

# Japan's Colonization of Korea and Urban Change: Aspects of the Control of Cities

MORIYAMA Shigenori

## Introductory Remarks

Cities are built by power. In normal circumstances, when a city already exists, power achieves its purpose by adding new facilities. The basis of the continuing existence of a city lies in social surplus. Viewing villages as regions producing surplus, cities attempt to control and integrate them in as far- and deep-reaching a manner as possible and in accordance with their own new rules. Cities are centres where the agencies of integration are concentrated, and they create traffic and communications networks with villages for the transportation of surplus goods and mould villages into farming villages subordinated to cities. So long as cities have been places where it is possible to lead a more affluent way of life than in villages, people have congregated in cities.

In addition, the capital city, which is the base of power, is symbol of state integration and a particular universe of meaning, and it is full of buildings for this purpose. Because the all-important capital usually occupies a preeminent position above other cities, the capital's interests are reflected in the new rules created by the state. For these new rules to have legitimacy, the capital must be a place which gives expression not only to dignity, but also to the future, and in this fashion the capital city also became a symbol of modernization.<sup>1)</sup>

Inasmuch as these propositions about cities are universal, they should also apply to the cities of Korea when it was colonized by Japan. But the actual concrete policies implemented by Japan vis-à-vis Korean cities during colonization and colonial rule were no doubt stamped with typically Japanese characteristics. The aim of this article is to clarify the distinctive features of Japan's colonization and colonial rule of Korea by considering changes in Korean cities from the perspective of the control of cities.

Because much of the existing research on Korean cities during the colonial period has for the most part used statistical methods, it has focussed primarily on the second period of colonial rule, for which there exists comprehensive statistical material, and there has also been a strong tendency to seek an explana-

tion for Korea's transformation into one of the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) in the characteristics of prewar urbanization and to explore their continuity with the characteristics of postwar growth.<sup>2)</sup> Among such researchers, Son Chōng-mok has described in a series of studies the formation of cities and their character from the early modern period down to the present day, and his research deserves to be consulted for both its quality and quantity, but with regard to the modern period he has placed emphasis on depicting the negative and discriminatory aspects of Japanese administrative policies.<sup>3)</sup> Namiki Masato, on the other hand, focusses on "social integration" and "popular integration," but his research is limited to the second period of colonial rule.<sup>4)</sup> Thus the perspective presented in the present study is missing in existing studies, and therefore this study should remedy some of the inadequacies of previous research.

In the following, I will focus first on the course taken by Japan's colonization of Korea and then on the colonial period, especially the period up until the March 1 (*Samil* 三 一) independence movement of 1919, and examine changes in urban policy; as for the second period of colonial rule from the 1920s onwards, I will limit myself to an overview. The reasons for this are that most research has concentrated on the second period of colonial rule, with a resultant dearth of research on the first period of colonial rule, and the study of this first period of colonial rule would seem suited to clarifying the distinctive features of colonization and colonial rule with which we are here concerned. As is evident from the propositions relating to cities cited earlier, cities are inseparably linked to regional and farming villages, and therefore I will also touch on the realities of the control of villages—that is, the system of local government—as the need arises.

### **I. Japan's Grasp of Cities during the Colonization Process: With a Focus on the Period of Protectorate Government**

The first characteristic of Japanese policies towards Korean cities prior to colonization (—here I will focus on those areas where the prefectural system (*fusei* 府制) had been established) was that they differed markedly depending on whether they were directed at the capital Seoul or at other cities. The reason for this was that whereas cities other than Seoul had developed and grown chiefly as settlements (often exclusively for Japanese) and coastal cities with the advance of the Japanese into Korea, especially after the Russo-Japanese War, Seoul was already the capital of the Chosōn 朝鮮 dynasty and Japanese had begun settling there together with other foreigners after the establishment of the Japanese legation.

Because the coastal cities apart from Seoul had not even existed previously, Japan facilitated travel to Korea for Japanese, granted subsidies, and also ne-

gotiated with the Korean authorities so as to place trading activities on a stable footing. Thus the Japanese actively developed these cities, and eventually they came to occupy the cities' central sectors.<sup>5)</sup> Residents' associations and chambers of commerce were established, and these exercised the functions of local bodies, as well as making various demands of the Japanese government, including requests for their incorporation and the implementation of a system of self-government. In response to these demands, the Japanese government enacted the Residents' Associations Law in 1905 and regulations for its enforcement the following year, and while consolidating their financial foundations, it also set about placing Japanese residents under its own control to the greatest possible degree.<sup>6)</sup>

In contrast, Seoul already had a walled city in its centre, and there were even fewer Japanese residents than there were Chinese. Even more important was the fact that Seoul was already the capital of Korea and a Korean city, and because there was no exclusively Japanese settlement, Japan was unable to urbanize Seoul as it pleased. The Japanese were concentrated in the "poorly drained outskirts" of Nihyōn 泥峴 near the foot of Namsan 南山 (South Mountain) where the Japanese legation was located, and they were forced to spread gradually from there to the surrounding areas.<sup>7)</sup> In short, except for certain aspects relating to the application of the Residents' Associations Law, Japan was unable to place Seoul under its control by means of well-defined urban policies.

That being so, after Japan established the residency-general in accordance with the protectorate treaty of 1905 and gained the opportunity for intervention in Korea's internal affairs in the form of administrative improvements on the basis of the Japan-Korea protocol of the previous year, did Japan, and in particular the first resident-general Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文, actively develop urban policies aimed at gaining control of Seoul? This was in fact not the case, the reason being that Itō was fully aware that since the basis of a city's continued existence lay in rural villages, he would be unable to win over the people of Korea by merely gaining control of its cities. Therefore, Itō gave top priority to conferring benefits on rural villages and set about implementing urban policies only so long as they benefitted rural areas and were not openly geared towards cities.<sup>8)</sup>

Firstly, during the early period of protectorate government he implemented "cultural policies." These took the form of a loan of ten million yen in business-promoting funds which were to be used for the expansion of education, assistance for financial institutions, roadworks, waterworks, hospital construction, and the encouragement of new industry (including agricultural improvements), but it was only hospital construction and assistance for various schools in the expansion of education (agricultural, forestry, normal and foreign language schools) that were directly aimed at Seoul, and both roadworks and waterworks

targetted cities other than Seoul.<sup>9)</sup> During the second half of the period of protectorate government, policies that might be characterized as “policies for nurturing self-rule” were introduced, consisting of establishing a judicial system, the establishment of banks, the promotion of education, and the encouragement of new industry, and these too targetted all of Korea.<sup>10)</sup>

Thus Itō implemented almost no policies for gaining control of cities that were aimed specifically at Seoul. But this does not mean that he had no interest in the importance of cities, especially in the position occupied by Seoul. That he was fully aware of the importance of urban policy is shown by his enthusiasm for the establishment of the Seoul Sanitation Committee, in which regard he made the following comments:<sup>11)</sup>

As regards the question of why such facilities should be provided in Seoul, the countryside has no such great need for sanitation, but because hygienically harmful matter is produced in large quantities in towns, it is inevitable that epidemics also proliferate. Therefore, even if the Japanese quarter in Seoul is kept clean, if the Korean quarter is unclean, then harmful matter will naturally come from the Korean quarter to the Japanese quarter, and even if the Korean quarter is kept clean, if the Chinese quarter is unclean, then the result will be the same. Therefore, there is no option but for all parties to agree to make plans for sanitation by common consent.

