

The Trade in Hu-chou 湖州 Silk at Nan-hsün-chen 南潯鎮 under the Control of the Taipings

By Genji KAWABATA

Preface

Since the Ming period, Hu-chou 湖州 silk or Hu-ssu 湖絲, famous as a raw silk export and also as woven silk material, had been made, as a side-product, by the farmers of Hu-chou prefecture in Chekiang 浙江 province on the south bank of T'ai-hu 太湖; Nan-hsün-chen 南潯鎮, where it was collected and distributed, was known far and wide, in foreign parts too, along with the name of *chili* silk, produced in Chili village 輯(七)里村, south of Nan-hsün-chen. In particular, with the opening of the port of Shanghai in accordance with the Treaty of Nanking, the centre for the export of Huchou silk shifted from Canton to Shanghai, which was more convenient, as a result of which a large number of people moved here and became interpreters and compradors in foreign trade,⁽¹⁾ and in *Hsien-feng* 咸豐 10 (1860) the Shanghai Chamber for the Silk Industry 上海絲業會館 came into being with Hu-chou merchants as its nucleus.⁽²⁾

However, from 1860 on, the silk producing area came under the attack of the Taiping forces, and in the following year Nan-hsün-chen itself came under their occupation. As a result, the English diplomatic authorities at the time thought that this blow would slow down the silk trade, and the missionaries, Joseph Edkins and others, of the London Missionary Society, visited to Soochow, and negotiated with Li Hsiu-ch'eng 李秀成 or the Prince Chung 忠王 about the silk trade.⁽³⁾ However, according to the figures, the trade in raw silk during the occupation of 1861 and 1862 increased. A. F. Lindley's *History of the Ti-Ping Revolution* explains this as having been due to the excellence of the Taiping's occupation policy,⁽⁴⁾ but increase in trade is increase in production, and is there no room for contesting the argument that this was based on the excellence of that policy? But however much one may wish to throw light on the true state of the silk trade under the occupation, the material available is fragmentary and inadequate. Only the (*Min-kuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih* (民國)南潯志, or Gazetteer of Nan-hsün, ed. 1923, in its account

of the situation of the market under the Taiping occupation, has assembled a comparatively large amount of material, and I think that by arranging and examining this we may be able to obtain a vague outline of the silk trade centred on Nan-hsün-chen and of the activities of the silk merchants. This should serve to throw light on the silk trade under the Taiping occupation and on the character of the silk merchants engaged in it.

I.

Nan-hsün-chen, which is well-known as the centre of the silk producing area, is situated to the east of the city of Wu-ch'eng-hsien 烏程縣 in Hu-chou prefecture on the southern bank of T'ai-hu 太湖, and it is near Chen-tse-chen 震澤鎮, on the border between the provinces of Kiangsu 江蘇 and Chekiang 浙江. This place was subjected to five attacks by the Taiping army, from the 12th day of the 6th month of *Hsien-feng* 10 (29 July 1860) to the 12th month of the following year, and it was placed under occupation in the last ten days of the 12th month of the latter year (January 1862), and this lasted until the 27th day of the 7th month of *T'ung-chih* 同治 3 (24 August 1864), a period of two and a half years. I propose to try to pass under review the situation of this district during this period, with particular attention to the trade in Huchou silk. The sources are principally the *Keng-shen yüeh-fei chü-hsün chi-lüeh* 庚申粵匪據潯紀略 or Account of the Taiping Rebel Occupation of Nan-hsün-chen in the year *keng-shen* = 1860 by Wen Ting 溫鼎, and *Tsa-i* 雜憶 or Recollections by Wu Chiao-sheng 吳焦生, which are found in the (*Min-kuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*.

When the report of the fall of Nanking was first received, Nan-hsün-chen was shaken by the threat of the aggressive advance of the Taiping army, but it was peaceful for several years thereafter. However, in the 2nd month of *Hsien-feng* 10 (February–March 1860), when, in order to divert the Ch'ing troops from their investment of T'ien-ching 天京 (*i.e.* Nanking under the Taipings), Li Hsiu-ch'eng ventured on a sudden attack on Hangchow 杭州, and then Ning-kuo 寧國 (1st day, 2nd month/22 Feb. 1860) and Kuang-te 廣德 (3rd day, 2nd month/24 Feb.) fell, people were much agitated, and when it was reported that Ch'ang-hsing 長興 had fallen (12th day, 2nd month/4 March) and that Huchou would be attacked, confusion arose such that, "people of all classes moved their families into the country or went to Shanghai. In the course of several days six or seven out of ten people fled." But as Huchou did not fall at this time and the Taiping army moved south, aiming at Hangchow, the horrors of war seemed momentarily to have receded, but at the end of the month it was reported that Hangchow had fallen and that Chia-hsing 嘉興 and Huchou were in danger. At this point Wen Chin-shu 溫金叔 a student from Wu-ch'eng-hsien, younger brother of Wen-ho 文禾 who was a *chin-shih*, proclaimed the need for a militia force, and set up an office

of public safety (Pao-an-chü 保安局) in the Chih-yüan temple 祇園寺 at the western quarter of the town. At this office, Shen Ying 沈榮 and Wu Chang-lin 吳長林, leaders of the gun-boats or *chiang-chuan* 鎗船, were made to gather together 100 gun-boats.

The gun-boats were rowing boats privately made by gamblers, and equipped with swords, spears and gunpowder; their leaders would force boats of prostitutes to anchor, act plays day and night, collect gamblers together, open gambling places and gamble at what was called *hua-huei* 花會, and so they were known as *chiang-fei* 鎗匪 (gun-rebels) or *tu-fei* 賭匪 (gambling rebels).⁽⁵⁾ In *Hsien-feng* 6 and 7 (1856-7), Wu Chang-lin was leader of the gambling rebels of Chen-tse-chen, and Shen Ying was also a leader known as Shen San 沈三 of Yen-mu 嚴墓. During the years *Hsien-feng* 8 and 9 (1858-9), they, together with Shao Kuo 沙鍋 who had joined the office, opened gambling places all over Nan-hsün-chen and indulged in brawls, and during this time it is said that the markets were sometimes closed for several days on end. Being in the employment of the office of public safety, the gun-boats are said to have hoisted the public safety flag, but it is also said that they put up the flag of the prefectural office, and that the leaders used the official rank of *Fu-pu-ts'o-shih* 撫部巖使 or *Yen-yün-shih* 鹽運使 (salt transport commissioners),⁽⁶⁾ for which reason I think that they had a connection with officialdom and so swaggered about quite openly. As a reason for the employment of the gun-boats by the office of public safety we find, "(*Chü-hsün chi-lüeh*): Only, if the gun-rebels were restrained from behaving as brigands, it was not possible to make them guard against the enemy"; but was it simply such a negative reason of preventing them from collusion with the Taiping army? I think rather the reason was the necessity of making use of their strength. It is said that the office of public safety depended on contributions from "all the trades (*Ko-yeh* 各業) and rich families (*gin-hu* 殷戶). Had there not previously already been a strongly rooted tie between the country gentry and wealthy merchants, who supported the office and the gun-boats?"

In the 4th month Li Hsiu-ch'eng successively occupied Ch'ang-chou 常州 and Soochow. In Nan-hsün-chen the defences were further tightened, and the office of public safety was moved to the Chi-le monastery 極樂庵 at the eastern quarter. On the 26th day came the news of the fall of Chia-hsing, and then the villages along the lake were devastated by fire. On the 19th of the 5th month P'ing-wang 平望, distant some 40 *li* (about 27 km.) from Nan-hsün-chen, eventually fell, and as in these two months the enemy threat was its nearest, there were those who hired boats and prepared to flee. However, "the shops were open for business as usual." On the day following, the 20th, Chao Ching-hsien 趙景賢, an official of Hu-chou, led troops by land and water and recovered P'ing-wang. On this occasion the gun-boats of the office of public safety also cooperated, and one of their leaders, Shao Kuo led an attack at the head of several dozen gun-boats and died in battle.

