

The Evolution of the *Iqtā'* System under the Mamlūks—An Analysis of *al-Rawk al-Husāmī* and *al-Rawk al-Nāṣirī*

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The *iqtā'* system, which was instituted in the Buwayhid Irak, was introduced into Egypt by Saladin of the Ayyūbid dynasty in 1169⁽¹⁾. According to the account of Maqrīzī⁽²⁾, on the collapse of the 'aṭā' system at the early Islamic period, farmers settled at villages (*fallāḥ qarār*) were, through the establishment of the *iqtā'* system, made subordinate, as agricultural serfs (*abd qinn*), to *iqtā'* holders. In the Ayyūbid period, entire regions, cities and their surrounding country, as well as strongholds and ports, in addition to villages, together with the revenue from the miscellaneous taxes (*maks*) on merchandise, grains and fowls, were distributed as *iqtā'*s. But, though in this way there was considerable variety, the most important constituent group was the cultivated farms of the villages. The amirs, in return for their *iqtā'* holding, used their revenue to support their own soldiers (*mamlūk* or *jund*); in time of war they had a duty to lead their troops in battle, in short, they owed military service (*khidma*) to the sultan. But, from the Ayyūbid period to the beginning of the Mamluks, the power of the non-mamluk cavalry (*ajnād al-ḥalqa*) was not yet on the decline, and the clearly defined military organization, with commanders of hundreds, forties and tens, had not yet been established⁽³⁾. But by about the end of the 13th century the power of the royal mamluks (*mamālīk al-sultān*) was emerging, and the sultans found themselves under the necessity of getting rid of the former amirs, and strengthening the basis of their power by means of the mamluks. In order to achieve this object they twice carried out country-wide surveys, that is to say, *al-Rawk al-Husāmī* and *al-Rawk al-Nāṣirī*.

Since C. H. Becker⁽⁴⁾, the importance of the surveys (*rawks*) in the Mamluk period has been pointed out by various scholars. For example, A. N. Poliak relates how the feudal landlords lost their local positions and were very clearly made to depend on the central government through the

two *rawks*⁽⁵⁾. This was the first study to point out some important features of the surveys, but a number of another important points in the actual content of the surveys have been overlooked. It is true that 'Alī I. Ḥasan first set forth the content of the surveys in a concrete manner, but here the materials used were limited, and also the interpretation of the result of the surveys is no more than superficial⁽⁶⁾. The same perhaps applies also to the work of Ibrāhīm A. Ṭurkhān⁽⁷⁾. I think it is essential not to treat the Ḥusāmī *rawk* and the Nāṣirī *rawk* without separating them, and first of all to show the difference in character between the two surveys. In this sense it could be said that up to now the work of H. Rabie on these surveys is the most comprehensive, and also has achieved definite results⁽⁸⁾. In this study use is made of many manuscripts apart from published materials, and a number of new facts are pointed out concerning the object and result of the two surveys. These facts, however, are on the whole merely set out one by one, and there is no mention whatever of the question of how the basis of the sultan's power or the structure of the *iqṭā'* system was altered by means of these surveys. As P. M. Holt showed in his analysis of the Ḥusāmī *rawk*⁽⁹⁾, it would seem absolutely essential, while taking into account the tendencies of the amirs and mamluks, to examine the question of the relationship between the sultan's power and the surveys.

Generally speaking, studies hitherto have only dealt partially with the surveys; nor has there been an adequately strict apprehension of the true situation based on criticism of the historical materials; as a consequence it has not yet been possible to elucidate the nature of the surveys in their entirety. Accordingly, one may well consider that, in order correctly to understand the historical significance of these two surveys under the Mamluks, it is essential to try to analyse anew and systematically the causes, the reality and the results of the surveys, including the surveys in Syria.

I. al-Rawk al-Ḥusāmī

The brief reign of Sultan Ḥusām al-Dīn Lājīn al-Manṣūrī (696–8/1296–9) ended without his having achieved any spectacular success, but his name has come down to posterity on account of one decisive political act. This was the survey of the whole territory of Egypt which he had carried out in the year after his accession. Some 120 years had passed since the survey of Saladin in 572 (1176). In this section I hope first to give an account of the object and content of the survey, and then to examine its results.

A. The object and content of the survey.

It is generally said that the reason for the Ḥusāmī *rawk* was that

the amirs, on the pretext of safeguarding (*ḥimāya*) the rights of the ajnād al-ḥalqa, were misappropriating their *iqtā'* revenues⁽¹⁰⁾. Certainly as Maqrīzī says⁽¹¹⁾, "because the amirs seized much of the *iqtā'*s from the ajnād [al-ḥalqa], nothing finally came into their hands. Their *iqtā'*s were placed under the control of the *dīwān al-amīr*, (the amir office), and it was possible by this means to circumvent depredators, but disputes arose which gave rise to violent disturbances." The ḥalqa cavalry at this time were allotted each their own *iqtā'*, and it is reckoned that the annual revenue, apart from tribute in kind (*dīyāfa*), was between 10,000 and 30,000 dirhams⁽¹²⁾. But because their *iqtā'*s were under the protection of the amirs, it became impossible to bring in enough, and this was the reason for the disputes and outbreaks of violence. The amirs referred to here were not, as Poliak says, confined to commanders of hundred⁽¹³⁾, and it would seem natural to suppose that amirs of various grades were included. This is explicitly set out in the following record of Khitat, which gives a concrete account of the protection relationship in question: "The ḥalqa cavalry go with their horses to where the inhabitants of the *iqtā'* are, and the muqqadam al-ḥalqa, commanders of ten, also go there. When the cavalrymen are assembled round the muqqadam al-ḥalqa, seats are placed for a meal, and many eat meals at these tables (*simāt*). But so long as the full strength of the cavalrymen was not assembled, they could not take a meal"⁽¹⁴⁾. Thus the amir who had placed the *iqtā'* of the jund al-ḥalqa under the control of his *dīwān*, had the custom of taking meals with these cavalrymen, but even so it is said that the appearance of the jund al-ḥalqa was wretched and their clothes shabby⁽¹⁵⁾. It would therefore seem certain that the immediate reason for carrying out this survey was to improve the condition of the jund al-ḥalqa, and also to reorganize the *iqtā'* system which was the basis of the state.

But I think it somewhat inadequate to regard the abolition of *ḥimāya* as the sole object of the Ḥusāmī *rawk*. We should not forget that, apart this there was a greater object, namely to strengthen the basis of the sultan's power by means of mamluk soldiers. In Sulūk, after the account of the survey, the following is recorded:

"The amir Mankūtāmūr, the sultan's representative, was heavily fettered by the pressure of the amirs of Egypt and Syria. He thereupon sought to remove these amirs, and in their stead to raise the status of the sultan's mamluks. He went so far as to arrest the Egyptian amirs and remained under the sultan, next setting his hand to countermeasures against the Syrian amirs"⁽¹⁶⁾.

It may probably be said that this situation also existed in the same form before the survey, and that the sultan was in the necessity to remove

the existing amirs and consolidate his authority by means of his own mamluks. Whereas the part occupied by the *ajnad al-ḥalqa* in the armed forces was as great as ever⁽¹⁷⁾, the number and power of mamluk troops was gradually increasing at this time. For example, when the power of the *al-mamālik al-burjīya*, created by the sultan Qālāwūn, became great in 698, it is related that there was soon an accumulation of many protection rights (*ḥimāya*) under them⁽¹⁸⁾. Thus it became an urgent duty from the sultan's point of view to incorporate mamluks he had fostered and those of previous sultans in a structure, and thereby establish a mamluk regime in the true sense.

Thus the sultan Ḥusām al-Dīn Lājīn accepted a proposal of his Coptic financier (*mustawfī al-dawla*), Tāj al-Dīn al-Ṭawīl, and put the *rawk* of Egypt in hand. There are four views as to the date of the start of this: 1. 6 Jumādā I 697⁽¹⁹⁾; 2. 16 Jumādā I 697⁽²⁰⁾; 3. Rajab 697⁽²¹⁾; 4. Dhū al-Ḥijja 697⁽²²⁾. The first and third of these, handed down by Ibn Iyās and Nujūm, as well as the account of Ṣubḥ, are extremely brief records of the survey, while it would seem that in the fourth the date of the end of the survey appears in error for that of its start. I therefore think that, we may choose the second view, that of Sulūk, which is the most concrete surviving account of the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, and so conclude that the survey started in 16 Jumādā 697 (1 March 1298). No material can be found giving definite information as to the date of the enquiry, but in Sulūk it is recorded that the redistribution of the *iqṭā'*s began on the conclusion of the enquiry on the 8th day of Rajab⁽²³⁾. According to this, the enquiry itself was carried out in a short period amounting to less than fifty days; examination of the method of carrying out the survey may throw light on the reason for this. Thus the complete conclusion of the survey, after the redistribution of the *iqṭā'*s and also the change of the *kharāj* year from 697 to 698, took place in Dhū al-Ḥijja of this year (September—October 1298)⁽²⁴⁾.

Two amirs, Badr al-Dīn Baylīk al-Fārsī and Bahā' al-Dīn Qarāqūsh al-Zāhirī, were appointed responsible for the execution of the survey⁽²⁵⁾. Along with the secretaries (*kātib*) of the various departments and the financial officials, they mobilized the various local governors (*wālī*), and proceeded with the enquiry⁽²⁶⁾. Thus, under the direction of the two amirs, the whole of this survey was carried out by making use of central and regional governmental organizations. It is to be supposed that this method of operation was one reason for the short time in which the enquiry was concluded. By comparison with the next, the Nāṣirī *rawk*, the concrete contents of this survey are, unfortunately, not very clear. Let us quote the *Zubda* of Baybars al-Manṣūrī, where there is a relatively detailed account:

"[The sultan Ḥusām al-Dīn] al-Manṣūr and his representative, Mankūtamur, were unanimous in their views as to the *rawk* of the villages, transactions (*mu'āmalāt*) and the *iqṭā'*s, and the reform of its organization. Thereupon they mobilized the secretaries of the various departments (*dawāwīn*) and the financial officials, and orders were given to record the survey enquiry (*al-muqtarahāt al-rawkiya*), the examination of Egypt's real revenues (*irtifā'*), then the verification of the land registers (*qānūn*) and tax registers (*mukallafāt*) of the villages, together with their revenues (*mutahaṣṣilāt*) and the amounts of their transactions, as well as the totals of the revenues in cash and kind"⁽²⁷⁾.

In short, an enquiry was carried out with the object of examining the land and tax registers of each village, and so establishing the amount of the revenue and transactions of the villages. It may be said that these enquiries were essential for establishing the annual revenue (*'ibra*) of the *iqṭā'*⁽²⁸⁾. According to Nuwayrī, at the same time as this, "there were carried out measurements of the land (*misāḥa rawk*) of every village"⁽²⁹⁾. But it seems that in practice these enquiries were not uniformly carried out for villages throughout Egypt. The reason for this was that those responsible for the survey had been required to make a rapid enquiry, and so, "in some villages they really carried out enquiries, in others, they based themselves on conjecture"⁽³⁰⁾. It can probably be said that such an inadequate method of enquiry was another reason for the short time in which the enquiry was concluded. Anyway, the survey documents (*waraqā*) compiled in this way were sent to the central government, and on them were based decisions on the rate of land distribution, and the redistribution of the *iqṭā'*s.

