

The Study of Sino-Japanese Relations in Japan and China, 1990–2005

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Introduction

The aim of this review is to summarize the various problems that have been brought up in the research literature on Sino-Japanese relations published in China and Japan since 1990, with emphasis on the contrasting images of the subject matter that have been depicted in the two countries. During the fifteen-year period in question, one can identify at least four common characteristics in the research, the first being the utilization in both countries of international politics as the basic framework for analyses which tend to regard Sino-Japanese relations as no different in character than those between any two sovereign nations in the world. Secondly, there is the diversity and complexity that runs through all of the research, and thirdly, one notices the employment of different problematics in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, in response to the changing situation in Sino-Japanese relations over time: the research during the 1990s perceiving the subject in terms of a main trend towards mutual friendship, despite the occurrence of friction and collision between the two countries; the research during the next decade mainly emanating from pessimism over strained relations between the two countries. Finally, there is the proliferation of descriptive, empirical research, leaving at least this reviewer with the impression that more attention should have been directed at finding and developing new research methodologies in the field.

This review will provide first an overview of the general trends

in the field, then turn to a theme-by-theme review of the subject matter based on books and articles published in the leading scholarly journals in both countries. However, please be aware that due to the interests of this reviewer and the limitations of space, some important research may not be discussed to the satisfaction of some readers.

I. Overview: The Structural Analysis of Sino-Japanese Relations

To begin with, let us take up the research literature that attempts to look back over and summarize the developments since the end of World War II, particularly during last thirty or so years since the formal normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

1. The Japanese Literature

Of the few attempts by Japanese scholars to sum up postwar Sino-Japanese relations, three come to mind: Mori 2006, Tanaka 1991 and Soeya 1995.

In the most recent study, Mori Kazuko, out of deep concern over the sense of crisis growing from the strained relations that developed between the two countries in the wake of the great shock experienced in Japan over the “anti-Japanese” demonstrations of Spring 2005, was inspired to embark on an investigation of the whole postwar situation. What resulted was a structural reconsideration of Sino-Japanese relations from the establishment of the People’s Republic to the present day, which led the author to suggest how to end the postwar period in a fashion acceptable to both sides and what to do in building a “new age.” By insisting on the idea that “Healthy Sino-Japanese relations form the looking glass that reflects Japan’s future direction,” Mori attempts to instill in her readers a strong sense of destiny, which one finds little of in either Tanaka Akihiko or Soeya Yoshihide’s work.

Tanaka’s objective is rather to fill in the dearth of research on Sino-Japanese relations by describing as faithfully as possible their

historical process since the end of World War II, resulting in a general history and introduction to the subject from a new analytical viewpoint that these are no different from the kinds of relations that are conducted between any two countries in the world. Soeya takes a more conventional direction in the form of a case study concerning trade relations between the two countries. What was here in these three treatises is Mori warning us about the grave nature of Sino-Japanese relations after taking into consideration both the international climate and foreign policies of each country towards the other, Tanaka examining those relations in terms of a three factors composed of the international political climate, policy on both home fronts and the mutual dynamism that both countries exert on one another, and Soeya posing the question of how Sino-Japanese trade developed in the midst of severe political restrictions, in terms of an intersection of lines representing harmony with, autonomy within and independence from relations with the United States.

The similarities attributable to the three studies are 1) all of them are the results of the cool, objective analysis of issues that normally tend to become very emotional — Mori not giving special treatment to Japan's China policy and Tanaka denying any unique quality in the relations between the two countries — and 2) similarity of approach, in the sense that all three regard the overall international environment as a very important factor — Mori regarding it as a crucial limiting factor together with domestic policy in the two countries, Tanaka arguing that the framework of Sino-Japanese relations is fundamentally determined by China's relations with the United States, and Soeya recognizing the heavy influence of international politics on those relations in the postwar period leading up to their normalization, characterizing Japanese diplomacy as a "passive response to the predominate international political environment" at the time.

2. The Chinese Literature

The study of Sino-Japanese relations up through the decade of the 1980s was limited to those Chinese who were directly involved in diplomatic and trade relations with Japan; so it was only from the

1990s on that the academic community became involved, producing a good number of doctoral dissertations on the subject. Three of the most representative efforts in terms of style among such scholarly work are Lin Daizhao 1997, Jin Xide 2002 and Xu Zhixian 2002.

Lin, a faculty member of Beijing University's Department of International Relations, is also the author of a textbook [Lin 1997] he requires in his course entitled "History of Domestic and Foreign Relations." Jin's book is a culmination of a body of research done by this veteran scholar over a long period of time, while Xu's work is the result of a joint study commissioned by a think-tank dealing with contemporary international relations and commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan.

All three volumes, which are policy-oriented efforts ultimately intended to contribute positively to promoting Sino-Japanese friendship, summarize the experiences and lessons involved in the development of relations between the two countries, list the characteristic features of their present situation, and offer prospects about their future. Lin goes into not only political and economic relations between the two countries since the end of World War II, but also their social and cultural aspects, while Jin attempts to analyze the features of how those relations developed, and Xu emphasizes pending issues, their causes and possible resolutions.