At dawn on the 12th day of the 6th month (29 July), Nan-hsün-chen was attacked by the Taiping army for the first time. This may be seen as retaliation for Chao Ching-hsien's attack on P'ing-wang. The Taiping army assailed first the eastern quarter, where the office of public safety was, and the west, south and north quarters, and the houses at these points were all destroyed by fire, but "in the high town, the dwellings were almost intact." The secretary of the office, Wen Chin-su same as Chin-shu 金叔 above, died in battle on this occasion. The Taiping army withdrew in the afternoon, but it is recorded that after that there was burning and looting by gun-boats and local bandits and villagers. "The gun-boats saw that the rebels had withdrawn, and they then burst into shops and pillaged them, as well as entering the houses of the rich, where they seized what they chose." "[13th day] when the local bandits and the villagers saw that the shopkeepers and rich pawnbrokers had still not come back, they plundered everything, until there was nothing left." These quotations show that "villagers" swelled the numbers of those who came to plunder the pawnshops, shops and rich families, who had fled at the news of the coming of the Taiping army. The advance of the Taiping army was accompanied by the destruction of villages, and even the gun-boats of the office of public safety took advantage of this to turn into gun-rebels.

The office of public safety in the Chi-le monastery was destroyed by fire as a result of the attacks of the 6th month, and it was reestablished in the Tung-ts'ang temple 東藏寺 at the Ma-chia-kang 馬家港. Ch'iu Li-t'ing 邱笠亭 or 邱立亭 became the secretary of it, and employed the gun-boats of Shen and Wu. "Local ruffians or t'u-kun 土棍 were deceitful and troublesome, and were severely punished by the office. They sent out gun-boats every day to Chen-tse-chen, to find out the state of the rebels, and they managed to obtain inside information." In this connection it may be noted that in the 8th month the Taiping army built a fortress at Chen-tse-chen, south of P'ing-wang, and created a local official. It is said that perhaps the gun-boats had secret intelligence with the Taiping army itself to find out about its state. Meanwhile there is the following about the Hu-chou silk trade at this time:

"After the withdrawal of the rebels from Nan-hsün, shopkeepers conducted their market by putting up huts in the eastern and northern quarters. The silk firms (*ssu-hang* 絲行) chose for their markets places of easy access for boats; they installed containers in the ships to accommodate the silk, and so carried on an improvised trade." (*Chü-hsün lüeh-chi*)

The duty of the reconstructed office of public safety was "severe repression by the office of trouble made by local ruffians," but I think that as a result of disturbances perpetrated in collusion with the Taiping army, the silk firms carried on their trade by exceptional methods, taking such emergency

measures to protect their goods.

From the 16th to the 17th of the 8th month (30 September–1 October, 1860), the Taiping army executed its second attack. More people were taken, as well as killed or wounded, in this attack than on the previous occasion; half of the shopping streets near the southern quarter were burnt, and the fire reached private houses too. The office of public safety at Ma-chia-kang was burnt down on this occasion, and so Ch'iu Li-t'ing moved it to his own house at the Feng-nien bridge 豐年橋. The duty of the office when it moved here became confined to: "at this time the gun-boats of the office only searched for news of Chen-tse, in order to protect the departures of the silk traders." I think that the reason for the employment of the gun-boats by the office of public safety was probably to take advantage of the real power held by the gun-rebels to navigate on the lake, and so send off the silk ships without being observed by the Taiping army. In the 7th month (August–September, 1860), the armies of Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Li Shih-hsien 李世賢 successively took the sub-prefectures of Chia-hsing, Shih-men 石門, T'ung-hsiang 桐鄉 and P'ing-hu 平湖, and Nan-hsün-chen now faced the attack as the foremost defense point of Huchou. In these circumstances the merchants took advantage of the rise in prices resultant from the shortage of commodities; they gathered together their remaining merchandise, opened street stalls and made enormous profits. This is something subsequent to the occupation, but it is said that when the importation of rice rose explosively, the silk merchants transported rice from Shanghai and sold it,⁽⁷⁾ and it is not surprising either that the silk merchants in control of the silk ships managed to pass through the areas occupied by the Taiping army, and increase their profits by bringing in goods of everyday use.

In the middle decade of the 12th month (January, 1861), Nan-hsün-chen was subject to the Taiping army's third attack. At the time there were no shops or houses or people in the centre of the town, and there was nobody living in the few houses that remained. Houses were located in the north and south of the town, in places not far from the openings in the stockade, and they thought it would be easier to run away when news came of the rebels' arrival, as a result of which, it is said that the number of houses looted and people taken prisoner or killed was less than on the previous two occasions.

In the 3rd month of the following year, *Hsien-feng* 11 (April, 1861), attacks were made over a period of two days on the territory of four small towns and six or seven villages round Nan-hsün-chen, and both shops and private houses were burnt. From this point, the cities of eastern Chekiang fell one after another and the situation became dangerous; on the 25th of the 8th month (29 September) the fifth attack was made, and fire spread to Sheng-she 晟舍 in the west, Shuang-lin-chen 雙林鎮, Ch'i-li 七里 and Ma-Yao' 馬要 in the south, and to the many towns along the shore of T'ai-hu lake

in the north. In attempting to escape a number of people put out boats and rowed into the encircling Taiping forces, losing their lives and property; some survived, whether hiding in harbours to which they made their way, or fleeing to the west, or taking refuge at Yen-mu in the area occupied by the Taiping army. It is to be supposed that in this fifth attack, said to be the most cruel since *hsien-feng* 10, material losses were the most severe. At the beginning of the 9th month Huchou-fu (the city of Wu-ch'eng-hsien 烏程縣) was encircled, and it fell at the end of the 11th month. A month later, in the last ten days of the 12th month (January, 1862), Nan-hsün-chen also finally fell into the hands of Taiping army.

II.

During more than two years, from the last ten days of the 12th month of *Hsien-feng* 11 (January 1862) to the beginning of the 3rd month of *T'ung-chih* 同治 3 (April 1864), Nan-hsün-chen was under the occupation of the Taiping army.

In the last ten days of the 12th month, captured by the rebels, absolutely no looting. The pseudo-commander-in-chief became a *chan-t'ien-yen* 詹天燕(占天燕). He took up residence at Ma-chia gang. He gave orders for calming the population." (*Chü-hsün chi-lüeh*)

About the *chan-t'ien-yen*, who commanded the occupying force, all that is known from the *tsa-i*, is his surname Ho (何), that he was over forty, that he was under the command of T'an Shao-kuang 譚紹光 or the Mu-wang 慕王, as he was known, in Soochow, and that he later rose through the degrees of *chan-t'ien-fu* 占天福, *chan-t'ien-an* 占天安 and *chan-t'ien-yen*.⁽⁸⁾ At the beginning of the occupation he took a private house at Ma-chia gang on the eastern side for his official residence, but from the 2nd month of the following year he moved to the earthwork built on the eastern quarter, and was appointed the commander during the the longest term as compared with others. The expression, "*chu shi an min* 出示安民", means that he put an end to what the *Tsê-ch'ing hui-tsuan* 賊情彙纂 compiled by chang te-chien 張德堅, refers to as *kung-hsien* 貢獻 or levying tributes and *lu-chieh* 虜却 or robbery, ordering that the population be thus calmed; then he set up *hsiang-huan* 鄉官 or a local administration, had *hu-tse* 戶冊 or a census registry made and *men-pai* 門牌 or certificate of domicile, issued to private houses, by these means starting to control the country places. We read,

"In the first year of *tung-chih* (the reign name was changed in the last ten days of the 12th month of *Hsien-feng* 11) the rebels recruited natives of the region as local officials. The pseudo-officers were designated

chün-shuai 軍帥 or army commanders, *shih-shuai* 師帥 or divisional commanders, *lü-shuai* 旅帥 or battalion commanders and *pai-chang* 伯(百)長 or company commanders. The highest was the army commander, to whom the others were subordinate. Now people in the country put out a *men-pai* on their houses. Collection was made by the army commander's office through the company commanders." (*Keng-shen yüeh-fei chü-hsün chi-lüeh*)

"After the calming of the population by the 'Hairy Rebels (Taipings)', every house hung out a *men-pai*, giving details of the age and number of the occupants and the amount of taxes on their population."

