

# Li Gong's Standpoint: Towards a Reconsideration of the Yan-Li School

ITŌ Takayuki

Li Gong 李塉 (*hao* 號: Shugu 恕谷; 1659–1733) is known for having been a disciple of Yan Yuan 顏元 (*hao*: Xizhai 習齋; 1635–1704), a rather unusual thinker of the early Qing, and because he devoted himself primarily to the publicizing and dissemination of his teacher's views, he is generally recognized and regarded as the latter's successor. It is for this reason that the designation “Yan-Li school” has won currency in the history of Chinese thought.

There were, however, considerable differences in thinking between these two men, and whereas Yan Yuan had strong revivalist and fundamentalist tendencies, Li Gong's thinking was underpinned for the most part by more moderate arguments. In the following I wish to reexamine past assessments of Li Gong and also summarize my own views on his interaction with the school of evidential scholarship (*kaozhengxue* 考證學) and so on and additional links between these various currents of thought.

## 1. What Is the Yan-Li School?—Its Formation and Assessment

First, let us briefly survey the figures who are usually considered to belong to the Yan-Li school.<sup>1)</sup>

As will be further discussed below, in view of its relative lack of past influence, there are questions about whether the use of the term “school” is even appropriate, but setting this matter aside for the moment, the person in whom this school originated was Yan Yuan (*zi* 字: Yizhi 易直, Hunran 渾然; *hao*: Xizhai), a native of Boye 博野 county in Hebei province (Zhili). He was born in Chongzhen 崇禎 8 (1635) of the Ming and died in Kangxi 康熙 43 (1704) of the Qing. Extant among his writings are the *Cunxue bian* 存學編 (4 fascs.), *Cunxing bian* 存性編 (2 fascs.), *Cunzhi bian* 存治編 (1 fascs.), *Cunren bian* 存人編 (3 fascs.), *Sishu zhengwu* 四書正誤 (6 fascs.), *Zhuzi yulei ping* 朱子語類評 (1 fascs.), and *Liwen shouchao* 禮文手鈔 (5 fascs.), and there have also survived several works compiled by his disci-

ples, namely, the *Yanxing lu* 言行錄 (2 fascs.), *Piyi lu* 闢異錄 (2 fascs.), *Xizhai jiyu* 習齋記餘 (2 fascs.), and *Nianpu* 年譜 (2 fascs.). He can hardly be said to have been a popular thinker during his lifetime and is known to have had only a limited circle of acquaintances, who included Sun Qifeng 孫奇逢 (*hao*: Xiafeng 夏峯) and Lu Shiyi 陸世儀 (*hao*: Futing 桴亭). Following the subsequent reevaluation of Yan Yuan, also mentioned below, in 1918 his spiritual tablet was inducted into state Confucian temples.

Yan Yuan's leading disciple Li Gong (*zi*: Gangzhu 剛主; *hao*: Shugu), the subject of the present study, hailed from Li 蠡 county in Hebei province; he was born in Shunzhi 順治 16 (1659) of the Qing and died in Yongzheng 雍正 11 (1733), and he passed the provincial civil service recruitment examinations in Kangxi 29 (1690). His writings include the *Zhouyi zhuanzhu* 周易傳註 (7 fascs.), *Shijing zhuanzhu* 詩經傳註 (8 fascs.), *Chunqiu zhuanzhu* 春秋傳註 (4 fascs.), *Lunyu zhuanzhu* 論語傳註 (2 fascs.), *Daxue zhuanzhu* 大學傳註 (1 fasc.), *Zhongyong zhuanzhu* 中庸傳註 (1 fasc.), *Lunyu zhuanzhu wen* 論語傳註問 (2 fascs.), *Daxue zhuanzhu wen* 大學傳註問 (1 fasc.), *Zhongyong zhuanzhu wen* 中庸傳註問 (1 fasc.), *Xiaoxue jiyue* 小學稽業 (5 fascs.), *Daxue bianye* 大學辨業 (4 fascs.), *Shengjingxue guizuan* 聖經學規纂 (2 fascs.), *Lunxue* 論學 (2 fascs.), *Xueli* 學禮 (5 fascs.), *Xueshe* 學射 (2 fascs.), *Xueyue lu* 學樂錄 (5 fascs.), *Pingshu ding* 平書訂 (13 fascs.), *Ni taiping ce* 擬太平策 (7 fascs.), *Zongmiao kaobian* 宗廟考辨 (1 fasc.), *Shugu houji* 恕谷後集 (13 fascs.), *Tiandao ouce* 天道偶測 (1 fasc.), *Xueyu lu* 學御錄 (1 fasc.), and *Shugu shiji* 恕谷詩集 (2 fascs.). Having studied for a long time under Yan Yuan, after the latter's death Li Gong devoted himself to making his teacher's views more widely known as well as associating with a wide range of contemporaries, including Mao Qiling 毛奇齡 (*hao*: Xihe 西河), Hu Wei 胡渭 (*zi*: Dongqiao 東樵), Yan Ruoqu 閻若璩 (*zi*: Baishi 百詩; *hao*: Qianqiu 潛丘), Wan Sitong 萬斯同 (*zi*: Jiye 季野; *hao*: Shiyuan 石園), and Fang Bao 方苞 (*hao*: Wangxi 望溪). In addition, he transmitted Yan Yuan's scholarship to many acquaintances and disciples, including Wang Yuan 王源, Yun Hesheng 惲鶴生, Feng Chen 馮辰, Wang Fuli 王復禮, and Cheng Tingzuo 程廷祚. Following Yan Yuan's canonization, Li Gong was likewise inducted into state Confucian temples in 1919.

Next, Wang Yuan (*zi*: Kunsheng 崑繩; *hao*: Huo'an 或庵), a native of Daxing 大興 county in Hebei province, was born in Shunzhi 5 (1648) and died in Kangxi 49 (1710); he passed the provincial examination in Kangxi 32 (1693). He wrote the *Pingshu* 平書 (10 fascs.) and *Juyetang wenji* 居業堂文集 (20 fascs.), and the aforementioned *Pingshu ding* by Li Gong is said to be a revised version of Wang Yuan's *Pingshu*, which had been lost. He

initially admired the scholarship of Wang Shouren 王守仁 (Wang Yangming 王陽明), but in his later years, though older than Li Gong, he studied under Yan Yuan and Li Gong. He also associated with a wide range of people, including Wei Xi 魏禧, Mao Qiling, Li Yong 李顥 (*zi*: Zhongfu 中孚; *hao*: Erqu 二曲), Xu Qianxue 徐乾學 (*hao*: Jian'an 健庵), Liu Xianting 劉獻廷, and Fang Bao.

Other scholars who belonged to this same lineage of learning include Yun Hesheng, Feng Chen, Wang Fuli, and Cheng Tingzuo. Yun Hesheng (*zi*: Gaowen 皋聞) was a native of Wujin 武進 county in Jiangsu province, but his dates are unknown. He revered Yan Yuan and later formed a friendship with Li Gong; his writings include the *Shishuo* 詩說 and *Chunqiu fushuo* 春秋附說. Feng Chen (*zi*: Gongbei 拱北, Shutian 樞天) was from Qingyuan 清苑 in Hebei province. He studied under Li Gong, and after the latter's death compiled a chronological record of his life (*Nianpu*). Wang Fuli (*hao*: Caotang 草堂) was from Qiantang 錢塘 county in Zhejiang province and studied under Li Gong; his writings include the *Sishu jizhu bu* 四書集註補 and *Shujie zhengwu* 書解正誤. Lastly, Cheng Tingzuo (*zi*: Qisheng 啓生; *hao*: Mianzhuang 緜莊), also known as Layman Qingxi 青溪居士, was a native of Shangyuan 上元 county in Jiangsu province; he was born in Kangxi 30 (1691) and died in Qianlong 乾隆 32 (1767), and he too studied under Li Gong. However, he is also regarded by some as a thinker affiliated to the lineage of the so-called "philosophy of *qi* 氣," associated with Dai Zhen 戴震 (*hao*: Dongyuan 戴東原) and others.<sup>2)</sup> Among his writings there have survived the *Shangshu tongyi* 尚書通義 (30 fascs.), *Yitong* 易通 (6 fascs.), *Chunqiu shixiaolu* 春秋識小錄 (3 fascs.), and *Qingxi wenji* 青溪文集 (20 fascs.).

It would seem that the widespread use of the designation and framework of "Yan-Li school," accompanied by an extolling and high appraisal of the epoch-making character of Yan Yuan's thought in particular, took root after its reevaluation and publicizing by Xu Shichang 徐世昌 and others during the Republican period, discussed in the following section.<sup>3)</sup> It should be noted, however, that a little earlier, in the late Qing, the assessment of Yan Yuan was relatively low in biographical histories of Confucianism and so on, not only in those written from the standpoint of "Han learning," but also in those written from a Neo-Confucian viewpoint, and there is evidence of a tendency to recognize differences of lineage between Yan Yuan and Li Gong.<sup>4)</sup>

## 2. A Reexamination of the Concept of “Practical Learning”: Issues in Understanding the Yan-Li School

Throughout the Qing period, during the heyday of evidential scholarship, Yan Yuan was a rather forgotten figure, but following the commendation of the Yan-Li school by Dai Wang 戴望 in his *Yanshi xueji* 顏氏學記, there was a gradual move to reevaluate this school from the late Qing onwards, with a particular emphasis on its tendency to emphasize practice and its utilitarian ideas, and assessments accompanied to some degree by preconceived notions were made in a way that was influenced by contemporary intellectual fashions, as it were, generally from modernist positions such as pragmatism, but eventually extending to materialistic views of the history of thought.

First, Dai Wang (*zi*: Zigao 子高), a native of Deqing 德清 county in Zhejiang province, was born in Daoguang 道光 17 (1837) and died in Tongzhi 同治 20 (1873). Initially a scholar of *Gongyang* 公羊 learning who studied under Song Xiangfeng 宋翔鳳, he later also became an admirer of the scholarship of Yan Yuan and Li Gong and enthusiastically set about reassessing them, but he died at an early age. The *Yanshi xueji* (10 fascs., 1869), his main work, was the earliest work to publicly acknowledge the Yan-Li school and codify its lineage. Dai Wang also wrote several other books, including the *Lunyu zhu* 論語注.<sup>5)</sup>

Next, a broader trend towards a reassessment of the Yan-Li school began specifically with its characterization as representing “pragmatism” (*shiyongzhuyi* 實用主義) or “practice-based pragmatism” (*shijian shiyongzhuyi* 實踐實用主義) by Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Hu Shi 胡適, and others who had been influenced by the American J. Dewey, and there was a pronounced tendency for the Yan-Li school to be understood and commended in terms of “practical use” (*shiyong* 實用), “utility” (*shili* 實利), “[personal] practice” ([*gongxing*] *shijian* [躬行]實踐), “execution” (*shixing* 實行), etc., that is, with connotations of what might be described as a modern view of “practical learning” (*shixue* 實學). This tendency was basically carried over into postwar research on intellectual history underpinned by Marxist dogma, especially in mainland China, starting with Hou Wailu 侯外廬, who described Yan Yuan’s thought as “a kind of materialistic realism.”<sup>6)</sup> Meanwhile, during the Republican period, not only had people such as Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 and Zhou Zuoren 周作人 evinced an interest in Yan Yuan’s so-called “practicism” (*xixingzhuyi* 習行主義) and his pedagogic thought, but in 1920, the year after the May Fourth and New Culture movements

began, the *Four Preservations Society* (Sicun Xuehui 四存學會) was founded by, among others, Xu Shichang, a man of letters who had served as the fourth president of the Republic of China, and there was evidence of a trend to reevaluate and publicize the Yan-Li school both politically and academically for various reasons.<sup>7)</sup> At any rate, when compared with the strongly idealist standpoint of “metaphysical learning” (*xuanxue* 玄學 philosophy) espoused by Zhang Junmai 張君勱 and others in the debate on science and the philosophy of life that was taking place at about the same time, certain modernistic tendencies were undoubtedly at play in the re-assessment of the Yan-Li school, a reassessment that could be regarded as an attempt to seek out in traditional thought a current of thinking that might be described as empirical rationalism.<sup>8)</sup>

But if we go back and consider the “practical learning” originally advocated by Yan Yuan, it turns out, as summarized in the following passage, to have been quite traditional, combining the “three tasks” (*sanshi* 三事) of the rectification of people’s virtue (*zhengde* 正德), the utilization of resources for their benefit (*liyong* 利用), and abundant provision for their livelihood (*housheng* 厚生) with the “six treasuries” (*liufu* 六府) of water, fire, wood, metal, earth, and grain cited in the “Dayu mo” 大禹謨 (Counsels of the Great Yu) of the *Shujing* 書經, the “six rules of conduct” (*liuxing* 六行), consisting of filial piety, brotherhood, familial love, affection towards relatives, responsibility to others, and charity mentioned in the “Dasitu” 大司徒 section of the “Diguan” 地官 in the *Zhouli* 周禮, and the six arts of ritual, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics.

