

Ming-Qing China's Policy towards Vietnam as a Mirror of Its Policy towards Korea: With a Focus on the Question of Investiture and “Punitive Expeditions”

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Preamble

I have elsewhere discussed China's policy towards Korea during the Ming 明 and Qing 清 from the perspective of “rites” or “propriety” (*li* 禮) and “chastisement” (*wenzui* 問罪).¹⁾ In this article, I shall show how the same issues manifested in Ming-Qing China's policy towards Vietnam.

The term *wenzui*, or “chastisement,” corresponds in modern diplomatic parlance to sanctions imposed by a superpower. Among these sanctions, the most severe was the sending of a “punitive expedition” (*wenzui zhi shi* 問罪之師). In other words, when Ming-Qing China considered another country to have departed markedly from the norms of “propriety,” it would send a “punitive expedition.” “Punitive expeditions” were sent by China to Vietnam on three occasions during the Ming and Qing, namely, during the Yongle 永樂 and Jiajing 嘉靖 eras of the Ming and during the Qianlong 乾隆 era of the Qing. In the case of “the punitive expedition” sent during the Jiajing era, however, the Vietnamese surrendered as the large Chinese army drew close to the border, and so no major military engagement took place. But it is a fact that a “punitive expedition” was sent, and because it is necessary to examine the logic behind the sending of this “punitive expedition” in order to consider the logic behind the other two “punitive expeditions,” it too will be taken up for consideration in the following.

Questions pertaining to “investiture” and usurpation had considerable bearings on the three “punitive expeditions” sent to Vietnam, and therefore I shall begin with some brief explanatory remarks. When a new king ascended the throne in a country with which China had relations, or when an incumbent ruler wished to enter into a suzerain-vassal relation-

ship with China, China would in response to his request enfeoff him in the manner of the feudal lords of ancient times and recognize him as the king of that country, and this was known as “investiture” (*cefeng* 册封). Thus, entering into a relationship based on investiture meant that the Chinese emperor and the king of another country formed a suzerain-vassal relationship. In the case of a suzerain-vassal relationship within China, a vassal would receive an emolument from the emperor, as well as enjoy various rights appertaining to his official post, and in return he would become a cog in the emperor’s vast bureaucracy, pledge loyalty to him, and serve him faithfully. He quite literally served the emperor as a vassal. The suzerain-vassal relationship in the case of a relationship based on investiture was similar in that it was mediated by the giving and receiving of rights and benefits by both parties. The king of the other country would gain an assurance that his country would not be subjected to direct rule by the more powerful country of China, and in certain periods some countries engaged in tribute trade, which guaranteed them enormous profits.

As I have previously explained elsewhere, investiture was underpinned by the spirit of propriety, which was a standard for maintaining a hierarchy of obligations and rank, and ever since the Han 漢 dynasty it had been considered that “propriety” was to be employed in conjunction with “punishment” (or that propriety took precedence and punishment was secondary), with the latter corresponding to sanctions in the realm of foreign affairs. A king who had entered into a relationship based on investiture was as a rule able to govern without any interference from China in his domestic affairs, but the problem was that within each country politics operated in accordance with the peculiar logic of that country, which was completely divorced from the wishes of China, which sought to exercise control by means of this ritual propriety. The most serious issue in this regard was usurpation of the throne. If a king who had been deemed suitable and invested by the Chinese emperor was killed or deposed through usurpation of the throne or by some other means, this would be at complete variance with propriety. In such cases, China would sometimes intervene in a major way on the pretext of maintaining propriety. Even when a king had abdicated or been succeeded in accordance with the rules of ritual propriety, the new king had to gain the emperor’s authorization if he wished to continue receiving the benefits of investiture.

This means that any country that wished to maintain a relationship

with China based on investiture would experience considerable interference from China. I have described elsewhere the immense import that this question of investiture had in the history of Korea.

For Ming-Qing China, Vietnam was, along with Korea, the most important country whose rulers were granted investiture. The accounts of foreign countries in the *Mingshi* 明史 320 *infra* begin with Korea, followed by Annam (Annan 安南), i.e., Vietnam. Research in recent years has frequently discussed the world order in East Asia centred on China in terms of the tribute system or investiture system. Were one to examine Ming-Qing China's policies towards Korea and Vietnam on the basis of this idealized system, one would expect to find that they were more or less identical. But the actual history of China's policies towards these two countries has been quite different. To state my conclusion first, it could be said that Korea and Vietnam were at opposite poles in this regard. By apprising ourselves of Ming-Qing China's policy towards Vietnam, we can use this as a mirror to gain a clearer grasp of China's policy towards Korea. If we reverse our perspective, the distinctive features of China's policy towards Vietnam should also become clearer. Further, on this basis I also wish to point out that the theories of the tribute system or investiture system being keenly discussed today in academic circles are, if anything, acting as an obstacle to an understanding of Ming-Qing China's diplomatic stance towards neighbouring countries.

I. "The Punitive Expedition" Sent by the Yongle Emperor

I shall begin by considering "the punitive expedition" sent by the Yongle emperor. In 1370 (Hongwu 洪武 3), the Hongwu emperor, who founded the Ming dynasty, sent an envoy to Vietnam and invested Trần Nhật Kiên 陳日燿 (=Dương Nhật Lễ 楊日禮) as king of Annam.²⁾ As a result, the Ming and Annam entered into a relationship based on investiture.

The problem was that Vietnam had for some time been calling itself not Annam but Đại Việt 大越, with its ruler assuming the title of "emperor" (*hoàng đế* 皇帝) and instituting his own era-name. For instance, Trần Nhật Kiên was using the era-name Đại Định 大定, which was in the view of the Ming a spurious era-name. It would appear that the Ming was fully aware of the fact that there was another "emperor" in Vietnam using his own era-name when it invested him as "king of Annam." This is because in the account of Annam in the *Yuanshi* 元史 209 it is stated that in 1258

(Xianzong 憲宗 8) during the Yuan the era-name in Vietnam was changed to Thiệu Long 紹隆, and that in 1285 (Zhiyuan 至元 22) Trần Nhật Huy 陳日烜 assumed the title of Đại Việt Quốc Chủ Hiên Thiên Thể Đạo Đại Minh Quang Hiếu Hoàng đế 大越國主憲天體道大明光孝皇帝, abdicated in favour of the crown prince, installed the crown-prince's consort as empress, and even used a seal engraved with the words "*Hạo thiên thành mệnh chi bảo*" 昊天成命之寶. In spite of the fact that the Yuan forces that had invaded Vietnam were defeated by this Trần Nhật Huy 陳日烜 and driven out of Vietnam, the Yuan court urged him to visit China, and he responded by sending an envoy and offering tribute. The *Yuanshi* was compiled in 1370, the year in which the Ming entered into an investiture-based relationship with Annam, and therefore when deciding on an important matter in the area of foreign relations such as granting investiture to the king of Annam, the leading figures in the Ming court would have been cognizant of these facts, namely, that the person whom they were referring to as "king of Annam" called himself "Emperor of Đại Việt" in his own country and that, while the era-name Hongwu was used in documents submitted to the Ming court, a different era-name was being used in his own country. It is natural to assume that the Ming was aware of these facts when it accepted his tribute and granted him investiture.

Even more of a problem was the fact that the Hongwu emperor had on several occasions been deceived by the "king of Annam" when accepting tribute from him. Around this time, the Vietnamese throne was being repeatedly usurped, with kings invested by the Ming being killed and kings who had sent tributary missions to the Ming being either killed or dethroned. Trần Nhật Kiên received his investiture in the eighth month of 1370, but in the eleventh month of the same year there was a coup d'état in which he was killed. He was succeeded to the throne by Trần Thúc Minh 陳叔明, who in 1372 (Hongwu 5) sent a tributary mission to Nanjing 南京. On inspecting the memorial accompanying the tribute goods, a secretary (*zhushi* 主事) in the Ministry of Rites (*libu* 禮部) noticed that the tribute had been sent not in the name of Trần Nhật Kiên but in the name of Trần Thúc Minh. The new "emperor" had brazenly sent tribute while concealing the fact that there had been a coup d'état. On learning of this, the Hongwu emperor (Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋) refused to accept the tribute goods and threatened to send a "punitive expedition" of 100,000 troops.

The mastermind behind the succession of usurpations and the replacements of the emperor was Lê Quý Ly 黎季犛. In 1377 (Hongwu 10)

he removed Tr n Thúc Minh from the throne and replaced him with Tr n Vĩ 陳煒. Then, in 1388 (Hongwu 21), he dethroned and killed this Tr n Vĩ and installed Tr n Nhật H n 陳日焜. But the following year, concealing from the Ming the fact that the throne had been usurped, he sent tribute in the name of Tr n Vĩ, which the Ming, unaware of Tr n Vĩ's dethronement, accepted. The Vietnamese had once again brazenly deceived the Ming court. Four years later, in the first month of 1393, the Ming again accepted tribute from the Annamese king. The facts came to light in the fourth month, and Zhu Yuanzhang ordered that all tribute from Annam be rejected. Yet three years later, in 1396, the Ming was once again accepting tribute from Annam.³⁾

