

The Fujianese Maritime Trade Network and the Toyotomi Regime's Piracy Cessation Ordinances

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Maritime trade between the Japanese archipelago and mainland China during the 16th century can be divided into three distinct periods. In the first period between the turn of the century and the decade of the 1530s, whereas Japan conducted its tribute trade with the Ming Dynasty only intermittently, the Ryukyu Kingdom played an important role as an intermediary in the Japan-Ming trade. The second period of the 1540s through the 1560s was marked by an interruption in the Japan-Ming tributary trade and the expansion of clandestine trade conducted by Chinese smugglers and *wakō* 倭寇 (lit. Japanese pirates). Then during the 30-year period between 1570 and 1600, the Macao-Nagasaki trade conducted by the Portuguese grew in the wake of the substantial decline of *wakō* activities. While such a periodization is based on changes occurring in the main trade routes, in fact, a diverse number of sub-trade routes also existed simultaneously. In particular, during our third period at the end of the century, in addition to the main Macao-Nagasaki route, there was a revival of the activities of Chinese smugglers trading with Japan out of the province of Fujian.

Concerning the movements and activities of *wakō* during the mid-16th century, the Ming Dynasty records provide us with ample information, while for Japan's trade with China at Nagasaki from the 17th century on, there are the systematic records kept by the Tokugawa Shogunate. In contrast, source materials describing details of the trade relationships between Japan and Fujian maritime merchant are few and far between, consisting of a small number of scattered records found in the historiography related to the Ming Dynasty, Japan and southern Europe. The present article examines the process by which the commercial network formed by Fujian maritime merchants expanded into western Japan, mainly the island of Kyushu, based on an extensive search for relevant information among the extant sources. Then the discussion will turn to the relationship between a Piracy Cessation Ordinance (*Kaizoku Chōjirei* 海賊停止

令, issued in 1588 by the Toyotomi Regime) and the expansion of the Fujianese maritime trade network onto Kyushu.

Here Fujian Province will be considered as consisting of two distinct regions: the Minbei 閩北 region in the north centering around Fuzhou 福州 Prefecture and the Minnan 閩南 region in the south centering around Zhangzhou 漳州 and Quanzhou 泉州 Prefectures. This latter Minnan, or “Zhang-Quan 漳泉,” region, which was referred to by contemporary Europeans as Chincheo, was the location of the base of operations for Fujianese maritime trade network: being formed at the port of Quanzhou during the Song and Yuan Periods, and then during the Ming and Qing Periods, moving south into the Zhangzhou Bay region, which stretched from the southern part of Quanzhou to the northern part of Zhangzhou prefectures. In the present article, “Fujian maritime merchants” refers to Minnan, or Zhang-Quan, maritime merchants based mainly in the Zhangzhou Bay region.

1. Maritime East Asia and the Japan-Ming Trade during the 16th Century

During the period in question, China’s three main ports of foreign trade were located at Hangzhou 杭州 Bay in northeastern Zhejiang Province, the Pearl River Estuary (Zhujiang-kou 珠江口) in central Guangdong Province and the previously mentioned Zhangzhou Bay. Trade activities in Hangzhou Bay were conducted mainly at Ningbo 寧波 and the Zhoushan 舟山 Islands and geared towards partners in the East China Sea, including the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsula. In contrast, the Pearl River Estuary acted as the gateway to a route through the western South China Sea to as far as Java, while Zhangzhou Bay was the embarkation point for a route stretching from the eastern South China Sea to the Sulu Islands, as well as a junction between South China and East China Seas.

As mentioned earlier, our three periods in the history of Japan-Ming trade during the 16th century can be called chronologically the Tributary Trade era, the *Wakō* era and the Macao-Nagasaki Trade era, respectively. In the discussion that follows, the latter two eras will each be divided into two additional sub-eras, in order to systematically depict the events of the century as unfolding in five phases.¹⁾

Phase I: The Tributary and Ryukyu Trades Era, 1500–1539

It is a well-established fact that from the end of the 14th century, the

Ming Dynasty enacted maritime prohibitions forbidding private merchants from engaging in trade activities on the high seas and limiting its foreign trade to the tributary trade with neighboring states. However, from the mid-15th century on, the Ming Dynasty's maritime prohibitions began to be relaxed in the South China Sea region. The Zhangzhou Bay region experienced an expansion of smuggling activities on the part of its Chinese merchants vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, and the Pearl River Estuary region began to conduct "reciprocal border trade" (*hushi* 互市) with foreign vessels arriving with no connection to the tribute trade. Meanwhile, on the Japanese archipelago, the production of commodities geared to the Chinese market remained at a low level, depriving Chinese merchants of the incentive to defy their government's prohibitions and frequent Japanese ports of trade.

During the whole 40 years comprising our Phase I, Japan succeeded in dispatching tributary missions to the Ming court on only three separate occasions, among which the mission of 1522 did not conduct substantial trade activities owing to the so-called Ningbo Incident, involving an armed clash between rival Japanese envoys. Given such conditions, it was no wonder that there was no significant response on the part of participants in the tribute trade to the great demand for Chinese products (*karamono* 唐物) that existed in Japan, which is probably the reason why the archipelago was forced to rely on Ryukyu traders to supply it with Chinese goods as middlemen. Although the tribute trade between Ryukyu and the Ming Dynasty tended to gradually decline from the mid-15th century on, it might have been compensated for by an increase in clandestine trade conducted with Ryukyu by Fujian maritime merchants. During this phase, Chinese goods were made available to Ryukyu through two separate primary routes—the Fuzhou-Naha 那霸 tributary trade and Zhangzhou-Naha clandestine trade—and then transported to southern Kyushu, where merchants from such port cities as Hakata 博多 and Sakai 堺 were waiting to distribute them throughout the archipelago.

Phase II: The Shuangyu Smugglers and Wakō Era, 1540–1566

In contrast to the South China Sea entering its own "Age of Commerce" from the mid-15th century on, that age for the East China Sea region arrived a bit earlier during the 1530s, with the drastic increase in production from the Iwami Ginzan 石見銀山 silver mine. At first, Japanese silver flowed into Ming China via the Korean Peninsula, and then from the 1540s on, many Chinese merchants hungry for silver de-

fied their Dynasty's prohibitions and began to make clandestine voyages to the shores of Kyushu. They would then transport the silver back into China through a smuggling entrepôt they had established at Shuangyu 雙嶼 in the Zhoushan Islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province. At that time Shuangyu was frequented mainly by Chinese smugglers and private Portuguese traders, but Southeast Asian and Japanese ships also sailed there to trade in Japanese silver, Southeast Asian goods and Chinese commodities.

Unable to leave the clandestine trade to expand, the Ming Court launched a full-scale attack on Shuangyu in 1548, completely destroying the port. However, this only prompted the Chinese smugglers to spread and increase their coasting operations in Southeast Asia and join Japanese pirates and smugglers in their *wakō* activities which expanded throughout the East China Sea. Their paramount leader was Wang Zhi 王直, who from the early 1540s on promoted a clandestine trade network connecting China, Southeast Asia and Kyushu, where the Portuguese arrived for the first time at the island of Tanegashima 種子島 on board Wang's junks in 1543. Meanwhile, Japan's tribute trade with Ming China would come to a close in 1549.

Phase III: The Wakō-Nanban Trade Era, 1557–1566

The year 1557 marked an important turning point in both the East and South China Sea regions. In the former, it was the year when Wang Zhi surrendered to the Ming Dynasty, a maritime defense system was strengthened and *wakō* activities on the Jiangnan 江南 and Zhejiang fronts were pacified. From that time on, *wakō* moved south into Fujian and Guangdong, where the port of Yuegang 月港 on the southern coast of Zhangzhou Bay became the center of the clandestine trade. During the early 1560s, the local powerful clans of Yuegang raised a rebellion in a gesture of resistance to the Ming Dynasty's prohibitions aiming to repress the clandestine trade. After the rebellion was quelled, Yuegang was in 1565 administratively formed into Haicheng 海澄 County in an attempt to strengthen the maritime defense system in the Zhangzhou Bay region.

Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, it was in 1557 that the Portuguese established a permanent settlement at Macao. From that time on, Portuguese scheduled cargo ships and smaller-scale private merchants from Macao began arriving in ports all over Kyushu, including Hirado 平戸 (Hizen 肥前 Province) and Funai 府内 (Bungo 豊後 Province), thus establishing what would be called the Southern Barbarian (*Nanban* 南蠻; viz.

Portuguese) trade with Japan. Men of the cloth, specifically the Society of Jesus, soon followed to proselytize and baptize the Japanese “heathen.” In Bungo and Hizen Provinces, in particular, the Ōtomo 大友 Clan in the former and the Ōmura 大村 and Arima 有馬 Clans in the latter, became avid protectors of the Jesuit missionaries, as the ships of their Portuguese compatriots frequented the Arima domain’s port of Kuchi-no-Tsu 口之津 and the Ōmura domain’s ports of Yokoseura 横瀬浦 and Fukuda 福田 during the 1560s.

Phase IV: The Nanban Trade Era, 1567–1579

Towards the end of the decade of the 1560s, the activities of *wakō* went into gradual decline, despite the fact that since the late 14th century neither the Ming Dynasty’s maritime prohibitions nor its tributary trade system which those prohibitions were intended to protect could be effectively enforced. What eventually happened was that at the end of the 1560s, the Ming Dynasty significantly loosened its maritime prohibitions and recognized the activities of Chinese merchants sailing out of the port of Haicheng County (formerly known as Yuegang) into the ports of Southeast Asia. Consequently, these Chinese merchants, in particular the Fujianese maritime trade network, quickly expanded their operations throughout the South China Sea region, as those who had been forced to resort to the clandestine trade with Japan seemed to have decided to “go legitimate” in the Southeast Asia trade. And although these same legitimate merchants by no means avoided the ports of Kyushu, their appearances there became substantially less frequent than the phases before and after.

On the other hand, the Ōmura Clan opened a new port facility at Nagasaki, giving rise to the Macao-Nagasaki trade by Portuguese vessels, which came to dominate China-Japan trade relations. In contrast, the entrepôt trade through the Ryukyu Islands received a decisive blow due to the rapid expansion of the Fujianese maritime trade network into Southeast Asia. Consequently, the official trade between the Ryukyu Kingdom and its counterparts in Southeast Asia came to an end in 1570, forcing the former to increase its reliance on the Japan trade, meaning a growing dependency on the Shimazu 島津 Clan of southern Kyushu.

Phase V: The Nanban-Tōsen Era, 1580–1600

The 1570s saw the development of both the Portuguese Macao-Nagasaki trade and the Fujian maritime merchants’ Haicheng-Southeast

Asian trade working in tandem. However, come the 1580s, attracted by the profitability of the Japan trade, the ships of the Fujianese maritime merchants (known as *tōsen* 唐船; lit., “Chinese Ships”) began to appear in the ports of Kyushu more and more frequently. They would either sail directly from the Zhangzhou Bay region or access Kyushu via the island of Luzon, thus prompting the development of the Fujian-Kyushu-Luzon route rivaling the Macao-Nagasaki route. It was also a time when the various *daimyōs* 大名 of Kyushu embarked on their own commercial ventures into Southeast Asia, stimulating the movement of Japanese merchants and mercenaries into the region. Meanwhile, the Ryukyu Kingdom was going through a transition of its own from a central entrepôt connecting the South and East China Seas to one serving the Kyushu-Luzon-Fujian commercial route.

