

Japanese Knowledge of Southern China during the Sino-Japanese War Period— As Seen from the Surveys of the Kōa-in (Asia Development Board)

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Introduction

In the period before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Japanese strategic planning with regard to China was focused on several regions of China: first, the Northeast = "Manchuria," then North China and finally Central China. Although Japan's major strategic and investment interests were centered on these parts of China, Japan did not completely ignore the southern part of China. The main responsibility for considering activities in south China was given to the Colonial Government of Taiwan. The Colonial Government's interest in southern China dates from within a few years of the establishment of the colonial administration.

The Colonial Government of Taiwan undertook the responsibility for planning with regard to southern China for two main reasons: first, this region was important to the concept of "Southern Advance," and secondly, the Colonial Government was concerned to assure the stability of Taiwan. In the early years, the most important fruits of this policy planning were in cultural and medical fields, and in the economic field the Sango Company, one of the Taiwan-based firms, was active in south China. However, the Sango Company withdrew after ten years. During this period, the Bank of Taiwan opened branches in most of the important cities of southern China, and those branches became important bases of support for Japanese economic activities. In the 1930s the Japanese government considered extending loans to the regional governments in Guangxi, Guangdong and Fujian, but the negotiations over the loans were not successful. Thus, Japan was not able to establish "authority" or to gain economically profitable advantages in south China. It was as a result of these kinds of difficulties that Japan's position in south China was on a more limited scale and got less attention than her efforts in north and central China. However, we should also note that in spite of the lower levels of success, the Taiwan Colonial Government's enthusiasm for pursuing an advance into China did not change. In 1936 the Taiwan Development Company was established with the specific

responsibility for Japanese economic activities in south China and Southeast Asia, and in the following year, a subsidiary known as the Fuku-Dai Company was founded.¹⁾

When war broke out between China and Japan, south China was included in Japan's overall war strategy, and the Taiwan Colonial Government contributed personnel to the administrative institutions in the occupied areas. The establishment of the Asia Development Board (hereafter Kōa-in) in 1938 was one indication of this incorporation. Kōa-in was the organization that was charged with trying to unify Japanese administration throughout the occupied areas of China. Under the system of control established under the Kōa-in, what became of the areas near the Taiwan straits, which had earlier been in the sphere designated for control by the Taiwan Colonial Government? One way to approach this problem is to look at the records of research conducted by organizations under the control of the Kōa-in, to see what they tell us about the activities of this new organization. In this essay I will use those reports as a way to consider the question of whether we can identify new knowledge and theorizing about south China within Japanese strategic policy.

1. Kōa-in as an Organization and its Research Strategy

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japanese forces began major campaigns in China. To deal with the new situation created by the expanding involvement in China, the Japanese government issued a policy paper entitled "Outline for Resolving the China Incident" on December 24, 1937. According to this policy statement, the Nationalist government was to be replaced by a pro-Japanese government in North China, and eventually a similar pro-Japanese government would be established in the Shanghai area.²⁾ In January of 1938, the Japanese government went one step further and announced its famous policy of "not dealing with the Nationalist government." As more territory came under Japanese occupation, new plans to deal with administration of the occupied zones were announced. Economic concerns were central to the occupation planning. As early as the "Outline for Resolving the China Incident," policymakers had stressed the importance of economic development in North China, and had called for the establishment of national policy companies to play a central role in bringing the economy of North China under Japanese control. Similar plans were also outlined for Central China.

At that time policymakers began to debate the necessity for establishment of a new organization to unify and coordinate the activities of the military with the policies of other Japanese ministries and organizations. The first of the proposals for such a new umbrella organization came from the Economy Planning Board in January 1938; at that time the Economy Planning Board proposed that an "Asian Office" ought to be established directly under the

Cabinet. Other proposals included a proposal for a "China Bureau" from the Legal Bureau, and the Foreign Ministry's plans for its own "China Development Office" attached the Ministry, which was a reflection of its worries about the loss of its own authority in matters of foreign policy. With so many plans, representing so many different interests, it was not easy to reach agreement. In late August the Army Ministry strongly requested the establishment of a new organization that would be able to centralize planning with regard to political and economic activities in the occupied areas; the Army stated its hope of transferring responsibilities from its own Special Service Department to such an organization. In spite of the strong opposition from the Foreign Ministry, the Cabinet approved the establishment of a new organization, the "China Affairs Board", on October 1. This organization was to take responsibility for drafting and implementing plans with regard to political, economic and cultural affairs in China and to supervise the national policy firms. Purely diplomatic affairs were excluded from its purview. The name was changed to the Asia Development Board (Kōa-in), and the organization was officially established under the Cabinet on December 16.³⁾

The Kōa-in was officially headed by the Prime Minister and a board that included as vice-chairs the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Army and Navy, plus a Director of General Affairs. Under this governing board, there were Departments of Politics, Economy, Culture and Technology. Employees were drawn from bureaucrats seconded from other ministries. In order to coordinate the activities of the Kōa-in with other ministries, a regular liaison committee was set up under the leadership of the Director of General Affairs. To strengthen the organization, advisory committees for Kōa-in were established; the first, made up of high-ranking bureaucrats from various ministries and academic experts was set up in July of 1939, and in September a technical advisory committee was added to advise on technical matters.⁴⁾ As we can see from the above description, the Kōa-in was designed to serve as a comprehensive organization overseeing China-related matters. However, as Japan shifted its focus from the war in China to Southeast Asia, and as the Pacific War began, a new organization known as the Ministry of Greater East Asian Affairs (Dai Tōa-shō) was established in November 1942, and the Kōa-in was subsumed under this larger organization.

In examining the activities of the Kōa-in, we need to look not only at the headquarters described above, but also at the various offices located in the occupied areas of China. The first liaison offices were established in March 1939. We can see the outlines of these organizations from the Imperial Edict, issued on March 10, which established the quota for employees of the liaison offices. Other information comes from the subsequent Cabinet orders which specified the cities in which the liaison offices were to be located and the areas that each was to supervise.⁵⁾ As a result of these orders, liaison offices in North

China, the Mongolian border regions, Central China and Amoy were established, and under the North China Liaison Office an office was established in Qingdao. A little later, further offices were established under the Central China Liaison Office, in Nanjing, Hankow, and Guangdong.⁶⁾ Military officers were appointed as the Director of General Affairs, as the head of the Department of Politics of the headquarters, and as the head of the Liaison Offices and subordinate offices. From this we can see that from the beginning the Kōa-in was controlled by the military.

The Kōa-in was charged with drafting policy for the occupied areas of China, and an important aspect of policy planning was research. We can see the importance given to research activities from the fact that in the four short years of its existence, Kōa-in and its various liaison offices produced a total of more than 1,700 research reports. General guidelines for surveys and studies were drawn up by the third section of the Department of Politics of the headquarters, with responsibility for more detailed survey questions assigned to the regional liaison offices. During the first year of its existence (1939) the major direction for research was stated in the following way: "We should stress research designed to aid in the building of the Japan-Manchuria-China economic block with special emphasis on natural resources that can be used for defense purposes." Moreover, as "the incident progresses, we should do research into questions related to the supply of crucial war materiel for defense purposes."⁷⁾ In the following year, the goals set out in 1939 were still at the top of the list, with the additional directions to do "basic research related to the development of war-related resources" and to "stress research related to the ways in which resources can be developed by enterprises and supplied to Japan."⁸⁾ In mid-1940 a number of leaders in the Army and Navy began to debate the "Southern advance" and on July 26 the Cabinet issued its "Basic Strategic Guidelines" and announced its determination to create a "New Order in Asia." As a result of these decisions, there were some new directions in the overall guidelines for 1941, issued in March 1941. The new guidelines stated that research "should stress cooperation with Japan and development of defense-related resources." Researchers were urged to quickly undertake research that would aid "in building a self-sufficient economy."⁹⁾ Although there were some individual studies and reports that dealt with political or cultural issues, the vast majority of the studies followed the lines indicated in these policy statements and stressed the mobilization of natural resources for national defense.