B. Results of the survey.

The government examined the survey documents returned from all over the country, and started by deciding on the overall rate of land distribution. In *Khiṭaṭ* we find, "Under this survey, the sultan distributed 11 *qīrāṭ* (11/24) to the amirs and junds, and took 9 *qīrāṭ* (9/24) to apply to the *iqṭā'*s of the newly introduced troops. Subsequently the sultan obtained the consent of the amirs and junds to 10 *qīrāṭ* (10/24) and applied the remaining 1 *qīrāṭ* (1/24) to the troops who demanded an increase on the ground of the insufficiency of the *iqṭā'*"⁽³¹⁾. That is to say, the 11 *qīrāṭ* were given to the existing troops, and the 9 *qīrāṭ* were designated as the portion of the *iqṭā'* destined to the newly introduced troops, that is to say, the mamluks. The remaining 4 *qīrāṭ* not mentioned here were probably retained as the sultan's domain, just as before the survey.

However, there are two other accounts in *Nujūm* in regard to this distribution of land in Egypt. The first is that, after the distribution of 11 *qīrāṭ* to the amirs and junds, 1 *qīrāṭ* from among them was allotted

to troops whose *iqṭā'* revenue was small, but at this time the sultan Ḥusām and his *nā'ib*, Mankūtāmūr, were assassinated⁽³²⁾. The second is that, when 14 *qīrāṭ* had been distributed to the amirs and junds, and 4 *qīrāṭ* to the sultan, then 2 *qīrāṭ* to soldiers of small *iqṭā'* revenue, the sultan was assassinated⁽³³⁾. The truth is, however, that the decision on the distribution of Egyptian land and the redistribution of the authorizations of assignment (*mithāl*) took place in Rajab 697, while the successive assassinations of the sultan Ḥusām and Mankūtāmūr took place after the beginning of 698⁽³⁴⁾. In fact, the two accounts given by Nujūm may both be regarded as giving chronologically confused versions of the facts. Further, Ibn Iyās says, "13 *qīrāṭ* were left for the sultan"⁽³⁵⁾, but this may well be regarded as the sum of the figures of 4 *qīrāṭ* for the sultan's domain and 9 *qīrāṭ* for the mamluks, given by Khiṭaṭ. From the foregoing considerations we may reach the following definite conclusions as to the land distribution based on the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, as given by Rabie or Holt⁽³⁶⁾:

- 4 *qīrāṭ*: sultan's domain⁽³⁷⁾
- 9 *qīrāṭ*: *iqṭā'* of the sultan's mamluks
- 10 *qīrāṭ*: *iqṭā'* of the amirs and junds
- 1 *qīrāṭ*: supplementary land for troops with small *iqṭā'* revenue

Before this survey, the sultan's domain had been 4 *qīrāṭ*, the junds had 10 *qīrāṭ* and the amirs 10 *qīrāṭ*⁽³⁸⁾; it is therefore clear, simply from a comparison of the land distribution, that the amirs and jund al-ḥalqa received a severe blow as a result of the survey.

At this time, then, the right of protection (*ḥimāya*) of the amir in respect of the jund al-ḥalqa, which was the direct cause of the survey, was abolished. At this point, Khiṭaṭ has the following to say:

"The sultan abolished this (*ḥimāya*), returned the *iqṭā'*s to the original holders, and placed it all outside the jurisdiction of the *dīwān al-amīr*. The first to establish the *dīwān al-amīr* was Sayf al-Dīn Mankūtāmūr, the *nā'ib al-saltāna*, but the sultan removed the *iqṭā'* there from its jurisdiction—it may be mentioned that the annual revenue of Mankūtāmūr, based on the *ḥimāya*, was 100,000 ardabb. Then the other amirs similarly had the *iqṭā'* under their right of protection removed from their own *iqṭā'*s, and the *ḥimāya* was thus completely abolished"⁽³⁹⁾.

Sulūk, too, gives a simplified account of this same matter⁽⁴⁰⁾. Again, Baybars al-Manṣūrī says, "The *iqṭā'* revenue of the jund was added to the revenues from their villages"⁽⁴¹⁾, and this may probably be taken to signify the abolition of the *ḥimāya*. In any case, we can probably take it that, simply in respect of the abolition of the *ḥimāya*, the Ḥusāmī *rawk*

carried through in accordance with the object of its expectation.

Thus the government, which had decided on the rates of land distribution and abolished the *ḥimāya*, proceeded on the 8th of Rajab (21 April 1298) to begin the distribution of the authorizations of assignment (*mithāl*). The order was the amirs on the first day, the *muqaddam al-ḥalqa* on the second day, then the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* on the third day⁽⁴²⁾. It is not clear when the turn of the sultan's mamluks for the *iqṭā'* allocation came, but, under the *Nāṣirī rawk*, their *iqṭā'*s were allocated after that of the *muqaddam al-ḥalqa*. Anyway, at this time, all the *iqṭā'* was allocated in a "complete (*darbastā*)" form⁽⁴³⁾. When the *iqṭā'* is described as *darbastā* at this time, the meaning is that all rights to levy taxes within the *iqṭā'* were allocated⁽⁴⁴⁾, but in this case the content of the meaning is somewhat different. The reason is that under the *Ḥusāmī rawk* the poll tax (*jawālī*) and property of heirless persons (*al-mawārith al-ḥashriya*) became the sultan's revenue, and at the same time *al-rizāq al-ahbāshīya* was also excluded from the *muqṭā'*s rights as *waqf* for the sake of mosques, preachers and the poor⁽⁴⁵⁾. In fact, even after the survey, various sorts of possessors of special rights, from the sultan down, were concerned in the *iqṭā'*, apart from the *muqṭā'*.

The *mithāl* allocations were thus concluded, but, as a result, according to Sulūk, "it was clear that they [the amirs and *muqaddams*] changed colour as a result of the smallness of the *iqṭā'* revenue (*'ibra*)"⁽⁴⁶⁾. And an almost identical account is given by *Nujūm*⁽⁴⁷⁾, where it emerges that the allocations of the *iqṭā'* to the amirs and *muqaddam al-ḥalqa* were not up to their expectations. And the situation was the same in respect of the *ajnād al-ḥalqa*. Some of them demanded of the sultan an increase of the *iqṭā'*, but it is said that *Mankūtamur* confirmed their discontent by throwing them into prison⁽⁴⁸⁾. What then was the extent of the actual diminution of *iqṭā'* revenue for the amirs and *junds* as a result of this survey? The *iqṭā'* revenue per head after the survey is tabulated by *Khiṭāṭ* and *Ḥusan* in the following '*ibra* table (1)⁽⁴⁹⁾:

'*ibra* table (1)

Rank	' <i>ibra</i> (dīnār jayshī)
amir of hundred	80,000—200,000
amir of ṭablkhāna	23,000— 30,000
amir of ten	7,000 or less
<i>muqaddam al-ḥalqa</i>	1,500 or less
mamlūk al-sulṭān	800— 1,000
<i>jund al-ḥalqa</i>	250— 1,000

There is no material now available giving concrete evidence as to the

iqṭā' revenue of the amir and muqaddam al-ḥalqa before the survey. It is therefore impossible to investigate the change in their *iqṭā'* revenue resulting from this survey, but there survives the following account in Sulūk in respect of the ajnād al-ḥalqa:

“The *iqṭā'* revenue [of the ajnād al-ḥalqa] was reduced by comparison with their income at the time of the sultan Qalāwūn. In the past their minimum had been 10,000 dirhams, and their maximum had been more than 30,000 dirhams, but in no time their maximum amounted to only 20,000 dirhams. Then under this survey the maximum *iqṭā'* revenue was fixed at 10,000 dirhams, and this was oppressive to the ajnād [al-ḥalqa]”⁽⁵⁰⁾.

On the other hand, Nujūm says that the *iqṭā'* revenue of the ajnād al-ḥalqa was held at 20,000 dirhams or less⁽⁵¹⁾. But according to the *'ibra* table (1), the *iqṭā'* income of the muqaddam al-ḥalqa was 1,500 dīnār jayshī or less, that is, 15,000 dirhams or less; so it would probably be right to suppose that the *iqṭā'* revenue of the ajnād al-ḥalqa, of rank inferior to the former, was not 20,000 dirhams or less, but 10,000 dirhams or less. This means, in fact, that, under the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, the maximum *iqṭā'* income of the ajnād al-ḥalqa was reduced by half, from 20,000 dirhams to 10,000 dirhams⁽⁵²⁾.

We can doubtless easily read into this the government's intention to raise the status of the sultan's mamluks by sacrificing the ajnād al-ḥalqa. This was the first step in the decline of the ajnād al-ḥalqa, becoming even more evident after the Nāṣirī *rawk*⁽⁵³⁾. And it is certain that, even in the case of the amirs and muqaddam al-ḥalqa, not only was the *ḥimāya*, which had been one of their sources of revenue, seized from them, but the *iqṭā'* allocation was not made according to their expectations. Thus the distribution of the *iqṭā'* was enough instantly to arouse in the amirs and ḥalqa a feeling of lack of confidence in the government. Moreover, Mankūtamur, who was the most senior person responsible for the survey, made use of his special prerogative to lay hands on a vast amount of *iqṭā'*⁽⁵⁴⁾, and the reaction against the government was thereby strengthened. And so, on Rabī II in 698 (January 1299), the sultan Ḥusām and Mankūtamur were assassinated by soldiers grouped round the amir Qibjaq, who was the *nā'ib* Dimashq, and Sayf al-Dīn Kurjī, who was the muqaddam al-mamālik al-burjīya⁽⁵⁵⁾. I will not go into the details of the assassinations, but it is necessary for us to give attention to the participation of such mamluk troops, previously created by the sultan, as al-mamālik al-manṣūriya and al-mamālik al-ashrafiya. These mamluk troops remained an effective military body, even after the death of the sultan, though some of them were killed and exiled. So it was impossible for the sultan to establish and

maintain a unified authority if he ignored them. Accordingly, on the occasion of the following Nāṣirī *rawk*, the most important question was somehow to place these mamluk troops within the *iqtā'* system.

II. Al-Rawk al-Nāsirī

Al-Nāṣir Muhammad b. Qalāwūn three times ascended the sultan's throne in Cario (693-4/1293-4, 698-708/1298-1308, 709-741/1309-41). Nāṣir, who ascended the throne at a time when the power of the Mamluk dynasty was firmly established, concentrated his efforts on domestic administration, and, by the settlement of the internal economy of the country, the power structure of the mamluks was established. The Nāṣirī *rawk*, which began in 713, was carried out four times. The dates and regions of the surveys may be tabulated as follows:

- (1) 713 (1313-14) Shām
- (2) 715 (1315-16) Miṣr
- (3) 717 (1317) Ṭarābulus
- (4) 725 (1325) Ḥalab

These are generally referred to collectively as the Nāṣir's survey (*al-Rawk al-Nāṣirī*). I propose below first to set out the circumstances of each *rawk*, and then to examine in order the object and result of the surveys.