As has already been noted, investiture was based on ritual propriety, and propriety was for the maintenance of obligations and rank. However, Tr n Nhật Kiên, the first Vietnamese ruler to be invested as king by the Ming, was killed by his uncle Tr n Thúc Minh, and this had been followed by a succession of usurpations of the throne. While there were, as far as can be judged from the *Ming shilu* 明實錄, no further instances during the Hongwu era of anyone being invested as “king of Annam,” tribute from the ruler of Vietnam, who was not recognized as “king,” was, as we have seen, still accepted. Instead of the statement “Tr n, king of Annam, sent an envoy and offered tribute” (安南國王陳○遣使入貢), the corresponding passage in the *Ming shilu* has simply omitted the two characters for “king” (國王) and reads “Tr n of Annam sent an envoy and offered tribute” (安南陳○遣使入貢). The only sanctions that the Ming was able to impose on the “Emperor of Đại Việt,” who had been repeatedly deceiving the Ming emperor, was to refuse his tribute on a number of occasions and, when Tr n Thúc Minh died, not to send a messenger bearing the court's condolences on the grounds that he had usurped the throne by killing the previous ruler and was therefore an “immoral” person. In the section on Annam, the compilers of the *Mingshi* (i.e., historiographers of the Qing) remarked in connection with the Hongwu emperor, who had been compelled to accept tribute from Vietnam in spite of repeated usurpations and improprieties, that “although he loathed the usurpations, he did not want to put the army to the trouble of sending an expeditionary force and so reluctantly accepted the tribute” (帝雖惡其弑逆, 不欲勞師遠征, 乃納入).⁴⁾

In the case of Goryeo 高麗, on the other hand, the Hongwu emperor censured the Koreans for being “insincere” when fifty horses brought as tribute to Nanjing were found to include two privately owned horses that

had been added to replace two horses that had died en route, and he refused to accept the horses. Likewise, when a usurper of the Goryeo throne requested a renewal of his predecessor's investiture, the Hongwu emperor used this as a pretext to apply considerable pressure on him.⁵⁾ While both Goryeo and Annam were tributary countries whose rulers had been invested by the Ming, the Ming's diplomatic stance towards them was very different, taking a hard line towards the former and a soft approach towards the latter.

The Ming dynasty sent military forces against Vietnam only once, during the reign of the Yongle emperor. This was nothing less than a "punitive expedition," intended to punish the Annamese king Lê Hán Thuởng 黎漢蒼 (H Đê 胡登 or H Hán Thuởng 胡漢蒼), whom the Yongle emperor had himself invested only two years earlier as king of Annam.⁶⁾

In 1400 (Jianwen 建文 2) Lê Quý Ly had deposed the last emperor of the Tr n dynasty, proclaimed himself emperor, established the new era-name of Thánh Nguyên 聖元, and changed the country's name to Đại Ngu 大虞. In the same year, he relinquished the throne to Lê Hán Thuởng. According to the *Ming shilu*, in 1403 (Yongle 1), H Đê (Lê Hán Thuởng), "administrator of the affairs of state of Annam," congratulated the Yongle emperor on his accession to the throne and also requested enfeoffment. The Ming court, suspecting that the fall of the Tr n dynasty had been due to foul play, immediately dispatched officials to investigate the truth of the matter. In the event, it was deemed not to have been a usurpation in view of the fact that Lê Hán Thuởng's retainers and some elders submitted a written statement vouching for the fact that "the Tr n family line had died out" (陳氏嗣絕), and it was also determined that Lê Hán Thuởng's campaign against Champa had taken place prior to the general amnesty granted on the occasion of the Yongle emperor's enthronement. In the same year an envoy was dispatched to invest Lê Hán Thuởng as king of Annam.

But the following year (1404) there was a turnabout, and Lê Hán Thuởng was deemed to be a usurper. This reversal began when someone claiming to be a retainer of the Tr n royal house of Annam appeared in Nanjing and submitted a petition to the Ming court claiming that the Tr n dynasty had been overthrown by the Lê family. Then in the twelfth month of the same year a tributary mission from Annam that happened to be in Nanjing was confronted by a person named Tr n Thiên Bình 陳天平, who claimed to be a descendant of the Tr n dynasty. The

members of the mission, realizing that he was a royal grandson of the Tr n house, were all astounded and prostrated themselves before him with tears in their eyes. On hearing of this, the Yongle emperor concluded that “the Lê family had killed their sovereign, usurped the throne, assumed the title of emperor, changed the era-name, committed atrocities against the people of Annam, and invaded the territory of a neighbouring country, none of which could be forgiven by the gods of Heaven and Earth, and because their subjects had all colluded in the deceit and concealed the facts, all the inhabitants of the country were criminals” (其弑主篡位, 僭號改元, 暴虐國人, 攻奪隣境, 此天地鬼神所不容也。而其臣民共爲欺蔽, 是一國皆罪人也). A mere year after having granted investiture, the emperor not only declared that Lê Hán Thuởng, whom he himself had invested as king, was a usurper, but he suddenly also included his assumption of the title of “emperor” among his crimes.

It is not known whether Tr n Thiên Bình was really a descendant of the Tr n royal house. It is most certainly true that the dramatic encounter between him and the tributary mission is overly theatrical. But regardless of whether or not he was an imposter, there can be little doubt that this was a deliberate frame-up on the part of the Yongle emperor, for if the emperor had been intending to continue supporting Lê Hán Thuởng, it would have been a simple matter for him to dispose of anyone who might appear on the scene and claim to be a descendant of the Tr n royal house. Furthermore, to immediately conclude, without undertaking any on-the-spot investigations, that the throne had been usurped just because someone claiming to be a descendant of the Tr n royal house had appeared was overhasty on the part of the Chinese emperor, who was suzerain of many vassal states.

In the first month of the following year (1405), an investigating censor (*jiancha yushi* 監察御史) was promptly sent to Annam and ordered the Vietnamese “to submit a written explanation of the reason for the usurpation of the throne” (爾其具篡奪之故以聞). Even though Annam may have been a tributary state whose ruler had received investiture from the Chinese emperor, it would seem to us that it was rather the Ming court that was guilty of “impropriety” by concluding immediately after a meeting between a tributary mission from Annam and Tr n Thiên Bình that the throne had been usurped and then ordering the Vietnamese to submit a written explanation of the reason for their usurpation of the throne. Lê Hán Thuởng responded on the one hand by building warships in preparation for war, while on the other hand he sent an embassy to ac-

company the Ming investigating censor on his return trip to China and to “apologize” and then sent another envoy to ask that he be allowed to receive Tr n Thiên Bình, the descendant of the Tr n royal house. The Ming agreed and returned Tr n Thiên Bình with an army escort of 5,000 men. It can only be assumed that it was the intention of the Ming to have Tr n Thiên Bình killed in Vietnam and use this as a pretext to start a war with Lê Hán Thuởng.

Once Tr n Thiên Bình had been killed and hostilities had begun between the two sides, the Yongle emperor decided in 1406 (Yongle 4) to dispatch a large army. After having conducted a ceremony at the emperor’s ancestral temple on the first day of the seventh month, he addressed the gods of the mountains, seas, and rivers in the following terms: “The traitorous vassals Lê Quý Ly and his son Hán Thuởng of Annam have repeatedly killed the rulers of their country and have exterminated the royal house, and they have usurped the country, changed the ruler’s family name, and assumed the title of emperor. . . . I am expressly reporting this because an expeditionary force will be dispatched on the sixteenth day of the seventh month. May the gods help us!” (享太廟，上還，御奉天殿，遣使祭告嶽鎮海瀆之神曰，安南賊臣黎季犛及子蒼，屢殺國主，殲夷其宗，篡奪其國，改易姓名，僭稱位號，…。以是月十六日兵行，特用致告，惟神相之)⁷⁾

The mountains (*yuezhen* 嶽鎮) among the mountains, seas, and rivers (*yuezhen haidu* 嶽鎮海瀆) mentioned here refer to the mountains that guard a country. The Yongle emperor informed these gods of the reason for the dispatch of troops and prayed for the gods’ protection, and he did this on account of the following precedent.

In 1369 (Hongwu 2), the Hongwu emperor had erected an altar to the mountains and rivers in the southern quarter of Nanjing and had there worshipped the gods of the mountains, seas, and rivers along with the gods of all mountains, rivers, and cities under Heaven. Later in the same year it was declared that because Annam and Goryeo both owed allegiance to China, their mountains and rivers should also receive rites of sacrifice in the same manner as those of China, and the following year envoys were sent to offer sacrifice to the mountains and rivers of Annam, Goryeo, and Champa.⁸⁾ Following investigations by the Secretariat (*zhong-shu sheng* 中書省) and the minister of rites (*liguan* 禮官), twenty-one mountains, six large rivers, and six small rivers in Annam were selected to receive rites of sacrifice. This policy was subsequently extended to other regions such as Ryūkyū 琉球, Japan, Zhenla 真臘 (Cambodia), Gansu 甘

肅, and Wusizang 烏斯藏 (Tibet). In 1375 the emperor stopped sacrificing in person to the gods of these foreign mountains and rivers, and in the case of the gods of Annam, for example, the rites were performed in Guangxi 廣西 province, while the gods of Goryeo were worshipped by the military command in Liaodong 遼東. But it goes without saying that these sacrificial rites were under the overall supervision of the emperor.⁹⁾

This peculiar practice of sacrificing to the gods of mountains and rivers located in other countries has already been noted by a number of other researchers, but little attention seems to have been paid to the reasons behind it and its actual functions.¹⁰⁾ It is evident from the following example, however, that the act of sacrificing to foreign mountains and rivers had quite practical functions.

In the second month of 1396 (Hongwu 29), in the midst of an incident concerning the perceived improprieties of Korean diplomatic documents, the Hongwu emperor sent through the Ministry of Rites a decree to Yi Seonggye 李成桂, the founder of the Joseon 朝鮮 dynasty, in which it was stated that because the Korean king had until now frequently created the causes of disputes, the gods of the mountains, rivers, and seas had been notified and asked to inform the Supreme Thearch (前者爲朝鮮國王數生釁端, 故告於嶽鎮海瀆山川神祇, 轉達上帝).¹¹⁾ According to the *Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄, in 1393 the Hongwu emperor had actually declared:

“Are the gods of the mountains and rivers of Goryeo not aware that you (Yi Seonggye) have created the roots of the problem and are causing harm to the people?” “I am about to clearly inform the Supreme Thearch and to order my generals to subjugate the east.”

