

# The Elements of Concealment in Ryukyuan Diplomacy between Japan and China in Early Modern Times\*

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## Introduction




Figure 1. An Illustration from the “Illustrated Tale of Furugōri Hachirō’s Shipwreck” in *Ryūkyū Nendaiki*

Figure 1 is an illustration which appeared in a chronicle of the Ryukyu Kingdom entitled *Ryūkyū Nendaiki* 琉球年代記, published in Japan in 1832, and was inserted into the vignette, “Illustrated Tale of Furugōri Hachirō’s 古郡八郎 Shipwreck.”<sup>1)</sup> The title in the upper right hand corner reads, “Furugōri Hachirō shaves the heads (*sakayaki* 月代) of the Ryukyuan [aboard ship].” The term “*sakayaki*” refers to the standard male Japanese hairstyle in the premodern era, in which the head is shaved from the

forehead to the tip of the skull and leaving the remaining hairline in the form of a bowed-out crescent. The figure with the Japanese traditional topknot (*chonmage* 丁髷) and “*sakayaki*” is probably Furugōri Hachirō himself, and the newly shaven figure in the bow of the ship, the figure being shaved, and the two figures with long hairpins through round topknots and without “*sakayaki*” are no doubt the Ryukyuans in question. From the pleasant expression of the Ryukyuans, there seems nothing coercive about the barbering.

The account accompanying the illustration may be summed up as follows.

Once upon a time, a Japanese by the name of Hachirō went adrift in the ocean and was cast upon the shores of the Ryukyu Islands. The king of Ryukyu ordered four of his subjects to return Hachirō to Japan, but alas, that ship also went adrift and was cast upon the shores of Ming China. Suddenly the faces of the Ryukyuan sailors turned forlorn. “Being a small, wretched kingdom, we have hidden our relations with Japan from the Chinese. If things go the way they are, our relations with Japan will be exposed, we will be executed and our kingdom will also run into terrible trouble,” they lamented. Upon hearing this, Hachirō came up with a plan. They would disguise themselves as Japanese by shaving their heads into the Japanese topknot (*chonmage*) style, donning Japanese clothing and assuming Japanese names. The Ryukyuans jumped for joy at such a unique and marvelous suggestion, then got down to the task of shaving their heads in the “*sakayaki*” style and inventing new names—Kōki 孝貴 becoming Kōhachi 孝八; Ikuma 伊久麻, Inosuke 伊之助; Miriji 美里二, Michitsugu 道次; Nakoya 那古称, Kosuke 古助—before going ashore and consequently being rescued as stranded Japanese sailors and sent home safely [sent to Japan and returning home to Ryukyu later].

The illustration therefore depicts the scene of the four Ryukyuans having their hair shaved for the purpose of landing in China disguised as Japanese.

This short tale was written by Ōta Nanpo 大田南畝 (1749–1823), a well-known author of the late Tokugawa Period who wrote under the pen name of Shokusanjin 蜀山人. He was a Tokugawa Shogunate vassal who worked at the functionary office in the foreign trade port of Nagasaki (*Nagasaki Bugyōsho* 長崎奉行所) and was extremely knowledgeable in foreign

affairs. A postscript added to the story by the author states, “This account of a castaway was selected for the tomfoolery exhibited by Ryukyuan in trying to pull the wool over Ming Chinese eyes with *sakayaki* hairstyles.” Given this comment and the nature of the illustration, the main theme of the story was Ryukyuan comically disguising themselves as Japanese by having their hair shaved, aiming at offering early modern Japanese readers a remarkable and amusing tale.

This was not simply a yarn, or an attempt at wit, but was based on facts. We can actually verify in historical records some cases similar to *Ryūkyū Nendaiki*.<sup>2)</sup> For example, in 1714, a ship from Satsuma 薩摩 Domain (present day Kagoshima 鹿兒島 Prefecture) on its way back from a voyage to Ryukyu was cast adrift onto the shores of China.<sup>3)</sup> Before landing, two Ryukyuan crew members hired in Naha 那霸, by the names of Kinjō 金城 and Goya 吳屋, used a kitchen knife to shave their hair in Japanese style and Japanized their names to Kin’emon 金右衛門 and Goemon 吳右衛門. In response to questioning by the Chinese authorities, the ship’s captain, a native of Satsuma, lied about having weighed anchor in Ryukyu, stating they had gone adrift while sailing into Kagoshima Bay from the port of Yamagawa 山川 in the south of Satsuma, all in order to conceal Satsuma’s relations with Ryukyu from the Chinese.

Again, in 1815, when another Satsuma ship heading from the island of Amami Ōshima 奄美大島 to Kagoshima was washed ashore in China, the two islanders aboard again cut their hair and Japanized their names to disguise their identities.<sup>4)</sup> Although Amami Ōshima was at that time part of the Satsuma Domain under the Tokugawa Shogunate, before Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu it had been part of the realm of the Ryukyu Kingdom, adopting Ryukyuan customs, including both names and hairstyles, customs which remained unchanged under Satsuma rule. It is interesting to note that aboard that same ship was a Satsuma samurai by the name of Furuwatari Shichirō 古渡七郎, which is very similar to the Furugōri Hachirō of the *Ryūkyū Nendaiki*, suggesting that Ōta Nanpo’s tale was based on this 1815 incident.

### 1. The History of the Ryukyu Kingdom and its Relations with Japan and China

The question obviously arises as to why people from the Ryukyu Islands, Amami and Satsuma would want to hide Ryukyu’s relations with Satsuma (i.e. Japan) from China, called “the Ming” in the sources, but

already under the rule of the Qing Dynasty at that time. Before examining this question, I will review the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom and its relations with both China and Japan.<sup>5)</sup>

It was around the 12th century when the Ryukyu Islands began to be formed into a kingdom. Then in the late 14th century, that kingdom entered into tributary relations with the Ming Dynasty, newly formed in 1368. The head of the kingdom as a tributary, or vassal, of the Ming emperor was required to pay regularly scheduled tribute with the dispatch of both diplomatic envoys and goods, and in return was invested by the emperor with the title of king of Ryukyu formally. Another benefit of investiture was permission to conduct foreign trade with China, called the “tributary trade.” As the result of setting up such relations, the Ryukyu Kingdom was able to obtain huge amounts of Chinese-made goods and to engage in a royally managed *entrepôt* trade which connected China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. From the beginning of the 15th century, Ryukyu began enjoying its commercial prosperity under the relative stability of the Ming world order.

This period of flourishing trade, however, came to an end in the 16th century, as Ryukyu began to feel the political and economic impact of 1) the conspicuous decline of the Ming Dynasty and 2) movements to unify the Japanese archipelago. Finally, in 1609, just after the establishment of the Tokugawa regime, the Shimazu 島津 Clan, the feudal lords of Satsuma Domain, were allowed by the Shogunate to launch an armed invasion of Ryukyu with the result that Ryukyu was defeated, was brought under Satsuma’s control and ultimately subsumed under Tokugawa rule. That being said, in ruling Ryukyu, the Shogunate adopted a policy that assumed the continuing existence of the kingdom as a tributary country of the Ming Dynasty,<sup>6)</sup> meaning that Ryukyu was not formally annexed to Japan, but rather was given a certain degree of autonomy as a foreign polity.

