

Warrior Lamas: The Role of Lamas in Lobjang Danjin's Uprising in Kokonor, 1723–1724

KATŌ Naoto

Introduction

To this day, Tibetan Buddhism enjoys great religious status among the Mongols. This is the result of the patronage and privileges that the Qing government extended to that faith as part of their strategy to control the Mongols.¹⁾ Ultimately, the encouragement of Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongols increased the proportion of the population neither able to fight nor engaged in production, caused overall demographic stagnation, and weakened the Mongols' capacity to resist the Qing.

Qing patronage of Tibetan Buddhism was based on the premise that lamas abhorred warfare. In 1723, however, lamas for the first time took up weapons against the Qing in the revolt of Lobjang Danjin < Blozang-bstan-'dzin, leader of the Kokonor Khoshut (Köke nayur Qoşuyud) league. This incident considerably influenced Qing policies vis-à-vis the Mongols as well as toward Kokonor and Tibet.²⁾ Why lamas, who ought to desire peace, would have joined the rebellion of Lobjang Danjin, is a question that yet awaits an answer. This paper is an attempt to retrace the actions of the lamas and bring to light their motivations on the basis of Qing archival materials.³⁾ (The spelling of Mongolian and Tibetan names generally follows that given in the *Qingding Xiyu tongwen zhi* 欽定西域同文志 [Authorized polyglot dictionary of the Western Regions].)

I

The death of Kangxi 康熙 and the succession of Yongzheng 雍正 spelled political instability for Kokonor and Tibet. On the one hand, Yongzheng recalled to Beijing the Qing *beile* in charge of the military

control of this region, Kangxi's fourteenth son Yūnti 胤禛, and ordered the virtually complete withdrawal of Qing forces from Tibet. These had been stationed there for more than two years after they had expelled a Dzungar invasion force and installed the Seventh Dalai Lama in the Potala. On the other hand, among the Khoshut Mongols of Kokonor, there was growing disappointment that despite Kangxi's promise to the contrary, they had not received confirmation for their right to rule Tibet, which they derived from their ancestor Guši Qayan. The Khoshuts therefore convened frequent assemblies where they debated secession from the Qing and an alliance with the Dzungar Mongols. This brought to the surface a serious rift between two Khoshut factions, one favoring independence and an alliance with the Dzungars, one loyal to the Qing. In an effort to preserve union, the Khoshut leader, Lobjang Danjin, sent emissaries to the Dzungars and conducted a purge of the pro-Qing faction. The Qing government thwarted Lobjang's plan with an act of aggressive interference in Khoshut politics. In a move that precipitated Lobjang's revolt, Yongzheng confirmed Dayičing Qošuγūči Čayan Danjin's right to succeed the late *beile* Danjung⁴.

Čayan Danjin was an influential man within his tribe, and the Qing side recognized that his abilities were equal to those of Lobjang. Danjung had been the son of Čayan's younger brother, and held great power in Kokonor, and when he died, Čayan Danjin had made bold to seize his former lands. This reckless act provoked the resistance of the Khoshut princes (*taiji*), and had great influence on the lamas' participation in Lobjang's revolt (see below). Čayan's usurpation did not endear him to the Qing side either, but when Lobjang began his attempt to round up all pro-Qing Khoshuts, Yongzheng formally confirmed Čayan's rights to Danjung's lands out of fear that Lobjang would concentrate all power in his person. In Lobjang's own words, Qing confirmation of this usurpation forced him to "clarify matters." On the 17th day of the 8th month of Yongzheng 1 (September 16th, 1723), Lobjang crossed the Yellow River to assail Čayan, and as a result also attacked the Qing garrison stationed there. In this move, Lobjang counted on military aid from the Dzungars.⁵ However, the Dzungars were fighting the Kazakhs and Kirgiz at this time. As they poured their forces into Western Turkestan, they had to avoid provoking the Qing in Kokonor.⁶ The Dzungars, therefore, sent no troops to back Lobjang's revolt.

When the Khoshut *taiji* realized that no military aid was forthcoming from the Dzungars, they gradually distanced themselves from

Lobjang. The Qing rallied them to their side and suppressed the uprising in a very short period. In 1724, Lobjang fled to the Dzungar, Cevang Arabtan. The Qing seized this opportunity to integrate Kokonor into the Banner System and brought the area under full imperial control.

