

A Critique of the Structure of Faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga**

By Noriaki HAKAMAYA

—Мало того, если б кто мне доказал, что Христос вне истины,
и действительно было бы, что истина вне Христа, то мне
лучше хотелось бы оставаться со Христом, нежели с истиной.¹⁾—

I

The underlying assumption of the present paper is that the contrast between “critical philosophy”, represented by Descartes, and “topical philosophy”, represented by Vico,²⁾ is to be found not only in Western Europe but also in the history of all philosophical traditions, including those of the East, and on the basis of this premise we herein present a critical study of the question of “faith”³⁾ in the history of Buddhism, with a special focus on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.

Here a brief comment on the contrast between these two philosophies may be in place. Whereas the former sets value on the “art of judgement (*ars iudicandi*)” which, in order to clearly distinguish only the true from the false, demonstrates (*demonstratio*) what is true by means of the word, the latter attaches importance to the “art of discovery (*ars inveniendi*)” which, giving precedence to the fact that discovery (*inventio*) preexists the judgement of what is true, seeks first of all to acknowledge not truth or verity (*veritas*) but rather verisimilitude (*verisimilis*) in its pristine aspect prior to any demonstration (*demonstratio*) by means of the word.⁴⁾ This contrast is also reflected in the interpretation of “truth (*Wahrheit*)”, with the former interpreting it as “true validity” whereas the latter tends to interpret it as the “naked fact”.

In the course of its development, modern scholarship has sided with the latter of these two currents. For example, Max Weber, who advocated a form of scholarship which “lets the facts speak (*die Tatsachen sprechen lässt*)”⁵⁾ and consequently expunged faith from its province, discusses with reference to the famous simile of the cave in Plato’s *Republic* the meaning of “truth (*Wahrheit*)” is scholarship.⁶⁾ For us, however, his discussion represents a classic example of an attempt to dilute the original meaning of “truth” in the sense of “what is true” and bring it infinitely close in meaning to the naked “fact (*Tatsache*)”. Later, again in Germany, Heidegger was to turn his attention to the same simile of the cave in his *Platons Lehre von der*

Wahrheit, and presenting a meticulous analysis together with the original Greek text accompanied by a German translation, he concluded that the original meaning of "truth (*Wahrheit*)" was not "correctness (*ὀρθότης*, *orthotēs*, *Richtigkeit*)" but "unconcealedness (*ἀλήθεια*, *alētheia*, *Unverborgenheit*)", thereby adding grist to the mill of the Weberians.⁷⁾ But to us it is a source of much displeasure that in Japan there should be still no end to popular views which, casually availing themselves of this conclusion, would interpret Buddhism through the medium of the "unconcealed and manifest truth".⁸⁾

Due consideration of the matter will reveal, however, that this interpretation of Buddhism is not simply a reflection of the above trend evident in the history of Western philosophy, but that the same contrast is to be found also in the history of Buddhism itself. The following two interpretations of "thusness (*chên-ju* 眞如: *tathatā*)" given in the *Ch'êng-wêi-shih lun* 成唯識論 clearly suggest this contrast:⁹⁾

Chên 眞 means true and unfalse. *Ju* 如 means being constantly thus and unchangeable. The meaning is that this truth remains under all conditions constantly thus in its nature. Therefore it is called *chên-ju* 眞如, which conveys the meaning of being profoundly immovable and not false.

Here *chên-ju* is explained by reducing it to *chên* and *ju*, with the meanings marked by a single underline corresponding to "correctness (*orthotēs*)" and those marked by a double underline corresponding to "unconcealedness (*alētheia*)". In this interpretation the single Sanskrit word *tathatā* has been explained by dividing it into two words not actually present in the Sanskrit, and it would therefore appear to be a non-Sanskritic interpretation. But it should be obvious that the former suggests, of the two representative etymological explanations of *tathatā*,¹⁰⁾ that which would derive it from an adjective (*tatha*: true < *tathatā*), while the latter suggests that which would derive it from an adverb (*tathā*: thus < *tathatā*). Of course, the *Ch'êng-wêi-shih lun* makes no attempt to choose between these two interpretations, and it instead explains "thusness" by working out a compromise between the two. Insofar as it adopts such an eclectic view, however, it indicates that it has taken the side not of "critical philosophy", which would distinguish only what is true, but of "topical philosophy", which permits various levels of interpretation.

Originally Buddhism had been a "critical philosophy" of intellectualism which, refuting any "topical philosophy" of experientialism seeking to discover an "eternal truth" such as *ātman* or *brahman*, sought to demonstrate by means of intelligence (*prajñā*) our ignorance (*avidyā*) of the truth of dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*). But as a result of developments within Buddhism itself experientialism, with its emphasis on concentration

(*samādhi*), would seem to have gradually prevailed and its compromising attitude, ready to acknowledge an “unconcealed and naked” truth, to have checked the exclusive attitude based on an intellectualism which, with its emphasis on intelligence (*prajñā*), sought to believe and cognize only the “truth” of dependent co-arising. In the course of these developments it was, in our view, the word *adhimukti* (recognition)¹¹⁾ which, in response to an experientialism emphasizing concentration, came into widespread use as a term with a meaning of considerable amplitude, ranging from “admitting” to the mind objects on diverse levels as they are to “opening up” the mind at will towards various objects, while it was the word *śraddhā* (faith) which, although curbed by the above current, attempted to defend a Buddhist intellectualism emphasizing intelligence and seeking to believe and cognize only the “truth” of dependent co-arising. As is well-known, this word *śraddhā* has been shown by comparative linguistics¹²⁾ to be the exact equivalent of, for example, Latin *credo* in the West as used by Augustinus when he said, “I believe in order that I may understand (*credo ut intelligam*)”,¹³⁾ and even in its general usage in India it retains a strong nuance of the “intellectual” in contrast to the “emotional” connotations of *bhakti*.¹⁴⁾ Without this intellectualism emphasizing intelligence, Buddhism would surely end up being barely distinguishable from non-Buddhist schools and devoid of any original doctrines or faith of its own which make of Buddhism what it is. In his *Lam-rim chen-mo* Tsong-kha-pa remarks on this point in the following manner:¹⁵⁾

One [who has become skilled in concentration] should not be satisfied with only that calm (*śamatha*), but needs to cultivate discernment (*vipaśyanā*) by generating the intelligence (*prajñā*) which infallibly determines the true meaning. [This is] because, if this is not done, his concentration alone will be in common with [that of] non-Buddhists too, so that even if he repeats only that [concentration], on account of not eliminating the seed of affliction, just as in the path of those [non-Buddhists], he will not free himself from existence.

In the present paper, we wish to point out that the “faith” of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* cannot possibly represent a form of “faith” supported by any such intellectualism emphasizing intelligence.

II

It would have to be admitted by any Buddhist that the object of faith in Buddhism is the Three Jewels (*ratna-traya*). The subject matter of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is, as is well-known, built up around seven topics, consisting of these Three Jewels, which each constitute a separate topic, and a further four topics. These seven topics are known as the “seven adamant

terms (*sapta vajra-padāni*)", and the opening verse of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, in summarizing the contents of the work as a whole, lists them as follows:¹⁶⁾

*buddhaś ca dharmaś ca gaṇaś ca dhātur bodhir guṇāḥ karma ca bauddham
antyam/*

krtsnasya śāstrasya śarīram etat samāsato vajra-padāni sapta//

The Buddha, Dharma, assembly (= Saṃgha), realm, enlightenment, virtues, and lastly Buddha-action:

This is the framework of the whole treatise, and in brief they are the seven adamant terms.

Having first explained individually the Three Jewels of the Buddha, Dharma and Saṃgha, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* moves on to the fourth and largest topic, namely "realm (*dhātu*)", and in doing so it offers the following comment together with verse 23.¹⁷⁾ We shall of necessity first quote the original Sanskrit and its Tibetan translation. In these and subsequent quotations all underlines have been added by us, and they indicate the sections of greatest importance which are taken up for discussion immediately afterwards.