A. The circumstances of the Nāṣirī *rawk*.

(1) The *rawk* of 713.

We have no certain information as to the month of 713 in which this survey started. However, the despatch of amir Sanjar al-Jāwalī, the *nā'ib* Ghazza, to Damascus on account of the survey was in the month of Dhū al-Ḥizza of 712 (April 1313)⁽⁵⁶⁾; and the journey to Cairo of Mu'in al-Dīn Habba Allāh, who was head of the Syrian department of military affairs (*nāṣir al-jaysh bil-Shām*) on completion of his enquiries in Damascus was in the month of Ramaḍān in 713 (January 1314)⁽⁵⁷⁾. Judging from these facts, the Syrian survey would have been carried out from the latter half of 1313 to the beginning of 1314. If we next look into who was responsible for the survey, we find that the most senior person appointed was not amir Tankiz, the *nā'ib* al-Shām, but Sanjar al-Jāwalī, the *nā'ib* Ghazza, mentioned above. The definite reason for making this choice is not known, but it may well be that, since this survey was centred on Damascus, the government may have wished to avoid having a local person directly involved in it. Anyway, for this *rawk*, the officials of the departments of military affairs of Egypt and Syria (*mubāshirūn*) as well as all the troops of Shām and Ghazza were mobilized under the leadership of

Sanjar and the other amirs⁽⁵⁸⁾.

In all the material we find, "the survey of al-bilād al-shāmīya was carried out"⁽⁵⁹⁾. But in fact this was not a *rawk* embracing the whole of Syria, from Ghazza in the south to Aleppo in the north. According to Nuwayrī, who lived at the time of the survey, "[sultan Nāṣir] ordered inspection of the villages of Syria, that is to say, Dimashq and its surrounding country, and the regions of Ḥims, Ba'lbakk, Ghazza and Ṣafad"⁽⁶⁰⁾. Again, in Nujūm, there is, "the sultan carried out a survey in Dimashq"⁽⁶¹⁾, and also in Ta'rīkh Bayrūt there is, "'Alā' al-Dīn Ma'bad carried out a survey in the Ṣaydā and Bayrūt regions"⁽⁶²⁾. From these descriptions it appears that the principal towns of northern Syria and the villages in the surrounding regions were not included in the area covered by the survey. The fact that, as will be recounted below, surveys were carried out of the region of Tripoli in 717 and that of Aleppo in 725 may be imputed to their having been excluded from the scope of the survey under consideration at this time.

The survey documents composed at the time of the Ḥusāmī *rawk* and the Nāṣirī *rawk* have not been found to survive even fragmentarily up to the present day. It is consequently extremely difficult to know anything about the actual content of the investigations in the case of this survey, but let us introduce the account given by Sulūk:

"Until [Sanjar] al-Jāwalī, having gone to Damascus, had drawn up the documents, for every village, of the *'ibra* and *mutahaṣṣil*, the *iqṭā'* and *waqf* within the villages, as well as those of the *milk* (privately owned land), he remained there with the amir Tankiz, the *nā'ib*. When it was finished in the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja, the *kharāj* year changed from 712 to 713, and these documents were presented to the sultan"⁽⁶³⁾.

The *mutahaṣṣil* was the actual annual revenue made up of cash and kind, and the *'ibra* was the annual revenue expressed by the conversion of the former into dīnār jayshī⁽⁶⁴⁾. According to this account, the annual revenue was ascertained within village units, after which separate investigations were made into the *iqṭā'*, *waqf* and *milk* within the villages. According to Ibn Yahyā, the *iqṭā'* held by the old muqṭa' (*al-salaf*) had in practice become their own privately held land, and it was an object of this survey to investigate this and redistribute the *iqṭā'*s⁽⁶⁵⁾. The survey documents drawn up in the various localities of Syria were sent to the capital, Cairo, where the government issued new authorizations of assignment (*mithāl*) based on them. Quṭb al-Dīn Ibn Shaykh, who was appointed head of the department of military affairs, carried these authorizations to Damascus, and then assigned them to every soldier. I propose to go into

the result of the distribution of these *mithāls* later, and would at this point add that the opportunity of this survey was taken to abolish the miscellaneous taxes (*maks*). That is to say, there was total abolition in Syria of the prison tax (*muqarrar 'alā al-sujūn*), the bow-making tax (*muqarrar ḍamān al-qawwāsīn*), the corvées of peasants (*sukhra*), and the sugar-cane tax (*muqarrar al-aqṣāb*), together with the various miscellaneous taxes (*rusūm al-shādd wal-wilāya*) levied by the inspectors of official departments (*shādd*) and governors (*wālī*)⁽⁶⁶⁾. As regards the significance of this abolition, I propose to examine it when considering the abolition of miscellaneous taxes of 715.

(2) The *rawk* of 715.

The sultan Nāṣir, who had put in order the military structure of Syria through this survey and the redistribution of the *iqtā's* based on it, next proceeded to put in hand a survey of Egypt. This was the 17th year since the Ḥusāmī *rawk* which covered the same Egypt. Before the survey, the government sent amirs all over Egypt, and ordered that the irrigation dykes and watercourses be put in good order. This would seem to tell us that the survey on this occasion was carried out after thorough preparations. In fact, the Mamluk government used the occasion of this survey to carry through an important evolution in the *iqtā'* system.

In Sha'bān 715 (November 1315), the government divided Egypt into four regions, Gharbīya, Sharqīya, Manūfiya and Buḥayra, and Qibli (Upper Egypt), and into each region it sent people responsible for the survey⁽⁶⁷⁾. The names of these people are listed by Sulūk, and may be summarily shown as follows⁽⁶⁸⁾:

Gharbīya region:

amir Badr al-Dīn Jankalī, ḥājib Āqūl⁽⁶⁹⁾, kātib Makīn al-Dīn b. Qazwīna⁽⁷⁰⁾.

Sharqīya region:

amir 'Izz al-Dīn Aydamur, Aytamish al-Muḥammadi⁽⁷¹⁾.

Manūfiya and Buḥayra region:

amir Balabān al-Ṣarkhadī, al-Qalanjaqī⁽⁷²⁾ Ibn Ṭurunṭāy, Baybars al-Jumdār.

Qibli region:

al-Talīlī⁽⁷³⁾, al-Martīnī.

It is not recorded in this source whether al-Talīlī and al-Martīnī, who were sent to Upper Egypt, were soldiers with the title of amir. But it would probably be right to suppose that at least one of them sent to the different regions was an amir⁽⁷⁴⁾. Further, in addition to them in charge of the survey, there were sent from the government secretaries (*kātīb*), financial officials (*mustawfī*) and surveyors (*qayyās*) to deal with the actual

enquiries, the land measurement and the preparation of the account books⁽⁷⁵⁾. Moreover, it is related that the sultan himself proceeded to Upper Egypt to preside over the control of the amirs and the secretaries⁽⁷⁶⁾. Here too it may be said that there was an expression of the great interest attached by the government to this survey.

Thus, with the amirs principally in charge, this survey was begun all over Egypt. Let us look at the actual content of the investigations according to Khiṭaṭ:

“When those responsible for the *rawk* proceeded to the first district, they first summoned the village's *shaykh*, *dullā'*⁽⁷⁷⁾, notaries public (*'udūl*), magistrates (*guḍāt*) and surveyors (*qayyāsūn*), and then ordered that the registration certificates (*sijillāt*)⁽⁷⁸⁾ in the keeping of the *muqṭa'* be produced. Next they investigated the taxes of the village in cash and kind, the nature of the kind, the area of the land, sown and unsown separately, then the *bāq*, *barā'ib* and *khars* in the village, together with the *mustabḥar*⁽⁷⁹⁾. Then they also carried out an investigation of the *'ibra* of the district, and the tribute goods like as grain, fowls, goats, clover, dough, cakes and other items, to be presented to the *muqṭa'*. Once these had all been recorded, the survey (*qiyās*) of the district began, and they proceeded to carry out a complete land survey, with the notaries public, surveyors and magistrates. They then decided on each village's tax registers (*mukallafāt*) and land register (*qundāq*), as well as the sultan's domain, that of the amirs, the troops' *iqṭā'* and the profits of the *rizaq* in the village. Then they moved on to another area. They thus came back after 75 days. In the documents collected were recorded the circumstances of ploughed land, the *'ibra* of the land of all the villages in Egypt, together with the cash and kind, and the nature of the kind, levied on every village”⁽⁸⁰⁾.

Sulūk and Nujūm, too, give a generally similar account, though in a somewhat abbreviated form⁽⁸¹⁾. Summing the account given, we may analyse the content of the survey investigation as follows:

(1) An investigation to obtain the tax situation, hitherto based on the *sijillāt*. On this basis were ascertained the amount of tax for a village, its land area and kinds of cultivated land, together with the tribute goods to be paid to the *iqṭā'* holder (*muqṭa'*).

(2) Establishment of the tax registers and land registers based on the land survey, together with decision on the ownership of the land. On this basis were determined the sultan's domain, that of the amirs, the troops' *iqṭā'* and then the *rizaq* revenue.

The first thing to be noticed in the above investigation, compared with the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, is its generally extreme thoroughness. In the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, as has been said above, an investigation was carried out in order to ascertain the tax revenue for each village, and then, by a fresh, but a incomplete land survey, the *iqṭā'* revenue was established. The second special feature of the Nāṣirī *rawk* is that the types of tribute goods (*diyāfa*) to be presented by the peasants to the *muqṭa'* were itemized. This investigation of the *diyāfa* did not enter into the matter in the Ḥusāmī *rawk*. To ascertain what was the intention of the government in carrying out such an investigation of the *diyāfa* may be regarded as the first step towards understanding the basic character of the Nāṣirī *rawk*. On this point there is the following interesting account in Sulūk:

“[the sultan] added to the *'ibra* of each village the *diyāfa* for which the peasants (*fallāḥūn*) were assessed, and the *jawālī* (poll tax) of each village. Previously, until the *rawk*, an independent *dīwān*, attached to the sultan, had been set up for the *jawālī*. But at this time, the *jawālī* of each village was added to its *kharāj* (land tax) revenue”⁽⁸²⁾.

That is to say, to the *'ibra*, which had hitherto been calculated on the basis of the *kharāj*, were now added the *diyāfa* and *jawālī*. This may be said to have been a completely new method of calculating the *'ibra*, hitherto unknown under the *iqṭā'* system. There is no doubt that in the detailed investigation of the *diyāfa* in the survey of all Egypt, such a subsequent reformation was envisaged. Moreover, in the sense that as a result of this reformation, as will be explained later, the multifarious authorities which had to do with the *iqṭā'* so far were unified, a very great change was brought about in the *iqṭā'* system and indeed in the very structure of the Mamluk state.

