

# Trade Administered by Maritime Trade Offices (*Shibosi*) in Song China and by Dazaifu in Heian Japan<sup>1)</sup>

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## Introduction

During the Song period there were established in China maritime trade offices (*shibosi* 市舶司) to manage and supervise maritime trade. These were government agencies that had their institutional origins in the maritime trade commissioners (*shiboshi* 市舶使) who had been installed in Guangzhou 廣州 as a temporary measure since the mid-Tang, and from the Song through to the Ming they were established in the main ports. During the Song and Yuan in particular, merchant ships were encouraged to ply their trade, and taxes known as *choujie* 抽解 or *choufen* 抽分 and official trade known as *bomai* 博買, *hemai* 和買, or *boyi* 博易 were important sources of revenue for the state. Maritime trade offices were established in many ports extending from Shandong 山東 to Guangnan 廣南, and the most important were Mingzhou 明州, for trade in the East China Sea (with Koryō and Japan), and Guangzhou and Quanzhou 泉州, for trade in the South China Sea (with Southeast Asia, India, and West Asia). Details of the legal system governing maritime trade offices during the Song can be found in the *Song huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿 86 (“Zhiguan” 職官 44), while with regard to maritime trade offices during the Yuan the full text of the Maritime Trade Regulations (*shibo zefa* 市舶則法) of 1293 is included in the *Da Yuan shengzheng guochao dianzhang* 大元聖政國朝典章 22 (“Hubu” 戶部 8) and the full text of the same regulations for 1314 is included in the *Tongzhi tiaoge* 通制條格 18 and *Zhizheng tiaoge* 至正條格 12. There also exists a large body of research on the subject.<sup>2)</sup>

On a previous occasion I discussed the importance of ports where maritime trade offices had been established in maritime trade during the Song with reference to the Mingzhou Maritime Trade Office in Liangzhe 兩浙 (Enomoto 2007: pt. 1, chap. 1). Mingzhou was already an important trading port in the ninth century, when maritime traders began trading independently in the East China Sea, but it did not necessarily occupy a

central position in this trade. It became the centre of trading activities in the East China Sea only in the late tenth century, when its position as an officially administered trading port was established with the installation of a maritime trade office. Although there are examples of the subsequent use of other ports such as Hangzhou 杭州, Xiuzhou 秀州, and Jiangyin 江陰 where maritime trade offices or branch maritime trade offices (*shibowu* 市舶務) had been established, ships plying the East China Sea mainly used Mingzhou. However, the establishment of maritime trade offices required of Song merchant ships only that they obtain departure permits at a port with a maritime trade office, and it did not restrict the affiliation of people or ships. For example, when merchants from Fujian sailed for the South China Sea they went to Guangzhou or Quanzhou to obtain departure permits and when they sailed for the East China Sea they similarly went to Mingzhou (Wu Zimu 吳自牧, *Mengliang lu* 夢梁錄 12, “Jianghai chuanjian” 江海船艦). Nor was it unusual for ships to visit other ports before entering or after leaving Mingzhou in order to engage in illicit trade, and the system of maritime trade offices was unable to take any effective measures against such activities. But ships engaging in illicit trade made frequent visits to ports with a maritime trade office, and it was not generally anticipated that there would be trading ships that engaged solely in illicit trade. In other words, trade administered by maritime trade offices possessed advantages for which illicit trading had no substitutes. It is to be surmised that one of these advantages was the security of business transactions provided by an official trading port, and another was the enormous size of the market for official and private trade. In short, the legal measure of establishing maritime trade offices had an enormous influence on maritime trade, but the actual supervision of trade by maritime trade offices did not necessarily function very well, and maritime trade during the Song developed with the system of maritime trade offices as one of its constituent elements but also included elements that fell outside the reach of this system.

What I wish to examine in the following, having taken into account the above situation, is the noninstitutional aspects that enabled trade to run smoothly in ports with a maritime trade office. Economic activities do not operate solely in accordance with legal systems, and private networks and other elements outside the legal system are often necessary for a legal system to function. For example, Yokkaichi Yasuhiro (2000, 2002, 2006a, 2006b) has drawn attention to the non-Chinese bureaucracy and private networks in the supervision and management of trade with South-

east Asia during the Yuan. Here too I wish to focus not on the system of maritime trade offices *per se* but on the activities undertaken under this system by maritime traders, maritime trade office officials, middlemen, and others involved in trade. Further, for the purpose of comparison I shall take up the government headquarters in Kyushu, known as Dazaifu 大宰府, which administered trade in Japan during the same period, and I shall examine the maritime traders, Dazaifu officials, aristocracy, and itinerant merchants who were involved in trade in Japan.

It should be noted that in China during the Song and Yuan periods place-names often changed, with Mingzhou, for instance, becoming Qingyuan 慶元 (present-day Ningbo 寧波). But in order to avoid confusion, in the following I shall use the place-names that were in use during the Northern Song.

### I. Measures Taken by Maritime Traders to Evade Legal Prohibitions

In 1105, during the Northern Song, Li Chong 李充, a maritime trader from Quanzhou, arrived in Hakata 博多, Japan, from Mingzhou. The *Chōya gunsai* 朝野群載, a Japanese collection of official and unofficial documents, includes in fasc. 20 (“Ikoku” 異國) the full text of a certificate of passage (*gongping* 公憑) that Li Chong had received from the branch maritime trade office in Mingzhou when setting sail.<sup>3)</sup> This certificate lists the names of the people on board and the goods carried by the ship, records the numbers of gongs, drums, and flags to be used in emergencies, the name of the guarantor, and the fact that Li Chong had been given a staff and a seal by the authorities in Mingzhou, and it also includes eight articles pertaining to the regulation of trade. The aim of these articles was to inform maritime traders and government agencies at their destinations of conduct prohibited by the Song, and they give us an idea of the specific concerns of the Song authorities.

The content of these articles can be summarized in the following manner: (a) when leaving port, the merchant had to notify the authorities in his place of residence (in the case of Li Chong, Quanzhou); (b) he was permitted to depart only after having been issued with a certificate of passage by the prefecture where the port of departure was located (in the case of Li Chong, Mingzhou); (c) the ship’s cargo, complement, and destination were checked before departure; (d) after the ship’s return to China the certificate of passage was returned to the maritime trade office and the authorities checked whether the number of implements and weapons

for self-defence were the same as at the time of departure; (e) travel to the Liao, Vietnam (Đại Việt 大越), and Dengzhou 登州 and Laizhou 萊州 on the Shandong Peninsula was banned; (f) it was forbidden to export weapons and carry women, spies, and army deserters; (g) merchants were prohibited from posing as state envoys and composing memorials; (h) it was forbidden to conceal cargo in order to evade taxes and official trade; and (i) in the event that the ship on its return put in at a port other than that from which it had departed, the maritime trade office at the port of departure had to be informed.

