

# Chapter V

## Changes in the Nagasaki Governorship System, 1680–1690

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### Introduction

The years 1680–1690 was a period when the *bakufu* (shogunate government) carried out great changes in its agricultural policies. There was also great upheaval among the feudal lords during this period, many of whom were transferred to other provinces or dismissed for various reasons. In the provinces that were under *bakufu*-control, regional administrative governors were dismissed one by one, a change which also contributed to the significant transformations to the *bakufu* administrative system itself during this period. The *bakufu*'s financial policies were already experiencing the effects of the increasingly tight economical situation, due to the wasteful spending by the fifth *shōgun*, Tsunayoshi, as well as the high price of commodities. Indeed, around 1676, the *bakufu* was already in debt, and had been forced to dip into the emergency reserves of gold, silver, and copper.<sup>1</sup> For these reasons, the governmental financial situation became increasingly direr, eventually leading to the reforms of the subsequent period.<sup>2</sup>

Both the implementation of the *shihō kamotsu shihō*, or the *Taxatie Handel* in Dutch, in 1672, as well as the introduction of the *gojōdaka* (fixed-ceiling trade) system in 1685, had a significant effect on trade in Nagasaki, due to many trade reforms that were implemented by the shogunate after these innovations. The construction of the Nagasaki-*kaisho* (*bakufu*'s trading office at Nagasaki) in 1695 was a sign of more aggressive attempts by the shogunate to take more profit from Nagasaki trade. On the other hand, re-minting efforts by Ogiwara Shigehide from

\* This was originally published in Suzuki Yasuko, *Nagasaki-bugyō no kenkyū* [A study on governors in Nagasaki, 1680s–1760s] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2007), chap. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Tsuji Tatsuya, *Edo bakufu seijishi kenkyū* [A study on political history of the Tokugawa shogunate] (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1996), 226–249.

<sup>2</sup> Ono Mizuo, *Edo bakufu zaiseishiron* [Financial history of the Tokugawa shogunate] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1996), 228.

1695, resulted in a drop in coinage purity, and dealt a heavy blow to the export of *koban* (Japanese oval gold coins) to the Dutch East India Company. Also at this time, the domestic output of copper, one of the most important exports, began to decrease, a further example of many problems that faced Nagasaki trade during this period.

Until now, research on the trade laws of this period has focused on the changes and substance of Nagasaki trade systems from 1604 to 1685, including the *itowappu shihō* and the *shihō kamotsu shihō*.<sup>3</sup> However, very little investigation has been conducted on the persons who lead these reforms, the Nagasaki governors and the reforms of the governorship system itself.<sup>4</sup> Research on the role of *ongoku bugyō* (shogunate administrator of distant lands), centered on the Kansai region from 1696–1699, has revealed fluctuations in personnel numbers and reform of the *ongoku bugyō* system.<sup>5</sup> This study examines Nagasaki trade during the 1680s and 1690s by analyzing reforms in the Nagasaki governorship system of the same period.

## 1. The Trade Smuggling Incident of 1686 and the Three-Man Nagasaki Governorship System

### 1.1. The Trade Smuggling Incident of 1686

The *gojōdaka* system was established in 1685 when the *bakufu* also re-introduced

<sup>3</sup> Ōno, 228; Yanai Kenji, “Nagasaki bōeki shihō kaihen no igi [The significance of the foreign trade reforms at Nagasaki],” *Kyūshū bunkasi kenkyūjo kiyō* 5 (1956): 69–78; Takeno Yōko, “Shihō baibai shihō no tokushoku nitsuite [On the characteristics of the *shihō baibai shihō*],” *Kyūshū shōka daigaku shōkei ronsō* 1, no. 1 (1960): 173–187; Nakamura Tadashi, *Kinsei Nagasaki bōekishi no kenkyū* [A study of the history of the Nagasaki trade in the early modern period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988); Ōta Katsuya, *Sakoku jidai Nagasaki bōekishi no kenkyū* [A study on the Nagasaki trade during the *sakoku* period] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 1992).