Table 1 is a summary of trading activities between Japan and the Ming Dynasty, matching our five phases characterizing the 16th century in the top row with the major ports of trade involved in the left-hand column. Important trading activities in each phase are shown in bold. What follows is a discussion of those activities focusing on the development of Japan’s trade by the Fujian maritime merchants centered around the port of Zhangzhou.²⁾

The changing routes in the Japan-Ming trade throughout the 16th century formed one link in the chain of fluctuation and reorganization of foreign trade in East Asia as a whole. In mid-century, while *wakō* were infiltrating the southeastern seacoasts, on the northern periphery, the Mongol Altan Khan was seeking to expand trade through year-by-year invasions and plunder across the border into northern China. As, in both the maritime and continental Asia, there occurred a trade boom of sorts where various ethnic groups participated in trading activities, unified control over diplomacy and commerce through the Ming Dynasty’s tributary system became untenable.

After the Ming Dynasty relaxed its maritime restrictions at the end of the 1560s, Altan Khan was recognized as a tributary in 1571 and permitted to conduct the border trade along the Great Wall. That same year marked the beginning of the Macao-Nagasaki trade as well as the construction of the city of Manila as the capital of Spanish Colonial Philippines. As the result of that latter event, a trans-Pacific Ocean route was opened linking Manila with Spanish Colonial Mexico, over which Spanish Galleons carried silver mined in the New World into Philippine ports. Consequently, even more foreign silver flowed into the Chinese market in

addition to the bullion imported from Japan.

It was in this manner that around the decade of the 1570s, a combination of the Ming Dynasty's commercial policy revisions and the opening of new trade routes by Spain and Portugal brought about a complete reorganization of trade in East Asia, here referred to as the "1570 system."³⁾ In contrast to the Ming Dynasty's "maritime prohibition-tribute trade system," which was based on the principle that tribute was inseparable from foreign trade, meaning an *integration* of tribute with trade, the "1570 system" was characterized by a principle of the *coexistence* of tribute and trade, under which various trade routes—the tribute trade, border trade, trade conducted by Chinese merchants legally advancing into Southeast Asia etc.—were recognized depending on differing conditions.

However, within that system, only participation by the Japanese archipelago, the home base of *wakō*, was not allowed due to the belligerent and invasive nature of those pirates. Consequently, the trade of silver for Chinese goods, which was the most profitable intraregional business in maritime East Asia at that time, would have to revert first to the Macao-Nagasaki trade route by the Portuguese, and then later to the clandestine trade conducted by the Fujian maritime merchants.

2. Maritime Deregulation and the Fujian Maritime Merchants' Trade with Japan

Of the three large maritime foreign trade centers of Hangzhou Bay, Zhangzhou Bay and the Pearl River Estuary, it was the Zhangzhou Bay region which suffered most from overpopulation and agrarian land scarcity, resulting in a great number of local residents seeking to earn their livelihoods in maritime trading activities. In particular, during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods, Quanzhou prospered as one of the most prosperous foreign trade ports in the world. However, during the last decades of the 14th century, maritime trade in southern Fujian rapidly declined in the aftermath of the Ming Dynasty's maritime prohibitions. First, a Maritime Trade Supervisorate (*shiboshi* 市舶司) was put in place in Quanzhou to regulate the Ming Dynasty's trade with the Ryukyu Islands, then moved to Fuzhou in 1471, resulting in the closing of legitimate maritime routes into southern Fujian. In response, Fujian maritime merchants got busy establishing a clandestine trade network out of the port of Zhangzhou into the South China Sea. As of the mid-16th century, Zhangzhou had become a center of later *wakō* activities rivaling Zhejiang's Zhoushan

Islands. Then with the relaxation of maritime prohibitions at the end of the 1560s, Fujian merchants expanded their maritime network to all destinations in Southeast Asia.⁴⁾

As a matter of fact, the Ming Dynasty's maritime deregulation was enacted at the beginning of the Longqing 隆慶 Era (1567–72) at the suggestion of Tu Zemin 塗澤民, the governor (*xunfu* 巡撫) of Fujian.⁵⁾ By decriminalizing all clandestine foreign trade conducted up until that time, the new policy recognized Chinese maritime merchants sailing out of Haicheng County (port of Yuegang), Zhangzhou, into both the “Eastern Ocean” (*Dongyang* 東洋) and “Western Ocean” (*Xiyang* 西洋): the former indicating a maritime region from the Philippines to the Moluccas; the latter a maritime region from the Indochina Peninsula to the islands of Sumatra and Java. On the other hand, such activities as the export of military wherewithal and travel to Japan remained forbidden.⁶⁾

Chinese merchants venturing into Southeast Asia would first have to receive a license (*wenyin* 文引) at Haicheng, the number of which were limited according to each destination, not to exceed a total of fifty per year all told. Then in 1589, the total number was increased to 88–44 for each “Ocean.” When the ships returned to Haicheng, customs were imposed according to the type and weight of their cargos.⁷⁾ Chinese merchants heading into western South East Asia would sail with the northern winds of winter and return with the southwestern winds of summer.⁸⁾ In contrast, sailing into eastern South East Asia generally required departing with the northwestern winds of late winter and early spring, then returning before the summer southwestern winds began to blow.⁹⁾ Wintering in ports of destination was prohibited in order to prevent clandestine stopovers in Japan.

Captains (*chuanzhu* 船主) who organized each venture would many times receive passenger fee from “guest merchants” (*keshang* 客商), who rented cargo spaces to load their own goods. Chinese merchants would carry Chinese-made exports goods like silk thread, silk and cotton cloth and ceramics out and return to Haicheng with such products of South Seas (*Nanhai* 南海) as pepper and other spices.¹⁰⁾

Fujian maritime merchants tended to concentrate their business in the Philippines.¹¹⁾ They would transport various Chinese commodities to Manila, where they would trade them for Mexican-minted eight-real silver coins.¹²⁾ While at first, during the 1570s, Chinese ships bound for the Philippines numbered less than ten per year, during the following decade they increased to between 20 and 30 annually, reaching a record

48 in 1588.¹³⁾ When the number of “Eastern Ocean” *wenyin* licenses were increased to 44 the following year, 16 of them cited Luzon as their destination.¹⁴⁾ In fact, it is thought that a large majority of cargo ships venturing into the “Eastern Ocean” were headed for Luzon-Manila, in particular. Accordingly, the Chinese resident population of Manila began to increase to a point where in 1590, 3–4 thousand were residing in the city proper with an additional 6–7 thousand living in neighboring regions on Luzon.¹⁵⁾

Meanwhile, during the 1580s, more and more Fujian maritime merchants again were heading out of Zhangzhou Bay for the shores of Kyushu. For example, in 1584 a cargo ship from Quanzhou sailed into the port of Akamagaseki 赤間關 (present day Shimonoseki 下關, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in the domain of the Mōri 毛利 Clan and promised the local magistrate that it would return six months later.¹⁶⁾ Moreover, during the latter half of the 1580s, Japanese-owned vessels began sailing yearly to Luzon in the pursuit of trade.¹⁷⁾ It was in this way that during the last decades of the 16th century a new trade connection through a Fujian-Luzon-Kyushu route was formed mainly through the auspices of the Fujian maritime merchant network. That is to say, within the main arterial connecting Fujian with Luzon a triangular branch line came into existence connecting it with Kyushu. This branch connection saw Japanese silver being carried from Kyushu to Fujian, Chinese goods exported to Luzon from Fujian, and Chinese goods as well as Philippine gold brought back to Kyushu. Manila also became a trading center for reciprocating Chinese goods and Japanese silver, while at the same time functioning as an entrepôt for ships bypassing the Macao-Nagasaki trade route.¹⁸⁾

However, in the 4th month of 1592¹⁹⁾, the situation radically changed with the Toyotomi Regime's invasion of the Korean Peninsula. In response, the Ming Dynasty placed a ban on all Chinese merchant ships sailing out of Haicheng, in order to prevent the smuggling of war materiel and the leaking of military information to the Japanese.²⁰⁾ Consequently, Haicheng's foreign trade activities came to a complete halt during the winter of that year and the spring of the next, throwing the society and economy of Fujian, which depended heavily on its foreign trade sector, into serious stagnation and chaos. Under such conditions Xu Fuyuan 許孚遠 was appointed governor of Fujian in the 12th month of 1592 to integrate the province both administratively and militarily. During the following year Governor Xu petitioned the Ming Court to report that despite the Dynasty's interdiction, clandestine trade with Japan was continuing

and to request that the ban be lifted. Xu reported that the maritime merchants of Quanzhou and Zhangzhou were setting sail under such pretenses as purchasing rice in Guangdong, carrying cargos to northern Fujian and conducting fishing and trade operations on Taiwan, but for the actual purpose of smuggling such products as lead and saltpeter to Japan.²¹⁾

The appeals of Xu and others seem to have resulted in a lifting of the ban by the end of 1593. Upon the resumption of foreign trade activities, Governor Xu issued a 17-article list of maritime regulations, entitled *Haijin Tiaoli* 海禁條例, enumerating banned activities, for the purpose of curbing the clandestine trade with Japan. The document began with the Article 1 announcing that the number of *wenyin* licenses would be increased from 88 to 100 per year. However, law enforcement regarding the clandestine trade with Japan was to be tightened. For example, since merchant ships smuggling goods into Japan would normally set sail with the southwestern winds in summer and return with the northern winds beginning in the autumn, no *wenyin* were to be issued from the 2nd month on, and no ships were allowed to set sail from Haicheng from the 3rd month on (Article 2). Moreover, Article 3 stipulated that inspections of returning cargos would be stepped up and any ships suspected of trading with Japan would be exposed. It is because, while merchant ships returning from Southeast Asia carrying South Seas commodities (including eight-real silver coins from Luzon), those ships secretly returning from Japan would be carrying large amounts of Japanese silver.²²⁾

Despite the resumption of foreign trade with Xu's regulations made known to maritime merchants, the clandestine trade with Japan continued as before.²³⁾ As a result of the Korean invasion, the prices of such commodities as gold for military spending and war materiel skyrocketed in Japan during the 1590s, meaning that the clandestine trade on the archipelago flourished like never before during that time.²⁴⁾

In addition, the number of Chinese maritime merchants sailing to Kyushu from Luzon was on the rise. During the trade seasons of 1596 and 1597, of the 24,000 Chinese who sailed to the Philippines in each season, half were returned home, leaving 11 or 12 thousand residing on the islands,²⁵⁾ all free to sail to Kyushu unhampered by any restrictions imposed by the Ming Dynasty. For example, in 1593, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 dispatched Harada Kiemon 原田喜右衛門 as his envoy to Manila to demand Philippine allegiance to Japan, Harada was accompanied by a couple of hundred Chinese and Japanese passengers and crew, including a Chinese pilot and helmsman.²⁶⁾ One Chinese Christian

aboard testified that “many heathen Chinese [in Manila] have found their way to Japan.”²⁷⁾

Chinese merchant ships would arrive in Manila around March of each year and set out on their return voyages during June, before the southwestern winds strengthened. Furthermore, galleons crossing the Pacific from Acapulco, Mexico, would arrive in Manila at around the end of May and return with the southwestern winds from the end of June on. On the other hand, merchant ships arriving from Kyushu would enter Manila with the northern winds either at the end of October or during March and depart it with the southwestern winds between June and July.²⁸⁾ In sum, after trading with Chinese merchants from Fujian and the galleons from Mexico up through June, Chinese residents of Manila were able to sail to Kyushu during July and return to Manila at the end of October.