In the period before the outbreak of the war, as we have already seen, Japan had made less progress in southern China, than in other parts of China, in establishing an economic and political base. Let us then turn to see what kind of research activities Kōa-in was able to carry out in the south China region.

2. The Amoy Liaison Office: Activities and Research

The Japanese navy began a blockade of the Central and South China coast from the end of August 1937, and occupied Jinmen Island on October 26, 1937 and Amoy Island on May 13, 1938. During this period, Japanese forces also occupied other small islands along the Fujian coast. Before the establishment of Kōa-in, general policy planning for the Fujian area had been undertaken, under the leadership of the commander of the naval brigade, by an organization known as the Restoration Committee which included representatives of the Navy, of the Foreign Ministry (General Consular service) and of the Colonial Government of Taiwan.¹⁰⁾

As we have already seen, the Amoy Liaison Office was established together with three other liaison offices on March 10, 1939. According to the regulations with regard to its establishment, the Amoy Office's area of control was described as "Amoy Island and nearby areas."¹¹⁾ The "nearby areas" referred to the islands of Jinmen and Nan-Ao, and other small islands. According to the personnel directives issued at the time of the establishment of the office, the first head was Rear Admiral Mito Haruzō, who was the former commander of the Magong auxiliary naval port on the Pescadore Islands.¹²⁾ The Liaison Office had a Political Section, headed by the naval captain Hara Chūichi, and an Economic Section headed by Fujimura Hirota who was seconded from the Colonial Government of Taiwan.¹³⁾ The Amoy Liaison Office was to have a staff of 46, the smallest of all of the liaison offices established at that time.¹⁴⁾

With regard to the personnel of the Amoy Liaison Office, we can note two things. First, it goes almost without saying that control was in the hands of the Navy. Although, following the regulations, the Navy's Special Services Division in Amoy was dissolved when the Liaison Office was established,¹⁵⁾ the fact that Hara Chūichi, who had been the head of the Navy's Special Services Division in Amoy, continued in the new organization is a sign that although the names had changed, little had changed in reality.¹⁶⁾

Secondly, we can see that a large number of personnel were seconded from the Colonial Government of Taiwan. In addition to Fujimura, mentioned above, seven other individuals were transferred from the Colonial Government.¹⁷⁾ In addition, a number of individuals who had been in the Navy's Special Services Division in Amoy also moved to the new organization. This transfer of personnel seems to follow the directions issued at the time of the establishment of Kōa-in which had ordered that "there should be a division in work between Kōa-in and other related divisions and offices." The directions issued at that time had referred to the previous activities of the Colonial Government of Taiwan in southern China, and had said, "With regard to the

areas described above [South China], if a regional office of the Kōa-in is established, steps should be taken to prevent competition between organizations, including the seconding of employees from the Colonial Government of Taiwan.”¹⁸⁾ In regard to this, the Colonial government “in response to the requests of the Amoy Liaison Office of the Kōa-in and the local navy authorities, has temporarily dispatched employees to aid with general administration, legal matters, and other technical matters,” and thus was working to set up a cooperative system for the administration of the occupied areas.¹⁹⁾ We can see that the knowledge and experiences gained by the Colonial government in its early approaches to South China were needed by the new organization, and that the Colonial government was cooperating in the establishment of a unified China policy under the umbrella of the Kōa-in.

The Japanese Army set up puppet governments in the occupied territories, and sought to assert its control through “guidance” of these newly established local governments. This was also the practice followed in Amoy. In the case of Amoy, a month after the occupation of the city, on June 20, 1938, an Amoy Peace Preservation Committee was set up under the “guidance” of the Restoration Committee.²⁰⁾ A little more than a year later, on June 27, 1939, the Kōa-in governing board approved regulations to govern the region. Those regulations calling for “strengthening power centers on both sides of the Taiwan straits and protecting communications lines in south China,” included “Draft regulations for Sino-Japanese cooperation with regard to the Amoy Special Municipality”, a “Sino-Japanese Memorandum on the Amoy Special Municipality” and “Draft Regulations on the Organization of the Amoy Special Municipality.”²¹⁾ Based on these regulations, the Amoy Liaison Office on July 1 established the first real puppet government for the area, the Amoy Special Municipality Government.²²⁾ At the time of the establishment of the Special Municipality Government, an agreement was reached in response to the request of the Liaison Office, which stipulated that “Half of the members of the municipal council should be Japanese citizens, and the Police Chief and the Assistant Police Chief should be Japanese, if the Japanese authorities so request.” Japanese advisors were also assigned to the new municipal government.²³⁾ The new Amoy Special Municipality included not only the island of Amoy, but also Jinmen Island and other islands. With these developments the Amoy Liaison Office attempted to bring the whole Amoy area under its “supervision and control” and as a “region of military importance.”

In response to requests from the Amoy Liaison Office, a number of individuals were dispatched from Taiwan to take up positions in the government. For example, it was said that “because there were almost no Amoy natives who could give lectures on agricultural development, the new Agricultural Office of the Commerce and Industry Division of the Construction Bureau of the city government was staffed by Taiwan natives who, because they shared the same

dialect, could serve as agricultural technicians, assistants, and extension experts.”²⁴⁾ In the case of the police, from the beginning of the occupation police officers had been dispatched by the Colonial Government of Taiwan, and there were more than 75 officers who took over the “guidance” of Chinese employees.²⁵⁾ On another front, “the Fuku-Dai Company was given responsibility for public works projects, and also carried out surveys on implementation of plans for industrial development.”²⁶⁾ In this way, the Amoy Liaison Office, which was operating under the control of the Navy, carried out its plan for administration of the occupied areas, making use of many individuals who were dispatched from Taiwan.

We noted earlier that the Amoy Liaison Office was responsible for carrying out policy-oriented surveys. Exactly what kind of survey work did it do? The Kōa-in headquarters sent general guidelines for survey work. In order to facilitate survey work in the Amoy area, the Liaison office in 1940 established an “Amoy Unified Research Committee.” The members of this committee included the head of the political section of the Liaison Office, the head of the economics section, and five members from outside organizations, selected from civilian organizations including Zen-Bin Suisan [All Fujian Marine Products Association], the Bank of Taiwan Amoy branch, the Amoy branch of Tōa Kaiun [shipping company], Hakuai Hospital, Fuku-Dai Company, and Japan’s two giant trading firms, Mitsui Yōkō and Mitsubishi Shōji. The two members from the Liaison office served as chairman and vice-chairman of the committee.²⁷⁾ The organizations that were designated to provide members of the committee were the major Japanese firms and organizations active in Amoy at the time. We have some idea of the kinds of research activities of three of these organizations— the Bank of Taiwan, Fuku-Dai Company, and the Zen-Bin Suisan. As for the others, it is still unclear what research activities they undertook.