It was in this manner that from the Shimazu Clan’s military subjugation in 1609 until the Meiji government’s annexation of Ryukyu as Okinawa 沖縄 Prefecture in 1879, Ryukyu was a kingdom simultaneously subordinate to both China and Japan. Historians generally refer to the kingdom during this 270-year period as “early modern” Ryukyu, to distinguish it from “old” Ryukyu prior to that period. Unlike the widely diversified foreign relations engaged in by the “old” Ryukyu, the diplomacy of the “early modern” Ryukyu became limited to the two polities of China (Ming-Qing Dynasties) and Japan. In the case of the latter era, commu-

nications and commodity distribution between Japan and Ryukyu was strictly controlled by Satsuma domain, meaning that all Japanese persons entering or leaving the kingdom were to be male Satsuma officials and seamen with travel permits issued by the domain, and even they were not allowed to be permanently settled in Ryukyu. Consequently, for the overwhelming majority of Japanese, although under Shogunate rule, Ryukyu represented a remote, inaccessible country.




Figure 2. Comparative Map of the “Old” and “Early Modern” Ryukyu

On the other hand, during most of the “early modern” Ryukyu era, no official diplomatic relations existed between Japan and the dynasties of China, and the only relationship between the two was private foreign trade by Chinese commercial vessels frequenting Japanese ports, which was limited to the port of Nagasaki in 1635. Therefore, it can be said that early modern Ryukyu, having official diplomatic relations with both China and Japan, existed as the link in foreign relations between the two large polities.

## 2. The Origin and Nature of Concealment Diplomacy

It was in 1644 that the rapidly declining Ming Dynasty fell in the wake of a peasant uprising, giving way for the Qing Dynasty, founded by the Manchu people, to rule over China. After hearing of this transition of power, the Ryukyu Kingdom continued to pay tribute to the remnants of the Ming Dynasty, until the Qing Dynasty requested the kingdom to swear allegiance to it via envoys dispatched in 1649 and 1652, prompting Ryukyu to adopt a duplicitous policy of pleasing both Dynasties, finally leading to its investiture by the Qing Dynasty in 1663. Not only had the Tokugawa Shogunate approved this policy during the 1650s, but it had gone as far as to clearly indicate that Ryukyu relations with the Qing Dynasty were to formally take precedent over those with Japan, in order to avoid any possible friction between Japan and China regarding the former's hegemony over Ryukyu.<sup>7)</sup> Such an attitude on the part of the Shogunate also benefited Ryukyu, making it possible for Ryukyu to avoid any confrontations over its dual allegiance to China and Japan and thus ease and shield the obvious contradictions inherent in a vassal serving two lords simultaneously.

And so, while accepting Chinese rule, from the mid-17th century on, Ryukyu adopted the unique diplomatic approach of completely concealing its relationship with Japan from the Qing Dynasty and all of its fellow Chinese tributaries.<sup>8)</sup> In other words, the kingdom performed as a tributary country of the Qing Dynasty in the China-centered international society, while securely maintaining its relationship with Japan behind a one-way mirror which kept the Chinese in the dark.

Although the particulars surrounding the initiation of this diplomacy are not very clear, from an admonition in 1649 issued by Satsuma to Ryukyu, stating, "it would not be wise for Ryukyuan and Japanese to appear like acquaintances in front of the Tartars (Manchus)," and another reminder issued in 1664 to the Ryukyuan tributary envoys sent to the Qing dynasty "not to allow Satsuma's rule over Ryukyu to become a topic of rumor in China," it is clear that the policy was very probably implemented at Satsuma's initiative.<sup>9)</sup> Moreover, it was probably the Shogunate's decision to give priority to Ryukyu-Qing relations in order to avoid any possible friction with China that exerted a good deal of influence on Satsuma's leading role and cooperative attitude towards the concealment policy.

Notwithstanding, even with Satsuma's initiative and cooperation, the

main actor in the implementation of the policy was the Ryukyu Royal Government in Shuri 首里, for it was this institution which was at the greatest risk of being castigated by the Qing Court for duplicity in serving both Japan and China, and thus responsible for strictly implementing concealment, whether in a spontaneous or proactive manner. The characteristic features of the Shuri Government's concealment policy were threefold: 1) keep its relationship with Japan hidden from all parties in and related to Qing China, 2) make every effort to keep the Qing Court convinced that Michinoshima (the modern Amami Islands) were Ryukyuan possessions, when in fact they had been annexed by Satsuma in 1611 and 3) when all else failed, to refer to the affairs of Japan as those of "Takarajima 寶島."

The term "Takarajima" of 3) refers to islands of Shichitō 七島 (i.e. Tokara トカラ Archipelago)<sup>10)</sup>, a chain of islands located between the Satsuma Peninsula and the Amami Islands, which were managed jointly by the Shimazu Clan and the Shuri Royal Government until its complete annexation by Satsuma as a result of Satsuma's invading Ryukyu.<sup>11)</sup> In concrete terms, whenever a Chinese investiture envoy visited Ryukyu, an official serving as proxy for the Satsuma-appointed local manager over Shichitō used to go to Naha, the main port of Ryukyu, and have a formal interview with the envoy as the representative of the Ryukyuan islands of Shichitō.<sup>12)</sup> That is to say, even though in practical terms Shichitō was governed and administered by Satsuma, when meeting envoys from China, this official presented only the view of Ryukyuan lordship over the islands (which overlapped Satsuma's administration). This practice was put into effect in 1683 when the arrival of the second Qing investiture envoy necessitated a group of Satsuma officials and ship captains to meet the envoy in the guise of the proxy of the manager of Shichitō; however, their appearance in Japanese attire with *chonmage* coiffures did not convince the envoy, who then refused to accept their tribute offerings.<sup>13)</sup> Although the words of the head envoy Wang Ji 汪楫—"Such a hideous appearance was nothing resembling Ryukyuan custom... Someone said they might be *woren* 倭人 (Japanese)"<sup>14)</sup>—are not all that explicit, it seems that he had seen through this "Shichitō" delegation's ruse.

A few years later the Shuri Royal Government became genuinely and independently engaged in the concealment policy and subsequently fabricated what we call here the "Takarajima rhetoric," misrepresenting Shichitō as follows;

Since these islands were so poorly endowed and the Ryukyu King-

dom was unable to provide for itself, it had compensated for the deficiency by trading with Joseon, Japan, Siam and Java in the past... Later [after the Shimazu Clan's invasion of 1609], its contacts with some foreign polities came to an end and it was again unable to support itself, until fortunately merchants from the Japanese-held islands of Tokara sailed to Ryukyu to trade and supply a deficiency for it. This is why we [Ryukyuan] call Tokara "Takara-jima" [Treasure Island] (*Chūzan Seifu* 中山世譜, rev. ed. 1725).