It was in this manner that during the last decades of the 16th century, Fujian maritime merchants came to frequent the ports of Kyushu from such points as the Zhangzhou Bay region (in particular, Haicheng) and Luzon (in particular, Manila). The routes over which they traveled were essentially four in number.

1. Sailing directly northeast on the East China Sea by the Tsushima 對馬 Current to the Gotō 五島 Islands, then into Nagasaki or Hirado.
2. Sailing north along the Fujian-Zhejiang coastline, then crossing the East China Sea to the Gotō Islands, before entering Nagasaki or Hirado.
3. Sailing directly northeast through the East China Sea by the Kuroshio 黑潮 Current to either the Tokara 吐噶喇 Islands or the Ōsumi 大隅 Islands, then on to the ports of southern Kyushu.
4. Crossing the Kuroshio Current to the Ryukyu Islands, then sailing north from island to island into the ports of southern Kyushu.²⁹⁾

On the other hand, merchant ships headed for Kyushu from Manila would first sail north along the eastern coast of Luzon, cross the Bashi Channel, then proceed to the eastern coast of Taiwan, before choosing one of the above four routes to Kyushu.³⁰⁾

While there were Chinese merchant ships that would immediately return home after entering ports in southern Kyushu, there were others that would sail either up the island's west coast for Hirado and/or Nagasaki or up its east coast for Bungo Province. The Chinese goods that they brought into Kyushu would be transported from Hirado and Nagasaki via

Akamagaseki and from Bungo through the Seto Inland Sea (Seto Naikai 瀬戸内海) to the port of Sakai, from where they would be supplied to markets throughout Kinai 畿内 Region. In addition, sailing through the Bungo Channel around the southern (Pacific) side of the island of Shikoku would increase in importance as an alternative route from southern Kyushu to Sakai.³¹⁾ It was the merchants of Sakai who were the leading players in this domestic commodity distribution network in Japan. They set up business relations with Kyushu-based *daimyōs*, merchants and even members of the Society of Jesus, in order to supply Kinai Region with foreign imports.³²⁾

One physical source indicating the growth in the Zhangzhou Bay-Kyushu trade at the end of the 16th century is the increase in the excavation of Zhangzhou ware from sites throughout western Japan. Zhangzhou ware, which is the term used for the type of porcelain produced in that region of Fujian, is referred to in Europe as Swatow ware after the port in Guangdong from which it was exported. Compared to contemporary Jingdezhen ware Zhangzhou ware tended to be generally coarse, crudely potted and often underfired, thus geared to the low-end mass consumption market; nevertheless, with the development of foreign trade in Haicheng from the end of the 16th century, its export throughout Southeast Asia rapidly increased.³³⁾

This trend spread to the East China Sea trade, as shown by recent archeological surveys which attest to significant increases in Zhangzhou ware dating to between the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century in all the major ports of Kyushu, including Hakata, Nagasaki and Bungo (Funai), although in amounts less than in urban sites of Southeast Asia. Zhangzhou ware occupies between 20 and 30% of the “blue-and-white” (*qinhua* 青花) ceramic artifacts unearthed.³⁴⁾ The Zhangzhou ware brought to the ports of Kyushu was distributed throughout the Seto Inland Sea into Kinai Region more and more from the end of the 16th century on, as shown by findings from archeological sites in the major cities of Ōsaka 大坂 and Kyōto 京都.³⁵⁾

There is no reason to deny that most of the Zhangzhou ware in Japan was brought there from the Zhangzhou Bay region by Fujian maritime merchants. For example, on a screen decorated with a map of the world made in Japan at the beginning of the 17th century, we find among the products imported to Japan from Zhangzhou a bolt of velvet, sugar, a rudely potted bowl and a “blue-and-white.”³⁶⁾ It is quite probable that Fujian maritime merchants loaded their ships with Zhangzhou ware for

ballast and brought them either directly or via Luzon up the Kyushu sea-coasts to Nagasaki and Hakata in the west or Bungo Funai in the east. There is a distinct possibility that Zhangzhou ware was also transported to Nagasaki and Hirado on Portuguese and Dutch vessels via Macao. Together with expanding their trade network in the South and East China Seas, the Fujian maritime merchants were able to open new commercial routes for Zhangzhou ware, which was formerly exported in huge amounts throughout Southeast Asia, as far as Kyushu and Kinai Region.

3. The Piracy Cessation Ordinance Issued to the Fukabori Clan of Hizen Province (1587)

From the 1570s on in addition to the further development of the Macao-Nagasaki trade by the Portuguese, during the 1580s Fujian maritime merchants once again expanded their clandestine trade activities with Japan. That being said, Portuguese and Chinese merchant ships were by no means passing through Akamagaseki and sailing into Kinai Region; rather, by the mid-1580s the Oda 織田 and Toyotomi Regimes had taken direct control of the port of Sakai, Kinai Region's largest port of trade, and been involved in foreign trade only indirectly. However, in 1587, the Toyotomi Regime subjugated the island of Kyushu by overcoming the Shimazu Clan of Satsuma 薩摩 Province, making it possible for that regime to now take direct control over foreign trade activities on the island. Together with quickly placing Nagasaki under its direct governance, the Toyotomi Regime issued a chain of ordinances ordering the island's powerful maritime entities to cease and desist from all acts of piracy (Kaizoku Chōjirei). As the result of his chronological examination of these Cessation Ordinances, historian Fujiki Hisashi 藤木久志 has argued that their enactment included 1) internal measures to bring the maritime population of Japan under the regime's control and 2) foreign policy measures predicated on the regime's sole sovereignty over all Japanese territorial waters. According to Fujiki's argument, 1) from the viewpoint of the internal affairs, the orders were part of a policy for abrogating the autonomy enjoyed by maritime feudal lords with proprietary rights over the sea and thus integrate their subjects directly under the national regime, and 2) in the context of the foreign policy, they formed "the basis for a comprehensive East Asian diplomatic policy," by aiming at guaranteeing the safety of all incoming foreign vessels in the hope of re-establishing commercial relations with the Ming Dynasty.³⁷⁾

Fujiki's work was then followed by various scholars specializing in the Cessation Ordinances, mainly in order to examine the process by which they were enacted.³⁸⁾ However, this body of research has almost exclusively been limited to discussing the aspect of national integration of the maritime population, while their implications in the foreign policy have been generally overlooked. For this reason, here in this article, we will reexamine the significance of the Piracy Cessation Ordinances within the context of the expanding Fujian maritime merchant's commercial network described above.

To begin with, during the medieval period throughout the Japanese archipelago, all maritime feudal lords would set up maritime checkpoints (*seki* 關) for the purpose of levying barrier tolls paid in the form of gratuities (*reisen* 禮錢) for passage through their waters. In fact, the maritime lords would put their men on board (*uwanori* 上乘) the passing ships in order to "guard" (*kego* 警固) them safely through their waters, and of course threaten to attack the ships if they refused to pay the tolls. It is this practice that would be the actual objective of the Piracy Cessation Ordinances.³⁹⁾

One contemporary late-16th-century Chinese source, *Riben Kao* 日本考 (On Japan; Compiled by Li Yangong 李言恭 and Hao Jie 郝杰) describes in detail this act of piracy as follows: Whenever a large-scale merchant vessel was sailing in Japanese waters, a dozen or so smaller vessels boarded by over one hundred "pirates" would surround and attack it. If the merchant vessel won the battle, it would be saved, but if the pirates were victorious, it would be looted. Even if the merchant vessel was successful in defending itself, the pirate vessels would lineup along its bow in escort formation and demand large gratuities for guiding it safely through Japanese waters. From the fact that such maritime forces were referred to in the contemporary sources as both "pirates" (*kaizokushū* 海賊眾) and "protectors" (*kegoshū* 警固眾), we can understand that acts of piracy and ensuring safe passage went hand in hand.⁴⁰⁾

The first known order written by Toyotomi Hideyoshi intending to put a stop to this practice was issued during the 5th month of 1587 just after his subjugation of Kyushu. Then from the 7th day of the 6th month, he began preparation for postwar arrangements at Hakozaiki 箱崎 on the outskirts of the port of Hakata, during which on the 15th he decided to take punitive action against Fukabori Sumikata 深堀純賢, the maritime lord of Hizen Province, for acts of piracy. The Fukabori 深堀 Clan, whose base of operations was situated on the southern shore of the entrance into the Nagasaki Bay, was accused of impeding the sea routes into the port

and preventing both foreign and domestic merchant vessels from navigating the seas. Jesuit missionary Luís Fróis has left us the following description of such acts of piracy.

About 2 *ri* (里; approximately 8 km) from the port of Nagasaki in the vicinity of the entrance to the Bay, a lord called Fukabori-dono owns a castle and a profitable livelihood... He is a pagan, a dangerous enemy of *Deus's* teachings, a man of enormous greed, and an openly active pirate (*pirata*) and a powerful privateer (*corsário*). He captures ships on the sea; not only those of his fellow countrymen, but also resorts even to capturing the vessels of poor Chinese peddlers who sail to Japan in their *somas* to trade. Despite the fact that such foreigners have the right to sell their wares freely at any port in Japan, this man (Fukabori-dono), driven by arrogance and greed, lies in wait for them on the sea, plunders and kills them, then commandeers their vessels.⁴¹⁾

The *somas* here, in which “poor Chinese peddlers” sailed, means large seaworthy sampans.⁴²⁾ It was reported around 1660 that “A considerable number of *somas* and junks generally come from Great China to Manila, laden with merchandise.”⁴³⁾ As a matter of fact, the Fujian-Kyushu trade during that time was probably conducted not necessarily by junks, but mainly by smaller *somas*, the voyages of which were financed by Fujian maritime merchants with small amounts of capital. In addition, Jesuit missionaries residing in Kyushu would send their correspondence to Macao via Chinese *somas* when there were no Portuguese ships available.⁴⁴⁾

On the same day that Hideyoshi ordered punitive action taken against Fukabori Sumikata, he met with Gaspar Coelho, the vice-provincial of the Jesuit mission in Japan. According to Luís Fróis, the person who introduced Coelho to Hideyoshi also reported, “In the vicinity of Nagasaki, there is a powerful pirate by the name of Fukabori (Sumitaka), whose plundering has brought a great deal of harm to the city's residents.”⁴⁵⁾ Historical sources of the Nabeshima 鍋島 Clan of Hizen Province have the following to say about this set of circumstances.

