聖求, who arrived in Shenyang on 15/V/Injo 15. This means that the actual redemption of captives by Yu Rim took place before that date.

Taking all of our historical sources together, then, we can say that prisoner of war redemptions following the second Sino-Korean conflict began to be carried out after 1/posterior IV/Injo 15 but before 21/posterior IV. That is to say, on 1/posterior IV Yu Rim received two thousand five hundred 兩 of military supply silver and set out on a journey from Kyōngsōng 京城 to Shenyang, which required one month (*i shuo* 一朔) to complete. Whether he secured the prisoner releases before or after his return to duty is not clear. Given that Yu's appointed territories included P'yōnganto, we can surmise that if he carried out the redemptions after his return to duty, the locations of the captives so released were probably in the vicinity of P'yōnganto and its neighboring areas. It is also difficult to rule out that Yu carried out redemptions on his way back to his duties, because there is the precedent set by the Provincial Intendant of P'yōnganto (*P'yōngan kamsa*) 平安監司 Nam Sōn 南銑, who in II/Injo 15, anticipating the possible opportunity to redeem prisoners of war on his way back to his appointment, borrowed from the Ministry of Revenue (*Hochō*) 戶曹 two hundred 兩 of its silver funds so that he would not be found without the wherewithal with which to bargain.¹³⁾

Indeed, this was the time of the transition period to the redemption market at Shenyang, for the imperial order of 13/IV/Injo 15 (1637) still had not been put into effect. It was still a period of relatively free-wheeling official and private bargaining before buy-back activities were severely restricted by the Ch'ing state. It is therefore quite possible that Yu Rim, under orders from the Bureau of Frontier Defence, may have very well taken the officially appropriated silver for the express purpose of directly securing the swiftest release of captives held in the encampments of Kêng Chung-ming himself. It is known that in IV/Injo 15 Yu Rim did in fact incorporate into the Ch'ing forces to defeat Kado 蝦島, which may possibly be attributed to the fact that prisoner release in that area was secured at quite inexpensive prices.

In the above two examples, we have seen redemptions which were carried out in the Korean capital right after the end of hostilities, and which were bargained in the provinces immediately prior to the market exchanges in Shenyang. Even though there are many items concerning the buy-back activities during the early redemption period, very seldom do we come across reports itemizing actual prices paid. Therefore, while it is very difficult to generalize about the amount of ransom paid from such a sparse sampling, which in fact seems to differ greatly depending on the official or private nature of the exchanges, what we can say is that during this early period there were

actual state-sponsored redemption payments which did not exceed ten 兩. This is the set of circumstances which Ch'oe Myonggil described in his *Non sokhwan tap* as "redemption prices . . . were originally not as high as they would become at a later time."

The state of affairs concerning war captive redemptions immediately following the hostilities of 1636-37 may be characterized by the Ch'ing state's issuing redemption permits, to which the Koreans responded with a nationwide fervor. Especially in the area of individual redemptions, the Korean capital, provincial highways and byways, and ultimately Shenyang bustled with the traffic of families frantically searching to buy back their captured loved ones. Together with the rise in redemption activities, buy-back prices almost immediately began to inflate. Ch'oe Myonggil comments in *Non sokhwan tap*:

The major reason behind the continuous rise in the price of war captives lies in the rather hasty willingness on the part of relatives urgently seeking the redemption of their loved ones to pay any ransom demanded without considering its relative value. It is in this way that many have been victimized by unduly inflated prices. Because here a great many of the war captives are either nobles or rich urban merchants, it is said that even by the side of any ordinary road the exchange prices for captives are being set at the outlandish level in the hundreds of 兩. If such reports are indeed truthful, there is no way in a million years that poor commoners possessing only small amounts of silver will be able to secure the release of their loved ones.¹⁴⁾

After decrying the victimization of redemptors due to their willingness to pay any amount of silver to ensure the return of their friends and relatives, Ch'oe Myonggil pleads for the control of buy-back prices by the Koreans themselves, a petition which was met with approval by the Korean monarch:

While there may be unavoidable differences which may occur due to a captive's age or position in society, still outlandish redemption prices as high as one hundred 兩 should not be allowed to be charged. Even if the refusal to pay the Ch'ing side such one-sidedly inflated prices results in having to give up hope of redeeming captives and returning home, we should do all we can to prevent prices from exceeding one hundred 兩; and all of those who pay such exorbitant prices should be prosecuted severely. If we take such measures, the Ch'ing side will finally see that there is no profit to be gained from artificially inflating ransoms demanded; and as a result, prices will naturally fall to values which are fair to all concerned. In this way everyone of us, regardless of his station in life, will be able to achieve his heartfelt wish [of buying back his loved ones].