From the above, it would seem that the authorities were especially concerned about stowaways, smuggling of contraband goods, tax evasion, travel to places on which travel bans had been imposed, overseas absconding by malcontents, and maritime merchants falsely claiming to be foreign envoys. But just how effective were these prohibitions? The effectiveness of (e) travel bans, for example, can be ascertained by examining sources from Koryō, to which travel was banned for a time. References to visits by Song maritime traders can be found in the *Koryō sa* 高麗史 (“Sega” 世家) and *Koryō sa chōryo* 高麗史節要, and it can be ascertained that there are eleven such references for the twelve calendar years from 1079 to 1090, when the Song sanctioned travel to Koryō,<sup>4)</sup> equivalent to approximately 0.9 visits per year (apart from official envoys).<sup>5)</sup> During an earlier twelve-year period from 1067 to 1078, when travel to Koryō was banned, there are ten references to visits by Song maritime traders,<sup>6)</sup> which is virtually the same as during the period when travel to Koryō was permitted. This is proof that the Song’s travel bans had little effect. According to the certificate of passage included in the *Chōya gunsai*, it would seem that for a time during the Northern Song travel was banned not only to Koryō but also to Japan and Islamic lands (Dashi 大食), but as far as can be confirmed from extant sources, there is no evidence of a halt in visits to Japan by Song maritime traders during the period when travel to Koryō was banned.<sup>7)</sup>

How did maritime traders go about travelling to regions on which travel bans had been imposed? A source that apprises us of one such pattern is a memorial that Su Shi 蘇軾, who had strongly argued for a ban on travel to Koryō, submitted in 1090 in connection with an incident involving Wang Yingsheng 王應昇, who had been arrested in the same year.<sup>8)</sup> According to Su Shi’s memorial, Wang Yingsheng had set sail with a certificate of passage authorizing him to visit Koryō, on which a travel ban had been lifted at the time, but in actual fact he had gone to the Liao

and engaged in trade there. Having learnt of this, the Hangzhou Maritime Trade Office searched his ship, whereupon there were indeed discovered high-quality cupelled silver (*nantingyin* 南挺銀), silk, and coins from the “Great Liao” as well as two written prayers for a safe voyage to the Liao. It is thus evident that there existed a pattern whereby maritime traders set sail, having applied to go to a region to which travel was permitted, and then headed to a region to which travel was banned. This incident came to light only after the maritime trader Xu Cheng 徐成 from Quanzhou, thought to have been one of Wang Yingsheng’s competitors, informed on him to Koryō, which then notified the Mizhou 密州 Coastal Navy. Wang Yingsheng would not have been exposed through the efforts of the maritime trade office alone.

When maritime traders were found to have visited places to which travel was banned, they often claimed that their ship had drifted off course. In 1018 the discovery in Guangzhou of a maritime trader who was carrying coins of the Vietnamese Early Lê 黎 dynasty became an issue, and an edict ordering an investigation of the matter was issued. The edict stated that “henceforth, if merchants engaged in overseas trade set out for southern lands, do business, drift to prefectures and commanderies under the jurisdiction of Jiaozhou 交州 (Đại Việt) on account of unfavourable winds, acquire silk used as money, silk cloth, cash coins, and so on, and return to the maritime trade office in Guangzhou,...” This assumes that the maritime trader who was carrying coins of the Early Lê dynasty had drifted off course to Vietnam.<sup>9)</sup> In the certificate of passage included in the *Chōya gunsai*, travel was banned to Đại Việt, and in view of the fact that annexation of Đại Việt had been government policy since the founding of the Song dynasty, there is a strong possibility that this travel ban had been in place since the start of the Song. Consequently, when maritime traders were found to have been trading in Đại Việt, they would probably have defended their actions by claiming that they had not gone there intentionally but had drifted off course, and the maritime trade office would have had no way of ascertaining the truth of the matter. Further, in 1159, during the Southern Song, there was issued an edict ordering that “maritime traders who readily go to the northern realms (Jin) on the pretext that they have been carried there by the wind or currents are to be punished in accordance with martial law.” This shows that questions were being raised about maritime traders who were entering the enemy territory of the Jin on the pretext that they had drifted there.<sup>10)</sup>

The maritime trade office was supposed to issue a certificate of pas-

sage after having checked a merchant ship's destination. But judging from the above examples, the authorities had no way of ascertaining where the ship actually went, and unless they had contact and had reached some sort of agreement with regions to which travel was banned, the imposition of trade bans on specific regions was virtually meaningless.<sup>11)</sup> In the certificate of passage preserved in the *Chōya gunsai* it is clearly stated that it was permissible to go to countries other than Đại Việt and the Liao on the grounds that "because all foreign countries lie far across the ocean, they are unable to watch China, and even if there are legal prohibitions, it is impossible to sever contact and inevitable that people of the Song will break the law and secretly go overseas." The Song refused to sanction travel to only the Liao and Đại Việt, both enemy nations, on account of its official diplomatic position, but it was aware of the ineffectiveness of the imposition of travel bans.

The duties of maritime trade offices that were most directly related to state interests were tax collection and official trade. The sole example for which the actual figures are currently known is that of a trading vessel plying between Japan and the Song that drifted off course to Huating 華亭 in Xiuzhou in 1244 and was investigated by the Mingzhou Branch Maritime Trade Office for the purposes of taxation and official trade (Enomoto 2009). Among the 860 planks of timber that it was carrying, 45 planks were taken in tax and 285 planks were purchased by the government in official trade. A total of 330 planks, these accounted for about 38 percent of the total amount of timber carried by the ship. Moreover, around this time ordinary Chinese merchant vessels were taxed at the rate of two-fifteenths for goods such as timber that were of low value in proportion to their weight, whereas the tax rates for ships from Japan and Koryō were one-ninth for high-ranking members of a ship's complement and one-fifth for others, and visits by such ships were being encouraged. If the ship in question had been a Chinese vessel, the taxes and official trade would have come to more than 46 percent. Further, the percentage bought in official trade was still higher in the case of goods such as aromatics and medicines, which were of high value in proportion to their weight, and government monopoly goods were as a rule all purchased by the maritime trade office.

Among the goods carried by maritime traders, there would have been some that they wanted the maritime trade office to purchase in bulk, but they would have avoided having goods purchased by the maritime trade office that had been ordered or bought with specific customers in mind.

In this connection, the certificate of passage in the *Chōya gunsai* mentions penalties in the event that maritime traders who had returned from overseas trading concealed goods that were liable for tax or purchase in official trade. The actual methods of concealment posited included lying about the content of the cargo, falsely claiming that the goods were stones, sending goods elsewhere beforehand, and selling them privately. These would all have been methods that were actually employed at the time.

A report submitted in the early 1250s by Bao Hui 包恢, administrative assistant to the fiscal commissioner of Guangdong 廣東, is an interesting document that touches on the movements of Japanese ships in Mingzhou.<sup>12)</sup> According to this document, the maritime trade office permitted a merchant vessel to leave only after it had carried out an inspection to ascertain that it was carrying no banned goods,<sup>13)</sup> and Bao Hui, having mentioned that copper coins, the exporting of which was banned, were leaving Mingzhou in large quantities, declares that the inspections carried out at Mingzhou were “a mere dead letter.”

According to Bao Hui, one reason for this was that it had become normal practice for inspectors to receive gratuities from the Japanese and go easy on their inspections. The concealment of goods and false declarations by maritime traders mentioned in the *Chōya gunsai* were premised on the connivance of maritime trade office officials seeking personal gain. Other methods that were adopted included hiding copper coins in “dwellings at sea” or “perilous places in the mountains or at sea” and transferring them somewhere faraway beforehand and then restowing them after the inspection had been completed. The references to sending goods elsewhere beforehand and selling them privately in the *Chōya gunsai* describe actions taken by Chinese maritime traders in order to evade the appropriation of goods purchased overseas and are a different case from that in Bao Hui’s report, which refers to the actions of Japanese merchants in Mingzhou, but both acted similarly in transferring cargo prior to inspections by the maritime trade office. According to Bao Hui, there were also instances in which a ship would sail 20–30 *li* out to sea before the inspector arrived, whereupon he would waive his inspection on the grounds that the ship had already been inspected. In such cases too one can posit the connivance of inspectors colluding with maritime traders.

It was probably against the background of this collusion between maritime trade office officials and maritime traders that large quantities of copper coins left the country. For example, a ban on the outflow of copper coins issued in 1143 was not enforced in Fujian and Guangnan, and

the smuggling of copper coins by maritime traders is said to have been tacitly allowed.<sup>14)</sup> In 1258 the Department of State Affairs declared that “although the ban on the entry of Japanese ships is strict, in recent years the Mingzhou Maritime Trade Office, swayed by profits from official trade and tax collection, has allowed Japanese ships to come and smuggle out copper coins, and the damage has been enormous.” The Coastal Military Commission in Mingzhou was accordingly ordered to clamp down on such activities at sea and in ports.<sup>15)</sup> In ports with a maritime trade office, such as Mingzhou, Quanzhou, and Guangzhou, importance would have been placed not so much on compliance with the ban on exporting copper coins but rather on the trade that flourished by disregarding the ban and on the resultant profits.

