

Babuḡab and His Uprising: Re-examining the Inner Mongol Struggle for Independence

NAKAMI, Tatsuo

I. Introduction

Babuḡab (Babuḡab)¹⁾ is a well known figure not only in the history of the Mongols but also in the modern history of China. Moreover, among the Japanese, especially from the pre-World War II days, Babuḡab, along with Demčuydongrub (Prince De 德王), may be considered the most famous Mongol apart from the Qaḡans of the Mongol Empire. Even in post-war Japan, Babuḡab was mentioned by a popular writer, Dan Kazuo 檀一雄.²⁾

Numerous but mostly contradictory descriptions of Babuḡab are found in the literature. In contemporary China, he is seriously criticized as a wild bandit-traitor.³⁾ In contrast, Owen Lattimore, writing in the 1930s, mentioned that Babuḡab and his followers were considered "patriots by all Mongols and their feats are told in many ballads, which are still sung everywhere in Manchurian Mongolia."⁴⁾ In Japan, Babuḡab is perceived as a naive Ch'ing loyalist and a Mongol collaborator in the "Second Manchu-Mongol Independence Movement" ("Dainiji Man-Mô dokuritu undô" 第二次滿蒙獨立運動) promoted and supported by Japanese "adventurers" advocating imperialistic expansion into East Asia ("Tairiku rōnin" 大陸浪人).⁵⁾ The degree of respect for Babuḡab in Mongolia under the Socialist regime (in the Mongolian People's Republic) was significant, and worthy of analysis. Although his behavior after the Kiakhta Agreement of 1915 was judged as that of a conservative reactionary, Mongol historians took a sympathetic view of him until the Agreement.⁶⁾ Furthermore, after so-called democratization began in Mongolia in the early 1990s, the criteria of judgement for historical studies and research have undergone drastic changes, and re-evaluations of past history and historical figures are now underway.⁷⁾ It has reached the point where some scholars describe Babuḡab as a "Mongol nationalist."⁸⁾

Although various interpretations of Babuḡab's life have come to light, none seem to suffice. Each historian, working from fragmentary materials on Babuḡab, merely describes one of several aspects of his life. In particular, the relationship between Babuḡab and the Japanese still need further analysis. The main objective of this paper is to re-examine Babuḡab's activities in the history

of Mongol independence and to further analyze his character from various archival materials recently found.

II. Early days of Babuĭab's life

Babuĭab was born in 1875, in the Tümed (East Tümed or Mongyolĭin) Banner of Josutu League in Inner Mongolia. Difficulties remain in tracing his activities during the early period of his life for it seems highly probably that most descriptions and information concerning young Babuĭab have been inserted later.

Babuĭab was a commoner by birth and as a boy worked the land. This constitutes one of the most important factor for us in terms of understanding his life. When he was about ten years old, his family moved to the imperial pasture in Sürüg, which in 1902 became Chang-wu hsien 彰武縣. The Mongols in Sürüg, most of whom came from East Tümed, had been engaged in agriculture over the years. Therefore, agriculture was carried out extensively in certain districts of East Mongolia (East Four Leagues of Inner Mongolia). At the time, the Mongol lands in East Mongolia apart from Silin youl League, remained unprotected against the extensive influx of the Han Chinese immigrants. The rapid increase of Han Chinese was a result of the Ch'ing government's abandonment of its earlier policy of maintaining an independent Mongol social structure. Inevitably, as large numbers of Han Chinese migrated to both Sürüg and East Tümed, the Mongols were forced into a minority status. Rampant exploitation by the Han Chinese raised tensions between the migrants and the Mongols. When Chang-wu hsien was formed from the imperial pasture, Babuĭab led an uprising against the Han Chinese immigrants there. Owen Lattimore, described this uprising as follows:

He [Babuĭab] raised among the Suruk [Sürüg] Mongols the force that became known as the Thirteen Companies. Living off and on as bandits, and serving also at the time in the Mongol militia, they drew recruits, in later years, from all over Eastern Mongolia.⁹⁾

Thus a strong anti-Han Chinese sentiment, which Babuĭab retained throughout his life, was implanted at an early age through these experiences.

The political climate in Manchuria and East Mongolia was altered by the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95 and the Boxer Rebellion which soon followed in 1900-01. As a result of these two incidents, by the turn of the century, some East Mongols assumed that the Ch'ing policy toward Manchuria and East Mongolia was supported by Russia, which was assisting China in its negotiations with Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. The East Mongols became apprehensive that Russia had allied with China. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, the Japanese army attempted to utilize those Mongols to support its attack on the rear of the Russian army in Manchuria, especially to destroy

the bridges along the Chinese Eastern Railway in Northern Manchuria. It has been said that Babuḡab joined the Mongol partisans under a Japanese commander, Captain Hashiguchi Yūma 橋口勇馬. After the Russo-Japanese War, with the recommendation of the Japanese army, Babuḡab was supposedly appointed commander of the police troops in Chang-wu hsien.¹⁰⁾ Although I have not been able to find any information to substantiate Babuḡab's "pro-Japanese" activities in either Japanese or Chinese source materials of this period. Hence, it seems probable that most descriptions concerning him during the Russo-Japanese War were fabricated by the Japanese after 1916.¹¹⁾

When the Wu-ch'ang Uprising 武昌起義 erupted in October 1911, the nobles and Buddhist priests of Qalq-a Mongolia declared their independence and subsequently organized the Boḡda qaḡan government in Urga. This declaration of independence was not a direct result of the Chinese Revolution, but rather a prolonged Mongol struggle to achieve their objective. The intention of the Boḡda qaḡan government was to create an independent "national" state including Outer as well as Inner Mongolia, known as "Greater Mongolia" ("Yeke Mongḡol ulus").¹²⁾

The Mongol declaration of independence in Urga was warmly received in other Mongol regions. Furthermore, the Boḡda qaḡan government was joined by numerous Inner Mongols who later held prominent positions.¹³⁾ In September 1912, Babuḡab fled from Chang-wu hsien with his family and followers to Urga with the intention of participating in this national unification movement led by the Boḡda qaḡan government.

