

Ahmed Ferid: A Forgotten Young Turk Intellectual

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At their first congress held in Paris in 1902, the Young Turks proceeded to split into two factions: one supporting power concentrated in a centralized government and opposing intervention by foreign powers, the other calling for diffusion of power regionally and foreign intervention for the sake of reform. The former faction was at the outset in the minority, but in 1907 took the leadership of the movement in conjunction with a Salonika group of young military officers, bureaucrats and teachers called the Ottoman Freedom Society. Then from the time of the revolution in 1908, this centralization/anti-intervention faction captured the dominant position among the Young Turks.¹⁾ However, the centralization faction, or the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP), continued to meet with opposition as it grew nearer and neared to power, and even when it eventually grabbed it. From the time of the split in the Movement at the Paris Congress, Prens Sabahaddin (1879-1948) was representative of those who opposed a "powerful state," arguing for priority to be given to individual initiative and regional separation of power.²⁾ As an opposing force to the CUP in this respect, however, he seemed to support any opposition group whatever its ideals happened to be. Furthermore, he was at that time not directly involved in politics nor did he desire to take responsibility for them. He was also no supporter of the tide of Turkish nationalism that was rising at the time.

The present paper will take up a different sort of figure in the Young Turk Movement, an all but forgotten activist by the name of Ahmed Ferid [Tek] (4 March 1878-25 November 1971), who at the outset sided with the centralization faction and played an important role in the development of Turkish nationalism,³⁾ but gradually became critical of the CUP. Here we will take up his activism and ideas mainly during the first two decades of the twentieth century. As Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), a contemporary intellectual and immigrant from the Russian territory, accurately pointed out, the nationalism of the Ottomans could not easily free itself from the phantom called "the Ottoman people."⁴⁾ Moreover, the advocates of centralized government, while aiming at the birth of such an Ottoman people through the formation of an equal, homogeneous nation, were in danger of having to resort to a program for "Ottomanizing" its citizenry. In the present paper, the activities and ideas of Ahmed Ferid will be examined as one possibility for freeing Turkey from the pipe dream of an "Ottoman nation."

I. Ahmed Ferid Prior to the Young Turk Revolution⁵⁾

Ahmed Ferid was born in Bursa on 4 March 1878⁶⁾ to the family of a chief accountant, Mustafa Reşid. His mother, Hanife Leyla, was adopted by the Âsim family of Cadi after the martyrdom of her father, İbrahim Ağa. Ferid would spend the winter at the family home in Istanbul and summer in a cottage in Bursa while his father traveled throughout the Empire performing his financial duties; but when he reached school age, he moved back to Istanbul permanently and rode a white Egyptian donkey back and forth to primary school. He enjoyed sailing in the Golden Horn and horseback riding in Kâğthane.

He decided on the army as his career and went through a curriculum that included the Military Prep School, the Military Academy, graduating at the head of his class, and enrollment in the Military Staff College. From his prep school days, he had been a friend of Yusuf Akçura, who had moved from the outskirts of Kazan. However, in 1896 Ferid was jailed for his participation in the Young Turk Movement and was arrested again the following year and sent to prison in Tripoli. Later he was reinstated in the Army and ordered to serve at staff headquarters in Tripoli with the rank of lieutenant. At that time Tripoli had become a crossroads for the constitutionalist faction, which included the chiefs of staff. It was assistant chief of staff Mazharpaşazade Şevket who organized the Tripoli branch of CUP and whose daughter would become Ferid's wife. With their support, Ferid in 1899 escaped with Akçura to Paris via Tunis, and after settling down in France, he enrolled along with his friend in École des Sciences Politiques and studied there for three years. He graduated with honors (seventh in his class) in 1903.

In Paris Ferid naturally joined with other members of the Young Turks and played an instrumental role at their First Congress held in February 1902. Opposition had already surfaced prior to the Congress between the decentralist/intervention faction headed by Prens Sabahaddin and İsmail Kemal, which called for acceptance of cooperation and intervention by foreign powers and harmony with non-Turkish peoples, and the centralist/anti-intervention faction of Ahmed Rıza, which opposed such ideas. Ferid backed the centralist faction, wrote the draft of a rebuttal to İsmail Kemal before the Congress, and during the gathering was one of most vocal critics of the decentralist faction, playing a leading role in the factionalism that divided the Young Turk Movement.⁷⁾

This young and talented army officer who chose the politics of the centralist faction would then write for the newspaper *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, which was published that April, and later for Abdullah Cevdet's (1869-1932) journal *İctihad*.⁸⁾ In the fall of 1903, after paying a visit to his friend Akçura in Kazan, Ferid could not return to Istanbul, but headed for Cairo, another center of the Young Turk Movement, and went to work managing the assets of several wealthy

Turks living there. In 1907 he married Müfîde, the daughter of one of his military patrons, Mazharpaşazade Şevket, in Alexandria.

We know very little of Ferid's career as a writer during his days in Egypt, except that in the first issue of *İctihad* published in Geneva by Abdullah Cevdet, he appears in a long editorial on pages two through ten, but the nature of his relationship to either the journal or its publisher is not clear.