## **II. Relations between Maritime Traders and Maritime Trade Office Officials**

By concealing their cargo, making false declarations, transferring goods to other places, and so on, maritime traders reduced the amount of tax levied on them and traded in banned goods. Further, according to Bao Hui’s report, one means of ensuring that they were able to do so was giving gratuities or gifts to officials attached to a maritime trade office. As was noted in the Introduction, even when they were involved in illicit trade, it was common practice during the Song for maritime traders to engage in trade also at ports with a maritime trade office. But while trade at ports with a maritime trade office was safe and large-scale transactions could be expected, it is also true that it had disadvantages, such as the seizure of quality goods for taxation and their purchase at low prices and earmarking by the government, and taking this point into account, maritime traders spared no efforts to maximize their profits. In simple terms, for them the ideal was to sell quality goods on the market at high prices, use inferior goods for taxes and official trade, and deal in banned goods outside the surveillance of maritime trade offices. Concealment and gift-giving were effective means towards this end.

I next wish to consider gifts in particular in a little more detail. Kuwabara Jitsuzō (1989: 213–214 [orig. pub. 1935]) has cited several specific examples as instances of profit-making by officials and perquisites of office, and he has shown that maritime trade office officials received many gifts from maritime traders. During the Yuan, there were penal provisions for officials who, though aware of illicit trade, overlooked it and for of-



officials who took bribes.<sup>16)</sup> Many of the examples of gift-giving mentioned in source materials concern high-ranking officials in maritime trade offices and in prefectures or subprefectures. For example, in Quanzhou in the mid-thirteenth century the situation was such that all officials holding posts in the maritime trade office were taking bribes from foreign merchants, with the sole exception of Song Yingxian 宋應先, supervisor of the Quanzhou Branch Maritime Trade Office.<sup>17)</sup> Again, those on board a Japanese ship that had set out for Mingzhou but was cast up at Wenzhou 溫州 in 1318 during the Yuan sent gifts of “red leather armour, swords, leather pouches, caskets, fans, etc.,” to the emperor and officials of the Jiangzhe Branch Secretariat via Wenzhou Circuit.<sup>18)</sup>

It was important for maritime traders to have connections with high-ranking officials since they were empowered to make the final decisions on the treatment of merchants. But their involvement in administrative matters was limited, and after a few years they would be transferred to another post. For this reason relations with the clerks involved in actually administering trade over a long period of time were equally important for maritime traders. For instance, special mention is made of Kong Kui 孔戣, who was appointed military commissioner of Lingnan 嶺南 Circuit in 817 during the Tang, for having reformed a state of affairs in which large numbers of rhinoceros-horn beads were being given as bribes even to menials by maritime traders at the banquets that were held for displaying their goods when they arrived in port.<sup>19)</sup> Again, when Lin Wu 林五 and Wang Er 王兒, whom Wang Yuanmao 王元懋 of Quanzhou had sent overseas, returned to Quanzhou in 1182 with their ship laden with aloeswood, pearls, camphor, musk, and so on, Wang Yuanmao, loath to have these goods taken in tax, presented the head clerk Wu Min 吳敏 with some household effects and declared for tax purposes only half of the cargo to Zhang Xun 張遜, supervisor of the maritime trade office. At the time, Zhang Xun had only just been appointed supervisor and was not yet very familiar with his administrative duties, and Wang Yuanmao thought it sufficient to arrange matters only with the head clerk.<sup>20)</sup>

As well as being a means of profit-making, gift-giving by maritime traders was also a self-protection measure to keep the illegal conduct of maritime trade office officials to a minimum. For example, in 1207, after the collection of taxes had been concluded in Quanzhou and Guangzhou, government agencies purchased quality goods at low prices, and officials attached to these agencies also took advantage of this opportunity on the pretext that they were engaging in official trade. This then became an is-

sue, and maritime trade offices were forbidden to detain merchant vessels and force merchants to sell goods once the regulation amount of goods had been acquired through taxes and official trade.<sup>21)</sup> This shows that provincial government offices and clerks were conducting official trade for their own gain on a scale beyond that stipulated for the amount of goods to be delivered to the central authorities. Questions were raised ten years later about a similar situation in Quanzhou,<sup>22)</sup> and Zhen Dexiu 眞德秀, who had taken up the post of prefect, prohibited officials from purchasing goods from maritime traders.<sup>23)</sup> The disturbance caused by Japanese merchants in Mingzhou in 1328 was also provoked by petty officials who mistreated and humiliated the Japanese merchants when doing business with them.<sup>24)</sup> Maritime traders were thus in a position in which they had no choice but to put up with ill treatment at the whim of officials of maritime trade offices, and by way of precaution they needed to maintain friendly relations with those affiliated to these offices.

Philip D. Curtin (1984: chap. 3) has described with reference to Europe and West Africa how the state demanded “protection costs” from merchants in return for providing a safe and secure trading environment. In the case of the Song, the goods earmarked for taxes and official trade corresponded to the “protection costs” paid to the state, but it could also be said that, in addition to this, maritime traders made gifts to officials of maritime trade offices, the local administrators, as a form of “protection costs.” By this means traders obtained sure protection through personal ties of friendship and also reduced the risk of suffering excessive expropriation, as a result of which they were able to ensure economic profits. According to the logic of the state authorities, taxes and official trade were legal measures, while gift-giving was condemned as a noninstitutional and sometimes criminal act, but as far as the traders were concerned, both were necessary expenses for ensuring the acquisition of profits.

As relations between officials of maritime trade offices and maritime traders deepened and became longstanding, eventually the two parties went beyond the one-off presentation of gifts in kind and money and began to think of profiting from trading activities *per se*. One such pattern was profiteering by maritime trade office officials who consigned goods to maritime traders. Officials had been prohibited from engaging in maritime trade since the start of the Song, but in view of the fact that similar bans were issued repeatedly throughout the Song, there seems to have been no end to this practice (Fujita 1932: 389–392 [orig. pub. 1917]; Shi 1968: 127–128). There are also numerous examples of officials who were

impeached for having engaged in trade. For instance, according to the biography of Zhang Jian 張鑑 in the *Songshi* 宋史 277, Zhang Jian, who served as prefect of Guangzhou from 998 to 1000, was subsequently impeached for having consigned private goods to a trading vessel. Although the truth of the affair is not known, such stories would have circulated precisely because involvement in trade by officials in Guangzhou was entirely plausible.

An extension of this is the emergence of Song maritime traders who worked their way into the organization of a maritime trade office and themselves obtained a post as an official. The most famous example is Pu Shougeng 蒲壽庚, whose case was taken up by Kuwabara.<sup>25)</sup> In addition, there is the example of Zhang You 張佑, supervisor of the Quanzhou Maritime Trade Office, who was impeached in 1126 for having acted against the public good and pursued private gain. He had originally been a “large merchant in Quanzhou.”<sup>26)</sup> He was presumably either a maritime trader or a large merchant who had dealings with maritime traders, and he was probably appointed because of his practical knowledge gained through his involvement in trade. Many more maritime traders would no doubt have been found among clerks whose names have not been recorded. Utilizing their positions as trade administrators, they were able to engage in trading activities under advantageous conditions. During the Yuan, the appointment of merchants or members of their families as officials administering maritime trade and sea transport was no longer eschewed, even as a matter of principle, and officials were quite openly involved in trade. Typical examples are the former pirates Zhu Qing 朱清 and Zhang Xuan 張瑄 and the Yang 楊 clan of Ganpu 澱浦 (Uematsu 2004; Chen 2005: 238–261 [orig. pub. 1995]).