As Satō Hisashi 佐藤長 has pointed out, one special feature of Lobjang Danjin's uprising was the participation of numerous lamas. Based on a number of examples, Satō argues that although in times of war, lamas would in general be expected to "preserve their neutrality and work toward armistice and reconciliation rather than participate actively in the conflict," their pacifist attitude turned into combativeness during Lobjang Danjin's revolt.⁷⁾ However, Satō does not elucidate the most basic questions of why the lamas participated in the uprising and whether they actually took up arms, and simply writes that the depravity of the lamas was a factor. Ma Ruheng 馬汝珩 and Ma Dazheng 馬大正 argue that the participation of lamas in Lobjang Danjin's revolt was in part the result of a law that restricted the construction of new monasteries, and that lamaseries throughout Kokonor were overcrowded with monks.⁸⁾ I agree to some degree with the description by Satō, Ma Ruheng, and Ma Dazheng of the situation of lamas at the time, but it seems improbable that this was really the fundamental or decisive reason for their participation in the revolt.

II

In 1723, the lamas of the principal monasteries of Kokonor behaved as follows.

In the sKu-khbum monastery, Qambu Nomun Qayan and all the other lamas had joined Lobjang Danjin's revolt during the summer.⁹⁾ Qambu Nomun Qayan was the son of Čayan Danjin's maternal half-brother, that is, Čayan's nephew. It is not certain what his exact rank as a lama was. In the uprising, he acted in concert with the son of Mergen Dayičing Lajab, who was his cousin. Mergen Dayičing Lajab, in turn, objected vehemently to Čayan's occupation of Danjung's lands and rallied a number of Danjung's former followers to his cause.¹⁰⁾ Before this background, the reason Qambu Nomun Qayan joined Lobjang's revolt was his discontent with Čayan occupation of the lands of a man that had been his own cousin, and together with Lajab pressed the attack on Čayan. The supreme Qing commander of this region of Kokonor, the

governor general of Sichuan and Shaanxi 四川陝西總督, Nian Gengyao 年羹堯, was convinced that the lamas of the sKu-khbum monastery participated in the attacks on the Qing because of Qambu Nomun Qayan.¹¹⁾

When Qambu Nomun Qayan learned that Lajab's son Vangšuy Lafutan had switched to the Qing side and not suffered any punishment, he presented himself to Yue Zhongqi 岳鍾琪, the provincial military commander of Sichuan 四川提督, on the 3rd day of the 11th month of Yongzheng 1 (November 30th, 1723). However, when Nian Gengyao received the report of Qambu Nomun Qayan's submission, he suggested in a memorial to the Emperor that he be executed in Xining 西寧 as a lesson to the rebellious lamas, and Yongzheng agreed to this.¹²⁾

The Third Čayan Nomun Qayan was a living Buddha with great authority in Kokonor. According to Wakamatsu Hiroshi 若松寬, he was nGag-dbang-blo-bzang-bstan-pa'i-rgyal-mtshan, the founder of the bDechen monastery, and had close ties to the most powerful *taiji* of Kokonor, and also commanded great economic resources.¹³⁾ As mentioned before, Čayan Nomun Qayan was critical of Lobjang Danjin's actions, and when Lobjang attacked Čayan Danjin, he went as far in his remonstrations as to spread his own priestly sash on the ground.¹⁴⁾ After the outbreak of the rebellion, he immediately signaled his support for the Qing side. Perhaps because of this, he was granted the right to a banner with the inscription "jasay blam-a" (扎薩克喇嘛) in 1725.¹⁵⁾

North of Xining, the lamas of the Qijiasi 奇嘉寺 and sGo-mang monasteries, especially those with close ties to Arabtan Ombu, one of the powerful Khoshut *taiji* on Lobjang's side, took up arms.¹⁶⁾ Both monasteries were among the greatest religious institutions in Kokonor, with several thousand monks each. However, according to Huang Xilin 黃喜林, the regional commander at Xining 西寧總兵官 assigned the task of pacifying them, their situation at the time of the conquest was as follows.

On the 9th day of the 12th month of Yongzheng 1 (December 6th, 1723), I marched a great army through the Beichuan 北川 frontier post [in Xining]. Beyond the frontier, the lamas and other Tibetans of the sGo-mang and Qijiasi monasteries all supported Arabtan Ombu and attacked us. I organized my forces into two columns and after advancing twenty *li* 里, captured an enemy scout. On the next fifteen *li*, I captured another five scouts. All were