After the survey had been carried out, the government abolished 29 kinds of miscellaneous taxes, starting with customs dues on cereals (*maks sāḥil al-ghalla*) and the tax levied on brokers' commissions (*niṣf al-samsara*)⁽⁸³⁾, after which it proceeded to decide on the general rate of distribution of arable land. That is to say, 10 *qīrāt* of the entire cultivated land of Egypt became the sultan's domain, and the *iqṭā'* destined to the mamālīk al-sulṭān was allocated therefrom. Then the portion of the *iqṭā'* destined to the amirs and ajnād al-ḥalqa was fixed out of the remaining 14 *qīrāt*⁽⁸⁴⁾. The sultan's domain and the *iqṭā'*s for mamluks totalled 13 *qīrāt* under the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, so that on the occasion of this survey it was reduced by 3 *qīrāt*. I propose to discuss later the influence this had on the *iqṭā'* allocated to each soldier, and the results. In any case, the survey was completely finished, with the final distribution of about 200 authorizations

(*mithālāt*) at the end of Maḥarram 716 (April 1316)⁽⁸⁵⁾.

(3) The *rawk* of 717.

As has already been pointed out, the survey of 713 did not in fact cover the whole of Syria, but the central and southern regions, omitting the northern part. *Rawk* were carried out in 717 in respect of the Tripoli region, and in 725 in respect of the Aleppo region, which were omitted on this occasion. At present there is no study to be found of what has so far been ascertained as to the execution of these two surveys or of statements as to their actual content⁽⁸⁶⁾. I will now try to give an account of the circumstances of these two surveys, while bearing in mind the *rawk* of 713.

First, the *rawk* of Tripoli; Sharf al-Dīn Ya'qūb, who was chief of the department of military affairs of Aleppo (*nāzir Ḥalab*), was made responsible for this *rawk*⁽⁸⁷⁾. Ya'qūb alternated several times between being chief of the department of military affairs of Tripoli and of Aleppo⁽⁸⁸⁾, but, at the time of this survey, he was chief of the department of military affairs of Aleppo. It may be conjectured that, as in the case of the survey of 713, the chief of the department of military affairs of Aleppo was chosen for the survey of the Tripoli region in order to avoid unfairness on the part of a local chief official.

The paucity of materials makes it very difficult to ascertain the actual content of the investigations, but in a general way, "a *rawk* was carried out of the Tripoli region (al-Mamlaka al-Ṭarābulusiya), the surrounding areas and strongholds, and the limitrophe zones"⁽⁸⁹⁾. There is no doubt that on this occasion, as in the surveys of 713 and 715, investigations of the 'ibra revenue to be levied on the villages of Tripoli and its surrounding country were carried out. This is because "as a result of this *rawk* the *iqtā's* were secured for six commanders of 40, three commanders of 10, as well as Bahrī mamlūks and ajnād al-ḥalqa of 50 men"⁽⁹⁰⁾. Thus, when the investigations were concluded, the survey documents (*awraq al-rawk*) were sent to Cairo, and on the basis of them the government" began to decide on the distribution of the *iqtā's* and the sultan's domain, to apportion financial resources for the maintenance of fortresses, as well as to calculate the outgoings of the area in question"⁽⁹¹⁾. With the conclusion of these operations in Ramaḍān (November 1317), *kharāj* year was changed, according to custom, from 716 to 717. And, in the case of this Tripoli survey also, various taxes, amounting to an annual sum of 110,000 dirhams, starting with the fowl tax and the prison tax, were abolished⁽⁹²⁾.

(4) The *rawk* of 725.

The survey of the Aleppo region in northern Syria began in Jumādā II 725 (August 1325)⁽⁹³⁾. For this *rawk*, too, material is scarce and it is very difficult to ascertain the actual content of the investigations. Accord-

ing to Sulūk, those responsible for this survey were Mughultāy al-Jamālī, commander of 10, and Makīn al-Dīn b. Qarūyana, a financial official⁽⁹⁴⁾. Mughultāy was a mamluk of the sultan and, at the time of this survey, held simultaneously the offices of *ustādār* and *wazīr*⁽⁹⁵⁾. Makīn al-Dīn had been a secretary responsible for the survey in the Gharbīya region at the time of the survey of 715, and was probably employed again for the Aleppo survey on the strength of that experience. We are told that they, accompanied by secretarial officials, proceeded to Aleppo and carried out investigations of the fortresses and the revenues there⁽⁹⁶⁾. No further details are known of the content of their investigations, but I would like to draw attention to the fact that "they carried out the Aleppo *rawk* by the same methods as in Syria"⁽⁹⁷⁾. This is because we can conjecture, at least in respect of the Syrian region, that the same methods were used for the three surveys. This question will arise again when we examine the nature of the surveys.

As Ibn Iyās says⁽⁹⁸⁾, the *rawk* of Aleppo concluded all the Nāṣirī *rawk* conducted over the principal regions under the Mamluk rule. Over ten years were needed from the Syrian *rawk* of 713. However, records survive to the effect that two more surveys were carried under Mamluk rule⁽⁹⁹⁾, after the Nāṣirī *rawk*. But we may suppose that these were not surveys on the scale of the Nāṣirī *rawk* and that they brought about no fundamental change in the nature of the *iqtā'*s.

B. The causes of surveys and their basic principles.

It may be said that the basic structure of the Mamluk state consisted in the mamluk regime with the sultan as its summit, and the *iqtā'* system, which constituted the social and economic basis. Consequently, in order to bring out here the causes and basic principles of the Nāṣirī *rawk*, I propose first to look into the mamluk regime, and then to examine the interior structure of the *iqtā'* system. The "mamluk regime" is a general term to cover the organization of political power in the Mamluk state, but here I would like to define it as "an organization in which troops of mamluk origin occupy the pivotal position in the state, and in which they control, through their holding of the *iqtā'*s, the agricultural communities and the cities."

The sultan purchased mamluks through slave-traders, placed them in a military school (*ṭabaqa*) where they were given religious instruction and military training, after which they were released from their slave status and incorporated in the army units directly subordinate to him⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. On graduation from the military school, the mamluks were given such weapons as bows and swords, and at the same time a certificate of release from

slave status (*'itāqa*), and then they were allocated *iqṭā'*s from the sultan's domain. From this relationship between the sultan and the mamluks, D. Ayalon extracts the next two points⁽¹⁰¹⁾. The first is the mamluks' feeling of loyalty to the sultan as their purchaser, their instructor, their liberator from slave status, and, finally, the donor of the *iqṭā'*s. The second is the strong feeling between the mamluks of comradeship (*khushdāshīya*) in belonging to the same group as a result of having been given instruction in the same school and serving the same master. This feeling of loyalty to the sultan and the mamluks' consciousness of mutual comradeship resulted in the mamluk military units maintaining an incomparable esprit de corps.

However, it may perhaps go without saying that the creation of such a mamluk regime was not simultaneous with the creation of the Mamluk dynasty. If we are to speak of the mamluk regime having been created, we must recognize that it involved the extension of the political and social power of the mamluks as holders of the *iqṭā'*, in the stead of the fallen *ajnād al-ḥalqa*, and thus the establishment of control of the agricultural communities and the cities by the mamluks. As has already been said, as a result of the *Ḥusāmī rawk*, the *iqṭā'* revenue of the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* was sharply reduced, and their military status began to fall down gradually. The reason adduced for this is that, generally, in point of military prowess they were inferior to the mamluks. That is to say, the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* may be held to have been lacking in the consciousness of comradeship and feeling of loyalty attributed above to the mamluks⁽¹⁰²⁾. Even so, behind such direct causes, as was pointed out in the course of the analysis of the *Ḥusāmī rawk*, importance must be attached to the following clear intention of the government in addressing itself to carrying out the survey. That is to say, because the power of the amirs was in the course of becoming a power in opposition to the government, the sultan intended to change the basis of his authority to the mamluks he had purchased. It may be said that the gradual extension of the political and social standing of the mamluks, by maintaining such a policy, and their consequent economic stabilization through the grant of the *iqṭā'*s to them, were, for the Mamluk sultan of the time, absolutely indispensable measures. In fact, even if we look at the reasons for the *Nāṣirī rawk* given by contemporary historians, it was somehow to increase the *iqṭā'* revenue of the mamluks. For example, we find the following in *Sulūk*:

“The reason for this survey was as follows. The sultan planned to increase the *akhbāz* (that is, the *iqṭā'*s) of the *mamālīk* who were the retainers of Baybars al-Jāshankīr and *al-nā'ib* Sallar, and of the surviving *al-mamālīk al-burjīya*. That is to say, this was because one *iqṭā'* was between an annual revenue of 1,000 *mithqāl* (1,000 *dīnār*)⁽¹⁰³⁾ and 800 *mithqāl*, and the sultan was afraid of provoking riots by con-

fiscating their *khubz'*"⁽¹⁰⁴⁾.

Almost identical accounts are also given us by *Khiṭaṭ* and *Nujūm*⁽¹⁰⁵⁾. In short, the political and social power of the mamluks left over from the reign of the previous sultan was gradually increasing, and the sultan could not establish and maintain his own authority if he ignored them. From the above it may be concluded that the first reason for the *Nāṣirī rawk* was that, in order that the government should grant the *iqtā'*s to the mamluks, it was under the necessity to increase the number of *iqtā'*s. For the authority of the sultan it became absolutely necessary to carry out a policy whereby, through the grant of the *iqtā'*s, the mamluks should be situated within the state organization, in other words, that, in the true sense, the mamluk regime be established.

Even so, an increase in land by means of the survey was not alone sufficient for the establishment of the mamluk regime; it was necessary that there be a fundamental reformation in the complicated power relationships connected with the *iqtā'*. The reason was that it was otherwise difficult to bring about an increase in the tax revenue of a given region, and therefore impossible to ensure an adequate *iqtā'*s for the mamluks. However, according to *Qalqashandī*, in general, the *iqtā'* of the amir in the time of the Mamluk dynasty was 1–10 villages, that of the sultan's mamluks one village or a half, while that of the *jund al-ḥalqa* was made up of part of a village⁽¹⁰⁶⁾. Further, the amir held multiple *iqtā'*s, and in quite a number of cases these were dispersed over a number of different places⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. This being so, in many cases, how could the *muqṭa'*, to whom were granted such village units of *iqtā'*, exercise their rights in respect of it before the *Nāṣirī rawk*? In order to examine this question, let us here consider the facts of the right to levy taxes within the *iqtā'*.

The principal rights possessed by the *muqṭa'* were the revenues from the land tax (*kharāj*) and the livestock tax (*marā'i*) as shown in the *'ibra*⁽¹⁰⁸⁾. And, as *Qalqashandī* too defines the *iqtā'* as, "the distribution of the *kharāj* land"⁽¹⁰⁹⁾, one may say that the basis was in fact the *kharāj*. As will be shown later, the *'ibra* expressed in *dīnār jayshī* units was not necessarily the same as the actual revenue, but in Upper Egypt and Syria, in the first half of the Mamluk period, taxes in kind were levied, and the rates were from 2–3 *ardabb* per *faddān*, according to the classification of wheat or barley. In Lower Egypt cash collection was already in operation, and the levy was at the rate of 30–40 dirhams per *faddān* according to the classification of the lands⁽¹¹⁰⁾.