In addition, Itō not only advocated the prompt establishment of the Seoul Sanitation Committee, but also pushed for it to be managed as a “joint Japanese-Korean self-governing organization” in accordance with “Japanese-Korean cooperatism.” He declared:<sup>12)</sup>

I wish to carry this out cooperatively in cities where foreigners live, that is, in mixed-residence quarters. This is something that cannot be ignored by any people. The Japanese have residents’ associations, and on the Korean side there are many citizens. Therefore, it is wrong to concern ourselves with facilities for only one party while disregarding the other. Therefore, I consider a joint Japanese-Korean self-governing organization to be the most appropriate for the circumstances. Thus, should a proposal for the organization of the likes of a Seoul Sanitation Committee based on “Japanese-Korean cooperatism” be drafted, and should Seoul mayor (*han-yun* 判尹) be made to apply to the Interior Minister for approval, and should the Interior Minister grant approval, then if preliminary negotiations were held with the Residency-General, a reply of consent would be issued immediately, and therefore I consider the adoption of this method to be the most convenient and also suited to the facts of the matter. This is

not restricted only to Seoul, but Taegu 大邱 and P'yŏngyang 平壤 should also be made to follow suit in the future. Furthermore, it does not apply solely to matters of sanitation, and with respect to fire prevention and so on too it would be inexcusable from both a moral perspective and an administrative perspective if, for instance, efforts were made to fight fires when buildings inhabited by Japanese were burning down, while fires in neighbouring Korean buildings were ignored. Therefore, I believe it proper in this case too for joint fire-fighting equipment to be provided.

However, this "impartial" (*isshi dōjin* 一視同仁) policy line adopted by Itō also manifested in the curtailment of the "self-government" of the residents' associations. In 1908 the residency-general submitted proposals for the partial revision of the detailed regulations for the enforcement of the Residents' Associations Law, and it was proposed that regular government officials be made eligible for election as members of association assemblies and that the association chiefs be chosen by the authorities. This was because it was intended at some points in the future to place Japanese and Koreans under the same institutional system.<sup>13)</sup>

But, as was only to be expected, this measure met with expressions of discontent from residents' associations and press organizations throughout the land. As a result, while appeasing them on the one hand, Itō was eventually forced to take steps to protect and extend the interests of the Japanese in Korea in a different manner. This took the form of a series of laws and regulations, including the promulgation and enforcement of Regulations for the Certification of Land and Houses and Regulations for the Mortgaging of Land and Houses in 1906 and the enactment of Regulations for the Certification of Ownership of Land and Buildings in 1908. While these measures were highly praised by the Japanese as "an epoch-making system," today they are regarded as "the first raft of legislation for the expropriation of Korean land by the Japanese."<sup>14)</sup> But what needs to be noted here is that the enactment of these laws was not focussed directly on Seoul alone.<sup>15)</sup>

As was noted earlier, Itō promoted urban policies so long as they did not conflict with the bestowal of benefits on rural villages and were not seen to openly favour cities. First, under "cultural policies," and with the exception of the temporary measure of assistance for financial institutions, Itō presented the Koreans with new rules for cities which he translated into concrete form. The expansion of education, roadworks, waterworks, and the encouragement of new industry (including agricultural improvements) all served to transform the provinces into farming villages in their relations with the cities, as well as linking farming villages to cities by means of these measures for improving the industrial infrastructure, and agencies of integration were established in the cities. In addition, in coastal cities harbours were constructed or expanded. As

regards the expansion of education, normal schools, higher schools, commercial and industrial schools, agricultural and forestry schools, and foreign language schools were all restricted to one each in Seoul, and they were made to integrate the government and public normal schools. By this means a school system with city schools at its pinnacle was established. As for roadworks, priority was given to roads linking coastal cities with the interior, and these included a 63-*ri* 里 road linking Chinnamp'o 鎭南浦, P'yöngyang and Wönsan 元山, a 25-*ri* road between Kwangju 光州 and Mokp'o 木浦, a 35-*ri* road linking Taegu, Kyöngju 慶州 and Yöngilman 迎日灣, and a 9-*ri* road between Chönju 全州 and Kunsan 群山. The roads were, in other words, improved in order to forward the social surplus from the interior to the coastal cities. Furthermore, with regard to waterworks, new water supplies were installed in Inch'ön 仁川, P'yöngyang and Pusan 釜山, and from 1906 four million yen were invested in harbour works. The chief reason given for these measures was the growth of trade, while the encouragement of new industry brought direct benefits to rural areas. With regard to this latter point, Itö clearly stated that "these funds [for encouraging industry] must be used first of all for schemes that will benefit large numbers of peasants, for instance, schemes that will increase produce in the future, such as agricultural improvements, road repairs, drainage, irrigation, and afforestation."<sup>16)</sup>

It is also worth noting that in addition Itö also reformed the taxation system in an attempt to prevent intermediary exploitation, and he organized the high tax-payers (landowners) by appointing them assistants known as *nin'in* 任員. As for the maintenance of public order, he used his own right of command over the armed forces in Korea to abolish the existing code of military discipline and the military police and to introduce a new code of military discipline, as well as making plans for strengthening the police force in the provinces. Thus, the "cultural policies" were based on the recognition that in order to absorb social surplus into the cities, it was important to transform the provinces into farming villages and create beneficiaries in these villages.<sup>17)</sup>

These aims also underpinned the "policies for nurturing self-rule" during the second half of the period of protectorate government. First, as can be seen in the fact that the establishing of the judicial system manifested in the form of the implementation of a nation-wide uniform modern justice system, there was established a court system headed by a higher court acting as the integrative agency in Seoul. With regard to the establishment of banks, plans were made for the establishment of a central bank and various hypothec financial institutions, and a system of banks headed by the central Bank of Korea was developed, with a hypothec financial institutions being subsequently established in the form of the Oriental Development Company (Töyö Takushoku Kaisha 東洋拓殖會社).<sup>18)</sup> It should also be noted that, in conjunction with the establishment of provincial finance associations, Itö also attempted to set up local government

committees. In this regard he commented, "Measures must today be taken to teach the methods of self-rule to the Korean people," and he attached considerable importance to the role of these committees. In actual fact they represented survey agencies for the future implementation of a local government system and followed the logic of cities, according to which the basis of the continuing existence of a city lay in farming villages.<sup>19)</sup> As for the promotion of education and the encouragement of new industry, the measures introduced under the earlier "cultural policies" were continued.<sup>20)</sup> Thus it could be said that urban policies were realized to a certain extent, and they became the basis for the moulding of future relations between cities and villages.

However, a noteworthy point regarding the protectorate government was that Itō, at least as long as he remained resident-general, undertook these measures with the justification of "guaranteeing Korea's independence" Itō strove to place Korea under Japan's exclusive protection in a way that did not conflict with the justification of guaranteeing its independence while averting interference and influence from other countries. It was for these reasons that he promoted "cultural policies" and "policies for nurturing self-rule." Therefore, the matter of greatest concern for Itō was that foreigners, especially Westerners, enjoyed extraterritorial rights, and consequently as long as he upheld the justification of "guaranteeing Korea's independence," he himself was forced to take various measures to abolish extraterritoriality. The "policies for nurturing self-rule" in the second half of the period of protectorate government in particular were aimed at doing just this. In other words, Itō was not in a position to pay special attention to only the interests of the Japanese in Seoul and other Korean cities. The various land laws were enacted with foreigners in mind.<sup>21)</sup> In addition, foreigners were not appointed to the Seoul Sanitation Committee, and while the ostensible reason for this was that foreigners had a well-developed sense of hygiene, in actual fact it was because foreigners with extraterritorial rights could not be made to contribute to the costs of the committee.<sup>22)</sup> In short, Itō considered it impolitic and premature to implement overtly urban policies, especially policies for gaining control of Seoul, at a time when foreigners, especially Westerners, enjoyed extraterritorial rights.

But Itō's protectorate government was unable to abolish extraterritoriality, and they were stymied by opposition and resistance from various quarters. The reason for Japan's decision to opt for colonization was that, rather than holding fast to the justification of "guaranteeing independence" and spending much time in establishing a judicial system and so on, the abolition of extraterritoriality could be achieved far more quickly by going one step beyond a protectorate and making Korea a full-fledged part of Japanese territory, a move which would also do away with any fears of foreign interference. What is more, Western nations at the time supported Japan's decision. Thus, in 1910 Japan annexed Korea and made it a colony.<sup>23)</sup> What sort of urban policies, then, did

Japan introduce in colonial Korea?