armed. When I interrogated them, the bandits from the Qijiasi monastery responded that they were "preparing for the arrival of a large Qing force." I made Šen Li hiyo and Hu hoo the commanders of flying squads 403 men strong, had Sir-a Mergen lead a Muslim force of 400, and dispatched them all from Zhigou 直溝 to the Qijiasi monastery; they slaughtered more than 500 bandits, and arrested one of the lamas who had been their ringleaders. They also seized more than a thousand head of cattle and sheep. Those that surrendered, we treated with clemency [to win them over] in accordance with the Statutes. That day, we pitched our camp at the sGo-mang monastery. Not a single lama or Tibetan came. That night, I set watches upon all mountain passes. The bandits inside the monastery came to the exit of the valley and fired their muskets. The following day, when I asked the lama why they had fired their muskets, he showed not the least sign of docility, and instead said that they would attack our great army. [In the ensuing battle,] our soldiers fought bravely and killed more than a thousand bandit lamas and other Tibetans. We captured 27 of Arabtan Ombu's lieutenants, and seized a vast amount of armor, bows, arrows, muskets, spears, cattle, sheep, horses, and camels. The sGo-mang monastery had long been a place where bandits assembled and plotted rebellion; because of this, we burned it to the ground. The captured ringleaders we all burned at the stake. Because the remaining 2000 lamas and other Tibetans all cast away their weapons and begged for their lives, I conveyed to them the authority and virtue of Your Majesty, and allowed them to return to their native homes.¹⁷⁾

That the 400 Muslims in the conquering army were only used to attack the lamas is important.¹⁸⁾ One part of the lamas who fled from the sGo-mang monastery, turned toward the rGyal-mdo monastery.¹⁹⁾ Nian Gengyao claimed that among all the monasteries of Kokonor, these two monasteries were especially "rotten."²⁰⁾ However, it is not clear what their actual condition was.

Northeast of Xining, there resided in the dGon-klungs monastery of Shatangkou 沙棠口 the living Buddha lCangs-skya qutu'ytu. Many of the lamas in this monastery had a personal relationship with Lobjang Danjin and Arabtan Ombu.²¹⁾ One reason for this was that as one of the great monasteries of Kokonor, it had long had a strong connection to the Khoshuts. For example, the body of Lobjang's father Daši Bayatur (died

in 1714) was enshrined within its walls. The Qing side was well aware of this fact. Before the revolt, they had asked the head of the dGon-klungs monastery, Dayma qutuγtu, to come to Xining. The Qing side had invited him under the pretext of having him “chant sutras” there, but then detained him as a virtual hostage. Apparently, he made several attempts to return to the dGon-klungs monastery, but failed every time. When the dGon-klungs monastery later rebelled, he was executed to state an example for his monks.

While the Qijiasi and sGo-mang monasteries were stirring in early December 1723, the dGon-klungs monastery was completely quiet. However, at the end of January 1724, the Qing side heard in rapid succession that four great tents had suddenly been pitched at the dGon-klungs monastery, and that squadrons of monk soldiers had been formed. Nian Gengyao immediately dispatched messengers to admonish the lamas, but they ignored his reprimand. According to information obtained thereafter, the lamas of the dGon-klungs monastery sent envoys to the Tibetans, lamas and laymen alike, who lived in the mountains east of the monastery, asking them to assemble in the monastery on the 11th day of the 1st month of Yongzheng 2, (February 5th, 1724) to attack the Qing forces. Nian Gengyao responded by ordering Yue Zhongqi and the vice commander-in-chief 副都統 Ilibu 伊禮布 to march on dGon-klungs from Xining via Weiyuanbao 威遠堡 with 4,150 Green Standard 綠營, Tusi 土司 (southwestern tribal) troops, and 470 Manchu warriors. At the same time, Nian deputed the commander of the vanguard 前鋒統領, Sudan 蘇丹, who was familiar with conditions in Tibet and Mongolia, to assist Yue Zhongqi.

Separately, he assigned 2,400 Green Standard and Tusi troops to Huang Xilin and the regional commander at Xinghan 興漢總兵官 Ujengga 吳正安, and another 1,700 to the regional vice commander 副將 Song Kejin 宋可進, and ordered them to secure the flanks of Yue and Ilibu. That is to say, however much this was a stronghold of Lobjang, as many as 8,720 Qing troops were mobilized to assault a single lamasery. Before dawn on the 12th day of the 1st month of Yongzheng 2, (February 6th, 1724), the main force under Yue Zhongqi and Sudan confronted the rebellious lama and laymen in a place called Halazhigou 哈拉直溝, about forty *li* from dGon-klungs. Battle was joined. At the end of two days of fierce fighting in several engagements, the Qing side claimed to have killed 6000 lamas and laymen. When Yongzheng read that the lamas did not retreat in the face of the mighty Qing force but

only turned to flight after all had been lost, he commented with his vermillion brush: "This is truly astonishing. This is the first time I have ever heard of lamas fighting."²²⁾

For an emperor who knew that lamas were generally pacifist, this stubborn resistance was truly "astonishing." The Qing forces suffered serious losses in these battles. Thereupon, the Qing army burned dGon-klungs. Yongzheng commented on the slaughter of lamas and destruction of monasteries in Kokonor: "Make sure to prevent Mongol public opinion from thinking that all we did was kill lamas and raze monasteries. Punish [only] those that deserve punishment."²³⁾ The Emperor was concerned not to turn the hearts and minds of the Tibetan Buddhists against the Qing.