Lin adopts a chronological approach to the subject, dividing the period between the end of the War in 1945 to the Emperor of Japan's visit to China in 1992 into five phases: 1) the start of diplomatic relations between the two countries immediately after the War, their expansion, failure, reopening and re-dampening, 2) the call for normalization and its realization, 3) the conclusion of the treaty of friendship, 4) new developments in the relations and 5) Japan and China in the twenty-first century. In conclusion he takes up several problems facing the two countries in their efforts at international cooperation. Xu also takes the chronological route, describing the political, economic and cultural aspects of normalization and the friendship treaty during the 1980s and the how relations developed after the end of the Cold War. In conclusion, he also takes up the

three main problems facing the future: the Taiwan question, historical issues and building mutual trust. Jin, on the other hand, eschews the chronological approach for a more problematic discussion, taking up such issues as 1) the logical starting point and historical preconditions for Sino-Japanese relations, 2) the post-normalization system, 3) reflection on thirty years of economic and political relations under that system, 4) redefining those relations at the turn of the 20th century, 5) thoughts on the past thirty years of normalization and 6) prospects for the twenty-first century.

3. Imagery

With the exception of Soeya's exploration into the pre-normalization postwar era, the rest of the research discussed in this section focuses on normalization as the turning point in Sino-Japanese relations during that era. Here is a comparison of what the six selections say about the structure of those relations before and after normalization.

1) Prior to Normalization

Beginning with the factors in realizing normalization, there are two hypotheses: that normalization was the result of 1) "the will of the people" or 2) the international environment.

The Chinese research leans towards the former, while the Japanese literature favors the latter. The people's will hypothesis emphasizes exchange between the two countries in the private sector, like trade and "third sector" relationships, as a strong motivation for diplomatic normalization. According to Lin 1997, the actions taken by the Chinese people's diplomacy movement and Japanese private organizations, opposition parties and sympathetic Diet members within the LDP created an unavoidable historical trend towards official normalization. While such international aspects as the return of China's seat in the United Nations, friction between Japan and the United States and the restructuring of US policy towards China represent the objective historical background to normalization, private sector diplomacy promoted by the people played a huge role in the history of international relations by creating an atmosphere conducive to normalization. Much of the

Japanese research, while recognizing private sector trade as marking a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations prior to normalization, refuses to directly link such activity to normalization per se.

The international environment hypothesis proposes that the realization of normalization was determined by the international conditions, mainly America's Asian strategy. Soeya 1995 cites the influence of "Pax Americana," while Tanaka views Sino-Japanese relations as being largely determined by US-China relations. Although citing the importance of the private sector in the process, Mori 2006 considers normalization as a by-product of *détente* between China and the US.

Secondly, concerning political and economic relations between the two countries, the research has focused on the policy debate between the two governments prior to normalization as to whether politics and economics should be considered separate or inseparable issues. Postwar Japanese governments tended to regard relations with China as having separate political and economic aspects, which enabled them to promote trade relations with the Mainland in the absence of a diplomatic settlement. On the other hand, China argued that politics and economics were inseparable. Tanaka understands the twenty years of postwar history prior to normalization as vacillating between these two extremes, depending on changes both in international conditions and the internal affairs of either country. However, Lin holds that any separation of politics and economics would have been impossible, since such a position would rule out the presence of any political elements within economic exchange and thus refute the actual efforts made by the two countries to build diplomatic relations. He argues that when mutual political animosity exists between two countries, their economic relations do not run smoothly, but when efforts are made to improve political relations, all aspects of exchange and contact benefit.

Turning to the so-called "1972 system," which formed the fundamental framework for Sino-Japanese relations at the time normalization was reached, Jin defines this moment as a decision that "consensus shall be formed between the two countries on solutions to such problems as the Taiwan question, historical issues,

regional security and territorial disputes, realized by mutual experience and overall consideration of national interests on the part of the leaders of both countries,” emphasizing that “despite changes occurring on the domestic or international level, the fundamental principles established under the 1972 system would not change.” While Mori is in fundamental agreement with Jin’s definition, she wonders whether the system was meant to be perpetual and why it is still in effect, calling for a new agreement in the spirit of the existing one that redefines parameters in response to a new stage in relations between the two countries.

2) Descriptions of the Past Thirty Years

First, all the authors are in agreement concerning the development of Sino-Japanese relations since normalization: the 1970s as a formation period for a fundamental framework (in Mori’s works, “the era of strategic friendship”), the 80s and early 90s as a period of stability and progress, and the period since the mid-90s marked by structural change (a transition period involving re-structuring and re-definition according to Jin). Mori adds another stage of “rebuilding” beginning in 2005.

In sum, all accept the time since the mid-90s as a period of transition, and despite the occurrence of such problems as the historical issues bothering both countries, they have entered into the mainstream of diplomacy (marked by the end of the “honeymoon” of the 70s and 80s according to Xu), in which aspects of friction and competition will certainly come to the forefront.

Regarding the disputes and conflict that are due to occur, Mori predicts that they will be complicated and structural in nature due to the stratified arrangement of the actors and the diversity/complexity of the issues involved. In concrete terms, Lin cites the two most important problems being the Taiwan question and historical issues, but also points to territorial disputes and trade imbalances arising from time to time, while Xu takes up the more fundamental problem of building mutual trust.

Next, concerning recent strained relations, Mori points out the rigid, or “fragile” structure of Sino-Japanese diplomacy, fragile not only in the historical sense of Japan’s invasion of China, but also in

the their unsystematic character; that is, depending solely on personal relationships. Another aspect of this fragility is the nationalistic ideology that has developed in both countries from the turn of the century on. Jin argues that in the process of both countries becoming world powers, there has been an exacerbation of strategic uneasiness and competitiveness between them. Xu states that over the past ten years or so since 1993, Japan's policy towards China has been destabilized due the former's conditions of economic development.