## II. Urban Policy during the Period of "Military Rule"

Having made Korea a colony, Japan rescinded foreigners' extraterritorial rights as it had done in Japan proper, and it was now able to develop urban policies for Korean cities freely and comprehensively. First, new integrative agencies headed by the government-general of Korea were established in Seoul and a centralized mode of government was consolidated. Secondly, new rules of control and integration were formulated, and the provinces, transformed into farming villages, were subordinated to the cities. Thirdly, in order to absorb all surplus into the capital Seoul, the traffic and communications networks were expanded and extended so as to cover almost the entire peninsula. Fourthly, symbolic buildings, such as the offices of the government-general, were erected in the capital Seoul. These policies were developed on the foundations laid during the period of the residency-government and were continued throughout the colonial period.

But, depending on the period, these policies for colonial rule differed in their emphasis, and consequently the urban policies that materialized also came to differ somewhat in character. Japan's colonial rule of Korea is usually divided into three periods: the period of "military rule" (1910-19), the period of "cultural rule" (1919-31), and the period of Korea's "transformation into a continental logistic base" (1931-45). The keynote of the administrative policies of the initial period of military rule was the formation of a "politically independent sphere" by the army, which was at the center of the government-general.<sup>24)</sup> "Independent" meant that it was uninfluenced by political trends within Japan, or that it would accept no interference whatsoever from Japan's political forces. First, the central figures in the government-general belonged to the army, in particular to the faction associated with the first governor-general, Terauchi Masatake 寺内正毅. (High-ranking bureaucrats under the governor-general, including the superintendent-general of state affairs, chief secretary, councillors, and heads of the Personnel Bureau, Foreign Affairs Section, Archives and Documents Section, Accounting Bureau, Public Works Department, Internal Affairs Department, Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Judiciary Department, Education Bureau, Communications Bureau, Railways Bureau, and Monopolies Bureau, were all either linked to Terauchi or belonged to the *Yamagata clique* (山縣閥). The superintendent-general of state affairs, Yamagata Isaburō 山縣伊三郎, was the son of the "elder" (*genrō* 元老) Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋.) "Independent" implied nothing less than the ability to rule Korea freely without being subjected to influence from Japan's domestic politics. Why, then, did the army's Terauchi faction want to turn Korea into a "politically independent sphere"?



The prime reason was that they were critical of the results of Itō's protectorate government. (In fact, the army had been critical of Itō's appointment as resident-general and of his right to command the armed forces in Korea.)<sup>25)</sup> In spite of the vast sums of money that had been invested in Korea, the protectorate government had failed to achieve its objective—the acquiescence of the Korean people—and had been unable to suppress their nationalist resistance, and ultimately the army had had to crush this resistance. In addition, the advance into Kando 間島, which had begun on Itō's initiative, linked the Korean question to the Manchurian question, bringing with it the danger of intervention by Western powers, and so the army promoted annexation for security reasons as well.<sup>26)</sup> Therefore, it was only natural that it should have been Terauchi, the third resident-general, who made the decision to annex Korea. One further reason for the army's advance into Korea was its wish to use Korea as a strategic base for an advance into Manchuria to prepare for a war of vengeance on the part of Russia. They were also motivated by a desire to rule over Korea and Manchuria as a single entity. This was the "plan for the unitization of Korea and Manchuria," which Terauchi persistently strove to realize.

How, then, was the formation of a "politically independent sphere" realized? And how was it related to the urban policies that materialized in tandem with it?

Firstly, in conjunction with the formation of a local government system, the use of the military police for surveillance and the maintenance of public order throughout the country was promoted. In forming a local government system, the government-general was faced with the twin issues of the establishment and consolidation of a local administrative system and the incorporation of ordinary local bodies into the various levels of this system. Therefore, on the one hand, following the introduction of a prefectural system in 1913, residents' associations were abolished the following year and prefectures, representing ordinary local bodies, were established in the cities. At the same time, with the implementation of the township (*myōn/men* 面) system (*men sei* 面制) in 1917, townships, also representing local bodies, were established throughout the country. In this fashion, a system of local administration with provincial governors at its head was established, while at the same time ordinary local bodies, capable of assuming responsibility for any future local self-government, were established and there arose the possibility of stabilizing relations between cities and villages on a formal level.<sup>27)</sup>

Next, the military police were used for the maintenance of public order so as to enable the local government system to take root, but at the same time they were also used to suppress Korean resistance, which was considered to be beyond the capabilities of the police force, and to prevent the emergence of a situation that might undermine Japanese rule in Korea, representing as it did a strategic base for Japan's advance into Manchuria. Furthermore, when com-

pared with the coexistence of the Korean police, the residency police, and the military police under the resident-general, the maintenance of public order by the military police was more effective because of its unified chain of command, and it was also less expensive. From the army's perspective, there was a certain rationality to rule by means of the military police.<sup>28)</sup> With regard to urban policy, these policies could be said to have subordinated villages to cities and to have been regarded as a means of rendering the absorption of surplus more orderly and efficient.

Secondly, in measures that later came to be criticized as representing the annihilation of ethnic culture, free speech was brought under control and improvements to education were promoted. As regards the control of free speech, in Japan the army represented a force most closely associated with the Meiji 明治 oligarchy, and it regularly resorted to the control of free speech, chiefly through the Home Ministry, as a means of opposing the popular rights faction and political parties. In order to create a "politically independent sphere," it was necessary to shut out all forms of criticism emanating from Japan. From the army's standpoint, it was inevitable that this method should be employed in Korea in conjunction with the suppression of resistance movements during the period immediately after annexation. Next, the objective of Terauchi and others in improving the education system was to nurture Japanese nationals loyal to the emperor, as had been the aim of the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in Japan, and in Article 2 of the Korea Education Ordinance it was stated that "the basic aim is to nurture loyal nationals in accordance with the intent of the rescript on education."<sup>29)</sup> But because education entails an enormous outlay, no further measures were taken. It was hardly likely that they would introduce higher education, and even less so ethnic education.<sup>30)</sup> It could be said in connection with urban policy that the control of free speech and improvements to education were both means of publicizing the new rules of governance.

Thirdly, the land surveys which were undertaken in order to establish a modern system of landownership met with no opposition from Japan since land-tax reforms had been carried out there too in order to determine those liable for land taxes. What is important is that some Koreans were newly recognized as landowners, and it was desirable for the Japanese that they should be local influentials expected to play a role in maintaining order in the provinces.<sup>31)</sup> In his measures for agricultural improvements and so on under the protectorate, Itō too had attempted to create beneficiaries among the Koreans as well as protecting the interests of the Japanese relating to land.<sup>32)</sup> In terms of urban policy, this too was indispensable for the absorption of social surplus.