Taken along by lamas, the living Buddha lCangs-skya qutuytu fled to the Zalong 雜隆 region by the headwaters of the Datong River 大通河. He later received the protection of Yue Zhongqi, and in the 16th day of the 4th month of Yongzheng 2, (May 8th, 1724) was sent to Xining.²⁴⁾ lCangs-skya qutuytu, whose original name was Avang Čoyijaγ, was 8 *sui* at the time. According to Satō Hisashi, he was considered the second incarnation of Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje, and was later sent to Beijing, where he was warmly welcomed.²⁵⁾

In this fashion, in the premier monasteries of Kokonor (sKu-khbum, Qijiasi, sGo-mang, and dGon-klungs), as well as in other monasteries, large and small, there were lamas who joined Lobjang Danjin's revolt. The Qing executed them without hesitation. They may have joined Lobjang Danjin in part because before they became lamas, they were tribesmen of the Kokonor Khoshuts, with personal ties to Lobjang and Arabtan Ombu, and therefore stood to lose and gain along with him (for example, in the internal dispute over the territories of the late Danjung). However, it is possible that the actions of the lamas were not just driven by such "secular" motivations, but also had religious underpinnings.

III

When in 1712 Lobjang Danjin's father, Daši Bayatur, and Čayan Danjin heard the rumor that bsKal-bzang-rgya-mtsho, a boy born in 1708 in Li-thang in Khams was an incarnation of the Sixth Dalai Lama, they offered him their protection and aid without delay, and proclaimed that the boy was indeed the reincarnation. As Luciano Petech argues, "the descendants of Gušuri Khan [Guši Qayan] living there [in

Kokonor], had always been rather jealous of their cousins in Tibet.”²⁶⁾ That is, jealousy of their fellow Khoshut Lhajang Qayan, who controlled Tibet, was a motive for their protection of the boy from Li-thang. According to Petech’s research, the situation at the time was roughly as follows.

At the beginning of the 18th century, Lhajang Qayan prevailed in a power struggle with the regent (*sde-srid*) of Tibet, Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho, and deprived Tibetans of virtually all political power. However, this provoked a conflict with the Sixth Dalai Lama; to strengthen his own power, Lhajang strengthened his blood ties with the Dzungars, and entered an alliance with the Qing Dynasty (he received the title *Yifagongshunhan* 翊法恭順汗 from Kangxi). Within Tibet, he won the support of the Panchen Lama through donations of territory and expensive gifts. On top of these policies, he sent the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tshangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho, and the powerless regent, nGag-dbang-rin-chen, to Beijing in 1706. However, the Sixth Dalai lama died en route in October, 1706 in Kun-dga’ nayur in the Southern part of Kokonor.

After Lhajang had effectively exiled this “true” Dalai Lama, he appointed a nameless monk born in Khams, nGag-dbang-ye-shes-rgya-mtsho, as the Sixth Dalai Lama. The clergy of Tibet had to tolerate this act of Lhajang’s in the face of his overwhelming military power.

In this situation, bsKal-bzang-rgya-mtsho was born in Li-thang. In Tibet, the Sixth Dalai Lama “created by Lhajang” had no support whatsoever in the population. Then the rumor spread widely that the boy born in Li-thang was the reincarnation of the exiled “true” Sixth Dalai Lama who had died in Kun-dga’ nayur. Because of this Lhajang dispatched officials to seize the boy, but as mentioned before, the descendants of the same Guši Qayan in Kokonor, Daši Bayatur and his sons Lobjang Danjin and Čayan Danjin protected the boy in the sKu-khbum monastery in Kokonor.²⁷⁾

In 1717, the leader of the Dzungars Cevang Arabtan, dispatched his cousin Cering Dondub to Lhasa to kill Lhajang Qayan. The success of this mission caused a great political upheaval. To handle the ensuing turmoil, the Qing Dynasty sent Yūnti 胤禵 as the Generalissimo for the Pacification of Distant Border Areas 撫遠大將軍 against the Dzungar invasion force. By 1720, they had recovered the area. At this point, the boy from Li-thang, bsKal-bzang-rgya-mtsho, entered Lhasa with the Qing army and was installed as the Seventh Dalai Lama.