Finally, regarding prospects for the future, Mori takes up the following six points : 1) the adoption of a more rational approach, 2) more effort on the part of governments and leaders in both countries, 3) the institutionalization of relations through various established channels, 4) the adoption of a fundamental common perception among the Japanese people concerning historical issues related to China, 5) the adoption by both parties of concerns for regional rather than national interests and that emphasis be put on building a multinational regime, 6) promotion of a joint project to build regional cooperation through the establishment of an "East Asian Union." On the other hand, Jin insists that the latent danger in an escalation from strategic uneasiness to outright conflict cannot be ruled out altogether, while Xu suggests that both parties concentrate on building a two-track channel of exchange and strengthen their efforts to promote regional cooperation.

II. Specific Topics

The present stage of Sino-Japanese relations has been described as "politically cool, but economically hot." The "economic warmth" being generated between the two countries continues to set new records in temperature, both qualitatively and quantitatively, bringing about deeper and deeper mutual dependence, to the extent that one can no longer exist economically without the other ("having to prop one other up" in Mori's words). The "political freeze," on the other hand, is, according to the research, occurring on many different fronts, including historical issues, the Taiwan

question, and military security; however, there are also scholars who look at the source of such coolness in leadership competition over how to integrate the region and the rise of nationalism in both countries, thus suggesting ameliorative policies aimed at promoting regional cooperation and private sector diplomacy. The following sections will concentrate on debates that have arisen over the five issues of economics, history, Taiwan, security and regional cooperation, while leaving socio-cultural relations and the problem of nationalism to the excellent research that has already been done.

1. Economic Relations

Postwar Sino-Japanese economic relations can be divided chronologically into the rise, and occasional fall, of private sector-oriented trade during the 1950s-60s, inter-government trade accompanying diplomatic normalization during the 1970s, relations propped up by investment and economic cooperation during the early 1980s, and the rise of an equal division of trade through direct investment from the mid-1980s on [Maruyama 2001]. Viewed from the standpoint of Japanese economic cooperation in relation to China's prosperity, the 1970s were marked by the promotion of economic mutual dependence on the basis of increased trade, the 1980s by Japanese direct investment and monetary loans, enabling the formation of China's economic infrastructure, and the 1990s by the rise of a market economy in China based on the consolidation of trade, investment and government-sponsored ODA [Hattori 1995, Kojima 2002].

The tremendous economic development that has occurred in China since diplomatic normalization with Japan has brought about changes in the relative positions of the two countries, the analysis of which has produced very different perspectives. In contrast to the research done during the 1990s attempting to explain the increasing intimacy of Sino-Japanese trade relations, as we entered the 2000s, much of the research was focused on the question of how the newly "developed economy" of China was influencing its Japanese counterpart, with plenty of critical discussion about the "Chinese threat" and the "hollowing out of Japanese industry."

1) Economic Intimacy

The great leap enjoyed by the Chinese economy since normalization is solidly proven by the available data on such aspects as trade, investment, financial cooperation (both government and private) and technological transfer. Moreover, any problems that have occurred are solely economic in nature, with little political overtones. For example, Hattori Kenji [1995] cited the low level of development in the Chinese economy as one factor that could weaken the “stability” of economic relations with Japan, which requires the latter to strengthen its economic cooperation with China and support China’s membership in the World Trade Association. Now from the turn of the century, with the strengthening of regional cooperation, the realization of China’s WTO membership status, the IT revolution going on in western China and the influence of relations with Japan on economic growth, an even more rosier picture is being painted [Okubo 2001]. From 2003 on, the previous fears of a Chinese economic threat have been alleviated by “special Chinese procurements” [Takahashi 2005].

Regarding changes in the relative economic status of the two countries, based on this new way of regarding China as a new and beneficial economic partner, Xue Jingxiao [2005] argues that there has been a remarkable turnaround from the 1980s, when China was highly dependent on Japan, to the present day, in which Japan is becoming more and more the dependent party in the relationship. Ding Dou [2005] and Zeng Xiaolan [2003] have stated that from the turn of the century there has been a change in mutual dependency from unbalanced to balanced, and while a high degree of sensitivity still exists on both sides, the Chinese side is becoming relatively less and less fragile.

2) The “Chinese Threat” and the “Japanese Industrial Void”

As represented by Hattori’s research, the 1990s was steeped in the perception that an “impoverished China” was a barrier to maintaining stability in its economic relations with Japan. In contrast, the 2000s brought on fears that rapid Chinese economic growth would speed up the hollowing out of the Japanese

manufacturing sector, thus reducing the “Chinese threat” to the economic sphere. Of course there was plenty of research which shared the apprehension that China’s economic development into a super power would have noticeable ill effects on Japan. This line of reasoning was well represented in a collection of papers edited by Ito Motoshige [2003], in which the contributors argued that the actual conditions of contemporary economic relations between the two countries show that the so-called “China threat” has been blown out of proportion, and proposed that ways be sought to stimulate the Japanese economy and bring about co-prosperity for both parties.

Specifically, the “China threat” rebuttal may be summarized in the following points.