### III. Maritime Traders and Middlemen

Among the people with whom maritime traders had dealings, there were, apart from officials of maritime trade offices, brokers or middlemen (*yaren* 牙人, *yakuai* 牙儈, *shikuai* 市儈), i.e., merchants who acted as commission agents. According to an anecdote from the Southern Han of the Ten Kingdoms period, the junk master Haji al-Hamid (Heji Luohami 何吉羅洽密) was on friendly terms with the Guangzhou broker Xu Shen 徐審 and, loath to part with him, presented him with a valuable aromatic called “hawk’s-beak incense” (*yingzi xiang* 鷹觜香).<sup>27)</sup> It is thus evident that through their dealings brokers also had close personal relationships with

maritime traders. During the Song and Yuan maritime traders were required to nominate a guarantor when travelling overseas, and in many cases brokers took on this role, being called *baozhi yaren* 保識牙人, *yabaoren* 牙保人, or *boyaren* 舶牙人 (Liao 1990). Guarantors would in many cases have been chosen from among the trader's business partners. It was inefficient for maritime traders, who brought large quantities of goods into port, to then sell them retail once they had been landed, and it was natural for them to make contact with brokers who could accept large quantities of goods at one time and put them into the distribution network. There was surprisingly little separating brokers from maritime traders, as is illustrated by the example of the wealthy merchant Yang Erlang 楊二郎 of Jiankang 建康, who started out as a broker and then made a huge fortune through repeated overseas trips.<sup>28)</sup>

Since the second half of the eleventh century, during the Northern Song, many brokers had been recruited by government agencies for economic affairs, and they were known as *guanya* 官牙 (Miyazawa 1998: pt. 1, chap. 4 [orig. pub. 1980, 1981]). In order to carry out the administrative duties associated with trade, the state authorities needed to organize to some extent brokers who possessed knowledge and networks relating to trade. Brokers played an important role also in trade at official frontier markets (*quechang* 榷場) located along land borders, and details of their role in maritime trade offices can be found in a study by Liao Dake (1990), according to whom they were in charge of grading cargoes, checking their content, pricing, and so on, and they also supervised maritime traders. Further, after having discharged these "official duties," brokers also entertained the maritime traders. A Yuan source describes how an inspection was conducted by a broker after a maritime trader had berthed his ship and then a banquet was held at the broker's home,<sup>29)</sup> and relations between traders and brokers would have been strengthened on such occasions.

Also important were those who operated warehouses and inns, which were known variously as *kedian* 客店 (inn), *didian* 邸店 (inn-cum-warehouse), and *tingta* 停塌 (warehouse). Since maritime traders needed facilities where they could stay and store their goods after they had been landed, they inevitably formed close relationships with the operators of such facilities. For instance, a large number of inns were concentrated in the Baojian district (Baojian *ying* 抱劍營) in Hangzhou, and they had close connections with maritime traders from Fujian and Guangnan.<sup>30)</sup> In 1072 the Japanese monk Jōjin 成尋 arrived in Hangzhou on board the ship of

the merchant Ceng Ju 曾聚 from Nanxiongzhou 南雄州, and with an introduction from Ceng Ju he stayed at an inn run by Zhang Bin 張賓 in the Baojian district.<sup>31)</sup> It is not known whether Ceng Ju also stayed there, but this would have been an inn with which he had close connections. Again, when the Quanzhou maritime trader Yang Ke 楊客 arrived in Hangzhou in 1140, he stored aloeswood, camphor, strings of pearls, etc., inside a storehouse belonging to Old Tang 唐翁 in the Baojian district and stored scented cloth and sappanwood outside the storehouse.<sup>32)</sup>

The operators of such inns, where goods tended to accumulate, often also acted as commission agents (Shiba 1968: chap. 5). It has been pointed out by others that innkeepers sometimes organized brokers as subcontractors, and there were instances in which brokers also operated inns (Miyazawa 1998: pt. 1, chap. 4). Innkeepers and brokers were thus closely related. It has also been pointed out that in Mingzhou during the 1250s a Japanese merchant who had lost his ship took up lodgings in the home of a broker and incurred enormous debts.<sup>33)</sup> It is likely that Japanese merchants who had lost their assets through shipwreck and so on accumulated debts in lodging expenses as they awaited the departure of other ships bound for Japan. These brokers probably operated inns for maritime merchants.

Information on the roles of brokers and innkeepers in long-distance trade, though not maritime trade, can also be gleaned from the *Nogŏltae* 老乞大, a Korean textbook for learning Chinese that dates from the Koryŏ period. During the Yuan, a Korean merchant arrived in Dadu 大都 (Khanbaliq), wanting to sell fifteen horses. The owner of the inn where he was staying accordingly invited a broker and two merchants and provided a venue for the transaction. The Korean negotiated over the price of the horses with one of the merchants, named Zhang Wu 張五, and suggested a price of 120 *ding* 錠 of silver in “exchange vouchers” (*jiaochao* 交鈔), a form of paper money, which was rejected by Zhang Wu. The broker Ma Er 馬二 then intervened and proposed 85 *ding* in accordance with the market rate. The Korean refused to accept this price, and in the end they agreed on 90 *ding*. Ma Er then stamped a seal on the exchange vouchers paid by Zhang Wu, guaranteeing their quality (and promising to exchange any that might not be able to be used), drew up a deed, received a commission from the Korean merchant, and undertook to pay the commercial tax that he had received from Zhang Wu to the appropriate government office.

In this case the innkeeper provided a venue for negotiations between

the Korean merchant and the Dadu merchants, while the broker closed the deal between the two parties, took a commission, and also acted as guarantor. There would also have been instances in which innkeepers and brokers would have been charged by merchants to sell their goods or would themselves have bought them. For example, the aforementioned Zhang Bin was entrusted by Jōjin with 3 small taels of alluvial gold and 100 taels of mercury, and eleven days later he handed over 13 *guan* 貫 to Jōjin,<sup>34)</sup> by whom he had presumably been asked to sell the alluvial gold and mercury.

Returning to the story recorded in the *Nogōltae*, the horses turned out to be sick, and so Zhang Wu, paying a fee for cancelling the contract, eventually returned them to the Korean merchant. Initially Zhang Wu had intended to take the horses to the south and sell them there at a profit. For the Korean merchant it was more efficient to sell all the horses together to a merchant who had a market within China. The innkeeper too said, "It would be the same if you took them to the market. As they say, 'It's better to sell wholesale all at once than sell loose a thousand times.' It's quicker and easier to sell them all together to these men." This would have been the same in the case of maritime trade, and in order to sell large quantities of goods efficiently it was necessary to put the goods that had been brought to port into a domestic distribution network, for which purpose contact with brokers and innkeepers was essential. At the same time, maritime traders who provided opportunities for large transactions were also important clients for brokers and innkeepers.

For maritime traders, their relations with brokers and innkeepers possessing points of contact with domestic distribution networks would have been even more important in illicit trading, which was difficult to conduct openly. In about 1258 Wu Qian 吳潛, coastal military commissioner for Mingzhou, submitted a memorial urging a halt to the collection of taxes and official trade in Japanese gold, and he mentioned the harmful effects this was having.<sup>35)</sup> According to his memorial, each year Japanese merchants were conducting large-scale transactions, but among the goods that they brought with them gold could not be sold to other people. In other words, being subject to a government monopoly, it was a target to taxation and official trade. Thus, when a Japanese merchant was enticed by a broker who said temptingly that he would sell the gold for him secretly because there was a government ban, he would believe the broker and hand over the gold. Such brokers would probably have been *guanya* employed by the maritime trade office. On receiving the gold, the broker

would hide it and threaten the Japanese merchant, saying that Song laws were strict, and so the merchant would return to Japan feeling aggrieved. Wu Qian is here describing a problem that was occurring at the time, and since he provides concrete details, his account is probably based on complaints by Japanese merchants or on facts that came to light in the course of the exposure and investigation of such incidents. These were cases in which brokers defrauded Japanese merchants, and it can be assumed as a precondition of such cases that illicit trading by maritime traders was frequently conducted with brokers acting as intermediaries.