Despite the unquestionable reason which lay in Ch'oe Myonggil's argument, for those who found the redemption of their loved ones almost within their grasps, the temptation to pay the inflated prices was no doubt too strong to refuse; and so those hoping to buy back captives gave no heed to such admonitions and paid whatever price was demanded—whether it required a mere reduction in the accumulated wealth of the rich or whether, in the case of commoners, it required the sale of landed possessions or the accumulation of debt. Even an official declaration of illegality could not turn people away from pouring ridiculous amounts of silver into the coffers of their loved ones' captors. Such rash action did nothing more than fan the flames of inflation practices, thus throwing redemption negotiations into an uncontrollable state of affairs. One characterization of such chaotic conditions can be found in a message from General Ingyrdai recorded in a petition sent by the Korean monarch to the Ch'ing emperor dated 13/IV/Injo 15:

Now whenever Korean people depart on journeys, they almost inevitably come upon the Ch'ing soldiers returning to their homeland. On these occasions the Koreans weave in and out of these cadres searching for captured loved ones. This is a very dangerous practice which could cause some very nasty incidents. We should take measures to absolutely prevent Koreans from coming upon groups of captives on the road.¹⁵⁾

Ingyrdai continues as follows:

If there be those who desire to redeem loved ones captured in the war, they will by all means be permitted to carry out buy-back negotiations in Shenyang after the withdrawal of all Ch'ing troops. Any attempts to make clandestine redemptions on the road to Shenyang are strictly forbidden.

B. Exchanges in the Redemption Market at Shenyang

These buy-back restrictions imposed by the Ch'ing government went into complete effect after IV/Injo 15, and were followed by the official dispatch of a redemption emissary from Korea. Apart from this, emissaries dispatched to the Ch'ing for other purposes also traveled to Shenyang in order to represent the Korean parties in the ransom buy-back negotiations. The redemption market was opened on the days 24/V, 21/VI and 28/X during the year Injo 15, and involved the gathering of war captives into one location and carrying out at one time large-scale exchanges with those Koreans who had come to buy the prisoners back. In later years it was the custom of Korean officials, who were dispatched to the Ch'ing for other purposes, to gather those who desired to buy back their loved ones and lead

them to Shenyang, where General Ingyrdai would issue an order for the prisoners to be brought to stand at a place just outside the palace sentry gate and for the bargaining to begin. However, such examples of redemption markets describe extremely small-scale buy-back activities. Markets carried out under the head of the redemption emissary was discontinued after the sixteenth year of Injo (1638), when its dispatch was no longer carried out. In any case, the opening of this official market on 24/V/Injo 15 clearly marked the transfer of buy-back activities from the free-wheeling type bargaining in scattered localities to centralized redemption carried out in the city of Shenyang; and it was the restrictions imposed on 13/IV/Injo 15 which first put this transition in motion.

In addition to the records describing the atrocities which took place in the Shenyang market, there is an item reporting on the first market on 24/V/Injo 15, which included the following information on prices:

There is no limit to the one-sided inflating of redemption prices by the Ch'ing captors. Especially when there are prisoners of noble birth, or when captives are parents, wives or offspring of persons coming to buy back them, the ransoms demanded reach alarming proportions in the hundreds and thousands of 兩. At such levels, it has been very difficult to secure the release of the captives; and frustrated persons can be seen in the streets crying and screaming in anger.¹⁶⁾

While the phrase "in the hundreds and thousands of 兩" may seem somewhat exaggerated, there is the item of 7/VII/Injo 15, which reports that when the Minister of War and Assistant *Ch'echalsa* (*Pyŏngjo p'ansŏ kyŏm Pu-Ch'e-chalsa*) 兵曹判書兼副體察使 I Songgu 李聖求 went to buy back his son, the captor demanded a ransom price of one thousand five hundred 兩.¹⁷⁾ Also, there is another example dated 2/XI/Injo 15 in which the daughter of the former prefectural governor (*chŏr moksa*) 前牧使 O Jun 吳俊 is ransomed for four hundred fifty one 兩, and the daughter of Chŏnch'ang-gun 全昌君 Yu Yŏnryŏng 柳廷亮 draws a redemption price of four hundred 兩 plus various items in kind. Judging from such cases, it does become clear that there actually were ransoms running in the hundreds and thousands of 兩; and we may well imagine how such rampant inflating of prices resulted in the complete frustration of those commoners who had traveled over great distances in the hope of swiftly redeeming their loved ones. The fate of such unequipped persons having nowhere to turn to for help is described in the following source:

Those of the prisoners held by the Ch'ing, who have been forsaken and therefore have no one to depend on, are seen gathered outside the Korean embassy in Shenyang bemoaning their fate and crying for the

Government to secure their quick release. The misery is almost too much for this observer to bear.¹⁸⁾

It was in this way that the last hopes of many commoners were laid at the foot of the Korean government and its special funding powers, but such redemption could never be achieved out of the government's financial difficulty. One historical source, which seems to sum up rather accurately the conditions under which both private persons and the Korean government attempted to buy back war captives during the earlier redemption period, is a petition sent by the Korean monarch to the Ch'ing Board of Revenue (*Hupu*) 戶部 in IX/Injo 18 (1640):

It has now been five years since the imperial armies of the Ch'ing dynasty began to take war captives [in the hostilities which took place between our two countries]. While a number of these persons have been bought back, all in all we have managed to secure the release of less than one in one hundred originally in captivity.¹⁹⁾

Because it was the Korean government who immediately following the end of hostilities took the initiative in positively channeling administrative funds to cover the ransom prices necessary for the release of war captives, we can only attribute such lack of progress in securing more successful redemptions during the first five years to the inflationary manipulation of ransoms by the Ch'ing captors and their agents. When I wrote my paper giving a general historical summary of the redemption problem during these times, I suggested a periodization schema which divided the buy-back activities into two periods delineated by the disappearance of the officially dispatched Korean emissary to oversee the redemption market in Shenyang. However, now, after having considered the problem of redemption prices, I believe that the former period should be further separated into two subdivisions. The earlier subdivision should include the relatively short time interval following the end of the war, when ransoms first came fairly cheaply, but almost immediately began to inflate as wealthier Koreans, willing to pay any price no matter how ridiculous the amount, hastily went about trying to secure the release of kin held prisoner. It was also a time marked by the withdrawal of the Ch'ing troops, which coincided with the wide geographical dispersion of buy-back activities and concomitantly great discrepancies in prices. Even though we do observe slight changes during this earlier interval, we may summarize it as a period during which the absence of restrictions on either location or buy-back procedures provided an environment for individually based free trading between captors and those desiring the redemption of their loved ones.