1. Japan’s trade conditions are not being greatly influenced by Chinese industrial development [Ito 2003].
2. Sino-Japanese trade relations are complementary.
3. The share of Japanese direct investment in China comes to only 5% of the total, and manufacturing transfer to China is not progressing [Fukao 2003].
4. Although mutual dependency is increasing in Sino-Japanese trade, Japanese exports account for only 0.5% of the country’s GDP, which warrants little alarm about the influence of China on the Japanese economy [Urata 2003].
5. By overlooking the fact that the process of industrial hollowing out has a boomerang effect leaves the “Chinese threat” hypothesis bereft of knowledge concerning fundamental economic mechanisms [Nagaoka 2003].

Although it cannot be denied that on the micro-level there are industries whose manufacturing facilities have been either relocated or closed, extrapolating such experience of specific regions and enterprises onto the macro-economic landscape is nothing but making a mountain out of a mole hill. Measures to be adopted in Japan can be taken from how the United States dealt with the Japanese challenge decades ago [Harada 2003, Katsumi 2003, Iijima 2003], and also include the active promotion of structural reform starting with deregulation, attempting to raise the quality of the industrial structure and searching for ways to feed off the

Chinese economic upsurge symbiotically [Ito 2003, Yokota 2002]. While there is absolutely no theoretical problem arising out of closing the gaps that exist between the two countries, in terms of international society, such political aspects as national sovereignty and security are different issues altogether [Ito 2003].

2. Historical Issues

The discussion and research on this topic can be divided into the following three categories.

1) Locating the Problem

The study of this aspect has run the gamut from various historical perceptions to a worsening of public sentiment. Since the 1980s, there have been clashes over the content of school textbooks, the visit of prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine to worship the war dead, and frequent “outbursts” by over zealous politicians-cum-amateur historians. In particular, from 2001 on, the clash of historical perceptions has grown more serious due to the publication of a new history textbook geared to fostering pride in Japan’s heritage and Prime Minister Koizumi’s continued visits to Yasukuni Shrine. This set of circumstances has left the Chinese side more deeply convinced that Japan’s leaders are not ready to reflect seriously upon their country’s past mistakes or live up to the promises they have made, while the Japanese side reacts to such criticism as China’s over-sensitivity about the past.

Concerning the textbook issue, Liu Jie et al. 2006 is a collection of research that includes an attempt to trace the mechanism of how this issue originated within the system by which Japanese history is taught and textbooks are officially inspected and approved [Mitani paper in Liu Jie et al. 2006]. There is also a comparative study [Ibaraki paper in Liu Jie et al. 2006] of the history textbooks used in both countries, which attempts to show the common aspects of how the subject is taught on both sides and concludes that such common aspects include history education as a means of combating the dilution of national identity and systems in which various political interests influence how history is taught.

On the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the discussion surrounds such

points as separation of religion and state governance, the feelings of bereaved families, the institution of the emperor, Asian diplomacy, responsibility for the Pacific War, and again related historical perceptions. The paper contributed by Murai divides the issue into chronological phases in order to clarify the debate in domestic and international terms. The international point of dispute is very closely related to a dichotomy that has been created to identify A-class war criminals i.e., those responsible for the War dividing the aggressors into militarists and the civilians they inducted, an idea that has become the official line in China to conceptualize the Japanese invasion.

Zhu Jianrong [2005] has indicated that the Yasukuni issue is the mechanism by which the whole set of historical issues will be resolved, while Mori Kazuko [2006] adds that if this is the case, it would be wise for the Japanese side to respond accordingly.

Regarding war reparations, despite the fairness shown by the Chinese government in refusing government compensation in the joint statement of September 1972, [Yamagiwa 1991], this abdication gave rise to two new problems concerning compensation to private parties and distorted Japanese ODA activities [Iechika 2003]. The escalation of the reparations question is not only related to the expansion of freedom in Chinese society, but also to China's demand for deeper Japanese reflection over the War than any material or monetary benefits that could be accrued [Yang Zhihui paper in Liu Jie et al. 2006]

Then there are the careless statements made by Japanese cabinet members, like the Incident at Lugou Bridge being "accidental" and the Nanking Massacre being a "fabrication," resulting in a recurring pattern of resignations.

What these politicians intend to convey by such statements is that Japan's aggressive actions in the War did not constitute "invasion," but rather the liberation of Asia from western imperialism [Kokubun 1999]. One rationale for Japan's refusal to pay reparations arises from the consciousness that the war was fought "in self-defense" [Okamoto and Igarashi 2005].

Beginning in the decade of the 2000s, the worsening of national sentiment due to these historical issues has been investigated

close-up in all kinds of public opinion surveys, the analysis of which overwhelmingly concludes that a significant decline has occurred in the level of mutual trust between the two countries. On the Chinese side, we have the poll conducted by the Japanese Research Section of the Academy of Social Sciences [*Japanese Studies* 2002, No. 6, pp. 2-14], and in Japan there is the survey done by the Cabinet Office. One analysis of this data concludes that given the mood in Japan of “flexibility” (meaning subordination) and “coolness” (meaning passiveness), public opinion favors resistance rather than engagement over the question, while in China the Japanese response is seen as “an abrupt outbreak of nationalism and right-wing ideology” [Lu Xijun 2003].