*ratna-traya-nirdeśānantaram yasmin saty eva laukika-lokottara-viśuddhi-
yoni-ratna-trayam utpadyate tad adhikṛtya ślokaḥ/*

samālā tathatātha nirmalā vimalā buddha-guṇā jina-kriyā/

viśayaḥ paramārtha-darśinām śubha-ratna-traya-sargako yataḥ//¹⁸⁾

*dkon mchog gsum bstan pa'i rjes thogs la gang yod na 'jig rten pa dang
'jig rten las 'das pa'i rnam par dag pa skye ba'i gnas ni dkon mchog
gsum skye bar 'gyur ba de'i dbang du byas nas tshigs su bcad pa/*

*dri bcas de bzhin nyid dang dri ma med// dri med sangs rgyas yon tan
rgyal ba'i mdzad//*

*gang las dkon mchog dge ba gsum 'byung ba// don dam gzigs pa rnam
kyi yul nyid do//¹⁹⁾*

To the best of our knowledge, there are at present available four translations of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* into modern languages, based on either the Sanskrit original or the Tibetan translation. We shall accordingly now quote in order of their publication the corresponding passages in these four translations.

(Obermiller)²⁰⁾ After the description of the 3 Jewels we have a verse concerning those (elements) the existence of which conditions the origination of the said Jewels, since they represent the source of all the purifying qualities, the mundane, and the transcendental.

23. The Absolute mingled with defilement,
 The Absolute free from all the stains,
 The immaculate attributes and the acts of the Buddha,
 (These elements) from which the 3 illustrious Jewels arise,
 (These 4 items) are only accessible to him who perceives the Absolute Truth.

(Ui; translated from the Japanese)²¹⁾ Subsequent to having explained the Three Jewels, there is a verse concerning that which when it exists the source of mundane and supramundane purity generates the Three Jewels.

[Kārikā] Thusness defiled and undefiled, the Buddha's virtues free of defilement, and the acts of the Victorious One
 Are the sphere of the Buddhas who see the supreme truth, and this is that from which there arise the pure Three Jewels. (23/7)

(Takasaki)²²⁾ Immediately after the explanation of the Three Jewels, there is one *śloka* with reference to the question, in what circumstances are there born the Three Jewels, what is the birth-place of purity, mundane and supermundane.

(Kārikā 4)

The Reality mingled with pollution,
 And [the Reality] apart from pollution,
 The Immaculate Qualities of the Buddha, and his Acts;
 [These are the four aspects of] the sphere
 Of those who perceive the Highest Truth,
 From which arise the pure Three Jewels. //23//

(Nakamura; translated from the Japanese)²³⁾ Following the instruction on the Three Jewels, there is a verse concerning this: What is it that when it exists the Three Jewels as the source of mundane and supramundane purity arise?

Defiled thusness, the undefiled, the Buddha's virtues free of defilement, and victorious deeds:

From that the Three Good Jewels arise. It is the sphere of the (Buddhas) who see the supreme truth.

We have, on a previous occasion,²⁴⁾ translated the section underscored in the Sanskrit as "that which only when it exists (*yasmin saty eva*) the Three Jewels as the source (*yoni*) of mundane and supramundane purity arise", but none of the underscored sections in the four modern translations quoted above would bespeak an understanding tallying with ours. This section constitutes a quite ordinary relative clause, with *tad* referring to the initial *yasmin*, and so the renderings of Takasaki and Nakamura, suggesting

as they do that *tad* refers to an interrogative pronoun, are especially unacceptable. In particular, Takasaki's twofold rendition of *yasmin* as "in what (circumstances)" and "what", with "the question" as their antecedent, could even be deemed a mistranslation. In content, *tad* does not refer to anything like "the question" but clearly points to *dhātu* and *gotra*, concepts of utmost importance in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and hence it is inadmissible to miss this vital point. In this respect, Ui's translation does not give any impression of ambiguity in regard to this all-important point, while the first translation by Obermiller, which defines the meaning of *tad* as "those (elements)", may be said to be the most clear-cut in regard to the specificity of its wording. Of course, he did err in translating *dhātu* or *gotra*, which should be singular, in the plural. But since it is evident that he rendered *dhātu* as "element(s)", his error may in this instance be regarded with tolerance, even though this rendition may today be open to question.²⁵⁾

In the above we have considered the translation of the underscored relative clause in each of the four modern translations. However, the most important point concerns in particular the qualifier (*avadhāraṇa*) "only (*eva*)" in the absolute locative expression "(that) which only when it exists (*yasmin saty eva*)". This qualified has apparently been described by Kanazawa Atsushi as representing "the Indian conscience".²⁶⁾ Yet the translations to date of the passage in question have all been lacking in this "conscience", and this is a point which should be reflected upon with candour. What is more, we are fully mindful of the fact that it is only because we have benefitted from the work of Matsumoto Shirō,²⁷⁾ who as well as recording Kanazawa's above statement has himself undertaken a penetrating critique of Tathāgatagarbha thought with a sharp awareness of the point at issue in regard to *eva*, that we ourselves may have been able to avoid the errors committed by previous translations.

In indicating the relationship between the "Three Jewels (*ratna-traya*)" and the "realm (*dhātu*)", the qualifier "only (*eva*)" has been attached to the latter, and the importance of this lies in the very fact that it clearly testifies to the irreversible relationship (*avinābhāva*) obtaining between the two, namely, that "in order for the former to exist the latter must invariably exist" or "the former exists only when the latter exists" or "without the latter the former cannot possibly exist". Hence the arising of the "Three Jewels" must be always dependent upon "*dhātu*", and on no account is the reverse possible. If, bearing this fact in mind, we now reexamine the four earlier translations, we find that it is the translation by Obermiller, who in the absence of the Sanskrit text had to rely solely upon the Tibetan translation in which *eva* has not been expressly translated, which rather ironically appears to be superior to the others. His rendition "the existence of which conditions the origination of the said Jewels" probably indicates that, even without *eva*, he was fully aware of the importance of this *dhātu*. Of course,


it goes without saying that if he had rendered it as “the existence of which alone conditions the origination of the said Jewels”, his translation would have been still closer to perfection. But all the same, when considered from the standpoint of a believer in the Three Jewels, it could hardly be regarded as the act of one in his right mind to continue believing in the Three Jewels when there exists something of greater importance supporting them from behind, for however piously one might act, the coat of mail in the form of *dhātu* would still be visible through the robes of the Three Jewels.

The general basic character of this *dhātu* would seem to have been already sufficiently exposed by Matsumoto using the designation *dhātu-vāda*,²⁸⁾ and so here we wish to touch specifically on the term “origin (*gotra*)”, which happens to be also a synonym of *dhātu*, in regard to its relationship to the Three Jewels. The synonymity of *dhātu* and *gotra* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is evident from the fact that verse 24, which comments on the aforecited verse 23, explains “the source of the Three Jewels (*ratna-traya-sargaka*)”, namely, *dhātu* in its role as the ground from which the Three Jewels arise, by rephrasing it as “the origin of the Three Jewels (*gotraṃ ratna-trayasya*)”,²⁹⁾ and it is in particular necessary to pay due attention to the fact that this usage of *gotra* is peculiar to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and that, furthermore, it conveys the basic nature of the structure of faith in this work. Usually *gotra* refers to the “lineages”³⁰⁾ of the three vehicles born of the ground (*dhātu*). But in the case of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, although still retaining this meaning, *gotra* also signifies the “essence” which, in the opposite sense of ground (*dhātu*), gives birth to these “lineages”. This ambiguity, which allows a single word to encompass a variety of meanings, may be regarded as perfect testimony to what might be described as the tensionless optimism of this current of thought.³¹⁾ But as far as the meaning of the term *ratna-gotra*, also incorporated in the title *Ratna-gotra-vibhāga*, is concerned, however, any such ambiguity may be said to be completely absent. Just as the relationship between the Three Jewels and *dhātu* was qualified by *eva*, so the meaning of *gotra* is in this case restricted to only that of *gotra* in the sense of the ground from which the Three Jewels arise. Therefore, the meaning of the compound *ratna-gotra* can be interpreted only in the meaning of a determinative compound (*tatpuruṣa*), namely, “the *gotra* of the Jewel (*ratnasya gotraṃ*)”, as was already indicated by the expression “origin of the Three Jewels (*gotraṃ ratna-trayasya*)” in the aforementioned verse 24, and on no account should it be understood as an appositional compound (*karmadhāraya*) meaning “Jewel, namely, *gotra*”.