III. Babuḡab and the Boḡda qaḡan government in Outer Mongolia

In November 1912, the Boḡda qaḡan government successfully established tentative diplomatic relations with Russia by signing the Russo-Mongol Agreement. For the Russians, this Agreement meant that Russia recognized the Boḡda qaḡan government as an autonomous regime merely in Outer Mongolia. After the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, relations between Russia and Japan changed from hostility to reconciliation, then moving even further to the level of outright cooperation. The first Russo-Japanese Entente in 1907 signified the initial step in the change of Russian policy. According to the Entente, the Japanese acknowledged that Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria were within the Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, a turning point was reached with the third Russo-Japanese Entente in 1912, which was concluded with the Mongol declaration of independence. As a result, Inner Mongolia was divided into two regions according to the latitude of Peking (116° 27'): the western region was considered to be in the Russian sphere of influence while the eastern region came under the Japanese sphere of influence, entirely without any consideration of the Mongols' wishes. At the time, the tide of world opinion

was shifting in support of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. To further complicate the situation, Russian foreign policy objectives strongly advocated concentrating on the European theater and Russia did not wish to be forced to assume additional responsibility in East Asia. Needless to say, Russia had absolutely no desire to support or underwrite the fully sovereign state envisioned by the Boγda qaγan government. For these reasons, the formation of an autonomous Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of the Republic of China was the most realistic method for Russia to solve the Mongol problem.¹⁴⁾

The Boγda qaγan government for its part wanted to use the Russo-Mongol Agreement to prove that it had already been recognized as a sovereign state. At the same time, it initiated military maneuvers in Inner Mongolia with the intention of expanding its territory beyond the area actually under its control in order to realize the formation of "Greater Mongolia." This plan was being promoted by the radical "nationalists" or "pan-Mongolists" within the Boγda qaγan government leadership such as Čeringcimed, the Home Minister, and was supported by the Inner Mongols in Urga. They proceeded with a military invasion of Inner Mongolia in January 1913. An army of 7,000 troops organized by the Boγda qaγan government was divided into five divisions, among which was the Dariγangγa division led by Gūng Nawangγombu, Gūng Qaisan and Babuǰab.¹⁵⁾ In the first half of 1913, the Boγda qaγan army prevailed over the Chinese army. Later that year, on August 2, the famous living Buddha in Yegūzer (Yogačari) Monastery, Yegūzer Qutuγtu Ǧalsangdaši, was nominated as the "Minister of the East", which the Boγda qaγan army had now occupied.

However, the Boγda qaγan army suffered for lack of weapons. Moreover, on November 5, the Russo-Chinese Declaration concerning the autonomous status of Outer Mongolia was signed. Thereafter, Russia guaranteed Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia while the Peking government led by Yūan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱 acknowledged Russia's broad economic interests in Outer Mongolia. Simultaneously, Russia was forced to set up a tripartite conference with the Peking government, the Boγda qaγan government and itself as a final step in the process of searching for a solution to the "Mongol problem." The invasion by the Boγda qaγan troops mentioned earlier encountered strong objections from Russia, and as a result, in December 1913, the Boγda qaγan troops were forced to withdraw from Inner Mongolia.

Despite official orders to withdraw all troops from Inner Mongolia, Babuǰab kept his troops stationed on the eastern fringe of the Inner and Outer Mongolian border area (the triangular area where Üjemčin and Qayučid Banners of Inner Mongolia and Sečen qan aimay of Outer Mongolia met). Moreover, Babuǰab was then conferred with the title of *Gūng* and the position of "ǧegūn emūn-e kičayar-un mongγolcud-i tübsidken toγtaniγulqu sayid" or "Minister of Pacifying the Mongols in the Southeast" by an edict of Boγda qaγan (the Emperor of Mongolia). Thus, it seems that the Boγda qaγan govern-

ment permitted Babuĵab to roam freely in the border area.

In June 1914, a tripartite conference was held in Kiakhta between the governments of Russia, the Republic of China and Mongolia. Babuĵab often wrote to the Boyda qaġan government emphasizing that at any cost, Inner Mongolia should be included in the territory of the Boyda qaġan's Mongol state.¹⁶⁾ He was still pursuing the aim of establishing a "Greater Mongolia" that included Inner Mongolia. Therefore, by remaining in the Inner and Outer Mongolian border area with his troops, he intended to show his determination to stress the importance of Inner Mongolia, which was his primary objective.

While the Kiakhta Conference was being held, Babuĵab approached the Russian delegation to create a political situation favorable to the Boyda qaġan government and his plan for a "Greater Mongolia." When World War I erupted in June 1914, many war supplies were sent to Russia from the United States and Japan on the Chinese Eastern Railway while Russia was preoccupied countering the German forces. German agents in China tried to sabotage these operations and cut off Russian war supplies by destroying tunnels along the railway between Hailar and Chichihar, and later intended to recruit Babuĵab for their tasks. In January 1915, Rabe von Pappenheim, a German military attaché in Peking, visited Babuĵab's camp in Ŭjemċin. Babuĵab immediately informed the Boyda qaġan government of this visit through Falsangdaši.¹⁷⁾ This information was later conveyed to the Russian consulates in Urga or Hailar through the Boyda qaġan government. In March 1915,¹⁸⁾ Babuĵab assassinated von Pappenheim's group, including eight Germans. This action was praised by the Russian authorities as a contribution to their war efforts against Germany, they dispatched a special mission to present rewards.¹⁹⁾ Babuĵab's activities apparently even reached the ear of Tsar Nicholas II who regarded them highly.²⁰⁾ Although this incident increased Russian interest in Babuĵab, it did not have any effect in terms of changing the Russian attitude towards the Mongol problem.

