

# The Formation of Chinese Buddhism and “Matching the Meaning” (*geyi* 格義)

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## I. The Points at Issue

It is to be assumed that there were two stages in the introduction of Buddhism to China and in its comprehension and acceptance by the Chinese. The first was the translation into Chinese of Buddhist scriptures written in Indic or Central Asian languages, while the second was the process of understanding Buddhism by means of these Buddhist scriptures translated into Chinese. In both of these stages an enormous influence was exerted by China's indigenous thought, especially the philosophy of Daoism. In other words, when considered from a philosophical perspective, the foundations for the acceptance of Buddhism in China may be deemed to have been provided by Daoist philosophy, which I characterize as the “philosophy of *dao-li* 道·理.” This comprehension and acceptance of Indian Buddhism by the Chinese through the medium of China's indigenous thought is generally termed *geyi* 格義, or “matching the meaning,” with this type of Buddhism being known as “*geyi*-based Buddhism,” and Daoist philosophy again played a decisive role in this *geyi*.

However, in past research the philosophical characteristics of Daoist philosophy have not been adequately elucidated, nor have the differences between it and Buddhism (in particular, the doctrine of dependent arising) been recognized. In addition, *geyi* has been understood as a phenomenon to be observed only from the time of the introduction of Buddhism to China up until the Wei 魏 and Jin 晉 periods.


In the present article, therefore, I shall first ascertain the characteristics of Daoist thought, or the philosophy of *dao-li*, and the characteristics of Buddhist thought. Secondly, I propose to examine the merits of previous views of *geyi* and to consider the question of the relationship between the formation of Chinese Buddhism and *geyi*.

## II. Buddhism and the Philosophy of *Dao-Li*

Today Buddhism encompasses a wide range of different types of thought, and it is important to clarify what we mean by Buddhism. Depending on our understanding of what is meant by Buddhism, there will be differences in our

research stances, and our evaluation of the various ways in which Buddhism developed will also differ.

I take the view that, philosophically speaking, the basis of Śākyamuni's teachings is to be found in the doctrine of "dependent arising" (*pratītya-samutpāda*). That is to say, I consider, when viewed in purely logical terms, that in contrast to Brahmanism, which posits a sole existent such as *ātman* or *brahman*, the Buddhism of Śākyamuni put forward the doctrine of dependent arising, clearly advocating "impermanence" and "no-self" (*anātman*), and negated India's indigenous realism (*ātma-vāda*), and this I essentially regard as orthodox Buddhism. My understanding of the doctrine of dependent arising follows the interpretation given by Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 on the basis of the "twelvefold chain of dependent arising."<sup>1)</sup> In delineating the philosophical characteristics of the doctrine of dependent arising, Matsumoto describes it as a philosophy that does not posit any ultimate source or ground and as a world view that is thoroughly dynamic and marked by irreversible temporal progression.<sup>2)</sup> Doctrines such as the *ātma-vāda* of orthodox Brahmanism, on the other hand, which recognize a sole existent representing the ultimate source underpinning everything else, he tentatively terms *dhātu-vāda*, and he points out that this also coincides with the philosophical structure of Buddhist Tathāgatagarbha and "original enlightenment" (*benjue/hongaku* 本覺) thought and Chinese Lao-Zhuang 老莊 thought. Matsumoto illustrates the structure of *dhātu-vāda* by means of the following diagram.<sup>3)</sup>



This diagram is explained by Matsumoto in the following manner:


As is clear from the diagram, everything is divided into the "locus" (L) below and the "super-locus" (S) above, and the structural characteristics of *dhātu-vāda* are as follows:

1. L is the base (locus) of S.
2. Therefore L produces S (or is the cause of S).
3. L is single and S is multiple.
4. L is existent and S is nonexistent.
5. L is the essence (*ātman*) of S.
6. S is nonexistent, but because it is produced by L and because it has L as its essence, it has a certain degree of existency or a ground for its existency.

Next, let us consider the characteristic features of Lao-Zhuang thought, or Daoist philosophy, the philosophical structure of which tallies with that of the above *dhātu-vāda*. On a previous occasion I tentatively characterized Daoist philosophy as the “philosophy of *dao-li*” and elucidated its distinctive features through an examination of works such as the *Laozi* 老子, *Zhuangzi* 莊子, *Yijing* 易經 and its commentaries, and *Hanfeizi* 韓非子.<sup>4)</sup> Here I shall therefore present only my conclusions. Firstly, it is clear that the *Laozi* expounds the metaphysics of the Way (*dao* 道), thereby establishing the philosophy of *dao*. The characteristics of this *dao* may be listed as follows:

1. It is eternal and immutable.
2. It is nameless (or ineffable), absolute and infinite.
3. It is the sole existent, constituting the ultimate source of everything else.
4. It represents a generative principle.

These characteristics are illustrated in the following diagram.



The philosophy of *dao* may be further summarized in the following terms. Firstly, the principles of *dao* are fully explained in the *Laozi*. Secondly, the *Laozi* also describes the essential identity of *dao* with everything else and explains the *modi vivendi* of the sage and human beings in general. In a word, it urges people to become free from desire and return to the *dao*, while the sage should observe the *dao* and conduct the affairs of state by means of non-action in accordance with the *dao*. Thirdly, the thought of the *Laozi* definitely constitutes a form of naturalism, and it clearly negates the humanism, traditionalism, culturalism and intellectualism of the Confucianists. What is more, naturalism may be considered to be more indigenous than humanism. This means that the philosophy of *dao* represents a philosophical formulation of indigenous thought and aims at a return to this indigenous thought. A similar example in Indian thought may be found in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, while in the case of Buddhism Tathāgatagarbha thought represents a typical example of a return to indigenous thought.

Next, the term *li* 理 (“principle”) was initially used to explain the basis of the Confucianist order based on “rites and music” (*liyue* 禮樂), but it gradually attracted the attention of Daoists too, and although grounded in the *dao*, it came

to be used as a concept similar in connotation to *dao*. During the Wei-Jin period, in particular, proponents of the current of thought known as *xuanxue* 玄學 (“Dark/Mysterious Learning”) undertook the logical and philosophical formulation of *li*, which was then adopted by Buddhists and applied to the interpretation of Buddhist scriptures in an attempt to facilitate the acceptance of Buddhism in China and its Sinification. Taking cognizance of the fact that this extended to the *lixue* 理學 of the Song 宋 dynasty, I have termed this current of Daoist thought the “philosophy of *dao-li*.”

It will now be evident that the doctrine of dependent arising, representing the basis of Buddhist thought, and the *ātma-vāda* (or *dhātu-vāda*) of orthodox Brahmanism are two antithetical forms of thought and that the Chinese philosophy of *dao-li* has the same philosophical structure as the *ātma-vāda* that stands opposed to Buddhism. Therefore, *geyi*-based Buddhism, which has its basis in a Chinese brand of realism, *viz.* the philosophy of *dao-li*, represented an attempt to interpret Buddhism by means of a form of thought diametrically opposed to Indian Buddhism, and it led to the distortion of Buddhism. In the following section I wish to consider previous views of *geyi* from such a perspective.

### III. Previous Interpretations of *Geyi*

There are two main points at issue in previous considerations of *geyi*. The first concerns the validity of the view that an attempt was made to break free of the practice of *geyi* from around the time of Shi Daoan 釋道安 (312–385) or Kumārajīva (*ca.* 350–409). In previous research it has not necessarily been clear what exactly is meant by the eradication of or breakaway from *geyi*. This is a question pertaining to the definition of *geyi*, and it also relates to one’s understanding of Chinese Buddhism. Therefore, I shall first examine previous definitions of *geyi* and then consider on the basis of concrete examples taken from Daoan and others whether or not the practice of *geyi* was actually abandoned around the time in question. The second point at issue concerns the view that would endorse the acceptance of Buddhism in China through the medium of *geyi* on the grounds that it was necessary for the propagation and dissemination of Buddhism. Whether or not this was really so should become clear during the course of our examination of the first point.

Up until now scholars of Chinese Buddhism, including myself, have equated the formation of a type of Buddhism adapted by the Chinese to the thought and culture of China with the establishment of so-called Chinese Buddhism, and notwithstanding it had become a form of Buddhism totally different in nature from Indian Buddhism, they have endorsed and championed it. It is to be surmised that one reason for this, at least in the case of Japanese scholars, has been that researchers of Chinese Buddhism, especially those who are also Buddhists, have been constrained by the sectarian divisions of Japanese Buddhism, which have their basis in Chinese Buddhism. Underlying this is the

long history of Buddhist research in Japan, where it has been conducted under the influence of Chinese Buddhism and has implicitly recognized as Buddhism anything with a Buddhist label. This tendency has cast a long shadow not only over researchers of Chinese Buddhism but also over researchers of Indian Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism and even researchers of Chinese thought and philosophy. It could thus perhaps be said that the chief defect of previous studies in Chinese Buddhism has been that researchers have been conducting their research without clarifying or questioning what exactly is meant by “Buddhism.” It is therefore difficult, I believe, for any research on Chinese Buddhism that lacks this right and proper perception and correct understanding of Buddhism, even research undertaken from the standpoint of Chinese philosophy or intellectual history, to achieve an impartial understanding of Chinese Buddhism.

Hitherto many scholars have alluded to and expressed their opinion on *geyi*. Here I shall broadly divide these into Chinese researchers, Japanese researchers of Buddhism, and Japanese researchers of Chinese philosophy and thought, and I wish to consider the opinions of leading scholars in each of these three categories and then present my own view.

I shall first take up for consideration the views of Chinese scholars. Among previous discussions of *geyi*, that which has been the most thorough in its presentation of historical sources is probably that by Chen Yinke 陳寅恪.<sup>5)</sup> With regard to the interpretation of the term *geyi*, he quotes the following passage from the biography of Zhu Faya 竺法雅 in the *Gaoseng zhuan* 高僧傳 4, stating that this represents an accurate interpretation of *geyi*.