But there is no need for the like of us to dwell on this point, for Dr. Takasaki Jikidō, the authority on this work, has already given us an explanation in plain and lucid language, and at this point we wish to defer completely to what he has to write on the subject.³²⁾

The Sanskrit title of this work is *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*. Translated literally, it means "Analysis of the Jewel Mountain". The original meaning of the term "jewel mountain (*ratna-gotra*)" is a mine or ore yielding jewels. A jeweller digs out ore from a mountain, removes its impurities by various means, polishes it, and transforms it into a jewel. The simile described in the *Ta-chi ching* 大集經 (**Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra*) and quoted in the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga* would have it that the Tathāgata likewise tempers sentient beings soiled with the stains of mental defilements and causes them to become enlightened. In other words, *ratna-gotra* represents an analogy for the *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature. But doctrinally speaking, "jewel" denotes the Three Jewels of the Buddha, Dharma and Saṃgha, and it is explained that the *tathāgata-garbha* is referred to as *ratna-gotra* in the sense that it constitutes the cause which establishes the Three Jewels. Therefore, "analysis of *ratna-gotra*" means nothing other than an elucidation of Tathāgatagarbha thought.

This can probably be considered a flawless explanation of the meaning of *ratna-gotra*. In developing his thesis, Dr. Takasaki also illustrates at a point a little past the above quotation the structure of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as a whole in relation to the "seven adamant terms" by means of the following diagram (with Sanskrit and English equivalents added by us):³³⁾



Although the passage quoted above was virtually flawless in its explanation, this diagram reveals a grave error in regard to a vital point, for it suggests that the relationship between *ratna-traya* (Three Jewels) and *ratna-gotra* is such that there exists the possibility of their being linked by an equal-sign. But since no such appositional interpretation is indicated in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, this equal-sign should be deleted and, for the sake of greater accuracy, this part of the diagram further modified to "*ratna-traya* (三寶) ← *gotra* (性)". When thus modified, the proposition "*ratna-traya* (三寶) ← *gotra* (性)" comes to bear a close resemblance to the "insignia of the Three Jewels (*sanbō-hyō* 三寶標) in *Bauddha* by Nakamura Hajime and

Saigusa Mitsuyoshi. Since we have on a previous occasion already discussed the reason that it is impossible for this “insignia of the Three Jewels” to represent the object of true Buddhist faith,³⁴⁾ we shall not restate our case here. However, it is probably incumbent upon us to point out briefly in connection with the subject matter of the present paper why the formula “*gotra = dhātu = tathāgata-garbha*” should embody a structure of thought which neglects faith. The reason is quite simple, for in its capacity as “the Dharma-nature of [all] *dharmas* (*dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā*)” *gotra* or *tathāgata-garbha* is, as is clearly stated by the *Ratnagotravibhāga* when quoting from the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*,³⁵⁾ an eternal and immutable truth having real existence regardless of whether the Buddha should appear in this world or not, and as such it is unrelated to faith. It would be quite absurd if this treatise were to assert that truth be unrelated to the Buddha and yet advocate in all seriousness that we should believe in the Buddha. Such a truth might, of course, become strikingly similar to an interpretation based on the “unconcealedness (*Unverborgenheit*)” of epigones of Heidegger, but if Dōgen should have ever been brought face to face with any truth “such as that in which cause and effect disappear and which is empty”, he would have doubtless said, “The Buddhas would not appear in the world, and the Patriarch [Bodhidharma] would not have come from the west”.³⁶⁾ Therefore, it should be born in mind that a follower of Tathāgatagarbha thought cannot be a follower of Dōgen, while a follower of Dōgen cannot be a follower of Tathāgatagarbha thought. Needless to say, those who have taken to the convenient shelter of the scholar’s domain, which permits of both standpoints, would from the first be exempt from any such need to choose either one or the other.

III

On the basis of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which may be characterized in the above terms, the Tibetan Jo-nang-pa school emphasized that aspect of the *tathāgata-garbha* as an eternal and immutable truth and advocated a theory of “other-emptiness (*gzhan stong*)”, according to which this *tathāgata-garbha* is empty in regard to other conventional *dharmas* (*kun rdzob pa'i chos gzhan gyis stong pa*) but is itself a real entity on the level of supreme truth, and it is today perhaps a matter of fairly common knowledge that this school was severely criticized by the orthodox schools of Tibetan Buddhism in general as a heretical doctrine.³⁷⁾ Nevertheless, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is counted in Tibet as one of the “five teachings of Maitreya (*Byams chos lnga*)”, and it is our view that these “five teachings of Maitreya” constitute a group of works which were relied upon almost always whenever conservative and compromising forces contrived to restore their influence in opposition to a rigorous selectiveness in questions of faith.³⁸⁾ In regard to these “five teachings of Maitreya”, Tsong-khā-pa himself composed prior to his change

in religious persuasion a commentary on only the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, but Dar-ma-rin-chen, one of his leading disciples, wrote a commentary not only on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* but also on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,³⁹⁾ in spite of having come under Tsong-kha-pa's tutelage after the latter's change in convictions. In our personal opinion, it was perhaps the stance of disciples such as Dar-ma-rin-chen that opened up Tsong-kha-pa's originally exclusive school of thought in the direction of compromise, as a result of which it ended up taking in just that much ambiguity as well, but this is not something which we have yet been able to bear out by conclusive evidence. Nor is it of course possible for us to attempt anything so bold here, although we would at least like to consult Dar-ma-rin-chen's commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in regard to the passage discussed above. A cursory reading gives the impression that the difficulties of the most important part have been cleverly evaded. But in this case it would seem advisable to deal with it in as mechanical a fashion as possible.

First, in order to clarify the position that the passage in question holds within Dar-ma-rin-chen's commentary as a whole, we shall present a synopsis of the latter's contents covering the greater part of the work. As regards the pairs of figures given on the right-hand side of the page, the upper figure indicates the page and line in volume *Ga* of the original edition, while the lower figure (closed by a bracket) indicates the page and line of the photographic reprint edition.