Due to the animosity which existed between the Fukabori and Ōmura Clans, whenever an Ōmura merchant ship entered the port of Nagasaki, it would not be allowed to sail past the Fukabori side of the harbor without paying a gratuity (viz. toll). After all, this was the normal

practice, for every merchant vessel, be it sailing into Kyō 京 (Kyōto), Ōsaka, Sakai, Hakata or Shimonoseki, passed through by paying a gratuity. As to the issue at hand, it was the townsfolk of these places who complained to Konishi Ryūsa 小西隆佐, the deputy (*shoshidai* 所司代) at Sakai, claiming that the Fukabori Clan of Hizen were traitors. When Konishi reported this to the Regent (*kanpaku* 關白, i.e. Hideyoshi), he flew into a rage.⁴⁶⁾

From this record, we find that the Fukabori Clan was demanding tolls from not only the merchant ships of the Ōmuras but also the merchant ships of the other cities which sailed to and from Nagasaki Bay, a practice that the Sakai merchants reported to Hideyoshi's vassal Konishi Ryūsa, making it possible to conclude that the person who mentioned the Fukaboris at the meeting between Coelho and Hideyoshi was Konishi's confidant.

Fukabori Sumitaka adopted a hostile attitude towards Ōmura Sumitada 大村純忠, the protector of the Society of Jesus and the initial host to the Portuguese ships that first entered Nagasaki in 1570, at which time Fukabori began launching repeated attacks on the port.⁴⁷⁾ For example in 1571, a seven-vessel fleet with Francisco Cabral, the Jesuit Superior, aboard was attacked by Sumitaka on its way to Bungo Funai, lost one of the ships to him and was forced to retreat back to Nagasaki.⁴⁸⁾ Then in 1583, when Coelho set out from Nagasaki on a voyage to Kinai Region, his ship was captured by Sumitaka and sent back home.⁴⁹⁾ There is no doubt that the Fukabori Clan's maritime dominance presented a major obstacle to both the wealthy Sakai merchants in their commercial dealings with Nagasaki and the Society of Jesus in its missionary efforts. This is probably why Konishi Ryūsa, the leader of the former and friend of the latter, took steps to eliminate the Fukaboris.

The day after his meeting with Coelho, Hideyoshi sent the following vermilion sealed letter (*shuinjō* 朱印狀) to Asano Nagayoshi 淺野長吉 and Toda Katsutaka 戸田勝隆, whom he had put in charge of maritime transportation in the Seto Inland Sea during the pacification of Kyushu.

Despite the ban placed on acts of piracy and brigandage in the provinces, I have been informed that the Fukabori Clan of Takaki 高來 County (*gun* 郡), Hizen Province, continues such obstructive behavior not only towards China (*Daitō* 大唐) and the Southern Barbarians (*Nanban*), but also towards [our own country's] commercial vessels.

Consequently, I have decided to take hostages from the Fukabori Clan, tear down its castle as soon as possible and hand over its domain to the provincial governor (*kokushu* 國主) [of Hizen, i.e. Ryūzōji Clan]. Furthermore, I hereby direct you to punish anyone found to be perpetrating [such] wrongdoing in the future.⁵⁰⁾

Then during the 7th month, Hideyoshi ordered Kobayakawa Takakage 小早川隆景 the punishment of the largest maritime power in the Seto Inland Sea, the Murakami 村上 Clan of Noshima 能島 Islands, for acts of piracy,⁵¹⁾ and exactly one year later on the occasion of issuing his “Sword Hunt” Ordinance (*Katanagarirei* 刀狩令) to disarm Japan's peasantry, he issued a general archipelago-wide Piracy Cessation Ordinance, which involved full cadasters of the maritime populations of every feudal lord and the signing of written pledges swearing abstinence from acts of piracy, and stipulated that those who committed piratical activities would be executed and the domains of the local lords who failed to crack down on them confiscated.⁵²⁾ Together with the disarmament of the peasantry and Declaration of General Peace (*Sōbujirei* 惣無事令), the Piracy Cessation Ordinance banned specifically the arbitrary exercise of armed force by maritime powers that be and thus brought them, their territory and their people under the auspices of the *daimyōs* of the Toyotomi Regime. The national integration of Japan's maritime population was now complete, and the Piracy Cessation Ordinances that would follow would for all intents and purposes be focused on stopping such behavior towards Chinese maritime merchants active in Kyushu.

4. The 1589 Piracy Cessation Ordinance Issued to the Shimazu Clan of Satsuma

Up to the mid-16th century, the main sea route, called the “Ocean Route” (*Taiyōro* 大洋路), connecting the Chinese mainland with the Japanese archipelago began either from Ningbo or the Zhoushan Islands, then crossed the East China Sea to the Gotō Islands, before reaching destinations at the ports of Hirado, Hakata etc. There was also an auxiliary route, called the “Southern Island Route” (*Nantōro* 南島路), by which ships would depart from Fujian and sail north to Kyushu through the Southwest Island (Nansei Shotō 南西諸島). Towards the end of the 16th century, however, as the clandestine trade conducted by the Fujian maritime merchants with Japan expanded, the route connecting southern

Kyushu with the Zhangzhou Bay region and Luzon turned into a major Japan-Ming trade route rivaling the Macao-Nagasaki route.

At the same time, the ports of southern Kyushu increased in importance as doors to foreign trade second only to Nagasaki. There, most of the incoming Fujian merchant vessels were of the above-mentioned *soma*-type, which was not sturdy enough to challenge the open sea, thus needing to stay close to the Southwest Islands from Ryukyu or ride the Kuroshio Current through the East China Sea into southern Kyushu. The end of the century marked a time when southern Kyushu was incorporated into the Fujian maritime merchants' commercial network as its northernmost base of operations in their trading activities in the East China Sea.

This was a time during which, according to Table 2, arrivals of Chinese merchant vessels at ports throughout southern Kyushu, including Yamakawa 山川 (2, 12), Kumizaki 久美崎 (3), Ichiki 市來 (4) and Kushi 久志 (8) on the Satsuma Peninsula, Uchiura 内浦 (6, 9) and Hami 波見 (13) on the Ōsumi Peninsula, as well as the islands of Koshikijima 甌島 (1, 13), Iōtō 硫黃島 (5) and Tanegashima (14), from mainly southern Fujian Province: Zhangzhou (7, 10, 15), Quanzhou (9, 13) and Fujian (17). The departure points of the unknown arrivals were also probably Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. Arrivals involving a Luzon connection also appear on five occasions (8, 11, 12, 13, 16), indicating the ports of Satsuma and Ōsumi as the major centers of the Fujian-Luzon-Kyushu trade.

Then at the end of the decade of the 1590s, as related by Korean court official Kang Hang 姜沆 in a memoir of his captivity in Japan, "both junks from China (*tōsen* 唐船) and ships of Southern Barbarians (*bansen* 蠻船) were arriving in and departing from Satsuma incessantly, and merchants trading with the regions of China or Southern Barbarians always called at this region. Chinese goods (*tōka* 唐貨) and Southern Barbarians' goods (*banka* 蠻貨) filled the market, where the Chinese (*tōjin* 唐人) and Southern Barbarians (*banjin* 蠻人) opened the shops to trade with those goods."⁵³ Bernardino de Avila Girón, a Spanish trader who resided in Japan from the end of the 16th century, informs us that a group of people from Zhang-Quan region, whom he refers to as "Chincheos," "came to form some kind of connections with the people of Satsuma, the closest [Japanese] location to China," marking the beginning of the official connection between Japan and China. This tradition seems to have reflected the existence of active interaction between Satsuma Province and the Zhangzhou Bay region. Girón also mentions that despite China's cessation of diplomatic relations with Japan, attracted by Japanese silver, "the Chin-

cheos continue to smuggle such items as ceramic pottery, cotton goods, pharmaceuticals and medicinal herbs into the kingdom [of Japan].”⁵⁴⁾

Unfettered trade activities of Fujian maritime merchants are exemplified by the case involving a merchant by the name of Zhu Junwang 朱均旺, a native of Jiangxi Province. In 1577, after setting sail from Haicheng for Quảng Nam Province on the central coast of Vietnam, he was waylaid by a group of *wakō* and forced to change his course to Satsuma, where he was stranded until 1591, when Zhangzhou maritime merchant Lin Shaoqi 林紹岐 sailed to Satsuma,⁵⁵⁾ took Zhu aboard and brought him back to Quanzhou, after which he informed the Ming Court about Hideyoshi's plan to invade the Korean Peninsula.⁵⁶⁾ In addition, Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩, student of the above-mentioned Kang Hang and founder of the Japanese Neo-Confucianist school, paid a visit to the Ōsumi Peninsula in 1596, where he conversed in writing with Chinese Junk captain Wu Wozhou 吳我洲 at the port of Hami (see Table 2, Item 13). Wu Wozhou, a native of Zhangzhou, had arrived at Hami from Fujian via Luzon; and Wu's son was a leader in the Chinese commercial community of Luzon.⁵⁷⁾

On the other hand, Satsuma and Ōsumi were also bases of operations for *wakō* activities along with the Gotō Islands and Hirado. Although by the end of the 16th century the later *wakō* had been all but pacified, small bands were still active plundering and extorting the maritime population. Of special note is that together with the relocation of the brunt of *wakō* activity to the South China Sea around Fujian, Guangdong and Luzon, it was Satsuma and Ōsumi that became their main bases of operations. For example, Luís Fróis tells us that since the Province of Satsuma is a hilly region of mostly poverty-stricken inhabitants, “they have over many years frequently participated in the activities called *bafan* (八幡, i.e. piracy)⁵⁸⁾,” adding, “for the purpose of pillaging and raping settlements along the Chinese coast, they have at their disposal a considerable fleet that compensates in number for what they lack in individual size.”⁵⁹⁾ A Japanese-Portuguese dictionary compiled at the beginning of the 17th century indicates the use of the term *bafan* at that time as “the act of sailing from Japan to China and other foreign locations to engage in brigandage.”⁶⁰⁾

Returning to Hideyoshi's Piracy Cessation Ordinances, it was during the 7th month of 1588, the year after the subjugation of the Shimazu Clan and pacification of Kyushu, that the Toyotomi Regime issued its general countrywide Piracy Cessation Ordinance and, with respect to the Shimazu Clan, demanded on no uncertain terms that all *bahan* activities be banned and suppressed in Satsuma and Ōsumi provinces.⁶¹⁾

It was regarding this latter matter that in the 11th month of that year Shimazu Yoshihiro 島津義弘, who was then in Kyōto, sent a letter to his vassal Ijichi Shigehide 伊地知重秀, ordering him to follow Hideyoshi's directive and severely crack down on any pirate ships headed for China (*totō zokusen* 渡唐賊船).⁶²⁾ Nevertheless, in the 1st month of 1589 Ishida Mitsunari 石田三成 and Hosokawa Fujitaka 細川藤孝, close advisers to Hideyoshi, sent a missive to Shimazu Yoshihisa 島津義久, Yoshihiro's older brother and head of the Shimazu Clan, informing him that his conformance with measures that the Toyotomi Regime demanded be taken was not satisfactory and confronting him with a 6-article list of demands.⁶³⁾ The 5th article dictated that the Shimazu Clan would draw up a plan for petitioning the Ming Dynasty to revive official foreign trade relations through tallies (*kangō* 勘合) issued by the Ming Court. The 6th article began by chastising the Shimazu Clan for the rampant proliferation of pirate ships in Shimazu waters in defiance of the Piracy Cessation Ordinance. It then pointed specifically to the region of Izumi 出水 in northern Satsuma as an embarkation point for pirate ships and demanded that they be strictly banned and suppressed. In response, Yoshihiro appointed Ijichi Shigehide to make quick preparations for negotiations with the Ming Dynasty over the reopening of trade, together with investigating and arresting the pirates of Izumi and their families for the purpose of handing them over to the Toyotomi Regime authorities.⁶⁴⁾