<sup>4</sup> Nagazumi Yōko, “Nagasaki bugyō to shihō shōhō [Governors of Nagasaki and the *shihō shōhō*],” in *Sakoku Nihon to kokusai kōryū* [Seclusive Japan and international relations], ed. Yanai Kenji, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), 1–27; Wakamatsu Masashi, “Jōkyōki no bōeki kaikaku nimiru Nagasaki bugyō no ichi [The position of Nagasaki *bugyō* at the foreign trade reform in 1685],” *Tōhoku daigaku fuzoku toshokan kenkyū nenpō* 25 (1991): 96–121.

<sup>5</sup> Murata Michihito, “Genrokuki niokeru Fushimi, Sakai ryō bugyō no ichiji haishi to bakufu no ongoku bugyō seisaku [The abolish and restoration of the Fushimi City magistrate and the Sakai City magistrate in Genroku period and the local magistrate system of the Tokugawa shogunate],” *Osaka daigaku daigakuin bungaku kenkyūka kenkyū kiyō* 43 (2003): 1–25.

the *itowappu* system, first banned in 1655. The *gojōdaka* system refers to the cap on the annual turnovers of the Chinese merchants (6,000 *kanme* of silver) and the Dutch East India Company (50,000 gold *ryō*).<sup>6</sup> Also due to the fact that turnover decreased from the earlier *shihō kamotsu* system period (1672–1684), this policy created a slump in Chinese and Dutch trade, compared to earlier periods.<sup>7</sup>

The *bakufu*'s introduction of the *gojōdaka* system was aimed primarily at limiting the turnover of Chinese ships, and it is seemed that they successfully limited the number of ships from Chinese merchants. However, this policy had an unexpected consequence—the surge in trade smuggling. Until then, the Chinese and Dutch boats arriving into Nagasaki had their cargo regulated and priced by the Japanese side. However, after the *gojōdaka* system, by allowing all arriving ships to Nagasaki permission to enter the port, opportunities to do transactions with the Japanese became limited. As a result, some Chinese ships were ordered to return without being able to do business. Table 1 shows the number of Chinese ships arriving in Nagasaki before and after the *gojōdaka* system, as well as the number of ships returning from Nagasaki with unsold merchandise. Before the *gojōdaka* system, there were no ships with returning cargo, but the number of ships returning sudden increase after its implementation.

Table 1. Number of Chinese Ships Entering Nagasaki vs. Number of Chinese Ships Leaving Nagasaki without Trading

Year	Ships Entering Nagasaki	Ships Leaving Nagasaki without Trading
1683	27	-
1684	24	-
1685	73	12
1686	84	28
1687	115	22
1688	117	77
1689	70	29
1690	70	20
1691	70	20
1692	70	3
1693	70	11
1694	70	3

Source: *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, 256–260.

<sup>6</sup> “Nagasaki kakitsuke [Nagasaki reports]” and “Nagasaki oboegaki [Notes on Nagasaki],” in *Tsūkō ichiran* [Overview on maritime relations], ed. Hayashi Fukusai, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1912), 300, 330; “Kanpō nikki [Diary of the Kanpō era],” in *Kanpō nikki to Hankachō* [*Kanpō nikki* and *Hankachō*], ed. Morinaga Taneo and Etchū Tetsuya (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1977), 282.

<sup>7</sup> Suzuki Yasuko, *Kinsei Nichiran bōekishi no kenkyū* [A study of the Japan-Netherlands trade by the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) in the 17th and 18th centuries] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 2004), 169–170.

The Chinese merchants who could not do trade in Nagasaki had to return with unsold merchandise, having invested time and resources sailing to Japan, were now accumulating rising debts. However, some Chinese were still willing to risk doing business in Nagasaki, and some Japanese sellers took advantage of this situation, selling cheap, smuggled unauthorized goods for huge profits. Both sides benefiting mutually, the smuggling trade spread, throughout Nagasaki and nearby waters. In this way, after the implementation of the *gojōdaka* system, illegal and black market trade increased among Japanese and foreign traders.<sup>8</sup>