<i>rtogs par bya ba'i don rnam pa bdun gtan la dbab pa</i>	27a1
⁴⁰⁾ [Confirmation of the seven kinds of meaning to be realized	389.1]
A 'bras du dkon mchog gsum bshad pa	27a2
[Elucidation of the fruit, namely, the Three Jewels	389.2]
A.I dngos kyi don	27a3
[Real meaning	389.3]
A.I.a spyi'i mtshan sbyar ba	27a3
[General combinatory relationship	389.3]
A.I.b so so'i don bshad pa	27a5
[Elucidation of individual meaning	389.5]
A.I.b.1 sangs rgyas dkon mchog	27a6
[Buddha Jewel (four further subdivisions are omitted)	389.6]
A.I.b.2 chos dkon mchog	35a3
[Dharma Jewel (two further subdivisions are omitted)	405.3]
A.I.b.3 dge 'dun dkon mchog	47a6
[Saṃgha Jewel (two further subdivisions are omitted)	429.6]
A.II skyabs kyi don bshad pa	48b6
[Elucidation of the meaning of refuge	432.6]
A.II.a spyi'i don	49a1
[General meaning	433.1]

A.II.a.1	<i>gang la skyabs su 'gro ba'i yul gyi dbye ba</i>	49a1
	[Differentiation of the objects in which refuge is taken (two further subdivisions are omitted)]	433.1]
A.II.a.2	<i>de la skyabs su song ba'i tshul</i>	49a6
	[Method of taking refuge therein]	433.6]
A.II.a.3	<i>shes byed dgod pa</i>	49b2
	[Establishment of evidence]	437.2]
A.II.b	<i>yan lag gi don</i>	51a6
	[Meaning of the limbs]	437.6]
A.II.b.1	<i>kun rdzob pa'i skyabs rnam par bzhag pa</i>	51b1
	[Definition of conventional refuge (two further subdivisions are omitted)]	438.1]
A.II.b.2	<i>don dam pa'i skyabs rnam par bzhag pa</i>	51b2
	[Definition of supreme refuge (three further subdivisions are omitted)]	438.2]
A.III	<i>dkon mchog gi ming don bshad</i>	58b3
	[Elucidation of the meaning of the term Three Jewels]	452.3]
A.III.a	<i>rtsa ba</i>	58b3
	[Basic meaning]	452.3]
A.III.b	<i>'grel pa</i>	58b6
	[Interpretation]	452.6]
B	<i>de thob byed kyī rgyu rkyen rnam par bzhag pa</i>	59b2
	[Definition of the causes and conditions which bring about the attainment of the fruit, namely, the Three Jewels]	454.2]
B.I	<i>spyi'i rnam par bzhag pa</i>	59b3
	[General definition]	454.3]
B.I.a	<i>spyi'i mtshams sbyar ba</i>	59b3
	[General combinatory relationship]	454.3]
B.I.b	<i>bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i don</i>	59b4
	[Meaning of the inconceivable]	454.4]
B.I.b.1	<i>bstan pa</i>	59b4
	[Instruction]	454.4]
B.I.b.2	<i>bshad pa</i>	59b6
	[Elucidation]	454.6]
B.I.b.2(a)	<i>dri ba</i>	59b6
	[Question]	454.6]
B.I.b.2(b)	<i>lan</i>	60a1
	[Answer]	455.1]
B.I.b.2(b)(1)	<i>bsam gyis mi khyab cing sang rgyas nyag cig gi yul du bstan pa</i>	60a1
	[Instruction that they are inconceivable and the object of only the Buddha]	455.1]
B.I.b.2(b)(1)a'	<i>rtsa ba</i>	60a1

	[Basic meaning	455.1]
B.I.b.2(b)(1)b'	'grel pa	60a4
	[Interpretation	455.4]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)	<i>bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i sgrub byed</i>	61a3
	[Proof of the inconceivable	457.3]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)a'	<i>dri ba</i>	61a3
	[Question	457.3]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b'	<i>lan</i>	61a3
	[Answer	457.3]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'1'	<i>rtsa ba</i>	61a4
	[Basic meaning	457.4]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'2'	'grel pa	61a6
	[Interpretation	457.6]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'2.'a''	<i>dri ma dang bcas pa'i de bzhin nyid rtog par dka' ba</i>	61a6
	[Difficulty of understanding defiled thusness (two further subdivisions are omitted)	457.6]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'2.'b''	<i>dri ma med pa'i de bzhin nyid rtog par dka' ba</i>	62a4
	[Difficulty of understanding undefiled thusness (two further subdivisions are omitted)	459.4]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'2.'c''	<i>dri ma med pa'i yon tan rtog par dka' ba</i>	63b2
	[Difficulty of understanding the undefiled virtues (three further subdivisions are omitted)	461.2]
B.I.b.2(b)(2)b.'2.'d''	<i>rgyal ba'i mdzad pa rtog par dka' ba</i>	66a6
	[Difficulty of understanding the acts of the Victorious One (two further subdivisions are omitted)	467.6]
B.I.c	<i>rgyu rkyen so sor rnam par bzhag pa</i>	67a2
	[Individual definition of causes and conditions	469.2]
B.I.c.1	<i>rtsa ba</i>	67a3
	[Basic meaning	469.3]
B.I.c.2	'grel pa	67b1
	[Interpretation	470.1]
B.I.c.2(a)	<i>rgyu rkyen ngos bzung ba</i>	67b1
	[Confirmation of causes and conditions	470.1]
B.I.c.2(b)	<i>rgyu rkyen du 'gyur ba'i tshul</i>	67b5
	[Method of becoming causes and conditions (four further subdivisions are omitted)	470.5]
B.II	<i>so so'i rnam par bzhag pa = so sor rnam par dbye ba</i>	68b1
	[Individual definition	472.1]
⁴¹ B.II.a	<i>rgyu'i gnas skabs khams de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po bshad pa</i>	68b2

	[Elucidation of <i>tathāgata-garbha</i> , which is <i>dhātu</i> as the stage of the cause	472.2]
B.II.a.1	<i>mtshams sbyar ba</i>	68b2
	[Combinatory relationship (two further subdivisions are omitted)	472.2]
B.II.a.2	<i>don dngos</i>	68b6
	[Real meaning (three further subdivisions are omitted	472.6]
B.II.a.3	<i>le'u mtshan bstan</i>	161a5
	[Instruction on the distinguishing features of the chapter	657.5]
B.II.b	<i>byang chub (la) sogs (pa) gsum bshad pa</i>	161b2–209a2
	[Elucidation of the three (topics) of enlightenment, virtues, and Buddha-deeds	658.2–753.2]

The passage in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* which we have taken up for discussion in the present paper corresponds in the above synopsis of Darma-rin-chen's commentary to B.I.a: "General combinatory relationship". We shall next give a translation of this together with the related sections as far as the "Interpretation" of B.I.b.2(b)(1)a'.

[B.I.a] (In regard to the general combinatory relationship)⁴²⁾ following the instruction on the fruit, namely, the Three Jewels, [there is] verse [23] on the subject of the causes and conditions of that which only⁴³⁾ when it exists (*gang yod na: yasmin saty eva*) is the Three Jewels (*dkon mchog gsum: ratna-traya*) as the source (*skye ba'i gnas: yoni*) of all good accumulation [of merit] (*legs tshogs*) and supramundane purity and is that whence those [Three Jewels] are born.

[B.I.b] In b [meaning of the inconceivable] there are two [sections, namely] 1. instruction (*bstan pa*) and 2. elucidation (*bshad pa*).

[B.I.b.1] In regard to 1 [instruction], it will be explained how the good (*dge ba*) Three Jewels to be attained arise from some causes and conditions comprising the foundation (*gnas*) as the generative principal cause (*nye bar len pa'i rgyu*): *upādāna*[-*kāraṇa*]), which is defiled thusness, and undefiled enlightenment, the undefiled virtues of the Buddha, and the acts of the Victorious One as the coexistent auxiliary conditions (*lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen: sahakāri-pratyaya*).⁴⁴⁾ "Good (*dge ba*)" means "excellent (*bzang po*)". Whose object is this? That which is totally consummate (*ma lus par yongs su rdzogs pa*) is nothing other than the object of the Buddhas who have seen the supreme.

[B.I.b.2] In 2 [elucidation] there are two [sections, namely] (a) question

(*dri ba*) and (b) answer (*lan*).

[B.I.b.2(a)] (a) [question] is “What has been clarified by this verse [24]?”

[B.I.b.2(b)] In (b) [answer] there are two [sections, namely] (1) instruction that it is inconceivable and the object of only the Buddha and (2) proof of the inconceivable.

[B.I.b.2(b)(1)] In (1) there are two [sections, namely] a'. basic meaning (*rtsa ba*) and b'. interpretation (*'grel pa*).