其高麗山川鬼神, 豈不知爾造禍, 殃及於民。…朕又將昭告上帝, 命將東討, 云云¹²⁾

In 1394, the following year, he sent the Korean king the text of a prayer addressed to the “gods of the seas, mountains, rivers, and so on,” which read as follows:

I wish to clearly notify the Supreme Thearch, but on the other hand I do not wish to notify him lightly and put him to any trouble. I am now sending someone to inform the gods first. O gods, I wish you to infer why I am doing something like this and to convey it to the

Supreme Thearch. Since he (Yi Seonggye) does not desist from wilfully deriding China as always, I most certainly intend to send a “punitive expedition” wherever it may be necessary.

予欲昭告上帝，又恐輕易有煩帝聽。今遣人先告於神，惟神察其所以，達於上帝。彼若肆侮不已，問罪之師在所必舉¹³⁾

As the chief priest presiding over all rites of sacrifice to the gods of mountains and rivers, the Hongwu emperor mobilized the gods of other countries without leaving Nanjing and had them inform the Supreme Thearch of Yi Seonggye’s “offences.”

This mobilization of the gods by the Hongwu emperor continued thereafter with uncompromising persistence, and in 1397 (Hongwu 30) he again threatened the Korean king, declaring that “because the gods of the mountains and rivers above and below are aware of your deeds, your sins will soon come to fruition and you will be unable to escape the consequences” (山川上下神祇有所知覺，禍將有日，必不可逃).¹⁴⁾ The *Ming shilu* also records that in 1398 the emperor sent a missive to the Korean king through the Ministry of Rites in which he touched on sending a “punitive expedition” and stated that “the Korean king is frequently causing disputes along the border, and the gods of our seas, mountains, and rivers are most certainly well aware of this” (今王數生邊畔于我，海嶽山川之神，必昭鑒于爾).¹⁵⁾

In this fashion, there was created during the Hongwu era a “system” whereby the Chinese emperor, when wishing to chastise the king of another country, would first inform the gods of the local mountains and rivers and have them notify the Supreme Thearch, as a result of which divine punishment would be visited upon that country. “The punitive expedition” sent by the Chinese emperor was also part of this divine punishment. In the first years of the Yongle era too the offences of the Vietnamese king were communicated to the gods of the mountains, seas, and rivers. The “system” of the Hongwu era would probably have been still alive at this time. When declaring Lê Hán Thuởng to be a usurper, the Yongle emperor stated that his actions were unforgivable in the eyes of the gods of Heaven and Earth (天地鬼神，所不容), and when he issued the edict for launching a “punitive expedition” two years later he said exactly the same thing. This expression may at first sight seem to be conventional and highly exaggerated, but when considered against the background of the system of “heavenly rule” or “divine rule” that was actually

alive in the early Ming, it was a perfectly natural turn of phrase.

As can be seen in the first chapter of the *Huang Ming zuxun* 皇明祖訓, Annam was one of the fifteen foreign countries that the Hongwu emperor had determined could not be invaded. Among these fifteen countries, Annam was the only country against which the Ming actually sent military forces after having decided in advance to go to war. To date no one has been able to explain in a completely convincing manner why the Yongle emperor sent an expeditionary force to Vietnam.¹⁶⁾ It has been suggested that, dreaming of restoring the vast territories of the Yuan period, he wanted to conduct a successful military campaign against Vietnam, something which not even the Yuan had managed to do. But this immediately raises the question of why he did not try to gain military control of Japan, which had also proved impossible for the Yuan to accomplish. The “crimes” committed by Lê Quý Ly and Lê Hán Thuởng as listed by the emperor in his denunciation of them to the gods of the mountains, seas, and rivers and in the edict issued when the expeditionary force set forth, and also by Zhang Fu 張輔, commander-in-chief of the campaign against Annam, were that they had usurped the throne, assumed the title of “emperor,” invaded Champa (whose ruler had also received investiture from the Ming), and made raids on Chinese territory. But none of these “crimes” was serious enough to warrant the dispatch of a large army said to have numbered 800,000 men, for most of these “crimes” went back to the reign of the Hongwu emperor and would remain largely unchanged even after the occupation of Vietnam came to an end during the reign of the Xuande 宣德 emperor.

If one takes into account the fact that “the punitive expeditions” subsequently sent by the Jiajing emperor of the Ming and the Qianlong emperor of the Qing, to be discussed below, can only be said to have had their origins in the arbitrary will of an autocratic emperor, then it will probably prove impossible to discover a logical reason for the Yongle emperor's similar expedition. But what we can be certain of is that “the punitive expedition” was meant to dispel long-standing frustration caused by the fact that people who had been invested as king of Annam or whose tribute had been accepted since the start of the Ming had assumed the title of “emperor” in their own country, were using “spurious” era-names, and were being deposed one after another quite irrespectively of the wishes of the Ming court, regardless of which the Ming had had no choice but to turn a blind eye in some cases and to administer a reprimand in others.

The Yongle emperor was himself a usurper. In fact, Lê Hán Thuởng of Annam was, according to the *Ming shilu*, the very first foreign ruler to request investiture when the Yongle emperor ascended the throne. Endorsement as Chinese emperor was necessary for a usurper. Consequently, even though the Yongle emperor suspected that Lê Hán Thuởng too might be a usurper, he hastily issued a decree of investiture, relying on the written statement that the Trần royal house had died out, submitted by Lê Hán Thuởng's retainers and elders, as almost his sole grounds for doing so. The emperor would probably have soon realized that this had been a mistake, but it is of course impossible for an emperor to make a mistake. Accordingly, he may have unilaterally pinned some crimes on Lê Hán Thuởng, which in turn led to the mobilization of a "punitive expedition." If this was indeed the case, then it can only be described as having been the result of the emperor's own arbitrary will.

It is also completely arbitrary for a usurper to describe usurpation as something unforgivable in the eyes of the gods. The *Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục* 欽定越史通鑑綱目, a historical work compiled during the Nguyễn 阮 dynasty in nineteenth-century Vietnam, includes an account of the Yongle emperor's sending of "the punitive expedition" against Lê Hán Thuởng (H Hán Thuởng), to which the Vietnamese emperor has added the following comment:

Zhu Di 朱棣, Prince of Yan 燕, of the Ming (i.e., the Yongle emperor) was no different from H Quý Ly (Lê Quý Ly), and he himself was not in the right. Though his orders may not have been carried out [in Vietnam], why did he not reflect on his own situation? Both were equally rapacious and brutal.

御批，明燕棣與胡季聲亦無以異，其身不正。雖令不行，盍反觀何如。均之貪殘而已¹⁷⁾

The Ming forces carried everything before them and subjugated Vietnam. The following year (1407) a Chinese administrative structure was imposed and Annam was incorporated into the Ming empire. But soon the Chinese were faced with a guerilla war. They sent 800,000 troops in all, but after suffering severe defeats, Chinese forces were finally withdrawn in 1427 (Xuande 2), with only 86,000 men, it is said, able to return to China.

It is true that the policies of the Hongwu and Yongle emperors in the

early Ming towards Korea and Vietnam were sometimes the same, with the Chinese emperor, as if in conformity with the investiture system, sacrificing to local gods of Korea and Vietnam and informing them of the “crimes” of their rulers. But as has already been noted, the Hongwu emperor’s diplomatic stance towards the two countries was utterly different, taking a hard line towards the one and a soft approach towards the other. There can be little doubt that the sending of a “punitive expedition” by the Yongle emperor had its origins in the arbitrary will of an autocratic emperor who was himself a usurper, but it should be considered to have been rooted at a deeper level in pent-up irritation and frustration at the fact that China had since the start of the Hongwu era been compelled to invest as king someone who was calling himself “emperor” in his own country and that there had been repeated usurpations of the throne without any consultation at all with the Ming court. The Yongle emperor’s hard-line policy towards Vietnam was in this sense the flip side of the Hongwu emperor’s more flexible and soft policy. In contrast, the Yongle emperor took almost no measures regarding Korea that could be characterized as hard-line. This was due to nothing other than the fact that the Hongwu emperor had earlier taken a hard-line policy towards Korea, and consequently there was no longer any need to adopt such a policy. In this respect too China’s policies towards Korea and Vietnam in the early Ming present a striking contrast.

II. “The Punitive Expedition” Proposed by the Jiajing Emperor

Next, I wish to consider “the punitive expedition” that the Jiajing emperor planned to send to Vietnam. The question of sending a “punitive expedition” became an issue in 1536 (Jiajing 15), more than one hundred years after the withdrawal of Chinese troops by the Xuande emperor. First, let us briefly review Ming policy towards Vietnam during this past century or so.

The central figure behind the defeat of the Ming army had been Lê Lợi 黎利. Because the Ming forces were being harassed by guerilla warfare, the Xuande emperor began to search for logical reasons to withdraw his forces. He reasoned that the Yongle emperor had sent an expeditionary force in order to restore the Trần dynasty, which had died out, and therefore he would return the country to the Vietnamese once a successor had been found. For this reason in 1430 Lê Lợi, claiming that he had not been able to find any descendants of the Trần dynasty because

they had all died, declared himself worthy of becoming an “outlying vassal” of the Ming since he had won the leadership of the people of Annam. In other words, he asked to be invested as king of Annam. But instead of investing him as king of Annam, the Xuande emperor appointed him “administrator of the affairs of state of Annam.” That is, he was to act as proxy for the king of Annam. Lê Lợi had been calling himself “Emperor of Đại Việt” and using the era-name Thuận Thiên 順天, but when dealing with the Ming he used the era-name Xuande and became “administrator of the affairs of state of Annam.” It was only in 1436 (Zhengtong 正統 1), during the reign of his son Lê Lân 黎麟, that the emperor of Đại Việt was promoted from “administrator of the affairs of state of Annam” and formally recognized as king of Annam. It had been an outstanding piece of diplomacy on the part of the Ming court that brought both status and tangible benefits.

