Chapter 10

The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Age of Ottoman Suzerainty

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Introduction

The long 19th century witnessed a disintegration of the once universal Orthodoxy into several "national" Churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, seated in Istanbul, lost while the Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Churches won.[1] This (hi)story has usually been studied in the context of ethnic nationalism: the more ethnic "awakenings" spread in the Balkans, the more the Patriarchate was considered an ethnically Greek institute, resulting in the dismemberment of the Orthodox commonwealth [Kitromilides 1990]. It remained almost unanswered, however, to what degree the Ottoman *suzerainty* was functional in this process. Arguably, in many cases, the Balkan nations were fighting a two-front war of "liberation", one, in a political sphere, against the Sublime Porte, or the "Turkish yoke", and another, in a religious sphere, against the Ecumenical Patriarchate, or the "Greek hegemony". Nevertheless, just as the Porte did not represent the "Turkish" ethnic interest, the Patriarchate never abandoned its ecumenism. The relationship between the Porte and the Patriarchate was always more complicated than usually considered. The Porte and the Patriarchate often struggled with each other. However, being aware that the partition of the Ottoman Empire almost inevitably led to a dismemberment of not only Islamic community but also the Orthodox Church, the Porte and the Patriarchate sometimes became (unholy?) allies, even if unconsciously or reluctantly. Their visions of universal rule—Islamic and Christian, respectively—precipitated this alliance in face of the same enemies: Western imperialism and separatism based on secular ethno-nationalism.

Despite the outstanding presence of the Orthodox Church in the Empire throughout its history, few Ottomanist scholars study the modernization of religions other than Islam,[2] while Church historians have been indifferent, if not antagonistic, to

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[1]   Standard reference is [Kitromilides 2006; Leustean 2014]. See also [Kiminas 2009: 11–29].

[2]   A typical Ottomanist approach is provided in the classic of Niyazi Berkes [1964]. Compare with Kemal H. Karpat's recent argument [2001]. An exception might be Gülnihâl Bozkurt's book, but she tends to describe each non-Muslim community as stable, monolithic, and anti-

everything Ottoman.[3] The secularization of Greeks is well studied,[4] but rarely has their Ottoman context been addressed.[5] Theorists of secularism or laicization, on their part, have seldom compared the Ottoman Orthodoxy with other cases.[6] As a result, the State-Church relations in the late Ottoman Empire as a whole, especially with regard to the Orthodox Christianity, remained an issue to be examined. An in-depth study of the 19th-century Ecumenical Patriarchate, an integral institution of the Ottoman Empire, would shed light on our understanding of what we call "religious" and its relations with modern states.

This article does not have any claim to be an exhaustive history of the 19th-century Orthodox Church; rather, my modest aim is to make a rough sketch of the institutional and canonical aspects of Ottoman modernity as experienced by the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. For this purpose, I examine the dismemberment of the Orthodox Church in the context of Ottoman suzerainty by focusing on the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

1. Greeks' Two Centers: Constantinople and Athens

Despite nationalistic claims to the contrary in later Balkan historiographies, the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman Empire were closely connected. The Ottoman conquest restored the unity of Orthodoxy by placing the four Eastern Patriarchates—Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria—under a single banner after several centuries of disunion [Çolak 2015]. In particular, the 18th century was a "golden age" of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, throughout which Constantinople's authority widened, annexing the Slavic Archbishoprics of Ohrid and Peć. Not only the Church, but also lay Christians, and especially Phanariots, actively participated in the Empire's elite society and contributed in one way or another to Ottoman political and intellectual development [Greene 2015].

Ottoman [1996].

[3]   An example of the Church historians' prejudice against the "Islamic fanaticism" and "Turkish and Islamic oppression" could be found in [Constantelos 1998: 126–32].

[4]   See, for example [Makrides 1997]; but also consult, on the lasting influence of the Orthodox Church, [Mavrogordatos 2003; Γαζή 2011].

[5]   Dimitrios Stamatopoulos' work on the secularization of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the *Tanzimat* period might be an exception [Σταματόπουλος 2003]. On the modernization of Orthodoxy in the context of (post-)Ottoman history, see also [Prévélakis 2008].

[6]   See, for example, Talal Asad's influential work [2003]. Masuzawa Tomoko, in her excellent study in the invention of world religions, did not adequately examine the Islam and Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire [2005].

While the Orthodox Greeks' presence in the early modern Ottoman Empire as sketched above is relatively well known, Greek elements in modern Ottoman history are not. It is widely assumed that, after the Greek War of Independence, the Ottoman Greeks lived as "unredeemed" co-nationals, only to be "liberated" by the Kingdom of Greece, whose foreign policy was characterized by the *Megali Idea*, or the irredentist claim to include all the Greeks in its territory by invading the Ottoman Empire.[7] In recent years, several historians have sought to correct this biased image and to illustrate the way in which the Greeks participated economically, politically, and intellectually in modern Ottoman society. Ottoman Greeks were anything but a simple object of the irredentist policies of the Hellenic Kingdom. Beginning in the late 18th century, but especially after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Greek merchant marines spread over the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and even the Atlantic, taking advantage of either the Capitulatory regime as foreign nationals or *protégé*s, or Ottoman nationality as the Sultan's *Avrupa tüccarı* [Harlaftis 1996: part I; Harlaftis and Laiou 2008]. During the *Tanzimat* era, while the Neo-Phanariots, in particular Stefanos Vogoridis, played an important role in Ottoman diplomacy [Philliou 2011], several Greek merchant bankers, the most famous among whom was Georgios Zarifis, became extremely influential not only in the Orthodox community, but also in elite Muslim circles including the Sultan-Caliph; they even controlled the financial sector of the Kingdom of Greece.[8] In both shores of the Aegean, Greek entrepreneurs were experiencing a "belle époque of capital" [Χατζηιωσήφ 1999].

Despite the increasing power of laymen during this period, the Ecumenical Patriarchate kept functioning as the center (or at least one of two centers along with the Hellenic government) for Orthodox Greeks in and around the Ottoman Empire. Patriarchs acted independently from the policies and policy makers of Greece, as the ecumenism of Constantinople did not necessarily suit the secular nationalistic vision of Athens. Patriarch Joachim III (1878–84 and 1901–12) was the most powerful representative of this ecumenical mission.[9] This does not mean, however, that the Patriarchate did not experience any ideological or institutional change. On the contrary, the way in which the Patriarchate adapted itself to the *Tanzimat* reforms made it a quintessentially Ottoman institution and transformed the State-Church relations accordingly.

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[7]   For a classical account of Greek irredentalism, see [Dakin 1972].

[8]   [Εξερτζόγλου 1989; Hulkiender 2003]. On Galata bankers' resistance against the Western financial penetration, see [Clay 2000]. Galata bankers' influence in Greece is studied in [Δερτίλης 1980].

[9]   [Stamatopoulos 2010]. On the confrontation between Athens and Constantinople during the tenure of Joachim III, see [Kofos 1986; Καρδαράς 1996].

1. 1. Favor Becoming Privileges

As argued in Chapter 2, the period between the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 and the Gülhane Edict in 1839 was a time of great transformation in the Ottoman East. Non-Muslims did not stay aloof from this trend; on the contrary, they were both instigators and objects of this change, mainly (but not exclusively) because the Great Powers used the non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan as a pretext for their interventions. Consequently, non-Muslims' status changed in such a way as to represent the changing philosophy of Ottoman rule.

In the early modern period, the Sultan gave each non-Muslim prelate a set of rights and duties as tax farmers; religious leaders enjoyed some authority over their flock, at least in the eyes of the Ottoman bureaucrats, only when they collected a sufficient amount of money. Under this *ruhani iltizam* (religious tax farm) system, contrary to the so-called millet system myth, Churches did not enjoy autonomy or privileges; theoretically speaking, non-Muslims were subject to God's order as the Muslims interpreted it and just received the favor of the Sultan as a personal sign of goodwill. In fact, the Sultan's "favor" gradually became an established right on the part of non-Muslims, but Churches had few, if any, institutional guarantee, as the Islamic legal tradition lacked an idea of legal personality comparable to the one applied to State-Church relationships in the West. While non-Muslims' *de facto* power steadily increased throughout the 18th century, their *de jure* basis improved little.[10]

The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia marked the beginning of an era in which the non-Muslim communities' *de facto* rights became *de jure* privileges. Russia's claim to "protect" the Christian subjects of the Sultan was based on a deliberate interpretation of this treaty, while the Porte "promet de protéger constament la religion Chrétienne et les églises" and especially "D'avoir pour les Ecclésiastiques l'estime particulière que leur état exige" (*ruhban zümresine münasip olan imtiyaz*) in the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia [*Muahedat Mecmuası*: vol. 3, pp. 254–73; von Martens 1817–35: vol. 2, pp. 286–322]. Likewise, with the convention of Aynalıkavak in 1779, the Porte promised

De ne pas mettre en quelque manière que ce soit des obstacles ou empèchement à la confession et l'exercice parfaitement libre de la religion Chrétienne, ainsi qu'à la construction de nouvelles églises, avec la réparation des vieilles (*Hristiyan*

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[10]   [Kenanoğlu 2004]. For more on the Orthodox Church in particular, see [Κονόρτας 1998].

mezhebinin serbestiyet-i kamile ile tearüf ve icrasına ve müceddiden kilise ihdasına ve atiklerinin tamir ve termimine [...] canib-i Devlet-i Aliye'den vechen minelvücuh mümanaat ve muaraza olunmaya).