Because of this fear [that scholarship would lose its foundations] I have written the *Preservation of Learning (Cunxue bian)* to explain clearly the way of the three tasks, the six treasuries, the six rules of conduct, and the six arts of Yao, Shun, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius, my main purpose being to make clear that the Way does not lie in the commentaries on the Classics and that learning does not lie in mental dexterity or reading, but that one should, without ever slackening throughout one’s life, strive to follow the school of Confucius in studying widely and disciplining oneself in accordance with ritual (*Lunyu* VI.27, XII.15) so as to actually study with one’s own person and actually practise with one’s own person. (Yan Yuan, *Cunxue bian* 1, “Taicang Lu Futing xiansheng shu” 太倉陸桴亭先生書 [Letter to Lu Futing of Taicang])

某爲此懼、著存學一編、申明堯、舜、周、孔三事、六府、六行、六藝之道、大旨明道不在詩書章句、學不在穎悟誦讀、而期如孔門博文、約禮、身實學之、身實習之、終身不懈者。

This passage shows why, together with an accurate understanding of the traditional Confucian concept of “practical learning,” some modification of the very framework of past understanding of Yan Yuan’s thought is necessary.<sup>9)</sup> In this respect, Li Gong’s understanding was in complete accord with that of his teacher. In addition, as can be seen in expressions such as “the study of rites, music, military strategy, and agriculture, occupations associated with water resources, the use of fire, and crafts” (禮樂兵農之學、水火工虞之業 [*Shugu nianpu* 恕谷年譜 2]), the importance placed on military strategy, agriculture, industry, and commerce alongside rites and music was also a characteristic shared by this school.<sup>10)</sup>

Learning in antiquity was uniform, whereas learning today is confused; learning in antiquity had substance, whereas learning today is vacuous; learning in antiquity was useful, whereas learning today is useless. How vast are the differences between antiquity and today! That which was regarded as learning in antiquity regarded illustrating virtue, renovating the people, and dwelling in supreme goodness as the Way and regarded the six virtues [of wisdom, benevolence, sagehood, righteousness, loyalty, and harmony], the six rules of conduct, and the six arts as things. At the age of eight one entered elementary school and studied the minor arts, observed the minor obligations, and tied up one’s hair [in the capping ceremony], and on entering university one studied the major arts and observed the major obligations—such was the sequence of learning. (*Cunxue bian*, “Preface”)

古之學一、今之學棼、古之學實、今之學虛。古之學有用、今之學無用。古今不同、何其甚也。古之爲學也、明德、親民、止至善爲道、六德、六行、六藝爲物。八歲就小學、學小藝、履小節、束髮、就大學、學大藝、履大節、爲學之序。

Of course, even if assessments in terms of “practical use” and “utility,” deriving from the aforementioned interests and concerns, went a little too far, it is an indubitable fact that, in the case of Yan Yuan, he did after all emphasize above all else the aspects of “(personal) practice” and “execution,” as is indicated by the frequent use of terms such as “practicism” to

characterize his philosophical position, even though it would of course have been a traditional Confucian form of “practicism.” This is clearly shown by the following passages.

From the Qin and Han on, the achievements of writing and lecturing were great, but the habits of practical learning and practical teaching were few.... Two thousand years have passed since practical learning disappeared, and people seek victory in mere talk and vie for superiority only on paper. (*Cunxue bian* 1, “Ming qin” 明親)

秦漢以後、即著述講論之功多、實學實教之效少。…實學既亡、二千年乎、唯口頭取勝、紙上爭長。

If one just seeks knowledgeable views and discussion by reading books, it is like asking for a picture of a rice cake, and one's hunger and thirst cannot be satisfied by this means. (Ibid. 3, “Xingli ping” 性理評)

但凡從讀書中討來識見議論、便如望梅畫餅、靠之饑食渴飲不得。

Today, those who speak about achieving knowledge mean no more than reading books, discussing and answering questions, and thinking about the distinctions between things, and they do not know how to achieve their own knowledge. Achieving knowledge does not lie in such matters. If one wishes to know about rites, no matter how many hundreds of times one reads books about rites, or how many tens of times one discusses and asks questions about them, or how many tens of times one thinks about their distinctions, none of this counts as knowledge. It is absolutely necessary for one to make obeisance, treat others with courtesy, offer up a jade goblet, and take silk gifts, and once one has done this personally, one will know that this is what a rite is like, and to know a rite is to act in this way. If one wishes to know about music, no matter how many hundreds of times one reads musical scores or how many tens of times one discusses and asks questions or thinks about its distinctions, none of this constitutes knowledge. It is absolutely necessary for one to strike or blow musical instruments, sing to oneself, and move one's own body, and once one has done this personally, one will know that this is what music is like, and to know music is to act in this way. This is what is meant by

investigating things and then knowledge coming. Therefore, I definitely think that “things” refers to the things of the “three things” and “investigate” (*ge*) refers to *ge* in the sense of to fight a wild beast with one’s bare hands and *ge* in the sense of to kill it with one’s bare hands. (Yan Yuan, *Sishu zhengwu* 1, “Daxue” 大學)

今之言致知者、不過讀書講問思辨已耳、不知致吾知者。皆不在此也。辟如欲知禮、任讀幾百遍禮書、講問幾十次、思辨幾十層、總不算知。直須跪拜周旋、捧玉爵、執帛帛、親下手一番、方知禮是如此、知禮者斯致矣。辟如欲知樂、任讀樂譜幾百遍、講問、思辨幾十層、總不能知。直須搏拊擊吹、口歌身午、親下手一番、方知樂是如此、知樂者斯致矣。是謂物格而後知至。故吾斷以爲物卽三物之物、格卽手格猛獸之格、手格殺之之格。

Considering desktop learning and reading to be in themselves completely futile and of little value, Yan Yuan here emphatically argues again and again with concrete analogies and descriptions that rites and music have meaning only when one uses one’s own body to practise them and that they need to be mastered in this fashion. Furthermore, in order to stress the concrete character of “investigating things” (*gewu* 格物) and impress it upon the reader, he even goes so far as to liken it to beating and killing a wild animal with one’s own hands. His extreme disdain for the “intellectual” aspects of reading and scholarship would have been irreconcilable with the contemporaneous current of evidential scholarship, then in its heyday.<sup>11)</sup>

There are people who suspect that the *Zhouli* is a spurious work. But what do they regard as the three things? However, there is no need for you to view the three things on the basis of the *Zhouli*. Simply regard benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and knowledge as virtues, regard the five relationships between father and son, between ruler and subject, [between husband and wife,] between siblings, and between friends as the rules of conduct, and regard rites, music, military strategy, and agriculture as the arts. I ask what else could there be in the world apart from these three? My “investigation of things” does not lie outside these three things. Even if one intersperses the writings and expositions of later ages, they merely clarify these three. If the “things” of the “investigation of things” are not these three things, then what are they? My Confucian is more honoured than the



farmer, artisan, or merchant and has the position of scholar for the very reason that he engages in learning to illustrate [illustrious] virtue and bring the people to a state of renewal and dwells in supreme goodness. (Li Gong, *Shugu houji* 4, “Yu Fang Linggao shu” 與方靈皋書 [Letter to Fang Linggao])

周禮人方疑爲僞書、何有三物。但門下不必作周禮三物觀、惟仁義禮智爲德、子臣弟友五倫爲行、禮樂兵農爲藝。請問天下之物尙有出此三者外乎。吾人格物尙有當在此三物外者乎。卽雜以後世文章講誦、亦只發明此三者耳。格物之物、非三物而何。吾儒明德親民之學、止於至善、乃尊於農工商、而爲士之職也。

As is evident from the above passage, Li Gong had a good grasp of the fundamentals of his teacher's views and based himself thereon, but there are no longer any signs of either the blatant disdain for reading and scholarship or the rather extreme analogies to be seen in the case of Yan Yuan. In his interpretation of “investigating things and achieving knowledge” (*gewu zhizhi* 格物致知) too there is a subtle divergence from the views of his teacher, and as will be discussed below, in many respects important differences can be discerned in their respective philosophical stances. But it is undeniably true that in the past, perhaps because of generalizations in terms of the category of a Yan-Li school, there has been a tendency for even Yan Yuan's disciple Li Gong to be regarded and represented as someone linked to the tendencies described above.<sup>12)</sup>

### 3. The Interpretation of the *Daxue*'s Dictum “To Investigate Things and Achieve Knowledge”: An Emphasis on “Knowledge”

In point of fact, there are considerable differences between the thought of Yan Yuan and Li Gong, and in contrast to Yan Yuan, who, together with a certain simple honesty, possessed strong revivalist and fundamentalist tendencies, Li Gong's thought was on the whole underpinned by arguments of a generally more moderate bent, as is evidenced by (1) the intellectualist position to be seen in his understanding of “practice” and his emphasis on “knowledge” in his interpretation of the *Daxue*'s dictum “to investigate things and achieve knowledge,” (2) a cautious and status quo stance towards classical studies which abhorred the sceptical questioning of the authenticity of Confucian classics such as the Old Text (*guwen* 古文) chapters of the *Shangshu* 尚書 (hereafter: *Old Text Book of His-*

tory), and (3) more realistic political theories, which are prominent, for example, in his compromise proposals in the debate about centralized vs. decentralized government. In the following, I wish to consider these points in some detail and offer some observations.

“Illustrating virtue” is the fundamental root and “renewing the people” is the peripheral branch. “Investigating things to achieve knowledge” is the beginning, and from “sincere thoughts” to “pacification of the world” is the end. “To achieve” (*zhi*) is “to bring about,” and it is the same as “to achieve” in “to achieve fulfilment in concrete particulars” in the *Zhongyong*. In the *Erya* it says that *ge* is “to reach,” and this corresponds to “reaches from above (heaven) to below (earth)” in the *Yushu*. The Cheng brothers and Zhuzi all gloss the character *ge* in *gewu* (“to investigate things”) as “to reach.” Again, in the “Junshi” chapter of the *Zhoushu* it says “he became equal to August Heaven” and “his natural life span reached a balance,” and these tally with the glosses in Cai Shen’s commentary. Again, in the “Rhapsody on Remonstrating against Engaging with Tigers in Combat” in the *Kongcongzi* it says that the meaning of *ge* is the same as *bo* (‘to seize, strike’), and Yan Xizhai’s interpretation of *ge* in *gewu* is like this and means to practise something in person. Again, the *Erya* has “*ge ge* is ‘to raise,’” and in Guo Pu’s commentary it says, “to lift something up.” Again, in the *Erya* the character *dao* (‘to reach’) and the character *ji* (‘to penetrate’) are both the same [in meaning] as *ge*. In my view, “to reach that region and pass through it” and “to seize it, raise it, and reach the zenith” are all meanings of *ge*. As for “thing” (*wu*), it is “things” in “things have their fundamental root and their peripheral branches,” and it corresponds to “illustrating virtue” and “renewing the people” and to “thoughts,” “self,” “mind,” “family,” “state,” and “whole world.” Moreover, that these are called “things” is because the acts of making sincere, rectifying, cultivating, regulating, governing, and pacifying all have things [as their objects], and if one studies those things, they all have those things, which is why rites, music, and so on in the *Zhouli* may be called “things.” “To investigate things” refers to “things” in the *Daxue*, such as studying rites and studying music, and one invariably takes up those matters and reaches their zenith. Zhuzi said, “It means to actually go to that place. For example, a person from Nanjian going to Jianning must go to Junguang to get there, and if he only went as far as the border with Jianyang, he would not

be said to have got there.” “To achieve knowledge and investigate things” means to follow the way of the sages, and prior to practice knowledge is required, and knowledge lies in study. The *Zhouguan* says, “Without studying, it is like facing a wall,” and in the *Xueji* it says, “If one does not study, one will not know the way.” Dong Zhongshu said, “If one applies oneself to scholarship, one’s general knowledge will broaden and the intellectual benefits are clear.” Xu Gan said, “When bright sunlight shines, one sees what is sought.” Studying is the bright sunlight of the mind. Therefore, kings of yore, when establishing study, used the six virtues, the six rules of conduct, and the six arts to instruct people, and they all had this meaning. It is said that if there is one place to which one does not go, there will be one place of which one is ignorant. This best penetrates the meaning of the fact that the achievement of knowledge lies in the investigation of things. (Li Gong, *Daxue bianye* 2, “Zhizhi zai gewu jie” 致知在格物解)

明德、本也、親民、末也。格致、始也、誠意以至天下平、終也。致、推致也、與『中庸』致曲之致同。格、『爾雅』曰、至也、『虞書』、格于上下、是也。程子、朱子于格物格字皆訓至。又『周書』君奭篇、格于皇天、天壽平格、蔡注訓通。又『孔叢子』諫格虎賦、格義同搏、顏習齋謂格物之格如之、謂親身習其事也。又『爾雅』、格格、舉也、郭璞注曰、舉持物。又『爾雅』、到字極字皆同格、蓋到其域而通之、搏之舉之以至于極、皆格義也。物、物有本末之物也、即明德、親民也、即意、身、心、家、國、天下也。然而謂之物者、則以誠、正、脩、齊、治、平皆有其事、而學其事皆有其物、『周禮』禮樂等皆謂之物是也。格物者、謂『大學』中之物如學禮學樂類、必舉其事、造其極也。朱子曰、謂實走到地頭。如南劍人往建寧、須到郡廣上方是至、若只到建陽境上、即不謂之至也。致知格物者、從來聖賢之道、行先以知、而知在于學。『周官』曰、不學牆面。『學記』曰、人不學、不知道。董仲舒曰、強勉學問、則聞見博而知益明。徐干曰、白日照則所求見。學者、心之白日也。故先王立學、教以六德、六行、六藝、皆此謂也。語云、一處不到一處黑、最切致知在格物之義。