Ferid begins his piece by decrying the twenty-eight year despotic reign of Abdülhamid II as a decadent embarrassment to the fatherland. Many who are dissatisfied with the present situation are content with merely badmouthing the Sultan and his retinue, he stated; and the powers that be have won their complacency by throwing them bits of money and social privilege for the past twenty-eight years, twenty-six of which Ferid had experienced.⁹⁾ Demonstrating his acquaintance with French positivist science, Ferid goes on to say that in order to break through this stalemate, it is necessary to study and analyze the society of the Turks, who make up the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire. He then mentions results of the research he carried on in Paris on the foundations of Turkish nationalism, i.e. Turkology, beginning with the ancient nomadic people who drove their herds on China's northern border and concluding with the rise and present decline of the Ottoman Empire. He explains that the original intent of the Ottoman sultanate was to invade and conquer neighboring lands so that it could maintain its herds and continue the way of life enjoyed by its ancestors. This sultanate ignored the social organization, customs and ways of life of those peoples it conquered, and above all refused to heed any progressive ideas. Turkish heroes of yesteryear relished war for its own sake, and it is the many useless and unnecessary campaigns of violence we waged in the past that have caused all the problems facing the Empire today. Moreover, at the height of such foolishness stand those who continue to claim in all their idiotic pomposity and arrogance that a nation with such a glorious past will never fall.¹⁰⁾

We can conclude from this editorial that first, Ferid had during his studies in Paris become imbued with the consciousness of a Turk with a long national heritage, which to his shame had been defamed through the hatred and prejudice of Europeans. Secondly, try as he may to defend his heritage, the reality created by the Empire itself belied any such attempt.¹¹⁾

Something had to be done to correct the present situation, and the publication of *İctihad* was thought to be a good start. Its role was considered to be twofold: "First and most importantly, we want to wake up the nation and shut out the corruption and immorality outlined above; and secondly, we need to show the European community that we have the ability to go forward progressively."¹²⁾

Ferid's words represent a common way of thinking among his contemporary Ottoman intellectuals with experience living in the West, and so probably offered nothing new to his readers. However, what follows suggests that some-

thing new was taking place within this young intellectual who had supported centralization at the Paris Congress of 1902. On the occasion of a new journal appearing on the scene, Ferid criticizes various periodicals already in publication, taking up, for example, the way in which Ottoman writers were addressing the Armenian question. In sum, they were finding the Armenian rebellion difficult to understand, because, even if the Armenians did obtain autonomy, they would be instantly gobbled up by the Russian Empire, thus losing their national identity. On the other hand, they could enjoy a national identity under Ottoman rule.¹³⁾

Ferid responds by saying that such thinking “has ignored one important point: national character that has been developed for thousands of years can hardly be lost in a few or even a few hundred. . . . What they have really lost at our hands are numerous lives.”¹⁴⁾ Concerning the Armenian rebellion, which for him was irrefutable, he states, “No one is capable of quelling discontent over oppression.”¹⁵⁾ According to Ferid, nothing but ill is in store for the Ottoman Empire under the present situation. In other words, his fundamental stance is that above all we ourselves have got to do something about changing the present situation.

Now with respect to exactly what changes were to be made, he first takes up the question of whether the Constitution should be revived, asking in a level-headed manner, “How could a set of laws that could not guarantee prosperity and happiness 27 years ago guarantee them now?”¹⁶⁾ No, the old Constitution will not do, only self-reform can bring about any changes in the present state of affairs. Merely repeating meaningless anti-government slogans and praising the glories of yesteryear, or even criticizing the view favoring intervention and assistance (*müdâhale ve muavenet*) from abroad is not the answer; what is necessary is to first raise one’s own educational standards to realize personal initiative (*teşebbüs-i şahsî*).¹⁷⁾

On this point of raising educational standards, which foreshadows Ferid’s later zeal in establishing the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*), while it is interesting that he brought it up, it is also in danger of falling into a banal discussion. Instead we should take notice of his wording here. That is to say, “intervention and assistance from abroad” symbolized the stance taken by the decentralist faction at the time that Ferid attacked the ideas of Prens Sabahaddin at the Paris Congress of 1902. Furthermore, the phrase “personal initiative” can be said to have been an important slogan of that same Prens Sabahaddin. The anger felt towards those who could only oppose the Ottoman government and its leader on the surface gave rise in Ferid to a certain understanding towards those who were building a nationalist movement, and no doubt began to wake up in him the cool and calm realization that it was no longer possible to hold on to a pure, idealistic version of centralized governance.

On the other hand, we should not forget that Ferid was after all an

Ottoman himself. For example, in April and May of 1904, during approximately the same time that Ferid was writing the editorial for the first issue of *İctihad*, his friend Yusuf Akçura was writing a series of articles for the Cairo newspaper *Türk* entitled "Three Ways of Policy (*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*)," to which Ali Kemal (1867-1922) wrote a rebuttal refuting the author on every one of his points. Ferid wrote an editorial in which he criticized Kemal's attack, while at the same time commenting that he did not agree with his friend's views.¹⁸⁾ This now famous article of Akçura can be summarized in the following two points. First, it was impossible for all the people residing in the Ottoman Empire to be enculturated and socialized as Ottomans; and secondly, the best path that the Empire could take would be to unify all of the Turkic peoples into one body.

