

The Madhyamaka Thought of Tson kha pa rgyal mtshan and Its Impact

KOBAYASHI Mamoru

Introduction

Tson kha pa Blo bzañ grags pa (1357–1419) established a unique system of Madhyamaka thought in which he accepted wholeheartedly the thought of Candrakīrti, who was critical of the thought of Bhāviveka in the lineage of Indian Mādhyamika thinkers. Based on this unique Madhyamaka thought, Tson kha pa created an unprecedentedly comprehensive Buddhist philosophical system which spans both *sūtra* and *mantra* traditions; he then went on to establish the dGe lugs pa sect. In the course of time, the dGe lugs pas increased in power not only in Buddhist circles but also in the political sphere. It is quite likely that, because of the uniqueness of his thought and perhaps because of advancement in political circles, Tson kha pa and his followers became the object of jealousy and antagonism among the masters of other sects. The attack against them, in the form of criticism, must have started even while Tson kha pa was still alive. Against such criticism on Tson kha pa's Madhyamaka thought, the followers of Tson kha pa responded by issuing rebuttals (*dgag lan*). This cycle of criticism-rebuttal went into motion in the early years of the 15th century and continued into the 20th century.

Of the records of such bilateral exchanges – criticisms on Tson kha pa's Madhyamaka thought from the masters of other sects and rebuttals from the dGe lugs pas – the writings on the controversies between the Sa skya pas and the dGe lugs pas are comparatively numerous and accessible today. The most representative critics of Tson kha pa among the Sa skya pa champions are Go rams pa bSod nams señ ge (1429–1489), gSer mdog Pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), and sTag tshañ lo tsā ba Śes rab rin chen (1405–?), who were given the title “*Go Śāk sTag gsum*.” The names of these three critics have been made still more famous by the fact that the followers of Tson kha pa composed the rebuttal treatises (*Go lan/ Śāk lan/ *sTag lan*) from the dGe lugs pa side to respond to

these masters.¹⁾ Even still, it is Roñ ston Śākya rgyal mtshan (aka sMra ba'i señ ge or Śes bya kun rig/ 1367–1449), a Sa skya pa master and a contemporary of Tsoñ kha pa, who was noteworthy for his criticism on Tsoñ kha pa's Madhyamaka doctrines.

Along with his teacher, gYag phrug Sañs rgyas dpal (1350–1414), Roñ ston might be more well-known as an author of the commentaries of *Abhisamayālamkāra*. However, Roñ ston was also prolific in writings in the area of the Madhyamaka studies, and attempted to issue critique on the Madhyamaka thought of Tsoñ kha pa either while Tsoñ kha pa was still alive or immediately following his death. He is evaluated as “the first scholar who opposed the dGe-lugs-pas” in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought, making him the forerunner of the criticism on Tsoñ kha pa.²⁾

In his youth, Roñ ston stayed at gSañ phu Monastery and learned the so-called gSañ phu studies. That is one of the reasons why he left numerous scholastic writings on Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka, Vijñāptimātra and Pramāṇa, etc., mostly in the *sūtra* tradition. Although his complete works were not published as a corpus (*gsuñ'bum*), his individually published writings are not small in number.³⁾ Among his writings, his criticism on the Madhyamaka thought of Tsoñ kha pa was launched mainly by the following two treatises: *Rigs lam kun gsal* (*Rigs gsal*), which is an introduction to the Madhyamaka thought (*dbu ma'i spyi don*) of Roñ ston, and *Zab mo'i De kho na nīd snañ ba* (*Roñ rTsa še ṭīk*), which is a commentary of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*) of Nāgārjuna. They are both surmised to have been composed approximately in 1420.⁴⁾ The former, in particular, unfolds comparatively substantial criticism on the philosophy of Tsoñ kha pa. The line of Roñ ston's arguments found in the writing has influenced Tibetan Buddhism in a significant way ever since.

First of all, the dGe lugs pas took to heart Roñ ston's severe criticism on Tsoñ kha pa and responded to it. The rebuttal treatise specific to Roñ ston's criticism can be called “*Roñ lan*,” so to speak, in the fashion of *Go lan/ Śāk lan/ *sTag lan*. Although any “*Roñ lan*” was not composed in actuality, mKhas grub (rje) dGe legs dpal bzai (1385–1438), one of the two major disciples of Tsoñ kha pa, responded to the criticism immediately by composing a voluminous treatise, *sTōñ thun chen mo* (*TTChen*), in which he cited many tenets and ideas from Roñ ston's Madhyamaka system and criticized them one by one.⁵⁾ Then, the Sa skya pas went on counterattack. Of the three Sa skya pas, *Go Śāk sTag gsum*, Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan are well-known as direct disciples of Roñ ston in

his last years, and the teacher's strong influence on them is quite evident in their works as I will show later on. Additionally, they rebutted the criticism on Roñ ston launched by mKhas grub rje and defended the teacher's thought. Be that as it may, Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan are great thinkers themselves, and as such, Go rams pa has offered critique on his own master's view,⁶⁾ and both of them tried to go beyond the scope of their master's system in an effort to create their own Madhyamaka thought. For this purpose, there were some aspects of Roñ ston's thought that were intentionally not incorporated into their respective systems. As such incidences suggest, the succession of Roñ ston's thought was not so simple and pure. This paper intends to analyze the specific features of Roñ ston's Madhyamaka system found mainly in *Rigs gsal*, and to clarify the mode and extent of the influences Roñ ston exerted on the later masters.

1. Critique on Tsoñ kha pa: Object of Negation by Reasoning

According to the *Biography of Roñ ston* (*Roñ rNam thar*) authored by Śākya mchog ldan, Roñ ston had debates with his contemporaries: Tsoñ kha pa himself and his two major disciples, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) and mKhas grub rje. It is also noted that he debated with Bo doñ Pañ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375–1451) and so on.⁷⁾ Whether they debated face to face or not is hard to determine, but it is certain at least that Roñ ston criticized Tsoñ kha pa in writing. His critique on Tsoñ kha pa can be viewed as one of the key features in Roñ ston's Madhyamaka system. In fact, Roñ ston unfolded a far-reaching criticism on Tsoñ kha pa's views in *Rigs gsal*. Of such numerous critical materials, this first section focuses on the argument regarding the "object of negation by reasoning" as an exemplar, in belief that the review of the argument is beneficial in elucidating Roñ ston's perspective.

It is well-known that Tsoñ kha pa divided the objects to be negated by the Mādhyamikas into the object of negation by reasoning (*rigs pa'i dgag bya*) and the object of negation by path (*lam gyi dgag bya*). Then, Tsoñ kha pa made it clear that the basic differences between the two representative schools of Mādhyamikas, the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas (*dBu ma Rañ rgyud pa*) in the line of Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas (*dBu ma Thal 'gyur ba*) in the descent of Candrakīrti, could be traced to their respective understandings of the object of negation by

reasoning, which represented their differing philosophical perspectives (*lta ba/ darśana*), this difference being the most serious among an abundance of differences on various topics between the two. Through this task, he identified the tenets of these two schools, and discussed the merits from the standpoint of the Madhyamaka system, establishing his own system that treats the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as absolute. Such views of Tsoñ kha pa must have caused a great stir in the Tibetan Buddhist circles where the thought of Svātantrikas seems to have been more dominant since the period of Earlier Propagation of Dharma (*sña dar*). Roñ ston himself, who had learned the gSañ phu studies, must have been astonished by Tsoñ kha pa's thought; and, as one of the leading figures of the Sa skya pa sect, he certainly could not have ignored Tsoñ kha pa's views. Roñ ston offered his critique against the basic ideas of Tsoñ kha pa's system in the context of "Object of Negation" in *Rigs gsal* (15a2–18a2).⁸⁾ The critique opens with his discussion on one of Tsoñ kha pa's key terms from his Madhyamaka system, "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*." It opens as follows:

《Tsoñ》 : Regarding the object of negation [by reasoning], someone says: "Because the 'true existence (*bden pa*)' means the existence from the object's own side without depending on a [subjective] mind, [the Mādhyamikas] negate it. Since even the Svātantrika [Mādhyamikas] accept the 'existence by one's own intrinsic characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*),' they acknowledge the existence of object from its own side. Therefore, because it follows that [the Svātantrikas] accept truly existent entities (*bden dños*), they are not the faultless Mādhyamikas. The difference between the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas is also nothing but this point."

《Roñ1》 : He is intent on an absurd argument fabricated without [accurate] learning of the Madhyamaka system. Whether "*rañ gi mtshan ñid/ svalakṣaṇa*" is to be accepted as "*definer* ('*jog byed*)" or as "true existence" [is a problem]. According to the former, since Master Candrakīrti also expounded "*rañ gi mtshan ñid (definer)*" [of all phenomena] from [visible] form (*rūpa*) to omnimodal knowledge (*sarvākārajñatā*), [given the opinion of Tsoñ kha pa that the Svātantrikas accept "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," Candrakīrti himself who accepts it] would be a Svātantrika.