Though this passage is contained in one of the Ryukyuan official histories, *Chūzan Seifu* revised in 1725, the original edition, published in 1701, does not contain this account.<sup>15)</sup>

Also forced by the trouble with Wang Ji to change their tack, in 1719 when the third Qing investiture envoy came to Ryukyu, Satsuma Domain strictly forbade any Japanese (Satsuma subjects) from appearing before any more Chinese envoys to Ryukyu,<sup>16)</sup> resulting in the complete concealment of all persons and ships of Satsuma origin from sight of Chinese delegations.<sup>17)</sup> For example, whenever an investiture envoy arrived at the port of Naha, the approximately 20 Satsuma officials stationed there to oversee Ryukyu would relocate to a nearby village in order to avoid being spotted.

The mid-18th century was marked by the Shuri Royal Government issuing a series of measures concerning concealment diplomacy,<sup>18)</sup> in particular what to do about incidents involving castaways—namely, Ryukyuan being cast adrift in Chinese waters (shores), and Chinese or Koreans in need of return through Chinese channels, being cast adrift in Ryukyuan waters (shores)—for such incidents were far different from the normal diplomatic process, in that they were unpredictable international events in which anyone could be involved. Therefore, anyone not thoroughly versed in the craft of diplomacy could easily disclose the secret. In the pages that follow, we will focus on the character of such castaway incidents as "serious risks to divulging the true nature of Ryukyu-Japan relations" in order to clarify more fully the interrelationship between the concealment policy and the international situation on the ground and its domestic implications, while at the same time, examining the historical significance of diplomacy under concealment for foreign relations among Ryukyu, Qing China and Japan.



### 3. Concealment Diplomacy and Ryukyuan Cast Adrift in Chinese Waters

As far as we can know from historical records, it was in 1721 that the Ryukyuan Royal Government first enacted provisions concerning subjects who happened to be cast away on Chinese shores, and these provisions were reissued in the document “Tō hyōchakusen kokoroe” 唐漂著船心得 (Precautions concerning castaways in Chinese waters). Then in 1785, a set of provisions were issued entitled “Goryōgoku no fune Tō hyōchaku no gi ni tsuki shimarikata” 御領國の船唐漂著之儀に付締方 (Action to be taken regarding ships of the realm bound for China cast adrift). Provisions in these documents, which were issued to all Ryukyuan subjects regardless of their social ranks and positions, related to the concealment of Ryukyuan-Japan relations and included stipulations 1) to refrain from divulging anything about relations with Japan if cast adrift in Chinese waters, 2) to immediately incinerate or sink any item, including coins, that may indicate relations with Japan and 3) to transcribe any written Japanese document, date or name containing Chinese characters into Japanese script (*kana*), which was thought to be undecipherable for the Chinese reader.

In 1753, an ordinance entitled “Tabiyuki kokoroe no jōjō” 旅行心得之條々 (Articles concerning precautions to be taken when traveling abroad) was issued to the officials dispatched to Satsuma and Sakishima 先島 (Yaeyama 八重山 and Miyako 宮古 Islands located at the southernmost end of Ryukyu) and a revised and expanded version of the ordinance was issued in 1759 to the envoys sent to China. Both versions were issued to members of the Ryukyu’s aristocratic class (*shi* 士, as opposed to *nō* 農, i.e. subjects). The latter portions of these, titled “Tō e hyōchaku no toki harshō no jōjō” 唐江漂著之時晴様之條々 (Articles regarding the reasonable excuses of being cast adrift in Chinese waters), contained detailed examples of possible scenarios in which doubts could be raised about relations with Japan and how to respond to those doubts. For example, in the case of a Ryukyuan envoy dispatched to Satsuma being castaway in Chinese waters, the proper response was determined as “I am an inspector who engaged a merchant ship out of Takarajima to investigate the welfare and safety of the people, and while on the way to an inspection tour of Tokunoshima 徳之島 of the Amami Islands, the ship was cast adrift.” In the case that a castaway ship was carrying silk goods purchased in China to Satsuma, the response was to be “Since there has

been a shortage of Takarajima merchants ships [at Naha] this season, I hired one to sail from here [Naha] directly to Takarajima to trade.” In the case of a castaway ship carrying silver, the vital commodity of the tribute trade to get Chinese goods, from Satsuma (It was necessary for Ryukyu to obtain Japanese silver via Satsuma since they had no silver mines), the response was to be “We have just returned from Takarajima where we traded silk thread, bolts of cloth and other local products for the silver aboard.” Finally, if the castaway ship had any Japanese (Satsuma) passengers aboard, the response was to be “Due to a small ship from Takarajima being shipwrecked and washed up onto the shores of Sanhoku 山北 (northern Ryukyu), we were in the process of transporting [the Takarajima castaways] to Chūzan 中山 (central Ryukyu).” The provisions also included the people of the Amami Islands as “Ryukyuan,” who if aboard a Japanese ship cast adrift in Chinese waters were to explain, “We are natives of one of the thirty-six islands that make up the Ryukyu Kingdom. We made use of a merchant ship sailing out of Takarajima on our way to conduct official business in Chūzan.” This “how-to” practical guide to concealment measures based on the “Takarajima rhetoric” also included instructions for all Ryukyuan castaways aboard Japanese vessels in Chinese waters to disguise themselves as Japanese. In other words, the story from the *Ryūkyū Nendaiki* cited at the beginning of this article was not only based on historical fact, but also in accordance with the official diplomatic policy of the Ryukyu Kingdom.

The Ryukyuan aristocracy was also schooled in concealment measures. There were civil service examinations (*kōshi* 科試 or *kō* 科) in Ryukyu, modeled after the Chinese system except that only candidates for lower level bureaucratic offices were examined, and at times five or six hundred examinees competed for only a handful of positions.<sup>19)</sup> Among the questions asked on current affairs, the equivalents of *cewen* 策問 (questions on the policy) in the Chinese civil service examination (*keju* 科舉), were examples of actual castaway incidents in need of concealment tactics, requiring the examinees to apply the correct “Takarajima rhetoric” to each case. Therefore, it seems that the “Takarajima rhetoric” and its successful utilization were subjects studied habitually by every aristocrat who dreamed of passing his civil service examination with flying colors.

It is also apparent that those Ryukyuan who were in fact cast adrift in Chinese waters took seriously their responsibility under royal command to conceal their kingdom’s relationship with Japan, based on this author’s exhaustive survey of incidents involving vessels cast adrift on their way

to and from Satsuma, of which not a single one when questioned by the Qing Dynasty authorities as to their points of departure and destination answered truthfully, preferring to cite the Amami Islands or “Takarajima” or any other place besides Satsuma (Japan). For example, according to testimony recorded by the Qing authorities regarding a Ryukyuan vessel cast adrift in the Jiangnan region in 1761, among the ship’s cargo were “burnt fragments” of the Japanese work *Jirin Kōkan* 字林綱鑑.<sup>20)</sup> Here we encounter a case of castaways caught in a life-threatening maritime emergency still bent on following Ryukyuan royal orders to “immediately burn all items that may indicate any relationship with Japan.” Although unable to conduct a thorough cover-up, according to the Ryukyuan sources, despite the perplexity expressed by the Qing authorities in sifting through fragments of evidence, a Ryukyuan official stationed in China managed to allay their doubts, thus avoiding a major incident; and as a matter of fact, there is no Qing Dynasty record of the documents found being regarded as problematic.