The Porte also agreed "De reconnaître et d'honorer des égards et distinctions conve-nables le clergé Chrétien de ces deux principautés" (*Memleketeyn-i mezbureteynin taife-i ruhbanına imtiyazat-ı layıka ile itibar ve rağbet oluna*) [*Muahedat Mecmuası*: vol. 3, pp. 275–84; von Martens 1817–35: vol. 2, pp. 653–61].

The Turkish version of a decree on Serbia in 1838, enumerating the rights of the Prince, regarded the autonomous administration of Church as among the "privileges and glorious favors" (*imtiyazat ve müsaadat-ı celile*) that had been granted since the time of Mehmet the Conqueror, while the French version had it that "il est conforme aux libertés et privilèges accordés anciennement par la Porte Ottomane à ses sujets chrétiens, que les chefs du Clergé administrent seuls les affaires de l'Eglise, en tant qu'elles sont indépedantes des affaires politiques". These "privileges" included that

les rémunérations et dotations du métropolitain, des évéques, des igoumènes, des autres membres du Clergés, de même que les fonds affectés aux fondations pieuses, sont déterminés par le peuple (*Sırp içinde metropolit ve piskoposlarının maaşlarına ve menziletlerine reayat kılınmak ve Sırp içinde keniselerinin idaresi ve mezheplerine ait ve Sırp metropolitlerine ve piskoposlarına ve ruhbanlarına mensup umurun tesviyesi için gerek metropolitlerinin ve gerek piskoposlarının başka cemaat şura yerleri tahsis olunmak*). [Aristarchi bey 1873–88: vol. 2, pp. 60–9; Belgradi 1291h: 242–51]

Presumably, at this stage, the privileges of Christians were coupled with the territorial autonomy of the area in question, such as the Danubian Principalities and Serbia. Nevertheless, in 1841, the Porte assured the non-Muslims of Jerusalem "la jouissance des immunités et privilèges qui leur étaient accordés en vertu des diplômes et firmans Impériaux avec hatti schérif expédiés tant de la part des Sultan Mes prédécesseurs et de feu Mon Auguste Père, que de Ma part Impériale", even though Jerusalem was not autonomous in the sense of Romania or Serbia [Noradounghian 1897–1903: vol. 2, pp. 339–40]. During this period, Ottomans gradually began referring to Christians' rights as privileges (*imtiyazat*), irrespective of the style of governance in the area in question. This shift reflected the changing atmosphere concerning State-Church relations in the Ottoman East.

From the 1820s to 40s, the Greek War of Independence, rise of the Mehmet Ali dynasty in Egypt, and Catholic proselytism presented a new environment to the Christians in the Eastern Mediterranean [Masters 2001; Makdisi 2008]. One such

example is France's insistence, in the protocol of London in 1830, to institutionally guarantee the privileges of Catholics in Greece, since it was believed that "la France est en possession d'exercer, en faveur des catholiques soumis au Sultan, un patronage spécial" and that

> S.M.T.-C. se doit à elle-même, et elle doit à une population qui a vécu si longtemps sous la protection de ses ancêtres, de demander que les catholique de la terre ferme et des îles trouvent, dans l'organisation qui va être donnée à la Grèce, des garantie capables de suppléer à l'action que la France a exercée jusqu'à ce jour en leur faveur.

Russia and Britain "ont apprécié la justice de cette demande, et il a été arrêté que la religion catholique jouira dans le nouvel Etat du libre et public exercice de son culte; [...] que les évêques seront maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits et privilèges dont ils ont joui sous le patronage des rois de France" [de Clercq 1880–1917: vol. 3, pp. 561–2]. These privileges were to haunt Greek jurists, as they restricted Greek sovereignty [Στρέϊτ 1903]. At the same time, France promoted the establishment of new Catholic communities in the Ottoman Empire: in 1831, the Porte recognized the Armenian Catholics as an independent community, and then, in 1848, the Greek Catholics gained independence from the Armenian Catholics.[11] Apparently, in France's (and, by extension, the Europeans') thought, there was continuity between their early modern protection or patronage over the Sultan's Christian subjects and the modern privileges that the Christians enjoyed in the Ottoman East. At any rate, the birth of new communities required reconsideration of the rules and duties by which each community should abide; hence the new institutional framework for State-Church relations. This, in turn, led to changes in the canonical jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church.

1. 2. Between Autocephaly and Autonomy I: Ecumenism in Retreat

Russian advances in the Eastern Mediterranean resulted in a retreat of the Greeks' spiritual authority. As early as the second half of the 18th century, the Orthodox Christians in Montenegro began to follow Moscow, not Constantinople, after the abolition of the Archbishopric of Peć, to which they had belonged. Crimean dioceses were transferred to the Russian Church following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 1783 [Kiminas 2009: 19]. Russian aggression over the Danubian Principalities resulted

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[11]   [Masters 2001: chap. 4]. On Armenian Catholics, see also [Ueno 2005].

in the incorporation of dioceses in Bessarabia, ceded to Russia in 1812 by the treaty of Bucharest [Batalden 1983]. Thereafter, Russia, with an apocalyptic vision, promoted, first, the so-called Greek project and then, Pan-Slavism, to capture Constantinople in the East while at the same time keeping, first, the legitimate order of the Vienna settlement and, then, the balance of power among the Great Powers in the West. These dual aims on the part of Russia more often than not placed Greeks in a difficult position [Zorin 2003: esp. 336–42; Vovchenko 2012; Zanou 2016]. Subsequent treaties between Russia and the Ottoman Empire gave birth not only to the secular vassal states under the (nominal) *suzerainty* of the Sublime Porte, as discussed in Chapter 2, but also to the autonomous Churches under the (nominal) jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Canonical ties provided the Greeks with a tool with which the influence of Constantinople outlived Ottoman rule.

In 1830, a Sultan's decree to recognize Serbian autonomy determined the following:

Le métropolitain et les évêques élus par la nation devront prendre leur investiture du patriarche grec de Constantinople, sans pourtant être obligés de venir dans cette capitale (*millet-i mersumenin intihap edecekleri metropolit ve piskoposları Dersaadetim'e gelmeğe hacet olmaksızın İstanbul Rum Patriği tarafından nasb u tayin olunması*). [Aristarchi bey 1873–88: vol. 2, pp. 56–60; Belgradi 1291h: 235–8]

A year later, the Ecumenical Patriarch confirmed the autonomy of the Serbian Church [Kitromilides 2006: 237; Kiminas 2009: 20]. In 1838, a decree to grant the so-called Turkish Constitution to the Serbs duly reconfirmed that

les Serbes, sujets de ma Sublime-Porte et lui devant un tribut, appartiennent à l'Eglise grecque, je leur ai donné la complète liberté de célébrer leur service divin d'après les cérémonies en usage, ainsi que celle de se choisir, sous ton assistance et ta surveillance, leur métropolitain et leur évêques, sous la condition que, conformément aux canons de l'Eglise, ils soient soumis à la puissance ecclésiastique du patriarche résidant à Constantinople, qui doit être regardé comme le chef de l'Eglise et du Synode (*reaya-yı Devlet-i Aliyemden olan Sırp milleti akaid-i Nasara üzere şeref-i mezhebini [*sic, Şark mezhebi?*] tabir olunan Rum mezhebi Hristiyanlarından madud olmak mülabesesiyle mezheb-i mezkurun ayin-i melufesi icrasına reis-i mezhep itibar eyledikleri Dersaadetim'de mukim Rum Patriği ve cemaatin tasdik ve ruhaniyesine [*sic, tasdik-i ruhaniyesine?*] tabiyeten metropolit ve piskoposları içlerinden inzimam-ı nezaretinle intihap olunmak üzere avatıf-ı aliye-i şahanemden Sırp milletine serbestiyet-i kamile ibzal*

olunup). [Aristarchi bey 1873–88: vol. 2, pp. 60–9; Belgradi 1291h: 242–51]

In this way, Serbian autonomy was established in both political and religious spheres.