時依雅門徒，竝世典有功，未善佛理。雅乃與康法朗等，以經中事數擬配外書，爲生解之例，謂之格義。及毘浮曇相等，亦辯格義以訓門徒。雅風采灑落，善於樞機，外典佛經遞互講說，與道安法汰每披積湊疑，共盡經要。(Taishō 50: 347a)

At this time [Fa] ya's disciples were all well-versed in the secular canons, but were not yet familiar with the principles of Buddhism, and so [Fa] ya, together with Kang Falang and others, took the numerical categories of the *sūtras* and matched them with non-Buddhist writings so as to establish examples that would engender understanding; this was called “matching the meaning.” In addition, Pifu, Tanxiang and others also explained matching the meaning and thereby instructed their disciples. [Fa] ya was uninhibited in mien and familiar with those in positions of power. He alternately explained non-Buddhist canons and Buddhist *sūtras*. Together with Daoan and Fatai he would explain the doubtful points that they had collected, and together they exhausted the essential purport of the *sūtras*.

This passage has been invariably cited in the past, and it has exerted a decisive influence on the interpretation of *geyi*. Chen Yinke notes that the meaning of *shu* 數 in the phrase *jingzhong shishu* 經中事數 (“the numerical categories of the *sūtras*”) is difficult to grasp, but he quotes the following passage from the commentary by

Liu Xiaobiao 劉孝標 on the *Shishuo xinyu* 世說新語, “Wenxue pian” 文學篇:

事數謂若五陰, 十二入, 四諦, 十二因緣, 五根, 五力, 七覺支屬。

*Shishu* 事數 refers to the like of the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields, four truths, twelfold chain of dependent arising, five faculties, five powers, and seven limbs of enlightenment.

Chen accepts this interpretation and then seeks out examples of this matching of numerical categories in the sources listed in note 5. The five precepts of Buddhism, for example, were equated with the five cardinal virtues, five elements and five classics of Confucianism, while the three refuges of Buddhism were equated with the three objects of awe in Confucianism. It is probably true that some of the numerical categories of Buddhism would have been explained by relating them to concepts appearing in Chinese classics. There are, however, no examples of this having been done with regard to the five aggregates and other numerical groups listed by Liu Xiaobiao. Therefore, there is no need to restrict the meaning of *shishu* to doctrinal numerical categories. Chen also takes this point into account and interprets *geyi* in a broad sense, citing the examples of Huiyuan 慧遠 (334–416), who quoted from the *Zhuangzi* when lecturing on the meaning of reality (*shixiang* 實相), and Sun Chuo 孫綽 (ca. 311–368), who contrasted the Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove with seven monks from India. With regard to Zhi Mindu’s theory of the nonexistence of the mind, the main focus of his article, Chen maintains that it is consistent with the purport of the *Laozi* and *Xici* 繫辭, a commentary on the *Yijing*, and concludes that it does not conform with the emptiness of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. It is also worth noting that Chen does not restrict the practice of *geyi* to the Wei-Jin period, but extends its parameters to later times and considers the *lixue* of Confucianists from the Northern Song onwards, influenced by Buddhism, to belong to the current of *geyi*, as well as regarding as variations of *geyi* examples of the amalgamation of the three religions of Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism and other forms of syncretism appearing in Buddhist writings, such as the thought of Zongmi 宗密 (780–841).

Next, Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, in Chapter 9 (“Shi Daoan shidai zhi banruo xue” 釋道安時代之般若學 [The study of *prajñā* at the time of Shi Daoan]) in the first volume of his study of the history of Buddhism from the Han 漢 dynasty to the Northern and Southern dynasties,<sup>6)</sup> refers to *geyi* under the heading “Zhu Faya’s *geyi*” and defines it in the following terms:

What is *geyi*? Ge 格 is “quantity.” It is a method for facilitating a person’s understanding of Buddhist works by matching and combining them with Chinese thought.

This view may be regarded as basically sound. However, Tang attaches special importance to the fact that Daoan pointed out the errors of *geyi* and

Sengrui 僧叡 considered *geyi* to be circuitous and to run counter to the principles of Buddhism,<sup>7)</sup> and he regards *geyi* as a method for understanding Buddhism that was used only up until the time of Daoan. At the same time, he recognizes that the aim of *geyi* was from the outset to blend Chinese thought with the foreign ideas of Buddhism, and he states that even the Buddhist theories of Daoan, who was opposed to the practice of *geyi*, were fused with Lao-Zhuang thought.<sup>8)</sup> If that was so, then his grounds for maintaining that the practice of *geyi* was abandoned from the time of Daoan and Kumārajīva are inadequate.

Ren Jiyu 任繼愈 also makes mention of “Zhu Faya and *geyi*” in his history of Chinese Buddhism.<sup>9)</sup> Ren interprets the phrase *jingzhong shishu* 經中事數 as topics, doctrines and concepts appearing in Buddhist scriptures, and in his view *geyi* refers to the practice of interpreting these by matching them with Confucianist or Daoist nouns, concepts and ideas. He also suggests its application to the practice of translation. This is a new idea that fills a gap in earlier views, and it is no doubt valid.

Next, let us move on to the views of Japanese researchers of Buddhism. In his “Shina Bukkyō shi no shoki ni okeru hannya kenkyū” 「支那佛教史の初期に於ける般若研究」 (The study of *prajñā* in the early phases of the history of Buddhism in China), Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽 quotes the above passage from Zhu Faya’s biography and then makes the following comment:

*Geyi* referred to the practice of comparing and matching the principles expounded in the *sūtras* with non-Buddhist works, namely, Lao-Zhuang works, so as to interpret and explain them and to make them easier to understand, and ultimately it means explaining the emptiness expounded in the *Prajñā [-pāramitā]-sūtra* by means of Lao-Zhuang nothingness.<sup>10)</sup>

A distinctive feature of Ui’s view is that he identifies the “non-Buddhist works” (*waishu* 外書) referred to in Faya’s biography with works of Lao-Zhuang thought and regards the explication of the emptiness expounded in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures by means of Lao-Zhuang nothingness as the example *par excellence* of the practice of *geyi*, and his is a rather narrowly defined view. Moreover, he seems to have been of the opinion that with Kumārajīva’s arrival in China *Prajñāpāramitā* thought came to be correctly understood and the practice of *geyi* was abandoned.

Meanwhile, Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定, in the opening article of a collection of studies on Chinese Buddhism, entitled “Shina Bukkyō shi taikan” 「支那佛教史大觀」 (An overview of the history of Chinese Buddhism), writes as follows:

*Geyi* means to employ Lao-Zhuang [thought] to interpret Buddhism. For this reason Buddhism did not exhibit the original spirit of Buddhism, and it may be considered that until Daoan’s subsequent reform of the practice of *geyi* Buddhism was in fact melded with Lao-Zhuang thought.<sup>11)</sup>

It will be evident that the above two views of Ui and Tokiwa differ markedly from the views of Chen Yinke and other Chinese researchers. There is, however, no gainsaying the fact that their understanding of developments in the history of Chinese Buddhism has exerted an influence on Japanese researchers since Ui's time.

Ōchō Enichi 横超慧日 also refers to *geyi* in a study of Zhu Daosheng 竺道生's *Fahua jing shu* 法華經疏<sup>12)</sup> and, like Ui, he too takes the view that from the time of Kumārajīva Chinese Buddhists broke free from the practice of *geyi*. With regard to Daoan, Ōchō states that although Daoan recognized the faults of *geyi*, one still cannot fail to detect the influence of Laozi in his writings.<sup>13)</sup> But he still rates highly the merits of *geyi*<sup>14)</sup> and attempts to reconcile the contradictions that have arisen in our understanding of Daoan.

Since the works of Daoists and Confucianists constituted the general education of men of culture in contemporary society, the method of comparing and matching Buddhist thought with non-Buddhist works when introducing and explaining it would certainly have been extremely effective. *Therefore, geyi should not be rejected if it is employed as a means of proselytization based on a grasp of the spirit of Buddhism.*<sup>15)</sup> (Italics added.)

My own opinion of this view will become clear in due course.

Lastly, let us consider the case of researchers of Chinese thought and philosophy. Itano Chōhachi 板野長八, in a study of Sengzhao 僧肇,<sup>16)</sup> examines the practice of *geyi* in connection with Sengzhao's *prajñā* thought and, citing the above views of Ui Hakuju and Tokiwa Daijō, suggests that they need to be emended. He first demonstrates that although Sengzhao (384–414) is widely recognized as having correctly understood the concept of *prajñā*, in actual fact his interpretation was completely grounded in the Lao-Zhuang idea of *dao*.<sup>17)</sup> But he does not reject as erroneous the views of Buddhist scholars on *geyi*, and instead he offers the following compromise:

Therefore, *geyi* represented the understanding or translating of individual items in Buddhist scriptures by matching them with items in Lao-Zhuang works and other general classics, and it is probably appropriate to regard it as a mechanical research method in which there was little awareness of the distinctive nature of Buddhism.<sup>18)</sup>

This definition is the result of Itano's efforts to place Sengzhao outside the confines of *geyi*, and it should be realized that it is the irresponsible views of Buddhist scholars that have led to this lack of precision.

As my final example I wish to cite the opinion of Tsukamoto Zenryū 塚本善隆, after which I shall summarize my own views. Tsukamoto has provided many instructive insights for our understanding of Chinese Buddhism, but here I shall



consider only the reference to *geyi* in the first volume of his history of Chinese Buddhism, in Chapter 5, Section 3, dealing with the three types of disciples that gathered under Fotudeng 佛圖澄. Having discussed the inevitability of the development of *geyi*-based Buddhism and explained the practice of *geyi* with reference to the relevant passage in Zhu Faya's biography, he makes the following comment on Daoan:

Reflecting on the fact that this method of interpreting and comprehending the Buddhist scriptures through the medium of the thought of Chinese classics was not the true seeker's method of understanding authentic Buddhism, he proceeded along the difficult path of comprehending Buddhist *sūtras* by means of Buddhist *sūtras* and accomplished the great undertaking of laying the foundations for the development of an independent Chinese Buddhism.<sup>19)</sup>

But because many of Daoan's extant writings are written in Lao-Zhuang terminology, Tsukamoto is forced, in spite of his above evaluation, to describe Daoan as "a person who applied himself to the exposition of *geyi*-based Buddhism in order to propagate Buddhism among the Chinese."