IV. Babuĵab as a symbolic leader of Inner Mongolia excluded from the Kiakhta Agreement system

The Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement signed in June 1915 guaranteed the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of the Republic of China. Russia was successful in forging an agreement which effectively implemented its aim, while the Boyda qaġan government had been forced to accept the contents of the Agreement in the interest of self-preservation. With this, the Inner Mongols who had joined the Boyda qaġan regime with the vision of establishing "Greater Mongolia" experienced frustration. The problem was of course taken up for discussion at the Kiakhta Conference. In the end, the Chinese government promised to grant amnesty to all Inner Mongols within the Boyda

qaγan government. The Inner Mongols then faced a new dilemma: either return to Inner Mongolia and accept subjection to the Han Chinese government in Peking, at the same time discarding the idea of "Independent Greater Mongolia", or abandon their home land and remain in Outer Mongolia, where they could salvage what they had gained by declaring their independence. In other words, Inner Mongols were obliged to choose between two alternatives – autonomy in Outer Mongolia or subjugation in Inner Mongolia. Almost all Inner Mongols under the Boyda qaγan government preferred to return to Inner Mongolia while a few, such as Damdingsürüng from Barγa, opted to remain in Outer Mongolia.

For its part, the Peking government reluctantly accepted the framework of the Kiakhta Agreement regarding Outer Mongolia, aiming to re-establish the former Ch'ing administrative system in Inner Mongolia. Consequently, the Inner Mongol nobles who had joined the Boyda qaγan government had their rights and titles fully restored when they returned home, albeit with their hopes dashed. There were several distinguished figures among those returnees to Inner Mongolia, such as Udai, who managed to gain positions within the Chinese government, but others, such as Babuγab, gained nothing. Babuγab chose neither of the two alternatives, attaching primary importance to Inner Mongolia, yet refusing to remain in Outer Mongolia. Babuγab probably assumed that, had he returned to Inner Mongolia, his life would end in despair as he would likely not find a way to satisfy his political ambitions. Although Babuγab was ordered to demobilize his troops and promptly return to Inner Mongolia, he still remained in the Inner and Outer Mongolian border area with his 3,000 troops.²¹⁾

In this way, Babuγab became the symbolic leader of those non-noble Inner Mongols who were excluded from the Kiakhta Agreement system and protest-
ed against it. By this time, the number of his independent forces was reported to be approximately 3,000, a considerable size, considering the Outer Mongolian forces amounted to approximately 10,000 men. Babuγab's soldiers were all Inner Mongols, some of whom had joined the forces organized by the Boyda qaγan government and returned to Inner Mongolia after the Kiakhta Agreement was concluded; others were new recruits of sympathizers to Babuγab's cause. His troops occupied the above mentioned eastern zone of the Inner and Outer Mongolian border, which covered a part of Sečen qan aimag of Outer Mongolia and of Qaγučid and Üjemčin Banners of Silin γoul League of Inner Mongolia. Geographically, this area belongs to the foot hills of the Hsing-an 興安 mountains. Known as an intersection of strategic routes to Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Barγa, Mongol bandits had been active there for ages. The existence of Babuγab and his troops turned out to be harmful not only for the local Chinese government but for the Boyda qaγan government as well, although the latter still tolerated their activities and made allowances to

them.

After August 1915, Damdingsürüng, Vice-Minister of Military Affairs of the Boġda qaġan government, was frequently sent to Babuĵab to persuade him to surrender to the Chinese.²²⁾ However, Babuĵab maintained his aim of creating an independent area governed by himself in Silin ġoul League. He proposed this plan to the Tu-t'ung (Lieutenant General) of Chichihar 齊齊哈爾都統 in exchange for surrendering to the Chinese and demobilizing his troops. The Tu-t'ung of Chichihar refused the proposal and began a counter offensive.²³⁾ Thus, Babuĵab gradually found himself becoming politically isolated. To further complicate the situation, as relations deteriorated between him and the Boġda qaġan government, the latter referred to Babuĵab as a "robber" or "bandit" and defended itself militarily against him as well. In fact, his troops often did act like bandits, as claimed by the Boġda qaġan government. The Chinese government decided to attack Babuĵab's forces on October 28th and this decision was conveyed to the Russian and Boġda qaġan governments prior to the attack.²⁴⁾

Babuĵab's troops were defeated by the superior Chinese forces and fled from Silin ġoul to Yegüzer Monastery in Outer Mongolia. Thereafter they crossed Outer Mongolia and proceeded to the Barya-Outer Mongolia border area along the Qalq-a river ("Turban nere"?). The Chinese forces failed to arrest Babuĵab, but took Ġalsangdaši as prisoner in Yegüzer Monastery.²⁵⁾ There the Chinese troops found much of the correspondence between Ġalsangdaši and Babuĵab, evidence which confirmed Ġalsangdaši's role as an associate of Babuĵab. The Chinese once again suspected Babuĵab of maintaining ties with the Boġda qaġan government. The arrest of Ġalsangdaši and the seizure of his monastery caused a serious rift between China and the Boġda qaġan government, since the Chinese forces had violated a provision of the Kiakhta Agreement, which prohibited them from entering Outer Mongolia.²⁶⁾ The Chinese authorities insisted that if the Boġda qaġan government would hand over Babuĵab, they would then release Ġalsangdaši and withdraw their troops from Outer Mongolia.²⁷⁾ However, Babuĵab had already broken free of Urga's control. Under strong pressure from Russia, the Chinese authorities had to compromise and be satisfied with Ġalsangdaši's personal apology in lieu of an official apology from the Boġda qaġan government to Yüan Shih-k'ai, the President of the Republic of China.