From a check of a bibliography²⁸⁾, we can identify 87 surveys undertaken by the Amoy Liaison Office. Those surveys fall into the following categories: agriculture, 28; animal husbandry, 4; forestry, 6; marine products, 11; mining, 9; urban planning, 6; transport, 7. Although the titles of these reports are listed in the bibliography, so far very few of them have been found in collections in Japan. Some of these reports, however, appeared in the journal *Chōsa Geppō*, which was published by the Kōa-in. In the discussion that follows, many of the surveys and reports that are discussed are among those that appeared in the *Chōsa Geppō* journal. Survey work undertaken by the Liaison Office included both research based on fieldwork, and research based on printed sources, what we might call “desktop” studies. In the discussion that follows, I will be examining primarily the reports based on fieldwork.

A. Agricultural Reports

In June of 1939, in line with policy needs, the Amoy Liaison Office directed that research should be undertaken on “development of resources in agricultural, soil surveys, structure of rural communities, and the study of basic customs and institutions in agriculture.”²⁹⁾ In line with those basic directions, two reports were produced: in October, a report entitled “Plan for increasing agricultural production on unused land in the Heshan district of Amoy”, and in January of 1940, a report on “Plan for increasing agriculture and animal husbandry on Amoy Island”.³⁰⁾ We can assume that these plans were drawn up in line with policies to increase agricultural production. Many of the reports listed below seem to have been conducted under a similar rubric. (In the following list, I have indicated the name of the researcher when known and the issue of the *Chōsa Geppō* in which each appeared).

1. *Amoi ni okeru nōsaku kankō chōsa* [A survey of customs with reference to agricultural production in Amoy]. Survey directed by an employee of the agricultural section of the Amoy Special Municipality Government. Appeared in vol. 1, no. 7.
2. *Amoi nōgyō seisan tōkei, fu Kinmon-tō* [Agricultural production statistics for Amoy, appendix: Jinmen Island]. Survey directed by an employee of the agricultural section of the Amoy Special Municipality Government. Appeared in vol. 3, no. 4.
3. *Amoi-tō ni okeru sosai saibai no tekiki oyobi tekihinshu shirabe* [Appropriate timing and varieties for vegetable crops on Amoy Island]. Hōmo Nō-en; I have not seen this report.
4. *Amoi chūku ni okeru kansho no keishitsu chōsa* [On the character of sweet potatoes in the Amoy area]. Main researcher, Uehara, technical assistant with the Amoy Liaison Office. Appeared in vol. 3, no. 5.
5. *Amoi-tō tōgyō no genjō* [The current state of the sugar industry on Amoy Island]. Chen Xuexiao, agricultural assistant with the Construction Bureau of the Amoy Special Municipality Government. Appeared in vol. 2, no. 10.
6. *Amoi oyobi fukinchi ni okeru kōma saibaihō* [Cultivation methods for jute in Amoy and nearby areas]. Appeared in vol. 3 no. 4.
7. *Amoi ni okeru tabako kōshu yōryō* [Outline of tobacco cultivation in Amoy]. Adachi Ryōnosuke, technical expert with the Monopoly Bureau of the Colonial Government of Taiwan, and assistant technician, Misao Shinkichi. I have not seen this report.
8. *Amoi-tō, Kinmon-tō tabako saibai keikaku chōsa* [Planning survey for tobacco production on Amoy and Jinmen Islands]. Adachi Ryōnosuke. I have not seen this report.
9. *Amoi ni okeru nōsakubutsu no kaika, ketsujitsu, seijukuki ichiran* [A chart

showing the flowering, development of fruit and ripening seasons for agricultural products in Amoy]. An employee of the agricultural section of the Amoy Special Municipality Government. I have not seen this report.

One-fifth of the land area of Amoy island was taken up by the city, the remaining four-fifths by an agricultural area known as the Heshan district.³¹⁾ Much of the Heshan district was mountainous, and only twenty-six percent of the land could be used for agriculture. The agricultural land was divided between paddy fields on which two crops of rice were grown, and dry fields—which in area were about twice the land area of paddy. In some ways, the agriculture regime was like many other regions outside large cities. However, the production of vegetables was not sufficient to meet local demand. The report cited as number two on the list above includes detailed statistics, based on the situation at the end of 1940, on the amount of land devoted to different crops, output per unit of land, and price of almost all major agricultural commodities. According to those statistics, farming households made up sixty-six percent of total households, and each family had on average about six mou of land. We can imagine that it was very difficult to make a living with this scale of land management.

According to the introduction to the report, this was the first survey of this kind on agricultural production in the Amoy region. It is not difficult to understand why. In Fujian province, with the exception of tea, there were no major agricultural commodities that were likely to attract attention. It is therefore not surprising that the agriculture situation in only one small part of the province had not been studied before. Item one on the list was undertaken to provide basic data; as for the method of the survey, data was derived from a survey of twenty households. Investigators interviewed each family, recording data on some thirty different agricultural commodities. For each crop they recorded information on the preparation of the fields for planting, planting methods, fertilizer use and methods of harvesting. Families were also asked about the use of labor, about agricultural implements, and about the size of the harvest and rent payments. The conclusion of the survey team was that in general land quality was not good and that there was insufficient water for proper irrigation. Farming methods were quite primitive and there was much room for improvement.

On the basis of this report, the Amoy Liaison Office developed plans for agriculture improvement that focused on improving farming methods. Among the central focuses were improvement of crop varieties and introduction of new seeds. At the top of their list of recommendations was an increase in vegetable production, and they encouraged the introduction of Japanese varieties of vegetables.³²⁾ The Hōmo Nō-en, listed in item number three, which carried out

the survey on appropriate growing season and varieties of vegetables, was a company with its headquarters in Taiwan that had come to Amoy right after the area was occupied, and which operated vegetable fields on a farm run by the Navy.³³⁾ We can imagine that the report used the experiments carried out on the Navy farm as a reference point. One of the new varieties introduced from Taiwan were new kinds of sweet potatoes.³⁴⁾ However, the report on sweet potatoes listed as number four, dealt with indigenous sweet potatoes, not with the newly-introduced varieties.

The Amoy Liaison Office gathered plant varieties from Taiwan and various places in Japan and tested them in Amoy to see if they were suitable for local conditions.³⁵⁾ Jute was not originally native to the area, in 1940 seeds were introduced from Taiwan. The report listed as number 6 was based on the "superior performance" of one farming family in the Heshan district. As for tobacco, a new variety of yellow-leafed tobacco was introduced in 1939 and grown as an experiment, and in the March of the 1940 a survey was undertaken to measure the success of the new crop. (list 8)

As we can see from the above, the reports on agriculture in the Amoy region were restricted to technical experiments, and did not touch on crucial issues like land distribution, tenancy practices or the structure of the overall farming system.

B. Marine Products

In May, 1939, the Amoy Liaison Office decided on the "Fundamental guidelines for the development of marine products in the Amoy region," and began to "undertake various surveys related to the development of marine products, including fishing policy and technical problems in the fishing industry."³⁶⁾

The various reports that appeared with regard to the rich resources in marine products related industries included the following items.