Zhuzi also knew that to investigate things was to study the written word, but he recognized that because the learning of sages was not completely reliable, there were inconsistencies in their words. To regard penetrating human nature and Heaven as the investigation of things is a superior attainment, like knowing the mandate of Heaven, and it is not something for youths when they begin their studies. To

regard reading, discussion, and the written word as the investigation of things represents the learning of literati of later ages and does not correspond to the “things” of the great learning of antiquity. To regard dealing with things, retaining one’s heart, and reflecting on one’s person as the investigation of things is the outcome of rigorous practice and is not the investigation of things. If one regards rigorous practice as the investigation of things, this means that practice precedes knowledge, which is the reverse of what it should be. Some say, “Are not the study of rites and the study of music of which you speak rigorous practice?” I say, “Not so.” The sages have clearly spoken of the distinction between love of learning and rigorous practice. Therefore, in the *Zhongyong* it says, “Study it extensively, [...] practise it in all earnestness.” In the *Yijing* it says, “[The gentleman] studies and accumulates the results of his study.” It also says, “He puts it into practice with benevolence.” In the *Zhongyong* it is also written, “Confucius has stated: ‘If one does not study, how can one practise?’” It can be seen that although study and practice are one thing, they are in reality two separate things. In my view, to study is to study throughout one’s life, while to practise is to practise at a particular time. For example, in the case of rites, to first engage in the performance of a rite signifies study, while sacrificial services, receiving guests, and greeting one another signify practice. Later Confucian scholars failed to transmit the learning of the sages, and whatever they have said about the character for “study” is not applicable. Rather than regarding the reading of books as study, they have instead regarded rigorous practice as study, and none of them accord with the sacred classics. To investigate things and achieve knowledge is to study and to know. Making one’s thoughts sincere, rectifying the mind, cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and pacifying the whole world are practice. The six arts are the practical things of great learning. Nowadays, even if one enters the National University, one hardly studies [practical] things and merely understands [abstract] principles. Why do they not look at the introduction on study in the “Neize” [in the *Liji*]? Besides, how can one separate principle and thing? (Ibid. 3, “Bian houru gewu jie” 辨後儒格物解)

朱子亦知格物是學文、但認聖學未甚確、故言有離合。如以窮至性天爲格物、則是上達、知天命之事、非成童入學事也。以讀書講論文字爲格物、則後世文墨之學、非古大學之物也。應接事物、存心省身爲格

物、則又力行之功、非格物也。以力行爲格物、是行先于知矣、倒矣。或曰、子之言學禮學樂、非力行歟。曰、非也。好學、力行之分、聖人明言之矣。故『中庸』曰、博學之、篤行之。『易』曰、學以聚之、又曰、仁以行之。『中庸』亦載、孔子曰、弗學何以行。可見學與行雖一事、而實兩事也。蓋學于平日爲學、行于臨時爲行。如今贊禮、先事演禮謂之學、至供祭、會賓、相禮乃謂之行。後儒聖學失傳、凡言學字皆不的。不以讀書爲學、則返之而以力行爲學矣、皆與聖經不合。格物致知、學也、知也。誠意、正心、脩身、齊家、治國、平天下、行也。六藝、大學之實事也。今云入大學、更不甚學事、只理會理。何不觀『內則』爲學之序乎。且理與事、亦何可分也。

In the above, Li Gong cites the views of various authorities on the meaning of the “investigation of things,” including Yan Yuan’s interpretation “to practise something in person,” but in the main he follows the views of the Cheng brothers and Zhuzi, who interpret it as “to arrive at or reach a thing,” and he clearly considers “knowledge” to be antecedent to “practice” and maintains that it must be grounded in specific “study.” It is wrong to favour either “plumbing human nature and Heaven” or “reading, discussion, and the written word,” but at the same time he takes the view that refusing to regard “reading” as “study” and equating the investigation of things with “rigorous practice,” such as merely “dealing with things, retaining one’s heart, and reflecting on oneself,” is to reverse priorities by putting practice before knowledge. “Study” and “practice” are originally inseparable, and “reading books” and “rigorous practice” should of course coexist, but it was understood by Li Gong that it was only on the precondition of “investigating things and achieving knowledge” on a daily basis, which correspond to “study” and “knowledge,” that “practice” such as “making one’s thoughts sincere, rectifying the mind, cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and pacifying the whole world” in accordance with circumstances became possible.

This interpretation of the *Daxue* by Li Gong, especially the importance attached to “knowledge” as opposed to “practice” to be seen in his understanding of “to investigate things and achieve knowledge,” represented a sharp departure from the slightly excessive priority given to practice by Yan Yuan and his somewhat extreme on-the-spot-ism, and this could be described as the essential point of divergence in their philosophical thinking. These rather intellectualist tendencies of Li Gong have already been aptly noted and analyzed by Irifune Hiromichi, whose analysis is worth

consulting.<sup>13)</sup>

#### 4. Questions Concerning the *Old Text Book of History*: Li Gong's Cautious Stance towards Classical Studies

At the time, considerable advances were being made in text-critical studies of Confucian classics such as the *Old Text Book of History*, but at the same time a cautious status quo stance towards classical studies could also be quite widely observed among contemporary scholars, including Li Gong, who abhorred the sceptical questioning of the authenticity of Confucian classics, and I too have on previous occasions briefly discussed its significance.<sup>14)</sup> First, Yan Ruoqu raised some important questions about the reliability of the *Old Text Book of History* in his *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* 尚書古文疏證, in response to which Mao Qiling wrote a refutation entitled *Guwen Shangshu yuanci* 古文尚書冤詞 (included in the *Xihe heji* 西河合集), and it is well-known that Li Gong contributed a preface to this latter work.

When I was travelling in the south, there were people who criticized the *Zhongyong*, *Daxue*, and “*Xici zhuan*” of the *Yijing*, and this also extended to the three classics of rites and the three commentaries [on the *Chunqiu*]. On witnessing this, I was much afraid, for if this were allowed to pass, then the classics would all disappear. Promptly seeking the reasons for this, I found that it had begun with attacks on the *Old Text Book of History*, claiming that it was a forgery. (Li Gong's preface to Mao Qiling's *Guwen Shangshu yuanci*)

及堪南游時、客有攻辨中庸、大學、易繫、以及三禮、三傳者。堪見之大怖、以爲苟如是、則經盡亡矣。急求其故、則自攻古文尚書爲僞書始。

Among people who talk about the *Book of History* nowadays, there is the view that would regard it as spurious, and Mr. Mao Qiling has already refuted and rectified this. What this matter involves is by no means insignificant, and it should be made known to the world at large. I have not yet seen Yan Baishi's book, but I have taken a cursory look at that written by Yao Lifang, while Qian Sheng's book I have looked at in detail, and they are all in error. People nowadays not only find fault with the *Book of History*, but also find fault with the

“Xici zhuan”; they not only find fault with the “Xici zhuan,” but also find fault with the *Zhongyong*, and do not desist until they have gone so far as to attack the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. This is a great affliction for the way of the sages and people’s minds, and so how could one look on unconcernedly without saying anything? Wishing to present some counterarguments, I shall await your book and ask for your advice. (*Li Shugu xiansheng nianpu* 3, “Shang Mao Heyou shu” 上毛河右書 [Letter to Mao Heyou (Qiling)])

今人辨尚書有僞之說、先生既有駁正、此事所關非小、即可行世。閻百詩書未見、姚立方所著略觀之、錢生書則詳觀之、均屬謬誤。今人駁尚書不已、因駁繫辭、駁繫辭不已、因駁中庸、不至揚矢周孔不止。此聖道人心之大患、豈能坐視不言。搆亦欲少有辨論、俟錄出請教。

Huang Taichong once said, “The sayings of the sages do not rest on their phraseology but on their ethical principles. If there are no flaws in their ethical principles, then [faulty] phraseology does no harm. There are some who take issue with sayings such as that concerning the human mind and moral mind in “Counsels of the Great Yu,” but how could this have been forged after the Three Dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou)?” (Words of Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 quoted in Yan Ruoqu, *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* 8.119)

黃太沖嘗謂、聖人之言不在文詞而在義理。義理無疵、則文詞不害。其爲異如大禹謨人心道心之言、此豈三代以下可僞爲者哉。

My father Zhengjun wrote the *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* in several fascicles.... There were not a few people who were suspicious of it and criticized it. Zhengjun, feeling uneasy in his mind, said, “In composing this book, I was doing nothing more than following Zhuzi, expanding on his views, and elaborating on them.” (Words of Yan Ruoqu quoted in Yan Yong’s 閻詠 preface to the *Zhuzi guwenshu yi* 朱子古文書疑)

家大人徵君先生著尚書古文疏證若干卷、…怪且非之者亦復不少、徵君意不自安、曰、吾爲此書、不過從朱子、引而伸之、觸類而長之耳。

That being so, the current *Book of History* consists of the thirty-three chapters found in both the New Text and the Old Text, interspersed with the texts of Fu Sheng and Kong Anguo, to which have been

added twenty-five chapters originating with Mei Ze and the twenty-eight characters of the “Canon of Shun” originating with Yao Fangxing to form a single work. Mencius said, “If one believed everything in the *Book of History*, it would have been better for the *Book of History* not to have existed at all” (*Mencius* VII.B.3), and today the evidence for this is even greater. (Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, *Rizhilu* 日知錄 2, “Guwen Shangshu”)

然則今之尚書、其今文古文皆有之三十三篇、固雜取伏生、安國之文、而二十五篇之出於梅賾、舜典二十八字之出於姚方興、又合而一之。孟子曰、盡信書則不如無書、於今日而益驗之矣。

Arguments about the Old Text and the New Text are many, and even Zhuzi had doubts about this.... Vilification by scholars in recent years has been particularly excessive. But most of what they say is not worth discussing. I would say that such indeed is the doubting of antiquity by later scholars.... This book was already circulating for four hundred years during the Han dynasty, and it became increasingly difficult to modify it. Consequently the difficult passages are all the more difficult. From the time when it emerged, the text said to have been recovered from a wall in the former home of Confucius frequently had characters added or removed in order to have it make sense. This book appeared after having been hidden for a long time. Why would those who transmitted it not have embellished it during this time? Consequently the easy passages are all the easier to understand. That being so, one suspects that what is called the Old Text has additions, deletions, and embellishments and does not completely preserve the arguments of the text from the Four Dynasties (i.e., the reigns of Yao and Shun and the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties). To purely regard it as a forgery represents the superficiality of shallow scholars and the impudence of petty people. (Li Guangdi 李光地, *Rongcunji* 榕村集 17, “Shangshu gujinwen bian” 尚書古今文辨)

古今文之辨、多矣。雖朱子亦疑之。…近年學者則毀詬尤甚焉。其語殆不足述。余曰、果哉後學之疑古也。…其書既行於漢代四百年、則益莫之敢改也。故難者愈難。孔壁之書、自其校出之時、間或增減以通文意有之。而其書又藏久而後顯。安必傳者之無潤色於其間哉。故易者愈易。然則古文云者、疑其有增減潤色而不盡四代之完文理或有之矣。謂其純爲僞書者末學之膚淺、小人而無忌憚也。



As has already been most aptly noted by Yoshida Jun, one can discern in the seemingly conservative indecision, suspension of judgement, and vacillation of the above writers an eminently cautious and prudent attitude that sought to suppress an excessively sceptical trend that threatened to undermine the very foundations of classical studies with its allegations of forgeries and to restore a certain balance to the discussion.<sup>15)</sup>

In connection with the passage on the human mind (*renxin* 人心) and the moral mind (*daoxin* 道心) in “Counsels of the Great Yu,” which was seen as problematic by Yan Ruoqu in his *Shangshu guwen shuzheng*, I would like to add that not only was this related to the textual criticism of the *Old Text Book of History*, but in one respect it also squares with the fact that the Neo-Confucian dualistic understanding of the structure of the “mind” (*xin* 心) in terms of its original or ideal nature and its actual state was progressively questioned and eventually negated in the midst of tendencies in the contemporary context of the history of thought towards the inseparability of *li* (moral principles) and *qi* (pneuma, vital energy) and the monism of “physical nature” (*qizhi zhi xing* 氣質之性), or the physical aspect of human nature, in ontology and theories of human nature.<sup>16)</sup>

“Principle” is the “principle” of *qi*. It most certainly does not antecede *qi*, nor does it lie outside *qi*. If one knows this, then one will know that the moral mind is the original mind of the human mind and that the “nature” of ethical principles is the original nature of the physical aspect [of human nature]. (Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 [Niantai 念臺], *Liuzi quanshu* 劉子全書 11)

理即氣之理、斷然不在氣先、不在氣外。知此則知道心即人心之本心、義理之性即氣質之本性。

As for “mind,” there is only the human mind, and the moral mind is that which constitutes the mind of humans. As for “nature,” there is only physical nature, and the nature of ethical principles is that which constitutes the nature of the physical aspect [of human nature]. (Ibid. 13)

心只有人心、而道心者、人之所以爲心也。性只有氣質之性、而義理之性者、氣質之所以爲性也。

People of yore, when interpreting the human mind and the moral

mind, regarded the moral mind as the master while the human mind always listened to its commands. This kind of thesis results in there being two minds in one body. There does not exist any moral mind separately from the human mind. For example, when one feels cold and thinks of clothes, or when one feels hungry and thinks of food, this is the dynamic mode of the mind. When one dons clothes because one ought to don clothes, or when one eats because one ought to eat, this is the static mode of the mind. That one ought to don clothes or that one ought to eat means to examine the reasons, but this is at one with thinking of clothes or thinking of food, and one arrives at both together. It is not the case that, having thought of clothes or having thought of food, one must additionally give rise to the notion that one will don clothes because one ought to do so or that one will eat because one ought to eat. (Ibid.)