《Roñ2》 : The second alternative is not appropriate either. This is

because Master Haribhadra [of the Svātantrika school] explained that [all phenomena] are merely nominally imputed, for he said “material world (*bhājanaloka*), ultimate (*paramārtha*), produced phenomena (*saṃskṛta*), nonproduced phenomena (*asaṃskṛta*) which are of the nature of imputation,” etc. [Similarly] this is because Jñānagarbha expounded that arisings that can withstand analysis by reasoning do not exist even merely conventionally. It is just as [his *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*] says, “If [you] say that owing to the strength of reasoning there is no arising even conventionally, it is correct; hence, it was taught that this [arising] is just as it appears.”⁹⁾

The “someone” in 《Tsoñ》 above is no other than Tsoñ kha pa himself. According to Tsoñ kha pa, the “true existence (*bden pa/bden grub*),” which is to be negated by the reasoning of Mādhyamikas (namely, Prāsaṅgikas), is “existence from the object’s own side (*yul rañ nos nas grub pa*)” or “existence by one’s own intrinsic characteristic (*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*),” and it can also be called “existence by one’s own intrinsic nature (*rañ bzin gyis grub pa*). The Svātantrikas, too, can be labelled “Mādhyamikas” because they negate the “true existence.” However, in the conventional sense in which the Mādhyamikas explain the mechanism of the conventional phenomena experienced by ordinary beings, the Svātantrika Mādhyamikas accept the “existence by one’s own intrinsic characteristic,” which is construed as the “true existence” from the standpoint of the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas. Therefore, the Svātantrikas lack, in actuality, the critical principle of Mādhyamikas. It is more suitable to call them “insufficient nominal Mādhyamikas.”

In 《Roñ1/2》 Roñ ston counters to the above view by examining the meaning of “*svalakṣaṇa*” contained in Tsoñ kha pa’s statement “*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa/*svalakṣaṇasiddha*.” Because the term “*svalakṣaṇa*” has multiple meanings, Tsoñ kha pa insisted that it was important to avoid confusion among a *svalakṣaṇa* (one’s own intrinsic characteristic) in the Madhyamaka thought, and a *svalakṣaṇa* (one’s own specific defining characteristic) in the Abhidharma literature, and also a *svalakṣaṇa* (particular characteristic) in the Pramāṇa literature.¹⁰⁾ However, the above critique in 《Roñ1》 does not take seriously, so to speak, what Tsoñ kha pa had pointed out. Roñ ston argues that when Tsoñ kha pa uses the word “*svalakṣaṇa*” to mean “*’jog byed/ ’vyavasthāpaka*,” it is also accepted by Candrakīrti. Depending on the context, the word “*’jog byed*” can signify a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as an *establisher* which

enables one's mental, verbal and bodily activities in relationship to the object. In this instance, however, the word "jog byed" can mean a *definer* such as "heat," which distinguishes "fire" from other elements such as "earth" and characterizes it specifically. It is equivalent to "svalakṣaṇa/asādhāraṇadharmā" in the Abhidharma literature, and if one borrows a common term from Indian philosophy, it would be "lakṣaṇa/mtshan ñid." If the term "svalakṣaṇa" means a *definer*, Candrakīrti explains "svalakṣaṇa" of visible form, etc., also in such treatise as his *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*. Therefore, it is not justifiable for Roñ ston to distinguish the Svāntarikas from the Prāsaṅgikas from the standpoint of the ontological argument of either approving or negating "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*."

The gist of the critique 《Roñ2》 is the same as the one of 《Roñ1》. According to Tsoñ kha pa, "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" is no other than the "true existence (*bden pa/ bden grub*)."¹¹⁾ Although the Svāntarikas themselves do not openly say so in their own words, seen from the viewpoint of the Prāsaṅgikas, they accept "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," which is tantamount to approving "true existence." Against such argument, Roñ ston counters by quoting sections from the treatises of Haribhadra and Jñānagarbha who belong to the Svāntarika school. He quotes such sections as "being of the nature of imputation" and "mere appearance" and the like, which purport the negation of true existence, and argues the coordination of the ontological standing between the Svāntarikas and the Prāsaṅgikas.¹¹⁾ As aforesaid, Tsoñ kha pa compared the two and he gave the Prāsaṅgikas predominance over the Svāntarikas. He clearly made his view of "Prāsaṅgika Absolutism." It is obvious that the aim of Roñ ston's critique of that view is to restore the status of the Svāntarikas, which Tsoñ kha pa badly devalued from the philosophical point of view.

After Roñ ston, his followers continued the tradition of negating the intrinsic differences between the Svāntarikas and the Prāsaṅgikas in their Madhyamaka thought. For instance, Śākya mchog ldan composed *sTon thun chuñ ba* (*TTChuñ*) in the tenth year of Roñ ston's death, arguing very much like his master Roñ ston in *TTChuñ* (54b6ff.). He criticized Tsoñ kha pa's view that the Svāntarikas accepted "*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*" as it appeared, which is to be negated by logical reasoning. Śākya mchog ldan says, "It follows that, just as the Svāntarikas, the Prāsaṅgikas also accept *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*," and "It follows that, just as the Prāsaṅgikas, the Svāntarikas also accept *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pa*."¹²⁾ In this way he inherited Roñ ston's style of argument. As for Go rams pa, he showed more direct influences from Roñ ston in his

Go Phar ṭik, written five years after the composition of *TTChun*: his explanations of the object of negation are almost word for word the same as the earlier quotations of 《Tsoñ》 and 《Roñ1/2》.¹³⁾

In this way Roñ, Go, and Śāk rejected the intrinsic differences between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas in contradiction to Tsoñ kha pa's views. Seen from a different perspective, this rejection can be interpreted as their intention to fuse the two systems.¹⁴⁾ With regard to this point, sTag tshañ lo tsā ba's comments are worthy of note. His stance itself of not giving much importance to the Svātantrikas and giving precedence to the Prāsaṅgikas, regarding the latter's thought as "Great Madhyamaka (*dBu ma chen po*)," is in line with the thinking of Tsoñ kha pa. According to his opinion, both traditions of the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas themselves had existed since long ago in India, but the combination and fusion of the two systems (*lugs gñis bsres pa*) was created artificially and occurred adventitiously in a later period.¹⁵⁾ When sTag tshañ lo tsā ba speaks of the "combination and fusion of the two systems," it is quite possible that he keeps in mind the stance of the three masters, especially Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan.

Furthermore, the above 《Roñ1/2》 is quoted quite literally and criticized in *TTChen* of mKhas grub rje.¹⁶⁾ This point has already been pointed out by Tauscher [1995: 148–149]. I will discuss the criticism on Roñ ston by mKhas grub rje in the following section.

2. Critique on Tsoñ kha pa: Deceptiveness of Emptiness

As I mentioned earlier, mKhas grub rje responded quickly to the criticism on Tsoñ kha pa by Roñ ston, and made his rebuttal in *TTChen*. There is an intriguing passage regarding the communication between Roñ ston and mKhas grub rje in *Roñ rNam thar* as follows:

Furthermore, when this Great One (Roñ ston) was invited to the "New Temple" (namely, dPal 'khor chos sde) by Śar kha ba Rab brtan 'phags (1389–1442) and rolled the Dharma Wheel, he acknowledged, "When being analyzed thoroughly by way of the Mādhyamikas' reasoning, all of the ultimate truths (*paramārthasatya*) are deceptive and belying." Then, the abbot of lCañ ra chos sde, dGe legs dpal (mKhas grub rje), could not tolerate it, uttered numerous harsh abuses and declared many times, "We shall debate."

However, the Great One was not engaged in face-to-face debate, and responded in letter addressed to the common disciples [of both sides]. The following was written in the letter:

Then, when you and your disciples and followers make inquiry into an utterly nonperceivable object, you accept *Yuktiṣa-ṣṭikāvṛtti* (*YṢVṛtti*) composed by Master Candrakīrti as a scriptural source (*āgama*), which has been purified by way of three sorts of examinations. It says, “Is even *nirvāṇa* a conventional truth (*samvṛtisatya*)? [Yes], it is so.” How is it?

By this comment, [mKhas grub rje’s] confidence was crushed to smithereens without remains.¹⁷⁾

This shows in brief what went on in the correspondence between Roñ ston and mKhas grub rje. Actually, there are several writings that describe vividly their relationship, but I will not engage in inquiry into the problems surrounding their debates any further.¹⁸⁾ Rather, in this second section, I will focus on the argument on the “deceptiveness of emptiness (*śūnyatā*)” mentioned above, which is another exemplar of Roñ ston’s critique on Tsoñ kha pa. I will review the characteristics of Tsoñ kha pa’s views and Roñ ston’s criticisms against them, and show how their opinions were inherited by the disciples of the respective masters.

Roñ ston’s theory on the deceptiveness of emptiness, in the passage of *Roñ rNam thar* above, is found in *Rigs gsal*. It says the following:

《 1: Deceptiveness of Emptiness 》 : Master Candrakīrti said in *YṢVṛtti*, “Is even *nirvāṇa* a conventional truth? [Yes], it is so.” He said [in that way] by [quoting] a passage from *Bhagavatī* (*Prajñāpāramitā*) as his authoritative source. It goes, “Even *nirvāṇa* is like a dream, like an illusion.....” The true existence (*bden pa/satya*) [of emptiness] can also be negated by the reasoning which analyzes the true existence and nontrue existence (*bden par yod med*) of emptiness. It implies that [emptiness] is proven to have a deceptive meaning, and therefore [it must be] a conventional [thing]. There are [three kinds of] reasoning: one that negates anything imagined through philosophically influenced apprehension; and another that negates anything imagined through innate apprehension; and yet another that negates what is imagined by a yogic mind. By the first two types of reasoning, [initially] in dependence on the ob-

ject of negation, such emptiness that is devoid of it can be established as the ultimate (*paramārtha*), whereas the deceptiveness [of the emptiness] can be established by the [third] reasoning such as “If something nonempty would exist,” or “If anything nonempty would not exist,” and the like. It is because [emptiness] exists [only] on verbal convention (*tha sñad du yod*) but does not truly exist (*bden par grub pa med pa*). It is like the appearance of a dream. Therefore, with the intention that [*dharmatā*] was a conventional [thing], [Candrakīrti] explained in *YSVṛtti*, “[*Nirvāṇa*] is said to be the ultimate truth only by worldly verbal convention (*’jig rten gyi tha sñad*).”