In response to these two points, Ferid first expressed understanding and sympathy towards his friend's pan-Turkism; however, he stated that no one would dare adopt such a proposal, for his point about "Ottomanization," the argument's underlying assumption, was not completely convincing. Ferid held great hopes in the possibility of pan-Turkism for the future; but "today it is a totally new, premature idea far removed from being of any benefit to present day Ottoman politics."¹⁹⁾ In addition, pan-Turkism "exists almost nowhere in this day and age, so how can anyone benefit from something that doesn't exist?"²⁰⁾

Eventually, Ferid was unable to accept Akçura's stinging point about the futility of policies to form an "Ottoman Nation" and enculturate all the ethnic minorities in the ways of their rulers. This, according to Ferid, was the policy being pursued by the Ottoman government since Tanzimat, which "promises no spectacular breakthroughs in the future, but for the time being it is the easiest and most beneficial course of action."²¹⁾ There is no question that Ferid realized in his calm and cool manner the impossibility of supporting all the existing boundaries of the Empire and Ottomanizing all the ethnic peoples living within those borders; but at the same time, he states, "We devote our thought to protecting and enculturating all the people that remain under our rule."²²⁾ This was for him the only realistic approach; and realistic approaches ("*opportuniste*" *lik*) were those most beneficial in the world of politics.²³⁾

Here we can appreciate Ferid's maturation as a cool thinker of multi-visual talents who thoroughly understood the importance of ideals, but at the same time gave priority to what works in reality. His attitude of discarding simple political centralization theories and adopting in part the arguments of Prens Sabahaddin is an excellent example of such intellectual growth. However, we cannot ignore the fact that Ferid neither refuted nor even criticized enculturation policies supported by simple centralization theories. Despite his sympathy for the Armenian nationalist movement, Ferid's support of enculturation policies expresses well the dilemma that the Ottoman Empire was facing at that time. It is possible that he was thinking of such policies as applicable to the

Muslim population residing in the Empire.²⁴⁾ This position was taken within a situation resembling that of the Ottoman nationalists during the 1910s, who while identifying themselves as Turks and clearly conscious of the existence of a multi-ethnic Empire, understood the situation within the framework of the empire as a Muslim state headed by a caliph.

One more of Ferid's editorials written while he was in Egypt is a short article on the problem of succession to the sultanate published in *İctihad* in 1905. It was inspired by the rumor that Abdülhamid II was planning to hand over the sultanate to his son, and argued against such a move, saying that legislation concerning succession should be passed, guaranteeing a livelihood to sons other than the heir apparent and insuring their interest as well in the welfare of the people.²⁵⁾

Ferid was married in 1907, and during the next July the Constitution was revived in the Ottoman Empire, which was incentive enough for him to return to Istanbul.

II. Ahmed Ferid During the Second Constitutional Period

We are not very clear about Ferid's activities immediately following the revival of constitutional government, but we do know that he taught political history at the Civil Service School (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*) from 1908 to 1913.²⁶⁾ He returned to Istanbul in 1908, but we do not know on what date; then in November his close friend Yusuf Akçura moved to Istanbul and took the initiative in founding the Turkish Society (*Türk Derneği*), but there is no record of Ferid being involved at that time, his name not being listed among the founding members.²⁷⁾ The only information we have is that he was elected as the deputy from Kütahya on 19 November 1909 in a by-election.²⁸⁾

However, even within CUP, it was the Salonika faction who rose to power after leading a successful revolution and pacifying the anti-revolutionary forces in April 1909, while the returning Young Turk expatriots played no major role, with the exception of Dr. Nâzım and Bahâeddin Şâkir.²⁹⁾ Even Ahmed Rıza, leader of the centralist faction, was shelved as president of the Lower House, and by his request Ferid was appointed, before his election, bureau chief of clerical affairs in the Lower House, a position that could not do justice to his true talents.

It is said that Ferid had contributed articles to the newspaper *Şûra-yı Ümmet* since his days in exile.³⁰⁾ What is noteworthy here is the memoir of Dr. Rıza Nur (1879-1942) concerning this time, stating that at the stage prior to the anti-revolution in April 1909, an anti-CUP faction was gradually amassing centering around the editorial pages of the *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, and the major contributors were "Ambassador Ferid" and Samipaşazade Sezâî (1859-1936) who since 1906 had been the editor in chief of this paper.³¹⁾ This Ambassador Ferid, who

served later in London, Warsaw and Tokyo after the founding of the Republic, is none other than our own Ahmed Ferid, which means that he had expressed anti-CUP sentiments from a rather early stage in his career. However, only one of his *Şûra-yı Ümmet* editorials remains: a piece describing the oppressive measures of Stolypin in Finland, the staunch opposition to this voiced by Kadet, and resistance among the Finnish people.³²⁾ Now let us look at Ferid's activities in the political world of 1909 and after.

In December 1909 debate broke out in Parliament over the so-called "Lynch question," involving a merger between the Lynch Company, a British firm that since 1840 had held a monopoly over shipping on the Euphrates River, and the Ottoman Empire's Hamidiye Company.³³⁾ In addition, the raging issue of alcohol regulation was causing a great deal of uproar in Parliament.³⁴⁾ Due to criticism from within CUP of the Government's position on both issues, Grand Vezir Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa was forced to resign his post. Ferid and Rıza Nur were among the critics.³⁵⁾