As will be reiterated below, I set a high value on Daoan's self-awareness as a Buddhist and on his earnest commitment. However, hitherto views of Buddhist scholars on his links with *geyi* have probably overestimated the significance of his statements in this regard. It is true that he realized that errors had been made in earlier *geyi*-based Buddhism and that in a dialogue with Sengxian 僧先 he remarked, "The previous matching of meanings (*geyi*) has often deviated from the principles [of Buddhism]."<sup>20)</sup> Up until now these words of his have been understood as a negation of the practice of *geyi*, but was this in fact the case? In my view, he did not necessarily negate it outright. What he really wanted to say is found in his response to Sengxian, who then said, "Let us analyze 'carefree wandering' (*xiaoyao* 逍遙); why should we discuss the rights and wrongs of our precursors?" to which Daoan replied, "When spreading the teachings, one should ensure suitability." I would suggest that he was arguing that *geyi* did not involve just the matching of topics and categories, but also had to be accurate and appropriate with regard to meaning too, and this view was also, I believe, expressed in his rules for translation.<sup>21)</sup> Daoan thus probably strove to obtain a correct understanding of Buddhism by reflecting on the manner in which Buddhist scriptures were being translated and by comparing different scriptures. It may therefore be considered that Daoan's activities marked a new epoch in *geyi*-based Buddhism. In other words, regardless of whether he did it mechanically or with an awareness of the distinctive nature of Buddhism, Daoan brought Buddhism to a stage where it became even more closely bound from its very foundations to China's indigenous thought as typified by Lao-Zhuang thought and Confucianism. When one considers the subsequent arrival of Kumārajīva in

China and the activities of his disciples, marked progress may be seen in their comprehension of Buddhist scriptures, but this does not necessarily mean that they attained a correct understanding of Buddhism, and instead it is to be observed how Buddhism was dexterously linked to China's indigenous thought and became transformed into a Chinese form of Buddhism. Tsukamoto is also aware of this point, and applying the term *geyi* to translation as well, he recognizes "the *geyi*-based translation of Buddhist scriptures" and tacitly admits that Chinese Buddhism was ultimately unable to escape the influence of *geyi*-based Buddhism.<sup>22)</sup> His views thus also have points in common with the views of the Chinese researchers noted earlier.

In the above we have surveyed earlier views of *geyi*, and I think that it can be said that these more or less exhaust the various opinions that have been expressed on *geyi* and *geyi*-based Buddhism. For my own part, I basically wish to adopt the interpretation of *geyi* put forward by Chen Yinke and other Chinese researchers. In addition to this, I characterize the indigenous thought of China that played such a decisive role especially in *geyi*-based Buddhism, namely, Lao-Zhuang thought, as the "philosophy of *dao-li*," and defining *geyi* as the comprehension and interpretation of Buddhism on the basis of this philosophy of *dao-li*, I refer to all forms of Buddhism based on this *geyi*-conditioned understanding as "*geyi*-based Buddhism."<sup>23)</sup>

#### IV. The Realities of *Geyi*

Through the above examination we have learnt that Chinese researchers have from an early stage understood *geyi* in a broad sense and have offered interpretations that accord with the realities of Chinese Buddhism. However, their demonstration of the validity of their views cannot be said to have been adequate. Buddhist scholars in Japan, on the other hand, have restricted the scope of the term *geyi*, and this has led to some ambiguity.

On the basis of my own views on *geyi*, I accordingly wish to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the views of Japanese researchers and offer a new perspective on the formation of Chinese Buddhism and *geyi*. Towards this end, I propose to undertake an examination of Daoan's writings and the *Erru sixing lun* 二入四行論, a record of the sayings of Chan 禪 practitioners thought to date from the early Tang 唐.

##### 1. Shi Daoan's Use of *Geyi*

It has been pointed out by many researchers that, judging from Daoan's extant writings, his Buddhism was a form of *geyi*-based Buddhism. Since, however, the earlier popular view that he negated the practice of *geyi* still appears to be deep-seated among contemporary Buddhist scholars, I have decided to reconsider his writings here, partly in order to rectify this prevailing view.

Daoan holds a position of high repute in the history of Chinese Buddhism. In

a word, he is considered to have laid the foundations of Chinese Buddhism. This phrase is not necessarily apposite, but it must be recognized that he compiled scriptural catalogues and continually strove to grasp the original meaning of the scriptures through their comparative study. Also worthy of special mention is the fact that he advocated the use of “Shi” 釋 (*Śākya*) as a religious surname for monks so as to reinforce their self-awareness as Buddhists and pursued the subjective study of Buddhism with a view to practising a way of life that accorded with the teachings of the Buddhist scriptures, which in turn manifested in the importance that he attached to meditation and monastic discipline. His critical observations on the contemporary practice of *geyi* may be regarded as a criticism of the trend towards philosophical discussion (*chingtan* 清談: “pure conversation”) and Daoist speculation (*xuanxue*) among contemporary Buddhists, and it is to be surmised that he was expressing his opposition to the tendency to extol a life of “non-action” (*wuwei* 無爲) and “spontaneity” (*ziran* 自然) and to abandon cultivated practice. As has been suggested by Ōchō Enichi,<sup>24</sup> this may be not unrelated to the fact that he grew up in the home of a Confucian family. Yet, in spite of this, his understanding of Buddhism was clearly based on *geyi*, or the philosophy of *dao*. Therefore, his practice of meditation and his delineation of the state to be obtained by this means were also conditioned by *geyi* and cannot be considered to reflect a correct understanding and acceptance of Buddhism. In the following let us consider a number of passages from his writings.<sup>25</sup>

The first quotation is taken from the opening passage of the preface that he wrote to the *Daodi jing* 道地經.

夫道地者，應真之玄堂，升仙之奧室也。無本之城杳然難陵矣。無爲之牆邈然難踰矣。微門妙闔，少闕其庭者也。蓋爲器也猶海。與行者，日酌之而不竭。返精者，無數而不滿。其爲像也，含弘靜泊，綿綿若存。寂寥無言，辯之者幾矣。恍惚無行，求矣澁乎其難測。聖人有以見因華可以成實，覩末可以達本，乃爲布不言之教，陳無轍之軌，闡止啓觀，式成定諦。鬣彥六雙率，由斯路歸精谷神。於乎羨矣。夫地也者，包潤施毓稼穡以成。鏐鏐瓊琛，罔弗以載。有喻止觀，莫近於此。故曰道地也。  
(Taishō 55: 69ab)

The *Ground of the Way* is the *mysterious hall for conforming with truth* and the *deep chamber for ascending to the immortals*. The ramparts of the *rootless* are remote and difficult to cross, and the walls of *non-action* are distant and difficult to pass over. Because the entrance is imperceptible, there are few who behold its courtyard. In capacity it is like the ocean. Even if those who proceed along it are drawn up daily, there will be no end to them, and even if those who return their essence are innumerable, it will not be filled. In form it is *all-embracing and serene; subtle yet everlasting, it seems to exist. Solitary and without speech*, those who explain it are few. *Indistinct and without any goings*, it is too vast to seek and difficult to fathom. The *sages*, seeing how the flower begets the fruit and how by seeing the *branches* one reaches the *roots*, spread the *unspoken teachings*, explain the *trackless path*, and by expounding calm and

revealing insight establish the truth of meditation. The six pairs of eminent men also follow it and by this path return their essence to the *spirit of the valley*. Oh, how enviable! The “Ground” is bounteous and cultivated through nurture and husbandry, and there is no gold, silver or precious stone that it does not contain. Although it is likened to calm-and-insight, there is nothing close to it. Therefore it is called “Ground of the Way.”

This preface was added by Daoan to the *Daodi jing* (1 fasc.; Taishō15) translated by An Shigao 安世高 (born 146, arrived in China ca. 167) when Daoan wrote a commentary on this work together with Zhi Tanjiang 支曇講 of Yanmen 雁門 and Zhu Sengfu 竺僧輔 of Yedu 鄴都. *Daodi* 道地 is thought to be a translation of the Sanskrit *yogabhūmi*,<sup>26)</sup> and this *sūtra*, focussing on the observation of the “five aggregates,” explains how to observe impermanence, suffering and no-self correctly through the practice of “calm-and-insight” (*zhiguan* 止觀), or meditation. Since the original meaning of *bhūmi* is “earth,” “soil” or “ground,” *di* 地 may be deemed an appropriate Chinese equivalent. But the translation of *yoga* as *dao* 道 is a very free rendering, and it is to be inferred from Daoan’s interpretation that the practice of *yoga* was regarded by him as the basis for accomplishing the Way. If, moreover, this term *dao* was used from the outset with the *dao* of Lao-Zhuang thought in mind, then this undoubtedly represents an example of *geyi*-based translation. Furthermore, as is evident from the above passage, this *dao* was conceived of as a state of rootlessness and non-action attainable through the practice of calm-and-insight, and in content the explanation given here does not merely borrow Daoist terminology, but may be described as a veritable exposition of the philosophy of *dao* as set forth in the *Laozi*.<sup>27)</sup> “*Yingzhen*” 應真 (“[those who] conform with truth”) presumably corresponds to *arhat*, while “*shengxian*” 升仙 (“[those who] ascend to the immortals”) signified the attainment of Buddhahood and here probably also refers to the Buddhas,<sup>28)</sup> and in these equivalents it is possible to discern traces of Huang-Lao 黃老 thought and immortalist thought going back to the Han dynasty. The Daoist ideal lay in returning to the nameless *dao* of non-action, representing the sole source of all things, while those who succeeded in returning to this *dao* were known as “sages” (*shengren* 聖人) or “perfected beings” (*zhiren* 至人, *zhenren* 真人) and were also identified with the immortals (*shenxian* 神仙) who neither aged nor died. The theoretical aspects of this ideal were based on the *Laozi*, *Zhuangzi* and *Yijing*, and on the practical side it gave birth to the idea of “nourishing life” (*yangsheng* 養生). Then, with the arrival of Buddhism, the Buddha was placed in the same category as Huang-Lao or the immortals, who were, namely, adepts of the Way.