[B.I.b.2(b)(1)a'] a' [basic meaning]: This *gotra* (*rigs*) of the Three Jewels is the object of the direct perception (*mngon sum: pratyakṣa*) of the Buddhas who have seen all totally consummate causes and conditions, and since in the fourfold order on account of the four reasons (*rgyu mtshan*) explained below others [apart from the Buddhas] cannot perfectly conceive of it with direct perception, it is the cognitive field (*spyod yul: gocara*) of the direct perception of only the Buddha. In the previous verse the four causes and conditions were confirmed and it was shown whose object they are, while in this [verse 25] the reason that they are his object is shown.

[B.I.b.2(b)(1)b'] b' [interpretation]: Defiled thusness is that which is described as the *dhātu* not yet liberated from the shell of affliction, as being pure by nature, and on the level of supreme truth as *tathāgata-garbha*. . . .⁴⁵⁾

Undefiled thusness is what is described as the Tathāgata's Dharma-body, which is characterized by that defiled thusness's having, after the exhaustion of all defilement and in the Buddha-stage, been transformed in its base (*gnas yongs su gyur pa: āśraya-parivṛtti*). If it should be said that this is extremely contradictory, since it is being propositionally stated (*khas blangs pa*) that defiled thusness is undefiled thusness, [that] would be a rash view (*bab col*) not fully cognizant of logic. Has it not been said that the base (*gnas: āśraya*) — namely, defiled thusness — which has been totally transformed is the Dharma-body? If that were not so, it would mean that a sentient being is [at once] a Buddha. A sentient being who has exhausted all defilement is a Buddha, and therefore just as it should not be propositionally stated that the *tathāgata-garbha* is the Dharma-body just because it has been propositionally stated that defiled thusness is the *tathāgata-garbha* and that thusness which has become void of all defilement is the Dharma-body, so there is no contradiction whatsoever in propositionally stating that defiled thusness which has exhausted all defilement is the Dharma-body. If it were not

possible for defiled thusness to become void of all defilement, then it would be necessary to propositionally state that it is not possible for a sentient being to become a Buddha and that it is not possible for a white cloth to become red, and this is that other standpoint (*gzhan de'i lugs*)⁴⁶⁾ which is ignorant of how to correctly establish the continuum of the accumulation [of merit] and which ends up proposing an eternal reality (*rtag dngos*).

The undefiled virtues of the Buddha are those qualities of the Buddha, namely, the virtues of disjunction (*bral ba*) and the virtues of maturation, such as the ten supramundane powers, which exist in such a manner that they are dependent upon the Tathāgata's Dharma-body itself, characterized by the defiled mind's having been transformed in its base into the undefiled mind.

The acts of the Victorious One are the unsurpassed thirty-two deeds of each of the Buddha's qualities themselves, such as the ten powers, etc. Because a certain deed abides spontaneously (*lhun grub tu*), it does not become nothing; because the continuum is firm, there is no discontinuation; because it functions without interruption, the continuum does not cease; and therefore there is no cessation in the continuum of accounts of prophecies [of the future enlightenment] of Bodhisattvas.⁴⁷⁾

B.I.a, the section in the above which seems to have touched on the passage in question of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, makes no attempt to expose or clarify the structure of thought intimated by the qualifier "only" in the text of the original, and it even gives the impression of being still more bloated than the original. But some careful thought on the matter would suggest that it may in fact have been Dar-ma-rin-chen's very intention to obscure the true nature of the original in this manner. We have already mentioned that if one interprets the structure of thought intimated by the qualifier "only" honestly and in its original and proper sense, the relationship between the Three Jewels and *gotra* becomes an irreversible relationship not permitting of any interchange of the two terms, and that if in this relationship one were to emphasize that aspect of *gotra* as an eternal and immutable truth, not only would it no longer represent a form of Buddhist faith, but in a typical instance it would be nothing other than the view of "other-emptiness" of the Jo-nang-pa school which was found to be a heterodox teaching. If one wished to escape being branded as such, the most expedient policy would probably be to obscure the relationship between the two. But even though Dar-ma-rin-chen might to this end do his utmost to deny any simple identity of defiled thusness and undefiled thusness in order to avoid lapsing into the "other standpoint (*gzhan de'i lugs*)" of the view of "other-emptiness" of the Jo-nang-pa school, his attempt can hardly be said to have been a complete success.

We shall close this section by quoting and briefly commenting on what Dar-ma-rin-chen himself has to say on the subject of defiled thusness, which he defined in the passage quoted above as “the foundation (*gnas*) as the generative principal cause (*nye bar len pa*['i rgyu]: *upādāna*[-*kāraṇa*])”.⁴⁸⁾

[The generative principal cause] is *dhātu* (*kham*s); since, if the *dhātu* does not become pure by nature, it becomes impossible for defiled thusness there to become purified of adventitious defilement, we have merely posited a base as the generative principal cause such that in regard to enlightenment, if [it] does not exist, [enlightenment] does not arise, and it is not something which generates the generated (*bskyed bya skyed byed*). The *gotra* (*rigs*; here means “lineage”) which has been acquired (*bsgrub pa las gyur pa*: *samudānita*) is also the cause of generation (*bskyed pa*['i rgyu] [of the Three Jewels].

Although it is perhaps possible to say that generally speaking *gotra* signifies both “lineage” and “origin”, we have already pointed out that in the example *ratna-gotra* it must be strictly taken in the latter sense. Furthermore, Dar-ma-rin-chen's ambiguous interpretation quoted here would also seem to open the way to the misunderstanding, exemplified by Dr. Takasaki in his diagram, that the Three Jewels are identical with *ratna-gotra*.

IV

In section II we noted in regard to the interpretation of the compound *ratna-gotra* that *gotra* means only “origin”, wherefore insofar as it is identical with *dhātu* and *tathāgata-garbha*, this compound can be interpreted only as a determinative compound, and that in this respect Dr. Takasaki's diagram must be corrected in part to “*ratna-traya* ← *gotra*”, which in turn comes to bear a close resemblance to the so-called “insignia of the Three Jewels”. In another paper⁴⁹⁾ we have, in addition, pointed out that germinal examples of this are to be found also in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*. On that occasion, however, we consider it to have been most careless of us to have completely overlooked the list of examples of the expression “seed of the Three Jewels (*san-pao-chung* 三寶種: **tri-ratna-gotra*)” which Dr. Takasaki had already gone to the trouble of compiling.⁵⁰⁾ This is a collection of fourteen examples of a formula meaning “not cutting off the seed of the Three Jewels” which Dr. Takasaki had extracted from *sūtras* contained in the *Ta-chi ching*. The fact that there are such a large number of examples would suggest that the tendency to give prominence not directly to the Three Jewels themselves but rather to the “seed (*gotra*)”—i.e., “origin (*gotra*)”—which gives birth to them and serves as their underlying support constituted a major current of thought in the *sūtras* of the middle phase of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. But if, in this tendency to lay stress on the “seed” or origin”, the compound

san-pao-chung (*tri-ratna-gotra*) should have proved to be able to produce only a determinative interpretation, namely, "seed of the Three Jewels (*tri-ratnasya gotram*)", then it may be considered to have clearly added impetus to a depreciation of the Three Jewels, a typical example of which may be said to be represented in the aforecited expression "origin of the Three Jewels (*gotraṃ ratna-trayasya*)", occurring in verse 24 of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in commenting upon verse 23 of the same work. What is more, as has also already been noted, it is in the position of the Three Jewels when greatest importance has been attached to *gotra* alone that the basic nature of the structure of faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is to be found reflected, and although the "faith" of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, in exhibiting such a structure, may be described as a religion of a "faith" embodying a concealed depreciation of the Three Jewels, it should be born in mind that the Sanskrit equivalent of "faith" in this case is not *śraddhā* (faith) but invariably *adhimukti* (recognition).⁵¹⁾

In this sense we do not find ourselves able to refer unqualifiedly to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as a "religion of faith". Nevertheless, following his examination of the structure of "faith" in this work from the three aspects of "reality (*astitva*)", "possibility (*śaktatva*)" and "virtuousness (*guṇavattva*)", Dr. Takasaki offers this conclusion on the subject of "faith" in the Tathāgatagarbha theory centred on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.⁵²⁾

It is said that this structure, in which the object of faith (the absolute) and the subject of faith (person) are coessential, constitutes a distinctive feature of Buddhism when compared with monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam. The most well-defined exposition of this structure is the Tathāgatagarbha theory, and it was at the same time also a "religion of faith" emphasizing absolute faith in the Buddha, who is endowed with great wisdom and great compassion.