昔人解人心道心、道心爲主、而人心每聽命焉。如此說、是一身有二心矣。離卻人心、別無道心。如知寒思衣、知飢思食、此心之動體也。當衣而衣、當食而食、此心之靜體也。然當衣當食、審于義理、卽與思衣思食、一事并到。不是說思衣思食了、又要起箇當衣而衣、當食而食的念頭。

[The thesis of] “human mind and moral mind” is precisely Xunzi’s thesis that human nature is [inherently] evil. That [the human mind] is “precarious” is a reference to the evilness of human nature, and that [the moral mind] is “subtle” means that this principle is different in all things and has no material form and that it is only after it has been selected in an extremely minute form that [this principle] is at one with the self. Consequently there arises [Xunzi’s] argument for the reform [of man’s essential nature]. Hence later Confucians believed that the mind is possessed only of consciousness, that principle lies in the myriad things of Heaven and Earth, and that only after having plumbed the principle of the myriad things of Heaven and Earth and having united it with the consciousness of one’s own mind can one speak of the Way. These are all errors due to the thesis of “human mind and moral mind.” Now, humans have only the human mind. When pity is appropriate, pity will arise of its own accord, and when shame is appropriate, shame will arise of its own accord. Courtesy towards others and a sense of right and wrong are no different. So long as one does not lose this original mind, there is no inversion of this.

This is what is meant by “hold fast the mean.” Therefore, Mencius said, “Seek the strayed mind” (*Mencius* VI.A.11); he did not say, “Seek the moral mind.” He said, “Lose your original mind” (ibid. VI.A.10); he did not say, “Lose your moral mind.” Confucius’s statement that “I followed what my mind desired without overstepping the line” (*Lunyu* II.4) merely says not to lose the human mind. That being so, these sixteen characters [of the passage on the human mind and the moral mind] should be considered to have greatly eaten away at the studies of principle. (Huang Zongxi’s preface to Yan Ruoqu’s *Shangshu guwen shuzheng*; *Nanlei wenyue* 南雷文約 4, *Nanlei wending sanji* 南雷文定三集 1)

人心道心、正是荀子性惡宗旨。惟危者、以言乎性之惡。惟微者、此理之散殊、無有形象、必擇之至精而後始與我一。故矯飾之論生焉。後之儒者、於是以心之所有唯此知覺、理則在於天地萬物、窮天地萬物之理、以合於我心之知覺、而後謂之道。皆爲人心道心之說所誤也。夫人只有人心。當惻隱自能惻隱、當羞惡自能羞惡、辭讓是非、莫不皆然。不失此本心、無有移換。便是允執厥中。故孟子言求放心、不言求道心。言失其本心、不言失其道心。夫子之從心所欲、不踰矩、只是不失人心而已。然則此十六字者、其爲理學之蠹甚矣。

In my view, Shun took the instructions that he had formerly obtained from Yao and what he had obtained himself through his everyday efforts and consigned them all to Yu, merely informing him of the reasons for holding the mean so that it would never come to an end. Why would he have established them to speak of the mind? Those who in recent times delight in speaking of the study of the mind discard the original intent of the entire chapter and only discuss the human mind and the moral mind. The more extreme among them merely single out the two characters for “moral mind” and promptly think that the mind is the Way, and even if they lapse into the study of Chan, they are unaware of it and become far removed from the original intent of the transfer of all under Heaven by Yao, Shun, and Yu.... Scholars in the world at large end up pointing to the sixteen characters in this book (i.e., the *Book of History*), deeming them to be the essence of the transmission of the mind, and students of Chan borrow them and make them their basis. In my humble opinion, the mind does not require transmission. Principles are what flow between Heaven and Earth, remain consistent from antiquity to the present day, and are always the same. Principles inhere in my mind and produce effects

in affairs and phenomena. Mind is that which governs and controls these principles and discriminates between right and wrong. Whether a person is worthy or not, whether an affair succeeds or not, whether the world is governed or is in chaos are all judged accordingly. This is why the sages examined the middle ground between precariousness and subtlety, between minute detail and singleness of purpose, and transmitted to each other the Way of holding the mean. They ensured that there would not be a single thing that did not accord with principles and that there would be no leaning one way or the other.

... If one speaks of the mind while externalizing benevolence, externalizing ritual propriety, and externalizing affairs, know that even if one undertakes something, it will not be feasible. To undertake something means that benevolence, ritual propriety, and the matter at hand are identical with the mind, and to apply oneself to benevolence is to apply oneself to the mind. To return to the observance of ritual propriety is to return to the mind. To engage in something is to engage in the mind.... The mind is quite precarious. When it comes to distinguishing between good omens and bad omens or differentiating between humans and animals, even great sages must guard against [the precariousness] that needs to be guarded against, and so how can one speak of the study of mind? The study of mind is to regard the mind as [an object of] study. To regard the mind as [an object of] study is to regard the mind as [inner] nature. The mind is endowed with nature, but the mind cannot be equated with nature. Therefore, it is right to seek the strayed mind and wrong to seek the mind, but it is right to seek in the mind. What concerns me about those who study the mind is that they claim to seek the mind. (Gu Yanwu, *Rizhilu* 18, “Xinxue” 心學)

蓋舜以昔所得於堯之訓戒、竝其平日所嘗用力而自得之者、盡以命禹、使知所以執中而不至於永終耳、豈爲言心設哉。近世喜言心學、捨全章本旨而獨論人心、道心、甚者單摭道心二字、而直謂卽心是道、蓋陷於禪學而不自知、其去堯、舜、禹授受天下之本旨遠矣。…世之學者遂指此書十六字爲傳心之要、而禪學者借以爲據依矣。愚按、心不待傳也、流行天地間、貫徹古今而無不同者、理也。理具於吾心、而驗於事物。心者、所以統宗此理而別白其是非、人之賢否、事之得失、天下之治亂、皆於此乎判。此聖人所以致察於危微精一之間、而相傳以執中之道、使無一事之不合於理、而無有過不及之偏者也。

…外仁、外禮、外事以言心、雖執事亦知其不可。執事之意必謂仁

與禮與事即心也、用力於仁、用力於心也。復禮、復心也。行事、行心也。…危哉、心乎。判吉凶、別人禽、雖大聖猶必防乎其防、而敢言心學乎。心學者、以心爲學也。以心爲學、是以心爲性也。心能具性、而不能使心即性也。是故求放心則是、求心則非、求於心則是。我所病乎心學者、爲其求心也。

Huang Zongxi's assertion in his later years that the passage on the human mind and the moral mind in "Counsels of the Great Yu" even has points in common with Xunzi's view that human nature is inherently evil is probably partially based on his teacher Liu Zongzhou's argument in connection with the nature of the mind that the human mind and the moral mind must not be understood in terms of a dual structure.<sup>17)</sup>

It would seem that Gu Yanwu too feared that this sort of discourse could at times tie in with the "study of mind" in a bad sense. But this perception *per se* has an underlying commonality with his misgivings that "Classical studies is what the study of principles was called in antiquity... Chan studies is what the study of principles is called today" (古之所謂理學、經學也。…今之所謂理學、禪學也 [Gu Yanwu, *Tinglin wenji* 亭林文集 3, "Yu Shi Yushan shu" 與施愚山書 (Letter to Shi Yushan)]), and as was noted earlier, his position, contrary to that of Huang Zongxi, was one with somewhat conservative nuances close to that of Li Gong and Li Guangdi in that he recognized the traditional, orthodox significance of classical studies and the value of their existence and aligned himself with a status quo stance towards classical studies.

## 5. Political Theory: Debates about Centralization vs. Decentralization, the Well-Field System, and the Land System

Lastly, I wish to take a brief look at Li Gong's political ideas and their position and significance within contemporary currents of thought with reference to his discussions of the feudal system of enfeoffment (*fengjian* 封建), representing a decentralized system of government, vs. the system of commanderies and counties (*junxian* 郡縣), representing a centralized system of government, as well as the well-field (*jingtian* 井田) system and the land system, about which I have previously essayed some observations in connection with the early Qing.<sup>18)</sup> In the overall contemporary context, the most radical arguments were those that considered the feudal system and the well-field system to form an integral whole and strongly advocated the realization of both, and proponents included, in addition

to the well-known Lü Liuliang 呂留良 (*hao*: Wancun 晚村), Li Gong's own teacher Yan Yuan.

That enfeoffment and well-fields were abandoned was due to circumstances, not principle; it was turmoil, not good governance. Rulers and ministers of later times, shilly-shallying and time-serving, nurtured thoughts of personal gain, and consequently it became impossible to return to the Three Dynasties. It was precisely this point about which Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, and Zhuzi were concerned and of which they invariably made an issue. Even though it may in the end not necessarily be possible to implement them in the manner of antiquity, Confucians cannot but keep this principle in mind and hope for the reappearance of a sage-king. Nowadays there are some who, while committing themselves to the current of Confucianism, regard such a stance as circuitous, but what else is one to hope for? (Lü Liuliang, *Sishu jiangyi* 四書講義 34)

封建井田之廢、勢也、非理也。亂也、非治也。後世君相、因循苟且以養成其私利之心、故不能復返三代。孔孟程朱之所以憂而必爭者、正爲此耳。雖終古必不能行、儒者不可不存此理以望聖王之復作。今托身儒流而自且以爲迂、更復何望哉。

But what is to be done if one wishes to conform to the Three Dynasties? If, after careful consideration, well-fields, enfeoffment, and schools are all restored, then there will not be a single person or a single thing that does not gain their proper place. This is what is meant by the “kingly way.” (Yan Yuan, *Cunzhi bian*, “Wangdao” 王道)

然欲法三代、宜何如哉。井田、封建、學校、皆斟酌復之、則無一民一物之不得其所。是之謂王道。

However, such views remained at the level of revivalist and fundamentalist ideas or dogma and were undeniably somewhat extreme when considered from an overall perspective. It is also a well-known fact that at the opposite end of the spectrum there was the standpoint of, for example, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (*hao*: Chuanshan 船山), who argued for the need for a system of commanderies and counties, also on account of contemporary circumstances.

An instance of two extremes contending for victory and engaging in useless discussion to no purpose is the debate about enfeoffment. The system of commanderies and counties has for almost two thousand years been unable to be reformed. Everyone past and present, high and low, has been content with it. This is the trend of the times, and how could it be so if it were unreasonable? (Wang Fuzhi, *Du Tongjian lun* 讀通鑑論 1, “Qin shihuang” 秦始皇)

兩端爭勝、而徒爲無益之論者、辨封建者是也。郡縣之制、垂二千年而弗能改矣。合古今上下皆安之。勢之所趨、豈非理而能然哉。

As far as the debate about centralized government (commanderies and counties) vs. decentralized government (enfeoffment) is concerned, Li Gong can, to state my conclusion first, be considered to have espoused a more reasonable and practical view that, like Gu Yanwu's renowned “Junxian lun” 郡縣論 and the views of Lu Shiyi, who would seem to have spoken for the majority of local élites, called for a compromise between the relative merits of both systems.

In the *Pingshu* it says that the Son of Heaven cannot govern by himself. During the Three Dynasties they governed by means of enfeoffment and in later times by means of commanderies and counties. The advantages of enfeoffment lie in a bulwark, the Son of Heaven administers government affairs by apportioning them, and his power can continue for a long time. Its disadvantages lie in that it is retained from generation to generation, assassinations and warfare never cease, and it is impossible to prevent the people from being adversely affected. The advantages of commanderies and counties lie in prefects and magistrates, their power is light-handed, they are easy to control, and there is no worry about revolts. Its disadvantages lie in the fact that they are not capable of taking charge of matters, villainous plots may become rampant, powerful ministers may take things into their own hands, and the Son of Heaven will be isolated on high without any way to rescue him. It is clear from the past course of history that these two each have their advantages and disadvantages, and those who argue by adhering to the pros and cons of one side are all wrong. That being so, which should the ruler follow? If he adopts the advantages of both and avoids their disadvantages, he will remove their disadvantages and only their advantages will remain, as a result of which

he will be able to govern. (Li Gong, *Pingshu ding* 2, “Fentu” 分土 2)

平書曰、天子不能獨理也。三代以封建、後世以郡縣。封建之利在藩屏、天子分理其政事、勢可以長久。害在世守、強弑逆戰爭、不可制而生民罹其毒。郡縣之利在守令、權輕易制、無叛亂之憂。害在不能任事、姦究可以橫行、權臣可以專擅、天子孤立於上而莫之救。是二者皆各有其利害、歷代故轍昭然。凡持一偏之得失以爲言者、皆非也。然則王者將何從。曰、兼收二者之利而辟其害、使其害去而利獨存、斯可以爲治矣。

Well-fields cannot be discussed on the same terms as enfeoffment. Enfeoffment should not necessarily be implemented, but well-fields should most certainly be implemented.... Among the people there are some with fields and some without fields, some with many fields and some with few fields, and they are dissimilar and not all the same, and so it is impossible to provide for them and put them at ease. If the people are not adequately cared for, they are poor, and if soldiers do not come from among farmers, they are weak. Can an empire that is poor and weak be maintained for any length of time? Therefore, well-fields should most certainly be implemented. But well-fields can also not be discussed on the same terms as [recruitment of officials by] selection and recommendation. Selection and recommendation are easy to implement and difficult to subvert, while well-fields are difficult to implement but easy to subvert. (Ibid. 7, “Zhitian” 制田 5A)