From the introduction of Buddhism up until the time of Daoan scriptures dealing with *dhyāna*, or meditation, enjoyed considerable popularity, with the *Anban shouyi jing* 安般守意經 being held in especially high regard, and it has been pointed out that one background factor in this popularity was the “nourishing of vital energy” (*yangqi* 養氣) associated with the idea of “nourishing life.”<sup>29)</sup> It was

only a natural outcome of the current of the times in which he lived that Daoan should have written a commentary on the *Anban shouyi jing*, and in his preface (*Anban zhu xu* 安般注序) he writes as follows:

安般者，出入也。道之所寄無往不因，德之所寓無往不託。是故安般寄息以成守，四禪寓骸以成定也。寄息故有六階之差，寓骸故有四級之別。階差者，損之又損之，以至於無爲。級別者，忘之又忘之，以至於無欲也。無爲故無形而不因，無欲故無事而不適。無形而不因故能開物，無事而不適故能成務。成務者，卽萬有而自彼。開物者，使天下兼忘我也。彼我雙廢者，守于唯守也。(Taishō 55: 43c)

*Ānāpāna* is the out [-breath] and the in [-breath]. It is the abode of the Way, and in its goings there is nowhere that it does not follow; it is the dwelling place of Virtue, and in its goings there is nowhere in which it does not reside. Therefore *ānāpāna* achieves attention by abiding with the breath, and the Four Dhyānas accomplish meditation by dwelling in the body. In abiding with the breath there are distinctions of six levels, and in dwelling in the body there are differences of four grades. As for the distinctions of levels, one diminishes it and diminishes it again, thereby reaching non-action; as for the differences of grades, one forgets it and forgets it again, thereby reaching non-desire. On account of non-action there is no form that it does not follow, and on account of non-desire there is no deed that does not succeed. Since there is no form that it does not follow, it is able to open up things. Since there is no deed that does not succeed, it is able to accomplish undertakings. To accomplish undertakings is to follow myriad beings and conform with others. To open up things is to make all under heaven forget themselves. If both other and self are abandoned, one is attentive only to keeping attention.

Here Daoan explains the breathing practice known as *ānāpāna* again with reference to the concepts of the Way (*dao*) and Virtue (*de* 德) in the *Laozi*, and it is evident that he regarded *ānāpāna* as a means for accomplishing both the Way and Virtue. *Ānāpāna* was translated as *shouyi* 守意, meaning to “keep [attention on]/guard the mind,” but it is to be surmised that it reflected the Daoist term *shouyi* 守一, or “keeping/guarding the One.” The current text of the *Anban shouyi jing* is interspersed with explanatory comments antedating Daoan, and among passages thought to represent such comments we find expressions such as “guarding the mind is the Way” and “An 安 is to guard the mind and ban 般 is to control the mind, and one eventually obtains non-action.”<sup>30)</sup> In this fashion *geyi*-based interpretations were added to *geyi*-based translations. The term *shou* 守, used by Daoan in expressions such as “achieve attention” (*cheng shou* 成守) and “attentive only to keeping attention” (*shou yu wei shou ye* 守于唯守也), originally referred to mental concentration (“keeping [attention on] the mind”), but as has already been suggested by others, it is thought to have come to signify “guarding the One.”<sup>31)</sup> Needless to say, this “One” was the “One Way,” with the aim therefore being to attain the Way of non-action and non-desire through the practice of “guarding

the One.” The process of this practice and the resulting state are here correlated to the ideas of “daily diminution” (*risun* 日損) in the *Laozi* and “sitting in oblivion” (*zuowang* 坐忘) in the *Zhuangzi*.<sup>32</sup> A further point to be noted in this connection is that there also exist prefaces to this same *Anban shouyi jing* by Kang Senghui 康僧會 and Xie Fu 謝敷, each with its own distinctive features. Daoan would probably have been familiar with the preface by Kang Senghui (?-247-?), and Daoan’s interpretation of non-action and non-desire based on “daily diminution” and “sitting in oblivion” was conceivably developed under the influence of Kang Senghui’s following thesis:

是以行寂繫意著息數一至十，十數不誤，意定在之。小定三日，大定七日。寂無他念，泊然若死。謂之一禪。禪棄也。棄十三億穢念之意。(Taishō 55: 43a)

By this means one practises quietude, tying down the mind, regulating the breath, and counting from one to ten, and if one makes no mistakes in counting to ten, the mind settles there. *In a lesser case it settles for three days, and in a greater case it settles for seven days.* If one is quiet and without other thoughts, *one will be calm as if dead.* This is called the First *Dhyāna*. *Dhyāna* is abandonment; it means abandoning thirteen million vile thoughts.

This represents an explanation of the first of the four *dhyānas*, and Kang Senghui’s interpretation of *dhyāna* (*chan* 禪) as “abandonment” (*qi* 棄) is unique to him. In addition, his exposition can be linked to the ideas of “daily diminution” and “sitting in oblivion” through his explanation of *dhyāna* in relation to particular numbers of days and his reference to a deathlike state while meditating. But even though Daoan may indeed have read the above passage in this manner, a perusal of Kang Senghui’s preface as a whole shows that although he uses Daoist terms such as *huanghu* 恍惚 (“obscure and indistinct”) and *xiansheng* 僊聖 (“immortal sage”), the term *huanghu*, for example, is used to explain not the state of the Way, but a state of mind. The opening passage of his preface is, moreover, faithful to the basic essentials of Buddhism:

夫安般者，諸佛之大乘，以濟衆生之漂流也。其事有六，以治六情。(Taishō 55: 43a)

*Anāpāna* is the great vehicle of the Buddhas by which they save sentient beings from drifting about [in the sea of transmigratory existence]. There are six aspects to this, and by this means the six sense-organs are controlled.

Overall Kang Senghui’s preface contains few Daoist expressions, nor does it posit the Way as an ideal state of being. These differences between Kang Senghui and Daoan are quite pronounced, and one of the reasons may lie in the differences in their background. As is indicated by his surname, Kang Senghui’s forebears came from Kirghiz (Kangju 康居), and his father migrated from India to Jiaozhi 交趾 (near present-day Hanoi), where Kang Senghui is said to have been

born. He was, in other words, an Indian of Kirghiz descent, and it is recorded that he arrived in Jiankang 建康, the capital of the kingdom of Wu 吳, in 247. It may therefore be assumed that his education in the classics differed considerably from that of the Chinese. Nonetheless his understanding of the Buddhist scriptures was comparatively faithful to the tenets of Indian Buddhism, whereas that of the later Daoan was quite the reverse, and presumably Daoan was unable to escape the influence of *qingtan*. However, one cannot overlook the fact that Kang Senghui paid special attention to the functions of the mind (*yi* 意, as in *shouyi*) and understood it to be the key to enlightenment.<sup>33)</sup> This became the keynote of Chinese Buddhism, especially of ideas relating to meditative practice. With the subsequent emergence of the mentalistic *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, *Avatamsaka-sūtra* and Yogācāra treatises, the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and other scriptures propounding Tathāgatagarbha thought, and the *Dacheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, this emphasis on the mind became quite decisive, resulting in the establishment of the Chan schools and leading even to the asseveration that "the mind is the Buddha." It is to be surmised, of course, that these developments were also influenced by the interest of Confucianists and Daoists in the spirit and the mind.<sup>34)</sup>

It will now be clear that although Daoan engaged earnestly in the study and practice of Buddhism and recognized the difficulties of translation and the shortcomings of *geyi*, his understanding and acceptance of Buddhism were based on the philosophy of *dao* underpinning the *xuanxue* of the Wei-Jin period, and he was hardly at all able to break free from its influence. This was partly because Chinese Buddhists, except for those involved in the translation of Buddhist scriptures under the tutelage of Xuanzang 玄奘 and similar figures, had no opportunity whatsoever to study Buddhism directly from original Indian texts, and it was inevitable that there should have been limits to Daoan's understanding. It was probably this that caused him, according to Sengrui, "to stop writing and, with a long sigh, leave the choice of words to Maitreya."<sup>35)</sup> This impresses upon us the need for the reconsideration of Chinese Buddhism to begin anew with the textual criticism of Chinese translations of Buddhist scriptures.

For this reason it is necessary to reexamine the sanctioning of Daoan's above interpretation of Buddhism by, for example, Ōchō Enichi who, as we saw earlier, argued that *geyi* should not be rejected if it is employed as a means of proselytization based on a grasp of the spirit of Buddhism. Even if one were to assume that Daoan himself had acquired a correct understanding of Buddhism, would it still have been possible for those who sought to study and practise Buddhism with his writings as a guide to attain a correct understanding of Buddhism by means of his explanations? The spirit of Buddhism can be enunciated only through a person's speech and writing. That being so, all that could be gained from Daoan's words quoted above would be the understanding that Daoist thought and Buddhist thought are basically identical.

## 2. *Geyi* in the *Erru sixing lun*

The understanding of Buddhism as influenced by the *qingtan* and *xuanxue* of the Wei-Jin period continued even after the time of Daoan and became still more deeply entrenched. The new religion of “Daoism,” affiliated to Daoist philosophy, also developed under the stimulus of Buddhism. Up until now it has been believed by some that *geyi*-based Buddhism was eradicated with the arrival of Kumārajīva, but this is incorrect. Even Sengzhao, who among Kumārajīva’s disciples was considered to be foremost in his understanding of emptiness, comprehended Buddhism on the basis of Lao-Zhuang thought and under the influence of Guo Xiang 郭象 and other exponents of *xuanxue*, and from first to last his writings propounded the philosophy of *dao-li*. Zhu Daosheng (355–434) also came under the influence of Guo Xiang, Wang Bi 王弼 and others, and by substituting *li* for *dao* he interpreted Buddhism by means of the philosophy of *li* and, on the basis of this monistic *li*, advocated sudden enlightenment and the attainment of Buddhahood by *icchantikas*.<sup>36)</sup> In addition, Jizang 吉藏 (559–623) of the Sanlun 三論 school, who looked up to Sengzhao as his model, wrote commentaries on several scriptures and treatises from the standpoint of the Prajñāpāramitā thought of the Sanlun school and completed the logical systematization of its teachings, but even though his Sanlun doctrines represented the most refined understanding of *prajñā* and emptiness to develop in China, in the final analysis he was unable to break free from Chinese thought patterns. To wit, his thought was firmly underpinned by the philosophy of *dao-li*, especially the philosophy of *li*.<sup>37)</sup>

The reason that I have decided to take up for consideration here the *Erru sixing lun*, traditionally regarded as the recorded sayings of Bodhidharma, is that its distinctive features have been described by Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山 in the following terms:

This [intellectual freedom] could be described as a characteristic element of Chinese thought, differing from Indian Buddhism, and it was a factor that later led to the establishment of Chan in the form of a distinct school. In point of fact, this work is the most eminently convenient for clarifying the thought of the early Chan school during its formative period in relation to the development of Chinese Buddhist thought at large.<sup>38)</sup>

I have judged the *Erru sixing lun*, the subject of the above comments, to be the work most suitable for the purposes of this article, that is, demonstrating that *geyi* continued to be practised in the Chan schools too from the Tang dynasty onwards, becoming even more firmly coupled with Chinese indigenous thought and resulting in the complete distortion of Buddhism. I shall not, however, concern myself here with the historicity of Bodhidharma or with textual issues relating to the *Erru sixing lun* since they go beyond the scope of my own field of research. I shall, moreover, consider only the opening section, dealing with



Bodhidharma's teaching on the "two entries and four practices" (*erru sixing* 二入四行). Yanagida considers this section to represent Bodhidharma's basic ideas,<sup>39)</sup> and since it may be considered to present the standpoint of the Chan schools in condensed form, I wish to examine the structure of its thought.