This explanation would unqualifiedly describe the thought based on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as a "religion of faith", and it therefore runs directly counter to our conclusion. For us it is in the first place extremely questionable whether, in a relationship between the object and subject of faith in which both are held to be coessential, the former can in fact be referred to as "the absolute". But setting this point aside for the time being, let us consider what Dr. Takasaki has to say on the subject of "absolute faith".⁵³⁾

In the case of the Tathāgatagarbha theory, too, the culmination of faith lay in the Buddha. When the Tathāgatagarbha theory, namely, "the existence of Buddha-nature", is to be apprehended only through faith, this faith is nothing other than faith in the Buddha.

However, we would suggest that some dispassionate thought be given to the question of just why believing in "the existence of Buddha-nature" should represent "nothing other than faith in the Buddha". The present writer, for one, is quite unable to fathom the reason that this should be so. As has been remarked elsewhere by Dr. Takasaki,⁵⁴⁾ the Sanskrit equivalent of what is here referred to as "Buddha-nature" is *buddha-dhātu* or *buddha-gotra*, and this too represents a determinative compound in which the emphasis lies primarily on *dhātu* or *gotra*. Hence it can hardly be claimed that faith in the "reality" of "Buddha-nature (i.e., the ground of Buddhas, or the origin of Buddhas)", in which only the "eternal truth", unrelated to the presence or absence of any Buddha, is of importance, represents "nothing other than faith in the Buddha". On the contrary, we believe that it is even possible to consider that this current of thought, depreciative of the Buddha, was reflected in the Three Jewels, the expression of Buddhist faith; that this manifested itself in the addition of the word "seed (*gotra*)" in works ranging from the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Ta-chi ching* up to the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and that it developed into an anti-Buddhist current which, although making a show of "faith", in actual fact went on to assume a "faithlessness" while adhering to the "recognition (*adhimukti*)" of facts.

In this manner, what might be described as an eviscerated "religion of faith" was brought to completion in the period between the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Ratnagotravibhāga*. But it was the *Ta-ch'êng ch'i-hsin lun* 大乘起信論 which brought this "religion of faith" to its sudden and finest flowering in China. Dr. Takasaki writes that "as far as the structure of its faith is concerned, the views of the *Ch'i-hsin lun* follow the traditions of the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha theories,"⁵⁵⁾ but we would suggest that, rather than "followed", they may even be deemed to have "shamelessly stretched the limits" of these Indian traditions. This is because, in its explanation of the "mind of faith", the *Ch'i-hsin lun* makes so bold as to specify first and foremost "thusness" as the fundamental object of faith, taking precedence over the succeeding Three Jewels.⁵⁶⁾ In addition, recent studies on the *Ch'i-hsin lun*⁵⁷⁾ indicate that the term "faith (*hsin* 信)" in this treatise corresponds to the Sanskrit *adhimukti*, and this fact should also be taken into due account when exposing the true nature of this sham "religion of faith" which had rejected *śraddhā*.

* This paper is in essence identical with my Japanese paper which appeared under the same title in *Bukkyō shisōshi ronshū* 佛教思想史論集 (Studies in the history of Buddhist thought; Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Kiyō 成田山佛教研究所紀要 [Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies], No. 11, March 1988) I, pp. 491-532. I myself am quite incapable of writing in English on a subject such as that dealt with here, and so I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Yamaguchi Zuihō for having proposed that the above Japanese paper be published in these *Memoirs* and for having recommended R. W. Giebel as translator. In spite of my own incompetence, when it comes to the written

word I find myself reluctant to place my trust in others. Nevertheless, I make an exception in the case of the present translator, with whose conversancy in both English and Japanese I have become personally familiar through his written papers and translation work. It was for such a reason that I decided to have the above paper published in English, and I wish to tender my heartfelt thanks to Mr. Giebel for having spent precious time on my account. It should also be remarked that, for reasons of space, considerable parts of sections I and IV of the original Japanese were deleted and rewritten in preparing this English version, and although some fresh views were added, I would still recommend that the reader refer to the original Japanese in regard to matters of detail. (August 16, 1988)

Notes

- 1) Ф. М. ДОСТОЕВСКИЙ ПОЛНОЕ СОБРАНИЕ СОЧИНЕНИЙ В ТРИДЦАТИ ТОМАХ, ТОМ 28-1, ПИСЬМА 1832-1859 (НАУКА, ЛЕНИНГРАД, 1985), p. 176, 90. Н. Д. ФОНВИЗИНОЙ, Конец января—20-е числа февраля 1854. Омск.
- 2) Ernesto Grassi, "Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy?: Meditations on the *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione*", in G. Tagliacozzo and H. V. White (eds.), *Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 39-50.
- 3) As will become clear below, one of the aims of the present paper is to clearly distinguish between *śraddhā* and *adhimukti* and to suggest that the former be preferred in the sense of correct "faith". In the present context, however, we wish it to be understood that the word "faith" is being provisionally used in the sense of a word embracing both these terms.
- 4) Cf. Grassi, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 42, 45. The "art of discovery" and the "art of judgement" may be regarded as corresponding in the history of Indian thought to "direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)" and "inference (*anumāna*)" respectively.
- 5) Max Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984 [siebente Auflage], pp. 25, 11. 7-8.
- 6) *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
- 7) Martin Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (mit einem Brief über den Humanismus) (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954 [zweite Auflage], pp. 5-52.
- 8) See, for example, Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治, *Shūkyōto wa nani ka—Shūkyō ronshū* I 宗教とは何か—宗教論集 I (What is religion?: Studies in religion I; Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社, 1961), pp. 216-219, and Tamaki Kōshirō 玉城康四郎, "Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kongentai" 佛教における法の根源態 (The fundamental nature of *dharma* in Buddhism), in *Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kenkyū* 佛教における法の研究 (Felicitation volume in honour of Dr. Hirakawa Akira on his 60th birthday: Studies on Dharma in Buddhism; Tokyo: Shunjūsha 春秋社, 1975), pp. 48-57. There is also the following collection of studies by both Eastern and Western scholars extolling the philosophy of "*to hen panta*" underlying the "unconcealed truth": D. Henrich (ed.), *All-Einheit: Wege eines Gedankens in Ost und West*, Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung, Bd. 14 (Leinen, 1985).
- 9) 眞謂眞實，顯非虛妄。如謂如常，表無變易。謂此眞實，於一切位，常如其性，故曰眞如。既是湛然，不虛妄義。(Taishō XXXI, p. 48a). For a French translation see La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi*, p. 560, and for an English translation see Wei Tat, *Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun*, p. 659.
- 10) See L. Schmithausen, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīśayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācāra-bhūmiḥ* (Wien: Hermann Böhlau Nachf., 1969), p. 105.
- 11) On *adhimukti*, see L. Schmithausen's book review of *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 132-2 (1982), pp. 408-409, and Yoshimura Hiromi 芳村博美, "Shinge