Fourthly, as for industrial policy, farming improvements were promoted in the realm of agriculture, while in the area of industry not only the indigenous industries of Korea, but also Japanese companies were regulated by various

laws and ordinances such as the Company Ordinances. Because of financial constraints, it was not possible to use pork barrelling with regard to agricultural improvements, but special importance was attached to technical guidance and the encouragement of agricultural improvements, and in order to improve rice cultivation in particular measures such as the propagation of "superior" varieties, improvements in the control of drying, the provision of irrigation water, and the promotion of fertilizers were adopted.<sup>33)</sup> Terauchi and his colleagues were not desirous of any sudden upsurge of Korean businesses, nor were they keen to see the industrialization of Korea. For them, desirable companies were only those which accorded with their own aims and did not clash with the management aims of the Oriental Development Company and the Bank of Korea, and the advance of any other companies into Korea signified an increase in the influence of interests within Japan and threatened to thwart on an economic front the formation of a "politically independent sphere."<sup>34)</sup>

Far more important was the development of railway, road, and communications networks, deemed to be of the greatest importance, and a considerable proportion of the government-general's annual expenditure was spent on these public works. Since they had been consistently critical of Itō's policy of encouraging new industries through the investment of vast amounts of capital, they had almost no interest whatsoever in nurturing industries other than those related to public works.<sup>35)</sup> At any rate, these public works were absolutely indispensable both from a military standpoint, which viewed Korea as a strategic base for an advance into Manchuria, and from the perspective of urban policy. Because of demands to curtail expenses, construction plans were frequently deferred, but even so, at about fifteen per cent of annual expenditure, they were always the largest single item in the budget.<sup>36)</sup> In addition to the existing Seoul-Inch'ŏn, Seoul-Pusan, and Seoul-Ŭiju 義州 lines, in 1914 the Honam 湖南 line (between Taejŏn 大田 and Mokp'o), the Seoul-Wŏnsan line, and the Hamgyŏng 咸鏡 line (between Wŏnsan and Hoenyŏng 會寧) were laid, and by 1920 most of the coastal cities and the main cities of the interior had been connected by a railway network.<sup>37)</sup> Furthermore, in 1911 the government-general drew up proposals for the maintenance and improvement of roads, and not only were there issued various rules and regulations regarding roads, such as Government-General Ordinance No. 51, but plans for road repairs were also prepared. According to these plans, roads were to be divided into three grades, with an additional offgrade, and a five-year plan for the first phase of roadworks, starting from 1911, was drawn up. The roads from Seoul to Pusan, etc., in particular were classed as first-grade roads, and priority was given to their construction. The budget for these roads was 10 million yen, and their total length was 587.5 *ri*.<sup>38)</sup> In addition, telegraph and telephone lines were laid in and between the main cities under the supervision of the Communications Bureau of the government-general.<sup>39)</sup>

Terauchi and his colleagues, who had criticized Itō's large capital investments, had to demonstrate that their own policies for ruling Korea did not require any extra outlay. Japan was, moreover, in serious financial trouble at the time, and financial assistance from Japan also had to be reduced. Furthermore, should financial independence be achieved, this would then become an effective means of buttressing the formation of a "politically independent sphere." Therefore, Terauchi and his colleagues worked to reduce annual expenditure through reforms of government organization and cuts in administrative costs (—from 1911 to 1917 the annual budget hovered around 50 million yen), and they also reduced grants from Japan (—in 1918 the government-general no longer received a grant). But if financial assistance could no longer be expected while annual expenditure remained unchanged, with a considerable proportion of it being spent on public works, there was no alternative but to increase annual income, and in point of fact sources of revenue were secured by increasing taxes on land, liquor, and tobacco and raising the national land (*eki tondo* 驛屯土) rent paid by tenant farmers.<sup>40)</sup> Considered from the vantage point of urban policy, these too could be described as the development of social surplus.

But in addition to the above policies related to governance, some purely urban policies were also implemented. First, as regards the establishment of integrative agencies, cities in the interior were designated seats of provincial government and became the regional centres for political functions. At the same time, these cities were also important centres of traffic communications, the sites of financial institutions and agencies of the authorities such as courts and police stations, and regional centres of educational institutions. On the military front, the headquarters of the Korean army was located in Seoul, while troops of a regimental scale were stationed in P'yōngyang and Taegu, and among the coastal cities Wōnsan was also given military functions. In this fashion the cities became regional centres of politics, the economy, and culture.<sup>41)</sup>

Next, in the main cities town planning was initiated in the form of street improvements and building controls. Plans for street improvements in Seoul published in 1912 listed thirty-one streets, with their width, paving, etc., following the standards used in Tōkyō 東京, and they were to have a carriageway down the centre flanked by footpaths. (By 1929 approximately 21,000 kilometres of streets had been built at a cost of about 5.8 million yen.)<sup>42)</sup> Ever since Japanese had begun settling in Seoul, the residential sections of the city had been divided along ethnic lines, with the Ch'ōnggye 清溪 river serving as a boundary between the Korean quarters to the north and the Japanese section to the south, and this tendency was reinforced by these street improvements.<sup>43)</sup> With the exception of the headquarters of the government-general completed in 1926, all important government and municipal offices, starting with the Seoul prefectural offices, were constructed within a one-kilometre radius of the city hall.<sup>44)</sup> As for building controls in Seoul, prior to 1913, when rules for regu-

lating buildings in built-up areas were announced and a Town Planning Law and Building Law were enacted, they had satisfied only the minimum requirements for city buildings.<sup>45)</sup> Furthermore, in cities other than Seoul it also became possible to levy special taxes from 1913 onwards, and this led to street improvement projects being carried out in these cities too.<sup>46)</sup> In conjunction with these projects, sewerage works were also undertaken in cities such as Seoul, Taegu, P'yöngyang, and Chinnamp'o, and these cities began to take on a modern look.<sup>47)</sup>

Seoul also saw, in addition to the above, improvements to various urban facilities, such as improvements to the water supply and sewerage, the organization of fire brigades, the construction of sanitary facilities in the form of hospitals such as the Taehan Hospital 大韓醫院, and street cleaning and the disposal of night soil under the supervision of the Seoul Sanitation Council.<sup>48)</sup> In order to provide financial support for these various undertakings, it became possible with the implementation of the prefectural system to levy various surtaxes in addition to household taxes. Hitherto Seoul had been exempted from taxation, but now it too gained a stable income through household taxes, a 60% surtax on the land tax, a 7% surtax on income tax, a surtax on the business tax, and so on.<sup>49)</sup>

In this manner, during the period of military rule Japan used the agencies of its centralized power structure headed by the government-general to forcefully promote its administrative and urban policies. The appearance of cities changed dramatically, and they guaranteed an affluent life-style as well as becoming objects of fascination. What effects, then, did the above policies actually have? And what were the distinctive features of Japanese control of the cities?

Let us first consider how the relationship between cities and villages actually changed. The true state of this relationship, however, cannot be revealed by means of the above formalistic and institutional observations alone. This is because so long as beneficiaries acting in concert with the authorities of the government-general did not emerge in the provinces and assume responsibility for local order, the subordination of the villages to the cities could not actually occur. Previous research trends have started to change in this regard.

The following views may be cited as representative of earlier negative evaluations of this issue.

[The local government system in Korea developed with Seoul at its pinnacle and with a colonially organized economic distribution sphere at its core.] Administrative, police, financial and distributional functions were concentrated in the central sections of local markets, and the community of Japanese merchants and landowners occupied this area. In the surrounding rural areas communal clan relationships were preserved, and lo-

cal control by the *yangban* 兩班 landowners continued.... But up until World War I the colonial management by the government-general did not proceed smoothly, and the administrative and fiscal capabilities of the regional administrative bodies were also underdeveloped. In the provinces in particular it proved impossible to find men of leadership among local headmen such as heads of myon (*menchou* 面長) and ku (*kuchou* 區長), and it was in fact impossible to forestall resistance by the *yangban* and Confucian forces. It was because of this that authoritarian administration by the provincial government offices and “conductive administration” by the military police were developed even more forcefully.<sup>50)</sup>

The local reorganization policies at which Japan had aimed in the initial stages of colonization cannot be said to have been successful, at least not with respect to the appointment of local influential figures to positions of responsibility for regional administration in an attempt to stabilize local rule and colonial rule. What was achieved during the process of building up the machinery of regional administration would seem to have been the establishment of a cheap system of regional rule in the form of rule by local influentials which accompanied the reorganization of the traditional management of villages (*dongli* 洞里), and the resultant siphoning of village-owned assets owned by villages by the central government. It is true that the functions of the *myön* as the smallest unit of the administrative machinery were developed and “made even clearer its role as the direct embodiment of colonial rule,” but it cannot be said to have fulfilled adequate functions.<sup>51)</sup>

In point of fact the workings of the regional governmental and public office organizations were far removed from those of a modern bureaucratic organization. This was because, while legally speaking they gave the appearance of a modern bureaucracy and the line of command in each unit organization was unified under the provincial governor, district governor, and local headman, in actual practice the Japanese staff despised the Korean superiors whom they were meant to serve in the course of their duties, and a dual structure of power based on people of this type prevailed throughout the country.... Far from being ironbound, discipline in the regional governmental and public offices under colonial rule was in fact, weak being easily ignored and plagued with the overriding of superiors by their inferiors.<sup>52)</sup>

There are also some evaluations who stress the fact that agricultural improvements were implemented by means of violent coercion.<sup>53)</sup>

But recently there have emerged more positive views, according to which

the policy promoting agricultural improvements won ready acceptance and a "political alliance" between the government-general authorities and Korean landowners was established.