The "two entries" of the "two entries and four practices" are "entry through principle" (*liru* 理入) and "entry through practice" (*xingru* 行入), with the latter consisting of "four practices." The section describing "entry through principle" is as follows:

夫入道多途，要而言之，不出二種。一是理入，二是行入。理入者，謂藉教悟宗，深信含生凡聖同一真性，但爲客塵妄覆，不能顯了。若也捨妄歸真，凝住壁觀，自他凡聖等一，堅住不移，更不隨於文教，此即與理冥符，無有分別，寂然無爲，名之理入。<sup>40)</sup>

Although there are many paths for entering the Way, in essence it may be said that they do not go beyond two types: (1) entry through principle and (2) entry through practice. "Entry through principle" means to comprehend the basic tenets by means of the teachings and to deeply believe that living beings, both ordinary people and holy sages, are identical in their true nature, which is only illusorily covered with adventitious defilements and unable to manifest itself. If one discards the illusory and returns to the true, abides concentrated in the wall meditation, remains firmly without moving in a state in which self and other, ordinary people and holy sages, are all one, and does not adhere to the written teachings, then one will become completely harmonized with the ultimate principle, be without discriminating thought, quiet and actionless, and this is called "entry through principle."

In view of the fact that the word *dao* ("Way") used at the start of this passage is contrasted with *tu* 途 ("path"), it is clear that it is not being used here in the sense of an ordinary "way," that is, a road or path along which one travels one step at a time, and it may be assumed to signify rather the *destination* or *ultimate source* that is reached by passing along such paths (in this case *tu*). Yanagida translates it as "truth," and he is probably right in describing the "[ultimate] principle" of "entry through principle" as "the Way itself, that which exists from the beginning."<sup>41)</sup> That being so, this means then that this "Way" refers to the *dao* of China's indigenous Lao-Zhuang thought, for no such fundamental "Way" is propounded in Buddhism. There are many different methods of "entering" or attaining this "Way," but the most important are said to be "entry through principle" and "entry through practice." The term "[ultimate] principle" (*li*) as used here is essentially synonymous with *dao*. The difference in the usage of these two terms is that whereas it is difficult to find concepts that contrast with *dao*, *li* is used in antithetical pairs such as "principle" and "teaching" or "principle" and "phenomena." This concept attracted the attention of both Daoists and Buddhists, and among the former Wang Bi, Guo Xiang and others elucidated the "philosophy of

*li*,” with *li* corresponding to the *li* of *daoli* 道理 (“principle of the Way”) or *yuanli* 原理 (“fundamental principle”). Among the Buddhists, as was noted earlier, it was especially Zhu Daosheng, one of Kumārajīva’s disciples, who interpreted Buddhism by means of this philosophy of *li*, and he concluded that the Dharma-body (*dharma-kāya*) and Buddha-nature (*buddhatva/buddhatā*) expounded in Buddhism corresponded to *li*. Sengzhao was much the same in this respect, but it was more explicit in the case of Zhu Daosheng. For example, he explained the “wisdom of emptiness” as “simply obtaining enlightenment by means of *li*,”<sup>42)</sup> and we also find the following comment of his in the *Da banniepan jing jijie* 大般涅槃經集解:

夫真理自然，悟亦冥符。真則無差，悟豈容易。不易之體為湛然常照。但從迷乖之，事未在我耳。苟能涉求，便反迷歸極。(Taishō 37: 380c)

Truth is spontaneity, and enlightenment is harmony. What is true does not err; why should enlightenment be changeable? The unchanging essence is tranquil and eternally bright. It is only if one follows delusion and goes against it that one remains thwarted. If one succeeds in seeking it out, then one will turn back delusion and return to the ultimate.

This accords with the purport of “entry through principle,” and it presumably explains the reason for Zhu Daosheng’s advocacy of sudden enlightenment. Once we come to Jizang of the Sanlun school, this receives a more logical formulation in the context of the correlation between “principle” and “teaching,” and the cognizance of the ultimate principle by means of the teaching became established as the basic tenet (*zong* 宗) of the Sanlun school. Jizang expressed this as “enlightenment alone is the tenet [of our school]” (*wei wu wei zong* 唯悟為宗).<sup>43)</sup> And once the ultimate principle has been realized by means of the teaching, the teaching, in accordance with the traditions of “obtaining the purport and forgetting the words” and “obtaining the moon and forgetting the finger [pointing to it]” that went back to the *Zhuangzi*, was naturally discarded. The groundwork for the Chan tenets of “not establishing words” and of “a separate transmission outside the teaching” had thus already been prepared. In connection with this expression “entry through principle” one cannot help calling to mind the *Jueguan lun* 絕觀論, attributed to Farong 法融 (594–657) of the Ox-Head (*Niutou* 牛頭) school. The original title of this work is said to have been *Ruli yuanmen lun* 入理緣門論,<sup>44)</sup> and it presents a dialogue between a master who has already “entered the [ultimate] principle” (*ruli* 入理) and his disciples who are still loitering in front of the gate leading to this ultimate principle (*yuanmen* 緣門). An examination of the terms *jueguan* 絕觀 (“cutting off meditation”) and *ruli* found in these two alternative titles has shown that they are already clearly set forth in Jizang’s Sanlun doctrines.<sup>45)</sup> According to Jizang, “entering the ultimate principle” means to realize the eternal, immutable and fundamental single “principle” transcending both language and thought, and because this is a state in which both oneself and

one’s surroundings are transcended, it is referred to as “cutting off the objects [of meditation] and meditative practice” (*jue yuanguan* 絕緣觀). Therefore, “object and meditation both become quiet” (*yuanguan juji* 緣觀俱寂) and because this is regarded as the essence of *prajñā*, it is also known as “*prajñā* in which meditation is cut off” (*jueguan banruo* 絕觀般若).<sup>46)</sup> In the final analysis, this signifies nothing other than the “ultimate principle” (*li*).

If we now return to the explanation of “entry through principle” in the *Erru sixing lun*, we find that the first *sine qua non* for entering the ultimate principle is “to comprehend the basic tenets by means of the teachings.” This is identical to Jizang’s view outlined above, the only difference being that although it is premised on the correlation between principle and teaching, it is here expressed in terms of basic tenets (*zong*) and teaching. An example of an interpretation in which *zong* and *li* are treated as synonyms is to be found in Jizang’s predecessor Huiyuan 慧遠 (523–592) of Jingying Monastery 淨影寺, who, when interpreting the term *siddhānta* (*xitan* 悉檀) as used in the term “four *siddhāntas*,” or four methods of preaching, explained in the *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論, equates it with *zong*, *cheng* 成 and *li*. It has, moreover, been pointed out by Kawada Kumatarō 川田熊太郎 that an example in which *siddhānta* is translated by *zong* is to be found in the four-fascicle translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, to which particular importance is attached in the Chan schools.<sup>47)</sup> The passage in question reads as follows:

佛告大慧，一切聲聞緣覺菩薩有二種通相，謂宗通及說通。大慧，宗通者謂緣自得勝進相，遠離言說文字妄想，趣無漏界自覺地自相，遠離一切虛妄覺相，降伏一切外道衆魔，緣自覺趣光明暉發，是名宗通相。云何說通相，謂說九部種種教法，離異不異有無等相，以巧方便隨順衆生，如應說法令得度脫，是名說通相。(Taishō 16: 499bc)

The Buddha said to Mahāmati, “All Śramaṇas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas have two kinds of characteristic modes: the *mode of the basic tenet* and the *mode of teaching*. Mahāmati, the *mode of the basic tenet* is characterized by self-realization; it is divorced from language, words and delusory thought; it leads to the realm of non-defilement; it is characterized by a state of self-awareness; it is divorced from all false awareness; it vanquishes all heretics and evil beings; and through self-awareness it shines forth with its own light. These are called the characteristics of the mode of the basic tenet. What are the characteristics of the *mode of teaching*? It is expounded in the various doctrines of the nine divisions [of the scriptures]; it is free of difference and non-difference, being and non-being, and so on; by means of skilful expedients it follows [the capacities of] sentient beings and makes them attain liberation in accordance with the teaching of the Dharma. These are called the characteristics of the mode of teaching.”