Matters unfolded toward the outbreak of Lobjang Danjin's revolt when Kangxi promised the Khoshuts to recognize them as the temporal rulers of Tibet.²⁸⁾

In this way, Daši Bayatur and his sons Lobjang Danjin and Čayan Danjin, had a close connection to the Seventh Dalai Lama, but whether their relationship went beyond the above is not known today. When bsKal-bzang-rgya-mtsho lived in the sKu-khbum monastery in Kokonor, Lobjang Danjin returned bsKal-bzang-rgya-mtsho's brother 'Phrin-las to laity, and married him to the daughter of his brother Tanglajab (whose only mention in the record is this, and who had already died at this point).²⁹⁾ When Lobjang finished his duty as councilor in Lhasa, he only took 'Phrin-las along with him to his own pastures, and always kept him by his side.³⁰⁾ When he rebelled, 'Phrin-las joined him in the attack on the Qing garrison at Zhenhaibao 鎮海堡.

After this, 'Phrin-las accompanied Lobjang on his flight, then left him in the environs of Gas, and arrived in an area called Qar-a usu in the 19th day of the 10th month of Yongzheng 2, (December 4th, 1724) just as his wife, that is Lobjang's niece, was dying. There, 'Phrin-las's father Sonom darja and his son, that is, the Seventh Dalai Lama, made 'Phrin-las surrender himself to a Qing official in Tibet, Zhou Ying 周瑛. Thereafter, he was sent to Nian Gengyao, arriving in Xi'an 西安 in the 24th day of the 2nd month of Yongzheng 3, (April 6th, 1725).³¹⁾

Thereafter, he was pardoned, but did not return to monastic life, but settled down in his native place of Li-thang in Khams. As a consideration from Nian Gengyao, he and his followers received a monthly stipend of 3 *dou* 斗 [about 50 kilograms] of rye, and he himself received in addition 2 taels of silver per month.³²⁾ The reason he was pardoned was that he had joined Lobjang Danjin's revolt under duress, and that Yongzheng ordered him to be "granted a generous pardon."³³⁾

Lobjang Danjin caused an incident by robbing Lajab's wife when he attacked Čayan Danjin.³⁴⁾ As the attack on Čayan was part of a dispute that Lajab had entered in protest against Čayan's seizure of all of Danjung's territories, it is difficult to understand why Lobjang robbed Lajab's wife.³⁵⁾ In fact, the reason lay in the descent of Lajab's wife. According to information obtained by Nian Gengyao, she was a kinswoman of the Seventh Dalai Lama.³⁶⁾ In his revolt, Lobjang Danjin labored to bring kin of the Dalai Lama on his side, and this was his way of accomplishing this end. Also, he had himself accompanied by kin not only of the Dalai Lama, but even kin of the Dalai Lama's inner circle.³⁷⁾

Nian Gengyao elaborated on this reason:

Knowing that Tibet's Tangyuds and Khan-chen-nas-bsod-nams-rgyal-po..... (the central political figures of Tibet after the withdrawal of the Qing force) did not get along with him, Lobjang Danjin took the elder brother of the Dalai Lama into his retinue. From the fact that he took along the Dalai Lama's kinswoman, it is evident that early on he had resolved to go into Tibet.³⁸⁾

This is a memorial written immediately after Lobjang had fled, and Nian Gengyao supposed that Lobjang had surrounded himself with kin of the Dalai Lama as a secret preparation for a move to Tibet. However, at this time Yongzheng already surmised that Lobjang would go to the Dzungars: "I think that when Lobjang Danjin heard that [our general] Zhou Ying had entered Tibet [with a thousand soldiers],³⁹⁾ he went to Tibet to seek refuge under Cevang Arabtan."⁴⁰⁾ As mentioned before, Yongzheng's supposition was correct.

Certainly, as Nian Gengyao thought, we cannot ignore the point that Lobjang Danjin, "whose ambition was to make himself king of Tibet"⁴¹⁾, surrounded himself with kin of the Dalai Lama so as to rule Tibet. However, the fact that Lobjang had 'Phrin-las, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, accompany him during his attack on the Qing garrison surely shows that apart from his aim of controlling Tibet, Lobjang Danjin was using 'Phrin-las as the ideal "tool" to suffuse his actions in Kokonor with the Dalai Lama's religious authority.⁴²⁾ This religious dimension no doubt was a considerable influence on the revolt of the lamas.