The Russian authorities were concerned with Babuĵab's well-being after his contribution to the war effort against Germany. Thus Russia attempted to act as an intermediary between Babuĵab, China, and the Boġda qaġan government. On December 27, 1915, Babuĵab agreed to a reconciliation with the Chinese under the following two conditions: (1) The Boġda qaġan government should allow Babuĵab and his followers to occupy an area where they could reside in Qalq-a. (2) The Chinese government should allow the families of his followers

left behind in East Mongolia to emigrate to Qalq-a. In exchange for the above two conditions, Babuĵab's troops shall demobilize and transfer their weapons to the Chinese authorities.²⁸⁾ Because of its distrust of Babuĵab, the Boyda qaĵan government was never committed to carrying out this plan, though it finally agreed to allow the troops remain in Qalq-a if they remained separately rather than living together in one area.²⁹⁾ Yet by March 1916, both the Boyda qaĵan and Russian governments had given up on this plan due to Babuĵab's "obstinacy."³⁰⁾

V. Japanese adventurers approach Babuĵab

Questions remain as to why the Boyda qaĵan government and the Russian government gradually distanced themselves from Babuĵab and his cause. This shift can be analyzed as a result of Japanese influence, which began around mid-1915. The first Japanese to approach Babuĵab was a stray "adventurer", Miyazato Yoshimaro 宮里好麿.³¹⁾ Miyazato worked in Hailar as a pharmacist, an occupation often used by Japanese agents to camouflage their activities. Miyazato at the time gathered information on Mongolia and built up an intricate network of contacts among the Mongols. In February 1913, Čeringčimed, the Home Minister of the Boyda qaĵan government, anticipated Japanese support in the cause of establishing Mongolia as a completely independent state that included Inner Mongolia. He thus went to Hailar and appealed to the Japanese consul-general in Harbin to arrange a trip to Japan. Miyazato, as a representative of Čeringčimed, persuaded the Japanese consul-general in Harbin as well as the Japanese military staff in Ch'ang-chun 長春 to accept Čeringčimed's mission. However, the Japanese consul warned them about Russian suspicions and they were obliged to abandon the trip due to strong Russian pressure.³²⁾ Miyazato can more or less be described by the Japanese term "Mongol adventurer" ("Môko rônin" 蒙古浪人), as distinct from a general "adventurer", since he specialized in Mongol issues. Miyazato informed Babuĵab that Japan would provide support, especially war supplies, to his troops, arousing Babuĵab's interest in a potential new ally. Needless to say, the image of a powerful Japan which had been held by Babuĵab since the Russo-Japanese War predisposed him to turn to Japanese aid. Consequently, in June or perhaps by July 1915, Miyazato brought Babuĵab's brother-in-law, Tasibaĵu, and another Mongol to Japan.³³⁾

Next we must examine the stance initiated by the Japanese government toward Mongolia and the activities conducted there by the Japanese "adventurers." After the outbreak of World War I in July 1914, interest in East Asia declined among the Western imperialist powers. Japanese expansionists took advantage of the situation, and maneuvered to consolidate Japanese special interests and rights in Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia, which had

already been acknowledged by Russia in the Russo-Japanese Ententes of 1907 and 1912. One can say that they saw the political-military situation in East Asia within the framework of the "Manchuria-Mongolia Problem" ("Man-Mô Mondai" 滿蒙問題), a term which actually implied a limited area prescribed in the Russo-Japanese Entente, namely Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia. The emphasis was clearly on the "Man" (Southern Manchuria); "Mô" (East Mongolia) was considered as nothing more than an "appendix" of Southern Manchuria and recognized as being only of secondary importance. This Japanese interpretation was embodied in the notorious "Twenty-one Demands", signed by the Ôkuma 大隈 Cabinet in May 1915 and submitted to the Yüan Shih-k'ai government.

As for the activities conducted by the adventurers, a significant turning point was the formation of the "Tai-Shi rengô-kai" 對支聯合會 (Joint Association on the China Problem) in July 1913. Before this coalition was formed, although various factions proclaimed the similar goal of establishing Japan's superior position in Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia, they adopted distinctive approaches to achieving this objective. For example, Kawashima Naniwa 川島浪速 tried to recruit those still loyal to the Manchu Emperor such as Prince Su 肅親王善耆, while a group led by Uchida Ryôhei 內田良平, known as the Amur River Society 黑龍會 (Kokuryû-kai), supported Sun Yat-sen 孫文. However, after the failure of the so-called "Second Revolution" in 1913 and the establishment of Yüan Shih-k'ai's dictatorship, Uchida finally relinquished his support for Sun, afterward concentrating on cooperating with Kawashima.³⁴⁾ The Joint Association on the China Problem pressured the Japanese government to pursue a much more aggressive China policy. Even if a portion of their aims was achieved by the "Twenty-one Demands", they were still dissatisfied with the Japanese attitude toward China. It was just at this time that Miyazato brought Tas-sibaḡu. –acting on behalf of Babuḡab –to Japan.

Miyazato had no access to the eminent adventurers or expansionists like Kawashima or Uchida. But through one of his associates, Tas-sibaḡu was introduced to Kawashima and the members of the Amur River Society. Consequently, in early November 1915, Aoyagi Katsutoshi 青柳勝敏 and others were sent by Kawashima and the Amur River Society to Babuḡab's camp along the Qalq-a River to observe the actual conditions there. By the end of 1915, Kawashima and the members of the Amur River Society accepted Aoyagi's report and finally decided to assist Babuḡab.³⁵⁾ Aoyagi's report indicated that Babuḡab was pro-Japanese, stating that he had joined the Mongol partisans organized by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War. However, as mentioned earlier, there are no descriptions of his political affiliation at that time in any contemporary sources. Even so, during the process of determining whether or not Babuḡab deserved Japanese support, the notion—true or not—that he had contributed to Japan's war efforts against Russia ten years earlier may well have helped

improve his image among the Japanese, who would surely have formed the idea of aiding a former ally much more palatable than the idea of aiding a common "bandit."

VI. "The Second Manchu-Mongol Independence Movement": its fiction and reality

All the same time that Babuĵab was forming an alliance with Japan, the political climate in China was also changing. In late 1915, Yüan Shih-k'ai was pressing forward with his campaign to become the new emperor, while the Chinese nationalists in Southern China reacted vehemently against Yüan. This political tension gave Kawashima an opportunity to attempt once again the plan which had failed in 1911. Previously, Kawashima's scheme was to establish a puppet "Manchu-Mongol (Man-Mô) kingdom" under Japanese protection, using Prince Su, who had advocated the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. However, Kawashima's plan quickly collapsed as the Japanese government accepted the British admonition and officially prohibited any Japanese from participating in such subversive acts.³⁶⁾