- (Adhimukti) no taishō to naru Butsuda (Buddha)” 信解 (Adhimukti) の対象となる佛陀 (Buddha) (Buddhas as objects of *adhimukti*), in *Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nenpō* 日本佛教學會年報, No. 53 (March 1988), pp. 51–66. In view of the fact that in contrast to *śraddhā*, which seeks to select intellectually only that which is true, *adhimukti* has the strong implication of accepting all things on a variety of levels, we translate this latter term as “recognition”; see Hakamaya, “Nyoraizōsetsu to Yuishikisetsu ni okeru shin no kōzō” 如來藏説と唯識説における信の構造 (The structure of faith in the Tathāgatagarbha theory and Yogācāra theory), in *Shin* (Bukkyō shisō 11) 信 (佛教思想 11) (Faith [Buddhist thought 11]; Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten 平樂寺書店, forthcoming).
- 12) Cf. M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 1095, col. 3, *śrat* or *śrad*, and *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford), p. 479, cols. 2–3, *credo*, p. 605, col. 1, *-do*.
 - 13) Taken from Odaka Kunio's 尾高邦雄 note on his Japanese translation of *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, p. 80.
 - 14) Cf. Minoru Hara, “Note on Two Sanskrit Religious Terms: *Bhakti* and *śraddhā*”, *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2/3 (1964), pp. 124–145.
 - 15) Peking ed., Vol. 152, No. 6001, Kha 1b4–2a3. For an English translation see A. Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 174.
 - 16) E. H. Johnston (ed.), *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), p. 1, 11. 2–5. Takasaki excludes the first three verses, including this verse, from his enumeration of the *kārikās*; see Jikido Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)* (Roma: IsMEO, 1966), p. 12.
 - 17) That this verse plays a considerably important role in the change of topic from the Three Jewels to *dhātu* is also suggested by the fact that it reappears at the start of chapter 5 (“All Sentient Beings Possess the *tathāgata-garbha*” 一切衆生有如來藏) in the Chinese translation; see Nakamura Zuiryū 中村瑞隆, *Bon-Kan taishō Kugyōichijōhōshōron kenkyū* 梵漢對照究竟一乘實性論研究 (Studies on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*: Comparison of the Sanskrit and Chinese; Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin 山喜房佛書林, 1961), p. 50, and Taishō XXXI, p. 828a. The later commentary by Vairocanarakṣita has “*ratna-traya-nirdeśānantaram ity-ādina dhātur ucyate/samalēty-ādi-jina-kriyēty-antena catur-vidham gocaram uktam*” (Nakamura Zuiryū, “*Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra-ṭīppaṇī* by Vairocanarakṣita”, in *Bukkyō shisō no shomondai* 佛教思想の諸問題 [Felicitation volume in honour of Dr. Hirakawa Akira on his 70th birthday: Problems in Buddhist thought; Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1985], p. 838), thereby clearly testifying to the change in topic from the Three Jewels to *dhātu*/*gotra*.
 - 18) Johnston, *op. cit.* (n. 16), p. 21, 11. 1–4.
 - 19) Nakamura Zuiryū, *Zō-Wa taiyaku Kugyōichijōhōshōron kenkyū* 藏和對譯究竟一乘實性論研究 (Studies on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*: Tibetan version faced by Japanese translation; Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan 鈴木學術財團, 1967), p. 39, 11. 5–8; Derge ed., No. 4025 (photographic reprint: Sems tsam 1), Phi, 85a6–7.
 - 20) E. Obermiller, “The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation”, *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. 9 (1931), pp. 148–149.
 - 21) Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽, *Hōshōron kenkyū* 實性論研究 (A Study of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1959 [repr.], p. 512. “23/7” indicates that verse 23 represents *kārikā* 7.
 - 22) Takasaki, *op. cit.* (n. 16), p. 187. Since, as was noted in n. 16, Takasaki excludes the first three verses from his enumeration of the *kārikās*, he here amends Ui's view (see n. 21) and counts this verse as *kārikā* 4.
 - 23) Nakamura, *op. cit.* (n. 19), p. 40.
 - 24) See Hakamaya, “*Yuimagyō hihan*” 『維摩經』批判 (A criticism of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*), *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (December 1987), pp. 10–16.
 - 25) In Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗, “*Yuishikiha no ichijō shisō ni tsuite*” 唯識派の一乘思想

- について (The One-Vehicle thought of the Yogācāra school), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū* 駒澤大學佛教學部論集, No. 13 (October 1982), pp. 307–308 and p. 291, n. 18, the writer proposes that *dhātu* be understood in the sense of *locus* and translated accordingly, thus questioning the aptness of conventional translations such as “essence” and “essential nature”. As for the rendering “element(s)”, examples such as “water is the element of fish” permit an interpretation in the sense of *locus*, but in view of the fact that “element(s)” usually signifies “constituent factors” in the plural, it is still a questionable translation.
- 26) See Matsumoto Shirō, “Chandorakīrti no ronrigaku” チャンドラキールティの論理學 (The logic of Candrakīrti), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Kenkyū Kiyō* 駒澤大學佛教學部研究紀要, No. 43 (March 1985), p. 200.
 - 27) See Matsumoto, *op. cit.* (n. 26), pp. 200–178 and p. 169, sup. nn. 1, 2; also *id.*, “Jñānagarbha no ‘sezokufushōron’ hihan ni tsuite” Jñānagarbha の「世俗不生論」批判について (On Jñānagarbha’s criticism of the “theory of the non-arising of the conventional”), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 15 (October 1984), pp. 386–385, sup. n. 1. A continuing awareness of this problem may be said to be also evident in Matsumoto’s subsequent papers.
 - 28) In addition to Matsumoto’s paper given in n. 25, see in particular *id.*, “Shōmangyō no ichijō shisō ni tsuite” 『勝鬘經』の一乘思想について (The One-Vehicle thought of the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Kenkyū Kiyō*, No. 41 (March 1983), pp. 416–389, in which the term *dhātu-vāda* is used for probably the first time.
 - 29) Johnston, *op. cit.* (n. 16), p. 21, l. 6.
 - 30) Although at the present stage a matter of pure conjecture, we believe that in the case of the “lineages” of the three vehicles, namely, *bodhisattva-gotra*, *pratyekabuddha-gotra*, and *śrāvaka-gotra*, not simply an appositional interpretation (which could in fact be erroneous), but also a strongly monistic determinative interpretation, such that the *bodhisattva*, *pratyekabuddha*, and *śrāvaka* arise from a single *gotra*, could perhaps have been possible.
 - 31) Cf. Matsumoto, *op. cit.* (n. 28), p. 390, n. 23. In his “Nyoraizō shisō wa Bukkyō ni arazu” 如來藏思想は佛教にあらず (Tathāgatarbha thought is not Buddhism), *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (December 1986), p. 373, n. 11 (omitted for want of space but supplied on request), Matsumoto has “*gotra* · [*bodhi*-] *hetu* ≠ *dhātu* · *garbha*”, thus clearly differentiating between the two terms, but in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* itself, especially in this passage, it should be noted that the relationship between the two is “*gotra* = *dhātu*”.
 - 32) Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道, *Busshō to wa nani ka* 佛性とは何か (What is Buddha-nature?; Kyoto: Hōzōkan 法藏館, 1985), p. 164; cf. *id.*, *Nyoraizō shisō no keisei* 如來藏思想の形成 (The formation of Tathāgatarbha thought; Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1974), pp. 11, 19, 723.
 - 33) Takasaki, *Busshō to wa nani ka* (see n. 32), p. 169.
 - 34) See Hakamaya, “Hihan to shite no gakumon” 批判としての學問 (Scholarship as criticism), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 18 (October 1987), pp. 424–425; see also diagram and accompanying note of *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 24), p. 14.
 - 35) Johnston, *op. cit.* (n. 16), p. 73, ll. 9–16; cf. Ui, *op. cit.* (n. 21), pp. 585–586. Here it is stated that “the Dharma-nature of [all] *dharma*s (*dharmāṇām dharmatā*)” is “to be recognized (*adhimoktavya*)”. Since the derivation of this verb *adhi-muc* is quite different from that of *śrad-dhā*, remarked on in n. 13, we understand it in the sense of “recognize”; see n. 11.
 - 36) See Dōgen 道元, 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* 正法眼藏 7: “Jinshin-inga” 深信因果 (*Collected Works* [ed. by Ōkubo Dōshū 大久保道舟], Vol. I, p. 680).
 - 37) See D. S. Ruegg, “The Jo naṅ pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists according to the *Grub mtha’ kel gyi me loṅ*”, *JAOS*, Vol. 83 (1963), pp. 73–91; *id.*, *Le traité du tathāgatarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris: École Française de l’Extrême-Orient, 1973); and Yamaguchi Zuihō 山口瑞鳳, “Chonanpa no Nyoraizōsetsu to sono hihansetsu” チョ