"Collection was made by the army commander's office" probably means that the cost of supplying the *men-pai* (*men-pai-fei* 門牌費) was collected by the army commander's office. This office was first installed in Mr. Yü's (俞) house at Pei-hsiao-tou 北小兜 south of Ma-chia gang, but in the 5th month of the following year we find, "at this time the army commander's office was established on the southern quarter; the recipient of the pseudo-post was named Lo 羅," so it was moved to the southern quarter. Lo was of course a countryman.

Apart from the local administration we find, "apart this there was also established the Chün-an-chü 均安局 office. The pseudo-official was a man of Hsün named Chang (張)" (*Chü-hsün chi-lüeh*). On this subject, the passage continues, "When the silk ships went to Shanghai, they were convoyed by the gun-boats until they were beyond Sheng-tse-chen. They [the *chiang chuan*] passed one rebel customs post (*chüa* 卡) and came back. For each bale the silk ships contributed something to the rebels, and something to the expenses of the office, and this was certainly better than the exaggerated profits. At this time the silk traders could go beyond the border in safety and gained profits together with the rebels." It is clear from this that the Chün-an-chü office had the duty of providing escort for the silk ships bound for Shanghai,⁽¹⁰⁾ and that they levied a contribution on the silk from which they defrayed the expenses of the office. The preparation here of the gun-boats for escort purposes is analogous to their employment by the office of public safety in the previous section.

In Wu Chiao-sheng's *Tsai-i* we read, a general office or *Tsung-chü* 總局 was established below the Chiang-chia 蔣家 bridge in the southern quarter. This was also called the *Ssu-chüan-chü* 絲捐局 or silk contribution office. Separate branch custom-posts (*fen-ch'ia* 分卡) were established in the four quarters and levied duty." This shows that silk contribution office was another name for the general office. At this time we are told that the centre of the town had been reduced to ashes, that the market in the northern quarter was north of the Cha-ch'un 柵春 bridge, and that the market of the southern quarter was south of the Hsing-fu bridge, so that the Wei-chia 蔚家 bridge

was situated in the middle of the market of the southern quarter. The Taiping army set up customs posts under the commanding general in the town that they occupied, levying transit dues and business taxes (*ti'en-chü* 店捐 shop contributions) on goods; in Nan-hsü-chen they set up customs posts in the four quarters. I think that the general office (*tsung-chü*) below the Wei-chia bridge was so called because it controlled these posts, that is to say branch posts (*fen-ch'ia*), and that it was also called the silk contribution office (*Ssu-chüan-chü*) because of the large amount of silk business in the town, and because it was based on levying the silk contribution assessed on that business. After the restoration of the Ch'ing authority, *Li-chüan-chü* 釐捐局 (*likin* tax office) was set up at the Nan-jen chü-fang 南賃居房 at the Wei-chia bridge.⁽¹¹⁾ I think that this may have taken over the site from the time of the occupation. Thus, apart from the army commander's office, the Chün-an office and the general office, also known as the silk contribution office, were also established, and the two latter require special attention because of their close connection with the silk trade. I think that the two were one and the same, but I will defer the proof of this.

Let us now try to consider the nature of the activities of the silk merchants under the occupation.

"At this time, when the Chan (t'ien-yen) rebel had another child, the silk firms would all send congratulations, and the Chan rebel would issue invitations to them. The young and handsome would go to a banquet at the fortress. Young rebels would serve the guests, who were honored with gun salute. More than ten places were laid. Those offering congratulations wore full dresses (*ma-kua-ma-i* 馬褂馬衣) and made just one salutation. Those in waiting were all young. The young rebels waited at the table and spied the departing guests. Then rebels drawn up in ranks would salute, firing their guns." (*Tsa-i*)

According to this, the silk firms would offer congratulations on the birth of a child to the occupying commander, and would be invited to a banquet held at the fortress. "More than ten places were laid" indicates that they were decidedly not few in number. I think that this kind of festive exchange presently developed into the following kind of combination between the rebel commander and the silk firms:

"During the rebellion, four official silk firms were established. Chuang Heng-ch'ing 莊恆慶 or Chuang Hsing-yüan 杏苑 and Li Heng-ting 李恆鼎 or Li P'ing-po 萍波 in the western quarter; Wu Chin-ch'ang 吳晉昌 or Wu Tieh-chiang 鐵江 in the northern quarter; and Pu T'ung-ch'ang 卜同昌 or Chu Lan-p'o 朱蘭坡 in the southern quarter. The other silk firms could only operate after obtaining the guarantee of an official silk firm (*kuan-ssu-hang* 官絲行). The director was of the Chang 張 family.

On every silk bale of 80 catties (*chin* 斤) they were taxed 16 silver dollars (*yuan* 元), to which was added 8 silver dollars for miscellaneous expenses. The quantities and dollar values of the silk firms' daily purchases of silk were examined and registered by the T'ang 湯 rebels." (*Tsa-i*)

According to this, official silk firms were designated in Nan-hsün-chen under the occupation in the western, northern and southern quarters, and the other silk firms were authorized to operate under the guarantee of the official ones. In the latter Taiping period, shops in the occupied territory were issued with *yin-chao* 印照 (stamped certificates) or *shang-p'ing* 商憑 (trade warrants) whereby the occupying commander authorized them to do business,⁽¹²⁾ but does it not seem that in Nan-hsün-chen too the silk firms came to be authorized to do business through the official silk firms? The designation of *kuan-ssu-hang* (official silk firm) does not, judging from examples, look like a Taiping one. There is an example under the Ch'ing, in Chia-hsing 嘉興 after the withdrawal of the Taipings, of a silk firm responsible for buying silk under the silk tax office being called the *kuan-ssu-hang*.⁽¹³⁾ It cannot be said to be appropriate to apply this usage to the Taiping case, but it may be that this appellation was customarily used among silk merchants in respect of its cooperation, under the silk tax office, in the control of silk transactions including authorization to the silk firms to do business.

