

Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula

— Some Remarks through the Turkish Historical Sources —¹⁾

By Yŭzō NAGATA

In February 1770, a rebellion broke out among the Greek inhabitants in the Maina district, the southern part of the Morea Peninsula, assisted by Russian military support. Spreading quickly to the entire peninsula, the rebellion transformed its nature from revolt against Ottoman rule to the national independence movement. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government sent her army so rapidly to the peninsula that it was suppressed in a short duration following the battle of Tripoliçe, the administrative center of the Morea province, on 9 April in the same year. But this event lent an initial impetus to the movements for national independence which evolved after 1821.²⁾

While earlier studies on this event were undertaken chiefly from the position of attaching importance to its relationship with the Russian policy of southern advancement and they accordingly stressed on such phases of the event as, the activities of espionage missions sent to the peninsula to incite the Greeks for the rebellion by the Russian Empress, Katharine II, who had intended to establish a firm influence on the Balkans, and as the concerted military operations between the Greek leaders and the Russian army officers.³⁾ This paper will attempt to bring into focus the substantial role of Greek notables (*kocabaşıs*) and the relationship of the rebellion to the history of the Ottoman Empire. The subject will be discussed from the following three points of view:

- 1) The actual state of Ottoman rule over the Morea Peninsula preceding the rebellion.
- 2) The role played by the Greek notables in the rebellion.
- 3) The role played by the Turkish notables (*a'yāns*) through the suppression process of the rebellion.

1. The Turkish Historical Sources on the Rebellion of 1770

The Turkish historical sources pertaining to the rebellion of 1770 are abundant. First of all, one should refer to the chronicle histories written by the palace chroniclers on every aspect of the study of Ottoman history. Of these chronicle histories, that of Sādullāh Enveri⁴⁾ and Ahmed Vāsif⁵⁾ contain the descriptions on the rebellion of 1770. Although they only formally

manifest the Ottoman government's viewpoint, one can obtain the idea about the general outline of the event from them. Next, one can refer to such sources privately edited as chronicles, letters, memorandums and so on. Of these kind of sources, Süleyman Penah Efendi's work, "A Short History of the Morea Peninsula" is the sole work which describes in detail on the event.⁶⁾

Furthermore, the most important Turkish historical sources are, doubtlessly, the archival documents preserved in the General Department of the Ottoman Archive attached to the Prime Minister's Office (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Genel Müdürlüğü*) and the Archive Section of the Topkapı Palace Museum, both in Istanbul; and other museums in Turkey and Balkan countries. These archival documents regarding the rebellion, mostly pertain with the organizations and operations of the Ottoman army corps to suppress the rebellion. But some are documents relating to the petitions applied to the Government by Greeks after the rebellion had been suppressed, and relating to the confiscation of the Greeks' properties who had fled or died during the rebellion.

2. Actual State of Ottoman Rule on the Morea Peninsula

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, which made possible for the Ottoman Empire to restore the peninsula under her rule, the Ottoman government at once appointed a governor (*vālī*) to this newly conquered peninsula. Following this, the feudal cavalymen (*sipāhīs*) and guardsmen (*muhāfızs*) were stationed at the peninsula to protect the peninsula from probable attacks of enemies, and Turks who had escaped to Anatolia during the Venetian rule, were forced to re-immigrate to the peninsula, and also land surveyings were conducted. The Morea Peninsula was thus integrated into the Empire as a *eyālet* (province).

It is a well known fact to the scholars of the history of the Ottoman Empire that something like the feudal system called the *Timār* System, basing on the state landownership Principle and peasant's small landholdings, had been firmly established over the entire provinces in Anatolia and the Balkans throughout the 15th and 16th centuries. Thus the sultan's authority had penetrated into the entire provinces mentioned above. However, this system was continuously disintegrated since the last decade of the 16th century, and a new political and social regime had appeared by the mid-18th century. This new regime was built up on big farms (*çiftlik*s) based upon the quasi-private landownership, in one part, and on the introduction of taxfarming (*iltizām*) in the other. The result of this transformation of the landholding and taxation system was the rise of the local notables in power. They had excluded the administrative authority of *vālīs* and *mutasarrıfs* (a governor of a *sancak*, subdivision of an *eyālet*), and had obtained such magistrate offices in their hands as *mütesellimlik* (an office in place of *mutasarrıf*), *voyvodalık* (an

office affiliated with the tax-collection from the sultan's or high official's domains) and *a'yānlık* (an office connected with the district administration) etc. The local administrations therefore had been transformed from the centralized administration by the sultans to the decentralized and magistrate administration by *a'yāns* since the second half of the 18th century.⁷⁾

The Morea peninsula was not an exception from this transformation of the society within the Empire. It was since 1747 that a system of taxfarming called *mālikāne* (taxfarming for life) was introduced to the peninsula. This system however caused the continuous struggles among local notables, both Muslim and Christian, concerning taxfarming rights and local administrative offices such as, *mütesellimlik*, *nāiblik* (a deputy office of a judge: *kadı*), *a'yānlık* and *kocabaşılık* (an office as the communal leader of the Greek society). As a result, *vālīs*, *voyvodas* and *kadıs* had lost their authority, and people were faced with the danger of oppression by local notables. Süleyman Penah Efendi who was familiar with the actual state of the peninsula describes for instance, the problems caused by the magistrate administration of districts as follows:

"Since *kadı*'s district administration had been substituted with *nāibs*', *sarrāfs* (money-changers) and *kapı kethüdāsıs* (an agent of local notables in Istanbul) appeared in Istanbul, and they began to sell and buy the offices of the district administration as if they had possessed them as a private fortune. As a result the *kadı*'s monthly wage increased from 100 *kuruş* (piastre) to 700 to 800 or more. Even the sultan's firman was not effective to reduce it."⁸⁾

Pointing out further problems caused by the magistrate administration, Süleyman Penah asserted that the central government should directly administrate the Morea by abolishing the taxfarming system and the magistrate government administered by local notables. In spite of Süleyman Penah's assertion, this form of government had been deeply rooted throughout the provinces in Anatolia and the Balkans including the Morea.

In addition, the guardsmen of the fortresses positioned to defend the Ottoman sovereignty on the peninsula, were scattered in various areas, and the fortresses themselves were wasted. Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa who was appointed as the commander of the Anaboli (Nafplion) fortress just before the outbreak of the rebellion, reported the miserable conditions of the fortress as follows:

"Although the above mentioned fortress (Anaboli) is the most important fortress for the defence of the peninsula, there is no weapon usable. Moreover, the number of guardsmen are quite limited due to the negligence of the government. Even the remaining guardsmen had left their duty, and had scattered here and there. (ellipsis) There is nothing to eat except

some wheat. Armories and, in particular, the palace built by christians in which the guardsmen should be stationed were completely wasted, and I myself am staying at this moment in a private house."⁹⁾

This situation must not be the exception only to the Anaboli fortress. Thus the Morea peninsula had been almost defenseless.

3. The Rise of *Kocabaşı* in the Peninsula

It is a fact that the rebellion of 1770 had not only been strategically organized for the purpose of the Russian policy of southern advancement, but also it consequently became the national independence movement of Greeks against Ottoman rule on which character this paper will pay due attention. It therefore depended upon the attitude of *kocabaşı* to this event, whether the rebellion would simply result as a disturbance by Manyots living in the Maina region, or it would develop to a national movement; and whether it would result in success or in failure.

We should therefore examine the function of *kocabaşı* in the Greek society, at first, and then the role played by them in the event. It is a well known fact that the Ottoman policy for the Christian subjects (the *Millet* System) had given to them full autonomy concerning communal affairs under the leadership of *kocabaşı* as long as taxes were paid. As W. Miller mentioned,¹⁰⁾ after the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II had admitted and even protected their communal autonomy long since the Byzantine Era. Under this policy the most important function of *kocabaşı* was to mediate between Ottoman authority and Greek inhabitants, in particular, with the assessment and collection of taxes which should be paid by the entire inhabitants to cover the expenditure needed for the promotion of the district administration. This function of *kocabaşı* was similar to *a'yân's* in the Turkish society.¹¹⁾ As already mentioned above, after the local administrations had been transformed to the magistrate government, *kocabaşı*s, either allied with or confronted with *a'yân's*, had succeeded to strengthen their social influence over Greek elements. In the Morea where the population of Turkish immigrants was not very large, *a'yân's* could not constitute a very solid force. In contrast, *kocabaşı*s had made remarkable growth. However *kocabaşı*s, as so many Turkish archival documents show, abused their position for personal profits, such as the illegal occupation of land and overassessment of the tax-registers.¹²⁾

A firman document sent by the sultan to the *mütesellim* of Morea and the *nâib* of the Tripoliçe district in January 1770, reveals the contents of the protest of the Greek inhabitants pertaining malpractices of their *kocabaşı*, Karlo Uluyorgi as follows:¹³⁾

1) Uluyorgi had enriched himself by using his privilege as a *kocabaşı* for four

to five years,

- 2) he had smuggled certain prohibited commodities for export to Europe,
- 3) although he had been arrested as a result of the above mentioned smuggle, he had succeeded to set himself free by using his fiscal power,
- 4) he had illegally collected some 30 to 40 *kise akçe* (15,000–20,000 piastres) under the pretext of the repairs and ornaments of his mansion being used as the office of *kocabaşı*,
- 5) he also had illegally collected some 70 to 80 *kise akçe* (35,000–40,000 piastres) for the payment of the special wartime tax.

Expanding a paragraph for *kocabaşıs*, Süleyman Penah mentions about the elections of *kacabaşıs* as follows:

“In every district two to four *kocabaşıs*, according to necessity, should be appointed on the *Rûz-ı Hızır* Day (6 May) annually with a proof delivered by the Islamic Law Court, and 250 *kuruş* should be paid to each *kocabaşı* to finance the amount from the district treasury annually. This appointment should be done in agreement with all of the inhabitants of the district. Their office should not be held beyond a year, and they should be dismissed from their office on every *Rûz-ı Hızır* Day, and the other individuals should be appointed instead of them, even if all of the inhabitants living in the district would express their satisfaction with their *kocabaşıs*. A *kocabaşı* should not hold his office beyond a year. If it became necessary to appoint the same person who had already been appointed to the office before, he should not be appointed without the passing of five years. As a result of this method of appointment, *kocabaşıs* would not joint for their profits, and they would not save their fortune by squeezing money and property from inhabitants. Because they are necessarily dismissed from the office at the end of the year.”¹⁴⁾

