

Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna)—His Philosophy, Practice and its Sources*

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The *bsTan 'gyur* (translated treatises) of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka contains a great number of Atiśa's (982–1054) works. This paper describes his philosophy and practice as well as some problems related to his non-tantric works. Most of his non-tantric works are mainly in the *dBu ma* section, but the other half of his works are also found in the *rgyud 'grel* (tantric commentaries) section because Atiśa was a Tantrist, which was typical for his time.

Most of his works are concerned with practice, which surely derives from his sense of time. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* (D 3948, P 5344)¹⁾ states:

Because nowadays, [all beings suffer from] the [five] degenerations of sentient beings, of times, of distress, of deluded views and of shortened life expectancy. They need not to listen to [all the] doctrines; they should cultivate [only] the essential *yoga*.

These days, there is no time to listen to such doctrines, which are vast like ships; one should cultivate only the excellent instruction, discarding anything else that disturbs the mind.

Life is short, yet there is much to be learned. Since you do not know even the length of this life's span, take only the things you are [really] looking for, like the goose (*hamṣa*) that separates milk from water.

*deñ (P diñ) sañ sems can dus dañ ñon moñs dañ // lta ba tshe'i sñigs mar
gyur pa ste // g'zuñ rnams mñan par dgos pa med pas na // sñiñ po don gyi
mal 'byor bsgoms bar bya // diñ (sic) sañ dus su gziñs dañ 'dra ba yi //
g'zuñ rnams rgya chen mñan pa'i dus med pas // yid 'khrugs (P 'khrug)
byed pa thams cad spañs byas la // dam pa'i ñer bstan 'ba' žig bsgom par*

*bya // tshe ni yun thun śes bya'i rnam par mañ // tshe yi tshad kyañ 'di
tsam mi śes pas // ñaṅ pas chu la 'o ma len pa ltar // 'dod pa'i dños po
dañ la (D dañ las) blañ bar bya // (D 280b1-2, P 324a1-4)*

Since the last verse is also stated in his other works,²⁾ it seems to be an especially important statement to him. In this way, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* explains the necessity for the immediate commencement of practice due to shortened life expectancy. Therefore, Atiśa thinks that one should cultivate only the “essential practice” and not be distracted by insignificant matters. Such an understanding led him to emphasize the “essential practice” in particular.

What is the “essential practice” for him? There are many minor works by Atiśa concerning practice in general such as the *Garbhasaṃgraha* (D 3949, 4469, P 5345, 5382), the *Bodhisattvacaryāsūtrīkr̥tāvavāda* (D 3946, 4472, P 5342, 5348, 5385), the *Hṛdayanikṣepa* (D 3950, 4470, P 5346, 5383), the *Bodhisattvamaṅyāvalī* (D 3951, 4471, P 5347, 5384), the *Bodhisattvādikarmikamārgāvatāradeśanā* (D 3952, 4477, P 5349, 5390), the *Mahāyānapathasādhanavarnasaṃgraha* (D 3954, 4479, P 5351, 5392), the *Mahāyānapathasādhanasaṃgraha* (D 3955, 4480, P 5352, 5393), the *Caryāsaṃgrahapradīpa* (D 3960, 4466, P 5357, 5379), etc. The *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭā*³⁾ (D 3930, P 5325), which is one of his relatively major works, explains his system of practice with respect to the “thought of awakening” (*bodhicitta*). However, the *Bodhipathapradīpa* (D 3947, 4465, P 5343, 5378) and its commentary, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*, show his theory of practice most extensively. Therefore, this paper describes his philosophy and practice as seen in these two works, while occasionally referring to other minor works.

Although many studies on Atiśa’s philosophy and practice have been already published, some unclear and controversial points still remain. One of the sources of controversy is how Atiśa is understood in Tibet. Namely, some of the Tibetan doxographies classify Atiśa as a Prāsaṅgika, following the lineage of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.⁴⁾ However, Atiśa himself does not seem to make distinctions among Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti and other Mādhyamikas or divide Mādhyamika into any subdivisions, as we will see below. The problem, therefore, lies in how we understand such an attitude in his own texts. Furthermore, it is also necessary to analyse his position, strictly differentiating between *śīla*, *dhyāna*, *prajñā*, etc. because the texts he bases his position on apparently differ by subject. Therefore, this paper focuses on clarifying his

sources according to subject and describes his practice and philosophy, setting the Tibetan understanding of Atiśa aside. I will also suggest some leads to solve problems in certain cases.

1. Atiśa' description of practice

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains practice in the order of *śīla*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*. Before explaining *dhyāna*, he explains why he presented *śīla* first:

Enlightenment (*abhisambodhi*) depends on the twofold accumulation (*saṃbhāra*). The twofold accumulation depends on benefit for others (*parārtha*). Benefit for others depends on supernatural knowledge (*abhijñā*). Furthermore, it (supernatural knowledge) depends on tranquility (*samatha*). Tranquility depends on the vow (*śīla*). Therefore the vow was explained first. For this reason, tranquility arises from the vow. Supernatural knowledge arises from tranquility. [Therefore] I said [in the *Bodhipathapradīpa* as follows]:

Supernatural knowledge does not arise without accomplishing tranquility. Therefore, [one should] strive to accomplish tranquility over and over again.

'di ltar rdzogs pa'i byañ chub chen po ni tshogs rnam pa gñis la rag las / tshogs rnam pa gñis kyañ gžan gyi don la rag las / de yañ mñon par śes pa la rag las / (D om. mñon par śes pa la rag las /) mñon par śes pa yañ źi gnas la rag las / źi gnas kyañ tshul khirms la rag las pas / dañ po tshul khirms bstan pa yin no // de bas na tshul khirms las źi gnas 'byuñ la / źi gnas las mñon par śes pa 'byuñ bas źi gnas grub pa ma yin pas (D om. źi gnas grub pa ma yin pas) / mñon śes 'byuñ bar mi 'gyur la // de phyir źi gnas bsgrub (P sgrub) pa'i phyir // yañ dañ yañ du 'bad par bya // (P /) [=BPP 153–156] źes smras so // (D 274a6–b1, P 316b5–8)

Naturally, as a follower of the Mahāyāna, Atiśa regards attaining the enlightenment of the Buddha as the goal. However, here he particularly emphasizes the significance of benefiting others, and from this viewpoint shows *śīla* to be a fundamental element of practice. Although wisdom

(*prajñā*) is not mentioned in the citation, wisdom is of course absolutely necessary because skillful means (*upāya*) for the benefit of others should be carried out in conjunction with wisdom (*prajñā*). In this way, *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains the *prajña* together with *upāya* after mentioning *śīla*, *abhiññā* and *śamatha*.