Unlike the Serbian case, whose Church was canonically made autonomous, other areas with a predominantly Orthodox population remained, at least formally, under the direct jurisdiction of Constantinople. Dioceses in Ionia (the metropolitanate thereof was created in 1799 under the Ottoman-Russian influence [Şakul 2009: 264]), under British protection, belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as the "Constitutional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands" in 1817 stipulated that

> there should be a metropolitan of the dominant religion of the Greek orthodox church in these states, possessing by consent of the holy father of the Greek church, the patriarch of Constantinople, a general spiritual power and supremacy over the whole of the pastors of the dominant church in these states (*ἐν τῷ Κράτει τούτῳ ὑπάρχῃ Μητροπολίτης τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ Ἐπικρατούσης Ὀρθοδόξου Ἀνατολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ἔχων τῇ συναινέσει τοῦ Παναγιωτάτου ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Πατριάρχου τῆς Ἀνατολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας τὴν ἐν γένει πνευματικὴν ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς ἐνταῦθα Ἐπικρατούσις Ἐκκλησίας Ποιμένων*)

and that

> the said metropolitan should be the archbishop or bishop that may be regularly ordained by the holy father, being the patriarch at Constantinople, for the four great islands of these states (*ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτος Μητροπολίτης ἀναδειχθῇ ὁ προσηκόντως ψηφισθείς, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Παναγιωτάτου Πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως κανονικῶς χειροτονηθεὶς Ἀρχιεπίσκοπος ἢ Ἐπισκόπος τινὸς τῶν μεγαλυτέρων τεσσάρων νήσων*). [Νικηφόρου 2008: 547, 618]

Treaties regarding the Danubian Principalities did not change the status of dioceses in these areas either, leaving Romania under the Patriarchate's direct authority. Similarly, "Le métropolitain de Samos sera, comme autrefois, nommé par le patriarche grec de Constantinople" [Aristarchi bey 1873–88: vol. 2, pp. 145–6; Λαΐου 2013b: 467–8].

To summarize, in the 1830s until the Ottomans launched the Tanzimat reforms, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was on the defensive; while Montenegro remained in the Russian sphere of influence, Serbia acquired an autonomous national Church of its own, with the metropolitan of Belgrade only nominally appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch. At the same time, Constantinople kept control of the Ionian, Romanian, and Samian dioceses. Interestingly, there were different political and religious relations in different areas: semi-sovereign Serbia under the Ottoman *suzerainty* had its autonomous

Church, while the Danubian Principalities, vassal states under the Sultan's *suzerainty*, and the Ionian Islands, a British protectorate formerly under Ottoman *suzerainty*, remained under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Samos, an autonomous Island under the Ottoman *sovereignty*, belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Ottomans' (nominal) authority over their (former) vassals seemed to provide a factor sustaining the Ecumenical Patriarchate's version of Orthodox unity. Here lay one, probably unexpected, aspect of Ottoman suzerainty. But ecumenical ties were not immune from secular powers; Constantinople's jurisdiction over Ionia put an international issue between the British protector and the Ottoman sovereign [Fairey 2012]. Moreover, not all the (former) Ottoman territories remained under the control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the most important case of which is Greece.

1. 3. Greece

Somewhat ironically, it is the Greeks who first posed the greatest threat to the universalism of the Orthodox Church: nationalism. When the Greek War of Independence broke out, the Ecumenical Patriarchate proved to be a loyal institution of the Sultan and excommunicated participants in the War, because, from the prelates' religious point of view, it was against God's will to arbitrarily resist the Ottoman Emperor, who was Caesar on earth. The Kingdom of Greece, for its part, was quick to sever ties with Constantinople, not only politically but also religiously. Under the influence of the secularist ideas of enlightenment, Greeks of the newly born Kingdom believed that a state could not be truly independent when being religiously subject to another. In 1833, the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Greece was unilaterally declared [Frazee 1969].

Like the Ionian precedent, Greek revolutionaries found it natural to declare Orthodoxy the "dominant religion", even before their independence, in the so-called Constitution of Epidaurus in 1822. Eventually, Article 1 of the first written constitution after independence, promulgated in 1844, made Orthodox Christianity "the dominant religion" (*Ἡ ἐπικρατοῦσα θρησκεία*) of the Kingdom. No less interesting is Article 2, which stipulated that

> The Orthodox Church of Greece […] is inseparably united, in a canonical sense, with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and every other Church of the same denomination (*Ἡ ὀρθόδοξος ἐκκλησία τῆς Ἑλλάδος […] ὑπάρχει ἀναποσπάστως ἡνωμένη δογματικῶς μετὰ τῆς ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει μεγάλης καὶ πάσης ἄλλης ὁμοδόξου τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἐκκλησίας*).

This clause reflected the Greeks' particular mentality to unilaterally assure the canonical autocephaly of their Church, by way of their "secular" constitution, even though the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not recognize it until 1850. In a sense, the Greeks set a precedent for other Balkan nations, in particular the Bulgarians, to detach from Orthodox unity, with the logic of a sovereign state system based on ethno-nationalism.[12] Greek annexation of the Ionian Islands in 1864 resulted in the transfer of their dioceses from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Church of Greece [Μεταλληνός 2004]. In 1881, when the Ottomans ceded Thessaly to Greece, similar transfer took place a year later [Παπαδόπουλος 1895: 78–9].

     As the leaders of Islamic and Christian universalism, the Porte and the Patriarchate endeavored to reverse the tide of separatism; precisely for this purpose, both had to adapt themselves to the wave of modernity. As part of their modernization project, the *Tanzimat* reforms transformed the State-Church relationship in the Ottoman Empire, the core legal institution of which were religious privileges.

2. Greeks in the *Tanzimat* State

2. 1. Invention of Religious Privileges

In 1856, with the treaty of Paris, the Great Powers officially recognized the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the Concert of Europe with the condition that Christians' rights be respected. Already in 1853, shortly before the Crimean War, the Porte issued the so-called Privileges Edict (*İmtiyazat Fermanı*) to improve the status of its Christian subjects. Since Russia was to declare war with a pretext of "liberating" the Christians, it was imperative for Britain and France, Muslim Ottomans' Christian allies, to appeal their cause in front of the European audience.[13] Under foreign pressure, the Edict declared that the rights of each Church, allegedly granted since the time of Mehmet the Conqueror, formed the "religious privileges" (*imtiyazat-ı mezhebiye*) that would be guaranteed hereafter.[14] The Reform Edict (*Islahat Fermanı*), issued toward the end of the war in 1856, preserved non-Muslims' newly established privileges, while

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[12]   On the parallel character of Greek and Bulgarian cases, see [Ματάλας 2003]. I have an impression, however, that the author underestimates the ecumenical mentality of the Constantinopolitan Greeks, just like some Turkish historians underestimate the Ottomanist mentality of Istanbulite Muslims.

[13]   On the religious aspects of diplomacy before the War, see [Fairey 2014].

[14]   *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 491, pp. 2–3; [Noradounghian 1897–1903: vol. 2, pp. 418–19]. For more on the political and ideological background of this Edict, see [Ueno 2016: 415–17].

at the same time explicitly recognizing equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. The inherent contradiction between these two axioms would invite incessant strife in Ottoman domestic politics. Finally, the treaty of Paris, in quite an exceptional way, transformed this domestic legal institution into an international obligation. Article 9 declared that

> S.M.I. le Sultan, dans sa constante sollicitude pour le bien-être de ses sujets, ayant octroyé un Firman qui, en améliorant leur sort sans distinction de religion ni de race, consacre ses généreuses intentions envers les populations chrétiens de son empire, et voulant donner un nouveau témoignage de ses sentiments à cet égard, a résolu de communiquer aux Puissances contractantes ledit Firman, spontanément de sa volonté souverain (*Zat-ı hazret-i padişahi tebaalarının saadet hallerine masruf olan himmet-i mütevaliyeleri iktizasınca kavmiyet ve diyanet ermeyerek cümlesi için mucib-i ıslah-ı hal olmağla beraber memalik-i şahanelerinin Hristiyan ahalisi haklarında niyat-ı inayetkaraneleri teyid eder bir kıta ferman-ı ali ihsan buyurmuş olduklarından ve bu babda olan efkar-ı şahanelerine bir delil-i cedid ibraz etmek istediklerinden irade-i müstakile-i şahanelerinden sadır olmuş olan işbu ferman-ı alinin düvel-i muahedeye tebliğini tensip buyurmuşlardır*).

As Cevdet Pasha, one of the most prominent Muslim statesmen in the late *Tanzimat* era, aptly put it,

> even if the [Reform] Edict seems to comprise of several favors granted by the Exalted State, since it was inserted in the treaty, it became a kind of treaty rights (*Ferman eğerçi Devlet-i aliyye tarafından verilmiş bâzı müsâadattan ibaret görünüyor ise de ahde idhâl olunmağla hukuk-ı ahdiyye idâdına girmiştir*) […] while the struggle had been fought over the Christian subjects' religious and judicial rights, hostility ended by further adding political rights (*mücadele hırıstiyan teba'anın hukuk-ı mezhebiyye ve adliyyesi üzerine cereyan edegelmişken hukuk-ı politikıyye dahi ilâve ile def'-i husumet olunmuştur*). [Cevdet Paşa 1991: 74]

In this manner, the Great Powers' intervention in the affairs concerning Ottoman non-Muslims was legitimized by the treaty. If we remember that, around 1861, the Capitulations were explicitly made exception to the rule of non-interventionism, as we saw in Chapter 2, the degree to which the Ottoman *sovereignty* was restricted even within its own territory appears quite impressive.