《2: Criticism on Conventional Existence of Emptiness》: Someone does not understand this meaning, and argues on the meaning of [the passage in] *YSVṛtti*, as follows: “It says that emptiness is conventionally existent (*saṃvṛtisat*), but it does not say that [emptiness] is a conventional [truth].” If so, when one is asked a question, “Is even *nirvāṇa* a conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*)?”, and if the person answers, “It exists conventionally (*saṃvṛtisat*)”, [such answer makes] the question and answer irrelevant [to each other], and it will be invalidated also by the aforementioned reasoning. As long as one does not realize, by depending on the reasoning that negates the true existence (*bden pa/ satya*) of emptiness, the fact that even emptiness has the nature of deceptiveness, even if one composed a treatise titled “*lHag mthoñ gi man ñag*,” one’s hard work would become futile, like a pagan’s ascetic practices.¹⁹⁾

The above passage in *Rigs gsal* is certainly the source of *Roñ rNam thar* which introduces Roñ ston’s views: “Ultimate truth is deceptive when analyzed by the Mādhyamikas’ reasoning” and “Even *nirvāṇa* is a conventional truth.” However, the opponent in *Rigs gsal* is not mKhas grub rje. The “*lHag mthoñ gi man ñag*” found toward the end of the quote 《2》 refers to, none other than, the “Chapter on *Vipaśyanā* (*lHag mthoñ chen mo/ lHag mthoñ chuñ ba*)” in *Lam rim chen mo* or *Lam rim chuñ ba* (*LRChuñ*) written by Tsoñ kha pa. Therefore, needless to say, the “someone” criticized in 《2》 should be regarded as Tsoñ kha pa. In fact, Tsoñ kha pa gives his opinion as follows in *LRChuñ* regarding the passage in question, “Even *nirvāṇa* is a conventional truth,” which is found in *YSVṛtti*:

As for the establishment of the existence of ultimate truth such as *nirvāṇa*, it is established to be merely existent according to conventional cognition (*tha sñad pa'i ses nor*), which is a conventional truth. However, this system does not assert that *nirvāṇa* is a conventional truth.²⁰⁾

According to Tsoñ kha pa, *nirvāṇa*, emptiness (*śūnyatā*), nonarising (*anutpāda*), and the like, are exclusively “ultimate truth.”²¹⁾ Although there are some sections in the Mādhyamika treatises that appear to negate the ultimateness of emptiness, such sort of negation does not refer to the “negation of ultimateness of emptiness,” in other words, it does not mean the “conventionalness of emptiness” or “deceptiveness of emptiness,” but it does mean the “negation of the ultimate existence of emptiness” or “negation of the true existence of emptiness,” namely, “conventional existence of emptiness” or “nontrue existence of emptiness.” In this way, the grasp of the fact “emptiness, which is no other than ultimate truth, exists conventionally” represents a special feature of Tsoñ kha pa’s Madhyamaka thought. It is precisely this point that drew Roñ ston’s criticism such as we have seen in the section 《2》.

Roñ ston’s own view of this point is expounded in the above section 《1》. It can be summarized as follows: also in Roñ ston’s system, “emptiness, which is the negation of true existence” is called “ultimate.” It does not exist in actuality, because it is arrived at dependent on the notion of the “object of negation.”²²⁾ As Tsoñ kha pa did, Roñ ston also negates the true existence of emptiness, but for Roñ ston, the “negation of the true existence of emptiness” or “nontrue existence of emptiness” does not imply the “conventional existence of emptiness” as held by Tsoñ kha pa. It means the “deceptiveness of emptiness” or “conventionalness of emptiness.” Roñ ston criticizes the “conventional existence (*saṃvṛtīsat*) of emptiness” of Tsoñ kha pa, but acknowledges emptiness in its “existence in verbal convention (*vyavahārasat*).”

The “*saṃvṛtīsat*” and “*vyavahārasat*” mentioned immediately above are confusing. However, if we consult the passage in *Rigs gsal* on the dual meaning of the word “nature (*rañ bzin/ svabhāva*),” the difference of the two terms can be understood as follows: emptiness is not existent conventionally (*saṃvṛtīsat*); however, the saying “Emptiness exists” was stated merely verbally (*tha sñad du/ vyavahārataḥ*), in order to encourage the people intent on entering the paths to Buddha or to shut out the fear of those who are attached to “substantial entities.”²³⁾

At a glance, this Roñ ston's view reminds us of “concordant ultimate (*mthun pa'i don dam*),” which is a characteristic idea often seen in the Svātantrika treatises, for example, “the ‘negation of arising (nonarising)’ or ‘negation of true existence (emptiness)’ can be acknowledged as ‘ultimate’ because they are concordant with ‘thusness (*tattva*),’ yet even nonarising and emptiness are nothing but ‘conventional’ when analyzed thoroughly by reasoning (i.e., by the third reasoning of Roñ ston).”²⁴) It is true that the argument on “deceptiveness of emptiness” in *Rigs gsal* is evolved on the basis of a passage from *YSVṛtti*, a Prāsaṅgika treatise, but it seems correct to conclude that Roñ ston owes a lot in substance to the Svātantrika treatises in order to develop his opinion for this controversy.

Lastly, I would like to point out an interesting incident regarding the developments that followed the controversy between Tsoñ kha pa and Roñ ston. It started out with mKhas grub rje, a disciple of Tsoñ kha pa, refuting Roñ ston's view in *TTChen* as usual, quoting the *Rigs gsal* 《1》 introduced above.²⁵) Then, in his *TTChun* (65b3ff.), Śākya mchog ldan defended his master, Roñ ston, by citing and critiquing the “criticism on Roñ ston by mKhas grub rje” found in *TTChen* (K.68b1-7, H.94b4-95a5, S.175, 5-176, 6), wherein he called mKhas grub rje “one who takes pride as a sage although not so wise (*mi mkhas śin mkhas par rlom pa kha cig*).” Śākya mchog ldan quotes in *TTChun* the passages of *Rigs gsal* (31b2-4, 31a4-b1, 4a4-5) as sayings of “Our Venerable Conductor and Lord of Dharma (*kho bo cag gi 'dren pa dam pa chos rje*).” Judging from the arrangement and variants of the passages cited, they are not direct quotations from *Rigs gsal* itself, but they are precise re quoting of the statements of Roñ ston, which mKhas grub rje quoted as the opinion of his opponent in *TTChen* (K.67a7-b4, H.93a4-b2, S.172, 9-173, 3). In the passage of *Roñ rNam thar* cited at the beginning of this section, Śākya mchog ldan introduced the controversy on the conventionalness of *nirvāṇa* or emptiness as the “controversy between Roñ ston and mKhas grub rje.” It seems to me that the portrayal of the controversy owes much to his exclusive dependence on the mKhas grub rje's passage in *TTChen*, which criticized Roñ ston's views, rather than on the Roñ ston's passage in *Rigs gsal* itself.

3. Critique on Candrakīrti

Critique on the Prāsaṅgika Champion Candrakīrti is another main pillar of Roñ ston's Madhyamaka thought. *Roñ rNam thar* has the following:

[Roñ ston] blamed [Candrakīrti] little by little – “Regarding the meaning of the treatises composed by Master Candrakīrti, there are no incorrect parts; however regarding the terminology, there are many mistaken parts” – and in order to satirize other [masters who highly evaluated Candrakīrti], he was lightly laughing at them jokingly. At that time, he was visited by some shreds of dreams that were not concordant with that [his opinion]. Therefore, he believed in the Venerable Master vehemently, and he composed especially the treatise which explained the intentions of the [Master’s] teachings.²⁶⁾

If that is correct, Roñ ston was initially critical of Candrakīrti, but later he came to respect Candrakīrti, so much so that he annotated Candrakīrti’s treatise. However, the authenticity of such change in Roñ ston’s thought, shown in the biography, is suspicious. It is true that he has written the commentary of Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*MAv*), *Roñ Jug ṭik*. However, while Roñ ston’s representative Madhyamaka treatise, *dBu ma’i spyi don* (*Rigs gsal*), was written when his Madhyamaka thought reached its maturity and contains numerous criticisms on Tsoñ kha pa and Candrakīrti, *Roñ Jug ṭik*, on the other hand, is simply an explanatory work without any criticisms on Tsoñ kha pa nor Candrakīrti. This seems to suggest that *Roñ Jug ṭik* was Roñ ston’s early work.