1.1 Sources that describe *śīla*

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* begins the explanation of *śīla* by defining three types of human beings. The best is one who deserves to enter the practice of the Mahāyāna. He states:

The vessel for the Mahāyāna is explained [by the following verse of the *Bodhipathapradīpa*]:

Superior is the person who is willing above all to remove the entire suffering of others by suffering in his own stream of being.

*rañ rgyud gtogs pa'i sdug bsñal gyis // gañ žig gžan gyi sdug bsñal kun //
yañ dag zad par kun nas 'dod // skyes bu de ni mchog yin no // [=BPP
17–20] žes pas ni theg pa chen po'i snod bstan pa yin no // (D 242a5–6,
P 279a1–2)*

Ultimately, this statement underscores the necessity of compassion (*karuṇā*) for the Mahāyāna Buddhist. It has the same meaning as the expression “perfection of the lineage” (*gotrasaṃpad*) as a cause of producing *bodhicitta* described in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*. Such a person is able to enter the path of the Bodhisattva, which starts with the first production of *bodhicitta* and the assumption of the vow.

Atiśa detailed the method of assuming the vow in his *Cittotpādasamvaravidhikrama* (P 5364, 5406, D 3967, 4491), which means “sequence of the method for producing the thought and for [the assumption of] the vow.” The title demonstrates the connection between producing the thought and the assumption of the vow itself. Therefore, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* also describes the thought of awakening in connection with *śīla*. In addition, Atiśa left a text called the *Gurukriyākrama* (D 3977, 4489, P 5374, 5402) for the preceptor of the vow.

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* declares that Atiśa himself wrote the

Cittotpādasamvaravidhikrama in accordance with both Asaṅga and Śāntideva. In the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*, Atiśa refers to the *Śīla-parivarata* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* by Asaṅga and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* by Śāntideva. As we will see later, Atiśa says that he depends on the *Śīla-parivarta* in the case of the method of receiving the vow from a master and on the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in the case of the method of receiving the vow without a master. The reason given for depending on both of them is only that both traditions are “the path of a big wagon” (*śiṅ rta chen po’i lam*). The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* explains the Bodhisattva’s vow in detail from both Asaṅga and Śāntideva’s viewpoint.

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* explains “taking refuge” and the “seven branch practices” (*yan lag bdun*) as preparations for the assumption of the vow. The “seven branch practices” are homage (*phyag ’tshal ba, vandanā*), offering (*mchod pa, pūjanā*), confession of sins (*sdig pa bsags pa, pāpadeśanā*), rejoicing (*rjes su yi ran ba, anumodanā*), entreaty (*bkul ba, adhyeśanā*), petition (*gsol ba gdab pa, yācana*), and dedication of one’s merit (*yonis su bsno ba, pariṇāmanā*). The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* discusses in detail the “seven branch practices” and also presents different opinions. The “seven branch practices” are derived from the *Bhadracaryāpraṇidhānarāja* (D 4377, P 5924) and also seems to be related to the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, but further examination is required. “Taking refuge” is explained in detail in his minor work, the *Śaraṇagamanadeśanā* (D 3953, P 5350), which illustrates “taking refuge” from fifteen different points of view.⁵⁾ Some of these points are also described in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*.⁶⁾ Atiśa wrote on the method for confessing sins in the *Āpattideśanāvidhi* (D 3974, P 5369).

In the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*, the thought of awakening is explained as being twofold: *praṇidhānacitta* and *prasthānacitta*. In this respect, Atiśa apparently follows Śāntideva. Although he also briefly, presents different views about the thought of awakening he declares that he does not see any difference among the views of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Śāntideva with regard to the way of producing the thought of awakening. Atiśa says:

Among Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Śāntideva, the way of producing the thought of awakening of resolution (*praṇidhānacitta*) does not differ, but agrees. At present, my masters, Bodhibhadra and Suvarṇadvīpa, also follow these sages. Because I also follow these masters, one should regard my minor work of the se-

quence [of the method for producing the thought and for the assumption of the vow] (the *Cittotpādasamvaravidhikrama*), which I made at request of my pupils, as following the tradition of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Śāntideva.

de la 'dir re źig slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub dan / slob dpon 'phags pa thogs med dan / slob dpon 'phags pa śān ta de ba dag smon pa byañ chub kyi sems bskyed pa'i cho ga'i tshul 'di la tha dad pa med ciñ mthun pa dan / da ltar bdag gi bla ma rje btsun dpal byañ chub bzañ po dan bla ma rje btsun su ba rñṇa dvī (P dvi) pa dag kyañ 'phags pa de dag gi rjes su 'brañ ba dan / bdag kyañ bla ma rje btsun de dag gi rjes su 'brañ ba yin pas bdag la slob ma'i tshogs kyis gsol pa btab nas byas pa'i cho ga'i thabs cuñ źig bdag gi bkod pa ni 'phags pa klu sgrub dan / 'phags pa thogs med dan / 'phags pa śān ta de ba dag gi lugs yin no źes khoñ du chud par bya'o // (D 250b1-4, P 288b4-7)

In this case, Atiśa follows both Suvarṇadvīpa and Bodhibhadra explicitly. However, the influence of Suvarṇadvīpa is limited only to this case, as I will discuss below.