One can find the names of the four houses that became the official silk firms among the names of those who, after the withdrawal of the Taipings, in the spring of *T'ung-chih* 4 (1865) requested the creation of a public office for the silk business (*Ssu-yeh-kung-so* 絲業公所), the silk traders Chuang Tsu-shou 莊祖綬, Li Kuei-hsing 李桂馨, Wu Tieh-chiang 吳鐵江 and Hua Ming-hsien 華銘軒.⁽¹⁴⁾ That is to say, only the two surnames, Li and Chuang, of the official silk firms of the western quarter are the same, but that of the northern quarter, Wu Chin-ch'ang (Tieh-chiang) is recognisably the same person. Also, may it not be supposed that the Pu T'ung-ch'ang (Chu Lan-p'o) of the official silk firm of the southern quarter was the person called Chu Shui-pao 瑞寶, styled Lan-ti 蘭第, who was the son of Chu Chao-ch'uan 朱兆傳⁽¹⁴⁾, who built up the fortunes of his family through the silk business? This means that the silk firms who had cooperated with the Taiping army under the occupation were, even after the end of hostilities, powerful figures in the silk trade and active in the business. The public office for the silk business after the rebellion was a revival of the public office for the silk tax created in *Hsien-feng* 4 (1854); its purpose was to collect tax and to protect the silk merchants";⁽¹⁵⁾ it was established in the vacant ground of the Kuang-hui Palace 廣惠宮 (Chang-wang-miao 張王廟 temple of prince Chang) in Nan-hsün; directors were coopted and managers taken on to run it, while expenses were met by taking 2 silver dollars per bale, according to the highest price of

export bales, and this was an organization set up autonomously by the silk firms to deal with the levying of the silk tax. For the purposes of tax collection in the Taiping occupied territory, it was the accepted system that the local people be made to set up public offices, and independently assess and levy taxes, and since this was later incorporated in the system of local administration,⁽¹⁶⁾ it is not surprising that the method was adopted whereby, for the collection of the silk tax too, the silk firms were made to do this themselves independently. In fact, did not the official silk firms cooperate with the Taiping army on the same footing as the silk firms in the public office for the silk tax? For regional control the Taipings recruited *tu-hao* 土豪 or local boss, *hsü-li* 胥吏 or *ch'a-i* 差役, i.e. clerks to form the local administration: it may be supposed that in the silk trade too they recruited the official silk firms from among the silk firms and made them cooperate under the silk contribution office which corresponded to the public office for the silk tax or silk industry.

In "the director was of the Chang family" what director is in question? If we take him to be the same man as in "there was also established the Chün-an office. The pseudo-official was a man of Hsün named Chang," he becomes the Chang who directed the Chün-an office and had control over the official silk firms. After the rebellion was over, in *T'ung-chih* 4 (1865), *Shan-chü-kung-so* 善舉公所 (an office for charity) was annexed to the public office for the silk business, and we are told that as its assets "the confiscated property of the spurious local official, Chang Chu-hsiang 張竹香" was applied;⁽¹⁷⁾ again, in the same year, there was an official notification of a request by Shao T'ang 邵棠 and others that they be given "the house of the spurious local official, Chang Chu-hsiang", which had previously been confiscated by the government for the reestablishment of the Hsün-chi Academy 潯溪書院 in this notification we read, "In the 5th month of this year (May 1865), the spurious rebel Chang Chu-hsiang was arrested by the sub-prefect and transferred to the prefecture; the said spurious official was the puppet of the hairy rebels; he did great damage in the country, and traces of his evil doings are everywhere. We who have personally suffered from these, respectfully submit this complaint, and await your Honour's enlightened decision."⁽¹⁸⁾ Is this Chang Chu-hsiang not the man named Chang? Moreover, in this notification there is, "This building at present houses the *likin* office, and also in the prefectural reply to this, there is, "We find that the present premises of the Nan-hsün *likin* office are the property of the spurious official, Chang Chu-hsiang,⁽¹⁹⁾ so that we learn that in *T'ung-chih* 4 (May 1865) the *likin* office was reestablished in what was originally the house of Chang Chu-hsiang. This is surely not fortuitous; was it not because the office for levying the silk tax had been located here at the time of the occupation? This is because under the Taiping occupation Chang Chu-hsiang had been director of a office connected with levying the silk tax, and it may be read

in this way because in the passage previously cited, after "the director was of the Chang family", the text continues with the levying of the silk tax under the Taiping occupation. Only, if this be so, what sort of relationship was there between the Chün-an office, of which Chang Chu-hsiang became director and the silk tax office? According to the *Chü-hsün chi-lüeh*, the Chün-an office convoyed the silk ships, and it provided for the expenses of the office by levying the silk tax. Thus it was connected not only with levying the silk tax but with the duties of the customs posts responsible for protection. At Wu-chen the customs posts which levied the silk tax convoyed the silk ships with gun-boats.⁽²⁰⁾ And working from this example, it is not to be supposed that the general office, which was responsible for the control of the customs posts, and was also called the silk tax office, was not confined to the collection of the silk tax. In which case we cannot but consider that the Chün-an office of the *Chü-hsün chi-lüeh* and the general office, of which another name was silk tax office, of the *Tsa-i*, were in fact one and the same. Only, as regards these appellations, it would seem that general office was used in the sense of its control over the customs posts, silk tax office in the sense that it collected the silk tax like the public office for the silk tax before the occupation, while Chün-an office was the formal designation of the Taipings. This would be analogous to the designations given to offices by the Taipings, such as the Jen-ho-chü 人和局 in Ch'ang-hsing 長興 prefecture in Huchou, which was the office for protection and levying the taxes.⁽²¹⁾

To sum up, I think that, in Nan-hsün-chen under the Taiping occupation, the Chün-an office was set up alongside the army commander's office, to control all matters concerning the silk trade, the collection of the silk tax, the convoying of the silk ships, the control of the silk merchants, and so on. It may be said to have covered the duties of the public office for the silk tax, the *likin* office and the office of public safety. The creation of such an office was probably due to the special situation of Nan-hsün-chen as a focal point of the silk trade. For all one knows, the director of the office, Chang Chu-hsiang, was elevated to that position from among the town's silk merchants, just as the army commander named Lo were elevated by powerful local peoples. Apart from the existence of a younger brother, by the same mother, called Chang Shu-hsiang 張墅香,⁽²²⁾ we know nothing about this man, but Chang appears as a silk merchant's name,⁽²³⁾ and after the rebellion a considerable amount of his property was confiscated. Even after the end of hostilities the four official silk firms, by requesting the creation of a public office and so on, did not lose their position. Was this not because the town's operation was centred on the silk trade carried on by the silk firms? For example, just as the most important duty of the office of public safety before the occupation, and of the Chün-an office under the occupation, was the convoying of the silk ships, in the latter Taiping period, the occupying commanders obtained the cooperation of their local landlords, gentry,

clerks and rich families for their local administration, I think that, in the case of Nan-hsün-chen, they sought the cooperation of the silk firms for controlling the silk trade and especially for setting up an office.

III.

In *Hsien-feng Nan-hsün-chen-chih*, (咸豐)南潯鎮志 ch. 14, Produce, a Hsün-chi document 潯溪文獻 is quoted as follows:

"In the Hsün country, *hsi-siu* 細絲 or fine silk is the main type, and there is very little thick one. After *hsiao-man* 小滿 (about 21 May to 4 June), the market in new silk is very flourishing. There is great clamour among the rows of shops and the streets are blocked with crowds. Some silk firms, which entertain Canton merchants and send shipments to Shanghai to trade with foreign merchants, are called *Kwang-hang* 廣行 and also *Ke-hang* 客行 (visiting firms). Those who buy exclusively local silk are called *hsiang-ssu-hang* 鄉絲行 (local silk firms), and those who buy twist (*ching* 經) or themselves twist are called *ching-hang* 經行 or twist firms. As well as these there are the small firms, who buy to supply the big ones known as *hua-chuang* 劃莊 (store on credit). Again there are those who propose themselves as sellers for local silk, who take a slight profit, and are known as *hsiao-ling-tou* 小領頭 (small leaders), vulgarly known as *Pai-la-chu-jen* 白拉主人. A large majority of the townsmen clothe and feed themselves on this. In recent years the natives have found it hard to make a living, and many have learnt the silk business."