According to Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道, *zongtong* 宗通 (Skt. *siddhānta-naya*) means “mode of ultimate perfection (or established conclusion),” while *shuotong* 說

通 (Skt. *deśanā-naya*) means “mode of teaching.”<sup>48)</sup> In content, the former is characterized by self-realization and divorced from language and thought, while the latter denotes the teachings, typically divided into nine types, that are taught in accordance with the capacities of sentient beings. Moreover, this way of thinking is based on the underlying premise of this scripture, which, on the basis of the admonition to rely not on the written word but on its meaning, emphasizes that the Buddha did not utter a single word about ultimate truth.<sup>49)</sup> It is therefore evident that this *siddhānta-naya* and *deśanā-naya* alluded to in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* correspond to the aforementioned principle and teaching. It is not clear on this evidence alone whether or not the author(s) of the *Erru sixing lun* had the traditions of Chinese Buddhism and the theories of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* in mind when they used these two terms, but the subsequent content of the *Erru sixing lun* would suggest that they may have made conscious use of these terms.<sup>50)</sup>

If we now consider what is meant by “comprehending the basic tenets,” it is said to mean “to deeply believe that living beings, both ordinary people and holy sages, are identical in their true nature, which is only illusorily covered with adventitious defilements and unable to manifest itself.” The term “true nature” (*zhenxing* 真性) presumably draws on the concepts of *zhen* 真 and *xing* 性 in traditional Chinese thought, and it should be noted that these were both used to explain *dao* and *li*. Links with the Buddhist term “Buddha-nature” (*foxing* 佛性) could also be posited. It is evident, however, that the passage in question gives expression to the theory that the mind is originally pure by nature, a view that was systematized in scriptures affiliated to the current of Tathāgatagarbha thought. Needless to say, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* belongs to the same current of thought, for it includes passages such as “the *tathāgatagarbha* is pure by nature... and is tainted by defilements” (如來藏自性清淨... 塵勞所染) and “although it is pure by nature, it is covered with adventitious defilements” (雖自性淨, 客塵所覆).<sup>51)</sup> That being so, is the “belief” (*xin* 信) in such an identical true nature that is pure by nature the same as the faith that one might have in the Three Jewels or in the Buddha? To my mind it would seem to bear similarities to the “faith” indicated by the “four faiths” (*sixin* 四信) in the *Dacheng qixin lun*.<sup>52)</sup> The first of these “four faiths” is given as “faith in the ultimate source” (*xin genben* 信根本), which means to believe (*xinjie* 信解) in the reality of “thusness” (*zhenru* 真如; Skt. *tathatā*), and it takes precedence over the other “three faiths” in the Three Jewels. It has been demonstrated by Takemura Makio 竹村牧男 that the most appropriate Sanskrit equivalent of the term “faith” as used in the *Dacheng qixin lun* is *adhimukti*.<sup>53)</sup> In addition, Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭 has pointed out the difference in meaning between *adhimukti* and *śraddhā*, which is also translated by the same word *xin* in Chinese.<sup>54)</sup> According to Hakamaya, the term *śraddhā* (*jingxin* 敬信 in Kumārajīva’s translation) is appropriate when speaking of faith in the Buddha’s teachings, such as the Three Jewels and Four Truths, whereas *adhimukti* (*xinjie* in Kumārajīva’s translation) means to comprehend or accept the “ultimate source” or “truth,” of which the present instance is an example.<sup>55)</sup> This is also clear from the following closely

parallel statement, also appearing in the opening section of the *Erru sixing lun*: “If the wise person duly believes this principle, he should practise in conformity with the Dharma.” (智者若能信解此理，應當稱法而行) I have pointed out elsewhere that this “faith” also finds expression in the *Shenming chengfo yi* 神明成佛義 by Emperor Wu 武帝 of Liang 梁, with whom Bodhidharma is said to have conversed.<sup>56)</sup> This treatise by Emperor Wu also gives expression to ideas similar to the concept of the one mind and its two aspects found in the later *Dacheng qixin lun*, and there is no doubting the fact that it prepared the way for the *Dacheng qixin lun*. When one takes into account the above considerations along with the subsequent emergence of a group of people who posited connections between the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra* and Bodhidharma and established an independent school and the role played by the *Dacheng qixin lun* in the formation of the Chan schools, one would be unlikely to err in assuming that the “true nature” alluded to earlier denotes “thusness *qua* Dharma-nature” (*zhenru faxing* 真如法性), in which case it may be said that Chinese indigenous thought and Buddhist works such as the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra* and *Dacheng qixin lun* have been closely conjoined in the thought structure of this first half of the explanation of “entry through principle” in the *Erru sixing lun*.

The above constitutes the basic purport of “entry through principle,” and on the basis of this one sets out to achieve union of self and ultimate principle by means of the “wall meditation” (*biguan* 壁觀). The meaning of this term “wall meditation” is not clear. Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙, following the explanation given in the *Chanyuan zhuquan ji dousu* 禪源諸詮集都序 by Zongmi (780–841), regards it as an analogy for “cutting off all external stimuli.”<sup>57)</sup> It is true that a wall separates the inside from the outside and may therefore signify the cutting off of the outside world. By the same token it can also imply the safeguarding of what is inside. However, in the present instance we find that “true nature” is contrasted with “adventitious defilements” and “the true” with “the illusory.” If these are separated into inside and outside, it is possible that “wall meditation” means to protect the inner true nature and cut off all outer adventitious defilements. If this interpretation is indeed correct, then it has aspects linked to “guarding the mind” (*shouxin* 守心) and “observing the mind” (*guanxin* 觀心), and it represents a revival of the traditions of “guarding the mind” and “guarding the One” (*shouyi*) that went back to the Wei-Jin period. But an impartial reading of the surrounding passage informs us that by remaining concentrated in the “wall meditation” all distinctions between self and other, ordinary people and holy sages, disappear, with self and other becoming one, and if one maintains this state, then one will enter a state of complete harmony with the ultimate principle, free of discriminating thought, quiet and actionless. This is the state of “entry into the Way” (*rudao* 入道) or “entry into the ultimate principle” (*ruli* 入理), in which one becomes one with the actionless and spontaneous *dao*, and the “wall meditation” could also be regarded as a means of reaching this state, in which case it could be understood as a form of meditation practised while sitting facing a wall. Its connections with the *jueguan* of the *Jueguan lun* should probably also be taken into

account. It is a term that requires further investigation.

Next, let us also briefly consider “entry through practice.”<sup>58)</sup> The first of the “four practices” is the “practice of repaying injury” (*baoyuan xing* 報怨行), in which one submits willingly and patiently to one’s tribulations without any feelings of ill will, regarding them, in accordance with the Buddhist teaching of karmic retribution, as the results of evil deeds committed in the past. The term *baoyuan* (“repaying injury”) derives from the admonition of Confucius to “repay injury with justice and repay kindness with kindness” (以直報怨，以德報德), found in Book 14 of the *Lunyu* 論語, and from the following passage in Chapter 63 of the *Laozi*: “Act without acting; pursue that which is not meddlesome; savour that which has no flavour. Make the small big and the few many; repay injury with kindness.” (爲無爲，事無事，味無味，大小多少，報怨以德) (It will be noticed, however, that there is a difference in the thinking underlying these two passages.) In the present case it is explained in terms of the doctrine of karmic retribution, but the real reason for not bearing ill will is “because consciousness penetrates to the source” (識達本故), and it is thus clear that it does not involve engaging in altruistic practices on the basis of a firm belief in dependent arising, or the law of cause and effect. It may also be noted that the section on the practice of patience among the five practices described in the *Dacheng qixin lun* contains the following statement: “One should be patient of the vexatious acts of others and not harbour thoughts of retribution.” (應忍他人之惱心不懷報)<sup>59)</sup>

The second practice—the “practice of submitting to conditions” (*suivyuan xing* 隨緣行)—means to accept, again on the basis of the doctrine of karmic retribution, all pain and pleasure or loss and gain as the results of past karma and, submitting oneself to karmic conditions, tacitly follow the Way. At the start of the explanation of this second practice it is stated that “sentient beings have no self” (衆生無我), but this cannot represent the Buddhist view of no-self, and it describes nothing other than a way of life characterized by an acceptance of fate and actionless spontaneity, characteristic of Lao-Zhuang thought.

The third practice is called the “practice of non-craving” (*wu suoqiu xing* 無所求行), in which one realizes the truth and, with one’s essence transcending the mundane, one’s mind in a state of non-action, and one’s body given over to fate, one regards all things as being empty by nature and is therefore without desire. The statement that “one settles one’s mind in non-action” (安心無爲) merits special attention. Tanlin 曇林 identifies “settling the mind” (*anxin* 安心) with “wall meditation” and refers to Bodhidharma’s teachings as “the method for settling the mind in the Great Vehicle” (*dacheng anxin zhi fa* 大乘安心之法),<sup>60)</sup> presumably on account of this statement in the section on the third practice. “Settling the mind” means to place it in a state of non-action, that is, in a state of union with the fundamental Way. This section too presents a picture of selflessness and freedom from desire based on a view of the sage typical of Lao-Zhuang thought.

The fourth practice is the “practice of conforming with the Dharma” (*chengfa xing* 稱法行), with Dharma here referring to the “principle of intrinsic purity” (性

淨之理), that is, the doctrine that everything is pure by nature. Believing in this principle, as was noted earlier, one practises in conformity with the Dharma, and in concrete terms it is equated with the practice of the six perfections. But because it is a form of practice in which the practitioner has already become one with the ultimate principle, “there is nothing to practise” (而無所行), and it represents a praxis that is totally divorced from the truly altruistic practices of the bodhisattva. Even though one may be convinced of the reality of “true nature,” cut oneself off from all external objects, and practise non-attachment, this cannot be described as an expression of the correct meaning of no-self. It is impossible to act in a way that really benefits others, nor can compassion arise, without both negating “true nature” and “ultimate principle” and also abnegating one’s own self. A life of non-attachment that lacks self-negation or the negation of self-attachment is nothing more than a thoroughly optimistic way of life characterized by the mere non-action and spontaneity of Lao-Zhuang thought.

As will now be clear, the *Erru sixing lun* shows evidence of the influence of the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* and *Dacheng qixin lun*, and it is also evident that it has close connections with the Sanlun and Ox-Head schools. In addition, the structure of its underlying thought shows a shift from “theoretical doctrine” to “religious doctrine,” and it is true that it fully reflects the developments that led to the emergence of the new religion of Chan. Yet although on the surface it makes use of Buddhist terminology and skilfully incorporates ideas of karma and bodhisattva thought, one is still forced to admit that at root it does after all represent a form of the Chinese indigenous “philosophy of *dao-li*” and is an example of “matching the meaning.”

On the basis of the above considerations it may be tentatively concluded, I believe, that Chinese Buddhism was *geyi*-based not just during the Wei-Jin period, but right up until the establishment of the Chan schools. In the present article I have, however, been able to illustrate the realities of *geyi* only with reference to Shi Daoan and the opening section of the *Erru sixing lun*, and in the future I accordingly hope to further examine the situation and philosophical changes during the intervening period. But it should be pointed out that it has not been my intention here to completely negate Chinese Buddhism, and I also believe that there is a need to ascertain the existence of those among Chinese Buddhists who had a correct understanding and awareness of the Buddhist standpoint.