Then during the 4th month of that year Yoshihiro once again sent Shigehide a letter concerning how to handle recurring incidents of piracy. Yoshihiro wrote that a "pirate ship headed for China" had been purchased in the harbor of Bōnotsu 坊津 on the southern tip of the Satsuma Peninsula, then sailed to the port of Kadonoura 門之浦, where it moored for one night, for which the person who provided the lodging was beheaded by the lord of Kadonoura, the Sata 佐多 Clan. He then lamented that instead of the incident being reported to the Shimazus, it was reported directly to the Toyotomi Regime. Upon hearing the news, Yoshihiro chastised the Sata Clan for such rash action in reporting the incident, saying that Hideyoshi had become angry that negotiations with the Ming Dynasty were not progressing quickly enough owing to the piracy. He concluded the missive by repeating the order to arrest all the parties to the incident at Izumi and Kadonoura, adding that since the tally trade negotiations would not be resolved within the year, all efforts must be made to expose and arrest all suspected pirates.⁶⁵⁾

According to the Cessation Ordinances, exposure and arrest of per-

petrators were to be the responsibility of the local feudal lord in each case, while punishment was to be meted out by the Toyotomi Regime authorities. The action taken by the Sata Clan in arbitrarily executing the parties to the Izumi-Kadonoura Incident, reporting the incident directly to the Toyotomi Regime without informing the local lord, the Shimazu Clan, was clearly in violation of that statute.⁶⁶⁾ Furthermore, in contrast to the punishment inflicted on the Fukabori and Murakami Clans for acts of piracy in the local waters of a maritime feudal lord, the piracy issue in the Satsuma region concerned a ban on sailing into foreign waters for the purpose of brigandage (*totō zokusen*). Therefore, in the latter case, the target for punishment under the Cessation Ordinance was expanded beyond the use of armed force by maritime proprietors within Japan to *wakō*-type *bahan* activities abroad.

By suppressing acts of piracy at home and abroad, the Toyotomi Regime was ready to start planning for a reopening of authorized trade with the Ming Dynasty based on the tally system, which was not necessarily predicated on tributary trade arrangements. The tally system was originally a form of document administration during the Ming Dynasty, according to which envoys coming and going to and from remote areas would carry a document sealed with a tally, which would be collated with a ledger prepared at the point of destination. This system was then applied to the foreign relations.⁶⁷⁾ In this sense, being a mere documentary instrument, the tally in itself was by no means inseparable from the tributary trade system.⁶⁸⁾ It is quite possible that the kind of a tally conceptualized by the Toyotomi Regime was a certificate for the purpose of general commercial activity, not thought to be the one intended to revive the tributary relation between Japan and Ming China.⁶⁹⁾ It is probably in this context that the Shimazu Clan was requested to persuade the Ming Court that the Piracy Cessation Ordinances had guaranteed safe transportation in both domestic and foreign waters, thus leading to the reopening of authorized trade relations. While we do not know in what specific way the Shimazu Clan responded to the Toyotomi Regime's request, in the author's opinion they probably attempted to negotiate with the Ming Dynasty either through the Ryukyu Kingdom or under the guise of returning shipwrecked or captured Chinese subjects. Regardless of the style of approach, the attempts made by the Shimazus ended in abysmal failure, resulting in the Toyotomi Regime abandoning any hope of reopening trade by the beginning of the 1590s and the reckless decision to launch an invasion of the Korean Peninsula.

5. The Fujian Trade Network and the Piracy Cessation Ordinances

After the issuance of the general archipelago-wide Piracy Cessation Ordinance and the directive to the Shimazu Clan banning *bahan* activities abroad in the 7th and 11th months of 1588, it was only a matter of time before the anti-piracy policy would be applied to foreign (in particular Chinese) vessels, as well. Throughout the 16th century, in addition to Satsuma and Ōsumi, the port of Hirado and Gotō Islands of Hizen Province had also been important staging grounds for piratical activities. For example, during the 1550s, the *wakō* commander Wang Zhi used Hirado and the Gotō Islands as his bases of operations in conducting clandestine trade via the East China Sea in association with the Matura 松浦 Clan. After Wang's downfall, it was still said that "for this 20 years, foreign ships gathered at Hirado, where Chinese smugglers relocated to set up retail businesses."⁷⁰⁾ And even after the decline of the late *wakō*, Hirado remained a base of operation for pirates. For example, one Jesuit sailing from the Gotō Islands to Hirado mentions "the danger of being attacked by corsairs while navigating the waters between the Islands;" and on a sea journey to Hakata as well, he notes being threatened by "the many corsairs that frequent the seas of Hirado and Hakata."⁷¹⁾ Again, a Franciscan missionary who visited Hirado in 1584 reported that the port's "bellicose" residents were fond of launching attacks along the Chinese coastline.⁷²⁾

Such evidence suggests that the Chinese people who frequented Hirado and the Gotō Islands were not only involved in the clandestine trade, but also acts of piracy. For example, there is the following vermilion seal declaration issued to Matura Shigenobu 松浦鎮信, the lord of Hirado, in the 10th month of 1589.

Since my (Hideyoshi's) order for all provinces to maintain peace on the seas, ships carrying tribute goods sailed [to Japan] at the request of China (*Daitō*). Nevertheless, it has reached me that this spring, commercial ships reported hailing from your (Matura's) territory under the command of a Chinese captain by the name of Tekkai つかい appeared in the spirit of *bahan* to perpetrate acts of piracy on the cargoes of the aforementioned Chinese ships. I order you upon receiving this report [of piracy on the part] of the abovementioned ships to arrest and transport this Tekkai and all of his crew here for questioning. Understand that if for any reason any of these pirates do not appear, you too will be held responsible for breaking the law. I

order you to transport them as soon as possible.⁷³⁾

Again, in the 11th month of that year Konishi Ryūsa's second son and Christian *daimyō* Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長 repeated the gist of Hideyoshi's declaration to both Matura and Uku Sumiharu 宇久純玄, the lord of the Gotō Islands, ordering them to investigate Captain Tekkai and his cohorts and transport them one and all to the Toyotomi authorities.⁷⁴⁾ This Tekkai, like Wang Zhi before him, commanded a fleet of ships operating out of Hirado and the Gotō Islands and manned by a conglomerate of mainly Chinese and Japanese crewmen, and took the opportunity of prevailing winds every spring to sail to China for clandestine trade, brigandage and the like. As to the Chinese ship bearing "tribute" for Hideyoshi which Tekkai and his men attacked, we can only conclude that it was a vessel which had defied the Ming Court's ban on voyages to Japan to engage in the clandestine trade. In any case, the Toyotomi Regime's piracy cessation policy was now complete, interdicting not only the Japanese from acts of piracy at home and abroad, but also the Chinese residents in Japan from acts of *bahan* towards their compatriots.

Thus, prohibiting the piracy on the sea around Japan and *bahan* abroad, the Piracy Cessation Ordinances guaranteed the peace on the sea, in the same manner as the Declaration of General Peace and "Sword Hunt" Ordinance on the land.⁷⁵⁾ The intent of the former was clearly to safeguard and promote the entry of foreign ships and to monopolize the profits yielded from them, by guaranteeing safe passage on the sea. Together with the pacification of Kyushu in 1587, Hideyoshi was also intent on bringing Nagasaki under his direct jurisdiction by wresting that port's foreign trade from the hands of the Society of Jesus by such means as his Christian missionary deportation orders. It was only a year later that he ordered Konishi Ryūsa to corner the market on raw silk thread being transported into Nagasaki by Portuguese vessels.⁷⁶⁾ Then in the 7th month of 1591, he ordered his Nagasaki deputy Nabeshima Naoshige 鍋島直茂 et al. to force Portuguese ships to sell them all the gold they were bringing in. The Portuguese met these measures with sufficient indignation and resistance to force Hideyoshi to abandon his monopoly efforts and allow the Society of Jesus to reside in Nagasaki, for the time being.⁷⁷⁾

What exactly had forced the Toyotomi Regime to make such compromises was the necessity to prioritize the continuation of the Macao-Nagasaki trade in order to procure military materiel and capital in preparation for a full scale invasion of the Korean peninsula. At that time, Japan was

totally dependent on foreign suppliers for such raw products as natural saltpeter to make gunpowder and lead to make bullets, and the gold coming in through the Portuguese and the Chinese was the key to acquiring such items.⁷⁸⁾

It was two months after he abandoned his plan to corner the Nagasaki gold market that Hideyoshi issued the following vermilion seal declaration to Nabeshima Naoshige, Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正, the lord of Kumamoto 熊本 (Higo Province), Kuroda Yoshitaka 黒田孝高, the lord of Fukuoka 福岡 (Chikuzen Province), and Mōri Yoshinari 毛利吉成, the lord of Kokura 小倉 (Buzen Province).

Hitherto, trading ships from India (Gesshi 月氏), China (Shintan 震旦), Korea (Kōrai 高麗, Shiragi 新羅 and Kudara 百濟) and many other lands have been allowed to come to Japan, and it has been ordered that when these ships reach Japan, they can land freely in every port and trade peacefully. It is for this reason that the captains of Gaibon がいぼん of the great Ming Dynasty have built new ships, opened a port of Kaihon かいほん and have dispatched trading vessels to Japan; and we are prepared to accept them. However, Southern Barbarians' Black Ships (Nanban Kurofune 南蠻黒船; viz. Portuguese ships) at Satsuma have violated free-trade by attacking one of these new ships, and the matter has been reported by the captains in a petition to us. This is a clear case of the violation of our laws. Hereafter, our attitude must be explained to [the captains of] the Black Ships, and they must be told that if they do anything of that kind in the future, it will be looked upon as a very serious matter.

Last year a Black Ship at Nagasaki plundered a trading ship from Kaihon, extorted gratuities (tolls) in silver, and commandeered equipment and other items from the ship, or so it has been reported. If this is true, we must conduct a strict investigation and enforce speedy restitution. Such a crime deserves the type of punitive action that will serve as a warning to others, but as it concerns foreigners, we are prepared to overlook it on this occasion. I hereby order you to advise them not to commit this kind of acts in the future.⁷⁹⁾

As to the place name, Kaihon, or Gaibon, mentioned in the above document, Charles Ralph Boxer, who had occasion to render the declaration into English,⁸⁰⁾ was informed by Enoki Kazuo 榎一雄 that the name may refer to the port of Haifeng 海豐 in eastern Guangdong Province.⁸¹⁾

However, Haifeng was not a major foreign trade port at the time, and we have no record of ships sailing out of that port bound for Japan. Perhaps the time has come to reconsider the location of "Kaihon" as our own Fujian port of Haicheng (Haiteng in the Minnan dialect), the only legally recognized foreign trade port at the time, while at the same time serving as the center of the Chinese clandestine trade with still interdicted Japan. In other words, the acts of piracy that the above declaration was written to sanction were perpetrated by (mainly Portuguese) Black Ships on the vessels of Chinese maritime merchants involved in the trade between Haicheng and the ports of Kyushu.