The second right held by the *muqṭa'* was that of levying the *diyāfa*. The *diyāfa* meant tribute goods presented to the *muqṭa'* by the peasants at irregular intervals, and it did not originally include cash. But it seems that, in practice, there were cases in which cash was paid in lieu of

kind⁽¹¹¹⁾. As has already been said in the account of the circumstances of the Nāṣirī *rawk*, this *diyāfa* consisted of fowls, goats, clover, dough, lentils, cakes and so on. Before the Nāṣirī *rawk*, this was not calculated in the *'ibra*.

The third right of the *muqṭa'* was that of levying forced labour (*sukhra*). For example, when, in 723 (1323), the amirs shared responsibility for given lengths, and undertook the construction of the *jizr*, "the amirs mobilized their peasants from various places," we are told⁽¹¹²⁾. Apart from this, there are accounts scattered in the sources, which show that, when canals were digged or put in order, the amirs requisitioned peasants within the *iqṭā'*⁽¹¹³⁾. However, we have no details about the rate of this forced labour, apart from the fact that, according to the rank of the amir, the *muqṭa'* had a specified duty to provide peasant labour for the state. No doubt labour was levied somewhat arbitrarily, according to the will of the *muqṭa'*.

Next, there is the poll tax (*jawālī*) levied from the *dhimmi*. As was said above, even before the Nāṣirī *rawk*, this was entirely devoted to the state treasury, and was levied by officials of the *dīwān al-jawālī*. However, on the occasion of the survey, this *jawālī* also was added into the *'ibra*, as a result of which the right to levy it became that of the *muqṭa'* instead of that of the officials.

How, then, were the miscellaneous taxes (*maks*) handled within the *iqṭā'*? Qalqashandī says that the *maks* levied from the *iqṭā'* became the revenue of the *muqṭa'* while the *maks* levied from the sultan's domain was the income of the government⁽¹¹⁴⁾. Even so there is some doubt whether, even before the Nāṣirī *rawk*, there existed in fact such a clear distinction in respect of the *maks* revenue. So, in order to examine this point, let us take up once more the *maks* abolished on the occasion of the survey. First, let us look at the cereal customs duty (*maks sāhil al-ghalla*): this was a miscellaneous tax levied at Būlāq port of call on all cereals collected from all over the country. While this revenue was a principal financial resource for the government, it was also distributed as *iqṭā'*s to 400 soldiers and a few amirs⁽¹¹⁵⁾. According to Maqrīzī, apart from this, there were also a number of *muqṭa'*s severally assigned for the governor's tax (*rusūm al-wilāya*), the tax on commercial goods (*muqarrar al-ḥawā'iṣ wal-bighāl*), the tax of prisons (*muqarrar al-sujūn*), the fowl tax (*muqarrar ṭarḥ al-farārīj*) and the tax of water-course tools (*mutawaffar al-jarārīf*)⁽¹¹⁶⁾.

From this it is clear that, at least before the Nāṣirī *rawk*, the government's rights or those of the *muqṭa'*s, who received the revenue as *iqṭā'*, were involved in a number of miscellaneous taxes. Again there remained such miscellaneous taxes as those on brokers' commissions (*niṣf al-samsara*), commercial goods, prisons, fowls, transit (*muqarrar al-fursān*), slaves (*shadd al-zu'amā'*), watercourse tools, houses (*muqarrar al-buyūt*), those levied on

military commanders and diplomats (*muqarrar 'alā al-muqaddamīn wal-rusul*) or on salts (*damān al-milḥ*), which were levied by government officials throughout the country, irrespective of whether the land was the sultan's domain or *iqtā'*⁽¹¹⁷⁾. So it should be clear that there existed a large number of *maksēs* which do not agree with the description given by Qal-qashandī, mentioned above. Also in the Syrian *rawk* of 713, as in Egypt, a large number of *maksēs*, levied by inspectors or secretaries of government departments, were abolished. From all this we may conclude that, in fact, there existed three cases of *maksēs* levied for the *iqtā'*: where they became the revenue of the *muqṭa'*, or the revenue of the government, or allocated to another soldier as *iqtā'*.

It has emerged from the foregoing examination that, setting aside a few *iqtā'*'s *darbastā*, in the ordinary *iqtā'* there were not only the rights of the *muqṭa'*, but a complicated combination of poll tax or the various kinds of miscellaneous taxes, levied as the sultan's, and then the second *muqṭa'*'s right to revenue from these miscellaneous taxes. As a result of this complex intermingling of various rights within the *iqtā'*, it may be said that the people were subjected to cruel depredations, and as a consequence they contract loans for large sums and fell into a situation of a kind of bankruptcy⁽¹¹⁸⁾. To put order into the system of distribution centred on the mamluks, an increase in the number of the *iqtā'*'s and a procedure for making the *iqtā'* allocation functional were necessary. And there was also the requirement that the amount of revenue shown in the *mithāl* be definitely obtained. For the simultaneous solution of these problems confronting the government, it was necessary that order be brought into the complicated relationships of the rights connected with the *iqtā'*, and that all the rights to levy the *kharāj*, *jawālī*, *diyāfa* and so on, be placed under the *muqṭa'* alone. Also, by this means it should have become possible to obtain the *'ibra* as before from the smaller *iqtā'*. We may thus probably conclude that the basic principles of the execution of the Nāṣirī *rawk* were to bring order into the complicated rights within the *iqtā'*, in fact to unify the control of the *iqtā'*'s.

Rabie lists four objects of the Nāṣirī *rawk*: (a) establishing the revenue from each kind of tax by investigations on the fields; (b) abolition of taxes allocated as *iqtā'*; (c) abolition or reduction of the large *iqtā'*'s; (d) increase of the sultan's domain⁽¹¹⁹⁾. But we should not, I think, forget the existence of the clear and, indeed, consistent intentions of the government, as outlined above, lying behind these objectives. If we compare the Ḥusāmī *rawk* and the Nāṣirī *rawk*, we find the character of the two surveys to coincide in point of basing the mamluks directly on the power of the sultan. But we can find important differences between the two surveys in that, whereas the first object of the Ḥusāmī *rawk* was the abolition

of the protective relationship between the amir and jund, that of the Nāṣirī *rawk* was the unification of control of the *iqṭā'*.

C. Evolution of the *iqṭā'* system.

In the case of the Nāṣirī *rawk*, as in that of the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, the authorizations of assignment (*mithāl*) were distributed to each soldier on conclusion of the investigations in each case. Taking the survey of 715 as example, this distribution was made to the amirs, muqaddam al-ḥalqa, mamālīk al-sultān and ajnād al-ḥalqa, in that order⁽¹²⁰⁾. After the sultan had ascertained the name, birthplace, race and date of arrival in Egypt of each soldier, it was, "Just as God made His distribution, he allocated the *mithāl* with his own hand without further special consideration"⁽¹²¹⁾. That is to say, no consideration was given by the sultan to the connection between the location of the *iqṭā'* granted and the *muqṭā'*. This principle ran through the Syrian *rawk* too, and we are told that Quṭb al-Dīn Ibn Shaykh, who was the *nāẓir al-jaysh*, drew the *mithāls* from under a cloth, and handed them over without reading them, one by one⁽¹²²⁾. This would seem to have been a measure negating the local character of the *muqṭā'* and making the alternation of the *iqṭā'* free.

After the conclusion of the *rawk* of 715, the value of the *'ibra* was fixed in detail in accordance with the ranks or appointments of the soldiers. This is displayed in tabulated form in *'ibra* table (2)⁽¹²³⁾. Before examining this table we must first explain the units of the *'ibra* there used, dīnār jayshī. This is because the way in which these dīnār jayshī are explained is connected essentially with the way in which we may apprehend the basic character of the *iqṭā'* system. The crucial question is how to interpret the fact that the rate of exchange from dīnār jayshī to dirhams differed according to the soldier's rank (see *'ibra* table (2)). H. A. R. Gibb mentions the dīnār jundī, which was the unit of *iqṭā'* revenue in the time of the Ayyūbid dynasty, pointing out that the rate of conversion from dīnār jundī into kind or cash (dirham) varied according to the rank of the soldier, but he maintains that this was for a different reason, which is unknown⁽¹²⁴⁾. Cahen, too, quoting the same sources as Gibb, mentions the *iqṭā'* revenue under the Ayyūbid dynasty, but he passes over the reason in silence⁽¹²⁵⁾. For Poliak, too, the reason for such differing values of the dīnār jayshī is inexplicable, but he conjectures that the reason for the value of the dīnār jayshī being low in the case of the *wālī* was that he hoped to make use of his political position to make a profit⁽¹²⁶⁾. Again, Rabie also takes up this question, and he says that the value of the dīnār jayshī was always changing according to fluctuations in the value of gold or cereals, but he leaves the matter without explanation of the question why the value of the dīnār jayshī of the *iqṭā'* varied in the cases of specific

'ibra table (2)

Military Rank	dīnār jayshī per man	dirham dīnār jayshī	dirham	outgoings (dirham)	outgoings revenue (%)	true revenue (dirham)
amīr of hundred						
(a) khāṣṣakiya	100,000	10	1,000,000	100,000	10.0	900,000
(b) kharjīya	85,000	10	850,000	70,000	8.2	780,000
nā'ib	100,000	10	1,000,000	100,000	10.0	900,000
wazīr	100,000	10	1,000,000	100,000	10.0	900,000
amīr of ṭablkhāna						
(a) khāṣṣakiya	40,000	10	400,000	35,000	8.8	365,000
(b) kharjīya	30,000	8	240,000	24,000	10.0	216,000
kāshif	20,000	8	160,000	15,000	9.4	145,000
wālī	15,000	8	170,000	10,000	8.3	110,000
amīr of ten						
(a) khāṣṣakiya	10,000	10	100,000	7,000	7.0	93,000
(b) kharjīya	7,000	10	70,000	5,000	7.1	65,000
wālī	5,000	7	35,000	3,000	8.6	32,000
muqaddam mamālik al- sultān.	1,200	10	12,000	1,000	8.3	11,000
muqaddam al-ḥalqa	1,000	9	9,000	900	10.0	8,100
naqīb alf	400	9	3,600	400	11.1	3,200
mamlūk al-sultān of 400 men	1,500	10	15,000			
mamlūk al-sultān of 500 men	1,300	10	13,000			
mamlūk al-sultān of 500 men	1,200	10	12,000			
mamlūk al-sultān of 600 men	1,000	10	10,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1500 cavalry	900	10	9,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1350 cavalry	800	10	8,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1350 cavalry	700	10	7,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1300 cavalry	600	10	6,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1300 cavalry	500	10	5,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1100 cavalry	400	10	4,000			
jund al-ḥalqa of 1320 cavalry	300	10	3,000			

soldiers⁽¹²⁷⁾.