As opposition mounted against the CUP in 1910, those leaving the party formed the People's Party (*Ahali Fırkası*) in February, officially confirming the rift that was tearing CUP apart. Fearing the revival of anti-revolutionary activity, CUP took oppressive measures in dealing with its critics, which backfired and gave even more impetus to the anti-CUP movement. In September the Ottoman Socialist Party (*Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası*) was formed, and during 1911 factionalism continued to divide the inner ranks of CUP, no doubt in the form of the New Party (*Hizbi Cedid*) and the Progress Party (*Hizbi Terakki*), but little is known about either's members or activities.³⁶⁾ Concerning the latter, the April 5 issue of *Jeune Turc* mentions that it was comprised of seven deputies, including Rıza Nur, Dr. Rıza Tevfik [Bölükbaşı] (1869-1949) and Ferid.³⁷⁾ The CUP tried loosening its hard-line centralist policies in an attempt to appease the opposing factions, but as a result, in 1910 drew even more distrust of chief martial law administrator Mahmud Şevket Paşa (1856-1913) who ordered the repression of the Albanian rebellion of 1910, resulting in a significant loss of political power.³⁸⁾

Under such conditions, Ferid in his opposition to the CUP centralists by no means supported the arguments of the military faction that was also pressuring CUP. Instead, he spoke out together with Albanian deputies against the continuing military repression of the Albanian uprising,³⁹⁾ and concerning the Balkan question, he stated, "[the peoples of the Balkans] will sooner or later drive us out of Rumelia or the eastern Balkan provinces. Rather than be ousted in such a way, we should abandon Rumelia and concentrate our efforts in Anatolia,"⁴⁰⁾ thus expressing surprising foresight on the point that the Ottomans had ruled the region for 600 years, a statement made at a time when Rumelia stood in the minds of the Ottomans as region equal in importance to Anatolia and before the Ottoman pessimism that would set in after the Balkan Wars. Furthermore,

after the Wars, Ferid proposed that the capital should be moved to Anatolia and recommended Kayseri as his choice.⁴¹⁾ These statements are worthy of note within the context of the continuity and change in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. In September 1911, when Italy invaded Tripoli, Ferid praised the military technological superiority of the Italians, in comparison to the poor conditions of the Ottoman army.⁴²⁾

In November 1911, the Freedom and Accord Party (*Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası*; hereafter FAP) was founded as the largest opposition party of the Second Constitutional Period. Due to their continuing criticism of the CUP leadership, Ferid's colleagues Rıza Nur and Rıza Tevfik participated in the FAP's founding. During that same month, Minister of War Mahmud Şevket Paşa was summoned by Parliament to explain the extension of martial law, but Paşa refused to appear, causing an uproar among irate deputies, including Ferid, Nur and Tevfik, who denounced him as a dictator in cahoots with CUP. While his critical attitude towards CUP had become very clear at that time, Ferid chose not to follow his two colleagues and join the largest opposition party. Following the incident, as opposition grew steadily fiercer between CUP and FAP, the Sultan appealed to non-affiliated, neutral deputies to conciliate the two parties. Ferid was included in this group. At its inception, in which Prens Sabahaddin had played a leading role, FAP showed itself to be a cosmopolitan party opposed to nationalism, a position that no doubt caused Ferid, who had been baptized and confirmed in the robes of Turkish nationalism, to avoid joining FAP.⁴³⁾ It is also ironic that many supporters of nationalism were members of CUP that Ferid was so critical of. Ferid's position was a subtle and delicate one: while a nationalist himself, he understood and supported the rights of non-Turkish peoples; and while critical of CUP on specific points of controversy, he was not ready to join a party in complete opposition to it. His position would be eaten away by both pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist positions, and maybe even completely co-opted by membership in either party. Therefore, Ferid decided to found his own party.

III. The National Constitutional Party and Decentralization Nationalism

Only one month after its founding, FAP, in December 1911, won the Istanbul by-election.⁴⁴⁾ In reaction, one month later CUP dissolved Parliament and announced a general plebiscite, known as the "big stick election," in which it used every political form of intervention imaginable to win a majority in the new Parliament. Ferid was not reelected.

These CUP tactics gave rise to deep feelings of frustration and doubt concerning constitutional government itself and its apparent upholder, CUP, resulting in a group of junior military officers taking action and forming during May and June 1912 the Savior Officers Group (*Halâskâr Zâbitân Grubu*).⁴⁵⁾ In June, once pacified Albania rose again in rebellion demanding full regional autono-

my. In the midst of this crisis, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa (1839-1918) was appointed Grand Vezir in July, and CUP was driven from the seat of power. Moreover, at the demand of the Savior Officers, Parliament was dissolved and CUP repressed.

In the midst of such political tension, Ahmed Ferid formed the National Constitutional Party (*Millî Meşrutiyet Fırkası*; hereafter NCP) on 5 July 1912.⁴⁶⁾ The NCP was to be known as the first nationalist-Turkist political party to be formed during the Second Constitutional Period; and even though it was anti-CUP, it was by no means welcomed by the cosmopolitan Freedom and Accord Party, which called the NCP's founding "an extreme blunder (*fahiş bir hata*)" and "playing with danger (*tehlikeli bir oyun*)."⁴⁷⁾ On the other side, CUP looked upon NCP as a harmful detriment to the whole *Osmanlılık* system.⁴⁸⁾ Whether on the side of centralization (CUP) or regional decentralization (FAP), to stress "Turkishness" was equivalent to calling for the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Rather than FAP, which showed no understanding toward ethnic consciousness, it was nationalists like Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) who belonged to CUP, that despite their dreams of an Ottoman nation, could be called closest to Ferid out of the two great parties.⁴⁹⁾ Yusuf Akçura praised his friend Ferid's new party, saying that denouncing in its statements enculturation policies towards the Arab regions, Albania and Rumelia showed a boldness to dare separate from Tanzimatism.⁵⁰⁾

Let us now look at what differences existed between CUP and Ferid's NCP, or rather between Ferid and CUP's leading nationalist Ziya Gökalp. In order to make the points of difference a little more concrete, let us begin with a review of Ferid's ideas about Turkish nationalism. In *Nevasal-i Millî*, published in 1914, Ferid, in an appeal aimed directly at the younger members of Turkish Hearth, a nationalist organization which appointed him its first chairman, presented what he felt it took to be a nationalist. While looking back upon his career up until that time, he explained in the most concise and clear terms the way he himself thought as a nationalist.