Süleyman Penah thus made clear the evil influence caused by a long-term appointment and the advantages of the one-year appointment method. This opinion carries some resemblance to the Muhsin-zâde Mehmet Paşa's policy for the appointment of *a'yânlik* during his first Grand Vezirate (1765–1768) preceding the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, and it also corresponds with the centralization policy of local administrations in the Tanzimat Era.¹⁵⁾

In spite of Süleyman Penah's warning, having found their profits in the weakness of the central government, *kocabaşıs* had saved their fortune and had increased their influence on the Greek inhabitants. They were not consequently anti-Ottoman. However they were inspired at the same time by the thought of Nationalism in Europe through their commercial activities with Europe. As a result they had been put into an ambivalent situation.

4. The Role of *Kocabası* in the Rebellion

After the political relations with the Ottoman Empire had turned worse around the problem of "Division of Poland", Katharine II strengthened the Baltic fleet stationed at Kronstad harbor to prepare for the coming war against the Ottoman Empire, and she sent numerous espionage missions to Montenegro, Morea, the Crete Island and the other areas of the Balkans to incite the Christian inhabitants to rebel against Ottoman rule. In Morea, among these espionage missions Papasoğlu (Gregorios Papadopoulos) was the most conspicuous in making arrangements for the rebellion. He was a Greek living at Petersburg, and had been promoted to the officer of a Russian bombardier corps.¹⁶⁾ Coming to the peninsula, he incited Greeks through a Greek, Benaki, who at once began to organize the Greek fighting troops and informed Papasoğlu that if the Russian fleet came to the Morea, some ten thousand Greeks will uprising.¹⁷⁾ It is Benakis Panayotti Mpenakis who was the highest Greek leader of the rebellion. According to G. Finley, Benaki was the richest man in the peninsula, and had great influence as the monopolistic exporter of the goods produced in the Maina region.¹⁸⁾ A Turkish archival document shows Benaki as a wealthy landowner having six big farms (*çiftlik*s) in the Kalamata district and its environs.¹⁹⁾ A report sent from the *mütesellim* of Morea to the Topkapı Palace reported; "the leader of this uprising is Benaki who is a *kocabası* of the Kalamata district, and Katharine II had sent a letter appointing him as a general of the Russian army."²⁰⁾

The rebellion began in February 1770 with the attack on the Koron fortress, and in this operation Benaki commanded some four thousand Greeks.²¹⁾ Mizistre (Mistra), Modon and Londar (Leondari) fortresses were also attacked by rebel forces simultaneously. Out of these attacks we will examine the case of Mizistre. Mizistre was attacked by a force of sixty thousand commanded by Antonios Psaros and Barkof.²²⁾ In this city approximately 1,500 Muslims inhabited as the majority. But the *kocabası* of this city had kept in advance two hundred Greeks in his house in secrecy. While the city was attacked by rebel forces, these Greeks also assailed simultaneously, leaving the Muslims in a difficult position. As a result, an armistice was concluded between rebel forces and the Muslims, forcing the Muslims to withdraw in peace from the city, surrendering all their weapons. Hence the Turks had left their weapons by Husein Bey's order, a chief *a'yân* of the city, but approximately two hundred Arvanians living in the city resisted surrendering their weapons and insisted on fighting to their death. In the midst of this confusion, Huseyin Bey and Yusuf Bey were killed, and another *a'yân* Hamdullâh Bey was captured.²³⁾ According to other documents, most of *sipâhî*s in the city were also killed during the battle.²⁴⁾ After the battle, A. Orlof, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army entered the city, and

declared exaggeratedly that Greeks were at long last liberated from the Turkish domination.²⁵⁾ It is said that an independent government was organized by the leadership of bishops and *kocabaşıs* as well as three thousand Manyots were appointed as guardsmen.²⁶⁾

Nevertheless, it must be taken into consideration that all *kocabaşıs* did not necessarily take the leadership of the rebellion. Some *kocabaşıs* hesitated or even opposed to participate, though they had been inspired by Russian agents. Some informed the government the activities of these agents. For instance, Süleyman Penah describes the *kocabaşı* of the Kalavrita city named Zaimoğlu as follows:

"A famous *kocabaşı* of the Kalavrita city, Zaimoğlu, sent a letter to the *mütesellim*, and said, "you do not fear from our *reâyās* (Christians), please be at ease. If some one participate in the rebellion, I will kill him by myself."²⁷⁾

Süleyman Penah also says:

"The above mentioned *kocabaşı*, Zaimoğlu, had pretended to support the rebellion, for he had been fearful of Th. Orlof (younger brother of A. Orlof) and *reâyās*. He had not, in fact, agreed subconsciously with the rebellion. Before the Kalavrita city was attacked, having thought that "some precautions will be made against the rebellion, and someone will listen to my warning", he had been staying with the *mütesellim* at Tripoliçe. After having lost any hope, he escaped to Kalavrita on the night the rebellion broke out."²⁸⁾

The same author also describes about Zaimoğlu's behaviors upon returning to Kalavrita as follows:

"Some 150 Muslims had lived at Kalavrita. When the rebel forces attacked the city, Zaimoğlu came from his village to the city, and mediated between Muslims and the rebel forces to conclude an armistice between them, according to which the Muslims left from the city upon surrendering their weapons. After the armistice was concluded, while preparing for some boats to transport Muslims to Salona located on the opposite side of a strait, Zaimoğlu supplied them with water and food, and then put Muslims in a monastery. After these arrangement were made, although he was requested by Th. Orlof and Greeks to participate in the rebellion and to attack the city of Tripoliçe by leading the Greeks of the Kalavrita city, he spent the time on one pretext or another, and did not go to Tripoliçe."²⁹⁾

The above mentioned evidence proves that Zaimoğlu originally had no intention to participate in the rebellion, though we do not have any proof as to why he was, in conclusion, exiled by the Ottoman government from the Morea peninsula after the rebellion collapsed. Süleyman Penah also describes no few *kocabaşı* had informed the *mütesellim* at Tripoliçe, by saying "Russians are inciting the rebellion, so it is doubtless that Greeks will uprising and Russians will come to Morea. Please inform our warning to the sultan."³⁰⁾

This fact shows that *kocabaşı* could not fall into step to rebel against Ottoman rule, which was one of the main reasons that the rebellion failed.

5. The Role of *A'yāns* in Suppressing the Rebellion

The news concerning the rebellion had reached to the Ottoman government as soon as it had broken out. Sultan Mustafa III immediately appointed Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa as the commander-in-chief of the Morea Peninsula with extensive authority as well as the governorship. Hüsametdin Paşa was also appointed on 26 April, 1770 as the admiral of the Ottoman Armada to prepare a fleet of some 30 battleships, and was ordered to set out to Morea as soon as possible. The Ottoman fleet however could not depart from Istanbul until 6 May, 1770, when the rebellion was almost suppressed. As a result, the Ottoman fleet was of no use during the suppression of the rebellion.³¹⁾

As for Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa, the former Grand Vizier,³²⁾ he had once been dismissed from his office for his opposition against the declaration of war with Russia and had been exiled to the Midilli Island. He had been reinstated to the Ottoman political stage by an appointment as the commander of the Anaboli fortress in July 1769. As soon as arriving at Morea, he had done his best to restore the fortress and to station the guardsmen but in vain, as we have already mentioned.

The rebellion had been developing rapidly. Mehmet Paşa who had been well informed that there was no sufficient army in the Morea for suppression was determined to request the cooperation of *a'yāns* living in Thessaly and Macedonia, north of the Morea Peninsula. The plan was to send the mercenary troops recruited within their districts. Therefore Mehmet Paşa requested permission to the sultan to accept his idea, on one hand, and sent letters to the *a'yāns* ordering to report urgently with their mercenary soldiers to the city of Tripoliçe on the other.³³⁾ As a result influential *a'yāns*, such as Bey-zāde Yusuf Ağa of İzdin, Ali Ağa of Çatalca and İsmail Ağa of Yenişehir (Larissa), responded to his letters and reached Tripoliçe with their forces at once. This arrangement taken by Mehmet Paşa was truly conducted with good timing. Because, before receiving Mehmet Paşa's letters, these *a'yāns* had already been ordered and completed the preparation to be mobilized to the battle front along the Danube River, which had been the main battle field

throughout the Russo-Turkish war.³⁴⁾ This fact made possible for them to start quickly to the Morea front, and consequently to succeed in suppressing the rebellion. However this was not a mere coincidence. It had been obvious to Mehmet Paşa's eyes through the experience of his first Grand Vezirate that these mercenary forces should be recruited by *a'yāns* which would be composed of the most reliable core in the Ottoman army corps during the war rather than the degenerating regular army corps composed of *sipāhīs* and *yeniçeris*.

A messenger sent by Hasan Efendi, *mütesellim* of Morea, reported to the sultan about these *a'yāns'* activities at that time as follows (see appendix):

"Some four to five thousand Muslim soldiers are stationed now at Tripoliçe. By chance I met with Çatalcalı Ali Ağa, commander of one thousand soldiers (*binbaşı*) at Livadiye, a halting-place three or four day's journey away from Tripoliçe. He had started to Morea with some 1,500 powerful soldiers, 80 *yük* (cargo) munitions of war (*cebhâne*) and 120 *yük* of hard biscuit (*peksimed*). I also met with İzdinli Bey-zâde's troop of 400 soldiers near the *Mora-derbendi* (the Morea-pass). They had started to Morea. At Yenişehir, seven troops of volunteer soldiers had been recruited, each of which had been composed of 100 to 150 soldiers whom İsmail Ağa had commanded and set out to Morea. I met with them at the suburb of Yenişehir, at a distance of one hour."³⁵⁾

Apart from these troops, firmans had been sent to the *a'yāns* of such districts as Salonika, Radoş, Kolonya, Kesriye, Horpeşte and Sarıgölü (see map). A force of approximately 10,000 soldiers had thus concentrated at Tripoliçe just before the battle of Tripoliçe on 9 April. G. Finley estimates the number of forces gathered at Tripoliçe as 6,000 and Sâdullâh Enverî as 11,500, of which forces the majority were occupied by mercenary soldiers recruited by *a'yāns*.³⁶⁾ We may therefore call these forces as "the allied forces of *a'yāns*" as our interpretation. The estimated numbers and the commanding *a'yāns* of each forces were as follows:

Place recruited	Commander	Estimated number of soldiers
Yenişehir	Müderriş Osman	1,500
Çatalca	Ali Ağa	1,500
Yenişehir	İsmail Ağa	1,000
Tırhala	Nimeti Bey	1,000
İzdin	Bey-zâde Yusuf	1,000
Florina	Elhaç Veli	1,000
Total		7,000

A. Orlof sent approximately 15,000 soldiers under the Psaros's command to Tripoliçe.³⁷⁾ Tripoliçe had been firmly guarded as the administrative

center of the Morea province; moreover, the above mentioned "allied forces of *a'yāns*" had already reached there before the rebel forces had attacked.