On the basis of this, the merchants engaged in silk transactions in Nan-hsün-chen may be roughly distinguished as follows.⁽²⁴⁾ First, there were the wholesalers of the producing area, known as 'local silk firms', who bought up the reeled silk from the farmers who produced it, and sold it in the distribution centres; next there were the distribution centre wholesalers, known as 'twist firms', who either bought twisted thread on which the producers had worked *hsiang-ching* 鄉經 or local twist, or bought reeled silk from the local silk firms, which they arranged to have twisted (*tai-ching* 代經). Then came the *ya-hang* 牙行 or brokerage firms, known as the *Kwang-hang* or *Ke-hang*, who dealt with Canton merchants in order to move the stocks of twist, or *Ke-hang* who went to Shanghai and dealt with foreign merchants. Finally there were the small commission agents, known as *hua-chuang* or *hisao-ling-tou*, who lived parasitically on the others. We are told that a good half of the townsmen were *hisao-ling-tou* who collected commissions by selling to the producers' local silk firms. We are told that at the beginning of the Taiping occupation the price of rice soared, and the *ching-chi hisao-min* 經紀小民 or small brokers who took refuge in the country were in great

trouble.⁽²⁵⁾ Is it not these small brokers in question? The *Wu-ch'ing-chen-chih*, ch. 20, Local Produce, mentions small brokers known as *fan-tzu* 販子 or pedlars who sold silk to weavers in the towns of Chen-tse 震澤, Ch'eng-tse 盛澤 and Shuang-lin 雙林. It cannot be supposed that many of the silk merchants carried on a stable business with large profits through such petty brokers as these. On the other hand we find, "small traders bought in and sold to big traders, and the big traders shipped to Shen-chiang-chieh 申江界 (Shanghai)" (in the *Nan-hsün silk market firms* 南潯糸市行 by Wen Feng 溫豐), and commission agents, proportionate to the big as opposed to the small traders, increased their huge profits along with the prosperity of the silk export business, and further made excessive profits by taking advantage if the rise in the price of rice which they carried on the return journeys. Though one speaks generally of the silk merchants and though even the small brokers enjoyed the benefits of the flourishing trade, it was the commission agents who laid hands on most of the profits.

As was said at the outset, quite a large number of merchants moved from Nan-hsün-chen to Shanghai to act as *mai pien* 買辦 or compradors and *t'ung-shih* 通事 or interpreters. The [*Min-kuo*] *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 21, Biography, cites such names as those of P'ang Yün-seng 龐雲鏞, Ch'en Hsu-yüan 陳煦元 and Chiang T'ang 蔣堂 (Wei-ch'eng, 維城) as silk merchants living in Shanghai who were natives of Nan-hsün-chen. Among these, it says, Ch'en Hsu-yüan "was resident in Shanghai for several decades. He was the leader of the silk business, and could interpret in western languages, reliably and sincerely. Chinese and western traders relied on him as on the Great Wall", so he was the interpreter of the silk trade. After the occupation of Soochow by the Taiping army, officials, gentry and merchants from Kiangsu and Chekiang took refuge in Shanghai, which they defended with the assistance of foreign troops, while also planning to recover the lost territory. In summer of *Hsien-feng* 10 (1860), Wang Yu-ling 王有齡, governor of Chekiang, worked through Wu Hsiao-fan 吳曉帆, governor of Kiangsu, to levy a silk tax on the Shanghai silk merchants in order to defray military expenses; we are told that on this occasion, on the recommendation of Chao Ping-lin 趙炳麟, who was responsible for interceding, the Shanghai chamber for the silk industry 上海絲業會館 was set up with Huchou silk merchants as its nucleus.⁽²⁶⁾ It goes without saying that this chamber was a guild-like organization which consulted the silk industry and engaged in mutual help for the common interest, but it cannot be said that the motive for its creation was purely economic. Chiang T'ang, who appeared above, had taken refuge in Shanghai when he saw that Huchou was in danger, but when Wang Yu-ling, governor of Chekiang, was seeking to defray military expenses at the beginning of the *Hsien-feng* period, Chiang was promoted director of the Nan-hsün-chen silk tax office in response to this, and Ku Fu-ch'iang 顧福昌 "in Shanghai at the time of the rebellion, contributed to fortifications,

to provide for defence", and so on, so the silk firms in Shanghai were active in measures to hold off the attacks of the T'aiping.

The activity of the Huchou silk exporting made the trade between the distribution centres of the silk producing areas and the trading ports intense. But the Taipings set up customs, examined travel passes and levied a transit tax on goods. As I have mentioned in the preface to this article, in 1860 the missionaries Joseph Edkins had an interview with the Prince Chung in Soochow and requested that the silk trade of occupied Chia-hsing and Nan-hsün should continue; the Prince Chung stated that the Taipings did not obstruct all kinds of commerce, and that if it was desired to continue trading, he required that a transit tax be paid on goods at the customs post set up by the King of Heaven; again, when in 1863, M. Morton, a subordinate to H. A. Burgevine, went from Soochow to Shanghai not holding a travel pass, it was stated in a letter from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Tan Shao-kuang 譚紹洸 to C. G. Gordon, "the inspections at our customs posts are extremely strict, and if anyone has no *lu-p'ing* 路憑 or travel pass, it is very difficult to get through secretly." The *Pi-k'ou jih-chi* 避寇日記 vol. 3, says that at P'u-yüan-chen 濮院鎮 in the last ten days of the fifth month (of *T'ung-chih*, i.e., 1, June 1862), "When the new silk first appeared at this time, merchants from everywhere all received *Wen P'ing* 文憑 or passes from the Long Haired Rebels (Taipings) and contributed tax to trade; the silk markets were very active, and in the south of T'ung-chiang-hsien 桐鄉縣, markets of Tu-chen 屠鎮 flourished." Thus was evasion of tax strictly controlled. But we find in the *Tsai-i*, "At this time [1860] rich merchants had early on helped their families to take refuge in Shanghai. There were also business men who came and went. The Long Haired Rebels' customs examinations were very strict, but if one used foreigners and hoisted a foreign flag as protection, the rebels did not dare to ask questions, and the unimpeded coming and going of Hsün merchants was simply owing to this." So there were also ships that carried foreigners and flew a foreign flag and so navigated freely. We are told by the *Yang-chou yü-k'ou-lu* 揚州禦寇錄, vol. 2, that in *T'ung-chih* 1, 6th month (July 1862), of those who sold foodstuffs and firewood from Yang-chou 揚州 to the Taiping army, "some ships flew foreigners' flags (they would pay the foreigners to obtain one flag from them; they flew it on their ship, and paid no *likin* tax at the customs posts that they passed; it was not used for more than one journey, such being the foreign usage then the custom-posts along the Yangtze suffered many losses); others attached their ship to the stern of a foreign vessel (this was known as duty-free by tow and was for speed); others would accompany foreign vessels with foreign flags, without entrusting themselves, and would navigate on the river; in each case the customs posts along the bank could not help treating in the same way." Thus by using foreign flags or attaching themselves to the stern of foreign vessels, they could pass freely even the Ch'ing *likin* posts. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Peking, England

demanded of the Taipings freedom of navigation on the waterways in the territory for ships flying the English flag. The Taipings refused on the ground that Ch'ing vessels flew the English flag and plied within their territory,⁽²⁷⁾ but this amounted to recognizing implicitly that there was free navigation for ships flying foreign flags. Nor would it be strange to suppose, moreover, that owing to the large number of adventurous merchants or ex-sailors among the foreigners, secret trading went on. I think that they sold arms and opium in the Taiping occupied territory,⁽²⁸⁾ and also made rich profits out of silk exports as collateral trading goods. The account in the *Tsa-i*, quoted above indicates that this door to trade also included secret transactions between Nan-hsün-chen and Shanghai. When in 1860 H. A. Burgevine's subordinate asked to be sent back to Shanghai for treatment of his wounds, Li Hsiu-cheng, and T'an Shao-kuang, gave him a travel pass, sent him from Soochow to Nan-hsün-chen, and here had him board a foreign vessel.⁽²⁹⁾ This ship had been sent by C. Gordon at the request of the Taiping army to sell rifles, and it seems to have been able to take advantage of this without any obstruction by the Ch'ing *likin* tax.