Ferid thoroughly supported Turkish Hearth and what it stood for. Later he would realize that Ottoman sovereignty was mere another name for Turkish sovereignty, and that what supported the Ottoman Empire at its roots was the Anatolian Turks, in the same way that the German people were the foundation of the Hapsburg Empire. And it was for this reason that the activities of Turkish Hearth, which was striving to correct the difficult situation that the Turks had fallen into, continued to have extremely deep significance for him. In his use of the term "*mefkûre*" to express "ideal" shows the influence of Ziya Gökalp on his ideas, while the use of the term "*ırk*" to mean "nation" follows the lead of Yusuf Akçura, who first employed the term in that sense.⁵¹⁾ Nevertheless, overall, the discussion is rather plain.

It was only later that Ferid would rise above such mediocrity; he then calls

upon Turkish Hearth to adopt the self-restraint of reason, explaining, "Why? Because he who uses a sharp sword must above all avoid attacking the wrong target."⁵²⁾ Ferid was well aware of nationalism's potential to injure innocent others, and thus warns the youth of Turkish Hearth not to pursue their dreams wildly by rushing into "Mesopotamia or Canaan, or Iran or Turan for that matter." The former two regions mentioned here refer to Arab lands within the Ottoman Empire, the latter two to Turkic regions outside the Ottoman sphere. As to how the peoples living in these regions should be treated by the Ottoman Turks, Ferid states,

In actuality, what is to be gained by tromping around in the Arabian desert with one's mind filled with fantasies and illusions? We must free ourselves completely from the mistaken dreams of Ottomanization politics. Why? Because we have already seen how just a bit of selfishness on our part can cause bloodshed and bring much harm down upon us. Therefore, if the Turks desire not to lose more than what they have lost already, they must genuinely to befriend their Arab neighbors, respected brothers in Islam. We must honor their ethnic sphere from Aleppo to Kirkuk and limit our nationalist activities to the regions north of their borders.⁵³⁾

And again,

If this is true for people living within national borders and affairs among their various ethnic peoples, then it must be also true for people outside those borders and affairs among sovereign states. . . . The dream of Turan, while today only the dream of a single region, is at the same time unduly threatening and irritating politicians in Russia.⁵⁴⁾

Ferid is here issuing important warnings about both domestic politics and foreign diplomacy. The "sharp sword" of nationalism when employed in errant fashion will wound other nations, irritate one's neighbors, and eventually cause injury to the swordsman himself. In concrete terms, domestically, it is not necessary to force Turkification upon the Arab peoples within Ottoman borders; internationally, it is not necessary to irritate and threaten the government in Moscow, which embraces so many Turkic people within its borders. "To insure victory, the ideals of the Turks should be based on both moderation and scrupulous care in both domestic and foreign politics."⁵⁵⁾

In the vilification of the Ottoman Empire's policy to enculturate non-Turkic, Muslim peoples within its borders Ferid's thinking clearly differs from that of Gökalp,⁵⁶⁾ and in his disagreement with pan-Turkism and call for discretion in dealing with Russia, his ideas are in conflict with those of Akçura. For Ferid, the protection of the fatherland means first "the iron benchmarks pound-

ed into soil on the Turk borderlines” at Edirne, Rize, Rhodes and Süleymaniye.⁵⁷⁾ Secondly, regions should be then added to the fatherland that are inhabited by Arabs, Kurds and Armenians being admitted as decentralized local authorities under Ottoman sovereignty. It was Ferid’s opinion that not only the Arabs, but also the other non-Turkic peoples within the four corners of Turk-held territory should be treated with prudence. He states,

We would not be able to walk this indigenous Turkish soil of ours without fear. Even here care must be taken to be moderate, and we must be ready to bear anguish and make sacrifices when the situation demands. It is not necessary to treat the Kurds, and especially the Armenians, peoples in our midst who stand in insignificantly small numbers compared to the Turks, with either compulsory goodwill or severity, but rather to endow them with privileges and benefits.⁵⁸⁾

In this way Ferid is urging a type of nationalism that takes into consideration the taking of precautions in avoiding inter-ethnic clashes that become a possibility whenever nation forming is forced upon people. There is also contained in the agenda of the National Constitutional Party a commitment to allowing each province in the Empire to exercise as much autonomous authority as possible.⁵⁹⁾ As a matter of fact, the Province Law passed in March 1913, which was praised for decentralizing specific powers wherever possible, while retaining authority at the center,⁶⁰⁾ was originally drafted by Ferid before the “big stick” election of 1912.⁶¹⁾