According to Atiśa's account of *śīla*, the person who is willing to receive the Bodhisattva's vow must maintain moral discipline (*so sor thar pa, prātimokṣa*). Of course, it is well known that it is not his own theory, but that of the Yogācāra school. It can be regarded as characteristic of late Mādhyamika thought, which is closely connected with Yogācāra practice. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* says:

The person who maintains one of the seven types of moral discipline at all times is qualified [to receive] the Bodhisattva's vow. However, this is not so in other cases.

so sor thar pa ris bdun gyi // rtag tu sdom gźan ldan pa dag // (D om. //)
byañ chub sems dpa'i sdom pa yi // skal ba yod kyi gźan du min //
 [=BPP 79-82] (D 258a5-6, P 297b5-6)

Atiśa explains this point by quoting the *Samvaraviṃśaka-panjikā* (D 3924, P 5319) of Bodhibhadra. It is clear that Atiśa depends on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* when one considers the relationship between Bodhibhadra and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Later, Atiśa explains seven *prātimokṣas*, not eight like the Sarvāstivādins, and explicitly points out the title

of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and in particular the *Śīla-parivarta* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

According to the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*, the reason one should follow the works of Asaṅga is that he is a Bodhisattva of the third stage as predicted (*vyākṛta*) in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*. Furthermore, Atiśa applies this type of logic to the case of Nāgārjuna. He describes the prediction of Nāgārjuna in his *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*, where he mentions titles of sutras such as the *Mahāmegha-sūtra*, the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, the *Mahābhērīhāraka-parivarta*, and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra* and quotes passages from the *Mahāmegha-sūtra*, the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*.⁷⁾

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains how the person who maintains moral discipline receives the Bodhisattva's vow as follows:

In accordance with the method described in the *Śīla-parivarta* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

byaṅ chub sems dpa'i sa dag gi // tshul khrims le'u gsuṅs cho ga yis //
[=BPP 87–88] (D 246a5–6, P 304b6–7)

In this way, he basically depends on the *Śīla-parivarta* here and briefly presents seven *śīlas*, which are explained in the *Śīla-parivarta*, in the commentary to the verse.

However, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains the following “the method of receiving the Bodhisattva's vow,” “causes of abandoning the vow,” “causes of producing sins,” “causes of not producing sins,” “rehabilitation from sins” and “benefits of the vow,” on the basis of the traditions of both Asaṅga and Śāntideva. Here, Atiśa declares that he wrote the method of receiving the vow, the *Cittotpādasamvaidhikrama*, conforming to both traditions.

However, because I follow both the traditions [of Asaṅga and Śāntideva], I made the method of receiving [the vow] from the master (*guru*) on the basis of the *Śīla-parivarta* and the method of receiving [the vow] without a master on the basis of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

'on kyaṅ bdag ni lugs de gñis ka'i rjes su 'braṅ bas na (P 'braṅs paṅs na)
bla ma las blaṅ ba'i (D blaṅs pa'i) cho ga tshul khrims kyi le'u la brten

ziñ (P ciñ) bkod la / bla ma (D bla na) med pa'i cho ga ni bslab pa kun las btus pa la brten ziñ (P ciñ) bkod pa yin no // (D 265b2-3, P 306a6-7)

In addition, the three types of *śīla* mentioned in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*, i.e. *saṃvara-śīla*, *kuśaladharmasaṃgrāhaka-ś°* and *sattvārthānugrāhaka-ś°*, apparently depend on the *Śīla-parivarta* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* as previous studies have already pointed out.⁸⁾

1.2 Sources that describe *dhyāna*

After *śīla*, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* describes *dhyāna* (here as tranquility) and supernatural knowledge:

All the Buddhas assert generating supernatural knowledge to be a cause of completing the accumulation of merit and wisdom... As a bird is unable to fly without a grown wing, one is not capable of benefiting sentient beings without obtaining supernatural knowledge.

bsod nams ye śes rañ bzin gyi // tshogs ni yoñs su rdzogs pa yi // rgyu ni sañs rgyas thams cad dag / mñon śes bskyed pa ñid du bzed // ... ji ltar 'dab gśog ma skyes pa'i // bya ni mkha' la 'phur (P phur) mi nus // de bzin mñon śes thob bral bas // sems can don byed nus ma yin // [=BPP 137-144] (D 272b2, 4, P 314b3-4, b5-6)

Atiśa also warns that one should not teach the *dharma* without first obtaining supernatural knowledge on the basis of the *Samādhisam̐bhāraparivarta* (D 3924, P 5319) of Bodhibhadra. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains in detail the necessity of supernatural knowledge for benefiting sentient beings and then moves on the subject of *dhyāna* as a prerequisite for supernatural knowledge. In the section on supernatural knowledge, he uses the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva as his sources. The citations from the *Adhyāśayasam̐codana-sūtra* are also found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. We can see the close connection between the description and Śāntideva.

In the section on tranquility, the *Samādhisam̐bhāraparivarta* by Bodhibhadra is quoted many times. Atiśa also bases his thought on that of Bodhibhadra in this case. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* says:

Even if one who spoils the branches of tranquility diligently meditates for thousands of years, he will not accomplish contemplation (*tiñ ne 'dzin, samādhi*).

*ži gnas yan lag rnams nams pas // rab tu 'bad de bsgom (P bsgoms) byas
śiñ // lo ni stoñ phrag dag gis kyañ // tiñ 'dzin 'grub par mi 'gyur ro //*
[=BPP 157–160] (D 274b2–3, P 317a2)

According to the commentary of the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*, “the branches of tranquility” are the nine branches of tranquility described in the *Samādhisambhāraparivarta* of Bodhibhadra. Only the last branch is briefly explained in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*.

In this text, *śamatha* is divided into two types: tranquility with signs (*mtshan ma dan bcas pa'i ži gnas*) and tranquility without signs (*mtshan ma med pa'i ži gnas*).⁹ It also conforms to the *Samādhisambhāraparivarta*. This division creates a problem which will be discussed later.

At the end of this section, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* declares that the Yogins who have acquired the *śamatha* are capable of generating insight (*vipāśyanā*) and moves to the next section on wisdom (*prajñā*).

1.3 Sources that describe *prajñā*

Atiśa explains wisdom together with skillful means (*upāya*), because according to him, neither wisdom without skillful means nor skillful means without wisdom can exist.

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains skillful means as follows:

I inserted the words of my master, Bodhibhadra, into the root text, [the *Bodhipathapradīpa*], that the Jinās assert that skillful means are all the accumulation of virtues, i.e. the perfection of giving and so on, excluding the perfection of wisdom.

*bla ma dpal byaṅ chub bzaṅ po'i źal nas 'di skad du / śes rab pha rol
phyin spaṅs pa'i / sbyin pa'i pha rol phyin la sogs // dge ba'i tshogs
rnams thams cad dag / rgyal ba rnams kyis thabs su bśad // (P om. //)*
[=BPP 181–184] *ces gsuṅs pa de bdag gi (P de dag for bdag gi) rtsa bar
bkod pa yin no //* (D 278a3–4, P 321a5–6)

He declares the verse of the *Bodhipathapradīpa* to be the words of

Bodhibhadra.