Three years later in 1594, just after the Ming authorities once again lifted the ban on Chinese merchant ships trading in Southeast Asia in 1593, the governor of Fujian Xu Fuyuan reported that even after the loosening of restrictions, the clandestine trade with Japan was still being conducted out of the Zhangzhou Bay region. To wit,

Although the ban has been lifted on overseas voyages [to Southeast Asia], the crackdown on smuggling to Japan remains very strict. The summer solstice essentially marks the end of the season for traveling to Southeast Asia. According to recent investigations, there are certain lawbreakers around Zhangzhou and Quanzhou who have secretly built ships in the Haicheng area and loaded them with commodities for smuggling into Japan. They absolutely must be arrested upon their departure from port.⁸²⁾

Here we have a Chinese source that seems to verify Hideyoshi's declaration that ships were being built in Haicheng (Kaihon) and from there sailing to Japan. After its failure to regulate the Macao-Nagasaki trade, it was only natural that the Toyotomi Regime would immediately ban the Portuguese carriers involved in that trade from perpetrating acts of piracy against Chinese merchant ships. Such action may have been an attempt to protect the expanding commercial network of Fujian maritime merchants in the East China Sea with Haicheng as its hub port, and thus to gain control over an alternative trade route, if only auxiliary to the Nagasaki-Macao route, dealing in Japanese silver and Chinese goods.

Such action would more or less constitute the overall consummation of the Toyotomi Regime's piracy cessation policy. To chronologically sum up the policy-making and implementation process:

- 1587 1. Immediately after the pacification of Kyushu, punitive action is taken against the Fukabori Clan; and acts of piracy towards Portuguese and Chinese merchant ships are forbidden on the sea around Kyushu.
2. Punitive action is taken against the Murakami Clan as Piracy Cessation Ordinances are applied to the Seto Inland Sea maritime routes.
- 1588 3. Along with “Sword Hunt” Ordinance, an archipelago-wide Piracy Cessation Ordinance is issued to gain control over the maritime population.
- 1588–89 4. The Shimazu Clan is directed to suppress acts of piracy abroad (*bahan*).
- 1589 5. The Matsura Clan is directed to suppress acts of piracy on the part of the Chinese.
- 1591 6. Portuguese (Nanban) merchant ships are forbidden from perpetrating acts of piracy on Chinese merchant ships.

As the above summary shows, Hideyoshi’s piracy cessation policy as vehicles for gaining hegemony over Japan’s maritime population was consummated at policy-making phases 2. and 3., while the main objective of the following phases can be said to have shifted to ensuring the safety of Chinese ships sailing into the waters off Kyushu. The targets of the orders were, in chronological order, maritime feudal lords perpetrating acts of piracy on Chinese merchant ships (1.), Japanese *bahan* activities in foreign coastal regions (4.), Japan-based Chinese *bahan* activities in foreign coastal regions (5.) and Portuguese (Nanban) attacks on Chinese merchant vessels (6.).

By the end of the 16th century, the Fujian maritime commercial network had expanded geographically from the South to the East China Sea, as the Fujian-Luzon-Kyushu trade route developed as an auxiliary to the Macao-Nagasaki route, and thus serving as a secondary route in the Japan-Ming trade. At the same time, the trade by both Chinese and Japanese merchants linking Kyushu and continental Southeast Asia also grew in scale. For example, in 1593 it was recorded that the port of Satsuma played host to four vessels bound for Luzon, three vessels headed for central Vietnam and one vessel on its way to Cambodia and Siam.⁸³⁾

From the viewpoint of his foreign policy, the main objective of Hideyoshi’s Piracy Cessation Ordinances at that same time was guaranteeing

safe voyages for Chinese maritime merchants, in particular those of Fujian sailing out of Haicheng, for the purpose of both promoting and establishing hegemony over the trade they conduct with Japan. The successful maritime security accomplished under the Piracy Cessation Ordinances was considered to be a crucial condition for the Toyotomi Regime in reopening official trade with the Ming Dynasty. That is to say, the Toyotomi Regime anticipated that the pacification of Japanese waters under those orders would persuade the Ming Court to declare Chinese merchants' trade in the East China Sea legal, just as it had declared their trade in the South China Sea de facto legitimate by the loosening of previous bans, for the purpose of opening a direct trade route between Japan and Ming, which could substitute the Macao-Nagasaki route.

Conclusion

It was at the end of the 1560s that the Ming Dynasty first relaxed its ban on Chinese merchant ships voyaging into Southeast Asia, an event almost simultaneous with Oda Nobunaga's victorious march into the capital of Kyōto. At the same time when the Oda-Toyotomi Regime embarked on the task of integrating the Japanese archipelago under their governance, the East Asian maritime trade order centering around the Ming Dynasty was being reorganized, thus ushering in what we have referred to as the "1570 system." It was under this system that the commercial network formed by Fujian maritime merchants began to rapidly expand into the South China Sea region, while the Portuguese were able to develop a trade route linking Macao and Nagasaki via the East China Sea.

Then during the 1580s, attracted by the huge profitability of trading in Japanese silver, Fujian maritime merchants expanded their operations to include clandestine trade activities with Japan, defying the Ming Court's ban on trade with Japan by stealing out of their Zhangzhou Bay ports with contraband bound for the island of Kyushu. Meanwhile, there was also a proliferation of Fujian maritime merchants active in South China Sea region, especially concentrating around Luzon, in particular Manila, which was experiencing large influxes of silver from the New World. It was at this time that one part of the Fujian maritime merchants began voyaging from Luzon through the Southwest Island into Kyushu. It was in this manner that by the end of the 16th century the triangular trade route connecting the points of Zhangzhou Bay, Luzon and Kyushu grew almost exclusively at the hand of Fujian maritime merchants. Even during 1592–

93, when a complete interdiction on maritime trade was reinstated due to Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of the Korean Peninsula, the Fujian clandestine trade network continued as if nothing had happened. This state of affairs has been verified archeologically by the sudden increase in artifacts of Zhangzhou ware unearthed from excavation sites throughout western Japan.

From the viewpoint of the domestic policy, the declarations issued by the Toyotomi Regime ordering the cessation of acts of piracy on the sea were attempts to forbid the unauthorized exercise of armed force by various individual lords who were then in control of Japanese waters and its maritime population, deprive them of their autonomy and integrate their rights and subjects under the *daimyōs* or local lords subinfeudated by the regime. On the foreign relations front, these same orders represented a foreign trade protection policy strictly forbidding acts of piracy against foreign (in particular Chinese) maritime merchants and thus providing them with safe voyages in which to operate. Immediately following his pacification of Kyushu, Hideoyoshi turned to the waters surrounding it with such actions as dispossessing the powerful Fukabori Clan of Nagasaki for acts of piracy (viz., the previously accepted practice of extorting safe passage (*kego*) tolls and pillaging ships refusing to pay). In 1589, another order directed the Shimazu Clan to suppress pirates sailing out to smuggle and pillage on the foreign coasts, behavior referred to as *bahan*, and then the Matura Clan of Hirado was ordered to expose the piracy committed by the Chinese. Finally, in 1591, Hideyoshi issued an order banning acts of piracy like those perpetrated by Portuguese (Nanban) Black Ships at Nagasaki and Satsuma against Chinese maritime merchants sailing out of the port of "Kaihon," namely Haicheng.

By the end of the 16th century, the various polities of East and Southeast Asia involved in the "1570 system" were officially trading with the Ming through at least one of three possible trade venues: 1) the tributary trade with the Ming Dynasty, 2) the border trade at specified market locations (*hushi*) and 3) the Haicheng-Southeast Asia routes operated by Fujian maritime merchants (*wangshi* 往市). Only the Japanese archipelago was excluded from participation in this three-pronged system, with the vast profit from the Japan-Ming trade falling into the hands of the Portuguese conducting the Macao-Nagasaki trade and the Chinese merchants involved in the clandestine trade. The Piracy Cessation Ordinances issued by the Toyotomi Regime aimed in part at promoting, protecting and controlling Japan's foreign trade with Ming China and Southeast Asia

through the Fujian maritime commercial network by guaranteeing its merchants safety in Japanese waters

In addition, the Toyotomi Regime was convinced that as an extension to pacifying the sea surrounding Japan, the Ming Court would agree to reopen official trade between the two polities, in the same spirit of relaxing restrictions on Chinese vessels sailing to Southeast East. On the other hand, around the time of the pacification of Kyushu, Hideyoshi began making public statements about his ambition to subjugate the Korean Peninsula and the Chinese mainland.⁸⁴⁾ However, at that time, since the Japanese archipelago was not yet fully integrated, he would have to be satisfied with the reopening of official trade with China for the time being, directing the Shimazu Clan to begin negotiations with the Ming Court. Come the 1590s, as efforts at negotiations bore no fruit, Hideyoshi abandoned hope and plunged Japan into a reckless invasion of the Korean Peninsula.

The grand illusions of expansionism that accompanied the launch of the invasion in 1592 were soon shattered in the following year when Hideyoshi was forced to enter peace negotiations with the Ming Court, which had come to the aid of the Joseon Dynasty. Again the issue of the reopening of official trade with China surfaced as one of Hideyoshi's conditions for ceasing hostilities demanding,

Animosity continues between Japan and Ming China, as in recent years the [officially sanctioned] tally trade has been interrupted. Now is the time to change such a state of affairs and allow both official and private commercial vessels to come and go as they please.⁸⁵⁾

The request for the revival of the tally trade was probably conceived in the hope that both Japan and China would now be allowed to issue tallies to both official envoys and private merchants freely traveling between the ports of each polity; that is, a request for recognition by the Ming Court of Japan's participation in the "1570 system" under the reciprocal border trade category (*hushi* or *wangshi*).

Another reason for launching an invasion of the continent was "because the Ming Court has not expressed any gratitude for Japan's suppression of piracy on the seas as a whole, and *wakō* activities in particular."⁸⁶⁾ Here again the theme of reopening official trade with China as recognition for pacifying the sea under the Piracy Cessation Ordinances reappears as a rather one-sided legitimization for the invasion. Notwithstanding, this

time around the Ming Court did take up Hideyoshi's request in a lively debate over the pros and cons of opening official trade with Japan,⁸⁷⁾ which concluded that the Court would admit Japan as a foreign tributary, but would not permit trade between the two polities, thus plunging the peace negotiation into a stalemate.

As Japan entered the 17th century, the issue of reopening official trade with China would have to wait for the Tokugawa Shogunate to take action. However, by the time the Shogunate would get around to it, at the beginning of the 1620s, the Ming Court's loosening of restrictions on maritime transport had brought about an influx of Chinese maritime merchants inundating Japan, as the China trade at Nagasaki grew in proportion to the Macao-Nagasaki trade. Moreover, regarding Fujian's Zhangzhou Bay region, the 1620s were marked by the rise of Zheng Zhilong's 鄭芝龍, commercial-military maritime force, who based himself both on the profits yielded from the trade centering around the Amoy (Xiamen 廈門)-Nagasaki route and on the naval forces, and whose half-Japanese son Chenggong 鄭成功 (born at Hirado) would put up strong resistance to maritime restrictions imposed by the Qing Dynasty and take control of the whole Fujian maritime commercial network active throughout the East China and South China Seas.