Be that as it may, in the chapters dealing with the “Selflessness of Person (*puḍgalanairātmya*)” and “Selflessness of Phenomena (*dharmānairātmya*)” of *Rigs gsal*, Roñ ston criticizes Candrakīrti’s thought itself. Although the criticism attacks various aspects of the thought, in this third section I will focus on the priority of the “negation of innate self-grasping (*lhan skyes kyi bdag ’dzin*)” and “negation of philosophically influenced self-grasping (*kun brtags kyi bdag ’dzin*)” as an exemplar of his criticism, which was argued in relationship to the selflessness of person in *Rigs gsal*.²⁷⁾

As commonly known, when one tries to ascertain the “object of negation by reasoning,” Tsoñ kha pa underscored the importance of the discernment of “innate grasping of true existence,” and also that of “true existence” grasped by it, which pertain to both “person” and *dharmā*. But that idea had been originally stated by Candrakīrti in the context of “Selflessness of Person” in *MAv*. Also, in the context of “Object of Negation” in *Rigs gsal* (16b2–17a3), Roñ ston introduces the view that the object of innate ignorance should be given priority for negation, and

mounts his criticism on it. In that context, he seems to cite it as a view of Tsoñ kha pa in particular. However, in the chapter dealing with “Selflessness of Person” in *Rigs gsal* (39a1–49b1), the same opinion is attributed to no other than Candrakīrti, and Roñ ston mounts severe criticism on it. *Rigs gsal* has Candrakīrti’s view as follows:

It is also meaningless to meditate on the nonexistence of “self” which is imaginarily constructed by heretics [based on the philosophical tenets]. It is because the purpose of the meditation on selflessness is the cessation of self-grasping, which is the fundamental [cause] of *saṃsāra*; however, self-grasping, fundamental [cause] of *saṃsāra* cannot cease by the meditation on the nonexistence of “self” imaginarily constructed by heretics. This is because [such practice] does not terminate the innate self-grasping [with which we are born]. If [an opponent should] say that it can be terminated by meditating on the nonexistence of “eternal-single-independent self,” [then], even though a philosophically influenced self-grasping ceases, the innate grasping [itself] does not cease.²⁸⁾

Candrakīrti himself does not use such special terms as “*than skyes kyi bdag ’dzin*” or “*kun brtags kyi bdag ’dzin*,” but he says the following in *MAv*:

When realizing selflessness, [someone] eliminates the “eternal self,” however he does not even acknowledge that this [eternal self] is the basis for self-grasping. Therefore, to say, “the wrong view of self (*bdag lta ba/ ātmadr̥ṣṭi*) is uprooted by knowing selflessness” is, indeed, marvelous!

[Allegorically speaking, a person] is seeing a snake abiding in a crack [in the wall] of his house, [then, another person comes and tries to] eliminate the fear [of an elephant] saying there are no elephants here, and, [on top of that], goes on to eliminate the fear of a snake. That would surely be a laughingstock [of other sages]. (*MAv*, 6.140/141)

Regarding the argument above, Tsoñ kha pa concludes, “When Buddhists, other than Prāsaṅgikas, and heretics try to determine the reality of things, because they do not know how to negate the objects grasped by the innate self-grasping, they waste their time in futile discussion.”²⁹⁾ Therefore, it is highly likely that the above quoted view, attrib-

uted to Candrakīrti in *Rigs gsal*, was Candrakīrti's own view merely paraphrased by Roñ ston consulting Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation.

In this way, having regarded the view, "the negation of the object of innate self-grasping should be given priority," as the opinion of Candrakīrti himself, Roñ ston mounts rather detailed criticism on the views of Candrakīrti in *Rigs gsal* (45a1–46b5). The crux of his criticism is as follows:

[Someone] says, "Then, it follows absurdly that by negating the 'arising from the four extremes (*mtha' bzi'i skye ba*)' the apprehension of true existence (*bden 'dzin*) would not cease. This is because the [innate] apprehension of true existence is seen [to exist] even among ordinary people who do not understand the 'arising from the four extremes,' [which was imaginarily constructed by philosophical tenets], to be true." When asked [regarding the selflessness of phenomena, in this way], how would [Candrakīrti] answer? ³⁰⁾

Roñ ston's critique can be sorted out in this fashion: According to Candrakīrti, in the case of the selflessness of a person, "eternal-single-independent self" is an object artificially constructed by philosophical tenets, and that is why the objects of the innate self-grasping, which every one of us has within, will not be negated, even though the "philosophical self" is negated. By the way, regarding the selflessness of phenomena, when the Mādhyamikas negate "true arising," they negate the "arising from the four extremes," namely, "arising from self," "arising from another" and so on. However, these are all philosophically constructed arising and ordinary people do not understand the mode of arising of things in that way. Hence, according to Candrakīrti, as with the case of the selflessness of person, in the case of the selflessness of phenomena, the "true arising" would not be negated by the negation of the "arising from the four extremes."

Incidentally, Roñ ston's logic above was handed down by his Sa skya pa disciples, as I will touch upon later. It is noteworthy that his logic was also recorded as "Roñ ston's critique on Candrakīrti" in the biography of Bo doñ Paṅ chen, who is said to have debated with Roñ ston.³¹⁾ The above logic must have been famous as unique to Roñ ston's arguments.

After criticizing Candrakīrti's idea in that way, Roñ ston explains his own view, "Toward the advocates of philosophical doctrines, the

Mādhyamikas conduct negation and affirmation through reasoning. What sort of understanding would true reasoning bring about to ordinary people? Without cognizing such significant point, it is quite laughable to point out the fault in the apprehension of philosophically constructed self as the object of negation.”³²⁾ According to Roñ ston, such profound thought of the Mādhyamikas as “negation of arising from the four extremes” is to be expounded just to those philosophically oriented, who are capable of arguing with reasoning. It is meaningless to explain it to the common people who are not at all equipped with reasoning skills. Therefore, according to his system, the Mādhyamikas basically negate the “philosophically imaginarily constructed self,” which is asserted by the advocates of the philosophical doctrines.

However, Roñ ston does not mean that the Mādhyamikas do not negate the “self” grasped by the innate ignorance among the simple ordinary people who have nothing to do with philosophical doctrines such as “self is eternal.” According to Roñ ston, ordinary people tend to grasp, quite unconsciously, the existence of “self” based on such characteristics as “eternity” and so on, but advocates of philosophical doctrines, on the other hand, seek out the characteristic features of “self” consciously and establish the grounds for the existence of “self.” Therefore, when the characteristics such as “eternity” and the like, which were imaginarily set forth by philosophical tenets, were negated, the common people would lose the grounds for adhering to the existence of “self.”³³⁾

In concluding the series of his arguments, Roñ ston recapitulates, “Except for Candrakīrti (*Zla ba ma gtogs pa*), many Indian great masters such as Bhāviveka, Śrīgupta, Śāntarakṣita, Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu are intent on explaining ‘selflessness’ through negating philosophically founded characteristic features such as ‘eternity’ and so forth.”³⁴⁾ The statement of excluding Candrakīrti from among the great Indian masters shows plainly the specific feature of Roñ ston’s Madhyamaka thought, namely, his stance of taking the side of Svātantrikas in particular and critiquing Candrakīrti’s heterodoxy.

I will outline the later developments of the “Critique on Candrakīrti.” First of all, on the dGe lugs pa side, in his *TTChen*, mKhas grub rje cited the theories in *Rigs gsal* as the views of a “certain person,” as usual, and then, argued against them.³⁵⁾ It is noteworthy that he said the following in a rebuttal: “you wanted to repudiate those texts of Candrakīrti (*khyod Zla ba’i gzuñ de dag ’gog par ’dod pas ni*).” mKhas grub rje, too, thinks that the above mentioned criticism of Roñ ston was di-

rected, not toward Tsoñ kha pa, but to Candrakīrti himself.

On the other hand, how did the Sa skya pa masters receive this? In this case, it is intriguing to note that the mode of reception is different from that of the earlier “Critique on Tsoñ kha pa.” For example, in the annotative notes to the two verses – *MAv*, 6.140/141 – , Go rams pa stated as follows:

《Go》 : Buddhist [masters] who accept the identity of “self” and aggregates (*skandha*) insist, “‘Self,’ which is the object of innate I-grasping (*nar ’dzin*), is the aggregates. When one realizes selflessness, he eliminates the eternal self.” [One of the verses, *MAv*, 6.140] shows “contradiction of acceptances” in their insistence. Its example is shown by a following verse (*MAv*, 6.141).

《Tsoñ》 : Someone (Tsoñ kha pa) had not understood this point and explained the meaning [of the verses] in the following manner: “It follows that by cognizing the nonexistence of philosophically grasped ‘self,’ the cognition of the nonexistence of ‘self,’ which is apprehended by the innate self-grasping, is not correct. This is because the ‘philosophically grasped self’ is not the ‘self grasped by the innate self-grasping.’” That is, it is written [in *dGons gsal*, K.231b3–4, S.387, 12–16].....

《Roñ》 : Then, the scholar of scholars (Roñ ston) stated: “If so, it follows absurdly that by negating the arising from the four extremes, the arising, which is the object of innate [ignorance], would not be negated. This is because the arising from the four extremes is imaginarily constructed [by philosophical doctrines].” Then, there are no answers to it.³⁶⁾

Roñ ston might have adopted the Tsoñ kha pa’s annotative remarks on *MAv*, 6.140/141. As Tsoñ kha pa had done, he also understood that the section *MAv*, 6.140/141 shows one of the principles of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka system – “The negation of the object of innate self-grasping takes precedence over the negation of the object of self-grasping influenced by philosophical doctrines.” And then, he went on to criticize the view of both Tsoñ kha pa and Candrakīrti. As for Go rams pa’s interpretation, as seen in 《Roñ》 above, he adopted the aforementioned Roñ ston’s logic of criticism itself.³⁷⁾ However, as seen in 《Go》, he interprets the two verses – *MAv*, 6.140/141 – differently from Roñ ston or Tsoñ kha pa; he construes them to mean that they merely showed the oppo-

ment's "contradiction of acceptances." Then, in 《Tsoñ》, he took the principle to be merely Tsoñ kha pa's view, and concentrated on criticizing only Tsoñ kha pa, without criticizing Candrakīrti. Such an attitude of Go rams pa is fully shared by Śākya mchog ldan in particular, and also by sTag tshañ lo tsā ba.³⁸⁾

Blunt criticism toward Candrakīrti's views is not found in the Madhyamaka texts of both Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan. Roñ ston criticized Tsoñ kha pa's "Prāsaṅgika Absolutism," which had held the Svātantrikas in low esteem; then, he interpreted the Prāsaṅgika views of Candrakīrti as closely possible to the Svātantrika views in an effort to dissolve the virtual differences between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas, making the difference one of form. However, when such attempts would no longer contain Candrakīrti's views within certain limits, he mounted his criticism on Candrakīrti himself. Even though both Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan received a great deal of influence from their master, they did not inherit the criticism on Candrakīrti from Roñ ston's Madhyamaka system. They basically aligned themselves with the Svātantrikas as Roñ ston had done, but, unlike Roñ ston, they reinterpreted the Prāsaṅgika views of Candrakīrti in a different line of thought from the one of Tsoñ kha pa, and absorbed Candrakīrti's views into their own system; that is to say, they seem to have intended to build a Madhyamaka system in which the thought of Svātantrikas and that of Prāsaṅgikas are combined and fused together. In the passage of *Roñ rNam thar* introduced at the beginning of this section, Śākya mchog ldan said, "Roñ ston was initially critical of Candrakīrti, but later he came to have esteem for him." It is likely that such a passage reflects Śākya mchog ldan's own view of Candrakīrti.