Comparative table of figures for Shanghai silk exports (Apart from a certain number of discrepancies between I and II, there are many identities)

Source Year	I. Morse	II. Williams	←Year→ (fiscal year)	III. Lindley
1845	6,433 bale	6,433 bale	1844-45	
1846	15,192	15,192	45-46	18,600 bale
		15,972	46-47	19,000
1847	21,176	21,176	47-48	27,377
1848	18,134	18,134	48-49	17,228
1849	15,239	15,237	49-50	16,134
1850	17,243	17,243	50-51	22,143
1851	20,631	20,631	51-52	23,040
1852	41,293	28,076	52-53	25,571
1853	58,319	58,319	53-54	61,984
1854	54,233	53,965	54-55	51,486
1855	56,211	57,463	55-56	50,487
1856	79,196	92,160	56-57	74,215
1857	59,986	66,391	57-58	60,736
1858	85,970		58-59	81,136
1859	67,874		59-60	69,137
1860			60-61	88,754
1861			61-62	73,322
1862			62-63	83,264
1863			63-64	46,863
1864	37,731		64-65	41,123
1865	40,000			

(Bernister)

- H. B. Morse: *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II. p. 366.
 S. Wells Williams: *The Chinese Commercial Guide* (1863), p. 198.
 A. F. Lindley *Ti-ping Tien-kwoh: The History of Tiping Revolution*, Vol. II. pp. 838-839.

(Lindley says that he used the tables of total exports published in *The Friend of China* for the period 1845-58, and the bi-monthly issues of the *China Overland Trade Report* for the period after the 1858 fiscal year.)

This table shows the figures given by Morse for volume of silk exports after the opening of the port of Shanghai; these are largely the same as those of Williams and Banister, and also generally close to those of Lindley. According to these, there was an increase of over 30,000 bales in 1853, the year of the establishment of the Heavenly Capital, (T'ien-ching, Nanking) by the Taipings, compared with the previous year, and in 1860 another increase of 25,000 bales. On the other hand, Lindley points out the fall in exports after the loss of Soochow by the Taipings in 1863, and he says that the Taipings' business and commercial policy in the silk producing area that they occupied was appropriate. However, surely the figures for the number of bales would have included a large quantity of raw silk collected at and exported from the trading ports as a result of the speculative transactions mentioned above? If this be the case, one cannot assert categorically that these prosperous results were the direct consequence of good commercial policies on the part of the Taipings. Morse says that the reason for the increase in silk exports at the time of the Taiping rebellion was that 50,000 looms were destroyed on the domestic market as a result of the fall of Nanking, that the domestic markets were closed for lack of buyers among those who wore expensive weaves, and so the raw silk from the producing area between Soochow and Hangchow was forced on to the foreign market.⁽³⁰⁾ I think that quite a large number of weavers of Nanking were taken on by the official-weavers of *chih-ying* 織營 (weaver camp) of the Taipings, but "after *Hsien-feng* 3 (1853), the silk textile works moved to escape the rebels, some north to Nan-tung 南通 and Ju-kao 如皋, some south to Sung-hu 松江 and Shanghai. At their new settlements many of them recruited weavers and started weaving, and the trade was done with other provinces;"⁽³¹⁾ this suggests that many fled to surrounding agricultural communities and carried on with their weaving. However, "at present the rebel poison in the provinces along the Yangtze not yet being at an end, the big merchant families hesitated to visit there. Because of the accumulation of woven goods in all directions, many weavers are out of business, which resulted in the heavy decrease of transported locally produced Huchow silk coming to the customs in Hongchow."⁽³²⁾ And this tells us of an increased accumulation of silk cloth and consequent inactivity for weavers. The silk from the

chili villages of Nan-hsün-chen was the raw material for Soochow woven silks and is said to have been called *Soo yarn* 蘇經⁽³³⁾, but the inactivity of the weavers pushed this out on to foreign markets, and led to the phenomenon described in since *keng-shen* 庚申 (1860), the foreign merchants' silk markets were very active, and many traders flocked there competing for profits."⁽³⁴⁾ But the increase in exports was not only on account of the domestic situation. The report of the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai for October, 1857,⁽³⁵⁾ said that the increase in the export of silk yarn was based on an unusual stimulus caused by a fall in European production, and that this was regarded as a temporary phenomenon, but that there was also no doubt that future European requirements of Chinese raw silk would increase, in view of its quality and price, thus pointing to the increase of foreign requirements. Feng Kuei-fen 馮桂芬 describes the situation at this time well: "Also, China has been subject to armed disturbances for some years, and the silk market has fallen 60% or 70%. But purchases by foreign ships are several times what they used to be, so that profits from sericulture have been better than ever in recent years."⁽³⁶⁾

Thus in 1860, when Soochow fell into the hands of the Taiping army, silk exports were at their highest. But in October of this year, the British minister, Sir Frederick Bruce, wrote to Lord John Russell to the effect that raw silk was coming out of China in extraordinarily large quantities, but that the collateral trading goods were opium, arms and small quantities of luxury goods, and sales of fine fibre were completely stifled.⁽³⁷⁾ The impossibility of achieving the sale of its own cotton, on which it was counting, put England in the position of having to think out a change of policy. Later on, in March, 1862, the chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the British consul, W. H. Medhurst;⁽³⁸⁾ this said that the quantity of raw silk being brought to Shanghai was falling in comparison with previous times, that the price for compensation against the dangers of transport had been raised, that the heavy *likin* tax of the Ch'ing government had also increased, that the price was rising, and was too high for foreign consumers; as a result of the occupation of Nan-hsün-chen by the Taiping army, a considerable amount of silk worms' eggs had been lost, the Taiping army was cutting down mulberries for firewood, the villages had been plundered at hatching time, all of which would influence future production, and the future of the silk trade was sombre. Since this letter could contain no reliable information on the amount of damage done in Nan-hsün-chen, one can hardly accept it as it stands, in the light of what was said in the preceding section, in regard to the silk business of Nan-hsün-chen. But it is to be noted that from now on foreign trade circles in Shanghai entertained doubts of the future of the silk trade, the tea trade was again mentioned, and the necessity of freeing the Yangtze was bound up with it. In the following year, 1863, the silk trade fell sharply by one half. Banister cites as the cause

principally the devastation of the silk producing areas as a result of the Taiping rebellion, and with that he mentions the surplus production in previous years and the fall in European requirements as a result of surplus stocks. So he maintains that the record exports of previous years practically exhausted the silk from the farming communities, and that the production of new raw silk fell back, the cause being the felling of mulberry trees by the Taiping army.⁽³⁹⁾ In the spring of this year, the Jardine, Matheson Company Correspondence says that the mulberry trees were flourishing and silk worm breeding was good, so that one can only conclude that the sudden devastation was the result of the attacks on the area by the Ch'ing and foreign troops since the 5th month.⁽⁴⁰⁾ In this connection a foreigner sent a communication to the Hui-fang-chü 會防局 or Office of communal defence to the effect that the Taiping army said on the 15th day (of the 9th month) that it would harvest the rice and burn down the people's houses, and, unless the foreign troops withdrew, it would burn the mulberry trees and no silk would be produced,⁽⁴¹⁾ while Lindley states that the withered mulberries and dying silk worms, from Wu-hsi 無錫 to Shanghai, which looked like the consequences of pillaging and looting, were the result of massacres and plunder on the part of the Ch'ing troops.⁽⁴²⁾ According to a detailed study by Lo Erh-kang⁽⁴³⁾ on the subject of the state of rubble to which the villages of Kiangsu and Chekiang had been reduced after the destruction of the Taipings, this was not the responsibility of the Taiping army but was the result of the movements of the Ch'ing army or the Ever Victorious Army. We thus know of the devastation of the silk worm and silk area as well as its cause.