But irrespective of the wishes of the Ming court, Vietnam continued to be plagued by usurpations of the throne. Although Lê Lân’s son Lê Tu n 黎濬 was invested as king of Annam, in 1459 he was killed by his retainer Lê Tông 黎琮 (Lê Nghi Dân 黎宜民). Lê Tông falsely reported to the Ming that Lê Tu n had drowned during a pleasure trip on a lake, and he had himself invested as king. But the following year he too was dethroned and later forced to commit suicide, with Lê Hạo 黎灝 (Lê Tư Thành 黎思誠) assuming the throne in his place. It was only after the Ming sent an envoy to invest this Lê Hạo as king of Annam that it learnt that Lê Tu n had not in fact drowned during a pleasure trip and that Lê Tông had committed suicide.

While aware of the fact that the rulers of Annam were continuing to be deposed one after another, the Ming continued to accept tribute from them and grant them investiture without conducting proper investigations. Around this time the Ming was also receiving year after year requests from Champa for assistance against incursions by Annam, but in response the Ming court merely admonished Annamese envoys when they came to Beijing or else dispatched its own envoy to chastise the Annamese and order them to cease their incursions and return the occupied territories to Champa. These reprimands and orders on the part of the Ming had, however, virtually no effect.

The state of relations between the Ming and Vietnam at this time is clearly shown by an incident involving a counterfeit decree and spurious era-name that occurred in 1480 (Chenghua 成化 16). At the time, Annam had invaded Laos, and a Ming military officer in Yunnan 雲南

province sent a spy to find out what was happening. In the course of his investigations a “counterfeit decree” issued by Annam was discovered, and it was found to bear the “spurious” date “H ng Đức 洪德 10,” corresponding to Chenghua 15. This was also reported to Beijing, but the Ming court decided that if Annam were censured for having issued a counterfeit decree and using a spurious era-name, this would close an avenue whereby the Annamese might themselves “mend their ways.”¹⁸⁾ Not only was no envoy or military force sent to chastise them, but no mention of this issue was made in subsequent imperial messages sent to the king of Annam. The Ming court decided to feign complete ignorance of the fact that there was an emperor in Vietnam and that he had issued a “counterfeit decree” and was using a “spurious” era-name.

In the same year there occurred another incident involving a counterfeit decree and spurious era-name. This time there was discovered a “counterfeit decree” in which the emperor of Đại Việt had appointed a Cham as proxy of the king of Champa to “administer the affairs of state.” This was discovered by Zhang Jin 張瑾, an official in the Messenger Office (*xingren si* 行人司), which was responsible for sending messengers to foreign countries. He had gone to Champa to bestow investiture on the king, only to discover that the person whom he was supposed to be investing as king had already been deposed and someone else who had received a “counterfeit decree” from Đại Việt (Annam) appointing him “administrator of the affairs of state of Champa” was ruling the country. Zhang Jin invested him as king, took the “counterfeit decree” back to China, and submitted it to the court,¹⁹⁾ which then imprisoned him for having granted investiture to someone else on his own initiative.

The following year, another official from the Messenger Office by the name of Wang Mian 王勉 went to investigate the situation in Annam, and in his report to the throne he noted that the Annamese king Lê Hạo was using a “spurious” era-name and asked that a “punitive expedition” be sent since Lê Hạo had for a long time been harbouring thoughts of disloyalty. In response, the Ministry of War (*bingbu* 兵部) accused Wang Mian of “trying to trigger a dispute in a frontier region out of a desire for promotion” and asked the emperor to punish him (以[王]勉希求進用, 引啓邊釁, 當治罪). It is recorded that he actually was punished.²⁰⁾

When considered from the standpoint of the Ming, it was naturally Lê Hạo, king of Annam, who ought to have been chastised, and yet it was Wang Mian, who pointed this out, that actually received punishment. Here we can see that investiture was the product of a fiction and that, at

least in the Ming's policy towards Vietnam, it was nothing but a fiction. Even though the Ming was fully aware that "counterfeit" decrees and "spurious" era-names were being used, it feigned ignorance and continued to accept tribute sent by Lê Hạo, king of Annam, in 1484 and 1487. It was Lê Hạo who had used the era-name H ng Đức. There is no sign here whatsoever of the hard-line stance earlier adopted by the Hongwu emperor towards Korea, when he repeatedly refused to accept tribute goods on the grounds that usurpation of the throne represented a breach of ritual propriety.

The dispatch of troops to Vietnam began to be discussed because of appeals from Champa, which was continuing to be invaded by Annam. These discussions began around 1489 (Hongzhi 弘治 2). But until the sudden emergence of arguments actively pushing for the dispatch of troops during the reign of the Jiajing emperor, these discussions remained by and large halfhearted. For instance, in 1489 the Ministry of War argued against the dispatch of troops because "Lê Hạo is respectfully offering tribute" (黎灝修貢惟謹) and "Annam is said to have always observed propriety" (安南素稱秉禮), and it was critical rather of Champa, which was seeking to rely on China without strengthening its own defences.²¹ In 1495, the grand academician (*da xueshi* 大學士) Xu Pu 徐溥 also opposed the sending of troops, basing himself on the statement that "the ruler does not govern barbarians" (王者不治夷狄) found in the commentary on the entry for the second year of Duke Yin 隱公 in the *Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan* 春秋公羊傳.²² In this connection it might be noted that in 1515 (Zhengde 正德 10), when the usurpation of the throne in Champa became an issue, the supervising secretary (*jishizhong* 給事中) Li Guan 李貫 argued that if the matter was to be dealt with in accordance with the *Chunqiu*, then, instead of sending a "punitive expedition," it would suffice to cut off tribute (律以春秋之法, 雖不興問罪之師, 亦必絕朝貢之路), while Ding Kai 丁楷, regional inspector (*xun'an yushi* 巡按御史) of Guangdong 廣東, also maintained that, when dealing with barbarians, it was sufficient for China to win them over if they came and ignore them if they did not (以爲中國之於夷狄, 來則懷之, 不來則止), and both argued that China should adopt a policy of non-interventionism regarding the internal affairs of "barbarians," i.e., foreign countries.²³ Thus, while the sending of troops to Vietnam was sporadically discussed by the Chinese, various arguments were put forward to prevent it from being actively pursued, and this was because the Chinese knew only too well from past experience how dangerous it was to take issue in earnest with the

Vietnamese. So long as the Ming's foreign policy was not overly swayed by the emperor's arbitrary wishes, it thus remained well-balanced on account of the rational decisions of its officials, and hard-line measures were prevented from gaining undue prominence.

But then in 1536 (Jiajing 15) the dispatch of troops suddenly began to be actively discussed. Prior to this, in 1522, a usurpation drama had once again unfolded in Vietnam, with Mạc Đăng Dung 莫登庸 driving out the emperor Lê Huệ 黎諱 and installing in his place the latter's younger brother Lê Xuân 黎椿. In 1526 Mạc Đăng Dung killed Lê Huệ and in 1527 he himself assumed the throne and also killed Lê Xuân. This resulted in a temporary break in the Lê dynasty.

According to the *Ming shilu*, on the 3rd of the eleventh month of 1536 (Jiajing 15), the Ministry of Rites in Beijing memorialized the emperor, suggesting that because Annam had not sent any tribute for close to twenty years and Mạc Đăng Dung had usurped the throne, an investigation should be conducted, the ringleader sought out, and punishment imposed, to which the emperor gave the following instructions: "Imperial messengers have not been in contact with Annam, and since it has not offered any tribute for a long time, it is plain that it has rebelled... Consult at once with the Ministry of War about a military expedition and submit a report." (安南詔使不通，又久不入貢，叛逆照然。…征討之事，會同兵部，速議以聞) Ten days later, the Ministries of Rites and War conferred and submitted a report to the emperor that concluded that a "punitive expedition" ought to be sent (宜興問罪之師).²⁴ As we have already seen, at the time usurpation of the throne was quite normal in Vietnam, and hitherto the Ming, pretending not to know the facts of the situation, had adopted a policy of non-intervention. It could be said that this policy, which had continued for more than one hundred years since the withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1427, now underwent a major change.

The reason for this major shift in foreign policy was that there had arisen a situation which necessitated the sending of an imperial messenger to Annam. On the 6th of the tenth month of the same year there had been born to the Jiajing emperor a long-awaited son. It was little more than a month later that the Ministries of Rites and War submitted a joint report urging the sending of a "punitive expedition." The accounts given in the *Ming shilu* and many other historical works, such as Zhu Guozhen's 朱國禎 *Huang Ming dashi ji* 皇明大事記 15 ("Annam panfu" 安南叛服), give the impression that initially it was Xia Yan 夏言, minister of rites, and others who advocated the sending of troops to Vietnam, whereafter the

Jiajing emperor too inclined towards this view. But in fact the reverse was true, and there can be little doubt that the emperor took the lead in the dispatch of troops, with the Ministries of Rites and War second-guessing his intentions and submitting their report accordingly. This can be inferred from the following train of events.