Atiśa describes wisdom as follows:

It is stated that the *prajñā* is the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the emptiness of self-nature which realizes a non-arising of the [five] aggregates (*skandha*), the [eighteen] elements (*dhātu*) and the [twelve] spheres (*āyatana*).

phuñ po khams dan skye mched rnams // skye ba med par rtogs gyur pa'i // ran bzin ston pa nīd śes pa // śes rab ces ni yons su bsad // [=BPP 189–192] (D 278b6–7, P 322a3)

The famous “four great reasonings” are explained as a method for realizing the *prajñā* in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*, although it is unknown who was the first to summarize it into four reasonings.¹⁰⁾

What are the “four [great reasonings]?” The reasoning of refuting the four alternate extremes of arising, the reasoning of the diamond particle,¹¹⁾ the reasoning of the lack of unity and plurality (*ekānekaviyoga*) and the reasoning of the dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

bzi gan ze na / mu bzi skye ba 'gog pa'i gtan tshigs dan / rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs dan / gcig dan du ma bral ba'i gtan tshigs dan / rten cin 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i gtan tshigs so // (D 279a3–4, P 322a8–b1)

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* explains these reasonings in detail. However, because this subject has been treated in previous studies,¹²⁾ here I will concentrate on presenting the sources and summarizing related problems in the next section.

First of all, the reasoning of refuting the four alternate extremes of arising is justified by citing the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX-146–150 of Śāntideva.

The reasoning of the diamond particle is explained by a verse in the root text, the *Bodhipathapradīpa*:

An entity does not arise from itself, not from another, not from both [of itself and another]. It does not [arise] without cause. Therefore, it lacks self-nature by way of own existence.

*dños po rañ las mi skye zin // gzan dan gn̄is ka las kyañ min // rgyu med
las min de yi phyir // ño bo ñid kyis rañ bzin med [=BPP 197–200]
(D 279b2, P 322b7–8)*

The content is very similar to the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, I-1 which is also quoted immediately after the verse in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* regards the aim of the reasoning of the diamond particle as refuting the arising of all entities which Buddhists and heretics assert. In this regard, he recommends reading the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna itself, the six commentaries, the two subcommentaries, the *dBu ma rnam par 'thag pa* (*Madhyamakavaidalya?*), the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, the *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāviveka and the *Madhyamakāvātāra* of Candrakīrti. This statement is a matter of controversy because the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are not distinguished here.

The reasoning of the lack of unity and plurality is justified by citing the *Madhyamakālamkāra* of Śāntarakṣita and the *Tattvāvātāra* of Śrīgupta.

Concerning the reasoning of the dependent origination, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* states:

In the reasoning of the *Śūnyatāsaptati* [of Nāgārjuna], the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* [of Nāgārjuna] and other [works], the emptiness of the self-nature of entities is established.¹³⁾

*ston ñid bdun cu 'i rigs pa dan / (D om. /) dbu ma rtsa ba sogs las kyañ /
dños po rnam kyis rañ bzin ni // ston pa ñid du grub bsad pa // [=BPP
205–208] (D 280a1–2, P 323b1)*

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* advises the reader to read these very texts.

In the explanation of the four great reasonings, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* mentions the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, but Atiśa declares that his explanation is based on Mādhyamika thought, which he calls the “great Mādhyamika” (*dbu ma chen po*). He explains the tradition in which he is rooted as follows:

The nectar of the noble Nāgārjuna had satisfied Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya (=Bhāviveka) and Śāntideva, down to Bodhibhadra. A little has even been sprinkled on me. Thus having proven the non-arising of all phenomena by the four great reasonings and following the former Ācāryas, one should hold to

the tenet of the great Mādhyamika.

*'phags pa klu sgrub źal gyi bdud rtsi des / ā rya de ba zla grags bha bya
dañ // (P /) źi ba'i lha dañ byañ chub bzañ po'i bar / tshim par gyur pa
bdag la'añ cuñ źig 'thor // de ltar gtan tshigs chen po bźi dag gis // chos
rnams thams cad skyes med bsgrub byas te / sñon gyi slob dpon rnams kyis
rjes 'brañs (P res 'brañ) nas // dbu ma chen po'i grub mthar gnas par bya //*
(D 280a6–8, P 323b7–324a1)

Next, these verses are followed by verses which are quoted at the beginning of this paper and emphasize the shortness of life.

Moreover, the works of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka, the eight major commentaries to the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* as well as the subcommentaries are mentioned here, although the works of Nāgārjuna are described in more detail in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāta*.¹⁴⁾

Now we should examine the purpose of this explanation. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* describes the four great reasonings not for the purpose of proof *per se* but of practice. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* states:

Here, the tenets of our great Mādhyamika are described only as such and not in extensive detail. Because I briefly explained it for those Yogins who desire to experience it, I said [in the *Bodhipathapradīpa*] “I explained for the purpose of contemplation.”

*'dir bdag cag dbu ma chen po'i grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di ltar yin no źes smos
pa (P om. pa) tsam du zad kyi / grub pa'i mtha' rgyas par ni ma bris te /
rnal 'byor pa ñams su len 'dod pa dag la ñuñ dun du bsdus nas bstan pa
yin pas / bsgom pa'i don du rab tu bśad // (P om. //) [=BPP 212] ces bya
ba de yin no // (D 281a4–5, P 324b7–325a1)*

In addition, Atiśa explains the non-arising of the *prajñā* itself. It is also based on the four great reasonings.

In this way, after explaining reason, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* describes emptiness through the scriptures by quoting many sutras. At the end of the section, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* states:

Therefore, having known such scriptures and reason as described in detail, having ascertained the meaning and having re-

moved uncertainty, one should cultivate the non-concept called “*vipāśyanā*.”

de bas na de lta bu'i luñ dan rigs pa rgya chen po bstan pa de dag ses par byas śin de'i don la nes par byas te / the tshom med par byas nas lhag mthoñ zes bya ba rnam par mi rtog pa de bsgom par bya'o // (D 285a2, P 329b1–2)

Here, we should pay attention to the connection between the four great reasonings and the *vipāśyanā*. Namely, it states that one cultivates the *vipāśyanā*, by which one can attain the emptiness of all things, only after removing uncertainty via the scriptures and reasoning such as the “four great reasonings.” The “four great reasonings” work only before the *vipāśyanā*.