It must therefore be said that up to now no adequate explanation of the *dīnār jayshī* has been produced. In order to study this question, let us first see what is said by one of the encyclopaedists of the time, Qalqashandī. His account may be summed up in the following two points⁽¹²⁸⁾:

(1) The *dīnār jayshī* were adopted as the units for expressing the '*ibra* of the *iqṭā'*, and, before the conversion rate differed according to the ranks of the soldiers, it differed already according to the *iqṭā'*.

(2) In the past, 1 *dīnār jayshī* had been 13 1/3 dirhams, but, with the passage of time, the value changed, and the '*ibra* expressed in *dīnār jayshī* came not necessarily to correspond with the size of the *iqṭā'*.

That is to say, as the result of the allocation of the *iqṭā'* of which the '*ibra* was not proportional to the real revenue, it was to be expected that differences between soldiers in the value of the *dīnār jayshī* would begin to arise. Let us next examine the actual manner of computing the '*ibra*. According to *Khiṭaṭ*, wheat was reckoned at 20 dirhams per *ardabb*, and other cereals at 10 dirhams, then the '*ibra* was reckoned at the rate of 1 *dīnār jayshī* to 10 dirhams⁽¹²⁹⁾. Unfortunately we do not know the conversion rate of *diyāfa*, apart from cereals, such as fowls or clover, which were reckoned in the '*ibra* after the *Nāṣirī rawk*. However, it seems clear from the above considerations that, in the course of converting from dirhams to *dīnār jayshī* in respect of the *iqṭā'*, conversions were made at the rate of 9 dirhams or 8 dirhams per *dīnār jayshī* in order to increase the apparent '*ibra*. So those who were allocated *iqṭā'*, estimated above the real revenue, that is to say, *iqṭā'* under bad conditions, were like commanders of 40 or *muqaddam al-ḥalqa* in group (b).

It is clear from '*ibra* table (2) that about 10% of the *iqṭā'* revenue of each amir was deducted as outgoings (*kalaf*). What would this mean? After telling us that *jawālī* and *diyāfa* were added to the calculation of the '*ibra* at the *Nāṣirī rawk*, *Maqrīzī* says, "He [the sultan] wrote the *mithāls* for the soldiers according to this regulation, and added there the costs of transporting cereals (*kalaf ḥiml al-ghalāl*) to the river at Cairo from elsewhere, and the customs dues (*maks*) levied on them"⁽¹³⁰⁾. According to this, there is no doubt that "outgoings" in the '*ibra* table additionally included the transport costs of grains levied as kind and the customs dues assessed on them⁽¹³¹⁾. We do not know what percentage of the '*ibra* the customs dues and transport costs respectively amounted to, but it is important that for the *muqṭa'* these outgoings had previously been reckoned in the '*ibra*. According to such considerations as these, the reason was

the undoubted intention of the government to raise the nominal *'ibra*.

Let us next compare the *'ibra* table (1) following the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, and the *'ibra* table (2) following the Nāṣirī *rawk*. The minimum *iqṭā'* revenue for amirs of 100 rises from 8,000 dīnār jayshī to 8,500, but the maximum is halved from 200,000 dīnār jayshī to 100,000. Amirs of 40 and of 10, to whom were granted *iqṭā'* of higher *'ibra* than before, belonged to the al-khāṣṣakīya group, which we may suppose to have been the amirs who formed the sultan's bodyguard⁽¹³²⁾. Further, the *iqṭā'* of the ajnād al-ḥalqa, whose *'ibra* was limited to less than 1,000 dīnār jayshī after the Ḥusāmī *rawk*, was further reduced after the Nāṣirī *rawk*, when their *'ibra* was brought below 900 dīnār jayshī. Moreover, those ajnād al-ḥalqa who, by reason of age or disability, were judged unfit for military duties, were paid, on the occasion of this survey, an annual income of 3,000 dirhams instead of *iqṭā'*⁽¹³³⁾. On the other hand, the *'ibra* of the sultan's mamluks, which was 800–1,000 dīnār jayshī before the survey, increased sharply to 1,000–1,500 dīnār jayshī after the survey. Here too, we may say, the government's intention to make the mamluks the direct basis of the sultan's power emerges clearly.

As we learn from *'ibra* table (2), as a result of the Nāṣirī *rawk* and the accompanying changes, progress was made to rendering functional an allocation of the *iqṭā'*s corresponding to soldiers' ranks or to the offices of such persons as governors (*wālī*) or tax inspectors. Hereafter, allocation or alteration of the *iqṭā'*s by the sultan became easy to carry out, and this was a further step in strengthening the government's control over the *muṣṭā'*s.

The foregoing is an account of the results of the surveys as seen in the relationship between the sultan and the *iqṭā'* holders. I next propose to examine what sort of changes were brought about in the relationship between the *iqṭā'* holders and the peasants. As was said above, a basic principle of the operation of the Nāṣirī *rawk* was to bring order into the multifarious rights connected with a single *iqṭā'* and bring about uniformity. Acting on this principle, the government brought about a reformation in the taxation system by returning to the *muṣṭā'* all the rights to levy *kharāj*, *jawālī* and *diyāfa*, and it also proceeded to abolish as many as some dozen *maksēs*. This series of measures necessarily involved a withdrawal of the officials sent out all over the country. Khiṭāṭ continues his account of the abolition of the miscellaneous taxes as follows:

“[with the abolition of these], there was a withdrawal of officials (*mubāshirūn*) from all over the country. In the past there had been no village (*balad*), whether in Upper or Lower Egypt, whether large or small, in which there had been no secretary (*kātib*) or superintendent (*shādd*) or such. The sultan abolished these officials, and then

removed them from all districts apart from those villages where there was the government revenue"⁽¹³⁴⁾.

There is an almost identical account in Sulūk too, and Nujūm also gives an account which may be supposed to have been based on that of Sulūk⁽¹³⁵⁾. The officials sent out by the government were generally termed *mubāshir*, but this appellation in fact covered such persons as heads of regional departments (*nāzir*), secretaries, inspectors, tax collectors (*‘āmil*), notaries public, local controllers (*mutahaddith*) and substitutes (*ṣayrafī*)⁽¹³⁶⁾. On the occasion of the Nāširī *rawk*, these officials were removed from districts which provided no government revenue, that is to say, districts outside the sultan's domain. As a result of this, one may say that it became possible for the *muqṭa'* to control his own *iqṭā'* uniformly without the intervention of another authority. According to Nuwayrī, this meant that all the *iqṭā'* in Egypt became *iqṭā' darbastā*⁽¹³⁷⁾.

Then, was this reformation, whereby all the *iqṭā'* became *iqṭā' darbastā*, also put into operation in the same way in Syria? It has already been said that the *rawks* of Tripoli and Aleppo were basically of the same character as the Syrian *rawk* of 713. But it is not clear whether, in the case of the Syrian *rawk*, the *jawālī* and *diyāfa* were added into the *'ibra* in the same way as in the case of Egypt. But Nuwayrī says, in the course of his account of the Tripoli *rawk*, "the *diyāfa* in respect of hay (*hashish*) and salt (*milh*), over which, before the survey, there had not customarily been rights, now came to be levied from the farmers in the *iqṭā'* of the amir"⁽¹³⁸⁾. I believe this to be simply, in fact, a change aimed at bringing uniformity into the control of the *iqṭā'*. In fact, as a result of the *rawk* of 713, apart from *milh* (privately owned land) and *waqf*, *al-mawārith al-ḥashriya* (property of persons without heirs), Syrian territory was distributed as *iqṭā' darbastā*⁽¹³⁹⁾. Moreover, since *jawālī* was not included in the three items excepted at this time, it may be conjectured that the levying was allocated to the *muqṭa'* in the same way as in Egypt. One would therefore probably not be far wrong in concluding that changes were put into effect under the Syrian *rawk* in much the same way as in Egypt.

Anyway, as a result of the above unification of control of the *iqṭā'*, the right of levying the poll tax was transferred from the government to the *muqṭa'*s. As a result of this, the *dhimmī* of each village came to pay *jawālī* to the village *muqṭa'*. However, we are told that thereupon the *dhimmī*—most of them were the Copts in the case of Egypt—evaded this payment by moving from village to village⁽¹⁴⁰⁾. Since the *muqṭa'*'s *jawālī* revenue was thus reduced, the *muqṭa'*s everywhere, to prevent this, were obliged to improve the treatment of Egyptian Copts⁽¹⁴¹⁾. Even so, there is no doubt that it was very difficult for the *muqṭa'* anywhere independently and, indeed, completely to supervise and control their own *iqṭā'*s.

It is certain that the unification of the control of the *iqṭā'*, described above, did not immediately lead to the *muqṭa'* becoming independent. This is because the *muqṭa'*, who were primarily regarded as amir, had the duty of registering the number of soldiers under them with the *dīwān al-jaysh*, and they did not have the right to employ and dismiss these soldiers⁽¹⁴²⁾. Also, if we look into the question of whether the *iqṭā'* was hereditary or non-hereditary, no material can be found to show that, under the Mamluk rule, the right to the *iqṭā'* was invariably hereditary by law. But it does seem that in the case of Syria, as compared with Egypt, the *iqṭā's* were frequently inherited⁽¹⁴³⁾. Relatively speaking, however, it is to be supposed that both in Egypt and in Syria, the local character of the *muqṭa'* was weakened after the surveys, and that, as a result, the tendency for the right to the *iqṭā'* to be non-hereditary was further strengthened. This would seem to be endorsed by the frequent mentions, in material dealing with events subsequent to the Nāṣirī *rawk*, of changes of the *iqṭā'* due to transfer, death or loss of position. In spite of the unification of the *iqṭā'* as a result of the surveys, the existence of a state authority with centralized powers stood in the way of the independence of the *muqṭa'*, and the right of allocating or removing the *iqṭā's* was placed under the absolute power of the sultan in the form of his indivisible right to appoint or dismiss amirs or other soldiers.

As a result of the Nāṣirī *rawk*, then, as has already been said, the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* were placed in a conspicuously disadvantageous position in point of *iqṭā'* holding. However, as Ayalon says, the status of the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* was not lowered at a blow after the survey, nor was the preeminence of the mamluks confirmed⁽¹⁴⁴⁾. And also, as the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* of Syria held *iqṭā'* of higher 'ibra than those of Egypt⁽¹⁴⁵⁾, there was probably a certain amount of difference between their tendency in Syria and Egypt. But after the survey the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* found themselves in difficulty about the management of the *iqṭā's*; some of them made abolition (*nuzūl*) of it, and some of them were ruined by taking measures to traffic (*muqāyada*) in it⁽¹⁴⁶⁾. In particular, on the occasion of the great plague of 749 (1348), there was an increasing number of cases of ordinary people ('amma), such as officials or merchants, laying hands on the *iqṭā's* of *ajnād al-ḥalqa* who had died⁽¹⁴⁷⁾. It perhaps goes without saying that the course of this ruin of the *ajnād al-ḥalqa* was paralleled, in reverse, by that of the establishment of the preeminence of the mamluks, both in status within the army and in point of *iqṭā'* holding. These mamluks operated advantageous *iqṭā'* holdings, which they used as a basis on which gradually to strengthen their control of the agricultural communities. Through their *iqṭā'* holdings they levied taxes on the peasants, and, by concentrating in the cities what they received in kind, they brought the real economic power of the cities into their hands⁽¹⁴⁸⁾. It is probably at this point that first

took shape the mamluk regime as I defined it at the outset.