Conclusion

Not only did Roñ ston criticize the Prāsaṅgika Absolutism of Tsoñ kha pa in Tibet, but also he criticized retroactively the Great Prāsaṅgika Master in India, Candrakīrti himself. Therefore, he must have had great sympathy for the Svātantrika tradition in the area of Madhyamaka studies. In effect, there are a number of writings to substantiate that point. However, it is quite interesting to note that, according to a Sa skya pa master, Nag dbañ chos grags (1572–1641), the works of Roñ ston, under the influence of Nāgārjuna and his disciples, are in line with the style of

Prāsaṅgikas. There are other materials that place Roñ ston in the lineage of Prāsaṅgikas.³⁹⁾ In this way, the evaluation of Roñ ston is not unequivocal. Lastly, I would like to review the “relationship between Roñ ston and Prāsaṅgikas” to conclude this paper.

According to the biography, while Roñ ston was still studying at gSañ phu Monastery in his youth, he acquired the Svātantrika studies descending from rÑog Blo ldan śes rab (1059–1109), and, at Thaṅ sag Monastery, he learned the Prāsaṅgika studies descending from Pa tshab Ńi ma grags (1055–?) under sPrul sku gZon nu rgyal mtshan, who is a successor of Žañ Thaṅ sag pa Ye śes ’byuñ gnas, who, in turn, was one of the four great disciples of Pa tshab.⁴⁰⁾ Roñ ston’s commentary on *MAv*, *Roñ ’Jug t̃ik*, might be a result of his study of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka at Thaṅ sag. However, it is not substantial enough to place Roñ ston in the lineage of Prāsaṅgikas just because of this commentary. Changed from the time of *Roñ ’Jug t̃ik*, now Roñ ston criticizes Candrakīrti’s views in *Rigs gsal*, the major work in the area of Madhyamaka thought.

The colophon of *Rigs gsal* is another interesting source that shows where Roñ ston’s thought belongs. It says as follows:

Roñ ston sMra ba’i seṅ ge Śākya rgyal mtshan from rGyal mo roñ in eastern [Tibet] who holds on his crown the dust from the feet of [both] Buddha-śrī, who was the Second Glorious Sa skya’i Paṇḍita and a scholar-practitioner superior to all other rivals; and “New Candrakīrti,” whose strength of intellect was fully augmented by the nectar of elegant sayings of Žañ Thaṅ sag pa Ye śes ’byuñ gnas ’od⁴¹⁾

Here are mentioned two masters – Buddha-śrī, aka gYag phrug Saṅs rgyas dpal, and “New Candrakīrti (*Zla grags gsar ma*).” The word “New Candrakīrti” could mean a singular or plural interpreters of Candrakīrti, who are descended from Žañ Thaṅ sag pa.⁴²⁾ Therefore, these two masters can be considered to represent the lineage of Svātantrika studies and that of Prāsaṅgika studies of Roñ ston respectively. The question remains whether Roñ ston made statements to indicate his intention to integrate the traditions of the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas in *Rigs gsal*. In any case, the colophon above does not provide sufficient proof to place Roñ ston particularly in the lineage of Prāsaṅgika masters.

As is commonly known, Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169), who is a well-known logician, was the forerunner of the critics of Candrakīrti

in Tibetan Buddhist history. It is of my opinion that Roñ ston's critique on Candrakīrti needs to be placed along the line of criticism of his predecessors such as Phya pa. However, it is intriguing to think that there have not been any noteworthy critics of Candrakīrti since Roñ ston. It is likely that critiquing on Candrakīrti became a taboo after the death of Roñ ston approximately in the middle of the 15th century, as the influence of the dGe lugs pas waxed. The three masters, *Go Śāk sTag gsum*, criticized Tsoñ kha pa's interpretation of Candrakīrti, not Candrakīrti himself, and attempted to incorporate Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka thought into their own respective systems. Śākya mchog ldan showed how his Madhyamaka system came down to him in his *Śāk Jug ũik* as follows: from Candrakīrti to Pa tshab ũi ma grags; from him to Zañ Thañ sag pa Ye śes 'byuñ gnas; from him to Roñ ston; and from him to Śākya mchog ldan himself.⁴³⁾ It might be a reflection of the milieu of Tibetan Buddhist circles following the death of Roñ ston, in which Candrakīrti was reevaluated, that Roñ ston was placed in the line of Prāsaṅgikas in this way.

Notes

*Parts of this paper are based on an unpublished dissertation submitted to Tohoku University in 2001 titled *Chibetto chūgan shisōshi no kenkyū* (*A Study of the History of Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought – Criticisms on Tsoñ kha pa & Candrakīrti by the Sa skya pa Master, Roñ ston sMra ba'i sen ge-*) by M. Kobayashi.

- 1) As for the summary of the history of the controversies between the Sa skya pas and the dGe lugs pas on Madhyamaka thought, refer to Tauscher [1995: 35–39]; Ruegg [2000: 60–69]. Major critical works on Tsoñ kha pa's Madhyamaka system by *Go Śāk sTag gsum* are as follows: Go rams pa wrote *lTa ba'i śan 'byed* (1468), and *lTa ba ñan sel* (*Go Jug ũik*), a commentary of *Madhyamakāvātāra* (*MAv*). The same author also has *Go Phar ũik* (1464), a commentary of *Abhisamayālamkāra*, and *Ñes don rab gsal*, an introduction to Madhyamaka thought, etc.; criticisms on Tsoñ kha pa are found, but they are not so detailed. Cf. Kobayashi [1999: 204] [2000: 99,n.1]. Śākya mchog ldan wrote *sToñ thun chuñ ba* (*TTChuñ/* ca. 1459) and a voluminous work, *dBu ma rnam ñes* (1477). *sPriñs yig Tshañs pa'i 'khor lo* (*The Complete Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 390–399, 8b3–13a2) is a small piece, but almost the entire verse is quoted, for criticism in *Śāk Lan*, mentioned below, under the name of “*rTsod yig tshigs bcad ma*” and the like. It forms the major object of *Śāk Lan*'s criticism. It is probably a work of 1489. Cf. Kobayashi [2004]. Although there is a criticism on Tsoñ kha pa also in *Śāk Jug ũik* (1468), a commentary on *MAv*, it is not substantial but fragmentary. sTag tshañ lo tsā

ba's *Grub mtha' kun ses* (*rtsa ba* was written in 1463) is well known as a "treatise that has posed 18 difficult questions to Tsoñ kha pa." Cf. Mimaki [1978: 109, n. 40]; Matsumoto [1997: 195–204]; Cabezón [1992: 391–392]; Kobayashi [2001]; Hopkins [2003: 527ff.]. As for the rebuttals from the dGe lugs pa side, responding swiftly to *lTa ba'i san 'byed* of Go rams pa, 'Jam dbyaṅs dGa' ba'i blo gros (aka Legs pa chos 'byor/1429–1503), who was the same age as Go rams pa, wrote *lTa ba nan pa thams cad tshar gcod pa'i bstan bcos gNam lcags 'khor lo* (Toh No. 6843) in 1477, while Go rams pa was still alive, to the effect of repudiating his criticisms. Cf. Kobayashi [1999: 202–205] [2000: 72–77]. Later, Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1544/46) started writing, toward the end of his life, *Zab mo ston pa nid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lTa ba nan pa'i mun sel* (*Śāk Lan & Go Lan*, Toh No. 6842). The first half is intended as a rebuttal to counter the three works of Śākya mchog ldan – two of them are aforementioned *sPrinṣ yig Tshaṅs pa'i 'khor lo* and *dBu ma rnam nes*, and thirdly *Lugs gnīs rnam 'byed* (*Two Controversial Mādhyamika Treatises*, New Delhi, 1974). The second half is to counter *Go 'jug tīk* of Go rams pa. He was able to complete the first half, *Śāk Lan*, but the second half, *Go Lan*, was left incomplete because of his death. His direct disciple, bDe legs űi ma, picked up the thread where his master left off and completed the work. bDe legs űi ma himself also wrote a commentary of *MAv, dBu ma dgoṅs rgyan rin po che'i 'phreñ ba* (Toh No. 6839), which includes many pieces of criticism against Go rams pa. Cf. Kobayashi [1999] [2000] [2004]. To counter sTag tshañ lo tsā ba's *Grub mtha' kun ses*, Pañ chen Bla ma Blo bzañ chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1570–1662) wrote *sGra pa Śes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan Luñ rigs señ ge'i na ro* (Toh No. 5952), and Phur lcog űag dbaṅ byams pa (1682–1762) wrote *sTag tshañ lo tṣha ba'i brgal lan rDo rje'i gzegs ma* (Toh No. 6154). Cf. Cabezón [1995] [2001: 242–244]; Matsumoto [1997: 197–199]; Kobayashi [2001]. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that one of the important motives for 'Jam dbyaṅs bṣad pa (1648–1722) to compose the famous *Grub mtha' chen mo* was to criticize sTag tshañ lo tsā ba. Cf. Matsumoto [1997: 199]; Hopkins [2003: 5].