Meanwhile, the so-called millet constitutions drafted one after another in the 1860s further systemized religious administration based on religious privileges. The

Greek version of the "millet constitution", or the "General Regulations" (*Rum Patrikliği Nizamatı* or *Εθνικοί Κανονισμοί*), was enacted in 1862 with the approval of the Porte. The Regulations created, along with the Holy Synod, the Permanent National Mixed Council (*Διαρκές Εθνικός Μικτό Συμβούλιο*), composed of eight lay councilors and four synodal metropolitans, as an administrative body of the Church, thus introducing pseudo-constitutional rule to the Patriarchate. In addition, the image of the Patriarch as the (Greek?) "national leader" (*milletbaşı* or *εθνάρχης*) legitimated, at least in the view of the Greeks, his and the prelates' involvement in not only religious but also political issues [Σταματόπουλος 2001].

This process accompanied transformation in administrative organization: before the *Tanzimat*, *piskopos mukataa kalemi* in the Chief Treasurer's Office (*Bab-ı Defteri*) was responsible for non-Muslim affairs. This responsibility was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1838 [Akyıldız 1993: 85–6]. Around 1860, the bureau of religious affairs (*mezahip odası*) was created [Ueno 2016: 420]. It moved to the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs (*Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti*) in 1877 [Demirel 2008: 64–70]. That the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for non-Muslim administration between 1838 and 1877 attests to the degree to which non-Muslims' privileges were a diplomatic concern. Put differently, while the affairs concerning non-Muslims were essentially financial in the early modern period (*ruhani iltizam* system), they were diplomatic in the early *Tanzimat*, until finally becoming religious after the promulgation of the Constitution. Meanwhile, prelates' *ex officio* participation in provincial administrative councils received official recognition and eventually was considered a political side of their "religious" privileges.[15] Finally, the 1876 Constitution explicitly guaranteed religious privileges. Article 11 recognized Islam as "la religion de l'Etat" (*Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin dini*), while at the same time declaring that the Empire

> protège le libre exercice de tous les cultes reconnus dans l'Empire, et maintient les privilèges religieux accordés aux diverses communautés (*memalik-i Osmaniye'de maruf olan bilcümle edyanın serbesti-i icrası ve cemaat-ı muhtelifeye verilmiş olan imtiyazat-ı mezhebiyenin kemakan cereyanı Devletin taht-ı himayetindedir*).

2. 2. The Politicization of Religious Privileges

Religious privileges made the Patriarchate's position vis-à-vis the state stronger than in

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[15]   [İbrahim Hakkı 1312r: vol. 1, pp. 307–12]. See also [Αναγνωστοπούλου 1997: 318–25; Anagnostopulu 2003: 29–35].

many cases around the world. In the Kingdom of Greece, the Church was subjugated to the state. In the other Balkan countries, establishment of semi-sovereign vassal states led to the foundation of an ethnic Church of their own. In these cases, the fate of the Church was determined by the secular will of the nation at the expense of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In the Ottoman Empire, the Patriarchate acquired privileges beyond the reach of the Muslim majority. Greek elites close to the Patriarchate probably gained the most during the *Tanzimat*, but their position was soon to be challenged.

Religious privileges presented a serious question in Ottoman domestic politics. No Muslim jurist denied religious privileges, which were after all an integral part of the Ottoman constitutional law. Muslims regarded religious privileges as an Ottoman expression of religious freedom, comparable to the similar institutions in Europe that determined State-Church relations [İbrahim Hakkı 1312r: vol. 1, pp. 296–313]. According to the so-called millet system myth produced in this period, however, non-Muslims' privileges represented the institutionally guaranteed autonomy that had been established in the time of Mehmet the Conqueror, if not the time of Caliph Umar. Notwithstanding the Porte's intention to exclude everything political from Christians' privileges, no sooner had this myth been popularized than the distinction between "political" and "religious" became a battlefield on which the Porte and non-Muslims fought with each other [Ueno 2016]. In particular, Greeks came to believe that the newly promulgated Constitution could not alter their "age-old" privileges. Whereas Muslims endeavored to make one and indivisible nation, based on individuals without any intermediaries, non-Muslims opposed everything that would undermine their vested interests [Fujinami 2011: esp. chap. 3]. So long as the Muslims' version of nation building project meant, even if implicitly and indirectly, the abolition of religious communities as a political unit, they were doomed to failure since the non-Muslims' privileges were institutionally guaranteed and internationally recognized. Eventually, non-Muslims' insistence on privileges, sometimes with the support of Western imperialists, aggravated the resentment of Muslim intellectuals. The otherwise liberal Young Ottomans' mistrust of egalitarianism reflected the Muslims' indignation toward non-Muslims' privileges [Arai 2013].

The religiosity of non-Muslims' privileges became controversial not only in an inter-communal but also in intra-communal context. Non-Muslims were identified first and foremost by their religious affiliation, that is, by their belonging to a religious community, and privileges were given to communities, not individuals.[16] Prelates

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[16]   This situation could be compared with the Russian case. See [Werth 2014]. Also consult [Schulze Wessel 2012].

resisted everything that would undermine the existing hierarchy, because clerics' "political" influence derived from "religious" privileges guaranteed by Ottoman law. Believing that they (alone) were entitled to represent the community, prelates often suppressed voices from below or outside. Nevertheless, if, how, and why prelates could represent the (secular) will and interest of the nation was always open to question. Powerful laymen sometimes bypassed the decision-making process of community as a way to "politically" address the Ottoman government. Neo-Phanariot Greeks' and the Armenian *Amira*'s close connection with the *Tanzimat* reformers could be well understood in this context.[17]

The concentration of "national" power in the hands of "religious" elites brought another intra-communal struggle: ethnic conflict. The identification of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a "Greek" institution invited non-Greek Christians' antagonism towards "Greek hegemony". In 1864–65, the Romanian United Principalities unilaterally proclaimed the autocephaly of their Church [Kitromilides 2006: 239]. At stake was the so-called monastery problem. While the General Regulations earmarked the revenue from the vast monastic lands in Romania for the Ecumenical Patriarch, Romanians' quest for independence targeted the Greeks' social and economic hegemony. In order to overcome the Romanians' separatism, the Patriarchate found a natural ally in the Porte, when it concerned their common will to keep Romania under their (nominal) authorities.[18]

In conclusion, the *Tanzimat* reforms created two sets of dualism: question of nation and community on the one hand, and of community and individual on the other. Non-Muslims were now both religiously privileged and politically equal with Muslims. Non-Muslim communities' religious privileges often suppressed non-Muslim individuals' freedom of religion, and, by extension, their right of national self-determination. Hence the rise of the Bulgarian question.

3. Ecumenism versus Pan-Slavism

3. 1. The Bulgarian Question

The Bulgarian national "awakening" dated at least to the early 19th century, but few had seriously considered creating a separate Bulgarian Church until the 1860s. Eventually,

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[17]   On the Armenian intra-communcal politics during the late *Tanzimat* period, see [Artinian 2004]. Compare with the Orthodox case as studied in [Σταματόπουλος 2003].

[18]   [Σταματόπουλος 2003: 108–9, 185–93, 347]. From a Romanian perspective, see also [Shida 2009: chap. 5].

however, the Bulgarian radicals were not content with anything but a national Church of their own, to which the ecumenism of the Greeks could not give approval. Pressed between the Greeks, Bulgarians, and the influential Russian ambassador Count Ignat'ev, the Sultan finally issued a decree that allowed the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870.[19] This is the only case in which the establishment of a national Church preceded the foundation of a nation-state. Nevertheless, neither the Porte nor Russia were prepared to take responsibility for the dismemberment of Orthodoxy; they intended the Exarchate to be an autonomous Church under the (nominal) authority of the Patriarchate, but the Greek dissatisfaction led to schism in 1872, in which the Exarchists were convicted of the heresy of "ethno-nationalism" (εθνοφυλετισμός) [Stamatopoulos 2009]. In this process, not only prelates but also the Neo-Phanariots were ethnically divided between the two mutually opposing camps. They gradually lost their once superior power.

After the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was closely identified with Hellenism. Russia's shift from Pan-Orthodox to Pan-Slavic policy further promoted anti-Slav feelings among Greeks. For many Greeks, both Ottoman and Hellenic, Pan-Slavism represented the most dangerous enemy of the Orthodoxy that must be Greek and ecumenical simultaneously. Since it had been decided to transfer a parish, two thirds of whose inhabitants adhered to the Exarchate, the struggle between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate to gain the souls of local Christians was intensifying. Following the treaty of Berlin in 1878, the formation of the Principality of Bulgaria and the province of Eastern Rumelia strengthened the power of Exarchists; the Exarchate's jurisdiction extended from a vassal state under Ottoman *suzerainty* through an autonomous province under Ottoman *sovereignty* to the Ottoman "mainland", including its imperial capital, Istanbul, where the Exarchate stayed. The expansion of the Bulgarian sphere of influence led to the notorious Macedonian question over the fate of the European provinces of the Empire; this question also formed the background against which the future Young Turks would make their appearance [Adanır 2001; Hacısalihoğlu 2008].