The battle of Tripoliçe was opened at five in the morning of 9th day of April 1770. Only after 30 minutes from the opening of the battle, the rebel forces began to desert leaving some 2,000 corpses, and from this moment, changing their position, the Ottoman side got the superiority. Some bishops and monks were executed by Mehmet Paşa's order for being suspected of their cooperation with the rebels.³⁸⁾

After the defeat, one part of the rebels attacked Balyabadra (Patras) and Gaston, but Ali Paşa, the *mutasarrıf* of Salonika, reached the location quickly and repulsed them. The other parts of rebels retreated in the direction of Maina and Anavarin. *A'yāns* were sent there with the mercenary soldiers, and fortresses were liberated one after another as in the case of Arkadiya, Mizistre, Anavarin (Navarino), Kalamata, Enderuse and Nişi. Being informed of these defeats which had resulted as the failure of the rebellion, A. Orlof escaped with Benaki, other *kocabaşıs* and bishops to the Russian fleet commanded by Elfinston and left the Morea peninsula. The Ottoman fleet appeared at last to Morea just at this moment.³⁹⁾

6. The Ottoman Policies after the Rebellion was suppressed

As an initial act, after the rebellion was suppressed, Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa confiscated the fiefs (*timārs*) of *sipāhīs* and guardsmen who did not take up arms in the battle field, and redistributed them to the soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battles. This policy was a traditional method under the *timār* system in the Empire. However the transfer of fiefs was not promoted smoothly. Consequently it can not be said that the Ottoman control was firmly re-established by this method. The problem had existed in the general degeneration of the *timār* system itself.⁴⁰⁾

Some *kocabaşıs* and Greeks who participated in the rebellion had abandoned their villages and towns, and the government promulgated to confiscate their land and other properties. Numerous letters petitioning the sultan's mercy, however, were sent one after another from the Greek inhabitants in each districts to the government. For example, a letter sent by the inhabitants of the Maina region with the signature of the *kocabaşı*, Yorgaki, proposed the following promises on the condition of their petition to be accepted:⁴¹⁾

- 1) to obey unconditionally to every *vālīs* appointed,
- 2) to pay all taxes including the poll-tax and the tithe with some additional payments,
- 3) to surrender all weapons possessed,
- 4) to deny entry to Russians and Russian vessels at Morea,
- 5) to deny entry to their villages to any *kocabaşıs* or captains who had par-

ticipated in the rebellion and had been exiled from the peninsula,

- 6) to yield hostages as a sign of loyalty,
- 7) to obey to every tax-collectors appointed,
- 8) to deny entry to vessels from the Malta Island,
- 9) to pay 15,000 *kuruş* (piastre) to the sultan in case the above mentioned promises are not fulfilled,

The government accepted all of these petitions and proclaimed a general amnesty by a firman sent to the commander-in-chief, Muhsin-zâde Mehmet Paşa, on 31 May, 1770.⁴²⁾ Contrary to this generosity, the government treated the *kocabaşıs* who had organized the rebellion, without mercy by confiscating all their *çiftliks*, gardens, buildings and other properties, and even prohibited them to return not only to their villages, but also to the peninsula.⁴³⁾ A Turkish document counted these *kocabaşıs* who were prohibited to return to Morea, as *kocabaşıs* of Balyabadra, Kalavrita, Gördös, Kalamata and Mizistre. This document proves that these *kocabaşıs* were suspected to organize the rebellion and that, of these *kocabaşıs*, Benaki was confiscated by the State Treasury (*Beytül-māl*) four *çiftliks* named Maliyokasro, Kalmikov, Ligolin and Kalinardi in the Kalamata district, and two *çiftliks* named Dinavolic and Garihne in the Enderuse district. The locations, scales and contents of all these *çiftliks* are unfortunately unknown.⁴⁴⁾ Furthermore, many properties in the possession of Greeks who had fled or died during the rebellion were also confiscated by the government. In the Mizistre district, for instance, such properties were confiscated, as land, houses, gardens, *hans* (inns or large commercial buildings), mills, shops, *çiftliks* and horses, and they were granted to *Shayh al-Islām* İvaz Paşa-zâde İbrahim Efendi who had been holding the *mālikāne* taxfarming rights of this district.⁴⁵⁾

As we mentioned above, one of the reasons for the success in suppressing the rebellion in such a short duration should be contributed to Muhsin-zâde Mehmet Paşa's policy to request the cooperation of *a'yāns* in Thessaly and Macedonia. Therefore Muhsin-zâde, later, in his second Grand Vezirate, recommended to the sultan these *a'yāns* for their promotion to the vezirate. Of these *a'yāns*, Müderris Osman Efendi of Yenişehir and Ali Ağa of Çatalca were appointed one after the other to the governorship on the Morea province, and thus they were promoted to the rank of the high official within the Empire bureaucracy.⁴⁶⁾