After the *gojōdaka* system was established, a serious smuggling incident occurred in January 1686. The sentencing of this incident is recorded in the *Hankachō* (Records of the criminal court by the governor of Nagasaki), still extant today. According to this book, on the evening of January 24 of the same year, four named Japanese people approached the fifteenth Chinese ship to arrive at Nagasaki bay. On boarding the ship and meeting the Chinese trader, Zhou Siguan 周四官, the Japanese and the Chinese engaged. Secret negotiations resulted in the four Japanese receiving raw silk and silk fabric.<sup>9</sup> As the smuggled goods were being loaded onto the Japanese boat, the illicit operation was discovered by a patrolling Japanese guard ship. Of the Japanese side, along with the four Japanese smugglers, ten others were sentenced to death and one was exiled from Nagasaki. The fourteen who received death sentences were executed in Nishizaka, Nagasaki on February 14 of the same year. This punishment would result in an unexpected change in the political situation of Nagasaki.

### 1.2. The Dismissal of Nagasaki Governor Miyagi Kenmotsu

The person who handed down the ruling for the trade smuggling incident of 1686 was the then Nagasaki governor Miyagi Kenmotsu Masamitsu. Miyagi Kenmotsu became *metsuke* (inspector of shogunate vassals) in 1679 and succeeded Ushigome

<sup>8</sup> Nagasaki-shi, ed., *Nagasaki shishi: Tsūkō bōeki hen Tōyō shokokubu* [History of Nagasaki City: Volumes of trade and traffic with Eastern countries] (Osaka: Seibundō, 1938), 205; Yamawaki Teijirō, *Nukeni: Sakoku jidai no mitsubōeki* [Smuggling: Secret trade during the *sakoku* period] (Tokyo: Nikkei Inc., 1965), 14; Shimizu Hirokazu, “Nukeni kō [Studies on *nukeni* or Smuggling],” *Chūō daigaku bungakubu kiyō* 92 (1979): 3–11; Ren Hongzhang 任鴻章, *Kinsei Nihon to Nicchū bōeki* [Studies on trade between Japan and China in the early modern period] (Tokyo: Rokkō Shuppan, 1988), 149–152; Nishimura Keiko, *Kinsei Nagasaki bōeki to kaiun seido no tenkai* [The Nagasaki trading system and development of seaborne traffic in early modern Japan] (Tokyo: Bunken Shuppan, 1998), 139–141.

<sup>9</sup> Morinaga Taneo, ed., *Hankachō: Nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku* [Records of the criminal court by the governor of Nagasaki], vol. 1 (Nagasaki: Hankachō Kankōkai, 1959), 51–53.

Chūzaemon as governor of Nagasaki.<sup>10</sup> The governors in charge when the *gojōdaka* system was established were Miyagi and, as will be noted, Kawaguchi Genzaemon Munetsune. It appears that, on discovering the smuggling incident, Miyagi made the decision to execute all fourteen Japanese smugglers autonomously, without consulting the *bakufu*. This act would lead to greater problems. After the executions, the incident was discussed in Edo among the *rōjū* (a council of feudal lords who decided on important matters). According to the *Nagasaki oyakushodome* (Manuscripts and documents of the office of the governor of Nagasaki), the *rōjū* decided the following:

“Since Nagasaki is a distant territory, it is impossible for the *rōjū* to consider in detail and judge upon all incidents that occur. It is up to the Nagasaki Governor to judge and penalize, using his discretion for minor offenses. However, the trade smuggling incident also involved non-Japanese, so it would be unfair to only punish Japanese criminals. Therefore, it follows that, aside from cases needing urgent penalty, the *rōjū* in Edo needs to be consulted on all capital punishment cases that involve more than five Japanese nationals. Aside from these cases, proceed as has been done until now.”<sup>11</sup>

In all likelihood, such detailed criteria for punishment of crime did not exist before the trade smuggling incident initiated this precedent. In fact, such smuggling crimes were rare. According to the *Hankachō*, the only notable case of a crime involving foreign countries and mass executions, since the beginning of the isolationist policy, was the 1664 case involving some Japanese smugglers who plotted to go to Korea and sell arms. These traders were sentenced to death in 1667.<sup>12</sup> When this incident broke, the *rōjū* in Edo were consulted.<sup>13</sup> The people involved acted in disregard for the isolationist edicts of the 1630s prohibiting overseas travel and attempted to do business. In short, since the crime involved violation of national law, it is natural that Nagasaki governor could not act on his own. Furthermore, the incident not only involved the city of Nagasaki and its residents but also the nearby territories such as Tsushima Island and Yanagawa. For these reasons, it is impossible for the Nagasaki governor to decide these cases by himself.