In 1864, the Taipings were destroyed. According to Banister, this great historical event had no direct influence on trade. He says that tea exports were down 6%, raw silk at 27,829 bales was down to one third of the previous two years, and that in the following year, 1865, it even rose by 50%, but was still below one half for several years.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Lindley blames this on the obstruction of free trade and transit, following on the destruction of the Taipings, on the Ch'ing courts xenophobic attempts to circumvent its treaty obligations and its generally arrogant policy.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Even so, when the silk producing area was first placed under the Taiping occupation, the English were afraid that silk exports might be halted and wished to continue the silk trade; why, then, did they venture to move on this area as a battlefield and make a sacrifice of the trade? The reasons were probably that foreign traders had doubts about the future of the silk trade, and in particular the English were worried about the trade in which they engaged in order to supply raw material to the French silk weaving industry; also, the home country considered it essential to open up the regions along the Yangtse as free trading markets in accordance with the Treaty of Peking rather than this mercantilist kind of trade, and for this purpose they dismantled the

Taiping's trade control, and perhaps in its overthrow they went too far. It would also seem clear that domestic cotton, which was being redirected towards the export market was in competition with English cotton from 1865, and began to succumb.⁽⁴⁶⁾ This all dealt a serious blow to artisanal work in the rural communities, but the silk firms, in their capacity of compradors, probably made considerable profits.

Conclusion

The silk firms of Han-hsün-chen, when under attack from the Taiping army, made use of the gun-boats, based on the office of public safety, and resolutely carried on their transactions in silk with Shanghai. Once under occupation, they cooperated with the occupation commander's Chün-an-chü and the official silk firms to maintain and develop the trade. Further, after the rebellion was over, there were successively set up in the city a *likin* office, a public office for the silk industry, the Hsün-chi Academy, the Shih-shan t'ang 師善堂 or the deserted charnel, Shan-chü-kung-chin-so or the office for charity (the above in *H'ung-chih* 4—1865), the Yü-ying t'ang 育嬰堂 or orphanage, and the Shui-shuai t'ung-tai-pan-kung-so 水帥統帶辦公所 or the navy inspector office (*T'ung-chih* 7—1868), and the Ssu-yeh hsü-li 糸業恤養會 or the Relief works for widow belong to silk industries (*T'ung-chih* 10—1871); these all depended on the contributions and cooperation of the silk firms, and the participation of such silk firms as those of Chiang T'ang and Lung Yün-cheng in Shanghai may be noted.

Thus both during and after the hostilities the silk firms were in active pursuit of profits from trade in silk. However, in spite of their proximity to the silk producing areas and the export ports to meet the raw silk requirements of the foreign merchants, their huge profits arose from the exchanges at speculatively disparate prices resulting from their being cut off from the special political and military situations. As a result of this, the capital for this trade had the character of comprador capital, subordinate to foreign capital, and so they came to cooperate with foreign powers in the protection of Shanghai, the principal position of foreign capital, in the event of attack by the Taiping army. There is also the aspect of the silk firms of Nan-hsün-chen cooperating with the Taiping government under the occupation, but it cannot but be thought that basically they occupied a position opposed to the nationalistic direction of the Taipings.

NOTES

- (1) (*Min-kuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, 1923, ch. 30, Manners and customs.
- (2) Negishi Tadashi 根岸信, *Shanghai no girudo* 上海のギルド. 1951. (The guilds of Shanghai), p. 243.

- (3) Joseph Edkins, translated by Wang Ch'ung-wu 王崇武, *Fang-wen Su-chou t'ai-p'ing chün* 訪問蘇州的太平軍. (A visit to the Taiping army at Soochow) (Contained in *Tai-p'ing-t'ien-kuo Shih-liao yi-ts'ung* 太平天國史料譯叢 a collection of translated materials on the Taiping rebellion, made by Wang), p. 133. Cf. Edkins, Joseph and Griffith John, A visit to the insurgent, chief at Soochow, *North China Herald*, No. 519, July 7, 1960.
- (4) A. F. Lindley (Lin Le), *Ti Ping Tien Kwoh: the History of the Ti-ping Revolution*, 1886, vol. II, pp. 838-839.
- (5) Details about the ch'iang chuan are found in Li Kuang-chi 李光燾, *Chieh-yü tsa-shih* 劫餘雜識, Hsü Yu-k'o 徐有珂, *Yen-ts'ao wen-ta* 燕曹問答, Ch'en Ken-p'ei 陳根培, *Hu-yin ch'ing-hua* 湖陰清話, and Wu Chiao-sheng, *Tsa-i*, all of which are contained in (*Minkuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 45. See Ts'ao Kuo-chih 曹國趾, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ke-ming shih-ch'i ch'iang-ch'e tai-hu ti-ch'ü chiao-ch'uan ti hsing-chih wen-ti* 太平天國革命時期江浙太湖地區槍船的性質問題 (On the character of the ch'iang-chien in the district of the Tai-hu during the Taping revolution period), On: (*Shih-shüeh yüeh-kan* 史學月刊, 1960, no. 2) and Suzuki Chüsei 鈴木中正, *Chügokushi ni okeru Kakumei to Shükyö* 中國史における革命と宗教 (Revolution and religion in the Chinese history), Tokyo: Tökyö Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974, pp. 280-283.
- (6) Hsü Yu-k'o, *op. cit.*, Ch'en Ken-p'ei, *op. cit.*
- (7) *Keng-shen yüeh fei chü-hsün chi-lüeh*: "At this time [*t'ung-chih* 1-1862, 3rd month], rice was expensive and rose to 12,000 Ch'ien 錢 per a dan 石; they were cut off from the previous year's rice from outside, so the farmers were all exempted from the previous year's grain tax and there was still no shortage. Only the small brokers (ching-chi-hisao-min 經紀小民) who had taken refuge in the country were in extreme difficulties. Fortunately the silk merchants went to Shanghai, and, when they came back, they sold rice in Nan-hsün-chen, and this was a help."
- (8) Kuo T'ing-i 郭廷以, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih* 太平天國史事日誌, vol. II. No corresponding person appears even in the table of ranks in Appendix 6.
- (9) See G. Kawabata, *Taihei tengoku ni okeru kyōkan sōchi to sono haikei* 太平天國における郷官創置とその背景 ("The Local Administrative System of the *T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo* and its Historical Background") (*Shigaku zasshi* 史學雜誌 63, 6). (English translation in *Acta Asiatica*, 22).
- (10) As regards the escorting of the silk ships, I think that "they were convoyed by the gun-boats until they were beyond Sheng-tse chien. They [the gun-boats] passed one rebel customs post and came back", means that they were escorted in order that silk ships that had paid the silk tax in Nan-hsün-chen should not be assessed again for the tax at the next customs post. Under the Taipings, a tax once collected was not levied a second time, but in the final period the occupying commanders arbitrarily set up customs posts, so that control was chaotic. On this subject, see G. Kawabata, *Taihei tengoku no kan ch'ia ni tsuite* 太平天國の關卡について (Local customs under the Taiping's regime) (*Wada hakase koki kinen tōyō shi ronsō* 和田博士古稀記念東洋史論叢).
- (11) (*Minkuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 2, Public Offices, the likin tax office.
- (12) Lo Erh-kang 羅爾綱, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo wen-wu t'u-shih* 太平天國文物圖釋, pp. 239-253. The 'stamped certificates' (Yin chao), 'trade warrants' (shangpin), 'customs warrants' (ch'ia-p'ing (卡憑) and so on, there mentioned, were all issued by the hands of occupying commanders such as Hsi Te-sheng 龔得勝, who combined Tseng-t'ien-yü 增天豫 and Li-min-wu 理民務, and Wang 汪 of the Lang-t'ien-i Yu-ssu wen-ching cheng-ssu 朗天義右肆文經政司.
- (13) *Wu-ch'ing-chen chih* 烏青鎮志 ed. 1936, ch. 20, Local Produce. "When the new silk came on the market each year, the purchase price was fixed by the prefecture through the official silk firms, and delivery was made to Shou-ssu-chü 收絲局 (the silk tax office) at Chia-chün 嘉郡 (Chia-hsing-fu 嘉興府).
- (14) (*Minkuo*) *Nan-h-hsü-chih*, ch. 2, public offices, the public office for the silk business.
- (15) *ibid.*, ch. 21, biography, Chu Chao Ch'uan.