- 2) Roerich [1949: 1080]. Cf. *Roñ rNam thar*, 22b3–7; Jackson [1988: II]; Tauscher [1995: 35–36].
- 3) For life and works of Roñ ston, refer to Jackson [1988] [1989]. Several of Roñ ston's works have been published after the research work of D.P. Jackson. A systematic review of the information on works of Roñ ston is awaited. As for the so-called "gSañ phu studies," see Hadano [1987: 146].
- 4) There are other materials that introduce a work of Roñ ston with the title of "*dBu ma'i spyi don Rigs tshogs gnad kyi zla zer*," etc. Although I cannot explain in detail here, this "*dBu ma'i spyi don*" is considered to be no other than *Rigs gsal* in which Roñ ston expounds his Madhyamaka thought systematically. Cf. *Grub mtha'i san 'byed*, 57a6; Ruegg [2000: 66, n. 149]; Jackson [1988: XIV]. Regarding the years for *Rigs gsal* and *Roñ rTsa se tīk*, colophons indicate that both treatises were initiated at Sa skya Monastery

in gTsañ region and completed at Nur smig Monastery. Roñ ston made three pilgrimages to gTsañ region in his life. The pilgrimage in question here must be his second one (1416–1421). He must have written both texts on his way back from gTsañ to dBus region in ca.1420. Cf. Cabezón [2001: 245–246]; Tauscher [1995: 36, n. 86]; Jackson [1988: IV]. Besides these materials, one can gain access to Roñ ston’s commentary on *MAv*, *Roñ Jug t̄ik*, which is a comparatively substantial work on his Madhyamaka thought. However, this treatise seems to have been Roñ ston’s early work before his Madhyamaka thought came into maturity; one cannot find any criticism on Tsoñ kha pa in it. Cf. Tauscher [1995: 36, n. 86]. Roñ ston had written the commentaries on each of three volumes of *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla in the year about 1430, and the texts were published recently. They are precious publications because the commentaries were highly evaluated as “superior pieces among Roñ ston’s works” (*Roñ rNam thar*, 3b5–7, 35b6), these pieces being the only “commentary on *Bhāvanākrama*” available today. However, as one may conjecture, they do not deal with the theoretical aspects of Roñ ston’s own Madhyamaka thought systematically. Moreover, in the area of research on Roñ ston’s Madhyamaka thought, his commentaries on *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, etc., are important sources which provide much information not to be ignored.

- 5) This fact has been pointed out in Tauscher [1995: 149, n. 314]; Tsultrim/Fujinaka [2002] [2003]. Cf. Cabezón [1997: 102, n. 23]. As for *TTChen*, mKhas grub rje wrote it at the famous dPal ’khor sde chen in rGyal rtse, but the exact year has not been identified. According to Cabezón [1992: 16–17], *TTChen* was written between 1424–28. Cf. Kuijp [1986: 23–24].
- 6) Cf. Cabezón [2003: 304–305].
- 7) *Roñ rNam thar*, 22a6–25a1.
- 8) Between “object of negation by reasoning” and “object of negation by path,” Tsoñ kha pa stressed the importance for the investigation of the former. Also in the context of “Object of Negation” in *Rigs gsal*, the argument focuses solely on “object of negation by reasoning.” However, the problem is not so simple; it is to be noted that *Rigs gsal* states two modes of dividing the object of negation. One of them is as follows: <1> *Rigs gsal*, 10a6–b1: *kun rdzob kyi zur du smos pa’i bden pa ni gn̄is te/ bden par gn̄as pa dan̄/ snañ ba’o// dan̄ po ni rigs pa’i dgag bya yin la/ phyi ma ni lam gyi spañ bya’o//* Cf. Tauscher [1995: 89]. Regarding these two divisions, Roñ ston goes into depth to explain them in other treatises. The passage in one of such treatises, *Roñ Jug t̄ik* (38a2–5), is noteworthy, because it is found almost word for word in *Go Jug t̄ik* (T. 43a2–b1, S. 101, 13–102, 15). It is quite clear that Go rams pa adopted Roñ ston’s view. To make the matter more complicated, Roñ ston says the following in the context of “Object of Negation” in *Rigs gsal*: <2> *Rigs gsal*, 16a5–6: *’dir dgag bya ni gn̄is te/ dños dan̄/ ched du bya ba’o// dan̄ po la yan̄/gtan tshigs dan̄/ thal ’gyur gyi dgag bya gn̄is so//* Cf. Tauscher [1995: 89–90, n. 187]. It can be suspected that the second mode of division might have been a Sa skya pa tradition, because there are more detailed refer-

ences in Go rams pa and Śākya mchog ldan's works. In reference to *Go Phar ṭik* (285b5–286a2) and *dBu ma rnam ṅes* (Ña 16b6–7), “*dños kyi dgag bya*” and “*ched du bya ba'i dgag bya*” could mean respectively “all discursive proliferations (*prapañca*) to be actually negated by the use of logical reasoning (*hetu*) or *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*)” and “apprehension of true existence (*bden 'dzin*), the negation of which is the aim to be accomplished through the actual proof of negation.”

- 9) *Rigs gsal*, 15a2–6: *gsum pa dgag bya la/* 《Tsoñ》 *'ga'zig blo la ma ltos pa yul rañ nos nas grub pa bden pa'i don yin pas de dgag go// Rañ rgyud pas kyañ rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par 'dod pas na/ yul rañ nos nas grub par khas blañs pa'i phyir bden dños khas blañs par 'gyur bas dBu ma pa skyon med min la/ Thal Rañ gi khyad par yañ 'di ñid do zes zer ba ni* 《Roñ1》 *dBu ma'i gzuñ lugs la ma sbyañs par rañ bzo'i blun tshig lhur byed pa ste/ rañ gi mtshan ñid ces pa 'jog byed la 'dod dam/ bden pa la 'dod/ dan po ltar na slob dpon Zla bas kyañ gzugs nas rnam mkhyen gyi bar gyi rañ gi mtshan ñid gsuñs pas Rañ rgyud par 'gyur la/* 《Roñ2》 *phyogs gñis pa yañ mi 'thad de/ slob dpon Senge bzañ pos/btags pa'i bdag snod kyi 'jig rten dan don dam pa dan 'dus byas dan 'dus ma byas^a) zes sogs kyi(s) tha sñad btags pa tsam du gsuñs pa'i phyir dan/ Ye ses sniñ pos rigs pas dpyad bzod kyi skye ba tha sñad tsam du yañ med par gsuñs pa'i phyir/ gal te rigs pa'i stobs kyis ni// kun rdzob tu yañ mi skye zer// de bden de yi phyir na 'di// ji ltar snañ bzin yin par gsuñs//^b) zes pa ltar ro//* (The underlined parts are cited in *TTChen*, K. 64a1–3, H. 88a6–b3, S. 163, 9–18. Cf. Tauscher [1995: 148–149]; Tsultrim/Fujinaka [2003: 326–327, n. 9].) a) *Abhisamayālamkārikākārikāsāstravivṛti*, H. Amano ed. (Heirakuji Shoten, 2000), 56, 3–4: *prajñāptiyātmakasya [sūnyatā-] bhājanalokaṣaramāthasamskṛtāsamskṛta-*. b) *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, k. 20.
- 10) As for three ways to translate “*svalakṣaṇa*,” refer to Ruegg [2000: 238, n.6].
- 11) Cf. *Roñ rTsa sé ṭik*, 25,19–26,16; Cabezón [2003: 311, n.31]. Also see Cabezón [1997: 102–104].
- 12) E.g. *TTChun*, 58b3–4, 59a3–4.
- 13) *Go Phar ṭik*, 285b1–5. As in *Rigs gsal*, in *Go Phar ṭik* (1464), Go rams pa examined two choices of the meaning of “*svalakṣaṇa*,” “*'jog byed*” and “*rigs pas dpyad bzod (= bden pa)*,” but in his *lTa ba'i śan 'byed* (S. 93, 5–94, 6, T. 29a6–b4), written four years later (1468), another choice of “*rañ mtshan dan spyi mtshan gyi ya gyal du gyur pa'i rañ mtshan*” was added, increasing the number of choices to three.
- 14) Cabezón [2003] calls Tsoñ kha pa and Red mda' ba, who clearly differentiate between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas, “hard doxographer,” and Roñ ston and Go rams pa, “soft doxographer.”
- 15) *Grub mtha' kun ses* (*'grel*), G. 69a5–6, T.86a2–3, C.146, 7–9.
- 16) *TTChen*, K. 64a1–3, H.88a6–b3, S.163, 9–18. Cf. Cabezón [1992: 173] [1997: 102, n.23]; Tsultrim/ Fujinaka [2001: 190–191].
- 17) *Roñ rNam thar*, 24b3–7: *yañ bdag ñid chen po 'di Śar kha ba Rab brtan 'phags kyis dgon gsar du spyan drañs chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba'i tshé dBu ma'i rigs pas śin du rnam par dpyod pa na/ don dam pa'i bden pa mtha' dag brdzun pa dan bslu ba yin par žal gyis bzes/ de la lCañ ra chos sde'i mkhan po dGe legs dpal ma bzod nas/ mi*

bsrun pa'i tshig nan mañ po 'don ciñ/ rtsod pa byed do zes lan du mar bsgrags kyañ/ bdag ñid chen pos dños su ma brtsad ciñ/ slob ma thun moñ ba rñams la phrin du sprins pa ni/ 'o na khyed rañ dpon slob 'khor dañ bcas pas sin lkog la dpyod pa'i tshe/ dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i luñ du khas len pa/ slob dpon Zla bas mdzad pa'i Rigs pa drug bcu pa'i 'grel pa las/ mya nan las 'das pa yañ kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin nam ce na/ de de bzin te/ zes gsuñs pa de ji ltar yin sprins pas/ spobs pa ma lus pa bcom nas/