3. 2. Between Autocephaly and Autonomy II: Cretan, Palestinian, and Macedonian Questions

After the treaty of Berlin, Constantinople's authority diminished in secular and religious regimes in an interrelated manner: the independence of two vassal states

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[19]   *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 1205, pp. 1–2; [Noradounghian 1897–1903: vol. 3, pp. 293–5].

formerly under Ottoman *suzerainty*, Serbia and Romania, resulted in their spiritual independence. In 1879, the Serbian Church became autocephalous [Παπαδόπουλος 1895: 72–3]. In 1885, the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the autocephaly of the Romanian Church [Σταυρίδου 2004: 312]. Meanwhile, the Patriarchate succeeded in retaining its jurisdiction for the Orthodox Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was occupied by the Habsburgs but remained under (nominal) Ottoman *sovereignty* [Παπαδόπουλος 1895: 84–8]. Likewise, the dioceses in Crete, which was semi-sovereign in all but name after 1897, continued to belong to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, partly because the island theoretically remained under Ottoman *sovereignty* [Νανάκης 1995].

At the turn of the 20th century, however, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was losing not only its own dioceses but also its supremacy over the other Eastern Patriarchates. In 1899, thanks to Russian Orthodox diplomacy, the new Patriarch of Antioch was elected for the first time from the prelates of Arab origin. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's refusal to accept this election resulted in a split in the Patriarchate of Antioch between the Greek and Arab camps. In a similar manner, after 1908, struggle between the Greek Patriarch and the Arab flock intensified at the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In both of these cases, the Sublime Porte and the Ecumenical Patriarchate confronted the same enemy, Russia, who helped the local elements at the expense of Constantinople [Hopwood 1969; Shida 2009: chap. 5; Vovchenko 2013].

While the Kingdom of Greece took some measures to aid the Greek prelates, the Ecumenical Patriarchate hesitated to cooperate with the Hellenic government and to directly intervene in the Eastern Patriarchates. Ecumenical Patriarchate saw the lay power's involvement in ecclesiastical affairs with caution; in addition, as the leader of the Orthodoxy, the Ecumenical Patriarchate could not but respect the autocephaly of traditional Eastern Patriarchates, no matter how their internal affairs ran contrary to the interest of Constantinople [Εξερτζόγλου 1995–96]. The same held true for the Church of Cyprus under the British occupation. When the Archbishopric of Cyprus became vacant in 1900, the ecumenism of Constantinople conflicted with the Greek nationalism of Athens over its successor.[20]

To summarize, in the second half of the long 19th century, the extinction of Ottoman *suzerainty* deprived the Ecumenical Patriarchate of an important means to claim its jurisdiction, while the autocephaly within the Ottoman lands—Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Cyprus—gave an impetus to the local elements' secession from Constantinople. Territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire proved little help for

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[20]   [Anagnostopoulou 2004: esp. 48–55]. For more on the Church of Cyprus under the Ottoman rule, see [Michael 2009].

the Orthodox unity to survive, as the Sublime Porte's sovereign rights did not legitimate the Ecumenical Patriarchate's intervention in autocephalous Churches. It is under such circumstances that many Greeks attempted to revive the Ottoman imperial framework, in order for Hellenism to prosper, resisting the tide of secular Balkan nationalisms.

3. 3. The Age of Helleno-Ottomanism

Against the common enemy of Western imperialism and Pan-Slavism, many Greeks, both Ottoman and Hellenic, found a natural ally in their old compatriots, the Muslim Ottomans. The common ecumenical metropole, Constantinople, further prompted the Greeks to pursue this alliance. The idea of Greco-Turkish cooperation or Helleno-Ottomanism spread for not only ideological but also socio-economic reasons. Prosperity of Greek civil society in the Ottoman lands promoted a vision of a Hellenized Empire through the initiatives of Greeks [Σκοπετέα 1988: esp. chap. 4; 1999]. One of its most ardent advocates was Pavlos Karolidis, professor at the University of Athens, who was born in Cappadocia [Fujinami forthcoming]. This Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox historian-cum-politician wrote:

> From among the frequently repeated frictions between Greece and Turkey there emerged and gradually increased an idea of rapprochement towards Turkey, for strengthening the place and influence of the Greek element in the great empire, ethically helped by free Greece, in order for the Turkish state to become a Helleno-Turkish state. This idea made progress before the great Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. During the reign of Abdülaziz (1861–76), the highest freedom was given in the Ottoman Empire to all the *mission civilizatrice* deriving from Greece and the Greek element. [...] Constantinople then turned out to be the great center of the civilizing Greek element. [...] Economically Turkey became a Greek state with all economic life and public works performed by Greeks and through Greek capital. Greek and unprejudiced foreign critics thought that the Hellenization of the great Ottoman state was only a question of time. [Καρολίδης 1932: part 2, p. 393]

Karolidis sincerely encouraged the Greeks to defend the Ottoman realm, because in his view the best way to achieve the Greeks' national goal, *Megali Idea*, was the Hellenization of the Ottoman Empire. Suspicious of the Catholic proselytism and Western imperialism, Karolidis believed in the necessity of maintaining an indigenous regional order of the East. The shortsighted outburst of ethno-nationalistic sentiments

in Greece, as demonstrated during the Cretan question, was therefore more harmful than helpful for the Orthodoxy, as well as for Hellenism [Καρολίδης 1922–29: vol. 2, pp. 267–70, 276–84]. In contrast,

> The government of Abdülhamit II, despite all its dissatisfaction concerning the events that happened in Crete, never changed its tolerant policy toward its Greek subjects and their Church. From a general viewpoint it is possible to say that under Abdülhamit II, as under Abdülaziz I, the power and prosperity of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire had come to the highest bloom. [Καρολίδης 1932: part 2, p. 115]

The Ecumenical Patriarchate was to play a central role in Karolidis' vision of Helleno-Ottoman Eastern Empire. The deeper the secular ethno-nationalisms penetrated in the Balkans, the more precious the universal value of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as *the* center of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman East, became for Hellenism. Although there were many non-Greek-speaking Christians, in Karolidis' view, neither racial origin nor language, but spiritual life had determined one's ethnicity in the East; all Orthodox Christians were therefore Greeks, regardless of their mother tongue, since the Greek language had shaped their spiritual life through Orthodox liturgy and cultures [Καρολίδης 1909]. However illogical this argument may sound to today's readers, it reflected the Greeks' interest in the Ottoman East. The multiethnic and ecumenical character of Ottoman Orthodox community should be maintained for the sake of the Greeks' *Megali Idea*. In other words, Orthodox Church must be Greek and ecumenical simultaneously, as the universal value of Christian faith formed the core of Hellenism. The Ecumenical Patriarchate was a dual center of Orthodoxy and Hellenism with universal legitimacy regardless of race and language, beyond borders of both the states and churches.

Consequently, Karolidis criticized those responsible for secularism in both the Ottoman Empire and Greece. *Tanzimat* reformers were particularly denounced, because they

> considered, in the light of European state organizations, the administration of Christian subject peoples entirely an object of the principles and ideals on the polity and state that were dominant in Europe; they gradually began to undermine the independence of the Church as a polity, and for this purpose they wanted to secularize the Church. [Καρολίδης 1922–29: vol. 5, p. 39]

Taking advantage of this policy on the part of the Porte, so Karolidis judged, some Galata bankers undermined the ancient religious constitution of the Church by

introducing the pseudo-constitutional regime. In Karolidis' view, the General Regulations of 1862 "entirely secularized the Church, utterly turned over the basis of ecclesiastical polity and annihilated the authority of the office of the Patriarchate as well as the personal power and activity of the Patriarch, so that they contradicted the tradition and history of the Church" [Καρολίδης 1913: 185–6]. Karolidis did not forget to criticize the secularization in the Kingdom of Greece. He repeatedly condemned the unilateral declaration of autocephaly by the Hellenic government and especially one of its chief proponents, Theoklitos Farmakidis [Καρολίδης 1922–29: vol. 4, pp. 3–46, 75–86, 112–17].

Meanwhile, Karolidis praised the virtues of Muslim Turks who had sustained imperial order in the East for centuries: "like Alexander the Great who had once come from Europe to Asia and introduced the European ideas of civilization, the Ottomans have come from Asia to Europe and brought about the light of East to Europe". Karolidis advised the Greeks and Turks to learn a lesson from these precedents and cooperate with each other on the common goal of reviving the East.[21] Karolidis was not the only one to imagine an indigenous imperial order in the East, with Muslim Turks as partners to Orthodox Greeks. Cléanthi Scalieri's quest for dual monarchy and Ion Dragoumis' project of Eastern Federation were among the most famous versions of this idea.[22] More cognizant of the legal and ethnic realities in the Ottoman lands than many of his counterparts in the Kingdom of Greece, whose chauvinistic attitudes often alienated non-Greeks, Karolidis represented a religious version of this idea, based on the ecumenical value of Orthodoxy.