In the above we have considered relations between maritime traders, maritime trade office officials, brokers, and so on in trade administered by maritime trade offices during the Song period. Maritime traders sought to ensure trade profits through illicit trading, concealment of goods, etc., and they tried to make certain of their profits by presenting maritime trade office officials with gifts and colluding with them. When compared with contemporary Southeast Asia and West Asia, the maritime trade office system of the Song would appear to have been operated in a strict and open manner,<sup>36)</sup> but in reality there was considerable scope for personal ties of friendship to intrude. Maritime traders also had close connections with brokers and innkeepers, and through these connections they secured access to domestic markets, including illicit trading.

The movement of goods in trading ports took place on the basis of the above relationships. The cargo carried by a trading ship was divided as follows: (1) the portion concealed by the trader (goods for illicit trading), (2) the unofficial share for trade administrators in the form of gifts, (3) the portion taken by the government and provincial government offices in the form of taxes and government purchases, (4) the share for investors paid in the form of dividends, and (5) the trader's official share. Apart from the goods used directly by these people, the greater part of these goods was put into domestic commodity distribution networks through brokers and innkeepers.

#### **IV. A Comparison of Trade Administered by Daizaifu and by Maritime Trade Offices**

In the above I have touched on collusion between maritime traders and trade administrators and on traders' contacts with domestic distribution networks, and next I wish to compare this situation with other regions in the area in which Song maritime traders conducted their business. In

this respect, Japan is a good target for comparison, since next to Song China it has the best corpus of extant source materials. Here, I wish to focus in particular on the nature of trade administered by Dazaifu in the mid- and late Heian period, corresponding to the Northern Song. Trade between Japan and Song China at this time was administered chiefly in China by the Mingzhou Maritime Trade Office and in Japan by Dazaifu, and a comparison of the two should be meaningful.<sup>37)</sup>

With regard to collusion between maritime traders and trade administrators, reference can be made to a letter addressed to a Chinese named Zheng Shisi 鄭十四 by the governor of Dazaifu, included at the end of vol. 2 of the *Unshū shōsoku* 雲州消息, a collection of model letters compiled by Fujiwara no Akihira 藤原明衡 in the middle of the eleventh century. In this letter, the governor thanks Zheng Shisi for his gifts of figured brocade, parrots, etc., and informs him that he will send him some black and red rice as provisions for his sojourn in Japan and also that there is someone who is desirous of some books. One can discern here a personal relationship between a maritime trader and a Dazaifu official mediated by gifts. In 1085 questions were raised about the fact that directives from the Council of State in Kyoto ordering maritime traders to leave Japan were not being followed because Dazaifu officials, swayed by personal feelings, were giving preferential treatment to foreigners.<sup>38)</sup> This hints at a situation in which Dazaifu officials, colluding with maritime traders, were according them preferential treatment. Further, Watanabe Makoto (2012: chap. 7, 229–230 [orig. pub. 2009]) has pointed out that Song maritime traders formed personal relationships with Dazaifu governors or provincial governors by having audiences with them. Maritime traders built up personal relations with Dazaifu officials just as they did with maritime trade office officials and thereby sought to gain guarantees regarding their trading activities.

One difference between Japan and Song China, on the other hand, was that when a ship arrived from China, it was allowed to engage in trade only after its arrival had been reported by Dazaifu to Kyoto and permission had been granted by the emperor following discussions with senior court nobles. The Dazaifu governor himself concurrently held the position of a senior court noble. Thus, in Japan relations with power holders in the central government were just as important as relations with Dazaifu officials, and consequently Song maritime traders often tried to make approaches with gifts not only to Dazaifu officials but also to senior court nobles. Specifically, it is known that ties mediated by gift-giving and cor-



respondence existed between Fujiwara no Michinaga 藤原道長 and Ceng Lingwen 曾令文, Fujiwara no Yorimichi 藤原頼通 and Zhou Liangshi 周良史, Fujiwara no Sanesuke 藤原實資 and Zhou Wenyi 周文裔, and Fujiwara no Yoronaga 藤原頼長 and Liu Wenchong 劉文冲. Especially in the case of Ceng Lingwen, reflecting Michinaga's wishes, he was granted permission to trade even though he had violated the regulations governing the frequency of visits by maritime traders, and a background factor in his treatment is thought to have been his relationship with Michinaga (Mori Katsumi 2008: 126 [orig. pub. 1948]).

The Dazaifu governor, like maritime trade office officials, sometimes engaged in trade by consigning goods to maritime traders. For instance, in 1026 Zhou Liangshi arrived in Mingzhou as an envoy of Dazaifu, and it is to be surmised that Fujiwara no Korenori 藤原惟憲, vice-governor of Dazaifu, lay behind this. Again, when the monk Myōhan 明範 arrived in the Liao in 1091 claiming to be a tribute ambassador from Japan, it seems that he was sent by Fujiwara no Korefusa 藤原伊房, acting governor of Dazaifu, on a ship belonging to the Song maritime trader Liu Gun 劉琨 (Hara 2006: 138–141).<sup>39)</sup>

Of course, relations between Dazaifu governors and maritime traders did not always go smoothly, and sometimes they clashed over their share of the cargo. In 1073 disciples of the monk Jōjin, who had gone to China to study, returned to Japan with gifts from China, and in 1077 200 bolts of coarse silk fabric and 5,000 taels of mercury were sent as return gifts to Mingzhou on a ship of the Song trader Sun Zhong 孫忠. On this occasion he was also carrying goods belonging to Fujiwara no Tsunehira 藤原經平, vice-governor of Dazaifu, and upon his return to Japan he seems to have met with trouble from Tsunehira regarding the allocation of profits. Sun Zhong tried to lodge a complaint with a messenger who had come from Kyoto, but met with interference from Tsunehira. His complaint was later taken up in Kyoto, and Tsunehira was subjected to questioning.<sup>40)</sup>

The above examples concern relations between maritime traders and trade administrators. But what about the traders' contacts with domestic distribution networks? Dazaifu secured as goods to be purchased through official trade that portion of a ship's cargo required by the central government or declared by the trader, and the rest was allowed to be sold through private trading. Considerable numbers of people seem to have come to purchase goods when they heard that a Song ship had arrived.<sup>41)</sup> As was the case in trade administered by maritime trade offices in China, Song maritime merchants would have needed to have contacts with do-

mestic distribution networks in order to sell their goods efficiently. Since the merchant class in Japan was not yet differentiated into specialized occupations, it is difficult to point to the existence of specialist middlemen involved in trade similar to the brokers and innkeepers of Song China, but it is possible to note the existence of people who had links with Song maritime traders and distributed their goods within Japan. Next, I wish to examine this point.

Mention has already been made of the maritime trader Li Chong from Quanzhou, who arrived in Japan in 1105, and there has been preserved a record of the investigation carried out by Dazaifu officials into the circumstances of his arrival.<sup>42)</sup> Li Chong had previously come to Japan in 1102 as a crewman on the ship of the Song maritime trader Zhuang Yan 莊嚴, but in 1104 Zhuang Yan was ordered to leave Japan, and Li Chong too was compelled to leave. On this occasion Li Chong had lent some of his personal goods to some Japanese, and before leaving Japan he tried to retrieve them, but the Japanese absconded without returning them. It was in order to recover these goods that Li Chong maintained that he had returned to Japan in 1105. This could be regarded as an excuse to justify his visits to Japan in successive years in violation of the regulations governing the frequency of visits by traders (Mori Kimiyuki 2008: pt. 2, chap. 2, 206 [orig. pub. 2004]), but he had prepared a list of debtors, and the Japanese to whom he had lent the goods seem to have actually existed. Judging from the fact that he had prepared a list, it may be assumed that there were a considerable number of debtors, not just one or two people.