1. *Amoi suisan tōkei, Shōwa 14* [Statistics on Amoy marine products for 1939]. *Shōwa 15 nen Amoi suisan tōkei*, no. 12 [Statistics on Amoy marine products for 1940]. I have not seen these reports.
2. *Kinmon-tō no suisangyō* [Marine products industries on Jinmen Island]. This search was undertaken by Uchida Harukichi, Okada Moritō and Guo Ximen of the Amoy Marine Products Association and Cai Shixing of the Amoy Fisheries Association. Appeared in vol. 1, no. 10.
3. *Nan-ō-tō jijō* [Situation on Nan-Ao Island]. Morita, who was an employee of the Amoy Liaison Office, prepared this report. Appeared in vol. 1, no. 1.
4. *Nan-ō-tō ni okeru suisan chōsa hōkoku sho* [A report on marine products on Nan-Ao Island]. Appeared in vol. 1, no. 10.

5. *Nan-ō-tō suisan kumiai setsuritsu ni kansuru hōkoku sho* [A report on the establishment of a marine products trade association on Nan-Ao Island]. I have not seen this report.
6. *Kinmon, Shōkinmon oyobi Amoi-tō ni okeru engyō keikaku* [Plans for the salt industry on Jinmen, Xiaojinmen and Amoy Islands]. Nagami Masuo, technical expert with the Colonial Government of Taiwan, and Hakomori Kyūma of the Southern Japan Salt Company prepared this report. I have not seen this report.
7. *Kinmon-tō, Nan-ō-tō engyō chōsa* [A survey of the salt industries on Jinmen and Nan-Ao Islands]. Morita Tomikichi, Imura Sajūrō, and Yang Qinglong of the Monopoly Division of the Taiwan Colonial Government wrote this report. I have not seen this report.

Fisheries in Amoy “occupied first place in all production on the island,”³⁷⁾ and in the case of Nan-Ao Island, seventy percent of the population was engaged in fishing. (list item four) However, at the time research was undertaken, the Japanese Navy had banned fishing, and the investigator who produced the report listed as item three had not been able to actually observe fishing. His report was based on interviews with individuals who had formerly been involved in fishing. According to the report in item two on the above list, “the [Jinmen] islanders are mostly part-time farmers and part-time fishers.” In light of the current situation in which it is very difficult to obtain supplies, we can see that the “fisheries industry is in a very bad state and both management and trading are very difficult.” (item list two)

In spite of the fact that the investigators were not able to observe fisherman at work, the report—as in those on agriculture—focused on technological issues of fishing methods and processing methods, and concluded that the techniques used were backward. The solution for these problems was the introduction of Japanese methods. The report listed as item three proposed that improvement in the fishing industry and in the trade of maritime products could best be advanced if “all activities related to maritime products” were re-organized under a new Sino-Japanese fisheries organization. And the report, in item five on the list, of the establishment of such a trade organization was undoubtedly in response to this view. In July of 1940 the fisheries associations of Amoy and Nan-Ao Island were joined together to form the Zen-Bin Marine Products Corporation.³⁸⁾ In this way the Amoy Liaison Office worked through the Corporation to try to establish control over all of the fishing industry in the region.³⁹⁾

As for the salt industry, according to the report in item three on the list “salt trade on Nan-Ao Island was conducted by the Peace Preservation Committee which then passed it on to the Amoy Liaison Office of the Kōa-in.” From this it would seem that the Liaison Office had established a salt monopoly throughout the region. The Liaison Office was attempting to

increase salt production in the region, and carried out surveys to determine appropriate coastal areas in December 1940. Those surveys covered Jinmen, Xiaojinmen and Nan-Ao islands. (list item seven)⁴⁰⁾

C. Mining Related

As part of the 1940 survey of mining resources, which was part of the survey of important strategic materials, the Amoy Liaison Office was directed to carry out geological surveys on two resources, cobalt and manganese. Under these directions, surveys were undertaken to search for sources of cobalt on Jinmen Island. At that time, the chief sources of cobalt were Canada and the Belgian Congo. Japan consumed 300 to 400 tons of cobalt a year, but domestic sources of production supplied only about two tons.⁴¹⁾ Thus cobalt was one of the strategic resources that Japan desperately needed.

Jinmen had been a traditional supplier of cobalt, most of which was used for coloring glazes in the ceramics industry. The first survey to investigate whether Jinmen cobalt could be used in the metals industry was undertaken by Aizawa Hajime, formerly chief executive officer of Tōyō Sōen Company. In February 1939, after obtaining permission from the Army and the Kōa-in, Aizawa visited Jinmen, obtained samples of cobalt, and took them back to Japan to study. (list item one) Experiments carried out on the rock samples by the Metallurgy Department of Tōhoku Imperial University suggested that, "there is a high possibility of being able to economically develop this resource".⁴²⁾ The Amoy Liaison Office made a follow-up study in February and March of 1940, and their study concluded that "there is only a very small supply of relatively high quality ore, and one cannot place much hope in the development of this resource." (list item one)⁴³⁾ Following these reports, the headquarters of Kōa-in dispatched a team of experts to do a follow-up investigation.

The survey team included nine members: Sato Genrō, a technical expert and two others from the Kōa-in, Konno Yoshio, a technical expert, and one other member from the Geological Survey, one member each from two private companies—Nihon Kagaku Kikai Seizō Corporation and the Nittō Kagaku Kōgyō Corporation, and two members from Nihon Denki Yakin Corporation. Added to this team were Aizawa Hajime, the man who had first expressed an interest in Jinmen cobalt, and Ichimura Takeshi, a professor of geology from Taihoku Imperial University. The survey was carried out in October and November of 1940, and many documents related to the survey can be found in the Foreign Ministry Archives. The reports put together by the Amoy Liaison Office include the following.

1. *Kinmon-tō kobaruto chōsa hōkoku*, [A report on the survey of cobalt on Jinmen Island]. *Chōsa Geppō*, vol. 1, no.8.

2. *Kinmon-tō kobaruto kōshō chōsa hōkoku* [A report on a survey of cobalt deposits on Jinmen Island]. Ichimura Takeshi, vol. 2, no. 6.
3. *Kinmon-tō kobarutokō chōsa chūkan hōkoku* [An interim report on the survey of cobalt mines in Jinmen Island]. Funaki Kōemon, Nittō Kagaku Kogyō. I have not seen this report.
4. *Fukkenshō Kinmon-tō ni okeru kobarutokō chōsa sho hōkoku* [Reports on a survey of cobalt mines on Jinmen Island, Fujian]. I have not seen this report.

What were the results of all of these surveys? Like the earlier report of the Amoy Liaison Office, the reports concluded that the deposits of cobalt were not extensive, and the ore was of low quality. (Nihon Denki Yakin, *et al.*,⁴⁴) and Ichimura, list item two) However, Aizawa continued to insist that given the importance of cobalt to Japan, efforts should be made to develop Jinmen's cobalt resources, and he proposed methods for refining that would convert low-quality ore into higher quality ore.⁴⁵ The research divisions of Mitsui Kagaku Kōgyō and Mitsubishi Kōgyō were recruited to help in the experiments in refining the ore and raising it to a higher quality level. However, neither Aizawa's method, nor those tried by other organizations, were able to improve the ore sufficiently so that it could be used in the metallurgy industries.⁴⁶

As for the surveys conducted by the Amoy Liaison Office on Nan-Ao Island, the following reports were produced.