All this does not mean that Greeks always had good relations with the Muslims. On the contrary, religious privileges, or more precisely, Greeks' interpretations of them, recurrently became a bone of contention. In 1883–84 and again in 1890–91, the Ecumenical Patriarchate protested what it considered a violation of religious privileges. In both cases, the Greeks shut down churches as a sign of protest until the Porte declared that it had respected their privileges from the outset. During these crises, both camps fought over the definition of privileges. The Patriarchate considered religious what the Porte considered political [Εξερτζόγλου 1992]. Unfortunately for the Muslims, whenever a crisis erupted, the Porte had to give in, as religious privileges were not only institutionally guaranteed but also internationally recognized. It was highly likely that, in case the Porte persisted, Great Powers would intervene on behalf of the non-Muslims, doing harm to the Ottomans' public image as well as sovereign rights.

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[21]   "Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası ve Büyük Bir Ziyafet", İkdam, no. 5271, 28 January 1909, pp. 2–3.
[22]   On Dragoumis' and Scalieri's ideas, see [Panayotopoulos 1980; Svolopulos 1980]. For a broader context, also consult [Σταματόπουλος 2009].

The privilege question reflected the aporia inherent in the Ottoman nation building project. For Muslims, it demonstrated the degree to which allegedly religious privileges were unjust and abused politically. This question became more problematic after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

4. The Young Turk Era

4. 1. Unity of Ottoman Elements

At first, Greeks welcomed the Young Turk Revolution, as they thought the new regime would make breakthroughs not only in their struggle against Pan-Slavism, but also in the stagnation within the Orthodox community. The quasi-monopoly power of prelates, Neo-Phanariots, and Galata bankers closed the door for participation in the intra-communal politics to the emerging middle class. In addition, Joachimist/anti-Joachimist struggle had negatively affected the Orthodox community for decades. Ottoman Greeks hoped with reason that something new would happen in the Empire in general and in their community in particular. The way in which the patriarchal crisis in 1910 was settled was one such consequence of what the new constitutional regime had introduced in the Greek Orthodox intra-communal politics [Fujinami 2009]. In the words of Karolidis,

> the ensuing change of regime was certainly cheered by the entire Greek nation with enthusiasm, and there emerged great hopes, for the fanciful and superfluous peoples, for the immediate transformations of the Turkish state to a Greek one as well as the resurrection of Byzantium; but there also emerged great hopes for even those most careful peoples for the beginning of a new stage of progress and the material as well as spiritual flourishing of Hellenism by their free activities in the new regime of Turkey. [Καρολίδης 1932: part 2, p. 115]

Karolidis himself expressed his high expectation for the new regime: "Our sole wish is the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire" (*Yegane emelimiz Devlet-i Aliye'nin tamamiyet-i mülkiyesidir*), because "We the Greeks, for the sake of our own national interest, hope constitutional regime to take root in the Ottoman Empire and this land to make a progress".[23] Now a MP elected from İzmir, Karolidis declared in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies that, only when the Ottoman government becomes strong, "[do]

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[23] "Karolidi Efendi'nin Beyanatı", *İkdam*, no. 5208, 24 November 1908, p. 3.

the Greeks also have the power to perform their fundamental historical mission".[24] This is because "We are looking at Constantinople as the center of our religious and national life", as "Our Megali Idea" (Ἡ μεγάλη ἡμῶν ἰδέα) is a vision to civilize the East with all the material and spiritual powers of Hellenism [Καρολίδης 1913: 137]. Karolidis was not flattering. While saying this, at the same time he warned that:

> our compatriots, especially the Turkish nation we respect, have to know the following: more than a thousand years, you have made a history, you have made one national conscience, with various elements (*anasır-ı muhtelife ile tarih teşkil etmişler, bir vicdan-ı milli yapmışlar*). If you want to strangle some of these elements, in that case you are digging your own grave.[25]

Karolidis faithfully followed the civic constitutionalist catchword of the new regime, the "unity of elements" (*ittihad-ı anasır*), namely, the unity of various ethno-religious communities in the Empire.

The unity of Ottomans was, however, easier said than done. More often than not, Greeks found a sign of Turkification in what the Turks considered Ottomanization, while the Turks doubted if the Greeks' nationalistic attitudes were compatible with the Ottomanist agenda. The two most important questions concerning the Ecumenical Patriarchate, that is, the Macedonian question and privilege question, offered an acid test of Ottoman constitutionalism. From the Greeks' viewpoint, Ottoman unity was possible only when the Greeks' legitimate rights, namely, religious privileges, including the Patriarchate's dioceses in Macedonia as well as full control over the Greeks' education and justice, were respected. For the Greeks, abolition of privileges meant the Turkification of Christians, while the loss of Greek dioceses was tantamount to the Slavization of Macedonia [Fujinami 2007; 2011: chap. 4].

To convince their Ottoman compatriots, Greeks sometimes referred to the invented tradition of privileges as granted by Mehmet the Conqueror. The Ottoman Islamic "tradition" could presumably resist the Young Turks' civic constitutionalist logic. Accordingly, Karolidis emphasized the "theocratic" character of the Ottoman state and even proposed to broaden the prerogatives of the Caliph,[26] which he believed were compatible with national sovereignty (*hakimiyet-i milliye*).[27] Moreover, with an analogy to a stock company, Karolidis underlined the need to respect the "capital" of

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[24] Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi (hereafter MMZC), Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 3, İçtima 13, p. 328.

[25] MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 3, İçtima 13, p. 328.

[26] *Takvim-i Vekayi*[3], no. 246, p. 8 (MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 1, İçtima 89).

[27] MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 3, İçtima 41, p. 1154.

each community, implying that the Turks should respect the most significant among the Greeks' "capital", that is, their religious privileges.[28]

Turks found no reason to comply with the Greeks' argument. According to the Turks, non-Muslims' privileges contradicted egalitarianism; by insisting on privileges, non-Muslims were betraying the ideal of the Ottoman nation through their preference of private communal interest over the public national interest. In the privilege question, at stake was the way to achieve constitutionalism; whether communities or individuals should be the basis of national sovereignty [Fujinami 2015a]. Greeks' arguments rarely convinced their Muslim and non-Muslim compatriots, including the Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and, of course, Bulgarians. In this atmosphere, Karolidis continued to defend the Orthodox unity under the spiritual authority of the Patriarchate, in a partnership with the Muslim Turks, because, in his view, while

> the Hellenic government for political reasons could ally with the Bulgarians […] cooperation between the Patriarchate and Exarchate, between the Greeks and Bulgarians in Turkey, between Hellenism and Bulgarianism, is the abrogation, negation, and reversal of the Great Church, Patriarchate, Hellenism, Greek nationality and history, and Greek national consciences. [Καρολίδης 1913: 254]

Practically, Karolidis had few other options but to ally with the Committee of Union and Progress.[29] He criticized those Greeks who allied with the Bulgarians (and anti-Unionist Turks), in particular Dragoumis' associates, the Society of Constantinople and its front organization, the Greek Political League (*Rum Meşrutiyet Klübü*/*Ελληνικός Συνταγματικός Πολιτικός Σύνδεσμος*), because in Karolidis' view they were "traitors who usurped the rights of Church and Nation" [Καρολίδης 1913: 341]. Karolidis was convinced that, "Like old Turkey from 1453 until 1908, new Turkey after 1908 unconsciously served the Great Church and Hellenism by pursuing centralizations for itself" [Καρολίδης 1913: 381].

4. 2. Sovereignty to Repress Privileges

The pro-Turkish Greeks had to solve another question in order to achieve an alliance with the Turks: the Cretan question. While the Porte kept claiming its *sovereignty* over the island, after 1899, both the local Christians and Hellenic Greeks took it for granted

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[28] *Takvim-i Vekayi³*, no. 290, p. 11 (MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 1, İçtima 115).
[29] [Fujinami 2011: chaps. 4–5]. Also consult [Veremis 1999; Boura 1999].

that Crete constituted a *semi-sovereign* "state" under the nominal Ottoman *suzerainty*. In 1908, Cretan Christians unilaterally declared a union with Greece. Pro-Turkish Greeks were obliged to demonstrate that they were not hurting the Ottoman *sovereignty*. Karolidis blamed the four protecting Powers—Britain, France, Russia, and Italy—in his attempt to deny the responsibility of Greeks because, theoretically, it was these Great Powers, not Greece, that had occupied Crete. "There is nothing that concerns Greece on this issue", rightly in the viewpoint of international law, argued Karolidis. Hence, in his words, "What we should do is to say the protecting Powers that give us Crete back".[30] Karolidis even proposed Venizelos, the newly appointed prime minister of Greece originating from Crete, to put an end to the question by placing Crete under the "nominal sovereignty" (ὀνομαστικῆς κυριαρχίας) of the Porte [Καρολίδης 1913: 133–45, 237–40, 385–93]. Given that Venizelos was also considering maintaining the *status quo* on the Cretan Island [Llewellyn Smith 2006: 134–43], this plan was not so impractical as might be expected.