As to the factors contributing to such a wise, easy-going version of nationalism, we should first cite Ferid’s friendship with Akçura. After seeing the strong reaction on the part of Turkic peoples in Russian territories against oppressive measures there to Russianize them, nation forming via enculturation became for Ferid clearly an impossible task. However, at the same time, Ferid was a deep thinking realist. Recall his criticism of an editorial written by Akçura during his days in Egypt, stating that since opportunism is the most important thing in politics, pan-Turkism is too far removed from reality. In his address to the youth of Turkish Hearth, he urged them not “to hold on to visions filled with empty illusions” (*hayalâta adem-i rağbet*) or “become obsessed with ideas of ignorant adventurers (*câhil cesûrlarımızın zannettikleri gibi çılgınca olmak*).” Rather, he reiterated the importance of prudence and moderation in phrases like “[politics means] the will to live in wisdom instead of sacrificing one’s life foolishly (*akıllıca ölmemeğe ve yaşamağa sa’y eylemektir*).”⁶²⁾

However, as of the beginning of 1913, it seems that Ferid had abandoned opportunism, as he stepped up his criticism of the ruling CUP, and as a result had the NCP organ *İfham* closed by the order of Cemal (1872-1922), director general of the Defense Corps of Istanbul. He then began publishing another

newspaper entitled *Vazife*, but when he carried an article written by Prens Sabahaddin, his presses were shut down again.⁶³ Later he was exiled to Bursa for a time⁶⁴, then in June 1913, when Mahmud Şevket Paşa was assassinated, Cemal began a quick and thorough rounding up of all anti-CUP elements, putting 102 political prisoners on a ship and exiling them to Sinop on the Black Sea coast.⁶⁵ Not even the friendship that existed between Ferid and Talât (1874-1921), a figure at the highest echelons of power along with Cemal and Enver (1881-1922), could save him from this large-scale purge.⁶⁶ For the next five years he would be removed from Istanbul, finally reaching his destination of exile in Bilecik, a southwestern Anatolian town.⁶⁷ In other words, Ferid was effectively kept out of politics until the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

In December 1919 at the former offices of *İfham*, Ferid, along with other colleagues like Mehmed Emin [Yurdakıl] (1869-1944) and Ahmed Hikmet [Müftüoğlu] (1870-1927) who had kept their distance from CUP, while cooperating with Ferid in the interest of promoting Turkish nationalism, founded the National Turkish Party (*Millî Türk Fırkası*).⁶⁸ Then after the Party disbanded in the midst of the occupation of Istanbul and the growth of the resistance movement in Anatolia, Ferid joined forces with Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) and became a member of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Then in 1925 Ferid was appointed to a series of ambassadorships, which took him to Warsaw, London and Tokyo for 18 years until 1943.

In addition to the task taken up in this paper of tracing the thought of Ahmed Ferid through his editorials written in such periodicals as *İfham*, *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, and *İctihad*, there is also the task which lies before us of studying his relationship with Mustafa Kemal after the founding of the Republic.

Notes

- 1) Concerning the Young Turk Movement, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak İctihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (1889-1902)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1985; id., *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: OUP, 1995. On the political situation following the Revolution, see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- 2) On Prens Sabahaddin, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Prens Sabahattin*. İstanbul, 1954; Nezahet Nurettin Ege, *Prens Sabahattin: Hayatı ve İlmî Müdafaaları*. İstanbul: Güneş, 1977.
- 3) He was the first chairman of the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*), one of the most important nationalist organizations from the Second Constitutional Period into the early days of the Republic. Concerning this organization see, Yusuf Sarımay, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları 1912-1931*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 1992; Yusuf Bayraktutan, *Türk Fikir Tarihinde Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*. Ankara, 1996; Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 1997. For the early phase of this organization, see also Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992, pp. 71-82.
- 4) A. Y., "Tanzimatçılık Aleyhine," *Türk Yurdu*, III/11, 1913, pp. 349-352. See also Arai,

Turkish Nationalism, pp. 57-65.