Conversely, the second subdivision of the earlier redemption period was

characterized the Shenyang war captive market, in which both governments took a leading role in buy-back activities, which now had been severely restricted to not only locality, but also to the number of persons who could negotiate and to the procedures by which they could go about securing the release of captives. Price manipulation was so damaging in its effect that the direction and content of state policy was forced to go through drastic revisions. Soon these two subdivisions in the earlier redemption period finally gave way to a later period, which was begun by such catalysts as the failure to dispatch the redemption emissary to Shenyang, a shrinking of the government role played in buy-back activities, and the disappearance of the large-scale captive market itself. Along with these transitional elements, the increasing incidence of such practices as the forced buy back of war captives (*noksok*) and strongarm methods in the collection of unpaid ransoms (*nokjing*) is a major feature that must be dealt with when describing the later redemption period. Let us now consider the trends in redemption prices from actual cases which occurred from the seventeenth year of Injo (1639).

2. The Later Period (Exchanges at the Korean Embassy at Shenyang)

A. The First Phase

The later period of war captive redemption pricing should be divided into two phases: one covering the time span from the seventeenth or eighteenth year (1639 or 1640) to the first half of the nineteenth year of Injo (1641); the other including all activities following the twentieth year of Injo (1642).

Putting aside for the moment those practices called *noksok* and *nokjing*, I would like to introduce here two source materials which summarize well the trends in redemption prices during the first phase of the later period.

The first source dated the seventeenth year of Injo (1639) is taken from examples of correspondence from official witnesses to certain important events (*Sōjangkwan mungyōn sakkōn yōkwan subon*) 書狀官聞見事件譯官手本 of the section on emissaries (*sasin pyōltan*) 使臣別單 contained in the work *Tongmun goryak* (Compendium of Sino-Korean correspondences) 同文考略:

Today the war captive redemption market was held outside the embassy for the first time [since the absence of the official market emissary]. Those seeking to secure the freedom of prisoners were led by a party of functionaries to meet their captured loved ones and then to begin buy-back negotiations with their captors. As before, prices are being one-sidedly inflated to the extent that even the most tired and useless elderly person will not be handed over for less than one hundred 兩. As a result, the number of captives successfully ransomed came to a mere nine persons.

At this point in time the official redemption emissary had already been done away with; and even government sponsored buy-back activities, with the possible exception of payments to persons who had specially petitioned for ransom amounts, came to be carried out in the same way as private individuals. Procedure required that all persons desiring to enter into buy-back negotiations, regardless of their official or private statuses, follow appointed functionaries into Shenyang and do all of their business at the Korean embassy there under the supervision of the Board of Revenue of the Ch'ing government. This source marks the first documentary evidence of redemptions carried out at the Korean embassy at Shenyang; and while the term *insi* 入市, or war captive market, is used here, judging from the small number of captives actually redeemed, there should be no doubt that this market was a small-scale institution in which the Board of Revenue gathered together captives marked for redemption by a restricted number of ransom payers. This market largely differed from the initial operation under the redemption emissary both in quantity and in quality because of continuously escalating price levels.

The second source which indicates the general conditions of war captive redemption during the first phase of the later period is a petition sent by the Korean monarch to the Board of Revenue of the Ch'ing 戶部參政李國翰送進朝鮮國王與戶部啓文一角原容稿一張 dated 16/IX/Injo 18 (1640), contained in the *Ch'aohsienkuo laishupu* (Collection of incoming letters from Korea) 朝鮮國來書簿仁祖十八年十月分, under the date of 21/X/Injo 18:

When determining the price to be paid for the return of war prisoners, captors seem unconcerned that they are feeding the flames of inflation in the average ransom value. Even in cases of elderly or infirmed captives, who cannot be employed productively as slaves, as soon as their captors discover that those persons seeking their release are close relatives, the ransom price is immediately increased tenfold. . . . How are we supposed to hold any hope of solving the redemption problem when even the cheapest buy back cannot be secured for less than forty or fifty 兩 and prices are known to reach levels in the hundreds of 兩?

Both of these sources—one a report to his home country's government from the scribe who accompanied an emissary dispatched to the Ch'ing court; the other a petition by the Korean monarch to the Ch'ing Bureau of Revenue—being official diplomatic documents, are perfectly reliable accounts concerning the true situation with respect to redemption price levels. As with the earlier period, examples of individual war captive buy backs are almost totally unrecorded except in cases in which the Ch'ing side made the Korean government accountability for some procedural difficulty and in cases which involved the government granting amounts necessary to secure the release of

certain individuals. These examples, therefore, fail to give us a true picture of normal redemption activities. For this reason, these two sources of the years Injo 17 and 18 respectively become all the more important for giving us a general view of the going prices under normal conditions during those years.