Owing to gaps in the record, it is not clear how the Seventh Dalai Lama himself viewed Lobjang Danjin. However, judging from the fact that the Dalai Lama sent two letters to Nian Gengyao requesting that Lobjang and his associates be pardoned (the Panchen Lama sent two letters to the same effect), it is clear that even when one takes 'Phrin-las out of the equation, relations between the Dalai Lama and Lobjang were hardly bad.⁴³⁾ However, this is no evidence that the Dalai Lama actually extended active support to Lobjang's revolt. Yet it is a fact that subordinates of the Dalai Lama participated in Lobjang Danjin's revolt. In Čayan toluγai in the South of Kokonor (the hill at the Southeastern edge of lake Kokonor where the *taiji* of Kokonor would assemble), rGyal-mtshan-mkan-po, a lama sent as an emissary from the Dalai Lama, co-

vered Lobjang's back.⁴⁴⁾ Early in the 1st month of Yongzheng 2 (the end of January 1724), he joined Lobjang, and then fled together with him before the attack of the Qing army. He was killed at Solum⁴⁵⁾ before the dawn of the 4th day of the 3rd month of Yongzheng 3, (April 16th, 1725).⁴⁶⁾

In this way, Lobjang Danjin's acted with an acute awareness of the Dalai Lama, and many associates of the Dalai Lama played a role in his revolt, be it out of their own volition or under duress.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, there are two broad reasons why numerous lamas participated in the revolt of Lobjang Danjin. Firstly, there were lamas who shared Lobjang's temporal interests in the conflict over Danjung's legacy, and were personally connected to Lobjang or under the command of people who were so connected. Secondly, we can discern that Lobjang sought to surround himself with religious charisma, always asking relatives of the Dalai Lama to accompany him; some lamas were drawn into the revolt by this connection. These two factors did not exist independently, but reinforced each other, making the lamas take up arms. While the Qing were aware of the effects their acts would have on public opinion, they burned the lamaseries and subjected their lamas to rigorous punishment. This is how the battle of the lamas ended.⁴⁷⁾

Notes

- 1) Much previous scholarship has addressed this issue, see for example Tamura Jitsuzō 田村實造, "Shinchō no Mōko tōchisaku" 清朝の蒙古統治策 (Qing administrative policy toward the Mongols), Tōa Kenkyūjo 東亞研究所 [ed.] *Shinchō no henkyō tōchi seisaku* 清朝の邊疆統治政策 (Qing Administrative Policy in its Borderland), (Tokyo, 1944, pp. 81-84).
- 2) The following publications explain the outbreak of the rebellion in the light of new evidence; Katō Naoto 加藤直人, "1723 nen Robusan danjin no hanran—sono hanran zenya o chūshin to shite—" 1723年ロブサン・ダンジンの叛亂—その叛亂前夜を中心として— (1723 Rebellion of Lobjang Danjin, With the focus on its outbreak), Mori Masao 護雅夫 [ed.] *Nairiku Ajia nishi Ajia no shakai to bunka* 内陸アジア・西アジアの社會と文化 (Society and culture of Inner Asia and Muslim world), (Tokyo, 1983, pp. 323-349), and Katō Naoto. "Lobjang Danjin's Rebellion of 1723: with a Focus on the Eve of the Rebellion." *Acta Asiatica*, No. 64, Tōhō Gakkai (1993). About the course of the rebellion, see Katō Naoto, "Robusan danjin no hanran to Shincho" ロブサン・ダンジンの叛亂と清朝—叛亂の経過を