- 5) This section relies heavily on the following sources concerning the career of Ahmed Ferid. "Ahmed Ferid Bey," *Nevasal-i Milli: 1329-1330*. İstanbul, 1914, pp. 184-191; Necati Akder, "Seçkin Vatansöver, Büyük Milliyetçi, Değerli Fikir ve Mefkûre Adamı Ahmed Ferid Tek Üfûl Etti!" *Türk Kültürü*, no. 110, 1971, pp. 116-128; Emel Esin, "Kayıplar: Ahmed Ferid Tek," *ibid.*, pp.137-142; François Georgeon, *Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*. Paris: Éditions ADPF, 1980.
- 6) Ferid's daughter, Emel Esin, in a memorial statement printed in *Türk Kültürü* puts the year of his birth at Rumi 1294/A.D. 1877, but in the same issue, a memorial article written by Necati Akder cites *Nevasal-i Milli* (published in 1914) stating Rumi 23 February 1293/A.D. 8 March 1876 as Ferid's date of birth. On further examination of the source, *Nevasal-i Milli* contains a picture of Ferid, his handwriting and an article authored by him, and therefore should be accepted as authoritative; however, Akder's calculation of the Western date for Rumi 23 February 1293 is not accurate and should be corrected to A.D. 4 March 1878 (Akder, *op. cit.*, p. 116; Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 137; *Nevasal-i Milli*, p. 184.). Incidentally, Emel Esin would later mention in another publication that her father lived from 1878 to 1972, this time getting his date of death wrong, but the date of birth is correct according to our calculations (Emel Esin, "Yusuf Akçura Hakkında Bilinmeyen Kaynaklar ve F. Georgeon'un Araştırması," *Türk Kültürü*, nos. 200-202, 1979, p. 428.). For more details on *Nevasal-i Milli*, see *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7, İstanbul: Dergâh, 1990, pp. 49-51.
- 7) *Nevasal-i Milli*, p. 185; Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 138; Hanioglu, *Young Turks*, pp. 187, 190, 191.
- 8) A.B. Kuran writes that after the Paris Congress it was decided that one "Ferid Bey" would be the principle writer for the *Şûra-yı Ümmet* (Ahmed Bedevî Kuran, *İnkılâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*. İstanbul: Tan, 1945, p. 154.). We think in all likelihood this Ferid Bey was none other than Ahmed Ferid; however, at the time this newspaper was first published, April 1902, Ahmed Ferid was, according to our information, still studying in Paris.
- 9) F., "Bir Musahabe," *İctihad*, no.1, 1904, p. 2/a-2/b.
- 10) *ibid.*, pp. 3/a-4/b.
- 11) Such a mentality may be directly linked to the historical view held by the early Turkish Republic giving little worth to the achievements of the Ottoman Empire. Concerning such a view, see Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de 'Resmî Tarih' Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*. İstanbul: AFA, 1992. (Particularly chapters 4, 5, and 6.)
- 12) *Birinci ve en ehemmiyetlisi milleti ikaz ederek musahabemizin başında arzettiğimiz seyyi'ate karşı bir sed çekmek. İkincisi de Avrupalılara terakkiye olan kabiliyetimizi göstermek.* (F., "Bir Musahabe," p. 7/b.)
- 13) *ibid.*, p. 9/a.
- 14) *Birkaç bin seneden beri yaşamakta bulunan bir milliyet ne birkaç senede ne de birkaç yüz senede ortadan kalkabilir.....Bizde gaybettikleri, doğrudan doğruya hayat! (ibid.)*
- 15) *İşyan meselesine gelince zulümden şikâyeti kimse men'edemez. (ibid.)*
- 16) *Acaba bundan yirmi yedi sene evvel sa'âdetimizi te'min edememiş olan bu kanun bundan sonrası için bu sa'âdeti te'min edebilecek mi? (ibid., p. 10/a.)*
- 17) *ibid.*, p. 10/a-b.
- 18) Akçuraoglu Yusuf, "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset," *Türk*, nos. 24, 26, 27, 1904; Ali Kemal, "Cevabımız," *Türk*, 1904; Ahmed Ferid, "Bir Mektup," *Türk*, no. 34, 1904. Later this article was published along with later papers in a book entitled *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kader, 1327(1911/12), which is the source used here.
- 19) *Evet! Türkleri tevhid siyaseti bir talih-i müstakbele malik olsa da, bugün henüz pek yeni, pek turfanda, her ne türlü olursa olsun siyaset-i Osmanîyeye celb-i fâ'ide edebilmekten pek uzak olduğu için....* (Ahmed Ferid, "Bir Mektup," in *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, p. 49.)
- 20) *Türkler ittihadî politikası âtiyen daha kavi, daha tâlihli, fakat bugün hemen gayr-i mevcuddur. Mevcud olmayan şeyden istifâde edilemez. (ibid., p. 60.)*

- 21) *Milliyet-i Osmaniye siyaseti bunların aksine olarak âtiyen pek parlak neticeler va'd etmese de eylem en sehlü'l-ia'kib, en ziyade müfid bir politikadır. (ibid.)*
- 22) *Biz tekmil elimizdekini müdâfaa ve temsile, siyaset-i Osmaniye'yi ta'kibe hasr-ı efsar eyleriz. Muvaffak olduğumuz kadarı bize kalır, kalmayanı gider; hükmi-kader veya ilcâ-yı kanun-i tabi'at deriz, gâ'ibetmekliğimiz muhakkak olan şeylerden başka hiç bir şey gâ'ibetmeyiz, fakat kazanabilirsek ancak bu yolda, bu meslekte kazanırız. (ibid., p. 63.)*
- 23) *ibid.*, p. 64.
- 24) Masami Arai, "An Imagined Nation: The Idea of the Ottoman Nation As a Key to Modern Ottoman History," *Orient*, vol. 27, 1991, p. 6.
- 25) A.F., "Veraset-i Saltanat Meselesi," *İctihad*, no. 6, 1905, pp. 83/b-84/b.
- 26) Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 139.
- 27) Arai, *Turkish Nationalism...*, pp. 7-10.
- 28) Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999, p. 261, n. 104. For details on the political history of this period, see Ahmad, *Young Turks*, pp. 24-28.
- 29) Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, p. 98.
- 30) *Nevasli Millî*, p. 186; Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 139.
- 31) Dr. Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*. vol. 2, İstanbul: Altındağ, 1967, p. 294. Cf. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*. vol. 1, part 1, 2nd ed., Ankara: TTK, 1963, p. 306.
- 32) F., "Makale-i Mahsus: Rusya ve Finlandiya," *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, no. 218, 1910, pp. 4/c-5/c.
- 33) Ahmad, *Young Turks*, pp. 56-57; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*. vol. 3, İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1989, pp. 59-61, 356-357.
- 34) *ibid.*, pp. 61-63.
- 35) *Ibid.* p. 63. Ferid's daughter Emel Esin cites as his criticism of the Government's position on the Lynch question as the main reason for the Grand Vezir's resignation. Surprised leaders of the CUP urged Ferid to recant his statements, but Ferid refused and was expelled from the organization. (Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 139.). On the other hand, Tunaya states that criticism arose from within the CUP concerning the question of foreign loans in 1910, citing Ferid as one of the critics. (Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*. vol. 1, İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1984, p. 269, n. 22.)
- 36) *ibid.*, p. 31; Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 86.
- 37) Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, p. 31, n. 43. Ferid is said, "for the past three years, he has acted in opposition to groups controlling Parliament under directions from the [CUP] Central Committee." (Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 3, p. 217, n. 64.).
- 38) Ahmad, *Young Turks*, pp. 86-90.
- 39) Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, pp. 541-542.
- 40) *Bizi nasıl olsa Rumeli'den kovacaklar. Oradan atılacağımıza kendiliğimizden bırakarak Anadolu'da toplansak daha iyi olmaz mı?* (Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, p. 524; *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 462.). This statement was related by Hüseyin Câhid [Yalcın] (1875-1957), but the date is unclear. It was probably made shortly after the anti-revolution of April 1909. Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, Vol. 1, p. 524; *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 462.
- 41) *ibid.*, p. 482.
- 42) *ibid.*, p. 443.
- 43) Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, p. 275.
- 44) On the political history of this period, see Ahmad, *Young Turks*, pp. 99-106.
- 45) Concerning this organization, see Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, pp. 313-350.
- 46) Concerning this organization, see *ibid.*, pp. 351-363.
- 47) *ibid.*, p. 353.
- 48) *ibid.*, p. 352.
- 49) At the very beginning of the first issue of *İfham*, the NCP's organ, a denial was printed refuting the notion that the NCP was a front party created by the CUP, showing that at least in appearance resemblance existed between the two parties. ("Millî Meşrutiyet Fırkasından," *İfham*, no. 1, 1912, p. 1/a.)