While these cases of Ryukyuan castaways show us that the basic concealment policy regarding all Ryukyuan castaways of “hide all evidence and keep your mouth shut” seems to have been widely followed, cases involving the practical application of the Takarajima rhetoric, circulating among the aristocracy, are extremely rare. Rather than an image of Ryukyuan strictly following direct orders from the kingdom, it would probably be better to attribute the motivation behind such universal strict concealment more to a personal fear among castaways of “something terrible” happening to them if some relationship between Ryukyu and Japan were discovered on their watch. On the other hand, those rhetorical techniques studied by the aristocracy were probably more important for success on the civil service examination and personal upward mobility in Ryukyuan society than of any practical diplomatic use in dealing with China.

The necessity for concealing Ryukyu-Japan relations from Qing’s eyes was recognized among the people of Satsuma to some extent, as shown in an incident in 1741 in which the captain of a castaway Satsuma vessel with two Ryukyuan subjects aboard hid the fact from the Chinese authorities that the ship was headed to Ryukyu. However there is the case of another Satsuma vessel cast adrift in 1853 revealing its destination as Ryukyu, which raised doubts, at least in this writer’s mind, as to what extent the people of Satsuma domain were aware of and privy to the concealment policy.

Moreover, it is quite possible that perceptions concerning such a policy beyond Satsuma borders were not very firm. For example, in the case of the 1741 incident where the castaways were eventually sent to Nagasaki and questioned by the Shogunate functionary there, before being returned to Satsuma, the Satsuma authorities reported in a correspondence to the deputy stationed at Edo Castle (*rusui-yaku* 留守居役) as follows;

Because it is mainly Satsuma vessels which serve as transportation for Ryukyu, owing to the shortage of large ships there, we have employed Ryukyuan sailors whenever our sailors are not available at Ryukyu, and our relations with Ryukyu have been kept secret as far as China. Though these are longstanding practices (*arikitrukoto* 有來事), it is the opinion of the Nagasaki functionary that if the Shogunate were to finally learn of it, they would become suspicious. That is why he questioned us [Satsuma domain] in detail and forwarded his findings to the Shogunate.

In other words, while Satsuma was well inured to the usual practice of concealing relations with the Ryukyus from China, the Nagasaki functionary was concerned whether the Shogunate had yet to hear of it or not, showing clear asymmetry in the knowledge regarding “business as usual” in Ryukyu between Satsuma and the Shogunate’s Nagasaki functionary and its headquarters in Edo.

#### 4. Chinese and Korean Castaways in Ryukyuan Waters and the Issue of Concealment

It goes without saying that as a tributary of the Qing Dynasty, the Ryukyu Kingdom was bound to rescue and protect any Chinese castaways discovered in its waters and safely return them and their vessels home. This same obligation had to be fulfilled when dealing with castaways from the Joseon Dynasty, a fellow Qing tributary. There was a short period of time, however, at the beginning of the early modern period, during which castaways in Ryukyuan waters were first sent to Japan with requests for their return to either Korea or China; but with the establishment of the Qing’s world order, this practice was abandoned in favor of the full adoption of the above-mentioned concealment policy.

Concerning the treatment of castaways, we have a source entitled “Shinkō sekkōsen Tōjin tsūsen Chōsenjin jōsen Nihon taryōjin jōsen

kaku hyōchaku narabini hasen no toki Yaeyamajima zaiban yakuyaku kinshokuchō” 進貢・接貢船、唐人通船、朝鮮人乗船、日本他領人乗船、各漂著并破船時、八重山島在番役々勤職帳 (Duty ledger of the officials stationed on the Yaeyama Islands regarding various incidents of tributary ships, Chinese cargo vessels, Korean crew ships and vessels carrying Japanese from other domains being cast adrift or shipwrecked), which was issued to the officials on Yaeyama Islands in 1816; in the section “Tōjin jōsen Chōsensen hyōchaku tsukamatsuri sōrō toki no kuji” 唐人乗船朝鮮船漂著仕候時之公事 (Incidents involving castaway Chinese and Korean crew ships), we find a directive being issued, stating, “It is forbidden for castaways to be shown any Japanese information, such as era and personal names... it is forbidden for Yamato 大和 (Japanese) song to be sung in the presence of castaways.” A similar directive also existed in the Miyako Islands, which were paired with the Yaeyama Islands as the southern remote islands of the kingdom. However, no such standing directive issued to maritime officials can be found regarding the main island of Okinawa, since in the case of such disasters there, Shuri Royal Government officials, already well-versed in the rules of concealment, would be dispatched with direct orders from the king to the scene of the incident, thus making the preparation of such a standing directive superfluous.

Chinese and Korean castaways were isolated in compounds of temporary huts with guards at the entrances, the main one of which was the Tomari-mura 泊村 compound (present-day part of Naha city). While Figure 3 shows the compound enclosed by a stone wall with a grass hut residence and guard post<sup>21</sup>), Figures 4 and 5 show only the stone wall surrounding an empty enclosure, lending a startling contrast between when there were castaways present and when there were not.





Figure 3. Chinese castaways at Tomari-mura 泊村 as depicted in the screen *Ryūkyū kōekikō zu byōbu* 琉球交易港圖屏風 stored at the Urasoe Art Museum



**Figure 4.** The same point as that shown in Figure 3, in the screen *Ryūkyū bōeki zu byōbu* 琉球貿易圖屏風 stored at the Archival Museum, Faculty of Economics, Shiga University, the motif and composition of which is very similar to the screen *Ryūkyū kōekikō zu byōbu*.



**Figure 5.** The same point as that shown in Figure 3, in the screen *Ryūkyū kōekikō zu byōbu* 琉球進貢船圖屏風 stored at the Kyoto University Museum.

Of course, whenever there was a castaway incident on the main island of Okinawa, the Tomari-mura staff and local residents were bound by detailed orders issued by the Royal Government “not to show any Japanese era or personal names or coins to the Chinese, nor sing any Japanese songs.” And of course, all Japanese (Satsuma) personnel stationed in the Ryukyus were kept away from the compound.

That being said, Japanese were not completely excluded from participation in handling foreign castaways, for one of the duties of Satsuma samurai officials stationed at Naha to supervise Ryukyu was to “oversee

the coming and going of foreigners,” and in the case of castaways, to “investigate and ascertain that there are no dangerous characters.” These duties are referred to in the related sources as either *mitodoke* 見届 (inspection) or *miwake* 見分 (identification).