Finally, I will bring together some of the various changes which accompanied the surveys. I have already given an account of the most important, but the following were carried out in addition. The first was a change in the manner of dealing with farm seed (*taqāwī*). In past the *al-taqāwī al-sultānīya* was regarded as a concomitant of the *iqṭā'* holding. But on the occasion of the *rawk* of 715, this *taqāwī* was no longer confined to the various villages⁽¹⁴⁹⁾. However, this does not seem to have involved doing away with the distinction between *al-taqāwī al-sultānīya* and *al-taqāwī al-baladīya*. This is because the *al-taqāwīya al-baladīya* was "taqāwī for village cultivation," and so may be considered to have been customarily to have been supplied to the villages⁽¹⁵⁰⁾. The second is that uncollected money (*bawāqī*) before and up to the end of 714 was excused⁽¹⁵¹⁾. This was a benevolent measure, in line with the abolition of the *maksēs*; it was also decided, parallel with this, to levy the tax based on the lunar calendar (*al-māl al-hilālī*) from the month of Ṣafar of 716, and of the tax based on the solar calendar (*al-māl al-kharājī*) from the first one third of 715⁽¹⁵²⁾. The third was that, corresponding to the designation of districts of Jīza and Manfalūṭ as the sultan's domain, certain villages were designated for the sultan's retainers (*ḥāshīya*) and officials, while the prime minister (*wazīr*) was entitled to the revenue of such *maksēs* as had not been the object of the abolition⁽¹⁵³⁾. The fourth was that the land which had been purchased from the state treasury (*bayt al-māl*) was bought back again and allocated as *iqṭā'*s⁽¹⁵⁴⁾.

According to Maqrīzī, the new regime brought into being by these reformation persisted until the end of the rule of the house of Qalāwūn with the appearance on the scene of the sultan Barqūq in 784 (1382). And even thereafter, this regime is said to have continued until the many changes made as a result of the great disaster of 806 (1404-05)⁽¹⁵⁵⁾. Further, Qal-qashandī says that through these surveys was established the basis of the empire (*qā'ida al-mamlaka*), which continued up to the reign of the sultan Ashraf Sha'bān (764-778/1363-76)⁽¹⁵⁶⁾. However the case may be, in the sense that it brought about great changes in the construction of the *iqṭā'* system and prescribed the state structure for the middle of the Mamluk period, the Nāṣirī *rawk* may well be said to have very considerable historical significance.

NOTES

- (1) *Rawḍatayn*, II, 450; *Abū al-Fidā'*, III, 50; *Kāmil*, XI, 344, Cl. Cahen holds that the *iqṭā'* system was put into operation by Saladin in 1171 (L'évolution de l'iqṭā' du IX^e au XIII^e siècle, *Annales: ESC*, vol. 8, 1953, p. 45), but 564 (1169) may be considered correct.

- (2) Khiṭaṭ, I, 85, 95, 97.
- (3) D. Ayalon, Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army, II (*BSOAS*, vol. 15, 1953).
- (4) C.H. Becker, Steuerpacht und Lehenswesen, *Islamstudien*, I (Leipzig, 1924) pp. 245-246.
- (5) A.N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250-1900* (London, 1939), pp. 23-25.
- (6) 'Alī I. Hasan, *Dirāsāt fī Ta'rīkh al-Mamālik al-Bahrī* (Miṣr, 1948), pp. 332-337.
- (7) Ibrāhīm A. Ṭurkhān, *al-Nuzum al-Iqtā'īya fī Sharq al-Awṣat fī al-'Uṣūr al-Wstā* (al-Qāhira, 1968), pp. 91-114.
- (8) H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt* (London, 1972), pp. 52-56.
- (9) P.M. Holt, The Sultanate of al-Manṣūr Lāchīn (*BSOAS*, vol. 36, 1973), pp. 527-530.
- (10) Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 25; A.I. Ḥasan, *Dirāsāt*, p. 333; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 52. See also Rabie, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50 on the etymology of *rawk*.
- (11) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88. cf. Sulūk, I, 864-865.
- (12) Khiṭaṭ, I, 87. One also finds here, "in the case of a difficult *iqtā'* (*al-iqtā' al-thaqīl*) annual income, it went down to as far as 5,000 dirham," but to judge from the context, this may be regarded as an exceptional income.
- (13) Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 25.
- (14) Khiṭaṭ, I, 87-88.
- (15) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88. According to this account, "they were in a pitiful condition" was clearly the *ajnad al-ḥalqa*. So Rabie is wrong in writing that the survey was carried out in order to investigate the pitiful condition of the mamluks of amir" (*Financial System*, p. 52).
- (16) Sulūk, I, 852; Holt, al-Mansūr Lāchīn, pp. 526-528. Sayf al-Dīn Mankūtāmūr al-Ḥusāmī was a mamluk of sultan Ḥusām, and was appointed *nā'ib al-sulṭān* in the month of Dhū al-Qa'da of 696 (Sulūk, I, 826-827, 829).
- (17) Ayalon, Structure, II, pp. 449-451.
- (18) Sulūk, I, 875-876.
- (19) Ibn Iyās, I, 137; Nujūm, VIII, 90.
- (20) Sulūk, I, 743; Zetterstéén, 45.
- (21) Ṣubḥ, III, 432.
- (22) Nujūm, VIII, 92. Dawādārī simply says that it began in Jumādā I (Kunz al-Durar, VIII, 371).
- (23) Sulūk, I, 844.
- (24) Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 199^v; Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100. In order to correct the discrepancy between the solar and lunar calendar, it was customary to advance the solar calendar one year every 33 years by the hejira calendar. (Ṭurkhān, *al-Nuzum al-Iqtā'īya*, p. 106)
- (25) Sulūk, I, 841-843; Nujūm, VIII, 91; Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 199^r; Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100.
- (26) Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 198^v; Sulūk, I, 841-843. Among these officials was of course included Tāj al-Dīn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Ṭawīl, a financial official who had advocated this survey. He was a newly converted Copt, but was reputed for his secretarial knowledge and skill, and he is said to be trustworthy in what he said (Sulūk, I, 841-843; Nuwayrī, XXIX, vol. 100).
- (27) Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 198^v-199^v.
- (28) Ibn Taghrībīrdī also says, "The financial official, Tāj al-Ṭawīl ordered all the official department to draw up the documents concerning the 'ibra of the *iqtā'* of the amir and jund, and the land registers" (Nujūm, VIII, 92-93).
- (29) Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100.
- (30) Baybars al-Manṣūrī, fol. 199^r.
- (31) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88. In Sulūk only the same result is briefly stated, "10 *qīrāt* were apportioned to the amir and jund, while the 11th *qīrāt* were granted to those who suffered from too small a *khubz* (*iqtā'*) revenue." (I, 843-844)

- (32) Nujūm, VIII, 92.
- (33) Nujūm, VIII, 93.
- (34) Sulūk, I, 844, 856-859; Ibn Iyās, I, 138.
- (35) Ibn Iyās, I, 137.
- (36) Rabie, *Financial System*, P. 52; Holt, al-Manşūr Lāchīn, p. 528.
- (37) At this time the areas hitherto maintained as the sultan's domain were Jīza, Iţfīhiya, Manfalūt, Huww and al-Kawm al-Aḥmar (all in Upper Egypt), and Iskandariya and Dimyāt (both in Lower Egypt) (Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100; Sulūk, I, 843-844; Baybars al-Manşūrī, fol. 199^r; Nujūm, VIII, 94)
- (38) Khīṭaṭ, I, 88; Sulūk, I, 841; Nujūm, VIII, 920; Ibn Iyās, I, 137. cf. Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 28.
- (39) Khīṭaṭ, I, 88.
- (40) Sulūk, I, 865.
- (41) Baybars al-Manşūrī, fol. 199^r.
- (42) Sulūk, I, 844.
- (43) Sulūk, I, 844; Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100.
- (44) Şubḥ, XIII, 156; Ibn al-Furāt, VIII, 123; Sulūk, I, 770; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 43.
- (45) Sulūk, I, 844; Nuwayrī, XXIX, fol. 100; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 52. A.I. Ḥasan says that only the *jawālī* and *al-mawārith al-ḥashriya* were excluded (*Dirāsāt*, P. 344), but it would seem that *al-rizaq al-aḥbāsīya* should also be added to these.
- (46) Sulūk, I, 845.
- (47) Nujūm, VIII, 94.
- (48) Sulūk, I, 846; Nujūm, VIII, 95.
- (49) Khīṭaṭ, II, 216; Ḥusn, II, 83; Şubḥ, IV, 50-51; Sulūk, I, 846; II, 146. Cf. Poliak, Some Notes on the Feudal System of the Mamlūks (*JRAS*, 1937), p. 103. Poliak says in this article that the 'ibra table shows the general situation under the Mamlūks, but if we compare it with the 'ibra table after the Nāşirī *rawk*, it is clear that this shows the *iqṭā'* revenue before the Nāşirī *rawk*.
- (50) Sulūk, I, 846. cf. Khīṭaṭ, I, 88.
- (51) Nujūm, VIII, 94-95.
- (52) 'Alī I. Ḥasan and D. Ayalon, who indicate no authority, both say that the *iqṭā'* revenue of the jund al-ḥalqa after the survey was 20,000 dirham or less, but they probably based themselves on Nujūm's account, judged to be wrong at this point (*Dirāsāt*, p. 334; Ayalon, *Structure*, II, p. 452).
- (53) Sulūk, I, 846; Zetterstéen, 45; Ayalon, *Structure*, II, pp. 451-457; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 53.
- (54) Nuwayrī says, "The *iqṭā'* of the nā'ib al-sulṭān is Marj Banī Humaym and the surrounding villages in Qūş, and Samhūd and the surrounding villages, as well as the water-mills (*dawālīb*) and sugar-cane pressing factories (*mā'āşir*) in those districts, and then there are Haraja Madīna Qūş, and the revenue in cereals alone exceeds 110,000 ardabbs" (XXIX, fol. 100. Cf. Sulūk, I, 844; Baybars al-Manşūrī, fol. 199^r).
- (55) Abū al-Fidā', IV, 39-40; Sulūk, I, 855-856, 859; Ibn Iyās, I, 138; Kunz al-Durar, VIII, 376 ff.; Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, 611 ff.
- (56) Durar, II, 262-267.
- (57) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 289-290.
- (58) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 289-290; Sulūk, II, 127; Ibn Iyās, I, 158-159.
- (59) Sulūk, II, 127; Ibn Iyās, I, 158; Zetterstéen, 160-161.
- (60) Nuwayrī, XXIX, fols. 289-290.
- (61) Nujūm, IX, 36.
- (62) Ta'riḫ Bayrūt, 86.
- (63) Sulūk, II, 127.
- (64) Poliak says that the *mutaḥaşşil* was the *iqṭā'* revenue expressed in dirham which was