井田、不可與封建并論也。封建不宜行、而井田必宜行也。…以民有田無田多田少、參差不齊、不可以供億也。民不溥所養則貧、兵不出於農則弱、貧弱之天下可久支乎。故井田必宜行。然井田又不可與選舉并論也。選舉易行而難壞、井田難行而易壞也。

If sages would arise, they would infuse [the system of] commanderies and counties with the intent of [the system of] enfeoffment, and then the world would be properly governed. (Gu Yanwu, *Tinglin wenji*, “Junxian lun” 1)

有聖人起、寓封建之意於郡縣之中、而天下治矣。

He who would govern the world well will remove the shortcomings of both and bring together the strengths of both. Were one, while fol-



lowing the present system of commanderies and counties, to revive the titles of feudal lords, expand their administrative authority, relax the system for guarding against them, and make their stipends and positions permanent, then there would be the substance of enfeoffment without the designation “enfeoffment” and there would be the advantages of enfeoffment without the disadvantages of enfeoffment. (Lu Shiyi, *Sibianlu jiyao* 思辨錄輯要 18, “Zhiping lei” 治平類)

善治天下者、當去兩短、集兩長。循今郡縣之制、復古諸侯之爵、重其事權、寬其防制、久其祿位、有封建之實、無封建之名、有封建之利、無封建之害。

Huang Zongxi too developed arguments that moved slightly towards advocacy of enfeoffment, a striking feature of which was his advocacy of the unity or inseparability of soldiers and farmers, which had also been an ideal in ancient times, and in this respect too he is, as noted earlier, in agreement with the basic stance of the Yan-Li school, which also attached importance to soldier-farmers. But while such opinions were not necessarily viewed with askance so long as they remained at the level of abstract discussion, once they became radicalized and clashed with the position of the Qing administration, for whom the separation of soldiers and farmers was a basic principle, then, as in the case of arguments favouring enfeoffment, they sometimes became the targets of persecution.<sup>19)</sup>

Today, the institution of enfeoffment has become something of the distant past. In view of the drift of the times, it should be possible to restore defence commands. The harmful effects of enfeoffment are that the strong annex the weak and there are areas to which the governance of the Son of Heaven does not extend. The harmful effects of commanderies and counties are that the harm and suffering of border regions are never-ending. For removing the harmful effects of both and implementing both without any inconsistencies, defence commands along the borders would be appropriate. (Huang Zongxi, *Mingyi daifanglu* 明夷待訪錄, “Fangzhen pian” 方鎮篇)

今封建之事遠矣。因時乘勢、則方鎮可復也。封建之弊、強弱吞併、天子之政教有所不加。郡縣之弊、疆場之害苦無已時。去兩者之弊、使其竝行不悖、則沿邊之方鎮乎。

Ever since the Three Dynasties there have been none like barbarians when it comes to disturbing the empire, and eventually even the five virtues [underpinning dynastic change] are fated to be eradicated. But as I see it, this is the fault of having abolished enfeoffment. Before the Qin had control of the empire, barbarians troubled China no more than did brigands.... It seems to me that the separation of soldiers and commoners began from the Han. Therefore, if enfeoffment is abolished, then soldiers and commoners cannot but be separated. If soldiers and commoners are separated, then soldiers cannot but be supported by commoners, and if soldiers are supported by commoners, then the empire cannot but be impoverished.

... Ah, those who held the empire in antiquity applied their energy day by day to rites, music, punishment, and administration, as a result of which they were able to exercise rule that was prosperous and peaceful. Those who held the empire in later times applied their energy day by day to the border regions, as a result of which their rule tended to become ad hoc. But the disadvantages of having abolished enfeoffment, even when having come to this pass, could perhaps be said to be merely as if feudal lords, having grown powerful, have raised the empty title of “Son of Heaven” above them. This means that the empire has unfortunately been lost to the feudal lords, but nonetheless the people of China are still ruling the lands of China, and so how can it approach leading beasts, feeding on people, and being overthrown by barbarians? (Huang Zongxi, *Liushu*, “Fengjian”; *Nanlei shiwenji* 南雷詩文集 2)

自三代以後、亂天下者無如夷狄矣、遂以爲五德殄嘗之運。然以餘觀之、則是廢封建之罪也。秦未有天下、夷狄之爲患於中國也、不過侵盜而已。…兵民爲二、蓋自漢始也。是故廢封建則兵民不得不分。分兵民則不得不以民養兵、以民養兵則天下不得不困。

…嗚呼、古有天下者、日用其精神於禮樂刑政、故能致治隆平。後之有天下者、其精神日用之疆場、故其爲治出於苟且。然則廢封建之害至於如此、而或者猶以謂諸侯之盛強、使天子徒建空名於上。夫卽不幸而失天下於諸侯、是猶以中國之人治中國之地、亦何至率禽獸而食人、爲夷狄所寢覆乎。

Moving on to the well-field system, we have already seen that Li Gong, unlike Lü Liuliang, his teacher Yan Yuan, and other radical thinkers, did not necessarily consider it to tie in with the feudal system, and he

differentiated the two systems. But whereas he proposed a midway compromise between enfeoffment and the system of commanderies and counties, in the case of the well-field system he gives the impression of having stubbornly argued for its implementation. At the time, the advocacy of well-fields in a practical sense, rather than as a revivalist or fundamentalist tenet, represented a demand for the reform of the land-tenure system in the form of equal fields (*juntian* 均田) and restrictions on the amount of land that could be held by an individual (*xiantian* 限田).<sup>20</sup> For instance, Lü Liuliang, in what was for him a fairly practical proposal, argued that even if it were impossible to revive well-fields, it should be possible to comply with their general intent by implementing the equal-field system and restrictions on landownership. Diametrically opposite to this view we find the well-known discussion of this matter by Huang Zongxi.

In later times, there have broadly been two theses saying that well-fields cannot be implemented. Namely, it would not be possible to reacquire the farmland of the powerful and the annual revenue of the Ministry of Revenue would be insufficient for meeting the expenses. But with regard to the laws for the land system, these issues could be resolved with laws for equal fields and restricted landownership. (Lü Liuliang, *Sishu jiangyi* 15)

後世謂井田必不可行、其說大約有二。謂豪強之田不可復取、與夫司農歲入、不足以供所出耳。然田制之法、又有均田限田之法以通之。

If it were permissible for [government-owned land that has been released] to be held by wealthy people, then there would of its own accord be no lack of land in the empire. Furthermore, why would there be any need for the troublesome nuisance of restricted landownership and equal fields, causing wealthy people hardship to no purpose? (Huang Zongxi, *Mingyi daifanglu*, “Tianzhi pian” 田制篇)

以聽富民之所占、則天下之田自無不足。又何必限田、均田之紛紛、而徒爲困苦富民之事乎。

Li Gong also wrote, “Without equal fields there is inequality between rich and poor, and it is impossible for people to own permanent assets. Equal fields are the foremost form of benevolent government.” (非均田則貧富不均、不能人人有恒產。均田第一仁政也 [*Ni taiping ce*]) There is thus

a considerable difference with the arguments of Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, etc., who in effect rejected the implementation of equal fields and restrictions on landownership, claiming that they were not pressing matters. This latter view was presumably based on a bourgeois position that defended the interests of wealthy farmers and citizens and spoke on their behalf, and it is evident that with respect to this point alone among the main topics of political debate Li Gong was generally close to his teacher Yan Yuan, sharing with him more egalitarian inclinations. In contemporary discussions of statecraft they were in agreement regarding their perceptions of the manner in which the economically powerful and the wealthy were taking possession of more and more land, but even so there existed major differences in their views about how to regard the adverse effects of large landed estates and about government involvement and intervention to control these.<sup>21)</sup>

### Concluding Remarks

Generally speaking, Li Gong's philosophical position is strongly marked by a certain degree of modification of his teacher Yan Yuan's views, and unlike Yan Yuan, who was somewhat isolated in scholarly circles and in his personal contacts, Li Gong is known to have associated with a surprisingly broad range of contemporary thinkers and scholars. This may be considered to provide supporting or circumstantial evidence that in a certain sense his ideas abounded in nuances shared by the general majority of contemporary intellectuals and that they were underpinned by a sense of reality that reflected a reasonable form of common or good sense prevalent at that point in time.

If we look back at Yan Yuan's thought from the vantage point of Li Gong's position, the reasons that he was to some degree forgotten during the heyday of the evidential research movement should become self-evident. Of course, although his "practicism," with its emphasis on praxis, differed, as has been discussed in detail above, from views of "practical learning" in a modern sense, it is to be clearly distinguished from the methods of inner cultivation going back to Song learning and, as has been pointed out by Miura Shūichi and others, shows clear evidence of the influence of Wang Yangming's school, and along with his revivalist tendencies one can detect in the "teaching of practical things" (*shìwù zhī jiào* 事物之教), which placed importance on practice associated with concrete

things, such as observation of the rites of antiquity, inclinations that conversely also have something in common with evidential scholarship.<sup>22)</sup> On the other hand, what could be described as his extreme on-the-spotism and his disdain for reading were incompatible with the textual criticism and intellectualist and analytical thinking of evidential scholarship, and if one leaves aside external factors such as the extent of his network of local connections and personal contacts, this was the prime reason for his having been ignored by contemporaries.

Returning now to Li Gong, while in its fundamentals his position inherited to a certain extent Yan Yuan's "practicism" and so on, he augmented his intellectualist proclivities, as is clear especially in his interpretation of "to investigate things and achieve knowledge" in the *Daxue*, and he parted company with the thinking characteristic of the Wang Yangming school, which had left strong marks on his teacher Yan Yuan. At the same time, one can also quite clearly discern in a positive sense a tendency to essay a swing back to the standpoint of *daoxue* 道學 or Neo-Confucianism, rather than in the negative sense in which it has been interpreted by Feng Youlan and others.<sup>23)</sup>

Li Gong's personal contacts, networks, and acquaintances, while centred on people in Jiangnan such as Mao Qiling, Yan Ruoqu, and Wan Sitong, also extended to scholars representative of Qing evidential research, as well as including the slightly earlier Gu Yanwu, and in his interpretations of the Confucian classics it is easy to detect sensibilities and methodologies shared with their realm of thinking. In this respect too he differed somewhat from Yan Yuan, who, while maintaining a certain underlying simple honesty, formed friendships with people of the so-called Northern school and Guanzhong school, such as Sun Qifeng and Li Yong, who were to a considerable degree oriented towards the school of Wang Yangming through the blending of his thought with that of Zhuzi, and also displayed many similarities with them in his thinking.

In addition, it is in one respect readily understandable that the cautious and status quo stance of Li Gong towards the classics and classical learning, eschewing a sceptical tendency to doubt their authenticity, as discussed above, was a widespread and conspicuous phenomenon also among thinkers such as Gu Yanwu and Li Guangdi, who had an affinity with the Neo-Confucian position. But as has been rightly noted by Sasaki Megumi and Kinbara Taisuke, in the case of Mao Qiling (who had considerable influence on this stance of Li Gong's), even given that he was by nature an argumentative person, he sided with the school of Wang

Yangming and criticized Neo-Confucianism and the *Jiali* 家禮, in which respect he was in fact closer to Yan Yuan, and there are aspects in which the criteria for assessment and criticism of both Neo-Confucianism and the Wang Yangming school are in fact not clear-cut.<sup>24)</sup>

Meanwhile, unlike many evidential scholars, Li Gong possessed a clear orientation towards statecraft, and in this respect too he departed in general terms from the views of his teacher and espoused political theories that were generally moderate and practical. With regard to the well-field system and the land system, on the other hand, he had egalitarian tendencies that had points in common with Yan Yuan's views and aligned himself rather with a position that championed the peasantry, a position that was diametrically opposite to the arguments of Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi, who spoke for the wealthy classes in Jiangnan, and it is to be surmised that regional characteristics and divergences lay behind these differences.

In this essay, focusing on Li Gong, I have endeavoured to prompt a reexamination of past assessments of both him and his teacher Yan Yuan, and at the same time I have reconsidered their similarities, intersecting, and points of contact with the three great Confucian scholars Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, and Wang Fuzhi, early Qing Neo-Confucianists such as Sun Qifeng, Lu Shiyi, and Li Yong, and also Qing evidential scholars such as Mao Qiling and Yan Ruoqu and have attempted to establish additional lines linking them together. But the circumstances of philosophical thought at the time were, as we have seen, in some respects extremely convoluted, and in order to be able to understand them in a more coherent manner it will be necessary to undertake further detailed investigations of individual, specific examples.

### *Postscript*

This article originally appeared under the title “*Ri Kyō no tachiba—Gan-Ri gakuha no saikō no tame ni*” 李塹の立場——顔李學派の再考のために in *Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 東洋の思想と宗教 [Thought and Religion of Asia, Journal of the Department of Asian philosophy, Waseda University], no. 23 (2011). As well as translations having been added to quotations from Chinese sources, additions and modifications have been made to the notes, but no major changes have been made to the general sense and content or to the overall formulation of my arguments.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my special thanks to Pro-

fessor Tsuchida Kenjirō 土田健次郎 and other faculty members of the Department of Asian Philosophy at Waseda University, who readily consented to the article's republication in English; to all those associated with the Waseda University Society of Asian Philosophy; and to Professor Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒 of Ochanomizu University, who suggested that I contribute an article to *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*.