Though I could find only four examples (one involving Chinese, three Korean) among historical sources which gave a detailed description of the *mitodoke* or *miwake*, here I will show them in chronological order.

The first, dated the 19th day, 3rd month of 1742, concerns the Untenmura 運天村 castaway compound on northern Okinawa, where Chinese castaways transferred in from Amami Ōshima Island were taken out of the compound for a stroll under the pretext of “walking exercise for their health.”<sup>22)</sup> Waiting in a nearby dwelling were two Satsuma officials sent from Naha for their *mitodoke* duties, dressed in Ryukyuan outfits and observing the neighborhood through a bamboo blind. They soon spotted the Chinese castaways out for their stroll and observed their demeanors, thus performing their *mitodoke* duties in the most perfunctory and simple manner imaginable.

In contrast, things got a lot more farcical during a *mitodoke* assignment about 50 years later on the 1st day, 5th month of 1794 in the case of a group of Korean castaways detained at Tomari-mura.<sup>23)</sup> On that day, some Satsuma officials left their office headed for the residence of Iha Peechin 伊波親雲上, where they planned to “inspect” the castaways, deciding to avoid the direct route to their destination that passed close to the compound, for fear of detection, taking instead a rather circuitous detour (Figure 6). As soon as the officials were positioned behind a bamboo blind, the Korean castaways were led out of the compound under the pretext of “walking exercise for their health,” and while the group was passing the Iha residence, a Ryukyuan official stepped out into the road and announced on cue, “I am the master of this house. Some of my female relatives, hearing that a group of Koreans were going out for a walk today, asked if they may not be invited in for tea and smoking tobacco.” Thus the Koreans came inside for a respite, being observed behind the blind by the “women” i.e. Satsuma officials in the completion of their *mitodoke* duties.

The “female relatives behind the blind” ploy derives from the East Asian custom of women of high standing avoiding direct face-to-face contact with males other than their kin on social occasions.<sup>24)</sup> In Ryukyu as well, the custom was prescribed for women belonging to the aristocracy, the Royal Government going as far as to encourage its women to veil




Figure 6. Route taken by the Satsuma officials in the occasion of mitodoke



(*koromo kaburi* 衣被り) themselves in public.<sup>25)</sup> Therefore the government managed to have the Satsuma officials disguise as women who did not cause any suspicion about not making appearance before the guests, by utilizing its own ideal image of women, which nearly overlapped with that commonly accepted in East Asia. As a matter of fact, one former Korean castaway who had been so “inspected” while detained in Naha in 1802 wrote,<sup>26)</sup>

One day, the interpreters took us out to a house, where the blinds were drawn while we were served tea and smoking tobacco. The men and women of the house were splendidly dressed. Upon inquiring as to the reason for the visit, we were told that the wife of a high official had wanted to see us up close.

This record verifies another ingenious trick and effect in the array of measures devised to conceal relations between Ryukyu and Japan from their mainland neighbors.

The term *miwake* was used in 1856 in the case of Korean castaways identified by the exact same “women behind the blind” ploy, down to the scripted invitation. Furthermore, in the 1844 case of Chinese castaways, as the result of a pre-negotiated agreement between the Royal Government and the Satsuma supervisors that there was nothing especially suspicious about the detainees, the *miwake* procedure would be omitted, although it was also decided to go ahead and report to the Satsuma authorities that in fact a *miwake* process had been completed. In other words, Satsuma’s supervision of Ryukyu was in the beginning adhered to merely as a formality, then gradually tended to hollow out in actual practice.

This all brings up the question of whether or not any encounters actually occurred between foreign castaways and Japanese (exclusively Satsuma male officials) during the period in question. Let us begin to reply with an incident recorded by pioneer Okinawalogist<sup>27)</sup> Iha Fuyū 伊波普猷 (1876–1947) in his *Okinawa rekishi monogatari* 沖縄歴史物語 (Historical tales of Okinawa).<sup>28)</sup>

Around the middle of the 18th century, a Chinese ship was cast adrift that led to its crew to being detained in the Tomari-mura in Naha and a prohibition being imposed on any Japanese passing through the neighborhood. Nevertheless, one day a Satsuma samurai by the name of Matsumoto Hikoemon 松元彦右衛門<sup>29)</sup> was spotted by the

detainees unwittingly passing by the facility in Japanese attire with a hat woven of sedge (*sugegasa* 菅笠) and a “hunting” style costume (*kariginu* 狩衣). After being informed of this egregious incident, the Royal Government met to deliberate how to respond, deciding that several Ryukyans dressed like Matsumoto would drop into the Chinese compound and say, “We were on our way boar hunting, when we decided to drop by on the way to see what Chinamen really look like. The man you saw yesterday is a member of our group that departed for the hunting grounds early.” Thus they put on an act to cover up the truth.<sup>30)</sup>

In our day and age such an incident would seem rather ridiculous, but in fact there is no evidence that either the Ryukyans or the Satsuma officials among them regarded it as laughing matter. That is to say, taking such pains to protect secrecy was for both groups, caught between China and Japan, one piece of common sense within a commonplace way of looking at international affairs. However, there is no doubt that the average Japanese at that time did not share such common sense or view about the outside world. As shown by the way Ōta Nanpo dealt with the concealment policy in his story introduced at the beginning of this article, it was the kind of trivia that could only have bewildered, amused and even shocked the average person on the street in Tokugawa Japan.

Among a lot of writing about Ryukyu done during that time by Japanese from places other than Satsuma, we find more discoveries of, and consequent surprises at, Ryukyu concealment policy. However, no matter how weird such measures seemed to such “outsiders,” not one bothered to pay attention to why Ryukyu, serving two masters in China and Japan, would go to such seemingly ridiculous lengths in hiding its relationship with Japan from China in particular. In other words, very little thought was given by Japanese in general to the fact that the Ryukyu Kingdom was fully inured to the fact of serving two masters and that as to the inter-relationship between the two sets of vassalage relations, the Tokugawa Shogunate considered the Qing-Ryukyu set to take priority. Possibly it is a conventional way that the Japanese people in those days generally understood the international situation around Ryukyu.

## 5. The Misinformed: Qing China and the Concealment Policy

Despite the monumental efforts on the part of both the Ryukyu

Kingdom and Satsuma Domain to conceal their relationship, the Chinese caught on to the hoax relatively early on. For example, in an audience with Emperor Kangxi 康熙帝 (1661–1722) in 1683, Wang Ji, the second Qing investiture envoy dispatched to Ryukyu, asked,

The Ryukyu Kingdom has been frequenting various countries including Japan, which desire the benevolence of the Qing Court to be extended. If those countries express the wish to render tribute to the Court at Ryukyu, how are we to respond?<sup>31)</sup>

The Emperor replied, “Upon such a request, report it to the Ministry of Rites (Libu 禮部) for its consideration.” This exchange shows that at least at this stage, the Qing Dynasty was fairly certain of the existence of some kind of relationship between Ryukyu and Japan.