The system of Meiji agricultural methods on which the Japanese empire's policy of agricultural improvement was based was consistent with the theories of agricultural improvement which the Korean landowning class had been pursuing since the final years of the Yi dynasty, and therefore it was accepted without any sense of rejection by the general landowning class... Agricultural administration during the 1910s fulfilled the function of bringing about political and economic collusion between the government-general authorities and the colonial landowning class.<sup>54)</sup>

The first landowners' society of the Japanese empire was not simply an agricultural association; it was an association established on the basis of a convergence of the interests of the Japanese empire and the Korean landowning stratum after they had experienced struggles with the "righteous armies" (*ũbyōng* 義兵) and forced occupation respectively—a convergence which was due to the needs of governance in the case of the former, while in the case of the latter, on the micro level it was in order to secure the power necessary for landowner operations and, on the macro level, it was on account of agricultural policies which coincided with the theories of modernization which had been pursued in the past from the landowners' perspective.<sup>55)</sup>

With regard to agricultural improvements during the 1910s, the interests of the government-general and the rural farmer-landowners would seem to have been in complete accord. But this is something that can be said only after the event, and there existed a latent rivalry between the two.... For one thing, the apparent convergence of their interests was such that the participation of rural farmer-landowners was made all the more possible because the policy of agricultural improvement during the 1910s was able to adopt only passive methods such as "guidance" and "encouragement" under conditions of fiscal constraint.... The fact that the contemporary Japanese demand for Korean agricultural produce was such that it could be satisfied by the increased production resulting from the government-general's passive policy of agricultural improvement could be said to have only just maintained the balance between the interests of the government-general and the rural farmer-landowners.<sup>56)</sup>

On the basis of the state of research indicated by the above quotations, it could be said firstly that while the relationship between cities and villages was

heading towards subordination and cooperation, it was also easily susceptible to change for the slightest reason. It is true that cities are inseparably linked to villages and cannot continue to exist unless they are able to secure the surplus from villages. It was incumbent on cities to create new rules which subordinated villages without destroying their processes of surplus reproduction. In this sense it can hardly be said that the urban and regional policies of this period succeeded in creating new rules.

The second change brought about by the urban policies was an increase in the population of most of the cities placed under the prefectural system, although the population of the capital Seoul did not change. In 1919 Seoul's population, which had been about 280,000 at the time of annexation in 1910, was approximately 250,000. Considered in more detail, the number of Japanese residents rose by about 30,000 from 38,000 in 1910 to 68,000 in 1919, while the number of Koreans fell by about 60,000 from 238,000 in 1910 to 179,000 in 1919.<sup>57)</sup> This could be said to indicate not only that there was an influx of Japanese coinciding with the colonization of Korea, but also that Koreans moved away, at least from the old city quarters. Reasons for the exodus of Koreans may be assumed to have been the loss of their land through sale or as security and an aversion to paying additional taxes for which they had not been liable in the past. But the government-general took no steps to counter the decline in the Korean population, and in the end, with a few exceptions, no beneficiaries emerged among the Koreans. The agencies of integration too were not established in the northern part of Seoul, where many of the Koreans lived, and priority was given to the convenience of the Japanese. In this sense, no further urban policies were necessary in Seoul after its occupation by the Japanese authorities. In one respect this represented inaction or confirmation of the *status quo*, and it could hardly be described as urban control.

As is evident from the above, the government-general made no efforts, at least not actively, to create beneficiaries among the Koreans in either cities or villages. Priority was given to subordination by means of a centralized bureaucratic administration and it was.

This which just represented the reality of urban policy during the period of military rule.

### III. Urban Policy in the 1920s and Later

From the 1920s onwards, the urbanization and modernization of Korea led to an increase in the urban population and gave rise to various urban problems, and the government-general was confronted with a need to develop some drastic urban policies. What sort of urban policies were implemented during this period and what were their distinctive features? In the following, basing myself on studies by previous scholars, I will first survey the increase in urban popula-



tion and its causes, and then I will summarize the urban policies implemented in Seoul.

Let us first consider the growth in urban population. According to statistics, Korea's population in 1920 was 17,260,000, and this included an urban population of 570,000 (3.3%). In the following years these figures changed as follows:

	Total Population	Urban Population
1925	19,520,000	850,000 (4.4%)
1930	21,060,000	1,190,000 (5.6%)
1935	22,900,000	1,610,000 (7.0%)
1940	24,330,000	2,820,000 (11.5%)
1944	25,920,000	3,410,000 (13.2%)

During the same period Seoul's population changed from 250,000 (1920) to 340,000 (1925), 360,000 (1930), 400,000 (1935), 930,000 (1940), and 920,000 (1944), and in 1942 it reached a record population of 1,140,000.<sup>58)</sup> Thus, urbanization proceeded at a gradual pace during the 1920s both in Korea as a whole and in Seoul, but it advanced quite rapidly during the 1930s, especially after 1935.

Next, if we consider the population of individual cities, the largest city according to the statistics for 1944, when the number of prefectures had increased to twenty-one, was Seoul, followed by P'yŏngyang and Pusan with 300,000<sup>+</sup>, Taegu and Inch'ŏn with 200,000<sup>+</sup>, and Hamhŭng 咸興, Sinŭiju 新義州, Ch'ŏngjin 清津 and Wŏnsan with 100,000<sup>+</sup>, and there were a further twelve cities with a population of more than 50,000. Not only was there now a city with a population of one million (Seoul), of which there had been none when Korea was first colonized, but the majority of cities had grown to a population of more than 50,000. With the exception of Taejŏn, Sŏngjin 城津 and Najin 羅津, these were all coastal and interior cities that had existed at the time of colonization. The urbanization of Korea was centred on coastal cities established by the Japanese and cities of the interior which had been newly charged with the functions of regional integration as urban policies unfolded.<sup>59)</sup>

The chief cause of this urbanization lay in the policies for colonial rule. As a result of policies ranging from land surveys to plans for increasing the production of rice, the dissolution of the peasant class, especially in the villages of the grain belt in the south, advanced and this led to the formation of a "colonial landowner system" and the ruin of the lower-class peasants. Furthermore, the cities alone were unable to absorb the population leaving the villages, and these people headed for Japan.<sup>60)</sup> In addition, it has been pointed out that there were movements in the population during the war as a result of the general mobilization policy embodied in the National Requisitioning Ordinance and so

on.<sup>61)</sup>

Next, if we consider the face of urbanization with reference to Seoul, we find that the following characteristics have been brought to light.<sup>62)</sup> First, Seoul's population growth was characterized both by overurbanization in the form of urban concentration prior to industrialization and by its transformation into the foremost city as a result of the concentration of political and economic functions in Seoul.

Secondly, within Seoul itself there emerged two dual structures resulting from disparity and differentiation. These were, namely, the dual structure that existed between the Japanese and the Koreans in the old city quarters (i.e., traditional society and modern society) and the dual structure to be observed in a modern city, between the old city quarters and the newly developed areas on the outskirts of the city. But in spite of disparity and differentiation, mixed residence continued apace, and consequently, because of the various forms of "homogeneity" between Koreans and Japanese, there was little difference in their life-style and culture, and the Japanese did not occupy a dominant position.