The Young Turks could not compromise Crete, because they had fought the Sultan for years to achieve "national sovereignty". In the Young Turks' view, anything that hurt Ottoman sovereignty must be repressed; the three privileges that had inflicted on sovereignty—the Capitulations, religious privileges, and privileged provinces—must be abolished. Even under Hamidian despotism, when it was politically dangerous to openly discuss the exercise of sovereignty, Muslim jurists were conscious of the danger that these privileges were posing to their *sovereign* rights [Fujinami 2015b]. Following the Young Turk Revolution, they felt free to advocate the necessity of restoring sovereignty at the expense of privileges. "In the Ancien Régime (*devr-i sabıkta*)", Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a constitutional lawyer and one of the most prominent Unionists, argued that,

> apparently law was one but the Sultans' servants and the servants' servants had their respective privileges. Beyond these unlimited privileges that had become customary, there were some exceptional privileges based on treaties and history; among these were foreigners' privileges, the immunities of Christians they had enjoyed since the time of Sultan Mehmet, and the privileges granted to the Island of Samos, inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, and the Island of Crete (*Ecanibin imtiyazatı, Hristiyanların ta ahd-ı Mehmet Hanıdan [*sic, Sani'den?*] beri nail oldukları muafiyat, Sisam ceziresine, Cebelilübnan ahalisine, Girit ceziresine verilen imtiyazat işte bu cümlesinden idi*).

[30]   MMZC, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimaiye 2, İçtima 92, p. 1729.

With the restoration of constitutionalism, Ottomans had to change this situation, because

> as the cream of the laws of humans, the Constitution in its essence is the enemy and annihilator of every kind of inequality. Nations and peoples united under the constitutional banner of justice and equity cannot imagine any special honor or privilege (*bir şeref ve imtiyaz-ı mahsus*). Everyone, every community, and every part of the people had the same status before the law.

Therefore, according to Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon had to choose either the Ottoman Constitution or autonomy as recognized by treaties; they cannot demand both, because they contradicted each other. So long as the Lebanese wanted equality with other Ottoman citizens, he continued, they had to abandon any privilege that ran contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, because

> the Constitution is one whole; just like the Ottoman territory, the Constitution is indivisible. Accepting only those parts of the Constitution you like and rejecting those parts you do not like is no less illogical than attempting to accept only the good parts and reject the bad parts of one and the same thing.[31]

Babanzade İsmail Hakkı's remark excellently represented the Muslim intellectuals' mentality that regarded all three privileges as contradictory and detrimental to the Ottomans' sovereign rights.[32]

    After the Young Turk Revolution, the Macedonian, Cretan, and privilege questions—issues that concerned privileged provinces and religious privileges—formed a thorn in the Greeks' side. As for the Capitulations, Karolidis understood Muslims' indignation against abuses not only by foreigners but also by their *protégé*s, including Greeks, done under the pretext of treaty stipulations. In Karolidis' view, Muslim Turks' legitimate complaints on the unjust privileges of foreigners led to their unjust criticisms towards the Greeks' legitimate religious privileges.[33] Karolidis also argued that these privileges had been treated in a similar manner in the early modern

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[31] [Babanzade] İsmail Hakkı, "Cebelilübnan Ahalisi ve İmtiyazatı", *Tanin*, no. 44, 13 September 1908, pp. 1–2.

[32]   For more about Babanzade İsmail Hakkı's ideas, see [Fujinami 2015c].

[33] [Καρολίδης 1932: part 2, pp. 87–9, 306–7]. The Capitulations were some of the most contested issues during the peace after the Ottoman-Greek war of 1897. Greece, as a self-proclaimed civilized nation, did everything to preserve its Capitulatory rights. See [Fujinami 2016a].

period [Καρολίδης 1892–93: vol. 2, pp. 45–7]. A Muslim Kurdish jurist, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, and a Greek Orthodox historian, Karolidis, agreed, albeit from opposite standpoints, on the significance of privileges in Ottoman history and law, but they disagreed on the question of how to treat them; their different views on privileges accounted for their different visions of the future Ottoman Empire.

4. 3. End of Ottoman Ecumenism

History permitted little time for the (possible) development of Ottoman constitutionalism. Taking advantage of the Italian invasion of Libya, in 1912, the Balkan alliance including Greece invaded the Ottoman Empire, leading to the almost complete loss of its European territory. In the subsequent Great War, the Ottomans sided with the Central Powers while Greece, after long hesitation and internal strife ending in the "National Schism" (εθνικός διχασμός), allied with the Entente Powers. The victory of the Entente seemed to offer Greece a golden opportunity to realize the *Megali Idea*. Greece invaded Anatolia in 1919, with British support. These developments, however, brought a deathblow to the unity of the Orthodox Church.

   In 1912, the Balkan Wars compelled the Albanians to declare independence; in 1922, the Church of Albania unilaterally declared its autocephaly, to which the Ecumenical Patriarchate consented as late as 1937 [Σταυρίδου 2004: 587]. Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes expanded the jurisdiction of the Serbian Church to include the dioceses of Bosnia and Montenegro, with the metropolitan of Belgrade becoming a Patriarch, with approval of the Ecumenical Patriarchate [Kitromilides 2006: 238; Kiminas 2009: 22]. In 1925, the Ecumenical Patriarchate also recognized the promotion of the Romanian Church to a Patriarchate [Σταυρίδου 2004: 548]. The schism with the Bulgarians ended as late as 1945; the Ecumenical Patriarchate allowed the Bulgarians the title of Patriarch only in 1961, even though the latter declared it eight years before, in 1953 [Kitromilides 2006: 242; Kiminas 2009: 25]. Antagonism between the Greeks and Arabs in the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem persisted under the French and British Mandate of Syria and Palestine [Papastathis 2014].

   The home of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, where the Greeks and Turks fought with each other, had to endure harder times until the new ecclesiastical regime was established. After the Balkan Wars, Crete, Samos, and a part of Macedonia were ceded to the Kingdom of Greece; but unlike the cases of Ionia and Thessaly decades before, this time the dioceses of these newly conquered areas or the "New Lands" were not incorporated into the Greek Church. This is because, on the one hand, the ensuing "National Schism" between the Royalists and the Venizelists hindered such an

important decision. On the other hand, many Greeks thought that the conquest of Ottoman lands was a question of time; in case the Kingdom of Greece captured Constantinople, the distinction between "Old Lands", "New Lands", and Ottoman lands would lose its meaning. The unity of Orthodoxy would be easily restored by the unification of the Church of Greece with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Few Greeks were bothered by the (temporal) problem of the mismatch of jurisdiction in Macedonia. In 1919, Constantinopolitan Greeks headed by the Venizelists proclaimed a rupture of official relations with the Porte [Alexandris 1992: 56–7]. Not only practically, but also symbolically, Orthodox Greeks abandoned their age-old tradition of coexistence with the Muslim Turks.

Turks resisted. During the Turkish War of Independence, some Turkish-speaking prelates in Anatolia opposed the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which became in their view a puppet of the Greek government, and founded a new Church of their own, with support of the Ankara government. This new Turkish "Patriarchate" was supposed to become another case of autocephaly with an ethno-nationalistic basis, just like the Serbian, Romanian, and Albanian Churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate never recognized such a "Turkish" Church. Moreover, since the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 obliged the Turks to respect the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the value of the "Turkish" Patriarchate decreased even in the eyes of the Turkish nationalists.[34]

Nevertheless, the Ecumenical Patriarchate could not maintain its former authority in what remained for the Turks in former Ottoman territory. Not only were many Orthodox Greeks killed during the Turkish War of Independence, they were also collectively deported from their homeland by the population exchange between Greece and Turkey [Hirschon 2003; Λιάκος 2011]. Christianity was almost completely wiped out from Anatolia. Moreover, at the conference of Lausanne, Turks were no less willing to get rid of religious privileges than to abolish the Capitulations.[35] In the eyes of the Turks, religious privileges constituted a "state within a state", which had contradicted and damaged their sovereignty for decades, even for centuries. The Ecumenical Patriarchate narrowly escaped being removed from Istanbul, and the remaining Greeks were deprived of any privileges. "Minority protection", as the treaty of Lausanne had anticipated, proved a mere scrap of paper in front of the Turkish nationalists, who were determined to disallow any intervention in their domestic affairs. Constantinopolitan Greeks were forced to "voluntarily" renounce any protection from outside [Kamouzis 2013].

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[34]   [Alexandris 1992: chaps. 3–5]. Compare with the Turkish view [Baş 2005].
[35]   On the abolition of religious privileges, see [Alexandris 2011]. Compare with the case of Capitulations, as described in [Elmacı 2005: chap. 6].