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* briefly explains the *vipāśyanā*, quoting the *Samādhisamḅhāraparivarta* of Bodhibhadra. Atiśa describes the *vipāśyanā* in slightly more detail in his minor work, the *Madhyamakopadeśa* (D 3329, 4468, P 4326, 5324).

The last verse of the *pāramitāyāna* section in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* is as follows:

After having contemplated emptiness in this way and having gradually obtained “warmth” and so on, one will attain such stages like [the first stage,] the *pramuditā*. The enlightenment of the Buddha is not far.

de ltar stoñ ñid bsgom byas nas // rim gyis (P gyi) drod sogs thob byas nas // rab dga' la sogs thob 'gyur te // sañs rgyas byañ chub yun mi riñ // [=BPP 237–240] (D 285b1–2, P 330a3)

Although the verse remains only a general description of the Bodhisattva path, we should take notice of the commentary which explains the eight steps of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*. However, we can hardly know the precise position of the eight steps in his practice from such a short description of him.

2. Problems related to Atiśa's philosophy and practice

Thus far, we have surveyed Atiśa's philosophy and practice, focusing

on its sources. Obviously, he uses very different sources depending on the subject. This means that we must be meticulous in our examination of his writings. In this section, I will summarize his position on each subject and present related issues, which may serve as a guide for future research.

2.1 Problems regarding the description of *śīla*

It is very clear that Atiśa's explanation of *śīla* is based on Śāntideva and Asaṅga. Atiśa often cites works by Śāntideva like the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as well as the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* and his other works. He apparently regards Śāntideva as very important. On the other hand, the influence of Asaṅga can also be seen in the description of cause and condition of producing the *bodhicitta*, etc. in the *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*. Some parts of his practice are obviously derived from Asaṅga, specifically the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

His attitude seems to be connected in particular with two of his own teachers, namely Suvarṇadvīpa¹⁵⁾ and Bodhibhadra.

Suvarṇadvīpa left works connected with Śāntideva like the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-ṣaṭtriṃśat-piṇḍārtha* (D 3878, P 5280), the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-piṇḍārtha* (D 3879, P 5281) and the *Śikṣāsamuccayābhisamaya* (D 3942, P 5338). Bodhibhadra wrote the *Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka-panjikā* (D 4083, P 5584), a commentary to the *Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka* (D 4081, P 5582) by Candragomin, which is said to be a summary of the *Śīla-parivarta* in twenty verses, and the *Samādhisambhāraparivarta* (D 3924, P 5444).

In particular, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* mentions the two teachers.

The “masters” [in the verse of the *Bodhipathapradīpa*] are Bodhibhadra, Suvarṇadvīpa and others.

de la “bla ma rnams” ni rje btsun dpal byañ chub bzaiñ po daiñ / rje btsun su wa rñṇa dvī (P di) pa la sogs pa'o // (D 242b6, P 279b3)

However, Atiśa does not quote from the works of Suvarṇadvīpa. Furthermore, later in the section on *prajñā*, Atiśa classifies Suvarṇadvīpa as a part of the Yogācāra and recommends following Bodhibhadra. Therefore, more research is needed to ascertain the source of Śāntideva's influence on Atiśa. This will be discussed again later in the connection

with *prajñā*.

Atiśa's description of *śīla* apparently depends on the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Nevertheless, some points still remain unclear.

First, the connection with the **Vinayasamgrahaṇī* ('*Dul ba bsdu ba*, D 4040, P 5541) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* needs to be examined. While Atiśa frequently explains the *prātimokṣa* by quoting the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, the explanation in his own words agrees with the *Vinayasamgrahaṇī*, although Atiśa does not mention its title explicitly in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*. Therefore, a study on the *Vinayasamgrahaṇī* itself and the tradition of such an understanding of the *prātimokṣa* is required in order to know Atiśa's understanding more precisely.

There is also a problem in the number of the monks' *vinaya*. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* counts 253 rules. Twenty-seven of them are things to confess, 213 of them are things to restrain and 13 are sinless. The number "253" might suggest the possibility of a correlation to the Mūlasarvāstivāda school. However, at the present time, we know nothing about the division of the rules into 27, 213 and 13. Therefore, we should still think carefully about this if one is also to seriously make a connection between Atiśa and the *Vinayasamgrahaṇī*.

The explanation of the Bodhisattva's vow obviously relies on the *Yogācārabhūmi* and Śāntideva. However, the tradition of Śāntideva has yet to be clarified. Although some works of Suvarṇadvīpa related to Śāntideva do exist, the connection between Atiśa's explanation and Suvarṇadvīpa is completely unknown. Therefore, it still needs to be examined how the tradition of Śāntideva was handed down to Atiśa.

2.2 Problems regarding the description of the *dhyāna*

Dhyāna is explained as tranquility (*śamatha*) in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*. As shown above, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* divides tranquility into two types: with and without signs. The citation from the *Samādhisamḥbhāraparivarta* of Bodhibhadra shows that this is the source for this division.

However, there is a contradiction here to the traditional understanding of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. For example, according to Kamalaśīla, *śamatha* is the one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā*) and means "tranquility" or "calming." On the contrary, *vipaśyanā* is "discriminating knowledge of the truth" (*bhūtapratyavekṣaṇjā*) and is therefore considered conceptual.¹⁶⁾

In the explanation of *śamatha*, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* cites the *Samādhisam̄bhāraparivarta* as follows:

As for tranquility without signs, the same text (*Samādhisam̄bhāraparivarta*) states: “From the discriminating knowledge itself, which is tranquility without signs, arises insight (*vipāśyanā*) without signs, non-conceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpañāna*).”

mtshan ma med pa'i zi gnas ni / yan de nid las mtshan ma med pa'i zi gnas so sor rtog pa'i ses rab nid las / mtshan ma med pa'i lhag mtho'i rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye ses 'byuñ zes te zes (P ces) pa dan / (D 275b4-5, P 318a7-8)

This sentence indicates that Atiśa considers tranquility without signs as discriminating wisdom and insight without signs as non-conceptual wisdom. However, because the discriminating knowledge is generally said to be related to *vipāśyanā*, objection is expected as a matter of course. Although the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* does not quote the refutation of the objection, the *Samādhisam̄bhāraparivarta* rejects it as follows:

[Objection:] The discriminating knowledge does not belong to *śamatha*. It observes in many forms. [Answer:] If so, *śamatha* would not be *śamatha* too because it observes at many moments and many factors.

so sor rtog pa'i ses rab ni zi gnas ma yin te / rnam pa du mas dmigs so ze na / de lta na zi gnas kyan zi gnas ma yin te / skad cig ma du ma dan cha sas du ma la dmigs pa'i phyir ro // (D 90b6-7, P 178b2-3)

Thus, Bodhibhadra accepts discriminating knowledge as *śamatha*. However, the source of this understanding still needs to be determined.