1. *Kanton-shō Nan-ō-tō kōsan shigen chōsa hōkoku (Gaihō)* [Report on a survey of mineral resources on Nan-Ao Island of Guangdong Province]
2. *Nan-ō-tō Daiha-san tangusutenkō chōsa hōkoku* [Report on an investigation of tungsten mines in the Dabashan area of Nan-Ao Island]. Report prepared by Yoshikawa Akio, contract employee of the Amoy Liaison Office. Appeared vol. 2, no. 11.

According to these reports, there were no minerals, either tungsten or magnetite—that were worth exploiting.

Neither the cobalt mines of Jinmen or the tungsten of Nan-Ao had previously been counted in the list of China's mineral resources. These surveys were undertaken in response to the directives to "explore previously unknown sources ... in order to ensure supplies of mineral resources."⁴⁷ This reflects Japan's determination to find natural resources.

D. Urban Planning

When the Liaison office was first set up, the "Regulations for the establishment of the Amoy Liaison Office" had listed the responsibilities of the organization. One of these was to make plans with regard to the development of the city and harbor. In line with this task, the following reports were produced.

1. *Amoi toshi keikaku* [Plans for the development of Amoy city]. Drafted by

- Aoshima Katsuzō, a technical assistant from the Colonial Government of Taiwan. I have not seen this report.
2. *Dai Amoi kensetsu keikaku* [Construction plans for greater Amoy]. Drafted by Nakamura Kei, technical expert with the Colonial Government of Taiwan. I have not seen this report.
 3. *Amoi-tō onsen chishitsu chōsa hōkokusho* [A report on a geological survey of hot springs on Amoy Island]. Hayasaka Ichirō, Professor, Taihoku Imperial University, and Tomita Yoshirō, Associate Professor, Taihoku Imperial University. Appeared in vol. 2, no. 7.
 4. *Amoi-shi gesuidō chōsa* [A survey of the sanitation system of Amoy city], Arai Minao, a technical expert, and one other individual from the Colonial Government of Taiwan. I have not seen this report.
 5. *Amoi-tō fūkei keikaku chōsasho* [A survey with regard to planning related to scenic spots on Amoy Island]. Tamura Gō, a technical expert of the welfare service of the Kōa-in. Appeared in vol. 3, no. 5.
 6. *Amoi kō chōsa* [A survey of Amoy harbor]. Yamashita Shigezō, technical expert with the Colonial Government of Taiwan. Appeared in vol. 2, no. 7.

The Kōa-in drew up city plans for Qingdao, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. From the tables of contents of those plans, it would seem that attention was focused on basic infrastructure and public use facilities.⁴⁸⁾ The first two items on the list above are of similar nature. The special characteristics of the plans for Amoy are the surveys that were undertaken of hot springs, and the consideration given to scenic spots. Item five on the list proposed to exploit the scenic resources of Amoy and to make it a mecca for tourists from all over China and Southeast Asia. The plans called for dividing the city into commercial zones, resort areas, and hot springs areas, and proposed building infrastructure to support the tourist industry.

As we can see from these plans, the target audience was the Overseas Chinese. Work among the Overseas Chinese was also one of the responsibilities of the Kōa-in and its various liaison branches. The Kōa-in believed that "Overseas Chinese are one of the main supports of the government in Chongqing."⁴⁹⁾ A book written at the time argued, "In order to develop the south China economy, and to build a stronger economic alliance between China and Japan... we need to make efforts to involve the huge capital resources of the Overseas Chinese."⁵⁰⁾ Within the Amoy Liaison Office's political section, there was a special committee charged with work among the Overseas Chinese, and within the government of the Amoy Special Municipality there was an office charged with the task of easing the way of Overseas Chinese, aiding them in entering and leaving the country, finding housing, and in other ways promoting friendship.⁵¹⁾

As we can see from the above discussions, research activities of the Amoy Liaison Office focused on resource studies in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and mining. Those studies made it clear that productivity levels in all of the fields were low. As a result the "commercialization" or "supply to Japan" of raw materials that the Kōa-in had hoped to achieve could not be realized. At the most the studies may have helped in suggesting avenues for improvement in production levels that might contribute to "stabilizing livelihood" for the ordinary people, which was one of the necessary conditions for control of the occupied territories.

3. Establishment of the Guangdong Office and its Research Activities

In September 1938 the Japanese army began its Guangdong campaign, which was designed to cut the supply lines that the British and Americans were using to send goods to unoccupied China. On October 21 the campaign resulted in the occupation of Canton. In June of 1939 the city of Shantou was occupied, and in addition to these two cities a number of surrounding counties were also brought under Japanese control. Administration in the newly occupied territories was in the hands of the Army's Special Service Agency, and under its "guidance" a Guangdong Peace Preservation Committee (with Peng Dongyuan as chairman) was established in December. A year later, this organization was reorganized as the Canton city administration.⁵²⁾ After the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government in March of 1940, that government was regarded as the new central government, and the Guangdong occupied areas became its regional subordinate units as the Guangdong Provincial Government (chaired by Chen Gongbo) and a Canton city government.⁵³⁾ As in the case of the Amoy government, many of the personnel for these organizations was seconded from the Colonial Government of Taiwan and various allied organizations including the Taiwan Development Company, Fuku-Dai Company, and other associated firms and associations.⁵⁴⁾

The Guangdong Office was established about a year after the occupation of the area. Until that time the Liaison Committee of the Kōa-in had been responsible for discussing policies with regard to political, economic and cultural affairs in Guangdong. The decisions of that body were then transmitted to the Army and Navy Ministries and the Foreign Ministry, and the branches of those organizations in the occupied territories in Guangdong were responsible for implementing the decisions. On July 26, 1939, after "taking account of the state of pacification and the restoration of economic activity," the Kōa-in governing board decided to establish the Guangdong Office. Although the decision to establish the office was made in late July, the first employees of the organization did not take up their positions until November 4.⁵⁵⁾ Although we know little in detail about the scale of this office, we do have

one report that the Guangdong Office had eleven employees in September 1942.⁵⁶⁾

As we saw in the first part of this essay, the Guangdong Office was set up under the administrative control of the Central China Liaison Office, and the first person dispatched to Guangdong was Naganuma Kōki, a member of the secretariat of the Central China Liaison Office.⁵⁷⁾ This office “maintained very close contact” with the Central China Liaison Office and also “reported directly to the Kōa-in headquarters about all of its plans, and consulted closely with the local offices of the three major administrative bodies [Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry] in dealing with all major issues.”⁵⁸⁾ From this we can see that the Guangdong Office was, in practice, directly subordinate to the Kōa-in headquarters, and had as one of its main tasks acting as liaison between the Kōa-in headquarters and the local branches of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry.