Subsequently, in 1915 Kawashima judged the situation to be favorable as compared to 1911-12. As already mentioned, the Western Powers had lost interest in East Asia after the outbreak of World War I, while Japan became much more aggressive in securing special interests and rights in Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia. Moreover, Kawashima was also successful in obtaining approval for his plan from Uchida's Amur River Society, which in 1911 had advocated the direct opposite. Kawashima planned to take advantage of both Prince Su and Babuĵab in his reconstructed plans for the "Independence of Manchuria and Mongolia." Furthermore, as Prince Su's "loyalist party" (Tsung-shê-tang 宗社黨) virtually lacked military and political capabilities, the roles played by the Japanese adventurers and Babuĵab's troops became decisive. Once the plan was implemented, Kawashima assumed that the Japanese army would move to assist them. On this basis, the Japanese adventurers began supporting Babuĵab beginning in January 1916. If the Japanese had instead neglected Babuĵab, he would have been left without any alternative but to accept Russian mediation. In fact, he was on the verge of accepting their mediation when he then turned to the Japanese adventurers for aid, although he could never clearly grasp their real aim.

As for Yüan Shih-k'ai's imperial ambitions, the Japanese government, which was initially ambivalent, took a stricter attitude after the outbreak of the "Third Revolution" on December 25, 1915. On March 7, 1916, the Ôkuma Cabinet officially decided to encourage anti-Yüan movements in various areas of China, such as Manchuria, Shan-tung, Shanghai and South China. It wished to remove Yüan from office and establish Japan's superiority in China,

although Yüan declared the postponement of his coronation in February.³⁷⁾ Within the inner circles of the Japanese government, Koike Chôzô 小池張造, Director of Political Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and General Fukuda Masatarô 福田雅太郎, Head of the Second Department of the General Staff Office, were especially active in this anti-Yüan plan. Koike was a confidant of the former Foreign Minister, Katô Taka'aki 加藤高明, and the "Twenty-one Demands" was underwritten by Koike. At the time, most in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were critical of this approach.

By then, the Japanese military was developing as an independent political power, having been unchecked by any other factional powers. Within the military establishment, two opposing cliques; the "Uehara clique" 上原系 and the "Chôshû clan clique" 長州閥, were the most powerful. The former occupied prominent positions in the General Staff Office and advocated the establishment of hegemony in China, especially in Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia, while the latter supported a less activist approach toward China, fearing that future Sino-Japanese relations would be harmed by an overly aggressive policy.³⁸⁾ At the time, General Fukuda of the Uehara clique intended to adapt Kawashima's strategy, using military force to prevent Yüan Shih-k'ai's coronation.

At the end of March, General Fukuda secretly sent Doi Ichinoshin 土井市之進, Koiso Kuniaki 小磯國昭 (who later became the Japanese Prime Minister in 1944), and two other officers to advise Kawashima's group in Manchuria. However, on March 7th, the Japanese diplomats in Peking and Manchuria vehemently opposed the decision of the Ôkuma Cabinet, fearing a strong negative reaction against Japan among the Chinese as well as Western Powers.³⁹⁾ In addition, Japanese diplomats and military officers from the Chôshû clique in Mukden suggested that active support for Chang Tso-lin 張作霖, who was on the verge of taking control of Manchuria, would be the sensible option for Japan.⁴⁰⁾ Consequently, in April, the General Staff Office ordered Doi to cease all military operations.⁴¹⁾ However, Japanese military advisers and adventurers around Babuḡab remained supportive of his uprising against the Chinese army in Manchuria. It seemed that Babuḡab was still inclined to support the Ch'ing Restoration Movement, cooperating with Prince Su, at least on the surface.⁴²⁾ Babuḡab assumed the title "Commander in chief of the Mongolian Forces of the Restoration Party", rendered as "Yeke čin ulus-un delekei-yi dakin manduḡulqu ayimaḡ-un tûsimel čerig-i yerüŋkeyilen ĵakiraqu sayid"⁴³⁾ in the Mongolian documents or "Chin-wang-shuai Meng-ku-chün šsu-ling-kuan" 勤王帥蒙古軍司令官⁴⁴⁾ and "T'uang-shuai Mêng-ku-chün ta-ch'ên" 統帥蒙古軍大臣⁴⁵⁾ in the Chinese documents. Babuḡab declared at the time that, "those who cut their Manchu queues must wear them again. Those not willing to do so will be arrested without regard to whether they are high nobles or commoners."⁴⁶⁾ Questions remain as to whether Babuḡab truly intended merely to strengthen the position

of Mongols within the restored Ch'ing dynasty or the "Manchu-Mongol Kingdom" under Japanese protection. It should be noted that the ideology of "restoration of the Manchu-Ch'ing dynasty" was actually not as effective among the Mongols as the Manchu loyalists had expected it to be. Also, the "Manchuria-Mongolia" regional concept was not accepted in the way the Japanese had perceived, and it was viewed as rather awkward by the Mongols.⁴⁷⁾ Babuĵab's inclination to support the restoration of Ch'ing dynasty did not originate so much from his principles as from the realistic necessity to obtain military aid from Japan. He no doubt expected that his political and military position against China and Outer Mongolia, or even against the Inner Mongols would be strengthened by gaining Japanese support.

Substantial amounts of weapons were secretly delivered to Babuĵab's camp in the Outer Mongolia-Barya border area by the Japanese adventurers, but those maneuvers were carefully monitored by local Chinese authorities and also by the Russian consulate in Barya.⁴⁸⁾ The Russian ambassador in Tokyo occasionally warned the Japanese government of the consequences of participating in the "loyalists" movement. Needless to say, Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria were acknowledged as areas under the Russian sphere of influence according to the Russo-Japanese Entente of 1907. As Babuĵab's camp was located within this Russian sphere, Russia was displeased with the amount of Japanese war supplies being sent.⁴⁹⁾ On the Chinese political scene, Yüan Shih-k'ai sudden death on July 6, 1916 caused major changes between China and Japan. Thereafter, the Japanese government turned to court the new president, Li Yüan-hung 黎元洪 and decision makers in Tokyo felt that all anti-Yüan movements now became senseless or even detrimental to the future development of Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese military also officially disengaged from the previous anti-Yüan operations. The adventurers and military officers around Babuĵab, however did not give up their intentions so easily. They believed that even without Yüan, the new president might some day become another Yüan, and so cling on to their objective of establishing a Japanese puppet regime in Southern Manchuria and East Mongolia using Babuĵab and factions loyal to the Manchu Emperor. In hindsight, it is difficult to suppose that they were convinced of their chances of success. They may rather have been taking advantage of the opportunity to demonstrate their power against the Japanese government and the military decision makers in Tokyo who had abandoned them and left them to their fate.