In particular, the antagonism that has grown in both countries following the “anti-Japanese” demonstrations in China during spring 2005, has been attributed in much of the research to the long standing gap that exists in how the historical issues involving the two countries are being perceived [Yokoyama 2005; Liu Jie et al. 2006]. While both dialogue and the formation of a common historical view is not an easy task, nonetheless, there are still scholars who are optimistic about the possibility of new talks and even joint research between the two countries [Kawashima Shin paper in Liu Jie et al. 2006].

2) Origins of the Debate

Even the origins of the debate are being debated. The Chinese side tends to argue that these are problems arising from the 1972 Joint Statement and the Treaty of Friendship which Japan has failed to resolve. The Japanese side is more complex, and those who put the blame on China cite such factors as that country’s political and social problems (economic disparity, power struggles among the political leadership, etc.), ingrained anti-Japanese sentiment among its people, internationally-connected social networks, and the lurking Taiwanese question.

Let us look at two concrete debates that were waged. The first concerns the view that in order to gain an advantageous response from Japan in the socioeconomic sphere, China manipulated the issues of the past thus creating the impasse over historical

interpretation.

In response, Yang Daqing [2001] argues that such a view gives the political power of the Chinese government too much credit and fails to explain why Chinese living overseas are so vehement about Japanese militarism and the reparations issues. The second example surrounds the idea that the emphasis on patriotism in the Chinese educational curriculum has inculcated anti-Japanese sentiment within the Chinese people. In response, Tajima Eiichi [2005] argues that objectives of the movement to emphasize patriotism into education were 1) to return marginalized people to a China-centered mentality, 2) to eradicate the poison of tribal nationalism and re-interpret it in terms of officially recognized nationalistic sentiment, and 3) to check the rise of nationalism among the country's ethnic minorities. Therefore, such a movement could never be interpreted in the light of such a narrow view as nurturing "anti-Japanese" sentiment.

Turning to the Japanese researchers who seeks the origins of the problem in their own backyard, Tajima Eiichi [2005] focuses on consciousness, in the sense that anti-Japanese sentiment in China is regarded in Japan as "unnatural" and "ridiculous," giving rise to the idea that Chinese culture is somehow eccentric and suspicious (refusing to enter into dialogue on the basis of cultural relativism). Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is the result of its "anti-Japanese" educational system; and by considering China as composed of a government provoking its citizens to run amuck, one can only consider the Chinese people in terms of a powerless mob, thus creating a reality tangled up in elitism. Asai [1995] concludes that the social illness called "historical frigidity" in Japan has spread in epidemic proportions from the halls of the Diet to the general public. While Fan Liming [2005] attributes the problem to rabble rousing on the part of influential right-wing, and some left-wing, politicians.

Lu Xijun [2003] studied the perception gap in both countries concerning the character of and points of debate over the problem of history, concluding that the Japanese side, which considers only the material aspects of reparations for past actions, places the problem in the context of "a Chinese obsession with history," while

the Chinese side, which emphasizes the emotional aspects of reparations for past actions, places the problem in the context of “the Japanese distortion of history.”

3) New Chinese Perspectives on Japan

This is an issue that has become the subject of very complicated debates in both the mass media and academia. Ma Licheng [2002], Shi Yinhong [2003] and Feng Zhaokui [2003] all suggest that the historical issues regarding Japan should be looked at with a more relaxed attitude in China, with Ma arguing that these issues should not be the central issue in Sino-Japanese relations and Feng saying that they are Japan’s problem not China’s. In academia, the Communist Party’s Public Relations Department held a lecture session on the subject with four speakers, Ma, Shi, Sun Shulin (Chinese Academy of Social Science researcher) and Lu Shiwei (professor, Wuhan University) [*Shishi Baogao*, July 2003, pp. 15-25], while the Academy of Social Science’s Institute of International Economics and Politics held a seminar in conjunction with the diplomatic journal *Shijie zhishi* (World Affairs) [*Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics), No. 9, 2003, pp. 9-41] and its Japan Research Institute gathered together experts from the Academy, the Sino-Japanese Research Society, China-Japan Friendship Association, the History of Sino-Japanese Relations Research Association and the Chinese International Problems Research Association to hold a panel discussion on Jin Xide and Lin Zhibo’s critique [2003] of Ma and Shi’s ideas.

In Japan, the media reacted immediately with the weekly *Bungei Shunju* publishing a translation of Ma’s article, originally entitled “New Thinking About Sino-Japanese Relations,” as “My Fellow Chinese, It’s Time to Curb Your Anti-Japanese Actions,” and the monthly *Chuokoron* (September 2003) introducing it under the title “The Damaging and Futile Character of Nationalist Reactionary Arguments.” Both periodicals praised Ma’s article as a prelude to the new diplomatic thinking of the “new Chinese leadership” (the Hu Jingtao regime). Overall, the reaction demonstrated the limits to Japan’s grasp of its relations with China, showing 1) a lack of attention to the present situation in Chinese

society, 2) a lack of understanding regarding China's policy towards Japan and 3) the immaturity of the present discussion in Japan about its own policy towards China [Su Haihe 2003]. The Chinese media and public opinion greeted the Japanese coverage as having a "re-export" effect, while China's John Q Public became aware for the first time that such ideas existed and most bloggers attacked them as another case of the Japanese government's misconceptions about history. While there was at least one call for Chinese scholars to develop these ideas in the hope that they will bring about improvements in Sino-Japanese relations [Wang Chensuo 2003], sharp criticism was came from Japanese specialists over their indulgent perceptions of history [Jin Xide and Lin Zhibo 2003].