Thirdly, city planning only took the form of redemarcation projects imposed from above by the authorities, and comprehensive plans for a modern city were inadequate. City planning began in earnest with the implementation of the Korean Urban Planning Ordinance of 1934, and this led to the large-scale expansion of the central city to "Greater Seoul" in 1936, but ultimately this did not result in any fundamental change to the city's appearance.

Fourthly, the neighbourhood representatives (*chōdō sōdai* 町洞總代) and neighbourhood associations (*chōdōkai* 町洞會), both organizations which had been established as the smallest administrative units, gradually lost their self-governing functions and became increasingly regulatory, but they still fulfilled the roles of "basal organizations" for integrating local residents. Local social welfare committees (*hōmen iinkai* 方面委員會), which were closely related to the neighbourhood associations insofar that their membership overlapped, served as organizations for keeping the movements of local residents under control rather than engaging in public welfare services such as relief work, which had been their original purpose. Generally speaking, these two organizations underpinned Japanese control of urban areas.

What, then, can be said about city planning on the basis of the above summary of the development and complexion of urbanization? In a word, the urban policies of this period failed to solve the problem of the creation of a stratum of Korean beneficiaries, which had been an issue at the time of colonization, and were ultimately characterized, as during the period of military rule, by subordination based on a centralized bureaucratic administration. Of course, if one examines the period in greater detail, one finds that during the 1920s, marked on the one hand by an upsurge of nationalist movements go-

ing back to the Samil independence movement, there was also evidence of the politicization of the Koreans through pork-barrel politics and the introduction of limited local self-government,<sup>63)</sup> while during the 1930s a considerable number of Koreans were appointed neighbourhood representatives and local social welfare commissioners in Seoul. But though these facts merit attention, these developments eventually dissipated in the exclusive emphasis on control through the medium of the Seoul Prefectural League (Keijōfu Renmei 京城府連盟) and the Patriotic Corps (Aikokuhan 愛國班) as the wartime general mobilization régime took shape.<sup>64)</sup>

### Concluding Remarks

Japan's policies towards Korean cities took many twists and turns after colonization, but the underlying characteristic of "subordination" remained unchanged. That is to say, urban policy during the period of military rule carried over from the urban policies of the period of protectorate government, but failed to create a well-defined stratum of Korean beneficiaries in both cities and villages, and therefore urban policy was driven by centralized bureaucratic administration, a situation which remained largely unchanged thereafter. But this cannot necessarily be said to have been deliberately or intentionally pursued from the very outset by the Japanese residency-general and government-general. Not only did it stem from the logic of cities, according to which cities seek to subordinate villages, but it was also due to the environment of each period. The administrative policies of the 1920s can be divided into the party-driven positive and assimilative policies of the first half of the decade and the contractionary and social policies of the second half, while the 1930s were characterized by the army-led policies for the development of heavy industries in the first half of the decade and policies for general mobilization in the second half, and these were all determined by the political, economic and military situation in Japan itself.<sup>65)</sup> Therefore, the government-general sometimes actively implemented urban policies, while at other times it remained inactive in this regard. In this sense, Japan's urban policies could be seen as an instance in which the intent and the result were quite different, and this was not limited to urban policy.

### Notes

- 1) Fujita Hiroo 藤田弘夫, *Toshi to kenryoku* 都市と権力 (Cities and power; Sōbunsha 創文社, 1991), pp. 58-61, 78, 80, 83, 85, 90, 93, 100, 105, 116, 165, 181, 201, 266, 272.
- 2) Hashiya Hiroshi 橋谷弘, "1930-40 nendai no Chōsen shakai no seikaku o megutte" 一九三〇・四〇年代の朝鮮社會の性格をめぐって (On the character of Korean society during the 1930s and 1940s), *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 朝鮮史研究會論文集

- 27 (1990); id., “Shokuminchi toshi to shite no Souru” 植民地都市としてのソウル (Seoul as a colonial city), *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 歴史學研究 614 (1990); id., “NIEs toshi Souru no keisei” NIEs 都市ソウルの形成 (The formation of Seoul as a city of the NIEs), *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 30 (1992); id., “Fuzan, Jinsen no keisei” 釜山・仁川の形成 (The formation of Pusan and Inch’ōn), in *Iwanami kōza: kindai Nihon to shokuminchi* 3, *shokuminchika to sangyōka* 岩波講座 近代日本と植民地 3 植民地化と産業化 (Iwanami lecture series: Modern Japan and colonies 3 – Colonization and industrialization; Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1993); id., “Shokuminchi toshi” 植民地都市 (Colonial cities), in Narita Ryūichi 成田龍一, ed., *Kindai Nihon no kiseki* 9: *toshi to minshū* 近代日本の軌跡 9 都市と民衆 (The course taken by modern Japan 9: Cities and the people; Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1993); Hori Kazuo 堀和生, “Shokuminchiki Keijōfu no toshi kōzō – sangyō bunpu no bunseki” 植民地期京城府の都市構造—産業分布の分析 (The urban structure of Seoul prefecture during the colonial period: An analysis of industry distribution), *Keizai ronsō* 經濟論叢 (Kyōto Daigaku Keizai Gakkai 京都大學經濟學會) 154-6; id., *Chōsen kōgyōka no shiteki bunseki* 朝鮮工業化の史的分析 (A historical analysis of Korea’s industrialization; Yūhikaku 有斐閣, 1995).
- 3) Son Chōng-mok 孫禎睦, *Hanguk kaehanggi toshi pyōnhwa kwajōng yōngu* 韓國開港期都市變化過程研究 (A study of the process of urban change in Korea during the period of the opening of ports; Iljisa 一志社, 1982); id., *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi kyehoek yōngu* 日帝強占期都市計畫研究 (A study of city planning during the period of forced occupation under the Japanese Empire; Iljisa, 1990); id., *Hanguk chibang chedo, chach’i sa yōngu* 韓國地方制度・自治史研究 (A study of the history of the local government system and self-rule in Korea), Vol. 1 (Iljisa, 1992); id., *Ilje kangjōnggi toshihwa kwajōng yōngu* 日帝強占期都市化過程研究 (A study of the process of urbanization during the period of forced occupation under the Japanese Empire; Iljisa, 1996); id., *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi sahoe sang yōngu* 日帝強占期都市社會相研究 (A study of aspects of urban society during the period of forced occupation under the Japanese Empire; Iljisa, 1996).
- 4) Namiki Masato 並木真人, “Shokuminchi kōhanki Chōsen ni okeru minshū tōgō no ichi danmen” 植民地後半期朝鮮における民衆統合の一断面 (One aspect of popular integration in Korea during the second period of colonial rule), in Takeda Yukio 武田幸男, ed., *Chōsen shakai no shiteki tenkai to Higashi Ajia* 朝鮮社會の史的展開と東アジア (The historical development of Korean society and East Asia; Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, 1997).
- 5) Hashiya, “Shokuminchi toshi”; Kimura Kenji 木村健二, *Zaichō Nihonjin no shakaishi* 在朝日本人の社會史 (The social history of Japanese in Korea; Miraisha 未來社, 1989), pp. 19-24; Yu Shijung 柳時中, “Shokuminchi jidai ni okeru Kankoku toshi no keisei to hen’yō – shokuminchi shoki o chūshin ni –” 植民地時代における韓國都市の形成と變容—植民地初期を中心に— (The formation and transformation of Korean cities during the colonial period: With a focus on the initial period of colonial rule), in Hayashi Takeshi 林武, ed., *Hatten tojōkoku no toshika* 發展途上國の都市化 (Urbanization in developing nations; Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo アジア經濟研究所, 1976), p. 138.
- 6) See Kimura, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3: “Shodantai no kōsei to katsudō” 諸團體の構成と活動 (The composition of various groups and their activities); id., “Zaigai kyoryūmin no shakai katsudō” 在外居留民の社會活動 (Social activities of overseas residents), in *Iwanami kōza: kindai Nihon to shokuminchi* 5, *bōchō suru teikoku no jinryū* 岩波講座 近代日本と植民地 5 膨張する帝國の人流 (Iwanami lecture series: Modern Japan and colonies 5 – The flow of people in the expanding empire; Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 29-30, 37-41; Son Chōng-mok, “Kaehanggi Hanguk kōryu Ilbonin ūi haengt’ae wa Ilbon chōngbu ūi kōryumin taech’aek” 開港期韓國居留日本人の行