These Japanese are said to have borrowed rather than purchased the goods in question. What could this mean? The act of borrowing goods from Song maritime traders can also be seen in other sources. For example, in 1104 monks from the temple Daisenji 大山寺 in Dazaifu borrowed “articles of people from the Song” and filed an application with Dazaifu for some undertaking.<sup>43)</sup> The “articles of people from the Song” were probably used as bribes for Dazaifu officials.

The *Konjaku monogatari shū* 今昔物語集 includes a tale about Sadashige 貞重, a man of wealth and power in Chikuzen 筑前, where Dazaifu was located. This Sadashige has been identified with Hata no Sadashige 秦定重, a Dazaifu official who lived in the early eleventh century.<sup>44)</sup> Sadashige was about to leave for Kyoto and, needing some gifts for Fujiwara no Yorimichi and some personal acquaintances, he borrowed “six or seven thousand (scribal error for ‘sixty or seventy’?)” bolts of fabric from a Chinese with ten good swords as security. Later one of his attendants acquired

a pearl in exchange for a robe on board a ship at Yodo 淀, a river port near Kyoto, and after Sadashige returned to Kyushu he presented this pearl and recovered the swords previously given in security for his loan.

The reason that Sadashige is said to have “borrowed” the fabric is that the swords which he deposited with the Chinese in return for some of his goods were a form of security, and it would have been agreed that a final settlement be made when Sadashige returned the original goods or articles of an equivalent value to the Chinese at a later date. But since the fabric was intended as gifts, it is unlikely that it would have been returned as it was, and even if it had been, there would have been no gain for the Chinese. The contract had probably been one in which Sadashige agreed to repay the Chinese by delivering to him domestic goods of equivalent value to the fabric with added interest, and in the event he repaid the Chinese with a pearl. As far as the Chinese was concerned, this was the same as exchanging the fabric for the pearl, but during the grace period when he was waiting to be repaid by Sadashige, this was expressed as “borrowed” rather than “bought.” Further, the Chinese obtained as security ten swords, which were Japanese export goods, and even if Sadashige had been unable to repay him, he would still have been able to reckon on some profit.

In this fashion, people who had contacts with Song maritime traders were sometimes entrusted with goods and granted a period of grace until the final settlement of accounts. In the example of Sadashige, the Song trader was able to acquire a valuable Japanese product in the form of a pearl, a commodity that was circulating in the capital region around Kyoto. In the case of Li Chong, his lending of goods to Japanese probably refers to a similar act, and the fact that he was unable to recover his goods before his departure may indicate that some of the Japanese had left Kyushu before the deadline for the settlement of accounts.

Daisenji and Sadashige represented entities with the greatest financial means in and around Dazaifu, namely, temples and Dazaifu officials, but their connections with the capital region are also worth noting. In the case of Daisenji, following active approaches from Hieizan 比叡山, the head temple of the Tendai 天台 sect located to the northeast of Kyoto, it became a branch temple of Hieizan in the late eleventh century.<sup>45)</sup> In the case of Sadashige, it is clear that he had ties with Fujiwara no Yorimichi, who was at the time wielding power in Kyoto as the emperor’s guardian. Both had contacts with temples and nobles in the capital region, whose demands for imported goods were the greatest. A large proportion of the

goods obtained from Song maritime traders are thought to have headed for the capital region in the form of gifts (as in the case of Sadashige and Yorimichi), but at the same time there were many opportunities for Song traders to obtain expensive domestic products circulating in the capital region. It is to be surmised that Song maritime traders lent goods to people able to provide links between Hakata or Daizaifu and the capital region and acquired goods circulating in the capital region as payment for their loans.

Not only were the places of residence for Song maritime traders restricted to the *kōrokan* 鴻臚館, originally an official guesthouse for foreign envoys, and Hakata port, but from the late tenth century onwards payment for goods sold through official trade was made in the form of a provincial tax (*kanmotsu* 官物) levied on Kyushu, over which Dazaifu had jurisdiction (Watanabe 2012: chap. 5 [orig. pub. 2002]). Consequently, when Song maritime traders desired goods from outside Kyushu, it was important for them to have contacts with the capital region, where goods from throughout Japan gathered. Toda Yoshimi (1991: chap. 9, 211 [orig. pub. 1976]) has posited on the basis of the example of Daisenji the existence around this time of “Chinese merchants’ usury capital,” and it is to be surmised that Song traders did not merely lend goods, but by doing so they also caused goods to circulate widely and managed to acquire goods from distant parts of Japan. In trade administered by maritime trade offices Song maritime traders were able to put goods in bulk into domestic distribution networks through intermediaries such as innkeepers and brokers, but because there were no corresponding entities in Japan, they lent goods individually to Japanese and, as in the case of Li Chong, drew up lists of people to whom they had made loans.

Although they are not clearly mentioned in historical sources, first to come to mind among those who would have borrowed goods from Song traders are naturally Japanese merchants. A merchant by the name of Hachirō no Mahito 八郎真人 appears in the *Shin sarugōki* 新猿樂記 by Fujiwara no Akihira, thought to have been composed in the 1050s to 1060s. He was an itinerant merchant who ranged from the Tōhoku 東北 region in the north to the island of Kikainoshima 貴駕之島 south of Kyushu, and he would have been an ideal person for Song traders to entrust with their cargo goods. The goods in which he dealt were divided into “Chinese goods” and “Japanese goods,” the former consisting of aromatic wood, materia medica, ceramics, and fabrics, and these would have included articles purchased or loaned from Song traders. Mention is made of vari-

ous “Japanese goods” too, including gold, mercury, and sulphur, which were Japan’s principal exports, and they could also be used as payment for “Chinese goods.” Hachirō no Mahito is of course a fictional character in a work of literature and not a real person, but there would have been merchants who could have served as models.

Hachirō no Mahito’s father Uemon no Jō 右衛門尉 is said to have lived in the Ukyō 右京 district of Kyoto, and many of the itinerant merchants appearing in sources from this period were based in Kyoto and the surrounding area (Gomi 1988: 129–131). They are said to have “borrowed one thing in a nearby town and headed to a distant province to make a threefold gain,” and they took goods borrowed in the vicinity of Kyoto to distant regions, where they sold them at a high return.<sup>46)</sup> That being the case, it can be readily supposed that there were merchants who borrowed goods from Song traders in Hakata and then sold them in Kyoto and its environs (and of course elsewhere too if there was a demand).

In order to ensure the sale of goods, it was useful to enter into contracts beforehand with customers able to take large quantities of goods, and Ishii Masatoshi (1998: 193–195) speculates that such relationships would have existed already in the ninth century. It can also be confirmed that by the time of the Southern Song Japanese were entrusting Song traders with trading capital (Enomoto 2007: pt. 1, chap. 2 [orig. pub. 2001]). Song maritime traders had contact with distribution networks within China through brokers and innkeepers and with distribution networks within Japan through Dazaifu officials, temples and shrines, itinerant merchants, etc. At the time, there had developed in Japan and Song China a structure whereby people belonging to different distribution networks in China, the East China Sea, and Japan made profits by consigning goods to each other.