As mentioned above, after coming to Ryukyu, Wang Ji refused to accept the tribute offerings from Satsuma people posing as the Shichitō (Tokara) islanders. Though he just wrote, “someone said they might be *woren* (Japanese),” undoubtedly he penetrated the fact and the Ryukyuan Royal Government would know it, therefore shortly after this incident the Government became seriously involved in the concealment policy. It is notable that Wang Ji, on the other hand, pointed out Ryukyu’s inadequate acceptance of the Chinese “civilized” system such as the civil examination, which later led to the large-scale reforms of the kingdom system modeled on Chinese standard.<sup>32)</sup> It is highly probable that Wang Ji or Emperor Kangxi had some political intension or strategy to enhance Chinese influence on Ryukyu while indirectly restraining Japanese influence.<sup>33)</sup>

One of the most essential point is that the Qing Court deliberately avoid treating the fact, or the Ryukyu-Japan relations, as a major international incident. For example, according to the records of deputy investiture envoy Li Dingyuan 李鼎元, who visited Ryukyu in 1800, a member of his entourage noticed the use of the date “2nd year of the Genna 元和 Era” (1616 in Japan) and inquired if that referred to the era of the same name during the Tang Period. Li replied negatively, informing him that it was a Japanese date, stating, “it shows us that Ryukyu was formerly under Japanese rule, but these days Ryukyu avoids any reference to that fact.”<sup>34)</sup> Here Li treated Ryukyu-Japan relations as past events and made no further reference about them. These examples of circumvention and ambiguity suggest that officials such as Wang and Li knew the facts, but

made every effort to make as little to do about it as possible.<sup>35)</sup>

This kind of attitude on the part of the Qing Dynasty seems to be closely related to the way in which the traditional Chinese world order was supposed to function, for within that order, predetermined diplomatic procedures (payment of tribute to and investiture by China) were strictly followed, while at the same time recognizing other relations of subordination on the part of its tributaries, as long as such affairs did not interfere with China's ultimate authority.<sup>36)</sup> Under such conditions, even if Chinese investiture envoys became aware of Ryukyu-Japan relations while in Ryukyu, there would be no advantage to pursuing any details above what was deemed necessary. In other words, envoys' complicity in "concealment" by not delving into facts unrelated or possibly damaging to China's international stability was an important aspect in protecting the prestige of the Chinese emperor and avoiding unnecessary points of dispute.<sup>37)</sup> Therefore, one can conclude that the Ryukyu Kingdom's smooth implementation of its policy of concealment was in fact enabled by such an attitude on the part of the Qing Dynasty, identifying a third determining factor in the almost two-century long era of "business as usual" in a complex set of Chinese, Ryukyuan and Japanese foreign relations (in particular, the absence of tributary status on the part of Japan), to be added to 1) the Ryukyu Kingdom's painstaking, often comedic, efforts at concealment and 2) collaboration on the part of Satsuma Domain.

That is not to say that these three "complicit" parties played their respective roles fully conscious of some grand ideal demanding maintenance of the world order at all cost. To the contrary, the strongest incentives behind actual concealment behavior included saving one's own skin, blind obedience to the state and upward social mobility, a set of such purely selfish motives probably functioning as essential elements of relations among Ryukyu, Qing China and Japan and making a certain amount of contribution to the durability and longevity of this period of unusually untroubled international relations in the history of East Asia.

## **6. Concealment Policy and Modern Diplomatic Sovereignty**

However, this era of stability, involving Ryukyu, Qing China and Japan and supported by the above-mentioned concealment policy, would be shaken by the advance of the Western powers in earnest into East Asia, eventually shattering the premodern international order. Although Western sailing vessels had made their appearance in Ryukyu as early as

the late 18th century in search of discovery, adventure and fuel supplies, it would not be until around the time of the Opium War (1840–42) that Westerners, the most incessant of which were British and French, sailed and steamed into Ryukyu demanding open foreign trade, commercial treaties and permission to proselytize.

Since most of the Western countries were in some contact or relation with Qing China, the Ryukyu Kingdom, ever under the beck and call of Japan (Satsuma), decided to follow the tried and true custom of concealing its true relations from the new interlopers, introducing itself as a tributary country under the hegemony of the Qing Dynasty. Around the time of the conclusion of Ryukyuan treaties with the United States, France and the Netherlands during the 1850s,<sup>38)</sup> to which the Tokugawa Shogunate cast a blind eye, Samuel W. Williams, interpreter for Commodore Perry, the US plenipotentiary, recorded as follows,

In reference to Tuchara [the Tokara Islands; “Takarajima”] or Japan, they said that the trade with Satsuma was carried on mainly for the purpose of procuring rare and fine articles to carry with them to China when they took tribute to Peking. They wished to say nothing respecting the latter trade and evaded a reply when I asked them if they did not take tribute to Kagoshima [Satsuma] also. The admission of being tributary to China seemed to please them, rather than be a humiliation, and the real fealty they are in to Satsuma must be a sore subject and a grievous burden, or it would hardly be so mortifying to them to say aught respecting it.

This passage reveals his totally mistaken notion about why relations between the Ryukyus and Japan were being concealed from China.<sup>39)</sup> However, Williams’ statement does indicate some understanding of Ryukyu’s subordination to Japan on the part of the Westerners. Furthermore, in 1862 the Shogunate publicly acknowledged that subordination when asked by British Deputy Ambassador Edward St. John Neale, adding that at the same time, “it had posed no prohibition on the traditional custom [of paying tribute to China],”<sup>40)</sup> thus, despite Ryukyu’s efforts for concealment, gradually bringing into international light the Ryukyu Kingdom’s position of “serving two masters.”

It was amidst such international developments that Japan experienced regime change in 1868, on the strength of which the new Meiji Restoration Government decided to annex the Ryukyu Islands, first plac-

ing them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during October 1872 to be, albeit, still administered as a foreign territory, free to continue its existing relations with Qing China, on the one hand, but bound by the decisions of the Foreign Ministry in its diplomatic relations with the West. Of course, the Meiji Government was aiming to deprive Ryukyu of its entire diplomatic rights. To become a sovereign state in the modern international system, it was necessary for the Meiji Government to unify into itself the diplomatic routes and rights which composed a key element of the modern notion of sovereignty.