### Notes

- 1) Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗, *Engi to kū—nyoraizō shisō hihan* 『緣起と空—如來藏思想批判』 (Dependent arising and emptiness: A critique of Tathāgatagarbha thought; Daizō Shuppan 大藏出版, 1989).
- 2) Matsumoto Shirō, *Bukkyō e no michi* 『佛教への道』 (The path to Buddhism; Tōkyō Shoseki 東京書籍, 1993), p. 50.
- 3) Matsumoto Shirō, *Engi to kū—nyoraizō shisō hihan*, p. 5.
- 4) Itō Takatoshi 伊藤隆壽, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no hihanteki kenkyū* 『中國佛教の批判的研究』 (A critical

study of Chinese Buddhism; Daizō Shuppan, 1992).

- 5) See Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, "Zhi Mindu xueshuo kao" 支愍度學說考 (A consideration of the theories of Zhi Mindu), in *Qingzhu Cai Yuanpei xiansheng liushiwu sui lunwenji* 慶祝蔡元培先生六十五歲論文集 (Collected essays in honour of Professor Cai Yuanpei's 65th birthday; Guoli Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan 國立中央研究院, 1933); reprinted in *Chen Yinke wenji zhi er: Jinmingguan conggao chubian* 陳寅恪文集之二 金明館叢稿初編 (Collected writings of Chen Yinke 2: Jinmingguan drafts, Vol. 1; Shanghai Guji Chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1980). The historical sources quoted by Chen are as follows:

Sengrui 僧叡, *Pimoluojietai jing yishu xu* 毘摩羅詰提經義疏序 (*Chu sanzang ji ji* 出三藏記集 8; Taishō 55: 59a).

Anchō 安澄, *Chūron sho ki* 中論疏記 3b (Taishō 65: 93a).

"Zhu Faya zhuan" 竺法雅傳 (Huijiao 慧皎, *Gaoseng zhuan* 高僧傳 4; Taishō 50: 347a).

"Shi Sengguang zhuan" 釋僧光傳 (*ibid.* 5; Taishō 50: 355a).

"Shi Huiyuan zhuan" 釋慧遠傳 (*ibid.* 6; Taishō 50: 358a).

Daoan 道安, *Si ahanmu chao xu* 四阿含暮鈔序 (*Chu sanzang ji ji* 9; Taishō 55: 64c).

*Shishuo xinyu* 世說新語, "Wenxue pian" 文學篇, and Liu Xiaobiao 劉孝標's commentary.

*Yanshi jiaxun* 顏氏家訓 5, "Guixin pian" 歸心篇.

Weishu 魏書 114, "Shi-Lao zhi" 釋老志.

Zhiyi 智顛, *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 6a (Taishō 46: 77b).

Zhiyi, *Renwang huguo banruo jing shu* 仁王護國般若經疏 2 (Taishō 33: 260c).

Sun Chuo 孫綽, *Daoxian lun* 道賢論 (quoted in *Gaoseng zhuan*; Taishō 50: 326c, 327b, 347c, 348a, 349c, 350a, 350b).

The above sources not only deal with the interpretation of *geyi*, but also include actual examples, and in addition to these the following works should also be noted:

Huirui 慧叡, *Yuyi* 喻疑 (*Chu sanzang ji ji* 5; Taishō 55: 41b).

Daoxuan 道宣, *Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳 15, "Lun" 論 (Taishō 50: 548b).

- 6) See Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, *Han Wei Liangjin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi* 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 (History of Buddhism during the Han, Wei, Two Jins and Northern and Southern dynasties), Vol. 1 (Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan 台灣商務印書館, 1937), p. 171 ff. Tang has also written the following article: "Lun 'geyi'—zuizao yizhong ronghe Yindu Fojiao he Zhongguo sixiang de fangfa" 論 "格義"—最早一種融合印度佛教和中國思想的方法 (On *geyi*: An early method for melding Indian Buddhism with Chinese thought), in *Lixue, Foxue, xuanxue* 理學·佛學·玄學 (*Lixue*, Buddhology, and *xuanxue*; Beijing Daxue Chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 1991).
- 7) The biography of Sengxian 僧先在 Huijiao's *Gaoseng zhuan* 5 contains the following passage: 因共披文屬思, 新悟尤多. 安曰, 先舊格義於理多違. 先曰, 且當分析道違, 何容是非先達. 安曰, 弘贊理教, 宜令允愜, 法鼓競鳴, 何先何後 (Taishō 50: 355a). In addition, Sengrui's *Pimoluojietai jing yishu xu* contains the following statement: 自慧風東扇, 法言流詠已來, 雖曰講格, 格義迂而乖本, 六家偏而不即 (*Chu sanzang ji ji* 8; Taishō 55: 59a).
- 8) Tang Yongtong, *op. cit.*, p. 172: 但格義用意, 固在融會中國思想於外來思想之中, ... 然安公之學, 固亦常融合老莊之說也.
- 9) Ren Jiyu 任繼愈, ed., *Zhongguo Fojiao shi* 中國佛教史 (History of Chinese Buddhism), Vol. 2 (Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1985), p. 201.
- 10) Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽, *Bukkyō shisō kenkyū* 『佛教思想研究』 (Studies in Buddhist thought; Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1940), pp. 669–670.
- 11) Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定, *Shina Bukkyō no kenkyū* 『支那佛教の研究』 (Studies in Chinese Buddhism; Shunjūsha 春秋社, 1938), p. 4.
- 12) Ōchō Enichi 橫超慧日, "Jiku Dōshō sen Hokekyō sho no kenkyū" 「竺道生撰法華經疏の研究」 (A study of the *Fahua jing shu* by Zhu Daosheng), *Ōtani Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō* 『大谷大學研究年報』, Vol. 5 (1952); reprinted in *Hokke shisō no kenkyū* 『法華思想の研究』 (Studies in Lotus thought; Heirakuji Shoten 平樂寺書店, 1986), p. 114.
- 13) Ōchō Enichi, "Shoki Chūgoku Bukkyōsha no zenkan no jittai" 「初期中國佛教者の禪觀の實態」 (The realities of meditation among early Chinese Buddhists), in *id.*, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no kenkyū* 『中



- 國佛教の研究』(Studies in Chinese Buddhism), Vol. 1 (Hōzōkan 法藏館, 1958), p. 204.
- 14) Ōchō Enichi, *Hokke shisō no kenkyū*, p. 113.
- 15) Ōchō Enichi, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no kenkyū*, Vol. 1, p. 204.
- 16) Itano Chōhachi 板野長八, “Sōjō no hannya shisō” [僧肇の般若思想] (Sengzhao’s *prajñā* thought), in *Katō hakushi kanreki kinen: Tōyōshi shūsetsu* [加藤博士還曆記念東洋史集説] (Collected studies on Oriental history in commemoration of the 60th birthday of Dr. Katō [Shigeru 繁]; Fusanbō 富山房, 1941), p. 128. The following note is appended to the passage quoted: “This view is shared by Dr. Tokiwa, Dr. Ui, and researchers of Chinese Buddhist doctrine in general.”
- 17) *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p. 129.
- 19) Tsukamoto Zenryū 塚本善隆, *Chūgoku Bukkyō tsūshi* [中國佛教通史] (General history of Chinese Buddhism), Vol. 1 (Suzuki Gakujutsu Zaidan 鈴木學術財團, 1968), p. 296.
- 20) See the passage from the *Gaoseng zhuan* quoted in n. 7.
- 21) These rules for translation are set forth in Daoan’s *Mohe boluoruo boluomi jing chao xu* 摩訶鉢羅若波羅蜜經抄序 (*Chu sanzang ji ji* 8; Taishō 55: 52bc), and they deal with five points in which aspects of the original text are lost when translating from Sanskrit into Chinese (*wushiben* 五失本) and, in view of this, three points in which the original text should not be needlessly modified (*sanbuyi* 三不易).
- 22) See Tsukamoto Zenryū, *op. cit.*, pp. 298, 307.
- 23) Tang Yongtong interprets *ge* 格 in the sense of “measure” (*liang* 量), but in classical usage its most common meanings are “to correct” and “to come/go,” and “to correct the meaning” is probably appropriate as an orthodox interpretation of *geyi* (although in the present article it has been translated as “to match the meaning”). In addition, I would interpret *shu* 數 as not only signifying numerical categories, but also denoting the theoretical principles expressed by such numerical categories. Classical examples of the usage of *shu* can be found in the *Yijing* commentary *Xici* 繫辭 1: 極數知來, 之謂占, 通變, 之謂事, 陰陽不測, 之謂神 (Ekikyō [易經] [Yijing], Vol. 2 [Iwanami Bunko 岩波文庫, 1969], p. 220); 極其數, 遂定天下之象 (*ibid.*, p. 237). Here the numbers of heaven and earth are considered to generate change in all things in heaven and on earth and to effectuate the functions of spirits and of *yin* and *yang*. This idea of “determining numbers” (*jishu* 極數) also had a pronounced influence on Buddhists; cf. Sengzhao’s “penetrating the spirit and determining numbers” (*qiongling jishu* 窮靈極數) in his *Banruo wuzhi lun* 般若無知論 (Taishō 45: 155a ff).
- 24) Ōchō Enichi, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no kenkyū*, Vol. 1, p. 203.
- 25) In addition to the passages quoted in the main text, mention may also be made of two further passages from Daoan’s writings: 要斯法也, 與進度齊軫, 逍遙俱遊, 千行萬定莫不以成衆行 (*Daoxing jing xu* 道行經序 [*Chu sanzang ji ji* 7; Taishō 55: 47a]); 般若波羅蜜者, 無上正眞道之根也。正者等也, 不二入也。等道有三義焉。法身也, 如也, 眞際也。故其爲經也, 以如爲始, 以法身爲宗也。如者爾也。本末等爾, 無能令不爾也。佛之興滅, 綿綿常存, 悠然無寄, 故曰如也。法身者一也, 常淨也 (*He fangguang guangzan lüejie xu* 合放光光讚略解序 [*ibid.*; Taishō 55: 48a]). With regard to questions relating to Daoan’s thought, see Tamaki Kōshirō 玉城康四郎, *Chūgoku Bukkyō shisō no keisei* [中國佛教思想の形成] (The formation of Chinese Buddhist thought), Vol. 1 (Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 1971).
- 26) P. Demiéville suggests *Yogācārabhūmi* as the Sanskrit equivalent of the title of the cognate *Xiuxing daodi (jing)* 修行道地 (經), and because he equates *xiuxing* 修行 with *ācāra*, he suggests *Yogabhūmi* for *Daodi (jing)* 道地 (經); cf. Paul Demiéville, “La *Yogācārabhūmi* de Saṅgharākṣa,” *Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient*, Vol. 44 (1954), pp. 342–343. Yet in his translation of Daoan’s preface, Demiéville gives first *yogācārabhūmi* and then *yogabhūmi* for the two occurrences of the word *daodi* (*ibid.*, pp. 346–347). Because the presence or absence of *ācāra* is not a fundamental issue in the present instance, to be on the safe side I have opted for *Yogabhūmi*.
- 27) Judging from the use later in the same passage of expressions such as *mianmian ruo cun* 綿綿若存 (“subtle yet everlasting, it seems to exist”), *huanghu* 恍惚 (“indistinct”), and *gushen* 谷神 (“spirit of the valley”), the explanation from 微門妙闢 (“Because the entrance is imperceptible, ...”) to 而不滿 (“... it will not be filled.”) is clearly based on the comparison of the Way to the female principle in