Notes

- 1) The following discussion is based on: Nakajima Gakushō 中島樂章, "14-16 seiki, Higashi Ajia bōeki chitsujo no henyō to saihei: Chōkō taisei kara 1570 nen shisutemu he" 14-16世紀、東アジア貿易秩序の變容と再編：朝貢體制から1570年システムへ (Transformation and reorganization of the international trade order in East Asia from the 14th to 16th century: From the tributary system to the "1570 system"), *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* 社會經濟史學 (Socio-Economic History) 76-4, 2011; Nakajima Gakushō, ed., "Semegiau umi: 1500-1600 nen" せめぎあう海：1500-1600年 (Seas of rivalry: 1500-1600), in Haneda Masashi 羽田正 ed., *Umi kara mita rekishi* 海から見た歴史 (East Asian history viewed from the sea), Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 2013.
- 2) See Nakajima Gakushō 中島樂章, "16 seiki matsu no Fukken-Firippin-Kyūshū bōeki" 十六世紀末の福建—フィリッピン—九州貿易 (The development of the Fujian-Philippine-Kyushu maritime trade in the late 16th century), *Shien* 史淵 (Journal of History) 144, 2007; Nakajima Gakushō, "The Invasion of Korea and trade with Luzon: Katō Kiyomasa's scheme of the Luzon trade in the late sixteenth century," in Angela Schottenhammer, ed., *The East Asian "Mediterranean": Maritime crossroads of culture, commerce and human migration*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009.

- 3) Nakajima, "14-16 seiki Higashi Ajia bōeki chitsujo no henyō to saihen," pp. 20-26.
- 4) Kobata Atsushi 小葉田淳, "Mindai Shōsenjin no kaigai tsūshō hatten" 明代漳泉人の海外通商發展 (The development of the maritime commercial activities of Zhang-Quan merchants during the Ming period), in Kobata, *Kingin bōekishi no kenkyū* 金銀貿易史の研究 (Studies in the history of the gold and silver trade), Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku 法政大學出版局, 1976; Sakuma Shigeo 佐久間重男, "Mindai kaigai shibōeki no rekishiteki haikai: Fukkeshō wo chūshin to shite" 明代海外私貿易の歴史的背景：福建省を中心として (On the historical background to private sector foreign trade during the Ming period), in Sakuma, *Nichimin kankeishi no kenkyū* 日明關係史の研究 (A study of Japan-China relations during the Ming period), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1992.
- 5) Xu Fuyuan 許孚遠, *Jinghetang ji* 敬和堂集, shu 疏, "Shutong haijin shu" 疏通海禁疏.
- 6) Kobata, "Mindai Shōsenjin no kaigai tsūshō hatten," pp. 248-259; Sakuma Shigeo, "Mindai kōki ni okeru Shōshū no kaigai bōeki" 明代後期における漳州の海外貿易 (Foreign trade in Zhangzhou in the late Ming period), in Sakuma, *Nichimin kankeishi no kenkyū*, pp. 324-330.
- 7) Kobata, "Mindai Shōsenjin no kaigai tsūshō hatten," pp. 245-259; Sakuma, "Mindai kōki ni okeru Shōshū no kaigai bōeki," pp. 330-334.
- 8) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, gongyi 公移, "Haijin tiaoyue xing fenshou Zhangnandao" 海禁條約行分守漳南道.
- 9) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, "Haijin tiaoyue xing fenshou Zhangnandao"; Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the Islands and their peoples, their history and records of the Catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those Islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the beginning to the nineteenth century*, Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903-11, vol. 16, pp. 177-178.
- 10) Sakuma, "Mindai kōki ni okeru Shōshū no kaigai bōeki," pp. 335-343.
- 11) On the trade between Fujian and the Philippines in the 16th and 17th centuries and the Chinese resident in the latter place, see: Chen Jinghe 陳荆和, *16 shiji zhi Feilübin Huaqiao* 十六世紀之菲律賓華僑 (The overseas Chinese in the Philippines during the sixteenth century), Hong Kong: Xianggang Zhongwen Daxue Xinya Yanjiusuo 香港中文大學新亞研究所, 1963; Juan Gil, *Los chinos en Manila (siglos XVI y XVII)*, Lisboa: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, 2011; Hirayama Atsuko 平山篤子, *Supein teikoku to Chūka teikoku no kaikō: 16-17 seiki no Manira* スペイン帝國と中華帝國の邂逅：16・17世紀のマニラ (Encounter of the Spanish Empire and the Chinese Empire: Manila in the 16th and 17th centuries), Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 2012; Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local comparisons and global connections*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, c2015. Also see: Nakajima, "16 seiki matsu no Fukken-Firippin-Kyūshū bōeki," pp. 56-65.

- 12) *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 16, pp.177–183.
- 13) Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques (XVI^e, XVII^e, XVIII^e siècles): Introduction méthodologique et indices d'activité*, Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960, I, pp. 148–160; Richard von Glahn, *Fountain of fortune: Money and monetary policy in China, 1000–1700*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, pp. 118–120.
- 14) Sakuma, “Mindai kōki ni okeru Shōshū no kaigai bōeki,” pp. 328–329.
- 15) *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 7, p. 230; Hirayama, *Supeiin teikoku to Chūka teikoku no kaikō*, pp. 277–281.
- 16) Kishida Hiroshi 岸田裕之, *Daimyō ryōgoku no keizai kōzō* 大名領國の經濟構造 (The economic structure of *daimyōs'* domains), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2001, pp. 200–203.
- 17) Okamoto Yoshitomo 岡本良知, “1590 nen izen ni okeru Nihon Firippin kan no kōtsū to bōeki” 1590年以前に於ける日本フィリピン間の交通と貿易 (Japan-Philippine communications and trade prior to 1590), in Okamoto, *Kirishitan no jidai: Sono bunka to bōeki* キリシタンの時代：その貿易と文化 (Japan's Christian era: Trade and culture), Tokyo: Yagi Shoten 八木書店, 1987.
- 18) Nakajima, “16 seiki matsu no Fukken-Firippin-Kyūshū bōeki,” pp. 79–83.
- 19) Years which appear in this article correspond not to the solar but to the lunar calendar (e.g. the 4th month of 1592 (Bunroku 1) is May–June of 1592 in the Gregorian calendar.). Thus months are hereafter presented without using the month names of the Western calendar.
- 20) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, “Shutong haijin shu”; *ibid.*, gongyi, “Chayi haijin xing buzhengsi” 查議海禁行布政司.
- 21) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, “Shutong haijin shu.”
- 22) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, “Haijin tiaoyue xing fenshou Zhangnandao.”
- 23) Xu Fuyuan, *Jinghetang ji*, gongyi, “Zhaohuan fanfan baixing xing Qincan-jiang” 招還販番百姓行秦參將.
- 24) Nakajima, “The Invasion of Korea and trade with Luzon,” pp. 155–159.
- 25) See *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 9, p. 266; p. 320; Chen Jinghe, *Shiliu Shiji zhi Feilubin Huaqiao*, pp. 126–127
- 26) *The Philippine Islands*, vol.9, pp. 54–55.
- 27) *The Philippine Islands*, vol.9, p. 40.
- 28) *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 16, pp. 177–178, p. 183, pp. 200–203.
- 29) Adachi Hiroyuki 安達裕之, “Higashi Shinakai no kōkai jiki” 東シナ海の航海時期 (Favorable sailing seasons in the East China Sea), *Kaijishi Kenkyū*, 海事史研究 (Journal of the Japan Society for Nautical Research) 66, 2009, pp. 25–29.
- 30) Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一, *Shinpan Shuinsen bōekishi no kenkyū* 新版朱印船貿易史の研究 (Studies in the commercial history of Japan's Vermillion Seal Ships), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, pp. 191–192.
- 31) Ichimura Takao 市村高男, “Chūsei no kōro to kōwan” 中世の航路と港湾 (Medieval maritime routes and ports of trade), in Arano Yasunori 荒野泰典 et al., ed., *Wakō to Nihon Kokuō* 倭寇と日本國王 (*Wakō* and Japanese king-ship), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2010.
- 32) Izumi Chōichi 泉澄一, *Sakai: Chūsei jiyū toshi* 堺：中世自由都市 (Sakai, a free

- city of medieval Japan), Higashi Murayama: Kyōikusha 教育社, 1981; Aoyagi Masaru 青柳勝, 16 seiki ni okeru Sakai shōnin no shōken, bunkaken no kakudai” 十六世紀における堺商人の商圏・文化圏の擴大 (Expansion of the commercial and cultural spheres of the merchants of Sakai during the 16th century), *Kokushigaku* 國史學 (The Journal of Japanese History) 132, 1987.
- 33) Michael Flecker, “A cargo of Zhangzhou porcelain found off Binh Thuan Province, Vietnam,” *Oriental Art*, vol. 48, no.5, 2002; Kikuchi Seiichi 菊池誠一, *Betonamu Nihonmachi no kōkogaku* ベトナム日本町の考古學 (The archeology of Japanese towns in Vietnam), Tokyo: Kōshi Shoin 高志書院, 2003, pp. 200–209; Sakai Takashi 坂井隆, *Kōshi kokka Banten to tōji bōeki* 港市國家バンテンと陶磁貿易 (The Javanese port polity of Banten and the ceramics trade), Tokyo: Dōseisha 同成社, 2002, pp. 49–52.
- 34) Hashimoto Hisakazu 橋本久和, ed., *Kōkogaku to Muromachi-Sengoku-ki no ryūtsū: Setouchi to Ajia wo musubu michi* 考古學と室町・戰國期の流通：瀬戸内とアジアを結ぶ道 (The archeology of commodity distribution in late medieval Japan: The Seto Inland Sea-Asian connection), Tokyo: Kōshi Shoin, 2012, pp. 119–138, pp. 245–270; Kawaguchi Yōhei 川口洋平, “Hakata kara Nagasaki he: 16, 17 seiki no bōeki toshi no suii” 博多から長崎へ：16、17世紀の貿易港市の推移 (From Hakata to Nagasaki: Historical trends in Japan's ports of trade during the 16th and 17th centuries), *Hakata Kenkyūkaishi* 博多研究會誌 (Journal of the Hakata Research Society) 8, 2000.
- 35) Mori Tsuyoshi 森毅, “16, 17 seiki ni okeru tōjiki no yōsō to sono ryūtsū: Ōsaka no shiryō wo chūshin ni” 一六・一七世紀における陶磁器の様相とその流通：大坂の資料を中心に (The state of ceramic pottery and its distribution during the 16th and 17th centuries: Based mainly on the sources from Osaka), *Historia* ヒストリア (Historia) 149, 1995, pp. 87–106.; Noshiro Tsutomu 能芝勉, “Momoyama jidai kara Edo jidai zenki no Kyōto shutsudo yunyū tōjiki no shosō” 桃山時代から江戸時代前期の京都出土輸入陶磁器の諸相 (Various aspects of the imported ceramic pottery during the Momoyama through the early Tokugawa era unearthed in Kyoto), *Kansai Kinsei Kokogaku Kenkyū* 關西近世考古學研究 (Archeological Studies of the Early Modern Kansai Region) 17, 2009.
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- 38) Miki Seiichirō 三鬼清一郎, “Kaizoku Kinshirei wo megutte” 海賊禁止令をめぐって (On Hideyoshi's Piracy Cessation Ordinances), in Miki, *Toyotomi seiken no hō to Chōsen Shuppei* 豊臣政權の法と朝鮮出兵 (Law under the Toyotomi Regime and the Invasion of Korea), Tokyo: Seishi Shuppan 青史出版, 2012; Kishida, *Daimyō ryōgoku no Keizai kōzō*, pp. 365–391; Fujita Tatsuo 藤田達生, “Kaizoku Kinshirei no seiritsu katei” 海賊禁止令の成立過程 (The formation process of Hideyoshi's Piracy Cessation Ordinances), in Fujita, *Nihon kinsei*