Conclusion

The long 19th century was a time of great transformation for the Orthodox Church. Once a universal leader of Eastern Christianity, the Ecumenical Patriarchate after World War I found itself under tutelage of the secular Republic; a small community of Orthodox Christians remained in Turkey, including Istanbul and the small Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The Balkan historiographies have traditionally celebrated the fall of the Ottoman Empire as the end of the "Turkish yoke". The disintegration of Orthodoxy has also been regarded as a natural outcome of national awakenings, as the legend has it that Orthodox tradition for an independent state is to have an independent Church. This is clearly an invented tradition on the part of the secular Balkan nationalisms, because the 19th-century Ecumenical Patriarchate never thought in this way. Nor did the Patriarchate consider itself a "national" Church of the Ottoman state. Karolidis criticized this invented tradition of ethno-national reading of the Orthodox history that must be universal. In his view, independence of secular polities did not and should not accompany the independence of Churches. Christians outside of the Empire had belonged to any one of the Eastern Patriarchates; only the heretic Churches dared to claim independence. According to Karolidis,

> The Christian Church, after its conquest in the Roman Empire in the 4th century A.D., could never think of an autocephalous Church established in an autocephalous state, because the Church neither knew nor recognized any other state or polity other than the Roman Empire and Emperor. [Καρολίδης 1922–29: vol. 4, p. 107]

Karolidis criticized those who anachronistically denounced the early modern Ottoman institutions by the logic of ethno-nationalism: for example, the Greeks who accused the Patriarchate for not Hellenizing the Orthodox Christians, the Bulgarians who attacked "Greek hegemony", and the Turks who condemned the Sultans for not Turkifying their subjects. Although such ethnocentric readings of history became common in the Interwar Balkans and Turkey, Karolidis remained loyal to his argument that the Ecumenical Patriarchate was never a national Church; for him, the Patriarchate was an ecumenical Church of universal value that did and should control even those dioceses in politically independent states beyond the temporal border of the Empire [Καρολίδης 1922–29: vol. 4, pp. 49–54, 87–109, 278–80].

Judging in hindsight, Orthodox ecumenism survived thanks to the Ottoman Empire. The end of Ottoman Islam led to an end of the Orthodox commonwealth. Paradoxically, the Greek irredentist vision of *Megali Idea* depended, in a sense, on the

existence of the Ottoman Empire. So long as this "Islamic" state existed, the Greeks could think of Hellenizing it as a whole, instead of dissolving it, through their economic power and ecumenical ideology. After the fall of the Empire, not only the Turks but also the Greeks were quick to construct a new tradition of national historiography, which took the one-nation-one-state model for granted, since the division of the Empire into mutually antagonistic nation-states made a vision of universal rule impractical, even unimaginable. In Greek historiography, memories of Ottoman ecumenism that had transcended the political borders were reduced to those of "diaspora", with the anachronistic presupposition that the Kingdom of Greece had been the "mainland" for all Greeks.

In conclusion, the age of Ottoman suzerainty was a critical period in which the sovereign nation-state model replaced not only the Islamic but also Orthodox universalism. Neither the Ecumenical Patriarchate nor the Sublime Porte was a passive victim in this process; on the contrary, just like the Porte made full use of the ambiguous concepts of *sovereignty*, *suzerainty*, and *imtiyazat* to keep its *de jure* authority as wide as possible, the Patriarchate endeavored to retain its spiritual authority beyond the *de facto*, sometimes even *de jure*, Ottoman borders, taking advantage of the *suzerain*, or more preferably, the *sovereign* rights of the Porte.[36] In so doing, the Ecumenical Patriarchate cautiously employed the canonical distinction between autocephaly and autonomy to assert its jurisdiction as widely as possible. This overlap of international and canonical jurisdiction was one factor that made the Orthodox Church an integral part of the (hi)story of Ottoman suzerainty. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, then, did the Ecumenical Patriarchate lose all of its former authority? Certainly not. Even though the Patriarchate lost many dioceses and surrendered to the newly born secular Turkish Republic, its spiritual power died hard.

In 1922, the Orthodox dioceses in North America were transferred from the Church of Greece to the Ecumenical Patriarchate [Erickson 2008: chap. 4]. In 1928, following the Asia Minor Catastrophe, the question of the "New Lands" in Greece was settled; Macedonia, Mount Athos, Samos, and Crete remained under the (nominal) jurisdiction of Constantinople but were administered by Athens. This measure was expected to help preserve the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate of Constan-

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[36]   In Greek, the concept of suzerainty was more clearly distinguished from sovereignty than in Turkish. Greek-English dictionaries at the turn of the 20th century usually equated *suzerainty* with ἐπικυριαρχία and *sovereignty* with κυριαρχία, respectively. See, for example [Jannaris 1895: 356, 377; Γεωργιάδης 1900: 934, 987]. In contrast, a Turkish-Greek dictionary published at around the same time translated both *hakimiyet* (a standard Turkish expression for *sovereignty*) and *metbu* (a seldom-used Turkish legal term for *suzerainty*) as κυριαρχία, demonstrating the ambiguities in Turkish concerning these two concepts. See [Χλωρός 1899–1900: 682, 1534].

tinople. Greeks attempted to save whatever could be saved in the spiritual authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, especially before the secular Turkish Republic, which was happy to deny the Patriarchate's universal or international character. Similarly, the dioceses in the Dodecanese Islands, under the Italian occupation from 1911 until the end of World War II, remained under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, even after their incorporation to Greece.[37] As a result, while the dioceses in the "Old Lands", including Ionia and Thessaly—ceded to Greece in 1864 and 1881—belong to Athens, those in the "New Lands", including Samos and Crete—former privileged provinces under Ottoman *sovereignty*—as well as the Dodecanese and Macedonia—occupied by Italy and Greece in 1910s––remain under the jurisdiction of Constantinople. The way in which the Ottoman territory was divided determined the ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Here, we find one legacy of the age of Ottoman suzerainty.

After World War II, as communism spread throughout Eastern Europe, Orthodoxy's value in the eyes of the Western camp increased. In fact, ever since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia's loss of influence had improved the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which accepted the autonomy of the Estonian, Finnish, and Latvian Churches. Additionally, during the same period, new dioceses were established in Western Europe and Australia [Kiminas 2009: 22–3].

There were some setbacks, the most serious of which was the Cyprus question. While the Archbishopric of Cyprus played an important political role in the island, the Ecumenical Patriarchate often became easy prey of the Turkish government, who took revenge for Cypriot Turks on the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Many Greeks had to migrate, resulting in a near extinction of Christians in Istanbul. Somewhat ironically, however, this development lessened the Ecumenical Patriarchate's burden to defend its flock. From then on, deprived of actual laymen, the Patriarchate was increasingly an ecumenical Church more than a domestic institution of Turkey [Macar 2003: chap. 5; Akgönül 2004]. The global wave of religious revival after the 1970s and the end of Cold War accelerated the Patriarchate's international activities. At the turn of the 21st century, the spiritual authority of Constantinople expanded beyond the former borders of the Ottoman Empire, including Western and Northern Europe, America, Australia, and so on [Anastassiadis 2005].

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The (hi)story of Ottoman suzerainty started in Crimea and ended in Constantinople in

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[37]   On the State-Church relationship in Interwar Greece, see [Nanakis 2006; Βαλάκου-Θεοδωρούδη 2003; Τσιρώνης 2010; Anastassiadis 2010].

both secular and religious spheres. Russia's southward advance since the late 18th century brought the fall of an imperial regime. The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 helped invent the tradition of the Ottoman Caliphate while the Russian annexation of Crimea and protection over Romania invited the eventual diminution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's spiritual authority. Whenever the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was hurt, Orthodox unity likewise shrank. Serbia, Romania, and Crete acquired political autonomy (or *imtiyazat*) in between the Porte's (nominal) *suzerain* and *sovereign* rights, while religiously becoming autonomous or semi-autonomous under the (nominal) jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Arguably, the schisms of the Greek and Bulgarian Churches represented the essential aspect of Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms refusing to accept Orthodox universalism as represented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Following the treaty of Berlin, the autocephaly of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Cyprus prepared fertile ground for Russian and British imperialistic interventions. In this process, the Great Powers urged local actors to separate politics from religion, as a requisite for the modern sovereign nation state system, while at the same time implanting Christians' religious privileges, in which the Porte's *sovereign* rights could hardly intervene. This aggravated the conflict between the Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks, despite the latter's vision of the Helleno-Ottoman Eastern Empire.

The dual imperial domain of Islamic and Orthodox ecumenism was gone with the Ottoman Empire. By the treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Istanbul ceased to be the imperial capital of the Sultan-Caliph and lost many of its former Orthodox dioceses; Ankara represented the secularism of the new regime, while the Ecumenical Patriarchate remained a virtual captive of the Turkish Republic. More importantly, the workable legal institution for coexistence between Islam and Orthodoxy within a single sovereign state had been lost. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, the Patriarchate steadily restored its once lost spiritual authority beyond its borders. Without a legitimate Caliph, and becoming a target of Western Islamophobia, the revival of Islamic universalism took a more difficult and tragic process but, at least, it is certain that the secularism of the Turkish Republic could not eradicate all the legacy of universal rule that the Ottoman Islam had once realized. In a long crisis of the sovereign state system, the (hi) story of Ottoman suzerainty must be of great significance as it helps us contextualize the Eurocentric nature of various legal concepts and institutions that conquered the world in the long 19th century and kept devaluing the Islamic and Orthodox universalism.