- Laozi*, Chaps. 6, 21, etc.
- 28) In the *Banniyuan jing* 般泥洹經 1 (translator unknown) we read: 亦爲自解脫, 度岸得昇仙, 都使諸弟子, 縛解致泥洹 (Taishō 1: 178b).
- 29) See Ōtani Tetsuo 大谷哲夫, “Chūgoku shoki zenkan no kokyūhō to yōjōsetsu no ‘yōki’ ni tsuite—Anpanshuikyō no ryūkō o megutte—” 「中國初期禪觀の呼吸法と養生説の「養氣」について—安般守意經の流行をめぐって—」 (On breathing techniques in early Buddhist meditation in China and the “nourishing of vital energy” in theories of the nourishing of life: With regard to the popularity of the *Anban shouyi jing*), *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 『印度學佛教學研究』, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1968), and *id.*, “Gi-Shindai ni okeru shūzensha no keitai—toku ni shinsenka to no kanren ni oite—” 「魏晉代における習禪者の形態—特に神僊家との關連において—」 (Forms of meditators in the Wei-Jin period: Especially in relation to Daoist immortalists), *ibid.*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1970).
- 30) Cf. An Shigao 安世高, tr., *Foshuo da anban shouyi jing* 佛說大安般守意經 1 (Taishō 15: 163c).
- 31) Tsukamoto Zenryū, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–307; cf. Aramaki Noritoshi 荒牧典俊, “Gi-Shin shisō to shoki Chūgoku Bukkyō shisō—jo—” 「魏晉思想と初期中國德教思想—序—」 (Wei-Jin thought and early Chinese Buddhist thought: An introduction), *Tōhō Gakuhō* 『東方學報』 (Kyōto), No. 47 (1974), p. 109. With regard to “guarding the One,” cf. *Zhuangzi*, “Zaiyou pian” 在宥篇: “I guard the One so as to dwell in harmony.” (我守其一, 以処其和)
- 32) “Daily diminution” is referred to in *Laozi*, Chap. 48, and *Zhuangzi*, “Zhibeiyou pian” 知北遊篇, while “sitting in oblivion” is described in *Zhuangzi*, “Dazongshi pian” 大宗師篇. Daoan’s statement that “one forgets it and forgets it again, thereby reaching non-desire” is presumably based on expressions relating to “daily diminution,” and a view similar to Daoan’s may be found in Guo Xiang’s commentary on the *Zhuangzi*: 夫坐忘者, 奚所不忘哉. 既忘其迹, 又忘其所以迹者. 內不覺其一身, 外不識有天地. 然後曠然與變化爲體, 而無不通也 (*Zhuizi jicheng san: Zhuangzi jishi* 諸子集成三, 莊子集釋 [Collected works of the philosophers 3: Collected commentaries on the *Zhuangzi*; Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1954], p. 128). The concept of “sitting in oblivion” also has overlaps with “sitting at ease” (*yanzuo* 冥坐) in the *Vimalakīrtinīrdeśa-sūtra*; see Itō Takatoshi, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
- 33) The *Fajing jing xu* 法鏡經序 by Kang Senghui contains the following passage: 夫心者, 衆法之原, 滅否之根, 同出異名, 禍福分流 (Taishō 55: 46b).
- 34) This topic is dealt with in particular in Chapter 3 of the *Laozi* and in the *Zhuangzi*, and it was probably a subject of greatest interest to Confucianists too. The debate over the immortality of the soul was also a manifestation of this interest.
- 35) See Sengrui’s *Pimoluojieti jing yishu xu* (Taishō 55: 59a).
- 36) On Sengzhao and Daosheng, see Itō Takatoshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 279ff & 185ff.
- 37) See *ibid.*, p. 301ff.
- 38) Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, *Daruma no goroku* 『達摩の語録』 (Recorded sayings of Bodhidharma; Chikuma Shobō, 1969), p. 5. All quotations from the *Erru sixing lun* are taken from this work.
- 39) *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 40) *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.
- 41) *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 36.
- 42) See Daosheng’s commentary on the *Zhu Weimojie jing* 注維摩詰經 5 (Taishō 38: 373a).
- 43) See Suemitsu Yasumasa 末光愛正, “Kichizō no yuigo-ishū ni tsuite” 「吉藏の唯悟爲宗について」 (On Jizang’s *wei wu wei zong*), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū* 『駒澤大學佛教學部論集』, No. 15 (1984).
- 44) See Yanagida Seizan, “Zekkanron no honbun kenkyū” 「絶觀論の本文研究」 (A textual study of the *Jueguan lun*), *Zengaku Kenkyū* 『禪學研究』, No. 58 (1970), p. 73. For referring to the text of the *Jueguan lun*, the following work is to be recommended: Tokiwa Gishin 常盤義伸 and Yanagida Seizan, *Zekkanron* 『絶觀論』 (*Jueguan lun*; Zen Bunka Kenkyūjo 禪文化研究所, 1973).
- 45) See Itō Takatoshi, *op. cit.*, p. 354.
- 46) In Jizang’s *Jingming xuanlun* 淨名玄論 4 we read: 般若體絕緣觀, 智慧名定於觀 (Taishō 38: 877c), while his *Sanlun yuanyi* 三論玄義 contains the following passage: 外未境智兩泯, 內則緣觀俱寂 (Taishō 45: 2a).
- 47) Kawada Kumatarō 川田熊太郎, *Bukkyō to tetsugaku* 『佛教と哲學』 (Buddhism and philosophy;

- Heirakuji Shoten, 1957), p. 25 ff; in the present instance, see p. 56 ff.
- 48) Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道, *Ryōgakyō* 楞伽經 [*Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*; Daizō Shuppan, 1980], p. 368.
- 49) For a critical examination of the “four supports” (*catuṣ-pratisaraṇa*), which provide the philosophical background for this thesis that the Buddha did not utter a single word, see Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭, “Shie (*catuṣ-pratisaraṇa*) hihan kō josetsu” 「四依 (*catuṣ-pratisaraṇa*) 批判考序説」 (An introductory critique of the four supports [*catuṣ-pratisaraṇa*]), in *id.*, *Hongaku shisō hihan* 本覺思想批判 (A critique of original enlightenment thought; Daizō Shuppan, 1989).
- 50) Suzuki Daisetsu already equates the *zong* of *Chan zong* 禪宗 (“Chan school”) with the *zong* of *zongtong* 宗通 in the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*; see Suzuki Daisetsu *zenshū* 鈴木大拙全集 (Complete works of Suzuki Daisetsu), Vol. 2 (*Zen shisō shi kenkyū* 禪思想史研究 [Studies in the history of Chan thought], 2; Iwanami Shoten, 1968), p. 37.
- 51) *Lengqie aboduoluo bao jing* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 2 (Taishō 16: 489a), 4 (*ibid.*: 510c).
- 52) See Hirakawa Akira 平川 彰, *Daijōkishinron* 大乘起信論 [*Dacheng qixin lun*; Daizō Shuppan, 1973], p. 339. The “four faiths” consist of faith in the “ultimate source” and the Three Jewels.
- 53) Takemura Makio 竹村牧男, “Daijōkishinron no shin ni tsuite—shinge Daijō no tenkai” 「大乘起信論の信について—信解大乘の展開」 (On faith in the *Dacheng qixin lun*: The development of belief in the Mahāyāna), in *Takasaki Jikidō hakushi kanreki kinen ronshū: Indogaku Bukkyōgaku ronshū* 高崎直道博士還暦記念論集 インド學佛教學論集 (Collected essays in honour of Dr. Takasaki Jikidō's 60th birthday: Collected essays on Indology and Buddhology; Shunjūsha, 1987).
- 54) See Hakamaya Noriaki, “*Hōshōron* ni okeru shin no kōzō hihan” 「『寶性論』における信の構造批判」 (A critique of the structure of faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*), in *id.*, *Hongaku shisō hihan*, especially the “Postscript” (p. 272).
- 55) Kumārajīva's equivalents are both taken from his translation of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Hakamaya translates *adhimukti* as “acceptance”; see Hakamaya Noriaki, “Shōtoku Taishi no wa no shisō hihan” 「聖徳太子の和の思想批判」 (A critique of Prince Shōtoku's idea of harmony), *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō Gakubu Ronshū*, No. 20 (1989), p. 102.
- 56) See Itō Takatoshi, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
- 57) Suzuki Daisetsu, *op. cit.*, p. 69. On Zongmi's explanation, see Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄, *Zengen shosen shū tojo* 禪源諸詮集都序 [*Chanyuan zhuquan ji douxu*; Chikuma Shobō, 1971], p. 116.
- 58) On the “four practices,” see Yanagida Seizan, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
- 59) Hirakawa Akira, *op. cit.*, p. 346.
- 60) Yanagida Seizan, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[This article was translated by Rolf W. Giebel.]