- 18) Cf. Cabezón [1992: 17–18; 389–390].
- 19) *Rigs gsal*, 31a4–32a1: 《1》 *Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel par slob dpon Zla bas/ci mya nan las 'das pa yañ kun rdzob bden pa yin nam ze na/ de de bzin te zes pa dañ/ bCom ldan 'das ma las/ mya nan las 'das pa yañ rmi lam lta bu/ sgyu ma lta bu/..... zes khuñs su mdzad nas gsuñs so/ /^a)..... stoñ ñid bden par yod med dpyod pa'i rigs pas kyañ bden pa khegs pa'i sugs la brdzun pa'i don can du grub pas kun rdzob bo/.....rigs pa la kun btags kyi 'dzin pas btags pa dañ/ lhan skyes kyi 'dzin pas btags pa dañ/ rnal 'byor pa'i blos btags pa 'gog pa'i rigs pa'o/ / rigs pa dañ po gñis kyi(s) dgag bya la ltos nas des stoñ pa'i stoñ ñid don dam du bzag pa yin la/ gal te stoñ min cuñ zad yod/ / mi stoñ cuñ zad yod min na/ /^b) zes sogs kyi rigs pa las ni brdzun par grub ste/ tha sñad du yod la bden par grub pa med pa'i phyir/ dper na rmi lam gyi snañ ba lta bu'o/ / de lta bas na kun rdzob yin par dgoñs nas Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel par/ 'jig rten gyi tha sñad kho nas don dam pa'i bden par gsuñs so zes 'byuñ no/ /^c) 《2》 'ga' žig gis don 'di ma rtogs par Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa'i don stoñ ñid kun rdzob tu yod par gsuñs kyi/ kun rdzob tu gsuñs pa ni ma yin zes smra ba ltar na mya nan 'das pa yañ kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin nam zes dris pa'i lan du/ kun rdzob tu yod pa yin zes pa ni dris lan ma 'brel bar 'gyur la/ ji skad bśad pa'i rigs pas kyañ gnod pa yin no/ / stoñ ñid bden pa 'gog pa'i rigs pa la ltos nas stoñ pa ñid kyañ brdzun pa'i rañ bzin can du khoñ du ma chud pa de srid du/..... lHag mthoñ gi man ñag gis miñ du btags pa'i bstan bcos brtsams pa yañ mu stegs pa'i brtul žugs ltar ñal ba brtsams pa 'bras bu med par 'gyur ro/ / (The underlined parts are quoted in *TTChen* almost word for word. Cf. n.25).) a) Cf. *YŠVṛtti*, C.A. Scherrer-Schaub ed. (*MCB* XXV, 1991), 35, 27–36, 9. b) *MMK*, 13.7. c) Cf. *YŠVṛtti*, 36, 10–12, 23–24.*
- 20) *LRChuñ*, K. 198a3–4, S.440, 2–5: *myañ 'das don dam bden pa yod par 'jog pa yañ kun rdzob bden pa tha sñad pa'i ses nor yod pa tsam du 'jog gi/ lugs 'dis myañ 'das kun rdzob bden par bzed pa min te/ Cf. Tsultrim/ Takada [1996: 103]; dGoñs gsal*, K. 133a1–2, S.216, 6–9.
- 21) Cf. *Rigs gsal*, 20b5, 35b6–36a1.
- 22) Cf. *Rigs gsal*, 30a2–3.; Tauscher [1995: 82].
- 23) Cf. *Rigs gsal*, 35b1–6.
- 24) E.g. *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, k.9.
- 25) *TTChen*, K. 67a6ff., H. 93a3ff., S. 172, 6ff. Cf. n.19); Cabezón [1992: 181ff.]; Tsultrim/ Fujinaka [2001: 198ff.] [2003: 356–357, n. 13].
- 26) *Roñ rNam thar*, 15a7–b2: *slob dpon Zla ba grags pas mdzad pa'i bstan bcos kyi don gyi cha la mi legs pa med kyañ/ tshig gi cha la ñes pa mañ po yod do zes 'thiñ slad cuñ zad cuñ zad mdzad ciñ/ gzan dag la zur za ba'i ched du/ ku re dañ bžad gad 'ga' žig mdzad pa'i skabs su/ de dañ mi mthun pa'i mtshan lam cuñ žig gzigs pas/ slob dpon*

- de'i zabs la lhag par dad cin/ de'i gsuñ rab rnams la dgoñs pa 'grel ba'i bstan bcos lhag par yañ mdzad do// Cf. Ibid., 35b4-6.*
- 27) As for Roñ ston's criticism on Candrakīrti's view that śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha do realize the selflessness of phenomena, refer to Kobayashi [1996].
- 28) *Rigs gsal*, 39b4-5: *gžan gyis btags pa'i bdag med pa goms par byas pa yañ don med de/ bdag med goms par byas pa'i dgos pa ni 'khor ba'i rtsa ba bdag 'dzin ldog pa'i ched yin la/ gžan gyis btags pa'i bdag med bsgoms pas ni 'khor ba'i rtsa ba bdag 'dzin mi ldog pa'i phyir te/ lhan skyes kyi bdag 'dzin la mi gnod pa'i phyir ro// gal te rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gyi bdag med par bsgoms pas ldog go ze na/ kun btags kyi bdag 'dzin ldog kyaṅ lhan skyes kyi 'dzin pa mi ldog ste/*
- 29) Cf. *dGoñs gsal*, K. 231b3-4, S. 387, 12-16.
- 30) *Rigs gsal*, 45a2-3: *'o na mtha' bži'i skye ba bkag pas bden 'dzin mi ldog par thal/ mtha' bži'i skye ba bden par mi 'dzin pa'i tha mal pa la yañ bden 'dzin mthon ba'i phyir zes brjod na lan ci yod/*
- 31) *Bo doñ rNam thar*, 207, 8-208, 4. Regarding the “debate between Roñ ston and Bo doñ Paṅ chen,” *Bo doñ rNam thar*, which was written in 1453 — several years after the deaths of the debaters —, has a detailed account. *Roñ rNam thar* (23ab2-4) also mentions the debate briefly.
- 32) *Rigs gsal*, 45a5: *grub mtha' smra ba'i nor rigs pas dgag sgrub byed pa yin gyi/ tha mal pa'i nor bden pa'i rigs pas rtogs pa ci zig skyed par byed/ gnad 'di ma ses par kun btags kyi bdag dgag byar bzun ba la skyon brjod pa ni bzad gad kyi gnas so// Cf. Ibid., 16b2-3.*
- 33) Cf. *Rigs gsal*, 45b5-46b2.
- 34) Cf. *Rigs gsal*, 46b2-5, 47a5-b1.
- 35) The quote in *TTChen* is not very accurate. The following underscored parts correspond to Roñ ston's insistences. *TTChen*, K. 48a2-b7, H. 66b4-67b5, S. 121, 16-124, 1: *rañ sde kha cig rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gyi gaṅ zag tu 'dzin pa gaṅ zag gi bdag lta lhan skyes su 'dod pa daṅ/ kha cig (= Roñ ston) de kun brtags yin kyaṅ des gzun ba ltar med par rtogs pa mthar phyin pa'i stobs kyis gaṅ zag gi bdag lta lhan skyes kyaṅ spoṅ bar 'dod pa la/ de lta na mtha' bži'i skye ba bkag pas kyaṅ bden skye mi khegs par 'gyur ro zes pa'i gnod byed gzun de dag la ston par byed pa ni/ khyod Zla ba'i gzun de dag 'gog par 'dod pas ni/ rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gyi gaṅ zag med par rtogs pa tsam gyis gaṅ zag gi bdag med rdzogs par rtogs par 'dod kyaṅ dgos la/ khas kyaṅ blaṅs te/ kun brtags kyi bdag 'dzin gyis gzun ba ltar gyi rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gsum khegs na/ lhan skyes kyis btags pa'i bdag gi mtshan nid khegs pa'i tshul gyis lhan skyes kyis btags pa'i bdag spyi ldog nas khegs par khyod rañ nid kyis dam bca' ba yi ger bris pa'i phyir ro// rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can khegs na bdag spyi'i mtshan nid khegs pa yañ/ bdag yod med kyi dgag sgrub kyaṅ grub mtha' smra ba'i nor byed kyi grub mtha' la blo kha ma phyogs pa'i nor mi byed la/ rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gyi bdag khas len pa dag gis kyaṅ rtag gcig rañ dbaṅ can gyi chos gsum po bdag gi mtshan nid du khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro zes khyod kyis smras so// bdag yod med kyi dgag sgrub grub mtha' la blo kha ma phyogs pa'i nor mi byed pas/ dud 'gro'i rgyud kyi bdag 'dzin lhan skyes kyi 'dzin staṅs la med pa'i kun brtags bkag pa tsam gyis lhan skyes la mi gnod par smra ba mi 'thad do zes zer ba yañ bab chol yin te/ Cf.*