- 中心として— (Lobjang Danjin's rebellion and the Qing dynasty: With the focus on the course of the rebellion), *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 東洋史研究, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1983). The historical setting of the rebellion is covered in Luciano Petech. "Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century." *T'oung Pao*, Vol. LII., Livr. 4-5, (Leiden, 1966, pp. 276-92); Luciano Petech. *China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century* (Monographies du T'oung Pao, Vol.1) 2nd and Revised ed. (Leiden, 1972); and Satō Hisashi 佐藤長, "Robuzan danjin no hanran ni tsuite" ロブザンダンジンの叛亂について (On Lobjang Danjin's rebellion), *Shirin* 史林, Vol. 55, No. 6, (1972). This article builds on many results of Petech's and Satō's exquisite research. Building on Katō's work, Ishihama Yumiko 石濱裕美子 has presented a new perspective on the uprising (Ishihama Yumiko, "Gushi han ōke no Chibetto ōken sōshitsu katei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu "グシ=ハン王家のチベット王權喪失過程に関する一考察 (A study of the process whereby the royal house of Guši Qayan lost its sovereignty over Tibet), *Tōyō Gakuhō* 東洋學報, Vol. 69, Nos. 3 and 4, (1988). Recently, she has also published some fascinating research on the Tibet-centered Buddhist world of the 17th and 18th centuries and its connections to Kokonor and Mongolia (Ishihama Yumiko, *Chibetto Bukkyōsekai no rekishiteki kenkyū* チベット佛教世界の歴史的研究 (A historical study of Tibetan Buddhist world), (Tokyo, 2001).
- 3) My sources include the official reports written in Manchu and Chinese by Nian Gengyao (see my review "Taihoku Kokuritsu Kōkyū Hakubutsuin hen *Nen Kōgyō sōshō*" 臺北・國立故宮博物院編『年羹堯奏摺』 (National Palace Museum in Taipei [ed]. *Confidential Memorials of Nian Gengyao*), *Tōyō Gakuhō*, Vol. 60, Nos. 3 and 4 (1979), and the memorials of other Qing officials in the same two languages (published by the National Palace Museum in Taipei as Gongzhongdang Yongzheng chao zouche" 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 (*Confidential memorials of Yongzheng's reign among the archival documents of the Qing Palace*).
 - 4) See Katō Naoto, "Lobjang Danjin's Rebellion of 1723: with a Focus on the Eve of the Rebellion", pp. 68-70.
 - 5) See Katō Naoto, "1723nen Robusan danjin no hanran", pp. 329-330.
 - 6) See Saguchi Tōru 佐口透, "*Roshia to Ajia sōgen* ロシアとアジア草原 (Russia and the Asia steppe)" (Tokyo, 1966, p. 121). I am preparing a separate article on this issue.
 - 7) Sato, Hisashi, *op. cit.* p. 14.
 - 8) Ma Ruheng 馬汝珩, Ma Dazheng 馬大正: "Lun luo-bu-cang dan-jin panluan yu Qing zhengfu de shanhou cuoshi" 論羅卜藏丹津叛亂與清政府的善後措施 (Lobjang Danjin's Rebellion and the remedial measure of Qing government), *Xinjiang Daxue Xuebao* 新疆大學學報 (1980, No.3 and *Zhongguo Menggushi xuehui lunwen xuanji* 中國蒙古史學會論文選集 [Collected papers of the society for Mongolian history of China, 1980]).
 - 9) My account of Qambu Nomun Qayan's actions is based on a Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao 年羹堯, the governor general of Sichuan and Shaanxi 四川陝西總督 and Generalissimo for the Pacification of Distant

Border Areas 撫遠大將軍 dated YZ 1.12.13 (National Palace Museum in Taipei [ed.]. Confidential Memorials of Nian Gengyao, Vol. 1, pp. 253-257).

- 10) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao, undated but probably written in YZ 1.11 based on its contents (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 676-680) and Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 1. 6. 20 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 14.).
- 11) Nian Gengyao's memorial dated YZ 1. 12. 13.
- 12) Marginal comments in Manchu by the Yongzheng Emperor to Nian Nian Gengyao's memorial dated YZ 1. 12. 13.
- 13) Wakamatsu Hiroshi 若松寛 "Tsagan-nomunhan no jiseki" ツァガン-ノムンハンの事績 (An achievement of Čayan Nomun Qayan), *Kyōto Furitsu Daigaku Gakujutsu Hōkoku (Jimbun)* 京都府立大學學術報告〈人文〉, (No. 32, pp. 4-10).
- 14) Marginal comments in Manchu by the Yongzheng Emperor to Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 1. 12. 28 (*ibid.* Vol. 1, pp. 288) and attachment to Nian Gengyao's Chinese memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 19 (Archives of the Palace Museum in Peiping 北平·故宮博物院文獻館 [ed.] *Wenxian congbian* 文獻叢編, Vol. 5, 1930. 7)).
- 15) Wakamatsu Hiroshi, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Ma Ruheng and Ma Dazheng link Lobjang to the Great Lama of the sKu-khbum monastery, Čayan Nomun Qayan based on the description of Wei Yuan's 魏源 *Shengwuji* 聖武記 and claim that Čayan Nomun Qayan participated in the revolt (Ma and Ma, *op. cit.*, p. 72). However, as mentioned before, Čayan Nomun Qayan is said to have sharply criticized Lobjang Danjin's attack on Čayan Danjin.
- 16) This account of the actions of the Qijiasi and sGo-mang monasteries is based on Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 1. 11. 17 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 206-216).
- 17) *Ibid.*
- 18) In broad outlines, the situation of Muslims in contemporary Kokonor was as follows. The "Chinese Muslims" (Manchu: *nikan hoise*) and the Tibetan Muslims (Manchu: *fandz i hoise*) living in the Xining area, as well as the "Tangyud turban worn Muslims 纏頭回" (*Tanggūt i can teo hoise*) living in areas like Doba 多巴 were all merchants, and had no intention of participating in the rebellion. Only the "Mongol Muslims" (*Monggo i hoise*), settled in areas like Shangbeita 上北塔 and Xiabeita 下北塔 outside the frontier at Beiquan, lived scattered across 60 or 70 villages both populous and rich in agricultural produce. The Muslims of Xiabeita were followers of jirγijab, Baljur arabtan, Lobjang Čayan, and Arabtan, respectively. Similarly, the Muslims of Shangbeita were loyal to the Khoshuts, Arabtan Ombu and Surja (the second son of Lhajang Qayan, who was captured during the Dzungar invasion of Tibet and exiled to Ili). Even before Lobjang Danjin's revolt, these groups were unwilling to cooperate with the Qing. After the capture of Surja, his wife Čangmar took up the rule of his lands, but was overthrown by Arabtan Ombu. It was Muslim Mongols that formed the main force that assaulted the Qing garrison. According to the records,