Three or four months before setting up Guangdong Office, there had been discussions between the South China Expeditionary Army and Wang Jingwei about establishing a government in South China, with headquarters in Canton. Although these plans were not brought to fruition, the fact that they were discussed is a sign of the importance given to the Canton region.⁵⁹⁾ The area was also important because of its proximity to Hong Kong, and its relation to important diplomatic questions involving the opening of the Pearl River Delta, which were questions of concern to Japan, England and America. So we can imagine that the office was established because of the recognition of the crucial political and economic importance of this region in South China.⁶⁰⁾

Because of the importance of the Canton region, even before the establishment of the Guangdong Office, we can find nineteen research reports on economics, transport and industry in the region on the lists of research results of the Kōa-in headquarters. The Fuku-Dai Company was responsible for most of these research reports, and they seem to have been highly evaluated afterwards because of their guide for the company's activities. One of the typical reports were the series on *Kanton-shō ni okeru yūbō jigyō* [Projects with good prospects for success in Guangdong Province].

The Guangdong Office began its research activities in 1940, and in addition to publishing the journals *Kanton kōgyō geppō* (July 1940-) and the *Kanton kin'yū geppō* (March 1940-), it also compiled twenty-one research reports. However, when we examine those reports we do not find reports that reflect the task that was given to the Office by the Kōa-in headquarters. The Headquarters had directed the local office to investigate the status of the Canton raw silk export trade. It had also been directed to consider the production and circulation of important medicinal drugs that might be supplied to Japan, and to survey the system of distribution and rationing of marine products. We also need to consider whether or not the office undertook research with regard to strategic mineral resources. The Kōa-in headquarters had

published a report in 1939 on “Kanton-shō no tungusuten kō” [Tungsten resources in Guangdong]; research for the report had been completed by the Fuku-Dai Company. According to that report, “We can expect to find many mineral resources within Guangdong province,” (found on the reverse of the fifth page). In the same year the Taiwan Development Company, in cooperation with five major trading companies, had collected materials on tungsten, coal and five other strategic metals. The fact that other organizations had already undertaken the work on surveying the production and supply of strategic metals may explain why the Guangdong Office did not produce studies in this category. We do find studies on the supply and demand for matches and pork, on the circulation and control over special Manchurian products entering the Guangdong market, statistics on trade, and on political trends among Japanese, foreigners and Chinese in the Guangdong region, all of which were related to concern for the political and economic situation in the area.

From the latter half of 1941 on until the abolition of the Kōa-in, research by the Guangdong Office focused on investigations of the food supply problem. The results of those studies were brought together in three major reports: *Kanton shokuryō mondai* [The food problem in Guangdong], *Kanton-shō dojō chōsa hōkoku* [A survey report on Guangdong soil], and *Kanton-shō nōson chōsa hōkoku* [A survey of Guangdong villages]. The first two of these studies were translations from Chinese works. According to the prefaces attached to the two works, *Kanton shokuryō mondai* was “intended to serve as a guide to food supply problems after the arrival of the Imperial Army,” and the study of soil was “to be reference materials for the problems we currently face in trying to stabilize the livelihood of the people and increase the food supply.” The third of these reports, the survey of rural villages in Guangdong, was the largest fieldwork-based survey undertaken by the Guangdong Office. According to the preface of the work, which was written by Furuki Ryūzō, a member of the secretariat of the Kōa-in who had been seconded from the secretariat of the Ministry of Finance, “in the past, very little was known about Guangdong Province.” The study was undertaken to “provide the absolutely basic knowledge we need to know to deal with the region,” and to achieve that goal they needed to “consider how they should approach and understand the problems of Guangdong rural villages.”

The survey was based on fieldwork undertaken in villages occupied by the Japanese Army between October and December 1941 by the Guangdong Office. The survey covered twenty-four *xiang* (villages) in the Pearl River Delta region near the city of Canton, including villages in Dongguan, Nanhai, Panyu, Zengcheng, and Zhongshan counties, and five *xiang* (villages) near Shantou in Chenghai, Chao’an, and Chaoyang counties. The study was co-authored by Shimizu Hiroshi, Numata Masaji⁶¹⁾, Fujioka Yasuo⁶²⁾ and Shi Xichun. Shimizu,

Numata and Shi had been responsible for editing the study on *Kanton shokuryō mondai* [The food problem in Guangdong].

What categories were included in this rural survey? A check of the list of questions shows that there were sections on 1) general affairs, which included the lineage system, landholding, and tenancy; 2) agriculture, which included scale of management, irrigation, agricultural labor, and agriculture implements; and 3) rice farming. Although the intentions were to complete a comprehensive survey, the work had to be completed in a very short space of time; moreover the researchers were operating in Japanese-occupied villages, and were not able to get the full cooperation of the peasants. It is therefore not surprising that the resulting survey was incomplete. In spite of all the problems, the report does provide a picture of the changes in peasant lives under the occupation, and indicates that economic life in rural areas had become much more difficult. Let us look at several concrete examples included in the report.

It is often said that the well-developed lineage system is a characteristic feature of South China society. The report indicates that since the occupation lineages had not been able to carry out the important ceremonies in honor of the ancestors, or that in cases where some attempt was made to preserve the rites, they included only simple rituals at the time of the Qingming festival. However, the researchers noted that there had been no change in the system of lineage land ownership. In these Guangdong villages, more than half of the village families were tenants, and most of the households cultivated between one and five *mou* of land. Rent was between 50 and 60 percent of the harvest. Peasant households supplemented their income from farming with cash income that came from remittances from family members working overseas, from employment outside the village, and from family sideline industries. All of these sources of cash income had been reduced since the beginning of the war. In the case of remittances, before the war money had primarily been remitted through British and American banks; under wartime conditions, such remittances had become much more difficult. Moreover, the war had badly affected the trade in Guangdong's major export commodities. Since several of those exports—particularly raw silk and the embroidery handwork that was widespread in the Shantou region—were produced by peasant households as sidelines, the decline in the trade directly impacted on the rural household economy. In the areas where tangerines previously had been grown, farmers had switched their fields to sweet potatoes and wheat; lychee trees were cut down, and the trunks were used for making charcoal. Some villages also reported that Japanese armies had taken over some of their fields, reducing the total amount of cultivable land.

Although Guangdong was one of China's major rice-producing regions, it was also a major consuming region and in the past rice deficits had been made up through import of foreign rice. Needless to say, the Japanese invasion had

worsened conditions: import of rice became more difficult, some of the fields were damaged as a result of the war, and the Japanese army also made requisitions on the rice crop. One of the researchers, Numata Masaji, made the following comments in an essay he published the year after the survey: "One of the major concerns is the question of the livelihood of sixty million people living in the region, that is to say the problem of food supply.... Before we can even begin to think about introducing improved agricultural methods, we need to reduce the crisis of starvation that is currently facing peasants."⁶³)

The Guangdong Office was originally established to act as a liaison between the Kōa-in headquarters and the local branches of the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Ministry. The Guangdong Office was also in charge of local administration. It was in keeping with these responsibilities that the research projects were undertaken. And as Numata commented, their most urgent task was to "stabilize the life of the people." However, we must also remember that one of the other researchers Fujioka Yasuo, was associated with the firm that was responsible for acquiring rice supplies for the Japanese military, and therefore this report was undoubtedly also used as a reference source in that work. As the war was transformed from a war only between China and Japan, to the broader Pacific War, each region was pressured to raise its level of self-sufficiency in gaining food supplies, and under that pressure the main job of the Guangdong Office became the food supply problem.