Xia Yan's writings include the *Guizhou zouyi* 桂洲奏議 (published in Jiajing 20; held by Cabinet Library in Japan), fascicle 12 of which includes two memorials entitled "Huangsi dansheng, qing zhaoyu Annan Chaoxian erguo shu" 皇嗣誕生, 請詔諭安南朝鮮二國疏 and "Hui bingbu yi zheng Annan guo shu" 會兵部議征安南國疏. The former is identical in content to the aforementioned memorial submitted by the Ministry of Rites on the 3rd of the eleventh month together with the emperor's response, but the memorial is dated "first day of the eleventh month." Likewise, the latter is the same as the joint memorial submitted by the Ministries of Rites and War on the 13th of the eleventh month together with the emperor's response, but the memorial is dated "eighth day of the tenth month."²⁵⁾

The problem lies with the former memorial, bearing the date "first day of the eleventh month." According to this memorial, it was submitted because several days earlier the emperor had given the minister of rites, Xia Yan, verbal orders to notify other countries immediately of the birth of his son, "making it known to both Chinese and barbarians together" (皇上面諭 [禮部尚書夏言], 皇子初生, 既詔告天下, 何獨外國至冊封日, 始遣使詔諭。…便當使華夷一體知悉, 他日冊立, 再行詔告。卿宜議擬舉行).²⁶⁾ In this memorial, Xia Yan argued on the one hand that "because the state of Annam has not sent tribute for more than twenty years, it will be difficult for it to avoid punishment for its breach of allegiance, and in terms of the law a "punitive expedition" ought to be sent" (安南國職貢不修, 歷二十餘年。背叛之罪, 已無所逃, 在法當興問罪之師). But on the other hand, citing reasons such as the fact that there was no regular king in Annam (但節據奏稱, 該國賊臣作逆, 國無定主, 云々), he also wrote, "This time issue an edict [regarding the birth of a prince] only to the king of Korea and desist from sending an envoy to the state of Annam for the time being" (合無今次止行詔諭朝鮮國王, 其安南國王暫免遣使), and suggested that further investigations should be conducted into the state of affairs in Annam. In other words, what can be inferred from this memorial as a whole is that Xia Yan was in fact lukewarm towards the idea of sending troops. While saying for appearance's sake out of consideration for the emperor's feelings that a "punitive expedition"

ought to be sent, he argued that the emperor should desist from sending even an envoy to inform the Annamese of the birth of a prince. In response, the emperor gave a show of endorsing this view, but he also replied as follows: "Wait a while with sending an imperial messenger until the state of affairs in Annam is known. Report back to me after having discussed countermeasures at the Ministry of Rites together with the Ministry of War. Don't concern yourself about trivial matters." (奉聖旨, 是。詔使且待彼國事情。你部裏會同兵部, 計議來說。勿視為非要) In this fashion it was indicated to Xia Yan that this matter was of particular importance, and it also became a matter concerning the Ministry of War as well. It has already been noted that, according to the *Ming shilu*, the emperor's instructions on this occasion were as follows: "Imperial messengers have not been in contact with Annam, and since it has not offered any tribute for a long time, it is plain that it has rebelled. . . . Consult at once with the Ministry of War about a military expedition and submit a report."

That the Ministries of Rites and War conferred and submitted a memorial proposing the sending of a "punitive expedition" was the result of these hints given by the emperor. In other words, the emperor took the lead in directing Xia Yan from the time of the birth of the prince right through to the decision to send troops.

This decision to send troops to Annam was due to the Jiajing emperor's completely personal reasons, namely, the need to notify Korea and Annam of the birth of a son. Relations with Korea were stable, and so it was decided without any difficulty on the 5th of the eleventh month to send Gong Yongqing 龔用卿.²⁷⁾ On this occasion it proved infeasible to send an envoy to Vietnam, but because there was still time until the investiture of the emperor's young son as crown prince, it would be quite sufficient to subjugate Annam by such time and then notify the "king of Annam."

The Jiajing emperor had probably been hoping that the Vietnamese would succumb in the face of his threat to send a large army and come bearing tribute of their own accord, and since it had been decided to send troops if the Vietnamese did not come in submission of their own accord, most officials in the Ministries of Rites and War, from the ministers down, acted in accordance with this policy. There were some, however, who were opposed to it. One of these was Tang Zhou 唐胄, vice minister of the left (*zuo shilang* 左侍郎) of the Ministry of Revenue (*hubu* 戶部), who, using the line of reasoning found in the *Chunqiu Gongyang*

zhuan, argued that “the emperor does not govern [barbarians] in the way that he governs China,” and went so far as to declare that “it is a blessing for China that the barbarians are divided and in turmoil” (帝王不以中國之治治之，…夷狄分亂，中國之福).²⁸⁾ His was the honest opinion that it was fortunate for China that usurpation and other internal conflicts should continue in other countries since this meant that China had no powerful rivals. Pan Dan 潘旦, the military superintendent (*tidu junwu* 提督軍務) of Liangguang provinces 兩廣 in command of the region bordering on Vietnam, who was also vice minister of the left of the Ministry of War, likewise remarked that “barbarians, birds, and beasts have no moral principles” and “the emperors of yore used the method of ‘not governing’ to govern [barbarians]” (夫夷狄禽獸，本無人倫。…古帝王治以不治之法也), and he too advocated non-intervention in Vietnam.²⁹⁾ But several months later Pan Dan had lost his post. The arguments put forward by Yu Guang 余光, governor (*xunfu* 巡撫) of Guangdong, are even more interesting. According to him, the Lê house was a line of usurpers, and Heaven had used Mạc Đăng Dung to inflict punishment on them; therefore, destroying the Mạc house and restoring the Lê house would be equivalent to restoring tyrants. He accordingly argued that Annam should only be censured for not sending any tribute, but military forces should not be sent.³⁰⁾ Displeased with this memorial, the Jiajing emperor ordered that Yu Guang be punished, and in fact he ended up forfeiting one year’s stipend.

As these discussions were taking place, in the fourth month of 1537 the Ministries of Rites and War enumerated Mạc Đăng Dung’s ten major crimes, and for the first time the fact that he had assumed the title of “emperor emeritus” and was using the “spurious” era-names of Minh Đức 明德 and Đại Chính 大正 were listed among his “crimes.” The Jiajing emperor also commented that “since Annam has not visited the court for a long time, by rights it ought to be chastised” (安南久不來庭，法當問罪), and steady progress was made in preparing for the sending of troops.³¹⁾

Here too we cannot help seeing the excessive self-interest in the Ming’s logic for sending troops and the undue arbitrariness of the emperor. Yet, on reflection, the Jiajing emperor ought to have known that the Ming had previously sent troops to Vietnam and paid dearly for it, even if this had happened more than a hundred years earlier. Why then, in spite of this, was he so obsessed with sending troops to Vietnam?

The answer is that the emperor was keen to reform the system of rites and wanted to maintain a balance with Korea. It is a well-known fact

that ever since his victory in the Great Rites controversy, he had become obsessed with reforming the system of rites.³²⁾ The system of rites required consistency across its various forms. For instance, the emperor had stopped performing joint sacrifices to Heaven and Earth and had established a new altar dedicated to Heaven, which meant that he had to establish another altar for performing sacrifices to Earth. If an imperial messenger was to be sent to Korea to notify the Koreans of the investiture of the crown prince and they were to be made to send a congratulatory mission to Beijing, then it was perhaps necessary to do the same thing *vis-à-vis* a comparable tributary country whose ruler had also received investiture and to make it respond in a similar way, for the investiture ceremony for a crown prince was likewise a question of rites.

That the Jiajing emperor thought of Korea and Vietnam as a pair in terms of the system of rites is evident from the following incident. In the eleventh month of 1538 he conducted a sacrifice to Heaven on the new round altar, and as well as addressing Heaven with the title *huangtian shangdi* 皇天上帝, he also visited his ancestral temple and conferred posthumous titles on the Hongwu emperor and his wife. The Ministry of Rites promptly submitted a memorial suggesting that Korea be notified that this ritual had been performed, to which the emperor replied that Annam was also under Heaven, and it was not right not to notify Annam too just because it had been rebelling in recent years (安南亦在天覆之下, 不可以邇年叛服之故, 不使與聞). He then racked his brains over whom to send as messenger to Annam, and in the end it was decided to bestow the title of minister of rites on Huang Wan 黃綰, vice minister of the left of the Ministry of Rites, and send him to Annam.³³⁾ Because it was a question concerning a rite dedicated to Heaven, the emperor probably felt that notifying only Korea among other countries under Heaven lacked balance and left something to be desired. But even if an imperial messenger were to be sent to Vietnam, at the time Mạc Đăng Dung had not yet surrendered, and it is thus evident just how obsessed the emperor was with maintaining a ritual balance and how hard he was trying to bring Annam too into the world of Chinese rites.

In the event, however, it proved impossible to send an envoy to Annam bearing news of the investiture of the crown prince, and consequently it was also not possible to have the Annamese send a congratulatory mission to China. This was because the ceremony for the investiture of the crown prince was performed in the second month of 1539, at which time Mạc Đăng Dung had not yet been brought to submission.

Korea was immediately notified of the investiture, and it sent an envoy as a matter of course to convey the government's felicitations. As for notifying Annam about the sacrifice to Heaven and the use of the title *huangtian shangdi*, Huang Wan, who had been appointed chief envoy, found various excuses not to set out, and so the news did not reach Vietnam.

It was only in the eleventh month of 1540 (Jiajing 19) that Mạc Đăng Dung, daunted by the risks involved in joining battle with the Ming army, arrived at Zhennan 鎮南 Pass on the Sino-Vietnamese border with a rope around his neck, indicating that he was a "criminal," and offered his submission. Almost two years had passed since the ceremony for the investiture of the crown prince.