- Cabezón [1992: 130–132]; Tsultrim/ Fujinaka [2001: 154–156]. See also *TTChun*, 31b7ff.
- 36) *Go 'Jug ṭik*, T. 90a2–6, S. 217, 13–218, 10: 《Go》 *bdag phuñ gcig tu 'dod pa'i ran sdes nar 'dzin lhan skyes kyi dmigs yul gyi bdag ni phuñ po yin la/ bdag med rtogs pa'i tshe rtag pa'i bdag spon ba yin zes 'dod pa la khas blañs nañ 'gal ston pa ste/ de'i dpe ni tshigs bcad phyi mas ston no// 《Tson》 kha cig 'di ma rtogs par kun btags kyi bdag med par rtogs pas lhan skyes kyi bdag med par rtogs pa mi 'thad par thal/ kun btags kyi bdag de lhan skyes kyi bdag ma yin pa'i phyir zes pa'i don du 'chad de/ 'di ltar — dGoñs gsal*, K. 231b3–4, S. 387, 12–16 — *zes bris so// 《Roñ》 de la mkhas pa'i mkhas pa dag gis de ltar na mtha' bzi'i skye ba bkag pas lhan skyes kyi yul du gyur pa'i skye ba mi khegs par thal/ mtha' bzi'i skye ba ni kun btags yin pa'i phyir zes gsun pa la lan med do// Cf. Nes don rab gsal*, T. 165b5–166a3, S. 334, 11–335, 3.
- 37) Cf. *Go 'Jug ṭik*, T. 84a6–b2, S. 202, 13–203, 3; *Nes don rab gsal*, T. 144a5–6, S. 291, 1–6; *Go Phar ṭik*, 286a3–4.
- 38) *Śāk 'Jug ṭik*, T. 59b7–61a4, S. 201, 10–205, 1. Cf. *TTChun*, 32b6–33b7; *dBu ma rnam nes*, Ja 20b7–22b2. As with Roñ, Go, and Śāk, sTag tshan lo tsā ba was critical of Tson kha pa regarding the problem at hand; he takes the view that the negation of *kun brtags* amounts to the negation of *lhan skyes*. His interpretation on *MAv*, 6.140/141 comes close to the ones of Go and Śāk. *Grub mtha' kun ses ('grel)*, G. 95a2–6, T. 120a3–b1, C. 194, 8–20. Cf. *Ibid.*, G. 8a4–b1, T. 9a6–b4, C. 36, 18–37, 5.
- 39) *Grub mtha'i san 'byed*, 57a5. Cf. Jackson [1985]; Ruegg [2000: 67–68].
- 40) *Roñ rNam thar*, 5b1–2. Cf. Jackson [1988: III].
- 41) *Rigs gsal*, 68b4–6: *dPal Sa skya'i Pañḍi-ta gnīs pa 'gran pa'i zla thams cad dan' gral (⇒bral) ba'i mkhas grub Buddha-srī dan/ Žañ Thañ sag pa Ye ses 'byuñ gnas 'od kyi legs bsad kyi bdud rtsis blo gros kyi dbañ po rab tu rgyas pa Zla grags gsar ma'i žabs rdul spyi bos len pa mdzad pa/ Šar rGyal mo roñ pa Roñ ston sMra ba'i señ ge Śākya rgyal mtshan gyis*
- 42) The term “New Candrakīrti (*Zla grags gsar ma*)” is found in Roñ ston’s final work, *Collection of Opuscles (Roñ Thor bu)*. Here are a couple of examples. Opuscule No. 14, *Bla ma kun 'dus la bstod pa sNan ñag rgya mtsho'i rlabs phreñ*, goes as follows: *dBu ma'i riñ lugs kun la mkhas gyur ciñ// yañ dag lta ba phul byuñ rab brñes te// Zla ba grags ltar bžed gžuñ kun la mkhas// Zla grags gsar ma dag la gus phyag 'tshal// (Roñ Thor bu, 7a5)* It is to be noted that “New Candrakīrti” in this context is in plural. Opuscule No. 30, *Theg pa chen po dBu ma'i bla ma bgyud rim la bstod pa Rin po che'i phreñ mdzes*, has the following verse immediately after the respectful salutation to Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, Žañ Thañ sag pa Ye ses 'byuñ gnas and other Tibetan masters: *Tshig 'Jug bZi gsum 'grel 'grel bsad dan// bstod tshogs gtam tshogs rigs tshogs thams cad kyi// tshig don mña' ba Zla grags gsar ma sogs// rtsa ba'i bla ma rnam la phyag 'tshal lo// (Ibid., 15a5–6. Cf. Ibid., 15b2)* The underscored “New Candrakīrti” here is placed in the lineage of Tibetan principal *bla mas*, who were well versed in *Prasannapadā*, *MAv*, *Catuḥsataka*, and their commentaries including subcommentaries, etc., transmitting Candrakīrti’s thought

through generations. Considering the references to “New Candrakīrti” in the opuscles above, it is not likely that the epithet was directed toward a single specific person. The epithet seems to have been a nickname or title given to the interpreters of Candrakīrti, who resided at *Thañ sag chos grwa*, where Roñ ston once studied. They are in the line of *Žañ Thañ sag pa Ye śes ’byuñ gnas* like *sPrul sku g’Zon nu rgyal mtshan*, who advocated the tradition of *Žañ Thañ sag pa*. Cf. Yoshimizu [1993: 213, n. 35]; Tauscher [1995: 37, n. 89].

43) *Śāk Jug ũik*, T. 88a6–7, S. 309, 12–310, 4.

Bibliography & Abbreviations

- Go Jug ũik* Go rams pa: *dBu ma la ’jug pa’i dkyus kyi sa bcañ ðañ g’zuñ so so’i dka’ ba’i gnas la dpyad pa lTa ba ñan sel*. S.ed.: Sarnath, CIHTS, 2001; T.ed.: *Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum*, Vol. 13, The Toyo Bunko, 1969.
- Go Phar ũik* Id.: *Śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ñag gi bstan bcos mÑon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa ðañ bcañ pa’i dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par bśad pa Yum don rab gsal. Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum*, Vol. 13.
- Grub mtha’ kun śes* sTag tshañ lo tsā ba: *Grub mtha’ kun śes nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa (rtsa/’grel)*. C.ed.: Mi rigs dpe skrun khañ, 1999; G.ed.: Toh Nos. 6866, 6867; T. ed.: Thimphu, 1976.
- Grub mtha’i śan ’byed* Nag dbañ chos grags: *Bod kyi mkhas pa śna phyi dag gi grub mtha’i śan ’byed. The Collection Works of mKhyen-chen Ngag-dwang chos-grags*, Vol. IV, Darjeeling, 2000.
- dGoñs gsal* Tsoñ kha pa: *dBu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bśad pa dGoñs pa rab gsal*. K.ed.: *The Collected Works of rJe Tsoñ-kha-pa*, Vol. 24, New Delhi, 1979; S.ed.: Sarnath, CIHTS.
- Ñes don rab gsal* Go rams pa: *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoñs pa zab mo dbu ma’i de kho na ñid spyi’i ñag gis ston pa Ñes don rab gsal*. S.ed.: Sarnath, CIHTS, 2002; T. ed.: *Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum*, Vol. 12.
- TTChuñ* Śākya mchog ldan: *sToñ thun chuñ ba dBañ po’i rdo rje źes bya ba Blo gsal mgu byed. The Complete Works of gSer-mdog Pañ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan*, Vol. 4, Thimphu, 1975.
- TTChen* mKhas grub rje: *Zab mo ston pa ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos sKal bzai mig ’byed (sToñ thun chen mo)*. H.ed.: *Madhyamika Text Series*, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 1972; K. ed.: *rJe yab sras gsum gsuñ ’bum*, Vol. 27, Dharamsala, 1998; S. ed.: Bylakuppe, Sera Mahayana University, 1996.
- lTa ba’i śan ’byed* Go rams pa: *lTa ba’i śan ’byed Theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer*. S.ed.: Sarnath, CIHTS; T. ed.: *Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum*, Vol. 13.
- Bo ðoñ rNam thar* Śākya’i dge bśñen ’Jigs med ’bañs (aka Amoghasidhi): *dPal ldan Bla ma dam pa thams cad mkhyen pa Phyogs thams cad las rnam par rgyal ba’i źabs kyi rnam par thar pa Ño mtshar gyi dga’ ston*. Bod ljoñs bod yig dpe rñiñ dpe skrun khañ, 1991.
- dBu ma rnam ñes* Śākya mchog ldan: *dBu ma rnam par ñes pa’i chos kyi bañ mdzod Luñ ðañ rigs pa’i rgya mtsho. The Complete Works*, Vols. 14, 15.

- Rigs gsal* Roñ ston: *dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi dka' ba'i gnad bstan pa Rigs lam kun gsal*, Dehradun, 1985.
- Roñ 'Jug ṭik* Id.: *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bsad Ñes don rnam nes. Two Controversial Mādhyamika Treatises*, New Delhi, 1974.
- Roñ Thor bu* Roñ ston thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsun'bum thor bu. *The Collected Works of Rong-ston*, Vol. B, 1999.
- Roñ rNam thar* Śākya mchog ldan: *rJe btsun thams cad mkhyen pa bses gn̄en Śākya rgyal mtshan dpal bzai po'i zal sia nas kyi rnam par thar pa Ño mtshar dad pa'i rol mtsho. The Complete Works*, Vol. 16.
- Roñ rTsa sé ṭik* Roñ ston: *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bsad Zab mo'i de kho na n̄id snañ ba*, Sarnath, CIHTS, 1988.
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