Conclusions

It is often said that the main work of the Kōa-in, which was established to provide overall supervision and guidance to the Japanese occupation of China, ended up being economic work. And as we have seen, from the beginning the organization was given the task of undertaking research that would contribute to "the construction of a Japan-Manchuria-China economic block," and further the task of identifying possible sources of strategic raw materials. The Amoy Liaison Office certainly undertook studies on agriculture, marine products and mining resources, but the results all suggested that there were few resources to be had, and little chance of assuring regular supply to Japan. The Amoy Office had been given responsibility for a number of small islands, but with the exception of Amoy Island, which had developed as a port city, the major occupation of the other islands was fishing. Under wartime conditions, the close integration between the small islands and the Mainland economy had been disrupted, bringing even greater economic distress. All of these problems were referred to the Amoy Liaison Office. While the Kōa-in undertook research on strategic materials, including forestry and mining in unoccupied areas of Fujian province, the studies were based exclusively on printed materials, and the Japanese army was never able to occupy the mountainous regions where

strategic materials might have been found. As a result the Amoy Liaison Office's work came to focus on the improvement of production methods, and the hope that the "people's livelihood" could be stabilized through such improvements.

As for Guangdong Office, its major task was to act as a liaison between the various Japanese organizations within the region and the Kōa-in headquarters. As a result its actual research work was quite limited. Its only major survey was the rural survey we have discussed above, and that was closely linked to efforts to solve the food supply problem. Although there are major problems with the study, one still can get some sense of the special characteristics of Guangdong rural society, and of the damage that had been done by the Japanese occupation. As for Hainan Island, which was under direct control of the Army, the Kōa-in only made a few attempts to carry out surveys in that area.

In this way the studies undertaken in the occupied areas of South China under the direction of the Kōa-in, concluded that South China had little in the way of "strategic resources that might aid Japan's struggle for self-sufficiency" and thus very little could be contributed to the construction of a "strong national defense." We can thus see a major difference between the activities of the North China and Central China Liaison Offices which were able to mobilize many researchers from Japanese firms to aid in carrying out research activities.⁶⁴⁾ This was a reflection of the relative distribution of Japanese investment in China, which in late 1938 was divided as follows: 61 percent in North China, thirty-six percent in Central China, and only a little more than one percent in South China.⁶⁵⁾

The Japanese advance into Southeast Asia began in 1940, and was fully implemented in 1941. Under these circumstances, while the occupied areas of South China were never to be developed as major sources of strategic raw materials, they did have an important role to place as bases for supporting the move to the south. For that reason, it became important to try to "stabilize the livelihood conditions of the people" in the occupied areas. In those efforts the Colonial Government of Taiwan and various national policy companies associated with it played a major role. Thus we can see that the position of South China in Japan's overall strategic plans in fact changed very little during the war years. In the pre-war period, South China had been only a minor factor in Japan's strategic plans, of interest primarily only to those in Taiwan. And even under the unified system established under the Kōa-in, this region of China continued to play only a minor role in Japan's overall plans. The scarcity of research results is thus one reflection of this larger picture.

Notes

- 1) Nagaoka Shinjiro, "Kanan shisaku to Taiwan Sōtokufu—Taiwan Takushoku, Fuku-

- Dai Konsu no setsuritsu o chūshin to shite” [Policy toward south China and the Colonial Government of Taiwan—With reference to the establishment of the Taiwan Development Company and Fuku-Dai Company], and Nakamura Takashi, “Taiwan to Nan-Shi Nan-yō” [Taiwan, South China and Southeast Asia]. Both articles are included in Nakamura Takashi, ed., *Nihon no Nanpō kan'yo to Taiwan* [Japan's relations with “the South” and Taiwan], Tenri-kyō Dōyūsha, 1988.
- 2) Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabini shuyō bunsho* [A chronological table of Japan's foreign relations and important documents], Hara Shobō, 1984, pp. 381–384.
 - 3) For a detailed explanation of the conditions surrounding the establishment of the Kōa-in see Baba Akira, *Nicchū kankei to gaisei kikō no kenkyū* [Sino-Japanese relations and foreign affairs organizations], Hara Shobō, 1983, chapter 9; and Shibata Yoshimasa, “Chūgoku senryōchi gyōsei kikō to shite no Kōa-in” [The administrative functions of Kōa-in in occupied China], in Honjo Hisako, Uchiyama Masao, and Kubo Tōru, eds., *Kōa-in to senji Chūgoku chōsa* [The Kōa-in and its wartime research on China], Iwanami Shoten, 2002.
 - 4) See the essay by Shibata cited above.
 - 5) *Kōa-in shitsumu teiyō* [A summary of the functions of the Kōa-in], Kōa-in Seimubu, 1940, pp. 39–41.
 - 6) Foreign Ministry Archives, A-1-1-0 31-4 “Tai-Shi chūō kikan setchi mondai ikken” [On the problem of establishment of central organization to deal with China] in the “Kōa-in kōseki gaiyōsho” [A summary of the accomplishments of the Kōa-in—hereafter Accomplishments], p. 501.
 - 7) Accomplishments, pp. 49–50.
 - 8) Foreign Ministry Archives I-3 “Kōa-in ni okeru Chūgoku ni kansuru chōsa keikaku kankei zakken” [Miscellaneous documents with reference to plans for by Kōa-in for research in China, hereafter Research Plans], section on “Shōwa 15 nendo chōsa jimu shori gaiyō” [An outline of administrative plans for research in 1940], prepared by the third section of the Political Department, 1941, reverse side of page two.
 - 9) Research Plans, section on “Shōwa 16 nendo chōsa hōshin” [research plans for 1941].
 - 10) Bessho Kōji, *Shin Amoi, Shōwa 15nen ban* [New Amoy-1940 Edition], p. 3.
 - 11) *Kōa-in shitsumu teiyō*, p. 41.
 - 12) *Minami Shina nenkan, Shōwa 14nen ban* [Almanac of Southern China, 1939 Edition], Taiwan Jitsugyōkai Sha, 1939, p. 13. Later personnel transfers were as follows: second head of the office, Navy rear admiral Ōta Yasuji (assumed office on July 2, 1940); third head, Navy rear admiral Fukuda Ryōzō (assumed office on May 7, 1941). See *Shina jihō*, 33:2 (August 1940), p. 51 and 34:6 (June 1941), p. 55.
 - 13) *Shōkō nenkan, Shōwa 15nen - Kōa ban* [Almanac of Commerce and Industry, 1940 edition for Asia], Nikkan Kōgyō Shinbun sha, 1939, p. 685 and the *Minami Shina nenkan*, p. 17.
 - 14) *Kōa-in shitsumu teiyō*, p. 41.
 - 15) The Taiwan Colonial Government sent personnel to the Navy's Special Service Agency in Amoy. According to the records of the time, “In August of 1940 with the establishment of the Amoy Liaison Office of the Kōa-in, the Navy's Special Service Agency in Amoy was abolished, and the employees of the Colonial Government who had been working for the Special Service Agency became employees of the Amoy Liaison Office.” *Taiwan Sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō* [An outline of the accomplishments of the Colonial Government of Taiwan], volume 45 (1939), p. 97.
 - 16) Bessho Kōji, p. 4.