On July 1, 1916, Babuĵab and his troops began mobilizing south into the territory occupied by Japan along the South Manchurian Railway. Japanese military advisers had encouraged Babuĵab to advance to this area for military support. On the way to Kuo-chia-tien 郭家店, Babuĵab's troops fought against superior Chinese forces. Plans for an uprising in Chang-ch'un organized by the "loyalist party" and the Japanese adventurers were to coincide with Babuĵab's

advance, but were suppressed by the Japanese authorities there. As Babuḡab's troops arrived in Kuo-chia-tien, the Japanese military advised Babuḡab to return to his base camp in exchange for more weapon.⁵⁰⁾ Babuḡab and the Japanese adventurers had no alternative but to reluctantly accept this advice. As soon as Babuḡab's troops were away from Japanese occupied territory, the main forces of the Chinese army attacked in Lin-hsi 林西. In the midst of the battle, Babuḡab was hit by a stray bullet. His checked career of forty-one years was ended.

After Babuḡab's death, his troops were scattered. Part of them returned to the base camp along Qalq-a River, soon thereafter causing havoc in Barya. Just at this time, the October Revolution took place in Russia and the resulting chaos affected Siberia. A Cossack militant, G. M. Semenov, whose mother was a Buryat Mongol, recruited a body of troops from Babuḡab's former soldiers in Hailar as their core unit, and with partial aid from the Japanese army advanced into Trans-Baikalia to engage in anti-Bolshevik activities.⁵¹⁾ At the same time, on a Buryat Mongol initiative, a "pan-Mongolistic" movement surfaced in Trans-Baikalia. In the summer of 1919, with Semenov providing assistance, a provisional government was established in Dauria. As mentioned earlier, Babuḡab's former troops, which had been incorporated into Semenov's troops, initiated a revolt, which ended the existence of the provisional government in Dauria.

The political situation in East Siberia, gradually shifted in favor of the Bolsheviks, and Semenov was overthrown. Later, R. F. Ungern von Sternberg, who had taken over the command of Semenov's forces, invaded Outer Mongolia, but military intervention there by the Soviet Red Army led to the "Mongolian People's Revolution" in 1921. Babuḡab's wandering soldiers were also found among Ungern-Sternberg's brigades.

VII. Conclusion

In re-examining Babuḡab's life, it becomes apparent that his political awareness and sense of cause in his activities were virtually non-existent. That is to say, he lacked the gift of foresight. The strong anti-Han Chinese sentiment of his childhood drove Babuḡab to lead an uprising against the Han Chinese immigrants to the imperial pasture in Sürüg. It has been mentioned that when the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, he joined a Mongol partisan brigade organized by Japan. However, this cannot be proved through any independent source materials. It is certain the Mongol declaration of independence in 1911 gave Babuḡab a new scope in his political career. He fought the Chinese army as a commander of a force organized by the Boyda qaḡan government, for the formation of "Greater Mongolia" including Inner Mongolia. However, even after the withdraw of the Boyda qaḡan army from Inner Mongolia, Babuḡab

remained to pursue his personal vision of a "Greater Mongolia."

The Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement of 1915 guaranteed the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of the Republic of China, while autonomy was not granted to Inner Mongolia. The Boγda qaγan government had been compelled to accept the Agreement for self-preservation, but Babuḡab attached primary importance to Inner Mongolia. As a result of the Agreement, the Inner Mongol nobles who had once joined the Boγda qaγan regime had their titles and rights fully restored according to the provisions of the Agreement. Commoners such as Babuḡab gained absolutely nothing from the cause. He became the disenchanted symbolic leader of the untitled Inner Mongols excluded from the framework of the Agreement.

Still, Babuḡab endeavoured to create a small autonomous area within Inner Mongolia for himself and his followers. This scheme was unacceptable to the Chinese government, which envisioned the re-establishment of the former Ch'ing administrative system in Inner Mongolia, while they reluctantly abided with the Kiakhta Agreement concerning Outer Mongolia.

After being defeated by the superior Chinese forces, Babuḡab turned to occupying a small corner of Outer Mongolia. The Boγda qaγan government no longer trusted Babuḡab, but under tremendous pressure from Russia, they agreed to allow him and his followers to stay within their territory. Still, Babuḡab preferred the plan to emigrate on a small scale to the inaccurate forecasts advocated by the Japanese adventurers. By then he was completely isolated from China and Outer Mongolia. It was only the Japanese adventurers, aiming to establish a "Manchu-Mongol Kingdom" under Japanese protection, who would provide any support for his cause. Although Babuḡab never completely accepted the plan offered by the Japanese, it meant he could partly satisfy his political ambition. In like manner, the Japanese army intended to use Babuḡab in military demonstrations to prevent the coronation of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Yüan's death in 1916 brought about major changes in Japanese policies in Northeast China. Soon thereafter, the Japanese army decided to discontinue cooperation with Babuḡab, who was then killed in 1916 in the midst of an uprising against superior Chinese forces.

Since the mid-19th century, the Mongols, especially the Inner Mongols, encountered chaotic circumstances. In the midst of such turmoil, they had to search for an identity to defend and preserve their dignity, whether as a Mongol or as an Inner Mongol. However, they had to choose among limited alternatives under difficult situations. Babuḡab was an example of an Inner Mongol who was a puppet of fate, losing his identity in the end.