Nevertheless, in order to add some support to these two sources, I have provided the actual examples of individual redemptions in table I. In cases of government funded ransom prices, the total amount granted in 兩 has been entered. In the case of the Ch'ing captors using strongarm tactics to collect unpaid ransoms, either the original amount contracted or else the amount of silver yet due has been entered. Therefore, since the amount of unpaid silver may constitute only a part of the actual price negotiated, room for doubt does remain in such examples. I have included these amounts only when it was possible to determine from accompanying documentary content that these amounts do in fact approximate the original prices.

TABLE I. Examples of Redemptions

Date	Captive	Notes	Price (兩)	Source
8/I/Injo 17	I Chil, husband of woman servant to Yu Gongryong	Amount unpaid	100	1
25/II/17	Hyoyong, son of Sin Songhoe, servant of the War Ministry	Original amount due	45	1
23/VIII/17	Unjin, woman of the official infirmary	Official redemption at the embassy at Shenyang	55	1
8/III/19	Ŭi Rip, neighbor of former Protector Min Sŏn	Original amount due; redemption by a servant to Min Sŏn	50	1
21/XII/19	I Mongho, soldier servant	Original amount due	40	1
28/I/20	Agricultural laborer	Official redemption	25-30	1
26/IV/20	Daughter of Yonchang <i>do-chông</i> , sixth generation grandson of Chungjong		150	2
9/X/21	Hogil, grandson of Ch'ông Kwangnok, resident of Mok-chông	Original amount due	47	1
13/II/22	Chasông, son of the County Magistrate of Kyeyang, Ye Kil, a member of royal family		200	3
24/V/23	Chônîl, a lumberjack		60	2
24/V/23	Pang Kyôngin, wayfarer in Chongju		80	2

Sources: 1. *Sinyang changgye* 瀋陽狀啓; 2. *Sŭngjôngwŏn ilgii* 承政院日記; 3. *Pibyŏnsa tungnok* 備邊司謄錄.

If we draw a line under the entry for the year Injo 19 (1641) and consider the examples above it as falling within the period described by our two preceding items of the years Injo 17 and 18 (1639 and 1640) (i.e. the first

phase of the later redemption period), we can see that the general levels of prices which were put in the “one hundred 兩” and “no less than forty or fifty but as high as hundreds of 兩” do indeed approximate well the true standards.

Next, in order to get some idea of what economic impact redemption payments exercised on everyday lives of the common people, let us consider once more the Korean monarch's petition to the Board of Revenue in the year Injo 18 contained in the *Ch'aohsienkuo laishupu*. The original intent of the petition was to decry the injustice perpetrated on the Korean people, who were unable to redeem their loved ones due to the continuing inflationary manipulation of ransom values, and to call for the establishment of fair standards for pricing:

In our country we have no custom of using silver in the purchase of commodities; rather, we pay for our market needs with bolts of linen or cotton cloth. Now, since the beginning of efforts to buy back war captives [and the establishment of silver as the exchange medium], silver prices have already doubled several times at the hands of manipulators. I am at a loss to understand how our people, first impoverished by that terrible war and then further imposed upon to provide ten 兩 for redemption, are going to be able now to come up with enough silver to meet ransoms put at no less than forty or fifty 兩 and sometimes reaching into the hundreds of 兩. It is utterly impossible. One hundred in gold constitutes the wealth held by as many as ten average families *in toto*. Given such conditions, there is absolutely no way of coming up with such an amount of silver for the redemption even of such close kin as parents, brothers, wives or children.²⁰⁾

A short historical review of currency and silver utilization in Korea will uncover that the first minting of coins was carried out using iron in the early Koryŏ 高麗 period, in the thirteenth year of Sŏnjong 成宗 (994). While silver coins 銀貨 were cast in the first year of Sukchong 肅宗 (1096) and small silver coins 小銀瓶 during the reign of Chunguk 忠肅 (1314–39), neither circulated as currency; and the production of both items was discontinued late in the reign of Kongyang 共讓 (1389–91). From that time up until the early years of Injo of the Li dynasty rice and cloth played the role of exchange media among the common citizenry. While in the eleventh year of Injo (1633) the Office of Stabilization Fund (*Sangp'ŏngchong*) 常平廳 was ordered to mint a round currency with a hole punched in the center called *Sangp'ŏng t'ongbo* 常平通寶, in places other than the commercial center of Kaesŏng 開城 rice and cloth remained as the main Korean currencies. Sources of silver at the time included ores mined in Korea, silver pieces 碎銀 which had been circulated by the Ming army during Hideyoshi's

invasion of Korea in 1591-98, and silver imported as a result of trade with the Japanese island of Tsushima 對島. All throughout the Injo era, the Korean government deeply felt the need for sponsoring the minting and circulation of money, but it was not until after the twenty-second year of Injo (1644), when the Ch'ing dynasty moved its capital to Peking, that the Koreans decided to go about the task in earnest. It seems that the Deliberative Councilor of the Right (*Uijŏng*) 右議政 Kim Ik 金堉, who had been dispatched to the new Ch'ing capital, became duly impressed by monetary currency circulation there and the convenience it afforded commercial activities. This prompted the Korean government under Hyojong 孝宗 to finally take measures in establishing a system of monetary currency. Considering the situation which we have seen occurring in the fifteenth year of Injo in the light of such slow monetary development in Korea, we know that due to the fact that redemption prices had been determined in units of silver 兩, commoners, who had almost no familiarity with silver circulation, nevertheless now were forced to come up with in some way or other a specified amount of silver for the purpose of securing the release of loved ones from the hands of the Ch'ing captors. While we have no idea by what method or route this silver was acquired, there is no doubt that it presented most Koreans with greater problems than those people with better developed monetary spheres within their economies.