- 17) *Minami Shina nenkan*, p. 18.
- 18) Foreign Ministry Archives, H-7-2-0 4-8, "Sankō shiryō kankei zakken, Kōa-in kankei" [Materials with reference to Kōa-in].
- 19) *Taiwan Sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō*, p. 97.
- 20) Bessho Kōji, pp. 3-4.
- 21) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 38.
- 22) For reports on major personnel appointments in the government see "Amoi toku-betsushi seifu seiritsu shiki kyokō" [Ceremony in honor of the establishment of the Amoy Special Municipality], in *Shina Jihō*, 31:2 (August 1939), p. 68.
- 23) Usui Katsumi, *Nicchū gaikōshi kenkyū-Shōwa zenki* [A diplomatic history of Sino-Japanese relations to the end of the war], Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998, p. 381.
- 24) Togami Tsugio, *Amoi-tō no nōji kairyō shōshi* [A short history of agricultural improvement on Amoy Island], Kōa-in Amoy Liaison Office, 1942, p. 22. The author was a technical expert with the Kōa-in. The book, written right before his transfer to Taiwan, is a record of what had been done in agriculture work to that point.
- 25) *Taiwan Sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō*, pp. 97, 692-693.
- 26) *Op.cit.*, p. 98.
- 27) Foreign Ministry Archives, Research Plans, "Research Plans for 1940", pp. 24-25.
- 28) Imura Tetsuo, ed., *Kōa-in kankō tosho zasshi mokuroku* [A bibliography of books and magazines published by the Kōa-in with explanations], Fuji Shuppan, 1994. This volume is a reprint of the *Kōa-in chōsa hōkoku sōmokuroku* which was published by the Dai Tōa shō in 1943.
- 29) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 679.
- 30) *Op.cit.*, p. 279
- 31) Ide Kiwata, *Minami Shina no sangyō to keizai* [Industry and economics of South China], Ōsaka-yagō Shoten, 1939, p. 61.
- 32) Togami Tsugio, p. 37.
- 33) Togami Tsugio, p. 24.
- 34) Togami Tsugio, p. 40.
- 35) Togami Tsugio, p. 27.
- 36) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 680.
- 37) *Shin Amoi shinan* [A new guide to Amoy], Kanan Shinnippōsha, [1941], p. 51.
- 38) Bessho Kōji, p. 13.
- 39) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 81.
- 40) Imura Tetsuo, p. 59.
- 41) Foreign Ministry Archives, E-327 "Gaikoku kōzan oyobi kōgyō kankei zakken, Shōwa 16 nen, Chūgoku no bu, Fukkenshō no bu, Kinmon-tō kobarutokō" [Materials related to foreign mines and mining industry: 1941, China related materials, Fujian section, Jinmen cobalt deposits—hereafter Jinmen cobalt]. This collection includes the following report: Tōhoku Imperial University Engineering Faculty, Metallurgy Department, "Kinmon-tō san kobarutokō seiren kenkyū hōkoku" [A report on studies to refine cobalt produced on Jinmen Island].
- 42) *Ibid.*
- 43) This report was also included in *Shina jūyō kokubō kōsan shigen chōsa* [A survey of important strategic mineral resources in China], Kōa-in, 1941.
- 44) Foreign Ministry Archives, E-326, Jinmen cobalt, includes a report by Kishimoto Katsutoshi and Amō Hisao, "Kinmon-tō kobaruto kōseki chōsa hōkoku" [A report on cobalt deposits on Jinmen Island].
- 45) The same collection includes a personal memorandum from Aizawa Hajime, "Kinmon-tō kobarutokō kaihatsu ni kansuru ikensho" [A person view on the development of cobalt deposits on Jinmen Island].
- 46) Foreign Ministry Archives, E-327, Jinmen cobalt.

- 47) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 150.
- 48) Imura Tetsuo, pp. 186–187.
- 49) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 46.
- 50) *Shina jihen to Kakyō* [The China Incident and Overseas Chinese], Taiwan Development Company, Chōsa-ka, 1939, p. 73. See also Higuchi Hidemi, *Nihon kaigun kara mita Nichū kankeishi kenkyū* [A Study of Sino-Japanese relations as seen from the perspective of the Navy], Fuyō Shobō Shuppan, 2002, especially chapter 7 on Japanese initiatives via Overseas Chinese during the Sino-Japanese war.
- 51) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 669.
- 52) Colonial Government of Taiwan Gaijibu, ed., *Minami Shina sōran* [Overview of South China], Taibei, Nanpō Shiryōkan, 1943, pp. 473–475, 528–529.
- 53) *Op. cit.*, p. 476, p. 529.
- 54) *Taiwan Sōtokufu jimu seiseki teiyō*, pp. 98–104.
- 55) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 39, p. 553.
- 56) Foreign Ministry Archives, M-1-1-0 7 “Dai Tōa-shō setchi kankei ikken” [Materials related to the establishment of the Dai Tōa-shō], vol. 3.
- 57) *Shina Jihō*, 31:5 (November 1939), p. 58.
- 58) Foreign Ministry Archives, Accomplishments, p. 649.
- 59) Usui Katsumi, pp. 373–374.
- 60) With regard to the importance of Guangdong, it seems that someone expressed the opinion that, “a South China Liaison Office should be established at once, and its subordinate offices should be set up in Amoy and Shantou and Hong Kong.” It is unclear whether this proposal received serious consideration. See the “Materials related to the establishment of the Dai Tōa-shō” cited above.
- 61) Numata Masaji (1906–77). In 1931 when Numata was an employee of the Niigata branch of the Zenkoku Nōmin Kumiai, he became involved in a tenant struggle in Wada village, and was arrested the following year. From 1935 to 1940 he was a member of the assembly of Takada city. After the war he was a member of the central committee of the Zen-Nichi-Nō. His autobiography, *Han no ki no uta—mumei nōmin undōsha no jidenteki kaisō* [Song of the Black Alder Tree—the autobiographical reflections of an unknown peasant activist], Ōzora sha, 2000, records his activities to 1940. An explanation included in this book, written by an editor, reports that Numata spent some time doing rural surveys in Guangdong. Numata wrote a book the year after the survey was completed entitled *Nanshi no nōgyō nōson* [Agriculture and rural villages in southern China], Tōyō Sha, 1942.
- 62) Fujioka Yasuo (1907–?). Fujioka was an employee of the agricultural section of the Colonial Government of Taiwan. He was seconded to Guangdong in 1939 and assigned the task of researching the possibilities for acquiring military rice supplies locally, and investigating methods for shipping the rice. Afterwards he was made the technical director for a firm established to acquire rice for the military. The firm was known by the Chinese name, Xing Yue Gongsi. This is reported in Fujioka Yasuo’s privately published autobiography, *Omoidasu koto nado* [What I can remember], 1985, p. 37, p. 42. After the war he published a report “Rice cultivation and ceremonies on Bali” which was included in *Dainiji Tōnan Ajia inasaku minzoku bunka sōgō chōsa hōkoku* [The second comprehensive report on rice-growing peoples of Southeast Asia], 1962.
- 63) Numata, *Nanshi no nōgyō nōson*, p. 7.
- 64) For an overall treatment of the research of the Kōa-in see the book edited by Honjo *et al.* cited earlier.
- 65) *Shina chōsa kankei kikan rengōkai kaihō* [The Journal of the Association of Organizations Conducting Research in China], 2:3, March 1941.