### Concluding Remarks

In the above, I have drawn attention to two noninstitutional aspects of trade administered by maritime trade offices and Dazaifu. The first was relations mediated by gift-giving between maritime traders and trade administrators (maritime trade office officials in Song China and Dazaifu officials and power holders in central government in Japan), and the second was the sale of goods through intermediaries possessing networks covering wide areas (brokers and innkeepers in Song China and Dazaifu officials, temples and shrines, itinerant merchants, etc., in Japan). These

two points can be applied to quite broad regions throughout the world in premodern commercial transactions. For example, in insular Southeast Asia during the seventeenth century Europeans were often exempted from anchorage fees or able to have them reduced by making gifts to local rulers (Reid 1993: 218–219). It has been pointed out that in the case of European ships arriving in Japan around the same time the Dutch East India Company used on average 5.65% of its annual trade earnings in the years 1642–60 for gifts (Katō Eiichi 1998: chap. 12 [orig. pub. 1987]).

As an example of intermediaries in the sale of goods one can cite the existent of *toi* 問 in medieval Japan. Originally they were in charge of transporting the annual tribute of landed estates (*shōen* 莊園) and also managed the warehouses for storing the crops produced by landed estates and undertook to sell the crops, but by the Muromachi period they also engaged in the general sale of commodities and were even involved in the innkeeping business and acted as middlemen in commercial transactions. When outside merchants came to do business in a town, it was general practice for them to stay at an inn run by a *toi* and either conduct their business transactions through the *toi* or entrust retail sales to him. The presence of *toi* has been ascertained in the principal ports throughout Japan, including those where overseas trade was conducted, such as Hakata, Sakai 堺, Hyōgo 兵庫, Obama 小濱, and Takase 高瀬 (Toyota 1952). In the Islamic world there were facilities called *khān*, *funduq*, etc., where outside merchants stayed, stored their goods, and were introduced to middlemen (Satō 1981: pt. 1, chap. 2 [orig. pub. 1969]; Yajima 2006: pt. 4, chap. 1). Insofar that they combined the functions of inns, storage facilities, and business intermediaries, these were all similar to the *kedian* and *didian* of Song China.

In short, trade as administered by both the maritime trade offices of Song China and Dazaifu in Japan developed, each under its own historical conditions, distinctive elements in the areas of the trade administration system and so on, but at the same time both possessed elements universally seen in premodern large-scale commerce.

## Notes

- 1) This article is an expanded version of an earlier article published in Japanese and entitled “Sōdai shihakushi bōeki ni tazusawaru hitobito” 宋代市舶司貿易にたずさわる人々 [People involved in trade administered by maritime trade offices during the Song], in *Minatomachi in ikiru* 港町に生きる [Living in port towns], vol. 3 of *Shirizu minatomachi no sekaishi* シリーズ港町の世

- 界史 [Series on the world history of port towns] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten 青木書店, 2006).
- 2) A basic study of the maritime trade office system during the Song is that by Fujita Toyohachi (1932: 281–398 [orig. pub. 1917]), which made use of the *Song huiyao jigao* for the first time. Similar ground is covered by the Taiwanese Shi Wenji (1968), but in content his study is a little better organized and more detailed than Fujita's. In mainland China many monographs have been published on maritime trade during the Song and Yuan periods, including those by Chen Gaohua and Wu Tai (1981), Gao Rongsheng (1998), and Huang Chunyan (2003).
  - 3) This certificate of passage was cited by Mori Katsumi (2008: 27–31 [orig. pub. 1948]) as a valuable example of such a certificate from the Song period. In the past there was, however, no reliable transcription of the *Chōya gun-sai*, and there were problems with the text. Recently Kabe Takahiro (2011) has produced a new text of this certificate based on the collation of several manuscripts, and I have used his text.
  - 4) Koryō broke off relations with the Song after offering tribute in 1030, and consequently the Song authorities prohibited maritime traders from going to Koryō. It is not clear when this travel ban was imposed, but it is mentioned in the *Qingli bianchi* 慶曆編勅, a collection of imperial decrees from the years 1028–43 (Su Shi 蘇軾, *Su Shi wenji* 蘇軾文集 31, “Qi jin shanglǔ guo waiguo zhuang” 乞禁商旅過外國狀). Later, as part of the active foreign policy pursued during the reign of Shenzong 神宗, tribute from Koryō to the Song was revived in 1071, and in 1079 the travel ban to Koryō was lifted. But once the Old Laws faction gained power after Shenzong's death, travel to Koryō was again banned in 1090, and when the New Laws faction returned to power the ban was again lifted in 1094 (Kondō 2009: pt. 3, chap. 5 [orig. pub. 2001]).
  - 5) According to the *Koryō sa* (“Sega”) and *Koryō sa chōkyō*, the Chinese who visited Koryō during this period were Lin Qing 林慶 (1079, 1081), Yang Zhen 楊震 (1081), Li Yuanji 李元積 (1081), Chen Yi 陳儀 (1082), Xu Jian 徐戢 (1087), Fu Gao 傅高 (1087), Yang Zhu 楊註 (1089), Xu Cheng 徐成 (1089, 1090), and Li Zhu 李珠, Yang Fu 楊甫, and Yang Jun 楊俊 (1089).
  - 6) According to the *Koryō sa* (“Sega”) and *Koryō sa chōkyō*, the Chinese who visited Koryō during this period were Lin Ning 林寧 (1068, 1075), Yang Congsheng 楊從盛 (1069, 1077), Wang Ning 王寧 (1069), Guo Man 郭滿 (1071), Yuan Ji 元積 (1071), Wang Hua 王華 (1071), Xu Man 許滿 (1071), and Lin Qing (1077).
  - 7) *Taigai kankeishi sōgō nenpyō* 對外關係史總合年表 [Comprehensive chronological table of the history of Japan's relations with other countries] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1999).
  - 8) Su Shi, *Su Shi wenji* 31, “Qi jin shanglǔ guo waiguo zhuang.”
  - 9) *Song huiyao jigao* 140-29, entry for Tianxi 天禧 2/11.
  - 10) *Jiannan yilai xinian yaolu* 建炎以來繫年要錄, entry for Shaoxing 紹興 29/2/jichou 己丑.
  - 11) It has been pointed out that an exception to this was the years 1090–94,

when the ban on travel to Koryō was reimposed, and travel restrictions were in effect during this time (Kondō 2009: pt. 3, chap. 5; Hara 2006). Factors behind this were probably the fact that the issue of travel to Koryō was receiving serious attention, as can be seen in Su Shi's passionate arguments, and the fact that with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Song and Koryō the Song was able to request the cooperation of Koryō in exercising control over maritime traders.