As Mehmet Paşa himself had confessed in his letter⁴⁷⁾ sent to Sultan Mustafa III, the insufficiency of the regular army corps composed of *sipāhīs* and *yenīçeris* would have been revealed through the war. Muhsin-zâde Mehmet Paşa had therefore done his best to make up an armistice with Russia as soon as he was appointed to the Grand Vezirate, he sent numerous letters requesting influential *a'yāns* in Anatolia and the Balkans to come with their mercenary forces to the Danube River front. As a result of this policy, the class of *a'yāns* obtained firm social influence in each provinces in Anatolia

and the Balkans after the war. From this point of view, the suppression process of this rebellion which occurred at the beginning of the war clearly made the situation of the military forces of the Ottoman Empire foreseeable in the near future.⁴⁸⁾

There remains a question pertaining the composition of "the allied forces of *a'yāns*". Who were the mercenary soldiers of these troops? Among many sort of men, the main body of these soldiers was composed by Arvanian mercenaries. After "the allied forces of *a'yāns*" began to pursue the rebels after the victory at Tripoliçe, the situation turned into pillage. Having proclaimed a general amnesty, the government tried to protect Greeks who had recently promised to obey the government, but it was in vain. Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa, the commander-in-chief of Morea at the time, sent a letter on 31 August, 1770 to the Grand Vezier, and requested for assistance as follows:⁴⁹⁾

"Coming to Morea following one after another, Arvanian soldiers arrested Greeks who recently pledged their obedience to the government. So far as I have stayed in this province as the governor, the coming of these Arvanians will never stop, and they will continue to do everything they wish. (ellipsis) Please appoint me to another place as soon as possible."

This pillage by the Arvanian mercenaries in the entire peninsula brought a serious issue to the Turkish history. Escaping from their pillage, many Greeks were forced to immigrate, crossing the Aegean Sea to Western Anatolia, where influential *a'yāns*, like the Karaosmanoğulları family, had been managing many *çiftlik*s or sheep-sheds (*ağıl*) and had been seeking for workers there. The Greek immigrants had learned that jobs as share-croppers in *çiftlik*s or shepherds in sheep-sheds, or other jobs in towns as merchants or artisans were available.⁵⁰⁾ Later, in October 1777, the government, sending firmans to the *kadıs* of Manisa, Aydın and İzmir provinces in Western Anatolia, tried to force these Greek immigrants back to Morea from these provinces.⁵¹⁾ These firman documents proved that the ceaseless immigrations of Greeks had continued. As for Greek immigration to Western Anatolia in general, it may have gradually occurred since the later half of the 17th century. However the situation of Morea after the rebellion would give great impetus to these population movements, and the Greek population in Western Anatolia had continuously increased, and this fact would become one of the reasons of the Turkish-Greek War after the First World War.

7. Concluding remarks

In this paper, we tried to suggest the following points through the Turkish historical sources.

- 1) The actual state of Turkish rule over the Morea Peninsula had been a system of Magistrate Government led by local notables. In Morea, however, where the number of Turkish immigrants was not very large, the Turkish notables (*a'yāns*) could not accordingly constitute a very solid force. In contrast, the Greek notables (*kocabaşıs*) had made a rather remarkable growth, and the rebellion was carried out on their initiative.
- 2) It was the *a'yāns* of Macedonia and Thessaly that applied themselves to putting down the rebellion. The rebellion therefore ran its course in the form of confrontation between the Greek and Turkish notable.
- 3) After all, the *kocabaşıs*, as compared with the *a'yāns* which had united in fighting to preserve their established economical interests, failed to present a united front against Ottoman rule. Some *kocabaşıs*, in particular living in the inner part of the peninsula opposed to participate in the rebellion. This situation resulted in the failure of the rebellion.
- 4) Some *a'yāns* who had greatly contributed to suppress the rebellion were promoted to the vezirate through the recommendation of Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa, a commander-in-chief of the Morea Province at the time and later Grand Vizier of the Empire. This situation was also a typical case to the rise of *a'yāns*, in general in the Ottoman politics after the Russo-Turkish War.
- 5) After the rebellion was suppressed the peninsula became a place of the pillage by Arvanians who were hired by *a'yāns* as soldiers of "the allied forces of *a'yāns*", and many Greeks were forced to immigrate to Western Anatolia. This resulted in the "Greekification" of the area.
- 6) Although the rebellion had failed, as a result, the event lent an initial impetus to the movements for national independence which evolved after 1821.