This article is based on research conducted in my capacity as a member of the research project on “The Formation of Public Knowledge: An East-West Comparison of Developments in Scholarship in the 18th Century” (principal investigator: Takahashi Hiromi 高橋博巳, Kinjo Gakuin University), funded by a grant-in-aid for scientific research (B) for 2010 from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. I wish to cordially thank all the institutions and individuals from whom I received assistance while conducting this research.

## NOTES

- 1) Having first situated Yan Yuan within the broad framework of the lineage of “practical statecraft” (*jingshi zhiyong* 經世致用), or the application of knowledge to public affairs, Yamanoi Yū 山井涌 uses the term “school of practice” to refer to Yan Yuan and thinkers such as Sun Qifeng 孫奇逢, Lu Shiyi 陸世儀, and Li Yong 李顥, who blended the ideas of Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Wang Yang-ming 王陽明, and explains it in terms of a triadic contrast with the “school of classical studies and historical studies” and the “school of technology.” In view of Yan Yuan's philosophical characteristics, this may be regarded as a fairly persuasive view. See Yamanoi Yū, “Minmatsu Shinsho ni okeru keisei chiyō no gaku” 明末清初における經世致用の學 [Practical statecraft studies in the late Ming and early Qing], *Tōhōgaku Ronshū* 東方學論集 1 (1954) (reprinted in id., *Min-Shin shisōshi no kenkyū* 明清思想史の研究 [Studies in the history of Ming-Qing thought; Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1980]).

In addition, it is interesting to note that more recently Chen Zuwu 陳祖武 has also pointed to the philosophical affinities of Yan Yuan and his school with Sun Qifeng, Li Yong, etc. Even if their style of scholarship, underpinned by a simple honesty in addition to an orientation towards practice, was the product of a certain regionality of inland northern China that differed from Jiangnan and so on, there is probably scope for reexamining these attitudes. See Chen Zuwu, *Qingchu xueshu sibian lu* 清初學術思辨錄 [A record of scholarly speculation in the early Qing] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1992), chap. 9, “Cong Sun Qifeng dao Yan-Li xuepai” 从孫奇逢到顏李學派 [From Sun Qifeng to the Yan-Li school]; id., *Qingru xueshu shiling* 清儒學術拾零 [Gleanings from Qing Confucian scholarship] (Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe 湖南人民出版社, 2002), chap.

- 6, “Cong Guanzhong, Zhangnan er shuyuan kan Qingchu de guanxue yu beixue” 从關中，漳南二書院看清初的關學與北學 [The Guanzhong school and Northern school in the early Qing seen from two private academies in Guanzhong and Zhangnan].
- 2) It is from such a viewpoint that Yamanoi situates and evaluates his thought; see Yamanoi Yū, “Tei Teiso no ki no tetsugaku—Tai Shin to no hikaku ni oite” 程廷祚の氣の哲學——戴震との比較において [Cheng Tingzuo’s philosophy of *qi*: In comparison with Dai Zhen], *Chūtetsubun Gakkaihō* 中哲文學會報 4 (1979) (reprinted in id., *Min-Shin shisōshi no kenkyū*).
  - 3) In his treatment of Xizhai (Yan Yuan) in *Qingru xue’an* 清儒學案 11, Xu Shichang lists Yan Yuan, Wang Yuan, Zhong Ling 鍾鏗, Yun Hesheng, Cheng Tingzuo, etc., while in his treatment of Shugu (Li Gong) in *ibid.* 13 he lists Li Gong, Feng Chen, Wang Fuli, etc. Likewise, in his *Daqing jifu xianzhe zhuan* 大清畿輔先哲傳 16, “Shiru zhuan” 師儒傳 7, Xu Shichang lists Yan Yuan, Li Gong, and Wang Yuan, and in *ibid.* 17, “Shiru zhuan” 8, he lists teachers and friends of Yan Yuan and Li Gong. Next, in *Qingshigao* 清史稿 480, “Liezhan” 列傳 267, “Rulin” 儒林 1, Yan Yuan, Wang Yuan, Cheng Tingzuo, Yun Hesheng, and Li Gong are listed, while in *Qingshi liezhuan* 清史列傳 66, “Rulin zhuan” 儒林傳 1, Yan Yuan and Wang Yuan are followed by Li Gong, Yun Hesheng, and Cheng Tingzuo, with accounts of their careers.
  - 4) For instance in the *Hanxue shangdui* 漢學商兌 by Fang Dongshu 方東樹, who clearly espouses the position of “Song learning,” Yan Yuan, Li Gong, Li Rong 李容, etc., are treated somewhat indifferently (至於顏元、李塉、李容等、知尊性崇禮矣。亦不能道中庸、盡精微、即仍是問學之失、此方辨漢學、未暇及彼也 [fasc. 1]). Similarly, the *Qing (guochao) xue’an xiaoshi* 清(國朝)學案小識 by Tang Jian 唐鑑, who on the contrary bases himself on the viewpoint of “Han learning,” includes the biography of only Li Shugu (Li Gong) (fasc. 12, “Jingxue xue’an” 經學學案). In addition, Li Yuandu 李元度, in his *Guochao xiansheng shilüe* 國朝先生事略 30, “Mingru” 名儒, under the heading “Brief Biographical Sketch of Mr. Li Gangzhu,” mentions Li Gong, Yan Yuan, Wang Yuan, and others in this order. Zhi Weicheng 支偉成, in the *Qingdai puxue dashi liezhuan* 清代樸學大師列傳, first discusses Yan Yuan in biographies of Qing forerunners of simple scholarship (“Qingdai puxue xiandao dashi liezhuan” 清代樸學先導大師列傳 1) together with a supplementary note on Wang Yuan and then gives brief accounts of Li Gong and Cheng Tingzuo in biographies of classical scholars of the Northern school (“Beipai jingxuejia liezhuan” 北派經學家列傳 2).
  - 5) Kano Naoki too basically places Dai Wang within the category of *Gongyang* learning and understands his reappraisal of Yan Yuan, etc., as unusual and somewhat obscure thinkers in connection with the historical character of the late Qing; see Kano Naoki 狩野直喜, *Chūgoku tetsugakushi* 中國哲學史 [A history of Chinese philosophy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1953), pp. 641–643. It may also be noted that there is an anecdote concerning Yan Yuan according to which, at the time of the Ming-Qing transition, he followed the trail of his father, who had been abducted by Qing troops, his whereabouts unknown, and when he finally found the place of his death



and the site of his grave, he exhumed the coffin and carried it back to his hometown.

In later times there also arose a view that would include Dai Wang himself in the lineage of the Yan-Li school on the grounds that he was involved in its revival; see Zhang Shunwei 張舜微, *Qing ruxue ji* 清儒學記 [Notes on Confucian studies during the Qing] (Jinan: Jilu Shushe 齊魯書社, 1991), “Yan-Li xue ji” 顏李學記 [Notes on Yan-Li studies] 3. This book also traces the vicissitudes of the Yan-Li school during the Qing. More recently, the formation, spread, and development of the Yan-Li school has been described in detail in Wang Yangchun 王陽春, *Yan-Li xuepai de xingcheng yu chuanbo yanjiu* 顏李學派的形成與傳播研究 [A study of the formation and spread of the Yan-Li school], *Wenshizhe boshi wencong* 文史哲博士文叢 (Jinan: Jilu Shushe, 2009).

- 6) Among representative works, early assessments based on an understanding from the standpoint of pragmatism include Hu Shi, *Dai Dongyuan de zhexue* 戴東原的哲學 [The philosophy of Dai Dongyuan] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1925); Liang Qichao, *Qingdai xueshu gailun* 清代學術概論 [An outline of Qing scholarship] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1921; Taipei: Dongfang Chubanshe 東方出版社, 1996); id., *Zhongguo jin sanbai-nian xueshushi* 中國近三百年學術史 [A history of Chinese scholarship during the past 300 years] (Shanghai: Minzhi Shudian 民志書店, 1926; Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1936; Taipei: Huazheng Shuju 華正書局, 1994; Taipei: Dongfang Chubanshe, 1996). As for assessments based on historical materialism, mention may be made of a series of studies published in postwar mainland China, starting with Hou Wailu 侯外廬, *Zhongguo sixiang tongshi* 中國思想通史 [A general history of Chinese thought], vol. 5, *Zhongguo zaoqi qimeng sixiangshi* 中國早期啓蒙思想史 [The history of early enlightenment thought in China] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1956). Such a tendency is also undeniable in the following works, even though they are nonetheless valuable studies: Yang Peizhi 楊培之, *Yan Xizhai yu Li Shugu* 顏習齋與李恕谷 [Yan Xizhai and Li Shugu] (Wuhan: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe 湖北人民出版社, 1956); Jiang Guanghui 姜廣輝, *Yan-Li xuepai* 顏李學派 [The Yan-Li school] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1987); Chen Dongyuan 陳東原, *Yan Xizhai zhexue sixiang shu* 顏習齋哲學思想述 [An account of Yan Xizhai's philosophical thought], *Zhongguo xueshu congshu* 中國學術叢書 (Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshe 中國大百科全書出版社, 1989; Shanghai: Dongfang Chuban Zhongxin 東方出版中心, 1996). In Japan too there have been several examples of such a perspective having been adopted: see, e.g., Murase Yūya 村瀨裕也, “Gan Gen no kyōiku setsu” 顏元の教育説 [Yan Yuan's views on education], 3 pts., *Shisō no Kenkyū* 思想の研究 3 (1968), *Kagawa Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kenkyū Hōkoku* 香川大學教育學部研究報告 30 (1971), 34 (1973); Ono Kazuko 小野和子, “Gan Gen no gakumon ron” 顏元の學問論 [Yan Yuan's theory of scholarship], *Tōhō Gakuhō* 東方學報 (Kyoto) 41 (1970). On research trends in the West, see in particular William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., *Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

Lack of space prevents me from going into details, but in recent years historical and evidential research based on extensive reading of copious contemporary sources is becoming mainstream in China too. See, e.g., Chen Shanbang 陳山榜, *Yan Yuan pingzhuan* 顏元評傳 [A critical biography of Yan Yuan] (Beijing: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe 人民教育出版社, 2004); Zhu Yilu 朱義祿, *Yan Yuan, Li Gong pingzhuan* 顏元·李塉評傳 [Critical biographies of Yan Yuan and Li Gong], *Zhongguo sixiangjia pingzhuan congshu* 中國思想家評傳叢書 (Nanjing: Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe 南京大學出版社, 2006); Wang Yangchun, op. cit. Another outstanding product of this research trend is Chen Shanbang and Deng Ziping 鄧子平, eds., *Yan-Li xuepai wenku* 顏李學派文庫 [The Yan-Li school library], 10 vols. (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe 河北教育出版社, 2009), which includes almost all primary sources and texts together with previously published important books and articles.

- 7) It is to be surmised that against the contemporary political and social background there existed various motives and external pressures behind the establishment of the *Four Preservations Society*, and it would seem to have had a considerable impact on and aroused much interest in academic circles too. In Japan it was introduced to Japanese readers almost immediately by Ojima Sukema 小島祐馬 in “Shison gakkai no Gan-Ri gaku teisho” 四存學會の顏李學提唱 [The advocacy of Yan-Li studies by the *Four Preservations Society*], *Shinagaku* 支那學 2-1 (1920).
- 8) Almost the same point is made in Minamoto Ryōen 源了圓, *Kinsei shoki jitsugaku shisō no kenkyū* 近世初期實學思想の研究 [A study of ideas about practical learning at the start of the early modern period] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社, 1980), chap. 1, “Jitsugaku gainen no kentō” 實學概念の検討 [An examination of the concept of “practical learning”], pp. 76–77. It may be noted that in the debate on science and the philosophy of life there was among Zhang Junmai and others who sided with the idealist standpoint of “dark learning” in opposition to Hu Shi, etc., a pronounced leaning towards and association with especially German idealism and Bergson’s philosophy of life among Western currents of thought, and this contrast is unmistakable.
- 9) In this sense, prewar Japanese studies that take into account traditional Confucian views of practical learning could be said to offer a more reasonable understanding. See, e.g., Morimoto Takejō 森本竹城, *Shinchō jugakushi gaisetsu* 清朝儒學史概說 [An outline of the history of Confucian studies during the Qing] (Tokyo: Bunshodō 文書堂, 1930), chap. 7, “Gan-Ri gakuha” 顏李學派 [The Yan-Li school]; Koyanagi Shigeta 小柳司氣太, “Gan Gen no gaku” 顏元の學 [Yan Yuan’s scholarship], in id., *Tōyō shisō no kenkyū* 東洋思想の研究 [Studies in Eastern thought] (Tokyo: Seki Shoin 關書院, 1934); Shimizu Kiyoshi 清水潔, “Gan Shūsai no shūkōshugi—shu to shite Sō-Mingaku haigeki to fukkōshugi to ni kanren shite” 顏習齋の習行主義——主として宋明學排撃と復古主義とに關連して [Yan Xizhai’s practiciness: Chiefly in relation to revivalism and the rejection of Song-Ming learning], *Kangakkai Zasshi* 漢學會雜誌 4-3 (1936); Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋轍次, “Gan, Li no jitsugaku” 顏·李の實

學 [The practical learning of Yan Yuan and Li Gong], in id., *Keishi ronkō* 經史論考 [Studies in the Confucian classics and histories] (Tokyo: Shimizu Shoten 清水書店, 1945) (reprinted in *Morohashi Tetsuji chosakushū* 諸橋轍次著作集 [Collected works of Morohashi Tetsuji], vol. 3 [Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten 大修館書店, 1987]).