- while the Muslims attacked Arabtan Ombu merely observed the events from a safe distance at the head of around a thousand soldiers. The Qing army did not exterminate the Muslims, but deftly won them to their own side after wiping out Arabtan Ombu's party among them. The Muslims that attacked the Qijiasi and sGo-mang monasteries under the command of Sir-a Mergen were precisely the Muslims of this region. (Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 1. 11. 11 (December 8th, 1723; (*ibid.*, Vol.1, pp. 178-184)).
- 19) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 5. 11 (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 518-539).
 - 20) Attachment to an undated Chinese memorial from Nian Gengyao (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 46).
 - 21) This account of the developments in the dGon-klungs monastery derives from Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 19 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 320-331).
 - 22) See the Manchu vermilion rescript to Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 19 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 325)
 - 23) See the Manchu vermilion rescript to Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 19 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 329)
 - 24) See Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 19.
 - 25) Satō Hisashi, *op. cit.*, p. 15
 - 26) Petech, "Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century," p. 281.
 - 27) *Ibid.*, pp. 270-286 and Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century*, pp. 8-69.
 - 28) See Kato: "1723 nen Robusan danjin no hanran", pp. 329-330.
 - 29) (a) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 3. 3. 3 (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 635-641); (b) Undated (probably early YZ 3. 3) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao and vice minister of the Court of Colonial Affairs 理藩院侍郎 Orai 鄂賴 (*Ibid.*, pp. 708ff.); and (c) Undated (probably early YZ 1.12) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao (*Ibid.*, pp. 680-684).
 - 30) After the Qing victory over Cering Dondub, Tibet was ruled by a council of two Khalkha Mongols, two Tibetans, and two Khoshuts. One of the Khoshut representatives was Lobjang Danjin (Petech "Notes on Tibetan History of the 18th Century," pp. 287-289).
 - 31) About 'Phrin-las, see the Manchu memorials by Nian Gengyao and Orai in endnote 27.
 - 32) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao and Orai dated YZ 3. 4. 2 (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 652-655).
 - 33) Yongzheng's vermilion rescript on Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 3. 3. 3.
 - 34) Undated (probably early YZ 1. 12) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao
 - 35) On the abduction of Lajab's wife, Yongzheng commented "How very interesting, what is Lajab doing about this?" (Undated (probably early YZ 1. 12) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 681).
 - 36) *Ibid.*

- 37) *Ibid.*
- 38) *Ibid.*
- 39) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 1. 11. 14 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 189-202).
- 40) Yongzheng's vermilion rescript on Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 3. 3. 3. (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 684).
- 41) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 4. 18 (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 488-491).
- 42) See undated (probably early YZ 3.3) Manchu memorial from Nian Gengyao and Orai (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 708-710).
- 43) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 4. 18.
- 44) Undated (probably mid YZ 2.1) Chinese memorial from Nian Gengyao (*ibid.*, Vol. 1. p. 42).
- 45) Satō Hisashi, *op. cit.*, p. 16. According to Satō, this place was Odun tala (that is "Sea of Constellations" 「星宿海」).
- 46) Nian Gengyao's Manchu memorial dated YZ 2. 1. 8 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 300-304).
- 47) In his summary of how he had handled Lobjang Danjin's uprising, Nian Gengyao stated the following. "The lawbreakers from every area ended up seeking refuge in lamaseries. Officials could not hound them down there. Because of this, lamaseries over time became the nests of lawbreakers." (Nian Gengyao's Chinese memorial dated YZ 2. 5. 11 << *Wenxian Congbian*, Vol. 6[1930/8] >>). That is to say, he criticized that numerous lawbreakers had entered the monasteries, but did not conform that this alone was a cause for the revolt. As is evident in the dGgon-klungs monastery, the actions of the lamas affected their neighbors and were carried out at a high level of organization. Other than that, it is dangerous to judge the "decay" of the lamas just based on the assessment of the Qing side.