Notes

- 1) This paper was originally based on a chapter of my doctoral dissertation presented to the University of Istanbul in 1969. I wish to express my special gratitude, first of all, to the Turkish Government who granted me with a scholarship to stay there and also granted a permission to my research at the *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Genel Müdürlüğü* and at the *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi* and other places. I am also grateful to my respectable teachers, Prof. Munir Aktepe, Prof. Mücteba İlgürel, and late Prof. Cavid Baysun without whose advice and assistance my dissertation would have never been completed.
- 2) For the details of this rebellion, see my doctoral dissertation, *Muhsin-zāde Mehmet Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi*, Tokyo, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (hereafter ILCAA), 1979, 158p.
- 3) For instance, G. Finley, *A History of Greece*, Vols., 5-6, Oxford, 1877; W. Miller, *The Turkish Restoration in Greece 1718-1719*, London, 1921; id., *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors 1801-1927*, repr., London, 1966.
- 4) Sâdullâh Enverî, *Târîh*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kütüphanesi, N.T.Y.5994.
- 5) Ahmet Vâsîf, *Mehâsin al-Âsâr ve Hakâik al-Ahbâr*, Bulak, 1246H.
- 6) Süleyman Penah Efendi, *Mora İhtilali Tarihçesi* (Aziz Berker ed.), *Tarih Vesikaları*, Vol. 2, No. 7-12, Ankara, 1942-43.

- 7) For the *İltizâm* System, see Abdelrahman Abdelrahim & Yuzo Nagata, *The İltizâm System in Egypt and Turkey: A Comparative Study*, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Tokyo, ILCAA, No. 14, 1977, pp. 169–194. For the *Mâlikâne* system see Mehmet Genç, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Mâlikâne Sistemi, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri*, Ankara, 1975, pp. 231–296; For *çiftlik* and *a'yâns* see Y. Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (çiftlik) of the Notables in Western Anatolia*, Tokyo, ILCAA, 1976; id., *Materials on the Bosnian Notables*, Tokyo, ILCAA, 1979; T. Stoianovich, Land tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy 1600–1800, *Journal of Economic History*, XIII, 1953, pp. 398–411; H. İnalcık The Emergence of Big Farms, *Çiftlik: State, Landlords and Tenants*, *Collection Turcica III: Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1983, pp. 105–126; B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and Struggle for Land 1600–1800*, Chicago UNV. Press, 1981; G. Veinstein, Ayan de la region d'Izmir et le commerce du Levant, *Études Balkaniques*, 1976-3, 1976, pp. 71–83.
- 8) S. Penah *ibid.*, *Tarih Vesikaları*, No. 10, p. 317; No. 11, p. 387.
- 9) Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Genel Müdürlüğü (hereafter BA.), *Cevdet Tasnifi Askeriye Kısmı (CAs.)*, no. 45616.
- 10) W. Miller, *op. cit.*, *Successors*, p. 28.
- 11) For the function of *a'yânlık*, see Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 1–12.
- 12) Cf. BA., Atik Şikayet Defteri (ASD.), no. 175, p. 19, 52, 59, 75, 83, 122, 126, 139; BA., *Cevdet Tasnifi Dahiliye Kısmı (CD.)*, no. 4904; BA., *Cevdet Tasnifi Maliye Kısmı (CM.)*, no. 2411, 2228, 8013; BA., *Mühimme Defteri (MD.)*, no. 169, p. 76, 92; Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (TSMA), no. E5226.
- 13) ASD., no. 175, p. 110.
- 14) S. Penah, *ibid.*, *Tarih Vesikaları*, No. 11, p. 396.
- 15) For Muhsin-zâde's *a'yânlık* policy, see Y. Nagata *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 31–36. For the district administration of the Tanzimat Era, see H. İnalcık, Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri, *Belleten*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 112, Ankara, 1964, pp. 623–690.
- 16) F. Kurdoğlu, *1768–1774 Türk-Rus Harbinde Akdeniz Harekatı*, Istanbul, 1942, p. 6; G. Finley, *ibid.*, Vol. 5, p. 302; A. Lamartine, *Histoire de la Turquie*, Tom. VII, p. 374–5.
- 17) G. Finley, *ibid.*, Vol. 5, p. 304.
- 18) G. Finley, *ibid.*, Vol. 5, p. 249.
- 19) BA., Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KPT), Sadaret, Kethüdâlığı Kâtib Kalemi, no. 3.
- 20) TSMA., no. E2930 (see: Appendix)
- 21) F. Kurdoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 8.
- 22) Ahmet Vâsif Efendi, *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 43.
- 23) TSMA, no. E2930.
- 24) BA., Ali Emiri Tasnifi, III. Mustafa Kısmı, no. 16249.
- 25) For German text of this declaration, see Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, Bd. V, s. 932.
- 26) G. Finley, *ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 309.
- 27) TSMA., no. E2930.
- 28) S. Penah, *Tarih Vesikaları*, No. 7, p. 74.
- 29) S. Penah, *ibid.*
- 30) S. Penah, *ibid.*, No. 7, p. 69.
- 31) For the organizations of Ottoman army to suppress the rebellion, see MD., no. 168, pp. 176–178; CA., no. 1567, 1592, 2427, 30868, 47508, 47558; *Cevdet Tasnifi*, Bahriye Kısmı, no. 2617; TSMA., no. D801-8/b.
- 32) Cf., Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*.
- 33) BA., Hatt-ı Hümayunlar Tasnifi (HH), no. 293; Ahmet Vâsif, *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 44.
- 34) HH., no. 293.
- 35) TSMA., no. E2930.
- 36) For the *a'yâns* coming to Tripoliçe, see Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 54–55.
- 37) Ahmet Vâsif, *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 43.

