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A Study on the Management of Local Military Expenditure of  
the Late Ming Dynasty: Focusing on *Qianxiang* during the She-An Rebellion

SHI Jian

It was the Ming Dynasty's military expense for the defense against the Qing Dynasty in Northeast China, called *liaoxiang* 遼餉, that largely determined the fiscal policy of the late Ming Dynasty, for any shortages that occurred in the *liaoxiang* budget would have tremendous influence on the Ming governance. In reality, not all *liaoxiang* was spent on the northeast front, as a portion of it was appropriated for as long as ten years to quell rebellions occurring in the southwest, which must have had a significant impact on what could be spent on the war against the Qing Dynasty.

The present article takes up the topic of *qianxiang* 黔餉, the military expense appropriated from *liaoxiang* for quelling the She-An 奢安 Rebellion raised by *tusis* 土司 of Sichuan and Guizhou, in an attempt to explain its character and better understand in what manner the Ming government determined regional priority in military expenditure, in the midst of growing dysfunctionality in fiscal management. Since such decision-making seems to have been a unique feature of late Ming fiscal affairs, the author offers an analysis of the circumstances surrounding *qianxiang*, i.e. its collection process and size, its management by the Ministry of Revenue (Hubu 戶部), etc., offering a clue to the way in which fiscal affairs were handled during the late Ming period.

The author begins with an overview of various types of the military expenses which appear in late Ming historical sources, in order to ascertain the scope of *qianxiang*. Next, after introducing the background to the She-An Rebellion, he offers an analysis of circumstances surrounding the establish-

ment of *qianxiang* and the levies which funded it. By grasping the nature of how *qianxiang* was funded, the author identifies two categories among its fiscal sources, i.e. the stable and unstable sources. The author finally turns to the manner in which the Ministry of Revenue, as a central government agency, attempted to manage those sources, concluding that the collection of levies for funding *qianxiang* and its appropriation during the She-An Rebellion would have had to have full approval of the central government through all phases from beginning to end.

### Soup Kitchens in Beijing during the Late Qing Period

MURATA Ryohei

This article examines the background to the government's operation of soup kitchens (*zhouchang* 粥廠) in Beijing in the late 19th century. During that time, especially in Beijing, soup kitchens deemed important in providing famine relief.

It has already been pointed out in the research to date that soup kitchens in Beijing were frequently operated from the beginning of the 19th century in response to such urban problems as transients and wealth discrepancies between the rich and the poor. What seems to be lacking, however, is ascertaining the government's overall logic regarding famine relief efforts and analysis of individual cases based on long-term trends. That is why the present article focuses on the case of soup kitchens temporarily operated during the 9th year of the Guangxu 光緒 Era (1883), based on documents written by Zhou Jiamei 周家楣, then governor of Shuntian 順天 Prefecture, to examine the process of the project.

Soup kitchens in Beijing during that time can be divided into three types: government-operated regular and provisional facilities, and private sector kitchens. Provisional kitchens would be set up near the gates of Beijing and in its suburbs. Then from the Tongzhi 同治 Era (1862–74) on, opening provisional kitchens became more and more frequent, with kitchens operating in both locations during the same year.

In 1883, Shuntian Prefecture did not follow the locational formula for

provisional soup kitchens, deciding rather to choose sites which did not overlap with existing ones. Moreover, the rule that provisional kitchens at the gates be located at the Inner-City gates was expanded to include kitchens at the Outer-City gates. The closure of the provisional facilities was implemented first in the suburbs, then at the gates, indicating that the Shuntian Prefecture government planned the operation of soup kitchens in and around Beijing Castle in holistic, organic terms.

It was in this way that provisional soup kitchens were designed to serve transients in the region rather than the resident population of the suburbs, in response to changes occurring both in Qing Dynasty governance and social conditions during the latter part of the 19th century.

European Piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Response  
of the Mughal Government: An Analysis of the Negotiations between  
the Mughal Government and the Dutch East India Company (c. 1690–1710)

KATO Shinsaku

From the 1690s onward, European pirates frequently plundered the sailing ships of Mughal subjects in the Western Indian Ocean. In response to such acts, the Mughal government demanded the European East India companies at Surat to investigate and root out the pirates under threat of prohibiting trade, which created a stalemate requiring the Mughal government and the companies to negotiate a settlement. This article explores the negotiation between the Mughal government and the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, VOC), examining the following three aspects.

First, the author examines the respective roles played by the Mughal court and its local authorities at Surat in response to the acts of piracy. The governor of Surat took some measures against the piracy upon hearing the news of it, and reported the measures to the court for the court's approval. When the court judged them inappropriate, it gave the governor instructions about a proper course of action. The court kept in close contact with the local authorities in order to take more effective measures, and played an important role in the response to the acts of piracy.

Next, the author investigates the attitude of the Mughal government towards maritime navigation conducted by its subjects, by focusing on its demands made to the VOC. The government intended to provide a convoy for the ships of Mughal subjects on the sea, to search for and capture pirates, as well as either to return the cargoes plundered by those pirates or else to compensate for any losses, with the help of the VOC. This was similar to the security which the Mughal government guaranteed travellers by land within its territory. The government intended to secure maritime navigation to the same extent that it did land transportation.

Finally, the author analyses the VOC's perception of the Mughal government's response and the VOC's counter-response. The government not only adopted harsh measures toward the VOC, but also adopted an attitude of compromise at times, taking into consideration the impact of its measures on customs revenue at Surat and the annual dispatch of pilgrim ships to Mecca. As the VOC recognised such intention on the part of the Mughal government, it continued to negotiate with the government so that it could resume its trading activities there, while taking such retaliatory measures as capturing merchant ships and blockading the port of Surat at times.

The Fictive Kinship of the Safavids and the Mughals in Diplomatic Relations  
since the Seventeenth Century: Diplomatic Correspondence  
on the Qandahar Dispute

TOKUNAGA Yoshiaki

Scholars believe that Safavid Iran (1501–1722) and Mughal India (1526–1858) emphasized their friendly relations with each other and peace was established for many years. It is typical of their good relationship that their monarchs referred to each other in diplomatic correspondence as family members since the seventeenth century. However, detailed analyses of this diplomatic practice have not been conducted. Why did these two empires continue this practice over several generations? To investigate this practice, this study analyzed the usages of terms and expressions indicative of their fictive kinship between the Safavids and the Mughals in their diplomatic cor-

respondence of the seventeenth century. The study particularly focused on correspondence about the Qandahar dispute, which was the biggest disagreement between these two empires.

This study revealed the following three points. Firstly, Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) and Jahangir (r. 1605–1627), who experienced a military confrontation regarding Qandahar in 1622, justified their operations using the discourse of kinship, thereby preventing a total breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two empires. Secondly, when confronted by the Qandahar dispute, the heirs of these two monarchs followed this diplomatic practice in an attempt to lessen the negative influence of the Qandahar problem on their relations. Thirdly, their fictive kinship was referred to in their correspondence with the intention of fixing the relationship, while diplomatic relations generally deteriorated in the second half of the century.

In sum, to maintain friendly relations between Safavid Iran and Mughal India, the countries' monarchs used terms of fictive kinship in their diplomatic correspondence. In addition, they each used that kinship discourse to request the other to accede to their political and diplomatic demands and to explain their military actions. In conclusion, the usages of terms of fictive kinship between these two imperial houses in their diplomatic correspondence over several generations reflect their diplomatic policies used to justified pursuit of their greatest interests while preventing full-scale confrontations.