- 50) A.Y., "Tanzimatçılık Aleyhine," *Türk Yurdu*, III/11, 1913, p. 350.
- 51) Ahmed Ferid, "Türk Ocağı: Genç Ocaklıya," *Nevasli Millî*, p. 188.
- 52) *Çünkü, keskin kılıç kullananlar yanlış hamlelerden sakınmaladırlar. (ibid., p. 189.)*
- 53) *Filhakika hayalin zarif kanadlarına binerek Arab badiyelerinde dolaşmaktan ne fayda çıkar? Osmanlı politikasının bu yanlış ilhamından artık tamamen ictinab etmeliyiz. Çünkü kanlı misallerle kanlı ilde gördük; az tama bize çok ziyan getirdi. Binaenaleyh Türk, yine gâib etmemek isterse, Arab'ın, bu necib İslâm kardeşinin hakiki ve samimi bir dostu olmalı ve Haleb-Kerkük hadd-i kavmisine dindârâne riâyet ederek faaliyet-i millîyesini bu hududun şimaline hasretmelidir. (ibid., pp. 189-190.)*
- 54) *Hududların berisinde, milletler beyinde böyle ise, hududların ötesinde devletler arasında evleviyetle böyle olmak lâzımdır....Turan hayali, bugün bir hayal-i mahal olmasına rağmen Moskof siyasetini bilüzum tahvif ve teşvik eyler. (ibid., p. 190.)*
- 55) *Türk mefkûresi galib gelmek için dahili ve harici siyasetinde i'tidal ve tedbir...(ibid., p. 189.)*
- 56) Gökalp, in an editorial printed in 1913, expressed his hope for a homogeneous culture to be created in the Ottoman Empire, and for that purpose called for a uniform educational system. ('Cemaat mekteplerinde, hususî lisanlarda, dinî ve kavmî tarihlere istinaden tahsil gören gayri mütecanis zekâlardan nasıl olur da- mesela İngiliz medeniyeti gibi - mütecanis bir irfan husule gelebilir.' in his "Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak: 6, Cemaat Medeniyeti, Cemiyet Medeniyeti," *Türk Yurdu*, :V/11, 1913, p. 804. See also Arai, *Turkish Nationalism*, p. 62.)
- 57) Ahmed Ferid, "Türk Ocağı: Genç Ocaklıya," pp. 189-190.
- 58) *Türklüğün şu mülk-i mahsusunda bile bi-perva yürümekliğimize ihtimal yoktur. Buralarda da yine mütedil, ihtiyat-perver, ve hatta lüzumunda kalbimiz sızlayarak, fedâkâr olmak mecburiyetindeyiz. Kürdlere, ba-husus Ermenilere, bize karşı akal-i kalil olan şu kavim ve bu millete karşı da bugün iltizam-ı cebir ve şiddete değil, belki ihsân-ı imtiyaz ve fevâide müftakir bulunuyoruz. (ibid., p. 190.)*
- 59) Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, pp. 356-357.
- 60) Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 134.
- 61) Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 139; see also "Siyasiyat," *Türk Yurdu*, II/3, 1912, p. 463.
- 62) Ahmed Ferid, "Türk Ocağı: Genç Ocaklıya," p. 191.
- 63) *Sadrazam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şeket Paşa'nın Günlüğü*. İstanbul: Arba, 1988, p. 60.
- 64) Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 140.
- 65) Some 220 others, including 19 non-Muslims were transported to various regions outside of the martial law zone. (Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1, pp. 347-349.)
- 66) Emel Esin, "Kayıplar...", p. 140.
- 67) *ibid.*
- 68) Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 2, İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1986, pp. 531-535.