In Japan's academic community, Takai Kiyoshi [2006] took Jin and Lin to task on their criticism of Ma and Shi's ideas, while Tianer Hui [2003], in an examination of Japan's transformation from a sovereignty-oriented to a globally oriented nation, argued that Ma and Shi had offered fresh ideas that could lead to the creation of more reasonable Sino-Japanese relations free of mutual misunderstanding. There were also those who sought action on the part of Japan, like Mitani Hiroshi in his postscript to [Liu Jie et al. 2006], who urged Japanese to tackle historical issues head-on and create an opening in the barrier of historical perceptions separating them from their neighbors in the region. He argued that "initiative taken on the part of Japan" will change the existing vicious circle into a beneficial one and mark the start towards reconciliation" and warned that as long as it continues to run away from historical reality, Japan will not be able to free itself from its enslavement to the past."

Lu Xijun [2003], Mori Kazuko [2006] and Liu Jie [2006] concur: Lu stating that much of the mistrust that exists between China and Japan is the result of a human perception gap and that the key to improving relations is education and training, Mori pointing to joint regional projects as a key to reconciliation, and Liu emphasizing empathy, willingness to listen and respect for one other.

3. Taiwan Question

Iechika Ryoko [2003] has divided the history of this problem into four stages. Her third stage, from the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952 to diplomatic normalization in 1972, is characterized by such problems as “two Chinas,” “Taiwan’s unresolved status” and Japan’s search for ways to deal with Taiwan without losing diplomatic ties to the Mainland. This stage ended in 1972 with the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The final stage has been marked by a persistent pro-Taiwanese stance by the Japanese government and other prominent leaders, and the existence of the often repeated slogans, “two Chinas” and “one China, one Taiwan,” active support for the cause of Taiwanese national independence, and a new wave of activity in the midst of Taiwan’s economic development and political democratization.

The Chinese views of Japan’s gestures of friendship towards Taiwan have always been by and large six of one, half a dozen of the other. First, following normalization, Japan changed its political and diplomatic stance in line with the mainland, urged Taiwan to adopt the same attitude, thus trying to strike a balance between the two rivals [Lu Xijun 2003]. Secondly, since the 1990s, Japan has strengthened *de facto* relations with Taiwan, both politically and economically, secretly and openly, and on every level imaginable. This intimacy, which is becoming more and more political in character, is best symbolized by the large contingents of Diet members making visits to Taiwan [Yang Yunzhong 1996].

Next, there is Japan’s change of attitude towards Taiwan after the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the official recognition by Japan of Li Denghui’s visit and the support given by Japan’s chief cabinet secretary to Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Organization [Yan Jing and Wang Jun 2003]. Japan’s hope of maintaining the status quo on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is not related to politically unifying the two parties, and therefore should be viewed as a problem on the mainland [Sun Yun and Dong Yun 2001]. Finally, according to the 1996 US-Japan Security Treaty and the New US-Japan Guidelines for Defense and Security, Japan’s “strictly defensive posture” in its strategic policy was changed into a more active role of “backup logistic support” for US troops [Yin

Yan Jun 1997]. This turn of events suggests to Chinese observers that Japan is conspiring to support a divided China and Taiwanese national independence.

The reasons behind Japan's beguilement of Taiwan have been studied from such angles as 1) geopolitics, strategy and a leftover from Cold War thinking [Sun Yun and Dong Yun 2001, Lu Xijun 2003], 2) the close economic relations between the two entities [Lu Xijun 2003, Yan Jing and Wang Jun 2003], 3) Japan's special feelings of affinity towards Taiwan and the pro-Taiwan faction in Japanese politics [Yan Jing and Wang Jun 2003, Zhang Jinshan 2001, Sun Yun and Dong Yun 2001, Fan Yuejiang 1999], 4) structural changes occurring in Japanese politics [Yan Jing and Wang Jun 2003], 5) the relationship to Sino-Japanese historical issues [Lu Xijun 2003] and 6) the Taiwanese independence movement's activities in Japan [Yan Jing and Wang Jun 2003]. Almost all of the above research done in China concludes that Japan has a duty to uphold the 1972 Joint Statement and 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and thus refrain from interfering in Chinese internal affairs.

One more interesting point here is the fresh approach to the problem taken by Ijiri Hidenori [2001] that since direct contact between China and Taiwan is being established by "secret emissaries" dispatched by both sides, Japan's involvement is merely a diplomatic supplement to stabilizing such contact. That is to say, Japanese diplomacy should be studied as a dependent, rather than an independent variable affecting the character of China-Taiwan relations.

4. Security

1) The Military Security Dilemma

For some time after the establishment of diplomatic normalization, the two countries had really no mutual security issues to deal with [Kokubun 1999], until the end of the Cold War, when debate arose concerning such topics as "the Chinese threat" and "Japanese militarism."

The first topic, which appeared in academia and the media

around 1993-94, was the subject of a gathering of fourteen scholars [Amako Satoshi, ed. 1997], and the March issue of the monthly journal *Sekai* featured a section entitled “The Fallacy of the Chinese Threat Hypothesis. The former contained papers examining the “threat” as originating from two different vectors, actual fact and imagery [see also Mori 1996, Hamashita 1996], concluding that in reality China posed no threat to either East Asia in general or Japan in particular [Kato 1997, Kayahara 1997, Asano 1997]. In the introduction to the proceedings, the authors suggest that China poses a so-called threat both as a “world power” and as a “weak sister.” Such an image has been rebutted in China on the basis of political, economic and military empirical data [Yao Wenli 2002].