Then during the following year, a Japanese Naval vessel, dispatched to Ryukyu for geographical survey duties, sailed to the Yaeyama Islands via Naha, picked up four Filipino castaways stranded there and brought them back to Naha.<sup>41)</sup> Previously the conventional protocol for handling castaways from Southeast Asia, a very busy region of ports of call for Chinese merchant ships, was to return them to the Chinese, who would then return them home. However, in this case, the Foreign Ministry officials stationed in Ryukyu determined that the Filipinos fell under the definition of “contact with foreigners,” which was within the bailiwick of the Ministry, deciding despite strong Ryukyuan protest to transport the castaways to Kagoshima Prefecture (former Satsuma Domain).<sup>42)</sup> The opposition expressed by the Ryukyuan stemmed from anxiety on the part of the Royal Government that the incident may be discovered by Chinese nationals residing in Japan, who would then reveal to the Qing Court of the true nature of Ryukyu-Japan relations. However, the government’s appeal to allow conventional diplomatic negotiations to take their course fell on deaf ears.<sup>43)</sup>

What we can observe from Ryukyu demanding direct diplomatic relations with Qing China without Japanese involvement based on the long standing concealment policy is twofold: first, that Ryukyu still believed in the existence of its diplomatic autonomy based on the premodern diplomatic sense of East Asia, and second, that it was that concealment policy which ensured Ryukyu’s autonomy in its foreign relations. What should be especially noted in this respect is the Royal Government’s handling of the ships and cargoes of the Chinese castaways it rescued during the early modern era.<sup>44)</sup> The strict regulation imposed by the Shogunate over foreign trade had also affected Ryukyu, to the extent that while the Kingdom was still allowed to engage in the tributary trade with China, it had been forbidden from conducting commercial transactions with foreign castaways. Meanwhile, in Qing China an institutional framework had been

put in place for the relief of foreign castaways, which included reimbursement for their cargoes and ships valued in cash. Although there was no directive of any kind issued by the Qing Dynasty to Ryukyu, there was always the possibility that Chinese castaways would demand similar compensation on the grounds that Ryukyu were a Chinese tributary bound by its sovereign's institutions. Therefore, in order to continue its concealment policy, Ryukyu would not be able to refuse such a demand by citing sanctions imposed by Japan. Instead, the Kingdom decided to plead "the plight of being a small, wretched kingdom" as the reason for not paying compensation.

However, in the case of 1749, it seems that a group of Chinese castaways were not convinced by the "poverty" angle, as the Royal Government reported to the Qing Court that it had reimbursed them 350 silver tael for their vessel. That fact was then omitted from the copies of diplomatic documents sent to the Qing Court which Ryukyu were obligated to submit to Satsuma Domain, meaning that Ryukyu were also concealing information from Satsuma about their relations with China that were in violation of rules set by Japan. It was the original concealment policy of hiding Ryukyu-Japan relations from China that made it all possible, for under that policy, Japan (namely, Satsuma) would not be able to intervene directly in encounters between Ryukyu and castaways or in the Qing-Ryukyu relations as a whole. It was under such circumstances that a relative amount of diplomatic autonomy (in modern terms, "sovereignty") was enjoyed by Ryukyu in their dealings with China and the countries which had some relations with it.

Although both Ryukyu and Japan may not have been fully conscious of such a state of affairs, the actual situation on the ground proves that the concealment policy guaranteed Ryukyu a free diplomatic hand vis-a-vis Japan to some extent during the early modern era. Consequently, by eventually usurping that diplomatic autonomy the new Meiji Restoration Government in effect created the very conditions that allowed for Ryukyu's annexation.

## 7. Conclusion

Although nothing resembling the concept of territorial sovereignty clearly defining the borders of modern nation-states existed in premodern East Asia, there did exist perceptions of geographical borders between polities in the sense of, for example whether a given island belonged to

Ryukyu or to Japan. However such a territorial issue never arose at least between the Ming and Qing Dynasties and the Ryukyu Kingdom, and even in the case of Japan at the advent of its early modern era, after the annexation of the Amami Islands by Satsuma, the geographical borders separating Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, i.e. the north of Amami Islands belonged to Satsuma (Japan), were well-defined.

That being said, after regime change took place in China at the hands of the Qing Dynasty later in the 17th century, a different perception of the borders separating Japan and China strongly took hold of the Ryukyu Kingdom. One good example of such a perception is the account of Satsuma officials stealthily observing (*miwake*) foreign castaways from behind bamboo blinds. Such borders created by the measures taken by Ryukyu to conceal their relations with Japan (Satsuma) from the Qing Dynasty functioned first and foremost as a one-way mirror towards the Chinese. This mirror was kept in place through collusion on the part of Ryukyu and Satsuma and was made even more effective tacitly by the Qing Court. If so, what the Chinese saw in their public sphere of vision was a Ryukyu that was subordinate only to them.

Secondly, these borders also functioned as a wall preventing Japan (mainly Satsuma) from directly participating in the diplomatic affairs between Ryukyu and China and its other tributaries. In its Ryukyu governance policy, which allowed the Kingdom a great deal of autonomy, Satsuma went so far as to forbid the officials it dispatched to the Islands as supervisors from intervening in domestic affairs, ordering them to concentrate their efforts on the movement of foreign ships, personnel and materiel in and out of the Kingdom. Even within such a limited set of duties, there were still restrictions; namely, never to cross the bamboo blind boundary separating them from the foreign castaways they were supposed be inspecting (*mitodoke*) and identifying (*miwake*).

The narrow space between the bamboo blind and the castaway became an extremely important one for the Ryukyu Kingdom, for at those times when the rules imposed by Japan and those imposed by China were at loggerheads, the Kingdom would, as shown by the examples presented here, feign obedience to the Japanese rules, while coming up with adaptations for following the Chinese rules. What made this double dealing all possible was the very wall that the concealment policy constructed vis-à-vis the Japanese side. Within that very narrow, but completely inviolable, space, the Ryukyu Kingdom was able to maintain diplomatic autonomy, by which it was able to balance the contradictions between Japanese and



Chinese rules at its own discretion.

The concealment policy was the product of a sense of impending crisis on the part of both Japan and Ryukyu brought on by a potential threat posed by Qing China. That is to say, unlike the Ming Dynasty, which was well into decline at the end of the 16th century, when Japan was strengthening its political hold on Ryukyu, the Qing Dynasty, which rose up in the mid-17th century as a military behemoth led by a foreign race of people of unknown character, presented such a serious threat to Japan, that the Tokugawa Shogunate, in an attempt to avoid any friction with Qing China over control of Ryukyu, allowed the Kingdom to swear allegiance to the Qing Court in the 1650s and ordered Chinese rules to take precedence over any imposed by Japan from that time on. It was this sense of impending crisis and efforts to avoid confrontation that made it possible not only for the Ryukyu Kingdom to subordinate itself to two polities at once, but also to smoothly balance the latent contradictions that threatened to arise out such a political predicament. The Kingdom's concealment policy was a political device for further reducing the risk of incurring the wrath of the Qing Dynasty on account of its allegiance to Japan. The policy created both a virtual and real political boundary between Qing China and Japan, which the Kingdom presupposed, guarded fiercely and utilized to its fullest potential, thus making possible the stabilization of state governance between China and Japan, by providing a means to following rules imposed by both polities and balancing any contradictions arising from them, while at the same time creating an international arrangement among the three entities free of conflict.