In his petition the Korean monarch complains that despite the fact that the average citizen would be hard pressed to come up with ten 兩 given the financially devastating effects of the war, still almost immediately following the opening of war captive redemptions ransom began to inflate until amounts demanded reached the range of from forty or fifty 兩 to several hundred 兩, thus presenting potential redemptors with an extremely disappointing set of circumstances.

A few comments should be made on the phrase "One hundred in gold constitutes the wealth held by as many as ten average families *in toto*" 百金爲中人十家之產. When read at face value and within the context of the petition, this phrase would seem to indicate mathematically the heavy economic burden presented by war prisoner ransoms at the time. Incidentally, we do know from the section for the seventeenth year of Injo (1639) in the *Tongmun goryak*, *gwon sip il* which describes a domestic servant of the wet nurse to the Ch'ing emperor attempting to buy silver with gold bullion that the rate of exchange between the Ch'ing and Korea for gold and silver ranged from seventeen to twenty 兩 of silver for one gold 兩, apparently presenting the danger of possible manipulatory inflation.

However, this phrase can already be found in the section entitled "*Tichi Wenti*" 帝紀文帝 of the *Han shu*, *chuan ssu* 漢書卷四, dated the twenty-third year of Emperor Hsiaowên's 孝文 reign. The item is a Chinese parable of Emperor Hsiaowên, who wanted to build a balcony for himself. He called a

carpenter in order to get an estimate of how much the construction would cost and was told he would have to pay one hundred in gold (*hai chin*) 百金. The price being too high, the emperor gave up his plans for adding the balcony. In this story the phrase (上曰) 百金中人十家產也 appears meaning literally that one hundred in gold is equal to the wealth of ten average households. However, from that time on the phrase came to be used adjectively to describe a large quantity of money. In the Korean monarch's petition of the eighteenth year of Injo (1640) the insertion of the character 爲 into the phrase has the meaning of "from early times it has been said . . ." thereby indicating in all probability that the phrase has been used to conjure up the image of that old parable. The sudden appearance of this classical literary phrase was designed no doubt to impress strongly on the Ch'ing state the utter helplessness and frustration that such outrageous ransoms had brought to the problem of redeeming Korean war captives. Therefore, the phrase being nothing but a mere literary device, we may not take it literally as a concrete example of the economic burden imposed by payments demanded for prisoner release.

Leaving the problem of the monarch's petition for the moment, we would like to turn to the problem of the value of silver in terms of rice, linen and cotton, which served as media of exchange in the daily lives of the Korean people. Unfortunately, for the postwar period in question relative values are impossible to discern due to the state of utter economic confusion characteristic of the time. The closest we can come to estimating these values is fifteen years later in XII/Hyojong 6 (1655), when Head of the Office of Royal Household (*Yŏnggonnyŏng busa*) 領敦寧府事 Kim Ik who, ever since his service in Peking during the twenty-second year of Injo (1644), had continued to pour all his energy into Korean currency minting, wrote the following passage on the occasion of revisions to be made in the currency minting laws:

Because the value of currency is so susceptible to fluctuation, we have fixed its value based on the standard of silver. One 兩 of silver is equivalent to six hundred *wén* 文; and the values of rice and cloth will fluctuate with the value of silver. The price of one *shêng* 升 of rice is equivalent to four 文; and one 兩 of silver is worth one *shih* 石 of rice.²¹⁾

In other words, because currency having no fixed value was subject to changes in relative worth, it was stabilized at the going rate for silver. An exchange rate of one 兩 of silver = one 石 of rice was also established with royal approval.

While fifteen years does not seem at first such a long interval of time, the fifteen years which marked the transition from the latter half of the Injo era into the early years of the Hyojong era present a number of extreme

contrasts characteristic of any postwar period. Under the influence of the great changes which took place in Ch'ing policy toward Korea as a result of the establishment of the new Ch'ing capital in Peking, Korea began to enter a period of state reconstruction from the chaos of the postwar era. While the changes which occurred during this time can be described empirically from a number of different vantage points, in the area of war captive redemption prices, which we have been dealing with in this paper, the most significant event was none other than reaching a final conclusion to the buy back of war prisoners. Because the redemption problem gave rise to the inordinate rise in the value of silver, the stabilization of silver prices during the Hyojong era constitutes a great contrast to this. During this more stable period, the official rate of one 兩 of silver = one 石 of rice, which was determined by the government in the light of the promotion of currency minting, therefore, no doubt would not give us any idea of a standard for knowing in real terms the extremely fluctuating silver rates during the last half of the Injo era, when people were so hard pressed to raise silver by themselves in order to engage in redemption transactions with the Ch'ing. However, if we consider the problem on a more abstract level, this officially set silver/rice rate of the early Hyojong era may form the basis for constructing an opinion as to just how hopeless the silver prices during the postwar Injo era had become in the light of the daily lives of the common people. Indeed, this relatively stable Hyojong era rate all the more emphasizes just how frustrating it must have been to try to meet the silver ransoms demanded during the Injo redemption periods. It was in order to draw out this comparison between the two eras that I chose here to include silver/rice data of the Hyojong era.