With respect to Japanese militarism, the Japanese Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science featured a collection of articles on its history [Ribben Xuekan, No. 4, 2005], and the Academy itself is promoting a research project that will hopefully result in the publication of a series on its study, source materials and historical development [see Jiang Lifeng and Tang Chongnan 2005]. Rather than an across-the-board denunciation of pervasive militarism, this research is attempting to point out certain aspects of Imperial Japan’s militarism that still exist today. Wan Feng, Liang and Tang, both specialists in Japanese studies, warn of a “resurrection of militarism from its ashes,” [Wan Feng, Liang Lifeng and Tang Zhongnan 2005] citing the rise of conservatism, neo-nationalism and ultra-right extremism in post-Cold War Japan, reminiscence of the political atmosphere that characterized the 1930s.

The resulting “security dilemma” that has arisen between the two countries can be categorized according to diplomatic historian Herbert Butterfield as either “a general dilemma” or “a dilemma based on structured conflict.” Both exist in reality in terms of degree of importance; that is, resolving one does not mean the resolution of the other. For example, Yao Wenli [2002] is of the opinion that while the general military security issues between the two countries have been reduced in magnitude, there may have been a worsening of the structural conflict that exists concerning

the issue, while Feng Yongping [2005] is certain that the situation has fallen into the structural conflict end of the scale. As to ways out of such difficulty, Yao urges cooperation between the two countries on a regional level, and Feng concludes that only an East Asian defense treaty organization will solve the problem.

2) The American Factor

The academic communities in both countries are in agreement that the United States is the most “significant other” influencing their international relations [Yang Bojiang 2003, Tanaka 1991, 2001]. Tanaka Akihiko [1991] goes as far as to say that the United States “determines” Sino-Japanese relations in a US-Japan vs. China (2:1) scheme. China, of course, is not happy with such a scheme, preferring a more mutual, triangular arrangement among the three entities. With the end to the Cold War and the growing seriousness of trade friction between the US and Japan, the 2:1 scheme has been showing signs of weakening, causing a period of transition tending more and more towards the formation of a triangle [Zhang Wenling, ed. 1997, Ren Xiao and Hu Yonghao 2002, Takagi 1994]. In a discussion of how the three countries can cooperate in making the Asian Pacific a more secure region in the post-Cold War era, Okabe Tatsumi, Takagi Seiichiro and Kokubun Ryosei [1999] suggested that while the US-Japan alliance provide a means of coercion as a last resort, through a constructive plan of cooperation with China, regional security by peaceful means can be assured over the long run.

While there is also the view that with the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance in 1996, there has been a trend toward a more clearly defined 2:1 scheme, resulting in more unbalance than before [Yang Bojiang 2003, Wang Shaopu 1998], the “constructive strategic partnership” ironed out between the US and China in 1997 lent a certain degree of balance to US relations with Japan and China and a return to the triangle. As a result of the strengthening of US-China relations, more stability in Sino-Japanese relations can be realized, leading to mutual links of friendship among all three [Wang Shaopu 1998, Wu Xinbo 1999].

In order to form a balanced triangular relationship, it is

necessary to bid farewell to Cold War modes of thinking. Acquiescence to “dancing with wolves” [Yang Bojiang 2003] will allow partners to develop cooperatively without restriction and bring about a transition from strategic cunning to strategic understanding, and through strategic dialogue, enduring mutual strategic relations can be formed. Chinese and Japanese scholars are clearly divided over what Japan’s position in the triangle is or should be. Liang Shoude [2003] examines the issue from the standpoint of international politics, arguing that Japan can play a special role as a gyroscope in stabilizing (balancing) the triangle, but all in all, the Japanese side is not very optimistic, like Kimura Masato [1995], who portrays Japan as wedged between the US and China. Attitudes in China regarding the US-Japan Security Treaty system have changed over time from strong opposition during the 1960s to acceptance during the 70s and 80s, back to deep suspicion and caution from the mid-1990s on [Kayabara 2001]. Fundamentally, Chinese view the system as contradictory to multi-lateral security frameworks, supporting such cooperation as shown by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), decrying the dual military alliance as an out of date Cold War idea [Yan Xuotong 1999] and calling for a multi-lateral framework that will check the negative influences of the US-Japanese arrangement. In contrast, the majority of Japanese experts envision a multi-lateral framework that will work based on the existing US-Japan system.

3) An East Asian Multi-Lateral Security Framework

The post-Cold War East Asian military security system consists of two elements, a balance of power centered around US-China relations and attempts at implementing ARF guidelines for multinational cooperation. Hoshino Shunya [2001] traced the origins and historical development of ARF and the Civilian Security Council of the Asian Pacific, both cooperative channels for inter-government dialogue. Concerning the connection to Japan, research in that country emphasizes that any cooperative arrangement must be made with the US-Japan security system in mind. For example, Hoshino [2004], while a firm supporter of the US-Japanese alliance functioning much like a public utility, admits that involvement in

the ARF council has had a fine-tuning effect on US-Japan relations. Soeya Yoshihide [2000] suggests that Japan's response entails 1) an unwavering position on its principle of a US-Japan security axis and 2) a positive evaluation of ARF's experiment in cooperative security. However, Japanese have been unreceptive to the "ASEAN + 3" organizational concept [Yamakage 2003].