- 12) Bao Hui, *Bizhou gaolie* 敝帚藁略 1, “Jin tongqian shensheng zhuang” 禁銅錢申省狀. This report has been discussed in detail by Sogabe Shizuo (1949: 161–172) and Shiba Yoshinobu (1992: 17–18). It is not known when it was drafted, but since the title is accompanied by a note identifying the author as “Guangdong fiscal commissioner,” it was presumably written when Bao Hui was serving as fiscal commissioner of Guangdong. According to Bao Hui's biography in the *Songshi* 421, he served first as administrative assistant to the fiscal commissioner (*zhuan yun panguan* 轉運判官) of Guangdong and provisional military commissioner (*quan jinglüeshi* 權經略使) and then held in succession the posts of bureau executive in the military appointments process (*shiyou langguan* 侍右郎官), vice-minister in the Court of Judicial Review (*dali shaoqing* 大理少卿), and judicial commissioner (*tidian xingyushi* 提點刑獄使) of Zhexi 浙西. Further, in 1251 he was appointed fiscal vice-commissioner of Guangdong (*Yongzheng Guangdong tongzhi* 雍正廣東通志 26; possibly an error for administrative assistant to the fiscal commissioner) and in 1254 judicial commissioner of Zhexi (*Songshi quanwen* 宋史全文, entry for Baoyou 2/6/jiaxu 甲戌). The report written during his term as fiscal commissioner of Guangdong would have been written around this time.
- 13) That there already existed a regulation concerning the mandatory inspection of merchant ships by specially commissioned officials prior to their departure in order to prevent the outflow of copper coins can be ascertained in the *Song huiyao jigao* 86-21 (Shaoxing 11/11), 166-142 (Jiading 嘉定 10/11/29), etc.
- 14) *Jiannan yilai xinian yaolu*, entry for Shaoxing 13.
- 15) *Songshi quanwen*, entry for Baoyou 6/8/wuxu 戊戌. There has in recent years been published a punctuated text of the *Songshi quanwen* based on the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書 text (Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe 黑龍江人民出版社), but I have used the Ming edition.
- 16) *Da Yuan shengzheng guochao dianzhang* 22, “Hubu” 8: “Shibo,” article 17 of the 23-article “Shibo zefa”; *Tongzhi tiaoge* 18, “Shibo” 10.
- 17) Liu Kezhuang 劉克莊, *Houcun xiansheng da quanji* 後村先生大全集 159, “Song tongpan” 宋通判.
- 18) *Hongzhi Wenzhou fuzhi* 弘治溫州府志 17, “Yishi” 遺事: “Fanhang” 蕃航.
- 19) Han Yu 韓愈, *Han Changli quanji* 韓昌黎全集 33, “Tang zhengyi dafu shangshu zuocheng Konggong muzhiming” 唐正議大夫尚書左丞孔公墓誌銘.
- 20) Hong Mai 洪邁, *Yijianzhi* 夷堅志, book 3, fasc. 6, “Wang Yuanmao ju'e” 王元懋巨惡.
- 21) *Song huiyao jigao* 86-33, entry for Kaixi 開禧 3/1/7.
- 22) Zhen Dexiu 真德秀, *Xishan xiansheng Zhen Wenzhong gong wenji* 西山先生真文



- 忠公文集 43, “Tiju libu Zhaogong muzhiming” 提舉吏部趙公墓誌銘。
- 23) Liu Kezhuang, *Houcun xiansheng da quanji* 168, “Xishan Zhen Wenzhong gong” 西山真文忠公。
  - 24) Yu Ji 虞集, *Daoyuan leigao* 道園類稿 43, “Shunde lu zongguan Zhanggong shendao bei” 順德路總管張公神道碑; Enomoto 2007: pt. 2, chap. 1.
  - 25) Pu Shougeng is thought to have been a Muslim maritime trader living in Quanzhou, and indignant at having had his sea junks requisitioned by the Song imperial household which, pursued by Yuan forces, had fled to Quanzhou, he entered into secret communication with the Yuan. According to Kuwabara (1989: 213), he served as supervisor of the maritime trade office in Quanzhou for thirty years until 1276. Since the supervisor of a maritime trade office was replaced every three years, and it can be confirmed that there were other supervisors of the Quanzhou Maritime Trade Office in the 1250s and 1260s, it is questionable whether he served as supervisor of the maritime trade office for thirty years (Li 1979: appendix 3; Dohi 1979), but it is probably true that he held an official position in the maritime trade office in the late Song.
  - 26) Li Guang 李光, *Zhuangjianji* 莊簡集 8, “Lun Ceng Yu deng zhazi” 論曾紆等劄子; *Jingkang yaolu* 靖康要錄, entry for Jingkang 1/3/23.
  - 27) Tao Gu 陶穀, *Qingyilu* 清異錄 2, “Xunliao men” 薰燎門: “Yingzi xiang” (*Quan Song biji* 全宋筆記 1-2).
  - 28) Hong Mai, *Yijianzi*, suppl. 21, “Guiguo mu” 鬼國母。
  - 29) Ren Shilin 任士林, *Songxiangji* 松鄉集 4, “Song Ye Boji xu” 送葉伯幾序。
  - 30) Shiba Yoshinobu (1988: pt. 1, chap. 4, 348 [orig. pub. 1984]) describes the Baojian district in Hangzhou as “a quarter for people from Fujian and Guangdong.”
  - 31) Jōjin, *San Tendai Godaisan ki* 參天台五臺山記, entries for Xining 熙寧 5/4/16–5/3, 6/5.
  - 32) Hong Mai, *Yijianzi*, book 4, fasc. 6, “Quanzhou Yang Ke” 泉州楊客. See also Kato Shigeshi 1952: chap. 20 (orig. pub. 1938).
  - 33) Wu Qian 吳潛, *Xuguogong zouyi* 許國公奏議 4, “Zou gei zaofeng woshang qian-mi yi guang chaoting rouyuan zhi wen yi wu haifang mi you guanxi” 奏給遭風倭商錢米以廣朝廷柔遠之恩亦於海防密有關係。
  - 34) Jōjin, *San Tendai Godaisan ki*, entries for Xining 5/4/22, 5/3.
  - 35) *Kaiqing Siming xuzhi* 開慶四明續志 8, “Juanmian choubo wojin” 蠲免抽博倭金: “Wu Qian zouzhuang” 吳潛奏狀。
  - 36) For example, Ibn Battuta comments as follows on the confiscation of the entire cargo in fourteenth-century Quanzhou when goods were found to have been concealed: “This is a kind of extortion I have seen in no country, whether infidel or Muslim, except China” (Gibb and Beckingham 1994: 893). It is to be surmised, however, that this passage is based not on Ibn Battuta’s own experiences but on hearsay (Yajima 2002: 311–321).
  - 37) On the legal system governing trade administered by Dazaifu, see Tajima 1995; Yamauchi 2003: pt. 2, chap. 2 (orig. pub. 1993); Watanabe 2012. References to the legal system governing trade administered by Dazaifu are, unless stated otherwise, based on these works.

- 38) *Chōya gunsai* 5, “Chōgi” 朝儀 2, “Jin no sadame” 陣定: “Daizaifu gonjō su Dai-Sōkoku shōkyaku Ō Zui (Wang Rui), Ryū Sō (Liu Cong), Tei Sai (Ding Zai) tō sanrai no koto” 大宰府言上大宋國商客王瑞・柳恩・丁載等參來事.
- 39) Zhou Liangshi and Liu Gun violated the Song’s prohibition against posing as state envoys and its travel bans, noted in section 1. Illegal behaviour by maritime traders was sometimes carried out with the cooperation of power holders at their destination.
- 40) *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編, entries for Xining 10/11/9, Yuanfeng 元豐 1/1/25 & 2/6; Minamoto no Tsunenobu 源經信, *Sochiki* 帥記, entries for Jōryaku 承暦 4/4/21, 5/27, int. 8/14 & 9/20; Minamoto no Toshifusa 源俊房, *Suisaki* 水左記, entry for Jōryaku 4/int. 8/14.
- 41) *Ruijū sandai kyaku* 類聚三代格 19, “Masa ni shoshi no okkan shite watakushi ni karamono wo kau wo kin’atsu subeki no koto” 應禁遏諸使越關私買唐物事.
- 42) *Chōya gunsai* 20, “Ikoku”: “Dai Sōkoku shōkyaku no koto” 大宋國商客事.
- 43) *Sanjūgo monjū* 卅五文集, official communication from provincial law-enforcement official (*kebiishi* 檢非違使) dated 1st month of Chōji 長治 2.
- 44) *Konjaku monogatari shū* 26, no. 16, “Chinzei no Sadashige no jūsha Yodo ni oite tama wo kaietaru koto” 鎮西貞重從者於淀買得玉語. See also Kamei 1995: 118.
- 45) Shūin 宗胤 and Shingon 信嚴, who borrowed the “articles of people from the Song,” were monks acting in concert with a messenger sent by Hieizan to exercise effective control over Daisenji (Toda: 1979: 212–223) and had especially close connections with Hieizan.
- 46) *Honchō zoku monzui* 本朝續文粹 2, “Hen’i shitsueki kikin tōzoku tō no koto” 變異疾疫飢饉盜賊等事.

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