- ナンパの如來藏説とその批判説 (The Tathāgatarbha theory of the Jo-nang-pas and criticism thereof), in *Bukkyō kyōri no kenkyū* 佛教教理の研究 (Felicitation volume in honour of Dr. Tamura Yoshirō on his 60th birthday: Studies on Buddhist doctrine; Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1982), pp. 585–605.
- 38) See Hakamaya, “Chibetto ni okeru Maitorēya no gohō no kiseki” チベットにおけるマイトレヤの五法の軌跡 (Vestiges of the five teachings of Maitreya in Tibet), in Yamaguchi Zuihō (ed.), *Chibetto no Bukkyō to shakai* チベットの佛教と社會 (Buddhism and society in Tibet; Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1986), pp. 235–268.
- 39) *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tika*, Tōhoku Catalogue (Tibetan Works), No. 5434; a photographic reproduction of a handwritten copy of the Bkra-shis-lhun-po edition is now available in *The Collected Works (gSun 'bum) of rGyal-tshab rje Dar-ma-rin-chen*, Vol. 3, pp. 337–772. A study with translation based on this work is to be found in Ogawa Ichijō 小川一乗, *Nyoraijō • busshō no kenkyū — Darumarinchen-zō Hōshōron-shakusho no kaidoku* 如來藏・佛性の研究—ダルマリンチェン造寶性論釋疏の解讀 (Studies on the Tathāgatarbha theory and Buddha-nature: A reading of Dar-ma-rin-chen's commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; Kyoto: Bun'eidō Shoten 文榮堂書店, 1969).
- 40) This “seven kinds of meaning to be realized” constitutes the first of the two sections of the “detailed elucidation of the limbs (*yan lag rgyas par bshad pa*)” given on p. 389, l. 1, while the “detailed elucidation of the limbs” represents the second of the two sections of the “establishment of the elucidation (*bshad pa nye bar dgod pa*)” (the first section being “definition of the subject matter [*lus rnam par bzhag pa*]”) given on p. 345, l. 5.
- 41) These following sections are dealt with in Ogawa, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 93 ff. The synopsis of the succeeding sections is given in the same work on interleaves between pp. 94–95 and pp. 112–113, and for details reference should be made thereto.
- 42) The Tibetan text of this paragraph is as follows: *bras bu dkon mchog gsum bstan pa'i rjes thogs la/ gang yod na 'jig rten pa'i legs tshogs thams cad dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i rnam par dag pa skye ba'i gnas dkon mchog gsum yin la de skye bar 'gyur ba'i rgyu rkyen de'i dbang du byas nas tshigs su bcad pa/*. If compared with the Tibetan text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* quoted above (marked by n. 19), it should become clear that this commentary is little more than a rephrasing of the corresponding passage in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.
- 43) Although the addition of “only” is not possible on the basis of the Tibetan text alone, it has been added here for the sake of consistency with our translation from the Sanskrit. But if one were to take into account Dar-ma-rin-chen's probable intent, it would perhaps be advisable not to add any such precise qualifier as “only”.
- 44) The original Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents of the terms translated here as “generative principal cause” and “coexistent auxiliary condition” appear as a pair in the *Mahāvīryūtpatti*, nos. 4491 and 4492 respectively. We are not fully familiar with the general definitions of these terms, but in the present context it is important to note that, among the last four of the “seven adamant terms” (excluding the Three Jewels), defiled thushness is equated with the “generative principal cause” while the remaining undefiled thushness, Buddha's virtues free of defilement, and acts of the Victorious One are identified with the “coexistent auxiliary conditions”. On “generative principal cause” see also n. 48 below.
- 45) The Tibetan text of the omitted section is as follows: *dag pa gnyis ldan la de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo dang de'i dgongs 'grel gyi bstan bcos 'di rtsa 'grel las/ de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i dngos ming gis bstan pa cung zad tsam yang med pas mthar thug gi chos sku de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying por byed pa ni/ rang dgar rnam gzhas byed na ma gtogs bstan bcos 'di rtsa 'grel gyi lugs su mi bya'o/| mdo gzhan las de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po dri mas rnam par dag pa chos kyi skur gsungs pa shes byed du byed pa ni/ rang nyid rigs pa mi shes pa'i rnam 'gyur du go bar byed pa'o/|*. Although not properly speaking an omissible passage, we beg the reader's indulgence in having omitted it on account of the fact that its contents are not directly related to the

purport of the present paper and, more importantly, that we are unable to clearly comprehend the parts underscored.

- 46) "The other standpoint" may be considered to refer to the Jo-nang-pa school mentioned at the start of section III of this paper.
- 47) There follows the sentence "*de ni mtshon pa tsam mo// gnas bzhi po 'di dag kyang shes so//* (It is only indicated, and it means 'these four topics [*gnas: sthāna*] also')," which we also omit. "*gnas bzhi po 'di dag kyang*" probably refers to the passage in Nakamura, *op. cit.* (n. 19), p. 39, l. 18, but the import of this sentence too is unclear to us.
- 48) Dar-ma-rin-chen, *op. cit.* (n. 39), 6a3-5 (347. 3-5). See also Ogawa, *op. cit.* (n. 39), pp. 39-40.
- 49) See Hakamaya, *op. cit.* (n. 24).
- 50) See Takasaki, *Nyoraizō shisō no keisei* (see n. 32), p. 741, n. 69.
- 51) The term *śraddhā* does not appear in the text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, except in two quotations, and it is only *adhimukti* which is used in this work; see Hakamaya, *op. cit.* (n. 11).
- 52) Takasaki Jikidō, "Nyoraizōsetsu ni okeru shin no kōzō" 如來藏説における信の構造 (The structure of faith in the Tathāgatagarbha theory), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Kenkyū Kiyō*, No. 22 (March 1964), pp. 107-108.
- 53) *Ibid.*, p. 107.
- 54) See, for example, Takasaki, *Nyoraizō shisō no keisei* (see n. 32), p. 11.
- 55) Takasaki, *op. cit.* (n. 52), p. 109, n. 8.
- 56) See Taishō XXXII, p. 581c; see also Hakamaya, "Yuimagyō hihan shiryō" 『維摩經』批判資料 (Notes on "A criticism of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*"), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 46 (March 1988), pp. 296-292.
- 57) See Takemura Makio 竹村牧男, "*Daijōkishinron no shin ni tsuite—Shinge daijō no tenkai*" 『大乘起信論』の信について—信解大乘の展開 (Faith in the *Ta-ch'êng ch'i-hsin lun*: The development of a Mahāyāna of *adhimukti*), in *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū* インド學佛教學論集 (Felicitation volume in honour of Dr. Takasaki Jikidō on his 60th birthday: Studies in Indology and Buddhology; Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1987), pp. 545-559. But it should be pointed out here that whereas Takemura sets high value on *adhimukti*, our estimation of this term is quite the opposite.