Even though in our consideration of silver rates we have failed to come up with a true empirical estimate (independent from the Korean monarch's petition of the eighteenth year of Injo of the social weight of war captive ransoms, we certainly cannot deny the tone of the petition's wording describing how outrageous ransom demands had driven the Korean people's livelihood to rock bottom, causing not only financial disaster but also bitter disappointment and utter disillusion within those families who desperately hoped to redeem their loved ones from the hands of their captors. In this sense the petition is an invaluable source in grasping the actual conditions of the period.

B. The Second Phase

We now enter the second phase of the later redemption period, which may be set off from the first phase not only because of the availability of official sources, but also because of significant changes which occurred beginning in the nineteenth year of Injo (1641). Probably the most important changes to occur were the appearance of particular and unusual ransoming

practices called *nokjing* (strongarm tactics of collecting of unpaid ransoms) and *noksok* (forced buy backs). The coercive collection of unpaid ransoms come in a variety of methods; but the largest part involved adding to the original prices contracted penalties for escapees 逃回人 and those captives who had been returned to their captors after attempting to escape. Generally speaking, most cases of coerced collection of unpaid ransoms involved a doubling of the original price demand; however, this depended a great deal on the social position of captives, and in the case of the Ch'ing captors who were very important persons in the Ch'ing regime, penalties could rise to astronomical amounts. Also, when individuals were unable to pay these penalties, the Korean government would be coerced to pay for them, thereby constituting one form of officially sponsored redemption (*kongdok*). Forced buy backs involved the act of captors dictating that certain persons be redeemed; and since this practice was carried out against the Korean government, we can see the conditions for one more special case of officially sponsored redemption. Captives, who were so pushed upon the government for buy back, were persons considered of no particular value such as women, infants, the elderly and the infirmed. Their captors were invariably persons of great influence in the Ch'ing state. While both practices of *nokjing* and *noksok* are seen almost immediately following the second Sino-Korean conflict (1636-37), their rampant use only came into vogue with a deterioration in the ability of the Korean people to buy back the remaining war captives. Tables II and III itemize examples collected describing these practices.

These tables clearly show that there was little difference between forced buy backs and forced collections in terms of unit (per person) prices charged; however, there are differences in the number of occurrences between the early and later redemption periods. Especially for the second phase of the later period, the area of forced buy backs shows a small lag from general periodization in the fact that this practice starts to pick up as early as the latter half of the year Injo 18. However, more important than a slight gap in timing are the facts that (1) we can see examples of the same captor on a given day making visits not only to the Korean embassy but also to the lodgings of the royal heir and various governmental couriers stationed in Shenyang for the purpose of hawking his prisoners, and (2) beginning at the end of the year Injo 19 we see certain captors concentrating on a single location to force the buy back of whole groups of prisoners, resulting in the Korean government having to pay out large amounts for greatly inflated redemption demands. What such catch-as-catch-can tactics employed more and more by captors show us is that (1) individual based war captive redemption had reached a hopeless stage with the drying up of wealth available to private Korean citizens for the buy back of close kin, and (2) the Ch'ing captors had come to realize that the redemption period was quickly drawing to an end, so they had better make haste in making as much money from

TABLE II. Forced Collections of Unpaid Ransoms (*nokjing* 勒徵)

Date	Captive	Notes	Price (兩)	Source
12/VIII/Injo 15	Wife of clerk Kim Junkup	(original price 100 兩) Double the original amount	200	1
6/IX/15	Captive of Kuiekai=Taisian	Redemption allowed following return of escape	200	2
2/XI/15	Captive of Kuiekai, daughter of the former Prefectural Governor O Jun		451	2
2/XI/15	Daughter of Chŏnchang-gun Yu Yŏnryŏng	Price unpaid; various items in kind added	400	2
21/IV/16	Fugitive from the Kuiekai Family		220	2
8/I/17	Wife of the former inspector Kwon Jun	Price unpaid	130	2
25/II/17	Hyoyong, son of Sin Song-hae, servant of the War Ministry		600	2
20/III/17	Son of Ch'oe Hŏnnam, capital dweller	Added items in kind: 200 rolls of white paper, one bolt of cotton cloth	300	2
20/IV/17	Fugitive Tŏgok, servant of the Chunghwa Palace		42	2
3/VII/17	Four fugitives		(unit price) 10,000	1
9/II/19	Three fugitives from the house of Kim Tongga of Anju	10,000 兩 per person demanded by Ingyrdai on bivouac in Uiju; then reduced after negotiations	(unit price) 3,000	2
8/III/19	Ŭi Rip, neighbor of the former Protector Min Sŏn	Penalty added to price of 100 兩 after an argument over price demanded	600	2
28/VIII/19	Female slave of the Kuiekai Family		500	2
21/XII/19	I Mongho, soldier servant, captive of Kuiekai	Original amount 40 兩, penalty added	80	2
26/VI/20	Captive of Kuiekai		80	2
2/II/21	Fugitive Pak Kilnam of Kae-song		300	2
2/II/21	Fugitive captured by the Provincial Office of the Administrative Assistant in Uiju	First 1,000 兩, then reduced after negotiations	600	2
4/V/21	Two returned escapees		(unit price) 200	2
19/X/21	Hogil, grandchild of Ch'ŏng Kwangnok of Mokch'ŏn	First 600 兩, then reduced after negotiations 47 兩 unpaid, penalty assessed after 5 years	80	1

Sources: 1. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgii* 承政院日記; 2. *Sinyang changgye* 瀋陽狀啓.