Notes

- 1) Written in Mongolian as "Babuujab" or as "Babujab". In Chinese characters, "Pa-pu-cha-pu 巴布扎布" or "Pa-pao-chia-pu 八寶加卜" were used. In Japan, he was known as "Babujappu バブジャップ".
- 2) Babujab is mentioned in *Yühi to Kenjū* 夕陽と拳銃 (*The Setting Sun and the Gun*), first published in 1956.
- 3) Lu Ming-hui 盧明輝, "Pa-pu-cha-pu chüan-chi" 巴布扎布傳記 (Babujab, a Biography), *Chung-kuo Meng-ku-shih hsüeh-hui ch'êng-li ta-hui chi-nien chi-k'an* 中國蒙古史學會成立大會紀念集刊 (Hu-ho-hao-t'e: Chung-kuo Meng-ku-shih hsüeh-hui, 1979), pp. 576-579.
- 4) Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York: John Day, 1934), pp. 223-224.
- 5) Kurihara Ken 栗原健, "Daichiji, dainiji Man-Mô dokuritsu undô to Koike seimu kyokuchô no jishoku" 第一次・第二次滿蒙獨立運動と小池政務局長の辭職 (On the First and Second Manchu-Mongol Independence Movements and Koike Chôzô's Resignation from Director of the Political Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916), *Tai Man-Mô seisaku shi no ichi-men* 對滿蒙政策史の一面 (Tokyo: Hara shobô, 1966), pp. 139-161.
- 6) Institute of History of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences ed., *Бүгд Найрамдах Монгол Ард Улсын түүх* (History of the Mongolian People's Republic), Vol. 2 (Ulaanbaatar: Улсын хэвлэлийн хэрэг эрхлэх хороо, 1968), pp. 530-535.
- 7) Nakami Tatsuo 中見立夫, "New Trends in the Study of Modern Mongolian History: What Effect Have Political and Social Changes Had on Historical Research?", *Acta Asiatica* No.76 (1999), pp. 7-39.
- 8) For example see Хэрээд Л. Жамсран, *Монголын цагаачин гахай жилийн хувьсгал* (The Mongolian Revolution of the Year of the Metal-yin Boar [1911]), (Ulaanbaatar: ШУА-Олон улс судлалын хvrээлэн, 1996), pp. 55-62.
- 9) Lattimore, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
- 10) Kokuryu-kai 黒龍會 (Kuzuu Yoshihisa 葛生能久 ed., *Tô A senkaku shishi kiden* 東亞先覺志士記傳 (Biographical Portraits of Pioneer Patriots in East Asia), Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kokuryu-kai, 1936), pp. 625-627.; Aida Tsutomu 會田勉, *Kawashima Naniwa ô* 川島浪速翁 (Kawashima Naniwa), (Tokyo: Bunsui-kaku, 1936), pp. 214-215.
- 11) The first detailed profile on Babujab was introduced in Japan in a journal of the Kokuryû-kai in 1917 just after his death; see Aoyagi Shungaku 青柳春嶽, "Babujapu gun" 巴布札布軍 (the Babujab Army), *Ajia jiron* 亞細亞時論 Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1917), pp. 94-101. and Vol. 1, No. 5 (November 1917), pp. 102-109.
- 12) Nakami Tatsuo, "A Protest Against the Concept of the 'Middle Kingdom': The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution", *The 1911 Revolution in China* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), pp. 129-149.
- 13) Nakami Tatsuo, "The Minority's Groping: Further Light on Khaisan and Udai", *Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyû* アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究 No. 20 (December 1980), pp. 106-120.; "Qaisan's Secret Letters from Urga", *Mongolica, an International Annual of Mongol Studies* Vol. 5 [26] (1994), pp. 394-398.
- 14) Nakami Tatsuo, "Mongoru no dokuritsu to kokusai kankei" モンゴルの獨立と國際關係 (Mongolia's Independence and International Relations), *Ajia kara kangaeru* [3]: *Shûen kara no rekishi* アジアから考える [3]: 周縁からの歴史 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan-kai, 1994), pp. 79-106.
- 15) Ц. Пунцагноров, *Монгол автономит үеийн түүх* (The History of Mongolia's Autonomous Period), (Ulaanbaatar: Улсын хэвлэл, 1955), p.60.
- 16) МУТТА=Монгол Улсын Төв Тvvхийн Архив (The Mongolian State Central Historical Archives in Ulaanbaatar), A-4-229, from the Foreign Minister to the Mongol Delegate of the

- Kiakhta Tripartite Conference, Olon-a ergügdegsen-ü dörbedüger on doluγan sar-a-yin arban jiryuγan [1914.].
- 17) АВПРИ=Архив внешней политики Российской Империи (Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow), ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3339 лл. 27-30, from Гalsangdaši to the Mongolian Prime Minister, translation from the Mongolian text.
 - 18) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3339 лл. 40-41, from the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar to the Russian Minister in Peking, April 13 [March 31], 1915.
 - 19) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3339 лл. 116-123, from the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar to the Head of the Fourth Political Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 4 [June 21], 1915.
 - 20) *Международные отношения в эпоху империализма: Документы из архивов царского и временного правительств, 1878-1917 гг.*, Ser. 3. Vol. 7 Part 2., p. 134 (No. 525).
 - 21) МУТТА, А-2-Д-1-267-(38), from the Foreign Minister to the Prime Minister, Olon-a ergügdegsen-ü tabuduγar on tabun sar-a-yin qorin dörben[1915.].
 - 22) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3339 л. 115, from the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar to the Russian Minister in Peking, September 5 [September 18], 1915.
 - 23) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 1, from the Russian Minister in Peking to the Head of the Fourth Political Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 16 [September 29], 1915.
 - 24) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 5, from the Russian Minister in Peking to the Head of the Fourth Political Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 15 [October 28], 1915.
 - 25) МУТТА, А-4-184-15, from the Chinese High Commissioner in Urga to the Outer Mongolian Autonomous Government, December 30, 1915.; АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 19, the Russian Diplomatic Agent in Urga to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 15 [28], 1915.
 - 26) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 36, the Russian Minister in Peking to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 21 [December 4], 1915.
 - 27) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 28, the Russian Minister in Peking to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 18 [December 1], 1915.
 - 28) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 65, from the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar to the Russian Minister in Peking, December 14 [December 27], 1915.
 - 29) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 82, from the Russian Diplomatic Agent in Urga to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 3 [January 16], 1916.
 - 30) *Международные отношения в эпоху империализма: Документы из архивов царского и временного правительств, 1878-1917 гг.*, Ser. 3. Vol. 10., p. 424 (No. 382).; Relating to the Japanese observation of Babujab's attitude toward governments of China and the Boyda qaγan, see Kokuritsu Kōbunsho-kan 國立公文書館 (National Archives in Tokyo), Kōbun zassan 公文雜纂 (Collection of Official Documents), Taishō go nen 大正五年 (1916), Vol. 39. 2A-14, Hōten Mantetsu kosho 奉天滿鐵公所 (the Mukden Office of the South Manchurian Railway Co.) ed., "Mō-hi tōmoku Babujappu kaijū-saku ni taisuru seihu no kushin" 蒙匪頭目巴布扎布懷柔策二對スル政府ノ苦心 (On the Efforts to Conciliate with the Mongol Bandit, Babujab), a confidential report, March 27, 1916.
 - 31) АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3105 л. 1, from the Russian Minister in Peking to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 6 [July 19], 1915.
 - 32) Nakami Tatsuo, "Bogudo Hān seiken no taigai kōshō doryoku to teikoku-shugi rekkyō" ボグド・ハーン政權の對外交渉努力と帝國主義列強 (the Boyda Qaγan Government's Search for Diplomatic Recognitions from the Powers), *Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū* No. 17 (1979), pp. 1-58.
 - 33) Kokuryū-kai (Kuzu'u Yoshihisa) ed., *op. cit.*, p. 625.; Aida Tsutomu *op. cit.*, p. 214.; АВПРИ, ф. 143 оп. 491 д. 3339 л. 115, from the Russian Vice-Consul in Hailar to the Russian Minister in Peking, September 5 [September 18], 1915.