As proof of its chastisement of Mạc Đăng Dung, the Ming did not allow him to use the title "king of Annam." Instead, the country's name was changed to "Annam command" (Annam *dutongshisi* 安南都統使司) as if it were a government office within China, and in lieu of the title of "king" Mạc Đăng Dung was granted the post of commandant (*dutongshiguan* 都統使官), of rank two, lower class. But this meant that the Ming had recognized his usurpation of the throne, and consequently when the Mạc dynasty subsequently became the victim of usurpation, the Ming found itself unable to simply abandon it. What is more, Mạc Đăng Dung and his successors continued to use "spurious" era-names, with Jiajing 20 (1541), for example, corresponding to the first year of the Quảng Hòa 廣和 era in Vietnam.

The Ming court continued to confer the post of commandant of Annam on the rulers of the Mạc dynasty. But the Lê dynasty, which had lost the throne to the Mạc clan, was making a comeback, and according to Vietnamese sources in 1533 (Jiajing 12), prior to Mạc Đăng Dung's submission to the Ming, Lê Ninh 黎寧 had assumed the throne and changed the era-name to Nguyên Hòa 元和. Until its fall, the Ming resorted to the clumsy expedient of appointing the head of the Mạc house "commandant of Annam" and the head of the Lê house "king of Annam."

III. "The Punitive Expedition" Sent by the Qianlong Emperor

The Vietnamese Mạc dynasty recognized Qing rule of China in 1659 (Shunzhi 順治 16), and two years later, in 1661, the Qing appointed Mạc Kính Diệu 莫敬耀 commandant of Annam. The Lê dynasty, meanwhile, declared its allegiance to the Qing in 1660 (Shunzhi 17), and in 1666

(Kangxi 康熙 5) the Qing recognized Lê Duy Hi 黎維禕 as king of Annam. Mạc Kính Diệu was no more than a local ruler controlling Cao Bằng 高平 on the border with China, but the policy of recognizing the head of the Mạc house as commandant and the head of the Lê house as king of Annam followed the precedent set by the Ming dynasty.

During the Kangxi era, the Mạc dynasty came under pressure from the Lê dynasty and was eventually forced to flee into Guangxi province in China. The Kangxi emperor installed Mạc Nguyên Thanh 莫元清, commandant of Annam, at Nanning 南寧 in Guangxi and then succeeded in sending him back to Cao Bằng as a result of diplomatic negotiations with Lê Duy Hi. But when Wu Sangui 吳三桂 rose in revolt, Lê Duy Hi took advantage of the resultant turmoil in Qing China to occupy Cao Bằng. Annam came under full control of Lê Duy Hi around 1683 (Kangxi 22), when the Qing authorities handed over to the Lê dynasty remnants of the supporters of the Mạc dynasty.

Thereafter, notwithstanding skirmishes along the border over territorial disputes, relations between the Qing and Vietnam (i.e., Annam) may be said to have been relatively stable, with Annam offering tribute and the Qing granting investiture to its rulers. By the time of the Qianlong era, disturbances were a regular occurrence in Vietnam, with the Tây Sơn 西山 brothers in particular rising in revolt, but there were no major problems in relations between the Qing and Lê dynasties. A major shift in this state of affairs occurred in 1786 (Qianlong 51), when Nguyễn Huệ 阮惠 (Nguyễn Văn Huệ 阮文惠), the leader of the three Tây Sơn brothers, captured Hanoi, and two years later the king, Lê Duy K 黎維祁, fled Hanoi, which provided the occasion for the Qianlong emperor to send a "punitive expedition" in 1788.

In the fifth month of 1787, it was reported to Beijing that the local leaders of Tây Sơn (i.e., Nguyễn Huệ and his associates) had made raids on the capital of the king of Annam, who had, moreover, lost the state seal given to him by the Qing. The Qianlong emperor criticized the king for having lost the all-important state seal while having been invested as king by the Qing.³⁴⁾ The emperor decided to send an army to Vietnam about one year later, and in the decree issued on this occasion it was stated:

Notwithstanding the fact that Annam has been feal to our court and has been most complaisant, it has suffered usurpation of the throne by a vassal and has come asking for assistance. Abandoning it would

not be “the path of nurturing small states and caring for their fate.” One must naturally mass large numbers of troops, condemn the crime loudly, and put down [the usurpers].

安南臣服本朝，最爲恭順，茲被強臣篡奪，款關籲投，若竟置之不理，殊非字小存亡之道，自當厚集兵力，聲罪致討矣³⁵⁾

In addition, to prevent the chieftains of tribes near the border with China siding with the Nguyễn, the emperor also gave orders for the following warning to be given: “Currently retainers of the state of Annam are making so bold as to arbitrarily occupy the land. The imperial court is already making preparations to send a large army on a “punitive expedition.”” (今該國臣下膽敢肆行竊據，天朝已派重兵，豫備興師問罪)³⁶⁾ The target of this “punitive expedition” was of course Nguyễn Huệ, who had rebelled against the Lê dynasty. The Qianlong emperor planned to help the “king,” Lê Duy K , defeat Nguyễn Huệ and secure the throne for him.

The emperor initially hoped that Nguyễn Huệ, on hearing that a “punitive expedition” was about to be sent to Vietnam, would succumb to this threat and surrender, but in the tenth month of the same year he made a clear decision to advance upon Vietnam. At the same time, there were also clear indications of his intention to have Lê Duy K , the king of Annam, come to Beijing with tribute.³⁷⁾

Sun Shiyi 孫士毅, governor-general of Liangguang and commander-in-chief of the campaign, set out from Zhennan Pass on the border on the 28th of the tenth month of the same year. On the 20th of the eleventh month he entered Hanoi, and on the same day he conferred the imperial patent and seal on Lê Duy K and invested him as king of Annam. But from the 3rd to the 5th of the first month of the following year, 1789 (Qianlong 54), the Chinese joined battle with Nguyễn Huệ’s forces at Hanoi and were routed, whereupon they were forced to withdraw from Vietnam. Only a few months had elapsed since the Qianlong emperor’s decision to dispatch troops.

This “punitive expedition” can only be described as a truly ill-advised and meaningless campaign.³⁸⁾ Why did the Qianlong emperor launch such an ill-advised and meaningless campaign? The ostensible reason given by him for sending troops was the restoration of the Lê dynasty, whose rulers he had granted investiture. But this was not a very convincing reason for sending troops, for, as we have already seen,

usurpations of the throne occurred at regular intervals in Vietnam. Furthermore, the emperor made the clear decision to send troops only one year and several months after having heard that the Lê king had been dethroned. As a decision by the emperor of the Qing empire, suzerain of many foreign countries, this too can only be described as not just ill-advised but also overhasty.

The reason that the emperor was in such a hurry to send troops was that, like the Jiajing emperor of the Ming, he too had his personal reasons. He was planning to celebrate his eightieth birthday in the eighth month of 1790 (Qianlong 55), and he wanted the king of Annam to attend the festivities in person. It was approximately two years prior to this that he threatened Vietnam, hinting that he had decided to send troops, and gave a clear indication that he wanted the king of Annam to attend the birthday celebrations, and if one takes into account the time necessary to prepare and launch a military campaign and also have an embassy actually come to Beijing, this was the very limit in terms of the time necessary to carry out his intentions. According to the entry in the *Qing shilu* 清實錄 for the 9th (*bingshen* 丙申) of the twelfth month, Qianlong 53 (1788), when the emperor heard that Sun Shiyi had entered Hanoi and invested Lê Duy K as king of Annam on the very same day, he immediately issued the following decree:

Lê Duy K is apparently saying that, after having been invested as king of Annam, he wishes to go immediately to Beijing to express his gratitude. Were he to do so after Nguyễn Huệ has been captured, he would have no domestic cares. See to it that his country is more or less stabilized and that he himself comes to the Forbidden City in the fifty-fifth year [of my reign in two years' time] to express his gratitude and celebrate my birthday.

黎維祁襲封後，請即赴京師謝恩等語。如阮惠等業已擒獲，該國王無內顧之憂。即令其將國事略為安頓，俟五十五年，親自赴闕謝恩，恭祝萬壽

As far as the Qianlong emperor was concerned, his plans would be ruined were Lê Duy K to arrive in Beijing prior to his eightieth birthday celebrations. Similar statements are found in entries for the 4th and 16th of the first month of the following year in the *Qing shilu* and *Qianlongchao junjichu suishou dengji dang* 乾隆朝軍機處隨手登記檔. It was also overhasty

on the part of Sun Shiyi to invest Lê Duy K as king of Annam as soon as the Chinese forces had retaken Hanoi. It should probably be assumed that before all else Sun Shiyi, mindful of the emperor's wishes, had Lê Duy K declare that he wanted to go to Beijing to express his gratitude. It could be said that about the only matters of concern to the emperor at this time in regard to the situation in Annam were the question of whether or not it would be possible to have Lê Duy K attend his birthday celebrations and the need to withdraw the Chinese army before they were counterattacked by Nguyễn Huệ and his forces, who had fled.

As has already been noted, Nguyễn Huệ did indeed launch a counterattack in the first month of 1789 and routed the Chinese army. The point at issue here is the policy adopted against Nguyễn Huệ, a supposed "criminal," by the Qianlong emperor. According to the *Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục*, Nguyễn Huệ had ascended the throne in the eleventh month of the previous year (1788). The Qianlong emperor more or less decided to abandon Lê Duy K and recognize Nguyễn Huệ as king of Annam on the 24th of the third month of 1789, two months after hearing of the defeat at Hanoi.³⁹⁾ When one considers that large numbers of soldiers had been killed, this too was overhasty. Then, on the 3rd of the fifth month, the emperor issued a decree addressed to Nguyễn Huệ, who had submitted a petition under the name of Nguyễn Quang Bình 阮光平. The decree included the following statement:

If you sincerely wish to enter into friendly relations with us, then, since the eighth month of the year Qianlong 55 will coincide with my eightieth birthday, ... come yourself to Beijing [rather than sending a representative], call out in a loud voice, "Please, I beg your favour!" and look up at me.