- (16) *ibid.*, ch. 2, public offices, the public office for the silk business.
- (17) *Tse-ch'ing hui-tsuai*, ch. 10, rebel food, k'o-p'ai 科派 (unauthorized levying). See my *op. cit.* on note 9, p. 43.
- (18) (*Minkuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 34, the public interest, 1, the office for charity.
- (19) *ibid.*, ch. 3, Schools, Hsün-chi Academy. The notification seeks the eventual removal of the likin office which was installed there, and the place being used for the academy and the office for charity.
- (20) *Pi-k'ou jih-chi* 避寇日記 by Shen Tzu 沈梓, ch. 3 (*T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-pien chien-chi* 太平天國史料叢編簡輯 iv, p. 160, p. 120).
- (21) *Chien-te-chai sui-pi* 儉德齋隨筆 by Hu Ch'ang-ling 胡長齡 (*Chungkuo chin-dai shih-liao ts'ung-k'an* 中國近代史料叢刊, 'T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo' 太平天國, vi) "All who operated businesses or shops, had to use a spurious warrant. They had to be in partnership with the head of the Jen-ho office, and if they did not cheat the rebels, the *likin* which they levied each day on travelling merchants all went to the Jen-ho office which collected it."
- (22) (*Minkuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 35, the public interest, Hsün-chi academy, appendix, endorsement of notification to prefecture by Shen Ching-lien 沈鏡澣, reply of prefecture.
- (23) It is recorded on the tomb of Lung Yün-seng 龐雲鍾 that Mr. Chang 張 and Mr. Chiang 蔣 combined their resources and set up a silk business which sold large quantities of silk. (*Min-kuo*) *Nan-hsün-chih*, 39, *Inscriptions*.
- (24) On the silk industry and transactions in silk it is essential to refer to Saeki Yüichi 佐伯有一 and Tanaka Masatoshi 田中正俊 *Jūroku, jūshichi seiki Chūgoku nōson seishi kinuori-gyō* 十六・十七世紀の中國農村製糸・絹織業 The Silk Reeling and Weaving Rural Industry in China during the 16-17 century. In: *Sekai-shi kōza* 世界史講座, I. Tōyō-keizai Shinpōsha, 1955.
- (25) See note 7.
- (26) Negishi, *op. cit.*
- (27) Lindley, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-423. Lo Erh-kang, *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-kao* 太平天國史稿, (Draft history of the Taiping-tien-Kuo) ch. 13, "Wai-chiao-chih" 外交志 p. 176 (rev. and enl. ed. ch. 14, p. 217).
- (28) From *The Daily Shipping and Commercial News* of February 11, 1862. (*Paper relating to Rebellion in China*, p. 155.) As regards opium, the ships are said to have hidden in secret places to escape the eyes of the Taiping army.
- (29) Letter from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and T'an Shao-kuang in reply to Gordon (included in *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao* 太平天國史料, compiled by Chin Yü-fu 金毓黻 et al., pp. 177-179.) The photogravure in "*Tai-ping tien Kuo shu-han* 太平天國書翰" by Hsiao-Shan 蕭一山.
- (30) H. B. Morse: *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. I p. 466.
- (31) [*Kuang-hsü hsü-tsuai*] *Chiang-ning fu-chih* (光緒續纂) 江寧府志 ch. 6, by Wang Shih-to 汪士鐸 et al. ed. 1881.
- (32) Ch'ing-tai ch'ao-tang 清代鈔檔, *Hsien-feng* 7th year, 6th month, 27th day (16 August, 1857). Report to the Emperor, from the administrator of the sick textile industry in Hangchow and North New Custom (Chung-Kao chin-tai shu-k'ung-yeh shick tzu-liao 中國近代手工業史資料 ch. 1, p. 596).
- (33) [*Minkuo*] *Nan-hsün-chih*, ch. 32, Produce. *Chia-t'ing so-yü* 家庭瑣語 by Chou Ch'ingyün 周慶雲: "First to exported was reeled silk, but no yarn; yarn is made by spinning reeled silk. . . . The Soochow weavers used it, and it was called "Soo yarn". It was at Hsün early, only none was exported."
- (34) Lung-kung mu-piao 龐公墓表. cf. note 23.
- (35) Report on Tariff and General Relations British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, October, 1, 1857. (*Further papers relating to the Rebellion in China* June 1862 to February 1863, p. 316.)
- (36) Feng Kuei-fen, *Chiao-lu k'ang-i* 校邠廬抗議 vol. 1, counsels for the country's welfare.
- (37) Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell, Sept. 20, 1860. (*Correspondence respecting affair in China*,

- 1859-61, p. 202.)
- (38) The chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to Consul Medhurst, March 18, 1862. (*Further Paper relating to the Rebellion in China*, Feb., July 1862, p. 45.)
- (39) T. R. Banister: *A History of the External Trade of China 1834-1881*, (Decennial Reports, 1922-1931, Vol. I, p. 58.) On the fall in requirements due to the stock surplus resulting from the production surplus of preceding year, footnote according to *North China Herald*, 14 May 1864.
- (40) Lo Erh-kang, *Man-ch'ing t'ung-huo chieh-chi wu-mieh t'ai-p'ing-chün sha-jen fang-huo chien-yin chü-lüeh k'ao-miu* 滿清統治階級誣讞太平軍殺人放火奸淫擄掠考謬, In: *T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo-shih chi-tsai ting-miu-chi* 太平天國史記載訂謬集, Critical essays on historical accounts of the Taiping, p. 31; The text of the Jardine Matheson & Co. Correspondence quoted in this article is the translation by Yen Chung-p'ing 嚴中平 under the title: *I-ho yang-hang tang-an* 怡和洋行檔案.
- (41) *Wu Hsü Tang-an chun ti t'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi* 吳煦檔案中的太平天國史料選輯, p. 280.
- (42) Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 681.
- (43) Lo Erh-kang's article quoted in note 17. Cf. J. S. Gregory, *Great Britain and the Taipings*, p. 164.
- (44) Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 681.
- (45) Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 687.
- (46) Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 61.