According to some scholars, the use of the designation “practical learning” to refer to Confucian scholarship began with Cheng Yi 程頤 (Yichuan 伊川); see Okada Takehiko 岡田武彦, *Sō-Min tetsugaku josetsu* 宋明哲學序說 [An introduction to Song-Ming philosophy] (Tokyo: Bungensha 文言社, 1977) (rev. ed., *Sō-Min tetsugaku no honshitsu* 宋明哲學の本質 [The essence of Song-Ming philosophy; Tokyo: Mokujisha 木耳社, 1984]), chap. 5, “Sō-Min no jitsugaku” 宋明の實學 [Practical learning in the Song and Ming]; Shimada Kenji 島田慶次, *Daigaku, Chūyō* 大學・中庸 [*Daxue* and *Zhongyong*], vol. 2, Asahi bunko 朝日文庫 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha 朝日新聞社, 1978). Examples of this can be seen in the following passages from *Henan Chengshi yishu* 河南程氏遺書 1, “Er xiansheng yu” 二先生語: “To study the classics is practical learning” (治經、實學也); “A book such as the *Zhongyong* applies the ultimate principle to concrete matters, such as vestiges of the nine classics and past sages in the state, and there is nothing that is not practical learning” (如中庸一卷書、自至理便推之於事、如國家有九經及歷代聖人之迹、莫非實學也). Following on from this, expressions such as “Its flavour is fathomless, and it is all practical learning” (其味無窮、皆實學也 [*Zhongyong zhangju* 中庸章句]) can also be seen in Zhu Xi (Zhuzi 朱子).

Reference should also be made to Kusumoto Masatsugu 楠本正繼, “Jitsugaku shisō ni tsuite no shiron—iwayuru jitsuji kyūze no kanō na jōken to sono genkai to ni kanshite” 實學思想についての試論——所謂實事求是の可能な条件とその限界とに關して [A preliminary study of the thought of practical learning: On the feasible conditions for the “search for the truth from actual facts” and their limitations], *Kyūshū Chūgoku Gakkaihō* 九州中國學會報 4 (1958); Okada Takehiko, “Jitsugaku to kyogaku no kattō” 實學と虚學の葛藤 [Conflict between practical learning and empty learning], in id., *Chūgoku shisō ni okeru risō to genjitsu* 中國思想における理想と現實 [Ideal and reality in Chinese thought] (Tokyo: Mokujisha, 1983); Minamoto Ryōen, *Jitsugaku shisō no keifu* 實學思想の系譜 [The genealogy of the thought of practical learning], *Kōdansha gakujutsu bunko* 講談社學術文庫 (Tokyo: Kōdansha 講談社, 1986); Ōtani Toshio 大谷敏夫, “Chūgoku ni okeru keiseigaku to jitsuri shisō ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu” 中國における經世學と實利思想についての一考察 [A study of statecraft studies and utilitarian thought in China], *Chūgoku-Shakai to Bunka* 中國一社會と文化 2 (1987) (reprinted in id., *Shindai seiji shisōshi kenkyū* 清代政治思想史研究 [Studies in the history of Qing political thought; Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin 汲古書院, 1991]); Itō Takayuki 伊東貴之, “Chūgoku no ‘jitsugaku’ kenkyū ni kansuru oboegaki” 中國の「實學」研究に關する覺書 [Notes on the study of “practical learning” in China], *Jinbun Kagakuka Kiyō* 人文科學科紀要 (College of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo) 102, *Kokubungaku, Kanbungaku* 國文學・漢文學 37 (1995).

However, similar thinking can also be seen, for example, in the case of

Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (Anding 安定), albeit in comparison with “essence” (*ti* 體) and “writing” (*wen* 文): “The path of sages has essence, utility, and writing. That which is immutable through the ages—lord and vassal, father and son, benevolence and righteousness, rites and music—is essence. That which leaves laws for posterity—the [classics] *Shijing* and *Shujing*, the histories, the philosophers, and *belles lettres*—is writing. That which implements them throughout the empire, brings benefit to the people, and returns to the supreme principles is utility.” (聖人之道、有體、有用、有文。君臣父子、仁義禮樂、歷世不可變者、其體也。詩書史傳子集、垂法後世者、其文也。舉而措之天下、能潤斯民、歸于皇極者、其用也 [Words of Hu Yuan’s disciple Liu Yi 劉彝 quoted in the section on Anding in Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 and Quan Zuwang 全祖望, *Song-Yuan xue’an* 宋元學案 1])

Among statements from the early Qing that slightly predate Yan Yuan and his associates, the following may be quoted: “There is the learning of erudite Confucian scholars, and there is the learning of average Confucian scholars. Learning is done by clarifying the essence and effectively applying it.... From the Song to the Yuan people prized practical learning.... During the Ming many talented men appeared, but scholarship was nothing like that of antiquity.” (有通儒之學、有俗儒之學。學者、將以明體適用也。…自宋迄元、人尚實學。…明代人材輩出、而學問遠不如古 [Pan Lei’s 潘耒 original preface to Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, *Rizhilu* 日知錄]) It would seem that from a certain time onwards a perception that the abuses going back to the late Ming had been swept away with the advent of the Qing and “practical learning” had arisen once again was quite widely shared, and the following passages could be said to epitomize this state of affairs.

During the three hundred years of the Ming examination essays were prized, and the vulgarity and superficiality of their adverse effects were such that there were even people unable to give the names of the Confucian classics and histories. During the current [Qing] dynasty the study of the classics has thrived, and in particular the Examining Director (Mao Qiling) emerged after the empty writings and public lecturing of the Donglin and Jishan schools, took upon himself the study of the classics, and shouted it out at the top of his voice, whereupon practical learning suddenly arose. (Ruan Yuan 阮元, *Yanjingshi erji* 學經室二集 7, “Mao Xihe jiantao quanji houxu” 毛西河檢討全集後序)

有明三百年、以時文相尚、其弊庸陋譎僂、至有不能舉經史名目者。國朝經學盛興、檢討首出于東林、戴山空文講學之餘、以經學自任、大聲疾呼、而一時之實學頓起。

Following the extreme decline of classical studies in the late Ming, there were moves to revere practical learning and thereby rectify the air of emptiness so as to revive Han learning in a way that could not be compared with the Tang and Song.... The three great Confucian scholars Wang [Fuzhi], Gu [Yanwu], and Huang [Zongxi] initially all devoted

themselves to Neo-Confucianism and then extended themselves, and at the start of the Qing they constituted a school combining Han and Song learning. (Pi Xirui 皮錫瑞, *Jingxue lishi* 經學歷史 10, “Jingxue fusheng shidai” 經學復盛時代)

承晚明經學極衰之後、推崇實學、以矯空疎、宜乎漢學重興、唐、宋莫逮。…王、顧、黃三大儒、皆嘗潛心朱學、而加以擴充、開國初漢、宋兼采之派。

What actually was the tide of thought of the Ch'ing period? Briefly speaking, it was a strong reaction against the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming, and its avowed purpose was “the revival of antiquity.” Its motives and contents were entirely comparable to [those of] the European Renaissance. (Liang Qichao, *Qingdai xueshu gailun* 2; English translation by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, trans., *Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period* [Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1959], pp. 21–22)

清代思想果何者邪。簡單言之、則對於宋明理學之一大反動、而以復古爲其職志也。其動機及其內容、皆與歐州之文藝復興絕相類。

In short, Ch'ing learning flourished by advocating the one word “concreteness,” and declined because of its inability to realize this word. Naturally, one reaps what one sows. (Liang, op. cit. 20; English translation by Hsü, op. cit., p. 83)

要之清學以提唱一實字而盛、以不能貫徹一實字而衰、自業自得、固其所矣。

- 10) In the context of the debate about ethical principles (*yili* 義理) too, the influence of Yan Yuan, Li Gong, Cheng Tingzuo, etc., on Dai Zhen and the links between them have been examined by several scholars from the viewpoint of their having been thinkers who argued for the legitimacy of practical benefits and utility. See Mizoguchi Yūzō 溝口雄三, *Chūgoku zenkindai shisō no kussetsu to tenkai* 中國前近代思想の屈折と展開 [The convolutions and development of premodern Chinese thought] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1980), pt. 2, chap. 3, “Shindai zen'yō ni okeru atarashii rikan no kakuritsu—kokki fukurei kai no tenkai kara mite” 清代前葉における新しい理觀の確立——克己復禮解の展開からみて [The establishment of a new view of *li* in the first half of the Qing: As seen in developments in the understanding of “to return to the observance of ritual propriety through overcoming the self”], §1 “Sōgakuteki jinseiron no hatan—Gan Gen, Ri Kyō no kokki kai” 宋學的人性論の破綻——顏元・李塈の克己解 [The collapse of the theory of human nature based on Song learning: Yan Yuan's and Li Gong's understanding of “overcoming the self”]; Ōtani, “Chūgoku ni okeru keiseigaku to jitsuri shisō ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu”; id., *Shindai seiji shisōshi kenkyū*. In particular, Ōtani has delineated the course of utilitarian thought as an undercurrent that during the Qing continued to be passed down in the school

of evidential scholarship and evolved into late-Qing ideas about statecraft. For further details, see also Itō Takayuki, “Yokubō, gōi, kyōsei—Chūgoku kinsei shisō no bunmyaku kara” 欲望・合意・共生——中國近世思想の文脈から [Desire, consensus, and coexistence: From the context of early modern Chinese thought], in *Yamane Yukio kyōju tsuitō kinen ronsō: Mindai Chūgoku no rekishiteki isō* 山根幸夫教授追悼記念論叢 明代中國の歴史的位相 [The historical topography of Ming-dynasty China: Memorial volume dedicated to the late Professor Yamane Yukio], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2007).

There would also seem to be a need to undertake a more substantial examination of the importance attached to “military strategy and agriculture” in relation to actual contemporary circumstances and as a point shared with Huang Zongxi (*Mingyi daifanglu* 明夷待訪錄, *Liushu* 留書, etc.).

- 11) A similar view is expressed by Minamoto (*Kinsei shoki jitsugaku shisō no kenkyū*, “Jitsugaku gainen no kentō,” pp. 76–77).
- 12) In response to this trend, Feng Youlan has highlighted the gulf between the two in the passage quoted below, and although there is a great deal in his understanding that is very much to the point, the basis of his assessment is diametrically opposite to that of the present essay, for while emphasizing a certain progressiveness in the case of Yan Yuan, he underrates Li Gong, implying that he had relapsed into timeworn conventionalism. That said, Feng’s emphasis of the difference between Li Gong’s interpretation of “to investigate things and achieve knowledge” and that of his teacher and his understanding of Li Gong’s interpretation as one that returned to the fold of *daoxue* 道學 could in a certain sense be described as an appropriate understanding if one sets aside Feng’s value judgement in this context. Needless to say, the underlying basis of his sense of values was Marxist dogma, and although officially the following passage was written after his ideological conversion to materialism, it is probably pointless to ask to what extent it reveals his true thinking.

The sphere of Yan Yuan’s public lecturing activities was not large, being limited to the area in Henan and Hebei. The activities of his pupil Li Gong were comparatively greater in their potential, and he did a great deal to give publicity to Yan Yuan. In the feudal society of the time Yan Yuan and Li Gong were grouped together and their school was called the “Yan-Li school.” But in reality Li Gong did not completely understand Yan Yuan’s thought. In the *Daxue bianye* which he wrote, Li Gong comments on the interpretations of the “investigation of things” by earlier people and emphasizes his own interpretation of the “investigation of things,” but he makes no mention whatsoever of Yan Yuan’s new interpretation. By and large, when Yan Yuan broke away from *daoxue*, he took none of his students with him, and the majority of his students remained within the fold of *daoxue*. They compiled Yan Yuan’s writings that do not run counter to the viewpoint of *daoxue*, calling them the *Four Preservations* (*Sicun bian*), and regarded them as Yan Yuan’s principal works. Then they compiled Yan Yuan’s writings that possess new viewpoints, calling

them *Leftover Writings of Xizhai* (*Xizhai jiyu*), and the two words “leftover writings” show that they had reversed their comparative importance and completely misunderstood where Yan Yuan’s contribution lay.... Therefore, in this book I do not use the designation “Yan-Li school,” I do not discuss Li Gong, and I discuss only Yan Yuan. (Feng Youlan, *Zhongguo zhhexueshi xinbian* 中國哲學史新編 [A history of Chinese philosophy, new edition], vol. 6 [Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1989], chap. 61, “Yan Yuan duiyu daoxue de pipan” 顏元對於道學的批判 [Yan Yuan’s criticism of *daoxue*], supplementary note, p. 33)

顏元的講學活動範圍不大、限于河北、河南之間。他的學生李塈的活動能力比較大、爲他作了許多宣傳工作。在當時封建社會中、顏、李并稱、他們的學派稱爲“顏李學派”。其實李塈并不完全了解顏元的思想。李塈在他所寫的《大學辨業》中批評了前人對於格物的解釋、并強調了自己對於格物的解釋、可是完全沒有提到顏元的新解釋。大概顏元从道學打出來的時候、並沒有把他的學生們都帶出來、大部分的學生們然留在道學里邊、他們把顏元不違背道學觀點的文章編爲《四存編》、以爲顏元的主要著作、而把顏元具有新觀點的文章編爲《習齋記錄》、“記錄”兩箇字表示他們的輕重倒置、完全不知道顏元的貢獻所在。…所以本書不用“顏李學派”這箇名稱、不講李塈、而只講顏元。