- 態斗日本政府의居留民對策 (The behaviour of Japanese residents in Korea at the time of the opening of ports and the measures taken by the Japanese government towards Japanese residents), *Hyangt'o Sōul* 郷土서울 37 (1979).
- 7) *Ibid.*; Hashiya, "Shokuminchi toshi"; Yu, *op. cit.*; Son, *Hanguk kaehanggi toshi pyōnhwa kwajōng yōngu*, pp. 238-250.
  - 8) Moriyama Shigenori 森山茂徳, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū: Chōsen shokuminchika to kokusai kankei* 近代日韓關係史研究 朝鮮植民地化と國際關係 (A study of the history of modern Japan-Korea relations: The colonization of Korea and international relations; Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1987), p. 204; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō* 日韓併合 (Japan's annexation of Korea; Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992), pp. 105-107, 110, 123; "Dai-ikkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第一回施政改善協議會 (1st consultative meeting for administrative improvement), in Ichikawa Masaaki 市川正明, ed., *Kankoku heigō shiryō* 韓國併合史料 (Historical sources on the annexation of Korea), Vol. 1 (Hara Shobō, 1978), pp. 129, 137.
  - 9) *Ibid.*; Kankoku Tōkanfu 韓國統監府 (Residency-General of Korea), *Kankoku shisei nenpō: Meiji 39nen, Meiji 40nen* 韓國施政年報 明治三十九年・明治四十年 (Annual report on the administration of Korea: Meiji 39 [1906], Meiji 40 [1907]; Kankoku Tōkan Kanbō 韓國統監官房, 1909), pp. 193-198.
  - 10) Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, pp. 215-218; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 141-148.
  - 11) "Dai-jūkyūkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第一九回施政改善協議會 (19th consultative meeting for administrative improvement), in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (Hara Shobō, 1978), p. 556.
  - 12) "Dai-nijūikkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第二一回施政改善協議會 (21st consultative meeting for administrative improvement), *ibid.*, p. 586.
  - 13) Kimura, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
  - 14) Naitō Masanaka 内藤正中, "Kankoku ni okeru Ume Kenjirō no rippō jigyō" 韓國における梅謙次郎の立法事業 (Ume Kenjirō's legislative activities in Korea), *Shimadai hōgaku* 島大法學 35, no. 3 (1991), pp. 14-15; Yi Yōng-mi 李英美, "Chōsen tōkanfu ni okeru hōmu hosakan seido to kanshū chōsa jigyō - Ume Kenjirō to Oda Kanjirō o chūshin ni -" 朝鮮統監府における法務補佐官制度と慣習調査事業—梅謙次郎と小田幹治郎を中心に— (The system of legal aides and surveys of customs under the residency-general of Korea: With a focus on Ume Kenjirō and Oda Kanjirō), Part 2, *Hōgaku shirin* 法學志林 (Hōsei Daigaku 法政大學) 98, no. 4 (2001), Chap. 3, Sect. 3; *id.*, Part 3, *Hōgaku shirin* 99, no. 2 (2002), Chap. 3, Sect. 4.
  - 15) *Ibid.*; "Dai-kyūkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第九回施政改善協議會 (9th consultative meeting for administrative improvement), in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 298-299.
  - 16) "Dai-ikkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai," in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 129-138; *Kankoku shisei nenpō: Meiji 39nen, Meiji 40nen*, pp. 193-198, 274-284, 371-379; Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
  - 17) Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, p. 204; Chōsen Sōtokufu 朝鮮總督府 (Government-General of Korea), ed., *Chōsen no hogo oyobi heigō* 朝鮮の保護及び併合 (The protection of Korea and its annexation) [in Kim Chōng-ju 金正柱, ed., *Chosōn t'ongch'i saryo* 朝鮮統治史料 (Historical sources on rule of Korea), Vol. 3 (Hanguk Saryo Yōnguso 韓國史料研究所, 1970)], p. 185.
  - 18) Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, pp. 215-216; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 141-145.
  - 19) Moriyama, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 145-146; Kang Chae-ho 姜再鎬, *Shokuminchi Chōsen no chihō seido* 植民地朝鮮の地方制度 (The local government system in colonial Korea; Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001), pp. 73-80.
  - 20) Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, pp. 216-217; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 146-148; Kankoku Tōkanfu, *Dainiji Kankoku shisei nenpō* 第二次韓國施政年報 (Second

- annual report on the administration of Korea; Kankoku Tōkanfu, 1910), pp. 107-108, 153, 155-157.
- 21) On Itō's views of the protectorate government, see Moriyama, *Nikkan heigō*. On the relationship between foreigners and land, see, e.g., Itō's comments in "Dai-jukkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第一〇回施政改善協議會 (10th consultative meeting for administrative improvement) and "Dai-jūyonkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai" 第一四回施政改善協議會 (14th consultative meeting for administrative improvement), in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 326-327, 442-446.
  - 22) "Dai-jūkyūkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai," in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 556.
  - 23) Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Daisanji shisei nenpō* 第三次施政年報 (Third annual administrative report; Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1911), pp. 45-47; Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, pp. 218-219; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō*, p. 152.
  - 24) Moriyama Shigenori, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū" 日本の朝鮮統治政策 (一九一〇~一九四五年) の政治史的研究 (A study of Japan's policies for ruling Korea (1910-1945) from the perspective of political history), *Niigata daigaku hōsei riron* 新潟大學法政理論 23, no. 3/4 (1991), pp. 69-70.
  - 25) See *ibid.*, p. 70; Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, pp. 225-226; *id.*, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 172-178; Yamamoto Shirō 山本四郎, "Kankoku tōkanfu setchi to tōsuiken mondai" 韓國統監府設置と統帥權問題 (The establishment of the government-general of Korea and the question of the prerogative of supreme command), *Nihon rekishi* 日本歴史 336 (1975).
  - 26) See Moriyama, *Nikkan heigō*, pp. 200-206; *id.*, *Kindai Nikkan kankeishi kenkyū*, Part 2, Chap. 2.
  - 27) Kang, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
  - 28) Moriyama, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū," p. 71.
  - 29) *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.
  - 30) *Ibid.*; Hara Keiichirō 原奎一郎, ed., *Hara Takashi nikki* 原敬日記 (Diaries of Hara Takashi), Vol. 3 (Fukumura Shuppan 福村出版, 1965), entry for Meiji 44.5.31.
  - 31) Moriyama, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū," p. 73-74.
  - 32) See works cited in n. 14; "Dai-kyūkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai," in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 298-299; Yamada Kōhei 山田公平, *Kindai Nihon no kokumin kokka to chihō jichi* 近代日本の國民國家と地方自治 (The nation-state and local self-government in modern Japan; Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大學出版會, 1991), pp. 587-588.
  - 33) Matsumoto Takenori 松本武祝, *Shokuminchi kenryoku to Chōsen nōmin* 植民地權力と朝鮮農民 (Colonial power and Korean peasants; Shakai Hyōronsha 社會評論社, 1998), p. 33.
  - 34) See Moriyama, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū," p. 74; Chōsen Ginkō 朝鮮銀行 (Bank of Korea), ed., *Senman keizai jūnenshi* 鮮滿經濟十年史 (A ten-year history of the economy in Korea and Manchuria; Chōsen Ginkō, 1919); Tokio Tōhō 釋尾東邦, *Chōsen heigō shi* 朝鮮併合史 (The history of the annexation of Korea; Chōsen Oyobi Manshū Sha 朝鮮及滿州社, 1926).
  - 35) See Moriyama, "Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū," pp. 74-75; Mizuta Naomasa 水田直昌, *Sōtokufu jidai no zaisei - Chōsen kindai zaisei no kakuritsu* - 總督府時代の財政—朝鮮近代財政の確立— (Public finances during the period of the government-general: The establishment of modern public finances in Korea; Yūhō Kyōkai 友邦協會, 1974).
  - 36) See *ibid.*; Hori Kazuo, "Chōsen ni okeru shokuminchi zaisei no tenkai - 1910~30 nendai shotō ni kakete -" 朝鮮における植民地財政の展開—一九一〇~三〇年代初頭