如爾必欲輸誠納款，乾隆五十五年八月，屆朕八旬萬壽，...親自赴京籲懇，以遂瞻雲就日之私⁴⁰⁾

But the emperor could not wait indefinitely for a reply and the performance of the investiture, and on the 22nd of the sixth month of the same year he issued a decree recognizing Nguyễn Quang Bình (i.e., Nguyễn Huệ) as king of Annam.

On the 13th of the eighth month of 1790, celebrations marking the eightieth birthday of the Qianlong emperor were held in grand style in the Taihe Hall 太和殿 of the Forbidden City. Among all the Mongol

chieftains and envoys from Korea, Burma, Laos, and so on who were present, the figure of “Nguyễn Quang Bình,” king of Annam, would have been particularly striking. Not only was this the first time in China’s history that a Vietnamese king had participated in person in a ceremony conducted in Beijing, but the very person who had defeated a large Chinese army was standing in the presence of the emperor himself. According to Vietnamese sources, however, this “Nguyễn Quang Bình” was in fact Phạm Công Trị 范公治, whom Nguyễn Huệ had sent as his double.⁴¹⁾ As emperor of Đại Việt, Nguyễn Huệ had not simply followed the orders of the Qing emperor.

In spite of having suffered a major defeat in Vietnam with a large toll of lives, within a mere half year the Qianlong emperor had recognized Nguyễn Huệ (under the name of Nguyễn Quang Bình) as king of Annam. When seen in this light, it would seem that it did not really matter whether it was the “most complaisant” Lê Duy K or the “usurper” Nguyễn Huệ who attended the emperor’s eightieth birthday celebrations, just so long as one of them did attend.

Concluding Remarks

There is in many respects an enormous contrast between Ming-Qing China’s policy towards Korea and that towards Vietnam. In the case of Korea, it is virtually inconceivable that, had there been a local ruler who called himself “emperor” and used a “spurious” era-name, China would have turned a blind eye and continued to grant him investiture. Not only did the investiture of someone calling himself “emperor” or using a “spurious” era-name never even become an issue in Ming-Qing China’s policy towards Korea, but because investiture was originally based on ritual propriety, when a ruler was deposed in Korea, there were sometimes quite heated discussions in the Chinese court as to whether or not the usurper should be granted investiture.⁴²⁾ In the case of China’s policy towards Vietnam, no such heated discussions took place.

The investiture of Vietnamese rulers involved a high degree of fictitiousness in the case of the Ming and Qing. It does not seem to have mattered to the Qianlong emperor whether the duly invested Lê Duy K or the usurper Nguyễn Huệ (Nguyễn Quang Bình) attended his eightieth birthday celebrations, just so long as one of them did come. When Hanoi fell to the Chinese army, he was already criticizing the weakness and incompetence of Lê Duy K and, reasoning that “Heaven has tired of the

Lê dynasty and abandoned it” (天心已有厭棄黎氏之意) and “Heaven has lost interest in the virtue [of the Lê dynasty]” (天厭其德),⁴³⁾ he displayed a stance that would seem to sanction even usurpers.

But it was not long before this logic escalated still further. During the reign of the next Jiaqing 嘉慶 emperor, Nguyễn Huệ’s son Nguyễn Quang Toản 阮光纘 soon lost his throne to Nguyễn Phúc Ánh 阮福映. In the decree issued by the Jiaqing emperor on this occasion it was stated: “Nguyễn Quang Toản discarded the imperial patent and seal bestowed by the imperial court and fled, and he will not be able to escape punishment” (阮光纘輒將天朝所頒敕印遺棄潛逃，其罪更無可追).⁴⁴⁾ In other words, the fact that he had been unable to safeguard the imperial patent and seal bestowed by the Qing at the time of his investiture showed that he did not have the ability to serve the emperor as a vassal and had lost the right to be king. Nguyễn Quang Toản was not only charged with this crime of disloyalty, but because he had been unable to repay the favours received by his father Nguyễn Huệ from the Qianlong emperor, he was also deemed to be guilty of the grave crime of lack of filial piety. The Jiaqing emperor ended up legitimatizing someone with the ability to safeguard the seal conferred by the Qing, in short, a usurper. The fact that Nguyễn Phúc Ánh promptly returned the Qing’s imperial patent and seal seized from Nguyễn Quang Toản and also captured some bandits who had been troubling the Qing was regarded as an expression of “extreme sincerity,” and not long afterwards, in 1804, he was granted investiture. This meant that, regardless of how often the throne was usurped, there was no longer any need to chastise the usurper. Investiture had originally been a question of ritual propriety for maintaining a hierarchy of obligations and rank, but it was now completely divorced from any questions of propriety. Investiture had instead become something similar to confirming as champion the winner in a combat sport in which any methods can be used in any way so long as the combatants do not turn on the referee.

Because investiture was a diplomatic bargaining chip in Ming-Qing China, the thinking about investiture was quite flexible. But since in the case of Vietnam the Chinese court was compelled to feign ignorance of the fact that Vietnamese rulers called themselves “emperor” and continue granting investiture, this bargaining chip may be said to have had little force when compared with China’s policy towards Korea. I once wrote that the Qing dynasty, though aware that Ryūkyū was in effect subject to Japan, may have feigned ignorance and continued to grant investi-

ture while striving not to learn the truth.⁴⁵⁾ As a result of what has become clear in the above, the probability of this hypothesis being true could be said to have increased.

As was noted at the outset, theories of the tribute system and investiture system are currently topics of keen debate. But even with regard to the chief countries whose rulers received investiture I am not aware of any such discussion having been conducted on the premise that investiture was at times so full of fictitious elements. The more that abstraction and modelling based on theories of the tribute system and investiture system advance, the harder it may become to discern the realities of Ming-Qing China's policies towards individual countries in East Asia. For example, one theorist, strongly influenced by the thesis of the tribute system, has put forward the theory of a "system of rule by ritual propriety," but he presents only the ideals of rule by ritual propriety and takes almost no account of the logic and circumstances by which "chastisement" and "punitive expeditions" were actually carried out.⁴⁶⁾ Another scholar, discussing diplomatic policy in the early Ming, characterizes its basic policy as first having been underpinned by sincerity, secondly having been based on the spirit of tolerance, and thirdly having valued peace.⁴⁷⁾ This too is no more than a selection of diplomatic ideals appearing on the surface of historical sources, and no attention whatsoever has been paid to the inconsistencies with these ideals to be seen in the policy adopted towards Korea by the Hongwu emperor in the early Ming and in the reasons that led the Yongle emperor to send a "punitive expedition" to Vietnam. A third scholar shows a more flexible stance in discussing the tributary relations and investiture-based relations into which China entered with other countries, arguing that these relationships represented the logic and ideals of the Chinese and that how other countries thought of them is a separate question, and yet he seems to imply that if they accepted Confucian culture, then these countries would have also accepted its logic and ideals, with Korea, Ryūkyū, and Vietnam being cited as typical examples.⁴⁸⁾ But as we have seen, in the case of Vietnam, right up until the end of the emperor Qianlong's reign it continued to make almost no attempt to accept the logic and ideals of the Chinese, and thereafter its rulers continued to call themselves "emperor" and to use "spurious" era-names. Meanwhile, in China investiture itself had by the time of the Jiaqing emperor become something similar to the confirmation of the victor in a combat sport.

It goes without saying that in the world at the time in question tribute

and investiture characterized Ming-Qing China's foreign policy. But what is necessary for us when seeking to clarify the international order in pre-modern East Asia is not greater refinement of theories of the tribute system and investiture system. Rather, what we need to do, I believe, is to educe a concrete and realistic picture of the foreign policies, with both hard and soft approaches, that the emperor and his officials deployed as Ming-Qing China continued to uphold a particular system or logic in its capacity as a great power.

NOTES

- 1) Fuma Susumu 夫馬進, "Min-Shin Chūgoku no tai-Chōsen gaikō ni okeru 'rei' to 'monzai'" 明清中國の對朝鮮外交における“禮”と“問罪” [“Propriety” and “chastisement” in Ming-Qing China's policy towards Korea], in *id.*, ed., *Chūgoku Higashi Ajia gaikō kōryū shi no kenkyū* 中國東アジア外交交流史の研究 [Essays on the history of Chinese diplomacy and cultural exchange in East Asia] (Kyoto: Kyōto Daigaku Gakujutsu Shuppankai 京都大學學術出版會, 2007).
- 2) Yamamoto Tatsurō 山本達郎, “Chinchō to Gen to no kankei (1225-1400)” 陳朝と元との關係 (一二二五—一四〇〇年) [The relationship between the Trần dynasty and the Yuan (1225-1400)], in *id.*, ed., *Betonamu Chūgoku kankei shi — Kyokushi no taitō kara Shin-Futsu sensō made —* ベトナム中國關係史 — 曲氏の擡頭から清佛戰爭まで — [The history of relations between Vietnam and China: From the rise of the Khúc clan to the Sino-French War] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, 1975), p. 144.
- 3) *Ming shilu* 明實錄, entry for cyclic day *wuxu* 戊戌, 3rd month, Hongwu 29 (Zhao Lingyang 趙令揚 *et al.*, eds., *Ming shilu zhong zhi Dongnanya shiliao* 明實錄中之東南亞史料 [Historical material on Southeast Asia in the *Ming shilu*], 2 vols. [Hong Kong: Xuejin Chubanshe 學津出版社, 1968, 1976], p. 59).
- 4) *Mingshi* 明史 320, “Annan zhuan” 安南傳.
- 5) Fuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-321.
- 6) Yamamoto Tatsurō, “Min no Betonamu shihai to sono hōkai (1400-1428)” 明のベトナム支配とその崩壊 (一四〇〇—一四二八年) [Ming rule of Vietnam and its collapse (1400-1428)], in Yamamoto, ed., *Betonamu Chūgoku kankei shi*.
- 7) *Ming shilu*, entry for cyclic day *wuzi* 戊子, 7th month, Yongle 4 (p. 97).
- 8) *Goryeo sa* 高麗史, entry for cyclic day *gyeongjin* 庚辰, 4th month, 10th year (*gyeongsul* 庚戌) of King Gongmin 恭愍 (Wu Han 吳晗, comp., *Chaoxian Lichao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao* 朝鮮李朝實錄中的中國史料 [Chinese historical material in the veritable records of the Yi dynasty of Joseon; Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1980], p. 15).
- 9) *Mingshi* 49, “Lizhi” 禮志, “Yuezhen haidu shanchuan zhi si” 嶽鎮海濱山川之祀.