- 13) See Irifune Hiromichi 入船弘道, “Ri Kyō no ‘kakubutsu chichi’ kaishaku ni tsuite” 李塈の「格物致知」解釋について [On Li Gong’s interpretation of “to investigate things and achieve knowledge”], *Chūgoku Tetsugaku* 中國哲學 (Hokkaidō Daigaku Chūgoku Tetsugakukai 北海道大學中國哲學會) 25 (1996). Irifune points out that Li Gong understood “illuminating illustrious virtue” and “renewing the people,” and also “investigating things and achieving knowledge” and “making one’s thoughts sincere, rectifying the mind, cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and pacifying the whole world,” as standing in a sequential relationship of relative importance to each other (*Daxue bianye* 2), and this view may also be assumed to be based on Li Gong’s position that knowledge preceded practice. Li Gong also writes more explicitly: “Therefore, after having broadened one’s learning one must discipline oneself in accordance with ritual, and after having engaged in scholarship and intellectual inquiry one must practise with all earnestness” (故博文之後又須約禮、學問思辨之後又須篤行也 [*Daxue bianye* 3]).
- 14) See Itō Takayuki, “Chitsujo’-ka no shosō—Shinsho shisō no chihei” 《秩序》化の諸相——清初思想の地平 [Phases of putting in “order”: The horizons of early Qing thought], *Chūgoku-Shakai to Bunka* 10 (1995); id., *Shisō to shite no Chūgoku kinsei* 思想としての中國近世 [Considering the early modern in the history of Chinese thought] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005), chap. 4, “Chitsujo’-ka no isō” 〈秩序〉化の位相 [Phases of putting in “order”], pp. 104–108.
- 15) See Yoshida Jun 吉田純, “Shōsho kobun soshō to sono jidai” 『尚書古文疏證』とその時代 [The *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* and its times], *Nihon Chūgoku Gakkaihō* 日本中國學會報 40 (1988); id., *Shinchō kōshōgaku no gunzō* 清朝考證

學の群像 [Evidential research scholars of Qing China], Tōyōgaku sōsho 東洋學叢書 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社, 2007); Lin Qingzhang 林慶彰, *Qingchu qunjing bianwei xue* 清初群經辨偽學 [Early Qing scholarship on the spuriousness of the classics], Wenshizhe daxi 文史哲大系 23 (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe 文津出版社, 1990); id., “Mao Qiling, Li Gong yu Qingchu de jingshu bianwei huodong” 毛奇齡、李塉與清初的經書辨偽活動 [Mao Qiling, Li Gong, and allegations of the spuriousness of the classics in the early Qing], in Guoli Zhongshan Daxue Qingdai Xueshu Yanjiu Zhongxin 國立中山大學清代學術研究中心, ed., *Qingdai xueshu luncong* 清代學術論叢 [Collected essays on Qing scholarship], vol. 1 (Taipei: Wenjin Chubanshe, 2001). Extremely thought-provoking and useful inquiries are undertaken in these studies, and they are well worth consulting.

- 16) For details on contemporary interpretations of and debate about the passage on the human mind and the moral mind in “Counsels of the Great Yü,” which began with Yan Ruoqu’s *Shangshu guwen shuzheng* and Mao Qiling’s rebuttal in the form of the *Guwen Shangshu yuanci*, see, in addition to the works cited in n. 15, Benjamin A. Elman, “Philosophy (*Li*) versus Philology (*K’ao-cheng*): The *Jen-hsin Tao-hsin* Debate,” *T’oung Pao* LXIX, 4-5 (1983); id., *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

As another striking instance in which, against the background of a major transformation in ontology and theories of human nature in the direction of the monism of “physical nature,” this combined with the results of evidential textual criticism to bring about considerable changes in the interpretation of the Confucian classics, Mizoguchi Yūzō has carefully traced discussion about the interpretation of the *Lunyu*’s statement “to return to the observance of ritual propriety through overcoming the self” from the early to mid-Qing, and in doing so he reveals the epoch-making character of Yan Yuan, Li Gong, Cheng Tingzuo, and Dai Zhen. See Mizoguchi, op. cit.; id., “Min-Shinki no jinseiron” 明清期の人性論 [Theories of human nature during the Ming and Qing], in *Sakuma Shigeo kyōju taikyū kinen: Chūgokushi, tōjishi ronshū* 佐久間重男教授退休記念 中國史・陶磁史論集 [Collected essays on Chinese history and ceramic history in commemoration of the retirement of Professor Sakuma Shigeo] (Tokyo: Ryōgen 療原, 1982).

- 17) On Liu Zongzhou, see Mabuchi Masaya 馬淵昌也, “Ryū Sōshū kara Chin Kaku e—Sō-Min Rigaku kara Shindai Jukyō e no tenkan no ichi yōsō” 劉宗周から陳確へ——宋明理學から清代儒教への轉換の一樣相 [From Liu Zongzhou to Chen Que: One aspect of changes in Confucianism in the Ming-Qing transition], *Nihon Chūgoku Gakkaihō* 53 (2001).
- 18) See Itō, *Shisō to shite no Chūgoku kinsei*, chap. 5, “Kinsei Jukyō no seijiron” 近世儒教の政治論 [Political theory in early modern Confucianism]. In this connection, there have in recent years appeared several notable and highly instructive studies: see Feng Tianyu 馮天瑜, “*Fengjian*” *kaolun* “封建” 考論 [A study of “enfeoffment”] (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue Chubanshe 武漢大學出版社, 2006); Zhao Yuan 趙園, *Zhidu, yanlun, xintai—“Ming-Qing zhi shi shidafu yanjiu” xubian* 制度・言論・心態——《明清之際士大夫研究》續編 [Institu-



- tions, discourse, and attitudes: Sequel to *A study of scholar-officials during the Ming-Qing transition*], Xueshushi congshu 學術史叢書 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 2006); Zhang Xiang 張翔 and Sonoda Hidehiro 園田英弘, eds., “*Hōken*,” “*gunken*” *saikō-Higashi Ajia shakai taiseiron no shinsō* 「封建」・「郡縣」再考——東アジア社會體制論の深層 [Rethinking *fengjian* and *junxian*: The depths of theories about East Asian social systems] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan 思文閣出版, 2006); Hayashi Fumitaka 林文孝, “Ko Enbu ‘Gunkenron’ no ichi” 顧炎武「郡縣論」の位置 [The position of Gu Yanwu’s “Junxian lun”], in Zhang and Sonoda, op. cit.
- 19) According to Narakino Sen 榑木野宣, *Shindai jūyō shokkan no kenkyū—Man-Kan heiyō no zenbō* 清代重要職官の研究——滿漢併用の全貌 [A study of important officials during the Qing: The full picture of the joint appointment of Manchus and Chinese] (Tokyo: Kazama Shobō 風間書房, 1975), Addendum: “Shindai ryokuki heisei no kenkyū” 清代綠旗兵制の研究 [A study of the Qing military system of the Army of the Green Standard], chap. 6, “Ryokuki heisei no haikai” 綠旗兵制の背景 [The background to the military system of the Army of the Green Standard], and Ōtani Toshio, “Yōseiki o chūshin to shita Shindai ryokuei gunsei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu—toku ni eisei, zaisei mondai o chūshin to shite” 雍正期を中心とした清代綠營軍制に関する一考察——特に營制・財政問題を中心として [A study of the Qing military system of the Army of the Green Standard, chiefly during the reign of Yongzheng: With a special focus on questions concerning the garrison system and finances], *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 東洋史研究 34-3 (1975) (reprinted in id., *Shindai seiji shisōshi kenkyū*), a background factor in the execution of Lu Shengnan 陸生柎 by order of Yongzheng was that his arguments in favour of the feudal system had, from his position of the inseparability of soldiers and farmers, criticized the Qing system of levying troops on the basis of the separation of soldiers and farmers, and Narakino and Ōtani suggest that this was one reason for Lu Shengnan’s persecution.
- 20) On contemporary discussion of the well-field system and land system in general, see Togawa Yoshio 戸川芳郎, Hachiya Kunio 蜂屋邦夫, and Mizoguchi Yūzō, *Jukyōshi* 儒教史 [A history of Confucianism], Sekai shūkyōshi sōsho 世界宗教史叢書 10 (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, 1987), chap. 11 (by Mizoguchi), “Shindai no keisei ron—hōken ron to densei ron” 清代の經世論——封建論と田制論 [Statecraft theory during the Qing: Discussion of enfeoffment and discussion of the land system]; Honma Tsugihiko 本間次彦, “Seiden no yume, toki no chikara—Minmatsu Shinshoki no ‘seiden’ mondai” 井田の夢、時の力——明末清初期の「井田」問題 [The dream of well-fields and contemporary power: The question of “well-fields” in the late Ming and early Qing], in Wang Shouchang 王守常 et al., eds., *Xueren* 學人 8 (Nanjing: Jiangsu Wenyi Chubanshe 江蘇文藝出版社, 1995).
- 21) On these points see also Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒, “*Sokaku no tochi shoyū ron*” 『租覈』の土地所有論 [The theory of landownership in the *Zuhe*], *Chūgoku—Shakai to Bunka* 1 (1986) (reprinted in id., *Shindai Chūgoku no bukka to keizai hendō* 清代中國の物價と經濟變動 [Commodity prices and economic fluctuations in Qing China; Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan 研文出版, 1997]);

Hayashi Fumitaka, “Chūgoku ni okeru kōsei–seizon to seiji” 中國における公正——生存と政治 [Fairness and justice in China: Subsistence and politics], in Miura Tōru 三浦徹, Kishimoto Mio, and Sekimoto Teruo 關本照夫, eds., *Hikakushi no Ajia–shoyū, keiyaku, shijō, kōsei* 比較史のアジア——所有・契約・市場・公正 [Asia in comparative perspective: Ownership, contracts, markets, fairness and justice], Isurāmu chiiki kenkyū sōsho イスラーム地域研究叢書 4 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004). According to Hayashi, Wang Fuzhi did give some consideration to indirect intervention for the purpose of curbing the appropriation of land and large landholdings, but basically, in conjunction with his position that stressed the inevitability of changing times, a natural solution to the problem was entrusted to autonomous developments in society, and generally the views he expressed were opposed to more active political intervention and artificial manipulation in the form of the redistribution of land by means of measures to restrict landownership and so on.

- 22) In several thought-provoking studies Miura Shūichi has conducted a lucid analysis and examination of congruities between Yan Yuan’s views and the Wang Yangming school and connections and influences between the two, taking into account the formation of Yan Yuan’s thought: see Miura Shūichi 三浦秀一, “Gan Gen no shisō—*Sonsei, Songaku ryōhen o chūshin ni*” 顔元の思想——『存性』『存學』兩篇を中心に [The thought of Yan Yuan: Chiefly on “Cun xing bian” and “Cun xue bian”], *Shūkan Tōyōgaku* 集刊東洋學 54 (1985); id., “Wakaki hi no Gan Gen—*Shinsho shitaifu no shisō keisei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu*” 若き日の顔元——清初士大夫の思想形成に關する一考察 [Yan Yuan in his youth: A study of the formation of the thought of an early Qing scholar-official], *Nihon Chūgoku Gakkaihō* 37 (1985).

On the revivalist fundamentalism of Yan Yuan and the Yan-Li school and the resultant affinities between their view of “practical learning” and evidential scholarship, see Kai-wing Chow (Zhou Qirong 周啓榮), *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). In addition, I have set out my own views in Itō, “Chūgoku no ‘jitsugaku’ kenkyū ni kansuru oboegaki”; id., “Chitsujo’-ka no shosō”; id., *Shisō to shite no Chūgoku kinsei*, chap. 4, “Chitsujo’-ka no isō.”

- 23) See Feng Youlan, op. cit.
- 24) See Sasaki Megumi 佐々木愛, “Mō Kirei no shisō henreki—Minmatsu no gakufū to Shin shoki keigaku” 毛奇齡の思想遍歴——明末の學風と清初期經學 [The change in Mao Chi-ling’s 毛奇齡 view of scholarship: The academic atmosphere in the late Ming and classical studies in the early Qing], *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 56-2 (1997); id., “Mō Kirei no *Shushi karei hihan—toku ni sōhō o chūshin to shite*” 毛奇齡の『朱子家禮』批判——特に宗法を中心として [Mao Chi-ling’s criticism on the Descent-line system in Chu Hsi’s family rituals], *Jōchi Shigaku* 上智史學 43 (1998); Kinbara Taisuke 金原泰介, “Mō Kirei no Yōmeigaku hyōka to Shushigaku hihan ni tsuite—Chō Retsu to no ronsō o chūshin ni” 毛奇齡の陽明學評價と朱子學批判について——張烈との論争を中心に [On Mao Qiling’s positive assessment of the Wang Yangming school and his criticism of Neo-Confucianism: With a focus on his debate

with Zhang Lie], *Chūgoku Tetsugaku* 中國哲學 31 (2003); Lin, op. cit. On Yan Yuan's views on "rites," see also Zheng Taixie 鄭臺燮, "Gan Gen no reiron" 顏元の禮論 [Yan Yuan's 顏元 essay on rite 禮], *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 45-4 (1987). Mao Qiling also expressed the view, although not necessarily in the context of criticism of *daoxue* and Neo-Confucianism in a narrow sense, that in earlier times there had not existed the designation *daoxue* (聖學不明久矣。聖以道爲學、而學進於道、然不名道學。凡道學兩字、六經皆分見之。卽或竝見、亦只稱學道、而不稱道學 [Xiheji 11, "Bian shengxue fei daoxue wen" 辨聖學非道學文]).