- 38) Ahmet Vâsıf, *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 43–44; Sâdullâh Enverî, *ibid.*, Vol. 1, folio, 91/b; G. Finley, *ibid.*, Vol. 5, p. 320.
- 39) Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 55–57.
- 40) Y. Nagata, *ibid.*, pp. 57–58.
- 41) CD., no. 1718.
- 42) CD., no. 3189.
- 43) CD., no. 7808.
- 44) KPT., no. 42, Sadâret Kethüdâlığı Kâtib Kalemi, no. 2.
- 45) CD., 18760. (date: February 1775).
- 46) Mehmet Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i Osmânî*, Vol. 1, p. 369; *id.*, Vol. 3, p. 98.
- 47) Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 69–70; MD., no. 171, p. 464.
- 48) Cf. Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Muhsin-zâde*, pp. 74–98.
- 49) TSMA., no. E11265.
- 50) Cf. Y. Nagata, *op. cit.*, *Some Documents*.
- 51) Manisa Müzesi, Şeri Mahkeme Sicill Defteri, no. 221, p. 19; no. 241, p. 41.

مودة مشی بان حسن افری قوبرنیک بوقدراری کوچان علی قوبرنیک نقریرد س عظیم

2930

بوقدری جزیره موده دن حقای اون ای کون اولوب قمازون چند دوزمقیم مایه کفره می مسقوبرا اعلی الله مرسته
 باصوب اهل ساموه سالو حلی بزه نسیم ایکن سزان سبکری تخله ایدلم ویرکلزیه باش اعیان اولون حسین بطلان زایه
 یاکفردده سالو تیزجون جمله می سالو حلی نسیم ایکن لکن اول طرفه ایکیوز نظر ارنود طائفی بونمقلله اندر سالو حلی نسیم
 ایلیق بزه نسیم و نجیه محارب دن ال ایکنز جو طراب ویر و کلزیه کفره مزبوره اهای مرقومه نایک سالو حلی الدلزه با ک
 فرصت بولوب اولو مرقوم حسین بی و دیگر اهان یوسف کی قن و محمد امین نایک نام اعیانی دخی بلیسه ساقه و ضعیف مایه
 کونودوب ماعدا اهل ساموه نایک بدر و غیل اول طرفی قن غلام و قصودی بالجله اسیرا یروب سبکری طرفه ارماک
 اصل هالیدن فقط بر نغمه می مذکور ارنود لقر سبیلله مایوس اولوب انان دخی غلامی یجون نقر فکینه نسیم اولشدر
 و مذکور ایکیوز نظر ارنود لقر مقدسکی معاومه ری اوزره بالو تقان مرقوم محارب ابرون طغسان مقداری نسیم اولوب
 فقط بوز اون نقری تخلص جان ایکنرله الوم طرابیجه ده متسل مایوس حسین افری قوبرنیک مایه اقامت اوزره در
 و کفره مزبوره نایک بلیشری قلم مایه قوجه بلیسی اولون نایک ویرکلزیه مایه مقدم ایکیوز مقداری رعایا کفری
 و جنرالین ویرلری اول طرفه شیع بولشدر و مرسته قوجه بلیسی خانه سده مقدم ایکیوز مقداری بلیشری ظاهر
 اخفا ابروب مایه کفره می کلزیه رعایای مذکوره دخی بر طرفن همم بکله اهل سامو مضطرب و غمناک و کفری مالوانا
 اینشدر و قلم مایه قامین می مسقوب نایک مانده مکن و سبکری غیر و ریشدر و قن حسین زاوه افری خفری مالوانا
 قیمنشدر و سبکری قلمی طرابیجه نایک بقی اقامت اطراف هر کجه معدا و کفار عسکر الله کون محافظه عظیم اقامت
 و کفره می دخی هر کون خلاصه کونز و در بندره دخی معدا و کفار عسکر وضعن ماعدا کفری بری و کون محافظه عظیم
 بالکفر و و ابروب مضطرب و هر کسند نه نقد نام اوزره در و مالو طرابیجه ده و در قن نایک بلیشری کفری
 اولون جنالیه اعیانی الحاج علی افری موده بران و در قن مسان اولون لادیده ده است کلام نایک بلیشری کفری
 و سکان بون حبه خانه و بوز بزی بون کما دله موده بری غایت اینشدر و ماعدا کفری دخی طرفن عز و اوال
 در بوز مقداری بیاد کفری دست کلام اندر دخی موده بری غایت اینشدر و ماعدا کفری دخی طرفن عز و اوال
 این اوزره دخی جنر و برشدر و بکیشردن بری عدد بر دخی بری غایت اینشدر و ماعدا کفری دخی طرفن عز و اوال
 قیومی باقی معین الله موده بری غایت اینشدر و ماعدا کفری دخی طرفن عز و اوال
 این قطع فاکون مالو مایه لمانن مایه بر افری هالی بیلزیه متوازد و سبکری قطع فاکون دخی مکره و نایک اوزره
 استماع ایدم لکن صحیف معلوم و کفری نقر برادر و قلم و در ده مایه قوجه مایه اولون و عیم و کفری مکره و نایک
 متبر مایه قلم نقر نه عی و معلوم کونز و مایه بران و کفری نقر برادر و قلم و در ده مایه قوجه مایه اولون و عیم و کفری مکره و نایک
 عیالان ابر و اولو ایسه بن بطرفه قن ایدم جر آنها اینشدر و بران ابر



Map of Morea and Thessaly