- kokka seiritsushi no kenkyū* 日本近世國家成立史の研究 (Historical studies in the formation of the early modern Japanese state), Tokyo: Azekura Shobō 校倉書房, 2001; Nakano Hitoshi 中野等, “Iwayuru ‘Kaizoku Chōjirei’ no igi ni tsuite” いわゆる「海賊停止令」の意義について (On the significance of the so-called “Piracy Cessation Ordinances”), in *Higashi Ajia kaiiki ni okeru kōryū no shosō: Kaizoku, hyōryū, mitsubōeki* 東アジア海域における交流の諸相：海賊・漂流・密貿易 (Various aspects of international relations in maritime East Asia: Piracy, shipwrecks and smuggling), Fukuoka: Kyūshū Daigaku 九州大學, 2005.
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- 41) Luís Fróis (edição anotada por José Wicki), *Historia de Japam*, Lisboa: Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, 1976–1984, vol. I, primeira parte, capítulo 100, p. 392
- 42) Sebastião Rodolpho Dalgado, *Glossário luso-asiático*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1921, vol. II, p. 313; Gil, *Los Chinos en Manila*, p. 787.
- 43) *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 16, pp. 177.
- 44) *Cartas que os padres e irmãos da Companhia de Jesus escreverão dos Reynos de Iapão & China aos da mesma Companhia da India, & Europa, des do anno de 1549 até o de 1580*, facsimile rpt. Tenri: Tenri Central Library, 1972, tomo II, pp. 55, 146, 234.
- 45) Luís Fróis, *Historia de Japam*, vol. IV, capítulo 52, pp. 392–395.
- 46) *Nabeshima Naoshige fu kōho* 鍋島直茂譜考補 (Additional thoughts on the biography of Nabeshima Naoshige), quoted from Fujiki, *Toyotomi heiwarei to Sengoku shakai*, p. 221.
- 47) Toyama Mikio 外山幹夫, *Chūsei Nagasaki no kisoteki kenkyū* 中世長崎の基礎的研究 (Fundamental studies on medieval Nagasaki), Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan 思文閣出版, 2011, pp. 311–313.
- 48) Luís Fróis, *Historia de Japam*, vol. I, primeira parte, capítulo 97, p. 375.
- 49) *Cartas que os padres e irmãos da Companhia de Jesus*, tomo II, p. 172.
- 50) *Sagaken shiryō shūsei: Komonjo hen* 佐賀縣史料集成 古文書編 (Collected historical sources of Saga Prefecture: Old documents), Saga: Saga Kenritsu Toshokan 佐賀縣立圖書館, 1959, vol. 4, *Fukaborike monjo* 深堀家文書 (Collected documents of the Fukabori Clan), pp. 238–239, document no. 381. Also see Fujiki, *Toyotomi heiwarei to Sengoku shakai*, pp. 219–221; Fujita, “Kaizoku kinshirei no seiritsu katei,” pp. 155–156.
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- 52) *Minakuchi Katōke monjo* 水口加藤家文書 (Collected documents of the Minakuchi Katō Clan), quoted from Fujiki, *Toyotomi heiwarei to Sengoku shakai*, p. 218.
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- 54) Avila Girón (Sakuma Tadashi 佐久間正 et. al. trans.), *Nihon Ōkoku ki* 日本王國記 (Relación del Reino de Nippon a que llaman corruptamente Jappon: Tratado em que se contem muito susintae abreviadamente algumas contradicções e diferenças de costumes antre a gente de Europa e esta provincia de Japão), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965, p. 50.
- 55) Afterwards, Lin sailed from Quanzhou for Luzon to trade wheat flour which he bought on this occasion (Table 2, Item 7).
- 56) Hou Jigao 侯繼高, *Quanzhe bingzhi kao* 全浙兵制考, addendum “Jinbao wojing” 近報倭警. See Nakajima, “16 seiki matsu no Fukken-Firippin-Kyūshū bōeki,” p. 82.
- 57) Fujiwara Seika 藤原惺窩, “Nankō nikki zankan” 南航日記殘簡, in *Fujiwara Seika shū* 藤原惺窩集 (Collected Works of Fujiwara Seika), vol. 2, Tokyo: Kokumin Seishin Bunka Kenkyūjo 國民精神文化研究所, 1939, pp. 380–381.
- 58) Whereas the Portuguese sources calls this activity *bafan*, it is recorded as *bahan* ばはん in the Japanese sources. Hereafter the author refers to this activity as *bahan*, while he employs the term *bafan* when quoting the Portuguese sources.
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- 67) Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, “Nichimin kangō saikō” 日明勘合再考 (Reconsideration of the Japan-Ming Dynasty Tally Trade), in Kyūshū Shigaku Kenkyūkai 九州史學研究會, ed., *Kyōkai kara mita uchi to soto: ‘Kyūshū Shigaku’ sōkan 50 shūnen kinen ronbunshū* 境界からみた内と外：「九州史學」創刊五〇周年記念論文集 (The boundary/frontier perception of its inside and outside: The collection of academic articles for the ‘Kyushu-Shigaku’ 50th anniversary), vol. 2, Tokyo: Iwata Shoin 岩田書院, 2008, pp. 327–362.
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- ninshiki to Chōsen Shinryaku* 豊臣政権の對外認識と朝鮮侵略 (The Invasion of Korea and the Toyotomi Regime's perception of international affairs), Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1990, pp. 188–191; Fujiki, *Toyotomi heiwarei to Sengoku shakai*, pp. 240–244.
- 69) There are examples of sealed documents (*inbanjō* 印判狀) called “tallies,” issued either by the Shimazu Clan to ships bound for the Ryukyu Islands or by the Tokugawa Shogunate to ships headed abroad for foreign trade. Kamiya Nobuyuki 紙屋敦之, *Taikun gaikō to Higashi Ajia* 大君外交と東アジア (“Taikun Diplomacy” and East Asia), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997, p. 262; Fujiki, *Toyotomi heiwarei to Sengoku shakai*, p. 243.
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Table 1: Chronological and Geographical Developments in the Japan-Ming Trade during the 16th Century

		Phases				
Port		Phase I (1500–39)	Phase II (1540–56)	Phase III (1557–66)	Phase IV (1567–79)	Phase V (1580–1600)
Hangzhou Bay	Ming tributary trade through the Maritime Trade Supervisorate (<i>shibosi</i>) at Ningbo (1511/1523/1539)	Clandestine trade with Shuangyu (–1548)	Later <i>wakō</i> clandestine trade and brigandage activities (1548–)	Surrender of Wang Zhi (1557)	Sporadic small-scale <i>wakō</i> activities	Sporadic small scale <i>wakō</i> activities
	Trade Supervisorate (<i>shibosi</i>) at Ningbo (1511/1523/1539)	Later <i>wakō</i> clandestine trade and brigandage activities (1548–)	Ming Court strengthens maritime defense system → Slowdown of later <i>wakō</i> activities			
Zhangzhou Bay	Clandestine trade with Ryukyu	Later <i>wakō</i> clandestine trade and brigandage activities (1548–)	<i>Wakō</i> operations moving south	Maritime prohibitions relaxed (1567–)	Hatcheng-Kyushu trade	Hatcheng-Luzon-Kyushu trade grows
Guangzhou Bay	Incoming Ryukyu ships?	Portuguese ships arrive in Kyushu from Shan-chuandao 上川島 Island and Langbaiaio 浪白澳 (Lampacao) (1550–)	Portuguese settlement (1557–) in Macao	Macao-Nagasaki route opened (1571–)	Macao-Nagasaki trade flourishes	
Ryukyu	Japan-Ming trade (Tributary trade + Chinese clandestine trade + Japanese trade)	Rebellion of Chinese smugglers (1542) → Slowdown in the clandestine trade	Decline in both Ming tributary and Chinese clandestine trades	State-sponsored trade with South East Asia discontinued → Stagnation of Japan-Ming entreat trade	Kyushu-Fujian-Luzon	

Table 2. Arrivals of Chinese Merchant Ships into Southern Kyushu at the End of the 16th Century

Year/Month	Port Name	Details About Arrival
1 1574 (Tenshō 2)/ Intercal 11	Koshikishima	Arriving ships submit a compliant to Shimazu Clan about the plunder of cargoes.
2 1583 (Tenshō 11)	Yamakawa	Shimazu Clan orders Ei 穎娃 Clan, the local lord (<i>jitō</i> 地頭), to report on Chinese and Portuguese ships entering the port.
3 1584 (Tenshō 12)/6	Kumizaki	Arriving ship presents Shimazu vassal Uwai Kakuken 上井覺兼 with gifts including oil jar.
4 1584 (Tenshō 12)/12	Ichiki	Arriving ship presents Uwai Kakuken with gifts including serving plate and tea bowl.
5 1585 (Tenshō 13)/2	Iōtō	Arriving ship shipwrecked, presents Shimazu Clan with silver from its cargo.
6 1590 (Tenshō 18)?/11	Uchinoura	Local lord Hongō 北郷 Clan forwards cargo items to Hideyoshi.
7 1591 (Tenshō 19)	Satsuma	Zhangzhou merchant Lin Shaoqi arrives; returns to Quanzhou in 1592/2.
8 1592 (Tenshō 20)/3	Kushi	Arriving ship stops on its way to Manila carrying wheat flour etc.
9 1593 (Bunroku 2)/7	Uchinoura	Shi Shiyong 史世用, a secret agent appointed by Fujian Governor Xu Fuyuan, et al. arrive aboard Quanzhou maritime merchant Xu Yu's 許豫 ship
10 1593 (Bunroku 2)/10	Ōsumi?	Shi Shiyong returns on board Haicheng merchant Wu Zuoyi's 吳左沂 ship. Forced back into port after ship runs adrift.
11 1593 (Bunroku 2)	Satsuma	4 ships from Luzon and 7 other foreign ships arrive in the area's ports.
12 1594 (Bunroku 3)/7	Yamakawa	Former Kanpaku Konoe Nobutada 近衛信尹 visits a Chinese ship arriving from Luzon.
13 1596 (Bunroku 5)/7	Hami	Fujiwara Seika meets with Quanzhou shipowner Wu Wozhou arriving from Luzon.
14 1596 (Keichō 1)/7	Tanegashima	Ming ship arrives to trade with the island's lord Shimazu Mochihisa 島津以久.
15 1598 (Keichō 3)/4	Satsuma	Fujian Governor Jin Xuezheng 金學會 infiltrates Quanzhou literate Lin Zhenxi 林震虢 as merchants.
16 1599 (Keichō 4)/7	Koshikijima	Two ships arrive, one from Luzon proceeds northwest to the coast of Akune 阿久根.

- 17 1598 (Keichō 4)/8 Satsuma Merchant ship arriving from Fujian is plundered. Merchants aboard submit complaint to Shimazu Yoshihiro.
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