### Notes

- \* I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Travis Seifman for his proofreading and useful suggestions.
- 1) Shūritsu Hawai Daigaku Hōrei Sōkan Hensan Inkaei 1981, pp. 396–397.
- 2) Watanabe 2012c (originally published in *Shigaku Zasshi* 史學雜誌 (Journal of the Historical Society of Japan), vol. 114-11, 2005). The present article is a revised and translated version of the above work.
- 3) Kagoshima-ken Ishin Shiryō Hensanjo 1974, pp. 701, Source No. 1810.
- 4) Ishii Kendō 石井研堂, coll., “Bunka 13 heishi, Sasshū hyōkaku kenbunroku” 文化十三丙子・薩州漂客見聞録 (Accounts of the Satsuma Castaways of the 13th Year of the Bunka Era), in Ishii 1900.
- 5) For a detailed outline, see Watanabe 2014a.
- 6) It was around that time that the Shogunate aspired to repair the damage done to Sino-Japanese relations by Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 豊臣秀吉 invasion

of the Korean Peninsula at the end of the 16th century, and to initiate an authorized trade between the two countries. For the realization of these two objectives the Shogunate intended for the Ryukyus, as an invested tributary of the Ming Court, to serve as an intermediate. (Watanabe 2012a).

- 7) Kamiya 1990a, p. 225.
- 8) In addition to Watanabe 2012c, the most informative research done to date on concealment diplomacy includes: Kishaba 1993 (first released in 1971); Kamiya 1990a (first released 1978); Kamiya 1990b; Kamiya 2013 (first released 2006); Tokunaga 2005a; Tokunaga 2005b.
- 9) Kamiya 1990b, pp. 261–262.
- 10) The seven islands of Kuchinoshima 口之島, Nakanoshima 中之島, Gajajima 臥蛇島, Tairajima 平島, Suwanosejima 諏訪之瀬島, Akusekijima 悪石島 and Takarajima (the present day Kagoshima Prefecture village of Toshimamura 十島村).
- 11) Kamiya 1990a, pp. 228–236 and Fukase 2004, pp. 89–92.
- 12) Kamiya 1990a, p. 232.
- 13) Wang Ji, *Shi Liugu zalu* 使琉球雜錄, vol. 2, and Ijichi Sueyoshi 伊地知季安, “Ryūkyū onkakarishū guan no oboe” 琉球御掛眾愚按之覺, in “Tenna 3 nen hichō nukigaki” 天和三年日帳拔書, in Kagoshima-ken Rekishi Shiryō Sentā Reimeikan 1999, p. 639.
- 14) Wang Ji, *Shi Liugu zalu*, vol. 2.
- 15) Kamiya 1990a, pp. 234–235.
- 16) Kamiya argues that it was Satsuma’s disapproval of the conventional practice, that is, encounters between Chinese investiture envoys and Japanese prevaricating that they were “natives of Takarajima” that caused the Ryukyus to fabricate their rhetoric (Kamiya 2013, pp. 273–274).
- 17) Tokunaga 2005a, p. 89.
- 18) Sources include “Tabiyuki kokoroe no jōjō” 旅行心得之條々 (Articles concerning precautions to be taken when traveling abroad; 1753 and 1759; mentioned later), “Tō hyōchakusen kokoroe” 唐漂著船心得 (Precautions concerning castaways in Chinese wasters; mentioned later), and “Kansen torai nitsuki shimarikata kakiwatashi sōrō oboe” 冠船渡來に付締方書渡候覺 (Memorandum on action to be taken upon arrival of investiture envoy ships; 1765), according to Kishaba 1993.
- 19) See Dana 1996.
- 20) This is probably the children’s primer (*ōraimono* 往來物) published during the Tokugawa Period entitled *Banpō jirin bunpō kōkan* 萬寶字林文法綱鑑, aka *Bunrin setsuyō hikkai ōrai* 文林節用筆海往來. It was first published in 1717 and went through numerous printings.
- 21) According to my earlier analysis (Watanabe 2014b), Figure 3 highly provably reflects the actual moment when pigtailed Qing Chinese castaways visited at Tomari-mura.
- 22) Ryūkyū Okoku Hyōjōsho Monjo Henshū Inkai 1988, vol. 1, pp. 71–72.
- 23) *Ibid.*, pp. 351–355.
- 24) This implies that male hosts would be required by custom to introduce themselves directly to their guests.

- 25) Tomiyama 2001, pp. 69–70.
- 26) Tawada 1994, pp. 49, 106, 129.
- 27) “Okinawa-gaku” 沖繩學 (Okinawalogy or Okinawa Studies) indicates the scientific body of research published in Japanese since the annexation of Ryukyu by Japan in 1879.
- 28) Contained in Iha 1962 (first published in 1946). This account was according to Iha based on a document source which does not presently exist.
- 29) One of four administrative assistants (*tsukeyaku* 付役) assigned to Naha between the 2nd month of Kan'en 寛延 3 (1750) and the 6th month of Hōreki 寶曆 2 (1752).
- 30) Iha 1962, p. 484.
- 31) *Kangxi qijuzhu* 康熙起居注, entry on the 25th, 8th month, Kangxi 21.
- 32) This trend of the Shuri royal government started around the 18th century (Tomiyama 2003, p. 62).
- 33) I presented this intension in detail at the 2017 Annual Meeting of Ryūdai Shigakkai 琉大史學會 (Historical Society of the University of the Ryukyus), that is to be published as an article in *Ryūdai Shigaku* 琉大史學 (Ryudai Review of History), no.20, 2018.
- 34) Li Dingyuan, *Shi Liuqiu ji* 使琉球記, entry on 25th, 8th month. Genna as a Japanese era covers the period between 1615 and 1624. At the point in time of the Tang era of Yuanhe 元和 (806–820), the Ryukyu Kingdom had not yet been established.
- 35) Fuma 1999, pp. vii–viii.
- 36) Motegi 1997, pp. 11–12.
- 37) Fuma 1999, pp. ix–x.
- 38) Namely, the Ryukyu-US Treaty of Amity of 11 July 1854, the Ryukyu-France Treaty of 24 November 1855 and the Ryukyu-Dutch Treaty of 6 July 1869, the latter two of which were not ratified.
- 39) Wells Williams 1910, p. 257
- 40) Yokoyama 1996, p. 408.
- 41) e.g., *Kyūyō* 球陽, appendix 4 (vol. 234); Ajia Rekishi Shiryō Sentā アジア歴史資料センター (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records), Ref. B03041138800, Ryūkyū kankei zakken 琉球關係雜件 (Miscellaneous records concerning the Ryukyus), Ryūkyū-han zaikin raiōkan 琉球藩在勤來往翰 (Correspondence with the officials stationed in the Ryukyu Domain; B-1-4-1-018) (Originally stored at Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan 外務省外交史料館 (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)).
- 42) Meiji Bunka Shiryō Sōsho Kankōkai 1962, p. 65.
- 43) Higashionna 1978, (first published in 1924), p. 344. However, in September of that year provisional approval was given only for Chinese castaways to be returned to China through the conventional diplomatic channels (Nishizato 2008, pp. 295–297).
- 44) For details on this topic, see Watanabe 2012b.

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