2.3 Problems regarding the description of the *prajñā*

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* describes the four great reasonings in this section. It should be noted that: 1) the four great reasonings are explained as a form of reason besides the scriptures for removing uncertainty before cultivating insight and 2) it is only explained briefly for the purpose of practice. Therefore it is not easy to discuss Atiśa's position in

detail only by the description of the four great reasonings. In other words, it is precisely this attitude of Atiśa that shows how much importance he attached to practice.

One thing we can definitely say from the description of the four great reasonings is that Atiśa includes the reasoning of the lack of unity and plurality in the four great reasonings. It means that Atiśa does not classify the Mādhyamika into such subdivisions like the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, a point that should not be disregarded.

The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* explains the Mādhyamika only in contrast to the Yogācāra. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* introduces the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika as follows:

The scholars in the world are as follows: Ārya Asaṅga explained a synonym of the teachings. He stated the meaning of the perfection of wisdom as representation-only (*viññaptimātra*). Nowadays masters like Suvarṇadvīpa and Śānti-pa understand it in this way. Ācārya Nāgārjuna explained the essence of the teachings. He comprehended the meaning of the perfection of wisdom as the great middle way (*dbu ma chen po*) which transcends existence and non-existence. He taught thus to the other scholarly lineage as well. Masters like Bodhibhadra and Kusulu-pa recognize in such a way.

dzam bu'i (P dza mbu'i) gliñ na mkhas pa dag ni 'di skad du / 'phags pa thogs med kyis (P kyi) bstan pa'i rnam grañs bsad pa / des ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don rnam par rig pa tsam du gsuñs śiñ / da ltar bla ma su wa rṇṇa (P ṇṇa) dvī pa dañ / bla ma śān ti pa yañ de ltar dgoñs so // slob dpon klu sgrub kyis ni bstan pa'i sñiñ po bsad de / des ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don yod pa dañ med pa las 'das pa'i dbu ma chen po'i don thugs su chud ciñ / mkhas pa gzan gyi rgyud la yañ de ltar gsuñs so // de (sic) ltar bla ma byañ chub bzañ po dañ / rje btsun ku su lu pa yañ de ltar dgoñs so // (D 280a4–6, P 323b4–7)

Atiśa himself takes the position of the great middle way, and he ultimately follows Bodhibhadra. Therefore, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* states the following:

Bodhibhadra attained the accomplishment (*dños grub*) by means of the instruction of Nāgārjuna and acquired the approval of

Ārya Mañjuḥoṣa. He obtained supernatural knowledge and perceived the truth, manifesting the intention of all the sutras, tantras and the precepts of *vinaya* at once. Bodhibhadra is therefore the person to whom [the teachings of Nāgārjuna] were transmitted, one after another. Thus one should follow him.

'phags pa klu sgrub kyi man nāg gis dños grub brñes nas 'phags pa 'jam pa'i dbyañs kyi gnañ ba thob pa / mñon par śes pa brñes pa / rgyud thams cad dañ / (D om. /) mdo thams cad dañ / 'dul ba'i luñ ma lus pa'i dgoñs pa dus gcig tu thugs la gsal ba bden pa gzigs pa des na (P pa) gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i bla ma ni dpal byañ chub bzañ po 'di yin pas 'di'i rjes su 'brañ bar bya'o // (D 282a2-3, P 325b8-2)

This description shows that Atiśa directly follows Bodhibhadra, whom he regards as the true successor of the tradition from Nāgārjuna. The tradition is nothing but the Mādhyamika, which Atiśa calls *dbu ma chen po*.

As a doctrine of the *dbu ma chen po*, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* only mentions non-arising of all phenomena. It is not a detailed description and still remains unclear. Here, Atiśa himself says:

I did not write the doctrine in detail.

grub pa'i mtha' rgyas par ni ma bris te / (D 281a4, P 324b8)

He recommends reading the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*, the *Tarkajvālā*, the *Madhyamakāvātāra*, and the subcommentary of Avarokitavratā to the *Mūlamadhyamaka*. From this description, it is difficult to know anything more than that the Mādhyamika is superior to the Yogācāra.

In this way, it is very obvious that Atiśa follows Bodhibhadra and considers the tradition from Nāgārjuna to Bodhibhadra as the Mādhyamika. The tradition is also said to be from Nāgārjuna through Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka and Śāntideva down to Bodhibhadra.

Undoubtedly, Atiśa regards these masters as important. However, the connection between Śāntideva and Bodhibhadra seems odd because, as seen above, Bodhibhadra left no works relating to the teachings of Śāntideva. Suvarṇadvīpa, another master mentioned in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*, wrote works connected with the works of Śāntideva but is considered as a Yogācāra in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*. Because Atiśa does not quote the works of Suvarṇadvīpa, we might say that Atiśa

does not regard Suvarṇadvīpa as very important. However, we can hardly find the reason Atiśa mentions Suvarṇadvīpa in particular as one of masters in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* besides Bodhibhadra. We might find the influence Suvarṇadvīpa had on Atiśa by chance through a study on the works of Suvarṇadvīpa himself. Research on Suvarṇadvīpa, who also wrote a commentary on the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, is therefore required, too.

In his description of *śīla* and *dhyāna*, Atiśa is apparently under the influence of Bodhibhadra. Atiśa describes *śīla* within the framework of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, quoting Bodhibhadra's *Samvaraviṃśaka-panjikā*. The descriptions of the *dhyāna* are often justified by the *Samādhisamḥāraparivarta* of Bodhibhadra, although we do not yet know with certainty what sources the *Samādhisamḥāraparivarta* itself is based on.

However, the description of *prajñā* in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* completely lacks citations from the works of Bodhibhadra despite his emphasis on the tradition from Nāgārjuna down to Bodhibhadra. It is justified by the teachings of former masters like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka, Śāntideva, etc.