- the currency of the time (Some Notes, p. 99), but it should probably be regarded as the tax revenue in general, made up of cash and kind (Khiṭaṭ, I, 88; Sulūk, I, 844; Ṣubḥ, III, 438; Zubda, 14).
- (65) Ta'riḥ Bayrūt, 85-86.
- (66) Sulūk, II, 132-133.
- (67) Sulūk, II, 146-147; Khiṭaṭ, I, 88; Nuzha, fol. 80^v; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 299-300; Kunz al-Durar, IX, 286. There is also the view that the beginning of the survey was in the month of Shawwāl of 715 (Zetterstéen, 164), but I prefer here to accept the view that it was the month of Sha'bān. Also, Qalqashandī takes the year to be 716 (Ṣubḥ, III, 432) but this would seem to be wrong.
- (68) Sulūk, II, 146-147.
- (69) Khiṭaṭ has A'zal (I, 88).
- (70) Khiṭaṭ has al-Makīn b. Farwīta (I, 88).
- (71) Khiṭaṭ has Aytamush al-Majdī (I, 88).
- (72) Khiṭaṭ has al-Qalījī (I, 88).
- (73) Khiṭaṭ has al-Balilī (I, 88).
- (74) According to Nuwayrī, the sultan despatched one or several amirs into a single region (XXX, fol. 299).
- (75) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88.
- (76) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 299-300.
- (77) The *dalil* (pl. *dullā'*) was an official resident in a village, and it was his duty to compile the land registers and tax registers, and to determine the taxes on the peasants (Sulūk, II, 149, n. 3; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 160).
- (78) The *sijillāt* were also called *awraq al-sijillāt*, and on them were entered the peasant's name and the area of his cultivate land, copies being held in the office (*dīwān*) of the *muqṭa'* (Minhāj, fols. 99^r-99^v, 101^v; Ibn Mammātī, 237, 305; Nuwayrī, VIII, 250; Ṣubḥ, III, 458).
- (79) *bāq* was land suitable for the cultivation of wheat, and the year after the wheat crop, clover or beans were grown on it. *Khars* was uncultivated land, unsuitable for sowing; *mustabḥar* was low lying land from which the water did not drain until the end of the sowing season. Cf. Cl. Cahen, Contribution à l'étude des impôts dans l'Égypte Médiévale (*JESHO*, vol. 5, 1962), pp. 258-260.
- (80) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88.
- (81) Sulūk, II, 149; Nujūm, IX, 43.
- (82) Sulūk, II, 150. cf. Khiṭaṭ, I, 88; Nujūm, IX, 50.
- (83) Khiṭaṭ, I, 88-89; Sulūk, II, 150-152; Kunz al-Durar, IX, 286; Nujūm, IX, 44-48; Nuzha, fols. 80^r-81^r; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 320-321.
- (84) Khiṭaṭ, I, 90. At this time the regions regarded as the sultan's domain were Jīza, al-Kawm al-Aḥmar, Manfalūt, al-Marj, Khuṣūṣ and others.
- (85) Sulūk, II, 155; Ibn Abī al-Faḍā'il, 761-762.
- (86) Ṭurkhān, *al-Nuzum al-Iqtā'īya*, p. 101; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 53 n. 5.
- (87) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 363-364; Sulūk, II, 176.
- (88) Durar, V, 209-210.
- (89) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 363-364.
- (90) Sulūk, II, 176-177; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 363-364. According to these sources, the *muqṭa'*'s total was 59, but Khiṭaṭ says, "the sultan fixed on 60 cavalry" (II, 171).
- (91) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 363-364.
- (92) Sulūk, II, 177; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 363-364. Ibn Kathīr, XIV, 82.
- (93) Sulūk, II, 264. There is also the view that this survey was carried out in 724 (Ibn Iyās, I, 164), but here I prefer to accept the view of Sulūk, which definitely records the day.
- (94) Sulūk, II, 264.
- (95) Durar, V, 124.

- (96) Sulūk, II, 264.
- (97) Ibn Iyās, I, 164.
- (98) *ibid.*
- (99) Under the year 791, Ibn al-Furāt has, "the amir Yalbughā al-Nāširi ordered a *rawk* of every village, and again distributed *mithāls* to amirs who had become commanders of 1,000, of 40 and of 10" (IX, 109). Again, this same Ibn al-Furāt records under the year 798 that the sultan confiscated the *iqṭā's* of 3 amirs, and carried out a *rawk* (IX, 437).
- (100) D. Ayalon, *L'esclavage du Mamelouk* (Jerusalem, 1951). For the structure of the army under the Mamluk dynasty, see D. Ayalon, *Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army I-III (BSOAS, vols. XV-XVI, 1953-54)*.
- (101) Ayalon, *L'esclavage*, pp. 27-31.
- (102) See, for example, Ayalon, *Structure*, I, "al-Halqa".
- (103) In the time of Sultan Nāšir, 1 *mithqāl* was equal to 1 *dinār* (Şubḥ, III, 436-437; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 193).
- (104) Sulūk, II, 146.
- (105) Kḥiṭaṭ, I, 88; Nujūm, IX, 42. Nujūm also says that the *iqṭā'* of the mamluks varied between 1,000 and 300 *mithqāl*, but this would seem to be wrong.
- (106) Şubḥ, III, 453-454; Poliak, *Feudalism*, p. 19.
- (107) For example, Sulūk, I, 394; Sira al-Zāhir, 25; Ibn al-Furāt, VII, 228, VIII, 154; Nujūm, VIII, 80.
- (108) Kḥiṭaṭ, II, 218-219; Sulūk, II, 149-150; Şubḥ, IV, 50. Moreover, Rabie does not state clearly that the *kharāj* was an element of the *iqṭā'* revenue, but there is no doubt that the *kharāj* was central to the 'ibra. Cf. R. Irwin, *Iqṭā'* and the end of the crusaders states (P.M. Holt ed., *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades*, Warminster, 1977), p. 70.
- (109) Şubḥ, XIII, 104.
- (110) Şubḥ, III, 453-455; I. M. Lapidus, *The Grain Economy of the Mamlūk Egypt (JESHO, vol. 12, 1969)*, p. 3.
- (111) Nuwayrī, VIII, 245; Poliak, *Some Notes*, p. 106; A. I. Ḥasan, *Dirāsāt*, p. 335. Also, these tribute goods were called *diyāfa* in Egypt, but in Syria they were called *rasm al-ayād wal-khamis* (tax of feasts and Thursday) (Nuwayrī, VIII, 245).
- (112) Kḥiṭaṭ, II, 130, 166; Sulūk, II, 251; T. Sato, *Irrigation in Rural Egypt from the 12th to the 14th Centuries (ORIENT, vol. 8, 1972)*, pp. 86-87.
- (113) Sira al-Mansūr, 25-26; Sulūk, II, 111-113; Nujūm, IX, 217-218.
- (114) Şubḥ, III, 467.
- (115) Kḥiṭaṭ, I, 88.
- (116) Sulūk, II, 149-153; Kḥiṭaṭ, I, 89-90; Kunz al-Durar, IX, 286; Nujūm, IX, 44-48.
- (117) *ibid.*
- (118) Sulūk, II, 150.
- (119) Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 53.
- (120) Zetterstéén, 164; Sulūk, II, 154-157; Nujūm, IX, 51-53.
- (121) Kḥiṭaṭ, I, 90; Sulūk, II, 154.
- (122) Ta'riḥ Bayrūt, 90.
- (123) Kḥiṭaṭ, II, 218-219. cf. Poliak, *Some Notes*, p. 103.
- (124) H.A.R. Gibb, *Armies of Saladin (Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London, 1962)*, pp. 74-90.
- (125) Cahen, *L'évolution de l'iqṭā'*, pp. 45-48.
- (126) Poliak, *Some Notes*, p. 100.
- (127) Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 49.
- (128) Şubḥ, III, 438-439. cf. Ibn al-Jī'ān, 3.
- (129) Kḥiṭaṭ, II, 218.
- (130) Kḥiṭaṭ, I, 88. In fact, the government, instead of abolishing the *maks sāḥil al-ghalla*,

had previously added it into the *'ibra*.

- (131) Poliak, Some Notes, p. 103, n. 1.
- (132) cf. Ayalon, Structure, I, pp. 213-216.
- (133) Sulūk, II, 156; Khiṭaṭ, I, 90; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 54.
- (134) Khiṭaṭ, I, 89-90.
- (135) Sulūk, II, 153-154; Nujūm, IX, 48. The account of Sulūk which corresponds to that of Khiṭaṭ, quoted in my text here, is as follows: "The government abolished the duties of inspection and financial supervision throughout all the regions. Hitherto there had been inspectors (*nāzīr*), financial officers (*mustawfi*) and other officials (*mubāshir*) placed in every village. The sultan did not employ a single official in regions where there was no governmental revenue, and even in cases where there was such revenue, he gave orders that none should be appointed but *nāzīr* and *amīr ḥukm*.
- (136) Sulūk, II, 360; Şubḥ, III, 452. Also, since there were cases where *mubāshir*, unlike government officials, meant private superintendents of the *muqṭa'*, who managed the *iqtā'*, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the two (Sulūk, II, 18-19, 82; Şubḥ, III, 454).
- (137) Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 299-300.
- (138) Nuwayrī, XXX, fol. 372.
- (139) Ta'rīkh Bayrūt, 87.
- (140) Khiṭaṭ, I, 90; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 320-321; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 55.
- (141) Nuwayrī, XXX, fol. 321.
- (142) Ayalon, Structure, II, p. 459; Rabie, *Financial System*, pp. 39-41.
- (143) For example, Ta'rīkh Bayrūt, 174, 176, 189, 191, 193, 197, 202.
- (144) Ayalon, Structure, II, p. 474.
- (145) Şubḥ, IV, 216.
- (146) Sulūk, II, 643; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie a l'époque des Mamelouks* (Paris, 1923), pp. xlv ff.; Poliak, *Feudalism*, pp. 28-29.
- (147) Sulūk, II, 783, 785-786, 830; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 56.
- (148) I.M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Massachusetts, 1967), chap. III; id., *Grain Economy*, pp. 1-14.
- (149) Khiṭaṭ, I, 91; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 55.
- (150) Ta'rīkh al-Fayyūm, 44, 48, 50, 79-80, 88, 90, 123, 154, 171.
- (151) Sulūk, II, 153; Nujūm, IX, 49.
- (152) *ibid.*
- (153) Sulūk, II, 153; Nujūm, IX, 50; Nuwayrī, XXX, fols. 299-300; Rabie, *Financial System*, p. 55.
- (154) Sulūk, II, 153; Nujūm, IX, 50.
- (155) Khiṭaṭ, I, 91. See also Ighātha, 41-47, on the disaster of the year 806.
- (156) Şubḥ, IV, 14.

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