- 10) Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay," in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 55; Iwai Shigeki 岩井茂樹, "Mindai Chūgoku no reisei hakenshugi to Higashi Ajia no chitsujo" 明代中國の禮制覇權主義と東アジアの秩序 [Ming China's hegemonism based on a system of rites and the world order in East Asia], *Tōyō Bunka* 東洋文化 85 (2005), p. 135.
- 11) Fuma, *op. cit.*, p. 323.
- 12) *Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄, cyclic day *jeongmyo* 丁卯, 5th month, Taejo 太祖 2 (p. 114).
- 13) *Ibid.*, cyclic day *gapsin* 甲申, 6th month, Taejo 3 (p. 127).
- 14) *Ibid.*, cyclic day *sinyu* 辛酉, 3rd month, Taejo 6 (p. 142).
- 15) *Ming shilu*, cyclic day *gengchen* 庚辰, 4th month, Hongwu 31 (Wang Qiju 王其渠, ed., *Ming shilu – linguo Chaoxian pian* 明實錄 – 鄰國朝鮮篇 [Veritable records of the Ming: Volume on neighbouring Korea; Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Zhongguo Bianjia Shidi Yanjiu Zhongxin 中國社會科學院中國邊境史地研究中心, 1983], p. 47).
- 16) Danjō Hiroshi 檀上寛, *Eirakutei – Chūka "sekai shisutemu" e no yume – 永樂帝 – 中華「世界システム」への夢 – [The Yongle emperor: The dream of a Sinocentric "world system"]* (Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 1997), p. 222.
- 17) *Khâm định Việt sử thông giám cương mục* 欽定越史通鑑綱目 12, entry for 9th month, Khai Đại 開大 4.
- 18) *Ming shilu*, entry for cyclic day *jiayin* 甲寅, 8th month, Chenghua 16 (p. 429).
- 19) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *bingchen* 丙辰, 10th month, Chenghua 17 (p. 436).
- 20) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *xinyou* 辛酉, 4th month, Chenghua 18 (p. 437).
- 21) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *dingyou* 丁酉, 10th month, Hongzhi 2 (p. 451).
- 22) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *dingchou* 丁丑, 10th month, Hongzhi 8 (p. 458).
- 23) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *xinchou* 辛丑, 7th month, Zhengde 10 (p. 481).
- 24) Ōsawa Kazuo 大澤一雄, "Reichō chūki no Min, Shin to no kankei (1527–1682nen)" 黎朝中期の明・清との関係 (一五二七–一六八二年) [The Middle Lê dynasty's relations with the Ming and Qing (1527–1682)], in Yamamoto, ed., *Betonamu Chūgoku kankei shi*, p. 342.
- 25) This date given for the latter memorial is presumably wrong in view of the fact that part of the former memorial (dated 11.1) is quoted in the latter, which moreover follows the former in the *Guizhou zouyi* (which is the opposite order of what one would expect if the dates were correct), and the latter appears in the *Ming shilu* in the entry for 11.13. There are many editions of the *Guizhou zouyi*, and while many of them give the date of this memorial as 10.8, the Zhongli Shuyuan 忠禮書院 edition of Qianlong 29 (1764) and Jiangxi Shuju 江西書局 edition of Guangxu 光緒 17 (1891) give its date as 11.8.
- 26) According to the *Guizhou zouyi*, this verbal command was given on 10.26, but the *Ming shilu* gives it in the entry for 10.30.
- 27) Fuma Susumu, "Shi Ryūkyū roku to Shi Chōsen roku" 使琉球錄と使朝鮮錄

- [The *Shi Liuqiu lu* and *Shi Chaoxian lu*], in *id.*, ed., *Zōtei Shi Ryūkyū roku kaidai oyobi kenkyū* 增訂使琉球錄解題及び研究 [Explanatory comments on records of Chinese missions to Ryūkyū with a study (rev. & enl. ed.)] (Ginowanshi 宜野灣市: Yōju Shorin 榕樹書林, 1999), p. 149.
- 28) *Ming shilu*, entry for cyclic day *renzi* 壬子, intercalary 12th month, Jiajing 15 (p. 496). See also *Yuzhi Mingchen zouyi* 御製明臣奏議 23: Tang Zhou, “Jian tao Annan shu” 諫討安南疏.
- 29) *Ming shilu*, entry for cyclic day *dingmao* 丁卯, 4th month, Jiajing 16 (p. 501).
- 30) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *renzi*, 10th month, Jiajing 16 (p. 507).
- 31) *Ibid.*, entry for cyclic day *gengshen* 庚申, 4th month, Jiajing 16 (p. 499).
- 32) Kojima Tsuyoshi 小島毅, “Kasei no reisei kaikaku ni tsuite” 嘉靖の禮制改革について [On the reform of the system of rites during the Jiajing era], *Tōkyō Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō* 東京大學東洋文化研究所紀要 117 (1992); Chung Tae Seop 鄭台燮, *Chūgoku kinsei no reigaku* 中國近世の禮學 [Liturgics in early modern China (Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Kyoto University, 2001)], pt. 2, chap. 1, “Tairei no gi” no tenrei ron bunseki “大禮の議”の典禮論分析 [An analysis of liturgical theory in the “Great Rites controversy”].
- 33) *Ming shilu*, entry for cyclic day *dingyou* 丁酉, 1st month, Jiajing 18.
- 34) *Qing shilu* 清實錄, entry for cyclic day *jichou* 己丑, 5th month, Qianlong 52 (Yunnansheng Lishi Yanjiusuo 雲南省歷史研究所, ed., “*Qing shilu*” *Yuenan Miandian Taiguo Laozhua shiliao zhechao* 《清實錄》越南緬甸泰國老撾史料摘抄 [Excerpts of historical material from the *Qing shilu* on Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, and Laos; Kunming 昆明: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe 雲南人民出版社, 1986], p. 111); Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Dang’anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館, ed., *Qianlongchao shangyu dang* 乾隆朝上諭檔 [Archives of imperial edicts of the Qianlong reign] (Beijing: Dang’an Chubanshe 檔案出版社, 1991), vol. 13, p. 839 (5.23).
- 35) *Qing shilu* 清實錄, entry for cyclic day *gengxu* 庚戌, 6th month, Qianlong 53 (p. 116); *Qianlongchao junjichu suishou dengji dang* 乾隆朝軍機處隨手登記檔 [Archives kept by the Council of State during the Qianlong reign] (Guilin 桂林: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社), vol. 40 (2000), p. 384 (6.19). The *Qianlongchao shangyu dang* mentioned in note 34 does not include any of the subsequent important edicts of the Qianlong emperor relating to the military campaign against Vietnam.
- 36) *Qing shilu*, entry for cyclic day *gengwu* 庚午, 7th month, Qianlong 53 (p. 119); *Qianlongchao junjichu suishou dengji dang*, vol. 40, p. 442 (7.10).
- 37) *Qing shilu*, entry for cyclic day *jihai* 己亥, 10th month, Qianlong 53 (p. 127); *Qianlongchao junjichu suishou dengji dang*, vol. 40, p. 674 (10.11).
- 38) Suzuki Chūsei 鈴木中正, “Reichō kōki no Shin to no kankei (1682-1804nen)” 黎明後期の清との關係 (一六八二—一八〇四年) [The Later Lê dynasty’s relations with the Qing (1682-1804)], in Yamamoto, ed., *Betonamu Chūgoku kankei shi*, p. 444.
- 39) Zhou Yuanlian 周遠廉, *Qianlong huangdi dazhuan* 乾隆皇帝大傳 [Extended biography of the Qianlong emperor] (Zhengzhou 鄭州: Henan Renmin Chubanshe 河南人民出版社, 1990), p. 599.

- 40) *Qing shilu*, entry for cyclic day *jiwei* 己未, 5th month, Qianlong 54 (p. 183).
- 41) Suzuki, *op. cit.*, p. 453.
- 42) Fuma, “Min-Shin Chūgoku no tai-Chōsen gaikō ni okeru ‘rei’ to ‘monzai,’” p. 335.
- 43) *Qing shilu*, entry for cyclic day *jiayin*, 12th month, Qianlong 53 (pp. 153, 156); *Qianlongchao junjichu suishou dengji dang*, vol. 41, p. 28 (Qianlong 54.1.16).
- 44) *Qing shilu*, entry for cyclic day *bingchen*, 12th month, Jiaqing 7 (p. 282); Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Dang’anguan, ed., *Jiaqing Daoguang liangchao shangyu dang* 嘉慶道光兩朝上諭檔 [Archives of imperial edicts of the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns] (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe), vol. 7 (2000), p. 465 (12.19).
- 45) Fuma Susumu, “Zōteiban ni yosete” 増訂版によせて [Remarks on the revised and enlarged edition], in *id.*, ed., *Zōtei Shi Ryūkyū roku kaidai oyobi kenkyū*.
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