Therefore, there still remain problems to be solved: if the description of the *prajñā* is connected with Bodhibhadra, how Bodhibhadra is related to the teaching of Śāntideva; how Bodhibhadra understands the teaching of Mādhyamika; etc. He left works mainly related to practice such as the *Samādhisamḥāraparivarta* and the *Samvaraviṃśaka-panjikā* and quotes a work of Śāntideva in the context of *dhyāna* in the *Samādhisamḥāraparivarta*.

Moreover, there are problems with the tradition of Śāntideva in Atiśa's description of the *prajñā*. Like his description of the *śīla*, Atiśa quotes the works of Śāntideva, and explains things such as the reasoning of refuting the four alternate extremes of arising. However, the tradition of this understanding remains to be found.

One more thing that might perplex us is that Atiśa explicitly rejects inference while declaring that he follows Bhāviveka, and also states the reasoning of the lack of unity and plurality (*ekānekaviyoga*) as one of the four great reasonings. The *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* states:

When one analyzes at the [level of the ultimate] truth, there is nothing like existence and non-existence as the ultimate truth. Therefore, one can accomplish nothing.

Even if someone who is separated from the tradition of the

masters [from Nāgārjuna] have established existence, non-existence, permanence, cessation, and the like through inferential knowledge, they will be exhausted and not reach their goal.

Why did Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, and so on write so many treatises? The scholars wrote [them] for the purpose of refuting the objections of heretics.¹⁷⁾

Thus, such valid means of knowledge are not necessary for cultivating the ultimate truth. I already wrote this elsewhere [in the *Satyadvayāvātāra*]. Therefore, it is not necessary to state it here.

For that reason, one should discard such texts of logic mainly concerned with inference and should cultivate the instruction transmitted from Nāgārjuna.

yañ dag ñid la rnam dpyad na // yod ces pa dañ med ces pa // yañ dag mtha' la de dag med // de bas gañ yañ bsgrub mi nus / bla ma'i brgyud pa 'bral ba dag // rjes su dpag pa'i ses rab kyis // (P /) yod med rtag chad sogs bsgrubs kyañ // ñal 'gyur don la reg mi 'gyur // chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas // gzuñ mañ byas pa ji lta bu // mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir // mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin // de bas don dam bsgom pa la // tshad mas dgos pa med do zes // (P om. //) bdag gis gzan du bkod pas (P pa) na // re zig 'dir ni brjod mi dgos // de bas rjes dpag gtsor byed pa'i // rtog ge'i gzuñ rnams dor byas la // 'phags pa klu sgrub gzuñ lugs kyi (P kyis) // brgyud pa'i man ñag bsgom par bya // (D 282b4-6, P 326b5-8)

Here, Atiśa explicitly rejects inference and makes an allusion to the *Satyadvayāvātāra*.

One might be confronted with problems especially in the following two statements of the *Satyadvayāvātāra*.¹⁸⁾ First, Atiśa recognizes only one ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) and denies the existence of two or more. He says:

There is only one ultimate [truth]. Others admit the twofold [ultimate truth]. How can the nature of reality (*dharmatā*), which can never be established, be two, three, and so on?¹⁹⁾

dam pa'i don ni gcig ñid de // gzan dag rnam pa gñis su 'dod // cir yañ ma grub chos ñid de // gñis dañ gsum sogs ga la 'gyur // (k.4, EJIMA

[1983:362])

Second, Atiśa denies direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) for understanding emptiness (*śūnyatā*) like the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*. He states:

A fool who [only] sees this side (*tshu rol mthoñ ba'i rmoñs pa, arvāgdarśin*) says that Buddhists accept both direct perception and inference [as valid means of knowledge] and perceives the emptiness by both means.

[If so,] heretics and the Śrāvakas would also understand the nature of reality. What need would there be to speak of the Yogācāras? There would be no difference between them and the Mādhyamikas.

Therefore, all doctrines would be the same because they are determined by the [same] valid means of knowledge. [Otherwise,] since all reasonings are different, would the nature of reality determined by the valid means of knowledge be manifold? Direct perception and inference are not necessary. Scholars made [them] in order to refute the objections of heretics.²⁰⁾

*mñon sum dañ ni rjes su dpag // sañs rgyas pa yis de gñis bzun // gñis pos
ston ñid rtogs so źes // tshu rol mthoñ ba'i rmoñs pa smra // mu stegs ñan
thos rnam kyis kyañ // chos ñid rtogs par thal bar 'gyur // rnam rig pas
lta smos ci dgos // dbu ma pa la mi mthun med // des na grub mtha'
thams cad kyañ // tshad mas 'jal phyir mthun par 'gyur // rtog ge thams
cad mi mthun pas // tshad mas gźal ba'i chos ñid kyañ // mañ po ñid du
mi 'gyur ram // mñon sum rjes dpag dgos pa med // mu stegs rgol ba bzlog
pa'i phyir // mkhas pa rnam kyis byas pa yin // (kk.10–13, EJIMA
[1983:363–364])*

So-called Svātantrikas like Bhāviveka, Śāntrakṣita, Kamalaśīla, etc. admit the secondary ultimate truth, which is often called *don dam pa dañ mthun pa'i don dam pa*, and use inference at a certain level of their practice. Therefore, a contradiction seems to exist between the expression of the *Satyadvayāvatāra* and Atiśa's attitude toward the four great reasonings in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā*.

However, it is clear that these statements are not intended to oppose

Bhāviveka because Atiśa states the following immediately after the verses:

Also in a treatise, Bhavya (= Bhāviveka) clearly states that [the *Dharmakāya*] could not be realized by means of both conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge.

*luṅ las kyaṅ ni gsal po ru // rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi // śes pa gñis kyis
mi rtogs śes // slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsuṅ //* (k.14, EJIMA
[1983:364])²¹⁾

Atiśa also refers to Candrakīrti in the next verse.

Who realized the emptiness? It was Nāgārjuna, who was predicted by the Tathāgata and saw the truth of the nature of reality, and his desciple Candrakīrti.²²⁾

*ston ṅid gaṅ gis rtogs se na // de bzin gśegs pas luṅ bstan zin // chos ṅid
bden pa gziṅs pa yi // klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin //* (k.15, EJIMA
[1983:364])

Here Atiśa makes a point of mentioning Candrakīrti in addition to Nāgārjuna. Of course, this shows how important Candrakīrti was for Atiśa. However, this is natural for Atiśa, who considers himself part of the lineage from Nāgārjuna, through Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka and Śāntideva down to Bodhibhadra, as shown above. Therefore, this statement can be only regarded as Atiśa tracing the lineage.