TABLE III. Forced Buy Backs (*noksok* 勒贖)

Date	Captor	Captive	Notes	Price (兩)	Source
20/IV/Injo 17	Ingyrdai	1 male child	Mentally retard- ed	60	1
22/V/18	Ingyrdai; interpreter Chông [Môngsu]	2 official redemp- tions	(total) 300 兩	(unit price) 150	1
20/VI/18	Ingyrdai	1 man		110	1
20/VI/18	Ingyrdai	1 official redemption		200	1
20/VI/18	Ingyrdai	1 official redemption		80	1
3/VII/18	Putapyon(g)a	1 official redemption		100	1
3/VII/18	Ingyrdai	1 official redemption		200	1
3/VII/18	Mandarhan	1 official redemption	sold after sever- al demands	100	1
2/XI/18	Ingyrdai	1 woman of P'yong- yang		150	1
25/VI/19	Mandarhan	1 male child	200 rolls of white paper added	60	1
4/VIII/19	Ingyrdai		In kind: 5 white- fish skins for riding saddle	120	1
5/IX/19	Ingyrdai	1 female child		50	1
10/X/19	Putapyon(g)a	one 15-year-old boy		100	1
3/XII/19	Aliyan-paig	1 female		40	1
21/XII/19	Ingyrdai	1 personal servant of Chasan		130	1
		1 commoner woman of Chunghwa		140	
12/VI/20	Ingyrdai	one 10-year-old boy		100	1
17/VII/20	Ingyrdai	2 women	(total) 230 兩	(unit price) 115	2
24/VIII/20	Ingyrdai	2 women, 2 sick children	(total) 480 兩	(unit price) 120	3, 4
2/pXI*/20	Ingyrdai	1 male child		150	1
2/pXI*/20	Ingyrdai	Chong Tuknam		250	1
17/I/21	Imperial family	Choe Chunnam		200	1
17/I/21	Pom Pak Family	3 men, 1 woman	(total) 300 兩	(unit price) 75	1

Sources: 1. *Sinyang changgye* 瀋陽狀啓; 2. *Sinyang ilgii* 瀋陽日記; 3. *Sungjŏngwŏn ilgii* 承政院日記; 4. *Pibyŏnsa tungnok* 備邊司謄錄.

* posterior XI (eleventh month)

the remaining redemption transactions as possible.

VI. Conclusion

When viewing war captive redemptions in the postwar period of the second Sino-Korean conflict from the aspect of prices demanded and ransoms paid, we notice an early interval during which the Korean government frantically paid out silver from already war-depleted state funds for the purpose of officially sponsored redemptions of destitute and forsaken prisoners; and we also see a later interval in which the government's role took a back seat to buy-back activities carried out on a private individual basis. However, soon the purchasing power of individual citizens became insufficient to meet the demands of the Ch'ing captors, so the most influential of these captors once again turned to the Korean government, this time forgetting the etiquette of diplomacy and employing coercive tactics to force the Koreans to buy back prisoners in the name of national interest. It was in this strange version of negotiation marked by one-sided coercion and threat that the war captive redemption ended.

In tracing the development of postwar captive price levels, we find two waves of inflationary manipulation, the sole reason why the buy back of prisoners was so unsuccessful in most cases. The first wave came on the occasion of the opening of the redemption market in Shenyang in 1637; and the second wave occurred with the Ch'ing government's move to Peking in 1644 and the subsequent general feeling that war captive buy-back activities were coming to an end. However, both waves present very different forms of inflationary tactics used. The first wave of inflation was brought about by a rush of financially well-off individuals to pay just about any amount to secure the quick release of loved ones held captive. That is to say, in the words of Ch'oe Myonggil's *Non sokhwan tap*, that this inflationary wave was brought on by the Korean side of the redemption problem, and it occurred in the midst of negotiations carried on between individual captors and redeemers. On the other hand, the second wave of inflation was the direct result of the coercive hawking of captives by the influential Ch'ing captors, who had very close relations with Korea. Considering the obligations Korea owed to the Ch'ing and the future political influence from the Ch'ing government, the Korean government inevitably had to accede to the coercive demands of the Ch'ing captors.

Unfortunately, we have been unable to find any source materials which would allow us to get an idea of the price levels at which ordinary buy backs were being made during the nineteenth year of Injo (1641) and following. This absence of sources seems to show the drastic reduction in the number of releases secured by private citizens due to a lack of funds, because any requests for issuing official documents made by close kin for meetings with

captured Koreans would have appeared in the government records. Another possible indication is that even if privately negotiated buy backs continued as before, captors hungry for profit forced terms of actual payment on to the government, which overwhelmed the government and left them little room for recording the general levels of private redemption prices for the second phase of the later redemption period.

However, even though we have not been able to come up with actual figures which indicate the general level of war captive ransoms for the second phase of the later redemption period, during our search we have been assured of at least two very clear points. First, there is the fact of captors concentrating on the Korean state government as the object of their demands for payment of redemption prices, which leads to the conclusion that they must have abandoned any hope of reaping profits from privately based exchanges. Under such conditions, any attempt to manipulate individual prices would meaninglessly send the redemption process into even more of an impasse than it was already in. Therefore, not considering such factors as increases or decreases in the number of buy-back exchanges or their success rate, we believe that it is quite safe to say that because inflationary manipulations of the general unit prices of war captives is unthinkable for the period in question, unit prices probably did not differ significantly between the first and second phases of the later redemption period.