- 34) Hatsuse Ryûhei 初瀬龍平, *Dentô-teki uyoku Uchida Ryôhei no kenkyû* 傳統的右翼内田良平の研究 (Study on Uchida Ryôhei, a Japanese Traditional Rightist Faction), (Hukuoka: Kyûshû daigaku shuppan-kai, 1980), pp. 167-179.
- 35) Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan (Kensei shiryô-shitsu) 國立國會圖書館憲政資料室 (National Diet Library in Tokyo), Terauchi Masaki Bunsho 寺内正毅文書 (Terauchi Masaki Papers), anon., "Babojabu" 八寶加卜 (Babujab), reported in February, 1916.
- 36) Nakami Tatsuo, "Gunsannorubu to Uchi-Mongoru no meibun" グンサンノルブと内モンゴルの命運 (Prince Güngsüingnorbu and the Fate of Inner Mongolia), *Nairiku Ajia, Nishi Ajia no shakai to bunka* 內陸アジア・西アジアの社會と文化 (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan-sha, 1983), pp.
- 37) *Nihon gaikô bunsho* 日本外交文書 (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), Taishô go nen 大正五年 (1916) Vol. II, (Tokyo: Gaimushô, 1967), pp. 45-46 (No. 47); Kurihara Ken, op. cit., pp. 145-148.
- 38) Kitaoka Shin'ichi 北岡伸一, *Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku* 日本陸軍と大陸政策 (Japanese Army and its East Asian Policy), (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan-kai, 1978), pp. 161-335.
- 39) *Nihon gaikô bunsho* Taishô go nen Vol. II, pp. 852-853 (Nos. 852-853).
- 40) *Nihon gaikô bunsho*, Taishô go nen Vol. II, p. 860 (No. 867); Kurihara Ken, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
- 41) *Nihon gaikô bunsho*, Taishô go nen Vol. II, p. 856 (No. 858).
- 42) Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan (Kensei shiryô-shitsu), Terauchi Masaki Bunsho, Babujab's letter addressed to Prince Su, July 1916, a Japanese translation from the Manchu text.
- 43) MYTTA, A-4-182-26, Babujab's propaganda, dated in Qabtu yosun [=Hsüan-t'ung 宣統]-u nayimaduŋar on jiruŋan sar-a-yin arban doluŋa.
- 44) MYTTA, A-4-182-51.
- 45) Liao-ning-sheng tang-an-kuan 遼寧省檔案館 (Liao-ning Provincial Archives in Shen-yang), Liao-yang-hsien 遼陽縣 File, No. 20454, September 21, 1916.
- 46) H. Марсаржав, *Монгол улсын шинэ түүх*, *Monumenta Historica* Tom. VIII. Fasc. 1. (Ulaanbaatar: III. У. А., 1994), p. 133.
- 47) Nakami Tatsuo, "Chiiki gainen no seiji-sei" 地域概念の政治性 (the Political Nature of the Concept of Regionality), *Ajia kara kangaeru* [1]: *Kosaku suru Ajia* アジアから考える [3]: 交錯するアジア (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan-kai, 1993), pp. 79-106.
- 48) АВПРИ, ф. 188 оп. 761 д. 328 л. 121, from the Russian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo, June 8 [June 21], 1916.; Liao-ning-sheng tang-an-kuan, Liao-yang-hsien File, No. 20356, June 9, 1916.
- 49) *Nihon gaikô bunsho*, Taishô go nen Vol. II, p. 868 (No. 878); pp. 888-889 (No. 907); Gaimushô seimu-kyoku dai-san-ka 外務省政務局第三課 (The Third Section of the Political Affairs Bureau of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed., *Nichi-Ro kôshô-shi* 日露交渉史 (History of the Russo-Japanese Negotiations), (Tokyo: Gaimushô, 1944), pp. 289-293.
- 50) *Nihon gaikô bunsho*, Taishô go nen Vol. II, p. 901-902 (No. 932).
- 51) Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Shinoda Jisaku 篠田治策 Papers, anon., "Holon Bairu oyobi zai-Dauriya Mô-gun ni kansuru gaijô" 呼倫貝爾及在「ダウリヤ」蒙軍ニ關スル概狀 (General Situation on the Mongol Army in Kölin Buyir and Dauria), which was written by a Japanese military officer in 1919.