The emphasis on only one ultimate truth and the rejection of valid means of knowledge are also not odd, if we think of the position of valid means of knowledge in his description of practice. The ultimate truth can be attained only through *vipaśyanā*. However, scriptures and reasonings are required for removing uncertainty before cultivating the *vipaśyanā*, as we have seen in the description of the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, I surveyed the philosophy and practice of Atiśa, who considers practice as particularly important, by focusing on its sources. His description has very different sources depending on the subject, such as *śīla*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*.

The Bodhisattva's vow is explained from the standpoint of both the traditions of Asaṅga and Śāntideva. The work by Asaṅga referred to here is the *Yogācārabhūmi*, mainly the *Śīla-parivarta* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. However, the tradition of Śāntideva remains unclear.

Dhyāna is described as *śamatha* in the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* and explained together with supernatural knowledge. The description of supernatural knowledge seems to be related to the tradition of Śāntideva. *Śamatha* is explained by quoting the *Samādhisam̐bhāraparivarta* of Bodhibhadra. However, there is a problem that remains to be solved in the understanding of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā* in the *Samādhisam̐bhāraparivarta*. The understanding of *śamatha* as discriminating knowledge and that of *vipāśyanā* as non-conceptual wisdom seems very unique. The source of the *Samādhisam̐bhāraparivarta* needs to be identified.

Prajñā is described as *vipāśyanā* accompanied by skillful means. The description mainly deals with reason and scriptures for removing uncertainty before entering the practice of *vipāśyanā*. Atiśa explains the four great reasonings as reason. He states that they are nothing but a summary for the purpose of practice. Therefore, we cannot argue his standpoint only from this description. However, it is to be noted that Atiśa always explains the Mādhyamika in contrast to the Yogācāra and does not divide the Mādhyamika into any subdivisions. He calls the Mādhyamika as such the *dbu ma chen po*, the great Mādhyamika.

Atiśa states that the tradition starts with Nāgārjuna, is transmitted to Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhāviveka and Śāntideva, and then to Bodhibhadra. The relationship between Śāntideva and Bodhibhadra, the connection between Bodhibhadra and the description of the *prajñā*, and so on are still unclear and requires further study.

Moreover, the *Bodhimārgadīpa-panjikā* mentions the teaching of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. It needs to be examined how the teaching was transmitted to Atiśa. In this regard, the relationship to Suvarṇadvīpa also remains to be examined.

A study on Prajñākaramati, a contemporary of Atiśa, may provide some clues. Prajñākaramati wrote a commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* by Śāntideva as well as one on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* are both closely connected with Atiśa. Although Prajñākaramati does not mention the four great reasonings, he is very similar to Atiśa in that he often bases his thought on Candrakīrti while also mentioning the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* as a source. Through a comparative study between Atiśa and Prajñākaramati, etc.,

we should be able to clarify the situation of the Mādhyamika between the tenth and eleventh centuries, which might give us an answer to the problem of these subdivisions of the Mādhyamika in Tibet.

Notes

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- 1) The *Bodhipathapradīpa* and the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* can be regarded as Atiśa's main works and therefore have been mostly used for studies on Atiśa. SHERBURNE [2000] provides the English translation and MOCHIZUKI [1988, 1999a, 2000a, 2001a, 2002c, 2003, 2004] the Japanese translation. NAGASHIMA [2004, 2007] and I have the similar interests, and he often provided the English and the Japanese translations respectively for the quoted passages from the *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā* and the *Satyadvayāvatāra* in this paper. My translation is especially indebted to NAGASHIMA [2004].
- 2) *Satyadvayāvatāra*, D 3902, 4467, P 5298, 5380, *Samśāramanoniryāṇīkāra-nāmasaṃgīti*, D 2313, 4473, P 3152, 5386.
- 3) MOCHIZUKI [1996] presents the German translation of the chapter on the *bodhicitta*. MIYAZAKI [2007] provides the Tibetan text and the Japanese translation.
- 4) MIMAKI [1982:29–30].
- 5) MOCHIZUKI [1990].
- 6) *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*, D 99a6f., P 110b1f.
- 7) MIYAZAKI [1993] discusses the relationship between the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and Atiśa from the point of the prediction of Nāgārjuna.
- 8) ENDO [1981], ONO [2001] and MIYAZAKI [1995, 2000, 2002].
- 9) *Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā*, D 275a7, P 318a1–2.
- 10) EJIMA [1980:201–248] attempted to clarify the history of summarizing the reasonings.
- 11) EJIMA [1980:232] pointed out that Kamalaśīla expresses the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*, I-1 as “*rdo rje gzebs ma thogs pa med pa'i bži*” in his *Madhyamakāloka*.
- 12) EJIMA [1980:239–248] and LINDTNER [1981:205–211].
- 13) NAGASHIMA [2004:84], note.54.
- 14) *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa*, D 113a5f., P 126b6f.
- 15) He is also called Dharmakīrti or Dharmapāla.
- 16) MIMAKI [2000], FUNAYAMA [2000].
- 17) NAGASHIMA [2004:81].
- 18) LINDTNER [1981] presents the Tibetan edition and the English translation, and EJIMA [1983] also presents the Tibetan edition and the Japanese translation of the *Satyadvayāvatāra*. NAGASHIMA [2004, 2007] tries to classify Atiśa into the Prāsaṅgika on the basis of Atiśa's attitude by using many of his works. NAGASHIMA [2004] also provides most of the English translation of the following quotation.

- 19) NAGASHIMA [2004:79].
 20) NAGASHIMA [2004:80].
 21) Cf. *Madhyamakahr̥daya-kārikā*, III-285cd. *savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa durdr̥śaḥ* //
 22) NAGASHIMA [2004:81].

Abbreviations

- BPP *Bodhipathapradīpa*. EIMER 1978.
 D The Derge edition. (Cat.) *Seizō daizōkyō sōmokuoku Tōhoku teikoku daigakuzō han* 『西藏大藏經總目錄東北帝國大學藏版』, Sendai 仙臺, 1934.
 P The Peking edition. (Cat.) Suzuki Daisetsu ed. *Seizō daizōkyō sōmokuoku-sakuin* 鈴木大拙編『西藏大藏經總目錄・索引』, Tokyo 東京, 1962.

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