China's response to ARF has been interpreted according to two opposing views. One points to a wait-and-see, case-by-case policy attitude motivated by power politics [Takagi 1997, Soeya 2000], the other viewing China as enthusiastic about a multi-national security framework and impressed over the effectiveness of ARF, which is ideologically-based in support of its "new view of security" [Takahara 2004] announced in 1997 and interpreted as a policy turning point [Mori 1999]. This new view is based on ideas about cooperative and consolidated security, emphasizing the aspect of "economic security" [Takahara 2004, Chu Shulong 1999], and its implementation involves promoting two qualitatively different forms of Asian diplomacy. The regionalism shown by the Shanghai Cooperative Organization dealing with central Asia and Russia aims at maximizing the influence and national interests of powerful nations in given regions, based on the old assumption of military superiority. On the other hand, a new form of regionalism, being sought in East Asia (i.e., the concept of an "East Asian Union" centered around ASEAN), has been suggested by a group of "social constructivists" [Mori 2005a]. Meanwhile, Takahara [2004] argues that China shows a parallel development of a framework including the US (Six-Party Talks, ARF) and one excluding the US, a technique for achieving flexibility in dealing with problems, which for Japan would become the key to building a new, more stable East Asian order.

5. East Asian Regional Cooperation

Historically speaking, the postwar regional cooperation in East Asia can be periodized into the formation and development of ASEAN during the 1960s and 70s to a wider entity known as the Asian Pacific region during the 1980s and 90s [Kikuchi 1995, Oba and Yamakage 1994], then being framed as "East Asia."

However, the possibility of regionalism developing in East

Asia are is now in doubt, with ASEAN+3 being incorporated into and gaining functional strength by means of existing Asian Pacific systems such as APEC and ARF. The membership should not been fixed, but rather differ functionally depending on the field of endeavor [Kikuchi 2001]. In addition, the idea of an “East Asian Union” has not been well received. The progress being made here in a functional sense by no means signifies the formation of any tight-knit community, and the opinion is that the possibility of East Asia going the way of the same large scale regionalism as in Europe, North America and Southeast Asia is very slim [Kikuchi 2005]. Nonetheless, Mori Kazuko [2005b] insists that a region can be “created” and that it is up to governments, the business community and academia to come up with their own “plans.”

It is generally thought that the foundation of any East Asian union would be located in the unification of economic affairs; but the existence of a cultural foundation has also been discussed. Since the 1990s a mutual permeation of popular culture on a more expansive scale has occurred throughout the region, creating “common perceptions,” determined by neither political nor economic relations [Aoki 2005]; and there is also the possibility of creating an “identity based on a sense of belonging” [Yu Xintian 2004].

The interrelationship between regional cooperation and Sino-Japanese relations has been viewed from two different points of view. The first concerns regional cooperation contributing positively to relations between the two countries, in the sense of a wave of cooperative enthusiasm forming “bonds of destiny” between them and a new stage on which to act [Bao Xiaqin 2005]. With the promotion of multi-faceted cooperation, the present problems that exist could be easily surpassed within a regional framework, “naturally” leading to both improvement and development of relations between the two countries [Yang Bojiang 2003, Ye Zicheng 2002]. The second point involves conversely the contribution that Sino-Japanese relations can make to regional cooperation. If Japan and China were to solve the structural difficulties they now face and accept Southeast Asia as equal Asian members, East Asian cooperation could develop under the leadership of a newly organized ASEAN [Cha Daojiong 2005]. Attitudes regarding region-

al cooperation from the turn of the century on tended to get off track in Japan [Gao Lan 2003], while China became more enthusiastic. As to motivation, two factors have been cited: one being zero-sum power politics, the other, international mutual and overlapping dependence, which has been argued to be China's position [Amako 2005]. Another opinion is that China is not motivated by an "East Asian Union" per se, but rather the process leading up to such an organization as in its best interest [Mori 2006]. Either way, researchers in both countries are convinced that at this stage in the game, Japan is being called upon to come up with an "Asian strategy" of its own.

Despite the emphasis that has been placed in the present review on juxtaposing the academic research that has been done in China against that done in Japan on their postwar relationship, it is my conclusion and firm belief that there is plenty of room for exchange of ideas among scholars active in both countries who are willing to engage one another in constructive dialogue.

Conclusion

The points of controversy which have appeared in the Japanese and Chinese research on the subject of relations between the two countries may be summed up as follows.

1. While China has adamantly emphasized consolidating specific historical experiences and lessons to be learned from them, Japan tends to look at the situation as a problem in international politics that exists between any two countries.
2. While China searches for future directions in relations based on their historical background, Japan tends to search for determining factors in the development of relations from external factors.
3. In concrete terms, each country has its own interpretation of the origins of their historical issues.
4. Concerning the relationship between bilateral alliances and cooperative multi-national framework, China has shown an ambivalent attitude toward the two, while Japan desperately seeks a compromise between them.

5. Concerning the Taiwan question, while China has changed its attitude towards Japanese involvement from one of apprehension to a search for a way out of the impasse, Japan is interested in promoting its relations with “both Chinas.” It is the main point of controversy.

However, the two countries in the decades to come in their efforts solve their common historical issues and seek cooperation, both economic and military, with their neighbors in East Asia.

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