Speaking of general redemption price levels, we do find an item of the sixth month of the twentieth year of Injo (1642), which decries the fact that "war captive redemption prices have reached such heights that it seems all means for any continued prisoner releases have now been exhausted."²²) However, this rather gloomy opinion indicates price manipulations only in cases of coercive collection of unpaid ransoms and forced buy-back practices, that is, only in cases of those distorted forms of officially sponsored redemptions by the Korean government. This is made clear by the item dated at the end of the nineteenth year of Injo (1641), which says, "Government-sponsored war captive redemptions have been hindered the most."²³)

The second point to be made about redemption prices during this final phase is that in these governmentally sponsored redemptions, because the majority of the cases involved coercion based on diplomatic obligations or added penalties for various infractions committed by captives, the nature of the inflation itself was very different from earlier phases, when prices were hiked based on the market value of a particular war captive. In other words, there were important changes which occurred over time in both the forms and quality of redemption price inflation practices.

Finally special mention should be made of a series of petitions for the stabilization of prices (*chong p'yongga*) 請平價, which we have quoted for actual examples of redemption prices. These diplomatic documents, which were written by the Korean monarch to the Ch'ing emperor on five different

occasions between the fifteenth and nineteenth years of Injo (1637-41), were unfortunately all completely refused or else ignored; but for the historian they provide all kinds of information on the problems surrounding war captive redemption during that duration, and, together with the two answers received from the Ch'ing, open up a whole new set of very important questions, which unfortunately we have not been able to deal with in this short paper.

NOTES

- 1) See Tagawa Kōzō 田川孝三, "*Chōsen tabako shōkō*" 朝鮮淡婆姑小考 (Some thoughts on Korean tobacco), *Chōsen Gyōsei* 朝鮮行政 (Korean government administration), 1935.
- 2) *Sinyang changgye* 瀋陽狀啓 (Official report from Shenyang), item dated 8/II/Injo 17 己卯年二月初八日.
- 3) *Ibid.*, item dated 25/VI/Injo 19 辛巳年六月二十五日.
- 4) *Injo silnok* 仁錄祖實卷四十七 (Veritable records of the Injo era), *gwon* 47, item dated II/Injo 24 二十四年丙戌二月辛巳.
- 5) *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgii* 承政院日記 (Daily record of the Royal Secretariat), item dated 1/posterior IV/Ch'ungchŏn 10 [Injo 15] 崇禎十年丁丑閏四月初一日; and *Sinkwan nok* 瀋館錄卷一 (Official records of the Shenyang Embassy), *gwon* 1, item dated 24/V/Injo 15 丁丑五月二十四日.
- 6) *Ch'aohsienkuo laishupu* 朝鮮國來書簿 (Collection of incoming letters from Korea), item dated 16/IX/Ch'ungchŏn 5 [Injo 18] 崇禎五年九月十六日; and *Tongmung huigo* 同文彙考 (Classified collection of Sino-Korean correspondences), item dated Injo 17 仁祖十七年己卯.
- 7) *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgii*, item dated 14/II/Shunchih 1 [Injo 22] 順治元年甲申二月十四日癸酉. This was a price paid for Chasong 次聖, son of the county magistrate of Kyeyang, Ye Kil, a member of the royal family 宗室桂陽令禮吉.
- 8) *Ibid.*, item dated 11/X/Tientsung 1 [Injo 5] 天聰元年丁卯十月十一日.
- 9) *Sok Nanjung chamnok* 續亂中雜錄第三 (Random records of recent disturbances, continued), chapter 3, item dated 6/VI/Injo 6 戊辰六月初六日.
- 10) *Non sokhwan tap* 論贖還割 (On the war captive redemption question) in *Jichon sonsaeng muchip* 遲川先生文集卷十二 (Collected writings of Master Jichon), *gwon* 12; and in *Injo silnok*, *gwon* 34, item dated IV/Injo 15 十五年丁丑四月戊寅.
- 11) *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgii*, item dated 21/posterior IV/Ch'ungchŏn 10 [Injo 15] 崇禎十年丁丑閏四月二十一日己未.
- 12) See note 5.
- 13) *Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgii*, item dated 13/II/Ch'ungchŏn 10 [Injo 15] 崇禎十年丁丑二月十三日.
- 14) See note 10.
- 15) *Sinyang changgye*, item dated 13/IV/Injo 15 丁丑四月十三日.
- 16) *Ibid.*, item dated 24/V/Injo 15 丁丑年五月二十四日; and *Sinkwan nok*, item dated 24/V/Injo 15 丁丑五月二十四日.
- 17) *Injo silnok*, *gwon* 35, item dated VII/Injo 15 十五年丁丑七月癸酉; and *Sok Nanjung chamnok*, *gwon* 4, item dated V/Injo 15 丁丑年五月.
- 18) *Sinyang changgye*, item dated 28/V/Injo 15 丁丑年五月二十八日; and *Sinkwan nok*, item dated 24/V/Injo 15 丁丑五月二十四日.
- 19) *Ch'aohsienkuo laishupu*, item dated 16/IX, contained in the section of the tenth month in the year Ch'ungchŏn 5 [Injo 18] 崇禎五年十月分.
- 20) *Ibid.*
- 21) *Hyojong silnok* 孝宗實錄卷十五 (Veritable records of the Hyojong era), *gwon* 15, item dated XII/Hyojong 6 六年乙未十二月癸亥.