- にかけて— (The development of colonial finances in Korea: From 1910 to the early 1930s), in Iinuma Jirō 飯沼二郎 and Kang Chae-ŏn 姜在彦, eds., *Shokuminchiki Chōsen no shakai to teikō* 植民地期朝鮮の社會と抵抗 (Society and resistance in colonial Korea; Miraisha, 1982).
- 37) See the sections on railways in the annual reports of the government-general, e.g., Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō: Taishō 2nendo* 朝鮮總督府施政年報 大正二年度 (Annual administrative report of the government-general of Korea: Taishō 2 [1913]; Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1915), pp. 126–132.
- 38) See the sections on civil engineering in the annual reports of the government-general, e.g., Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu shisei nenpō: Meiji 45nen, Taishō gannendo* 朝鮮總督府施政年報 明治四五年・大正元年度 (Annual administrative report of the government-general of Korea: Meiji 45/Taishō 1 [1912]; Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1914), pp. 188–195; Sōul T'ūkpyōlshisa P'yōnch'an Wiwonhoe 서울特別市史編纂委員會, ed., *Sōul 600nyōn sa* 서울六〇〇年史 (600-year history of Seoul), Vol. 4 (Sōul T'ūkpyōlshi 서울特別市, 1981), pp. 386–388; Son, *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi sahoe sang yōngu*, pp. 312–320.
- 39) See *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 1032–1037, and sections on communications in the annual reports of the government-general.
- 40) See Moriyama, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi seisaku (1910–1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyū,” pp. 75–78; Mizuta, *op. cit.*; Hori, “Chōsen ni okeru shokuminchi zaisei no tenkai – 1910~30 nendai shotō ni kakete –.”
- 41) Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Saikin Chōsen jijō yōran* 最近朝鮮事情要覽 (Survey of the recent situation in Korea; Chōsen Sōtokufu, 1921) [quoted from Yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–134].
- 42) See *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 389–392; Son, *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi kyehoek yōngu*, pp. 101–105; Yi Chōng-hūi 李正熙, “Kyōngsōngbu shidae ūi toshi kyehoek e taehan koch'al” 京城府時代の都市計畫에 대한考察 (A study of city planning at the time of Seoul prefecture), *Hyangt'o Sōul* 33 (1975).
- 43) See works cited in n. 5; Son, *Ilje kangjōnggi toshihwa kwajōng yōngu*, pp. 360–383.
- 44) *Ibid.*; Yi, *op. cit.*
- 45) See *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 367–369; Son, *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi kyehoek yōngu*, pp. 106–111; Yi, *op. cit.*
- 46) Son, *Ilje kangjōnggi toshi kyehoek yōngu*, pp. 111–114.
- 47) *Ibid.*, p. 113; *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, p. 416.
- 48) *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 317–321, 405–406, 416–418, 1094–1103.
- 49) “Dai-jukkai shisei kaizen kyōgikai,” in Ichikawa, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 335–337; *Sōul 600nyōn sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 469–471; Kang Pyōng-shik 姜秉植, *Ilje shidae Sōul ūi t'oji yōngu* 日帝時代 서울의土地研究 (A study of land in Seoul under the Japanese empire; Minjok Munhwasa 民族文化社, 1994), pp. 59–62, 194–201.
- 50) Yamada, *op. cit.*, p. 600.
- 51) Ōwa Kazuaki 大和和明, “Shokuminchiki Chōsen chihō gyōsei ni kansuru ichi shiron – mensei no kakuritsu katei o chūshin ni –” 植民地期朝鮮地方行政に関する一試論—面制の確立過程を中心に (A preliminary study of local administration in colonial Korea: With a focus on the establishment of the *myōn* system), *Rekishi hyōron* 歴史評論 458 (1988), p. 55.
- 52) Kang Chae-ho, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
- 53) Hori Kazuo, “Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen ni okeru nōgyō seisaku – 1920 nendai shokuminchi jinushisei no keisei –” 日本帝國主義の朝鮮における農業政策—一九二〇年代植民地地主制の形成— (The agricultural policies of Japanese imperialism in Korea: The formation of a colonial landowner system in the 1920s), *Nihonshi kenkyū* 日本史研究 171 (1976); Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Both these authors point to a “saber-rattling agricultural administration.”
- 54) Chōng Yōn-t'ae 鄭然泰, “1910 nyōndae Ilje ūi nongōp chōngch'aek kwa shikminji

- chijuje — irünba ‘mijak kaeryang chöngch’ aek’ chungshim üro —” 一九一〇년대日帝의農業政策과植民地地主制—이른바「米作改良政策」을중심으로— (The agricultural policies of the Japanese empire in the 1910s and the colonial landowner system: With a focus on the so-called “policy of improving rice cultivation”), *Hanguk saron* 韓國史論 20 (1988) [quoted from Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 32].
- 55) Hong Söng-ch’an 洪性讚, *Hanguk kündae nongch’on sahoe üi pyöndong kwa chijuch’ üng-20 segi chönbangi Chönnam Hwasun-gun Tongbok-myön ildae üi sarye* 韓國近代農村社會의變動과地主層—二〇世紀前半期全南和順郡同福面일대의事例 (Changes in Korea’s modern rural society and the landowner class: The case of Tongbok myön, Hwasun district, South Chölla during the first half of the 20th century; Chishik Sanöpsa 知識産業社, 1992) [quoted from Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, p. 32].
- 56) Matsumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-57.
- 57) *Söul 600nyön sa*, Vol. 4, pp. 1077-1082; Yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 130, 132.
- 58) Hori, *Chösen kögyöka no shiteki bunseki*, p. 111, Table 3.11; Namiki, *op. cit.*, pp. 530-531, Table 1.
- 59) Yu, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.
- 60) Hashiya, “Shokuminchi toshi to shite no Souru,” p. 9; Hori, *Chösen kögyöka no shiteki bunseki*, pp. 108-117.
- 61) Namiki, *op. cit.*, p. 529.
- 62) See *ibid.*, pp. 528-529, 536-538; Hashiya, “NIEs toshi Souru no keisei,” pp. 122-124; *id.*, “Shokuminchi toshi to shite no Souru.”
- 63) See Moriyama, “Nihon no Chösen töchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyü,” pp. 81-92; *id.*, “Nihon no Chösen shihai to Chösen minzokushugi — 1920 nendai no ‘Chösen jichi ron’ o chüshin to shite —” 日本の朝鮮支配と朝鮮民族主義—一九二〇年代の「朝鮮自治論」を中心として— (Japan’s rule of Korea and Korean nationalism: With a focus on the “Korean self-rule thesis” of the 1920s), in Kitaoka Shin’ichi 北岡伸 — *et al.*, eds., *Sensö, fukkö, hatten — Shöwa seijishi ni okeru kenryoku to kösö* 戦争・復興・發展—昭和政治史における権力と構想 (War, recovery, and growth: Power and planning in the political history of the Shöwa era; Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000).
- 64) See Namiki, *op. cit.*, pp. 541-546; Sin Yöng-hong 愼英弘, *Kindai Chösen shakai jigyo shi kenkyü* 近代朝鮮社會事業史研究 (A study of the history of social work in modern Korea; Ryokuin Shobö 綠蔭書房, 1984).
- 65) See Moriyama, “Nihon no Chösen töchi seisaku (1910-1945nen) no seijishiteki kenkyü.”