The trade smuggling incident in 1686 involving Japanese and Chinese

<sup>10</sup> Hayasi Jussai, ed., *Shintei Kansei chōshū shokafu* [Revised genealogies of the Tokugawa shogunate's direct retainers and vassals compiled in the Kansei era], vol. 10 (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruijū Kanseikai, 1966), 323.

<sup>11</sup> “Nagasaki oyakushodome,” National Archives of Japan, Tokyo.

<sup>12</sup> *Hankachō*, vol. 1, 2–12; *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 3, 514–518.

<sup>13</sup> Kanai Toshiyuki, ed., *Nagasaki ryakushi* [The condensed history of Nagasaki], vol. 1 (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Shiyakusho, 1926), 63.

nationals, however, marked a precedent for doing business outside of official trade rules in and around Nagasaki-controlled territory. Since the incident could be seen as a violation of the newly implemented *gojōdaka* system, it seems likely Miyagi felt a strict punishment needed to be handled down swiftly. It was also believed a severe penalty would make Nagasaki residents, Chinese and Dutch traders follow the *gojōdaka* system.

From examination of the aforementioned *Nagasaki oyakushodome*, it seems clear that the Miyagi case was less a point of criticism and more of warning for future cases involving crime and punishment. It seems probable that this was the first time the *bakufu* realized a precedent needed to be set for Nagasaki, that any cases of illegal trading among Japan and foreign nationals needed to be first communicated to Edo for ruling. Furthermore, the evidence from the third article of the *Nagasaki omote oshioki no gi gechi* (The orders for the criminal punishments issued by the shogunate) of 1697, reads: “Consultation with Edo must follow precedents ruling up to now.”<sup>14</sup> Therefore, there is a possibility that Edo made some decision on how to deal with illegal trade between the smuggling incident of 1686 and 1697, when the *Nagasaki omote oshioki no gi gechi* was received.

Whatever the case, for major incidents on Nagasaki, it was mandatory to contact the Nagasaki governor working in Edo first then have the *rōjū* decide the punishment. This is documented in the *Oshioki ukagai shū* (The compilation of inquiries on the criminal punishments submitted to the shogunate).<sup>15</sup> However, the only extant document pertains only to the Kyōho era (1716–1735) and onwards. Whether documents pertaining to the period before were lost, or the practice of consulting the *rōjū* became standardized only from the Kyōho era, it is one of the two.<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, one would expect Miyagi’s act of violation would have resulted in his immediate summon to Edo to be dismissed (*oyakugomen*). In fact, he was not summoned at all, but stayed on and served out his term as Nagasaki governor, as was customary during the alternating governorship system. Miyagi dealt severe punishment to those involved with the trade smuggling case this time, but his

<sup>14</sup> “Nagasaki omote oshioki no gi gechi [The orders for the criminal punishments issued by the shogunate],” in *Tokugawa kinreikō* [Tokugawa interdictions], ed. Ishii Ryōsuke, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1959), 87.

<sup>15</sup> Morinaga Taneo, ed., *Oshioki ukagai shū: Nagasaki bugyōsho kiroku* [The compilation of inquiries on the criminal punishments submitted to the shogunate], 2 vols. (Nagasaki: Hankachō Kankōkai, 1962).

<sup>16</sup> Hiramatsu Yoshio, *Kinsei keiji soshōhō no kenkyū* [Studies on the code of criminal procedure in early modern Japan] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1960), 500, 502; Yasutaka Hiroaki, “Nagasaki bugyō shokken no ichikōsatsu [A study on authorities of the governor of Nagasaki],” *Chihōshi kenkyū* 314 (2005): 85.

rulings continued to be used to deal with trade smuggling cases until 1717–1718.<sup>17</sup> This is evidence that the *bakufu* did not particularly express dissatisfaction with Miyagi's unilateral ruling in the trade smuggling case.

In fact Miyagi's dismissal came after his transfer back to Edo on November 4, 1686. According to the *Ruidaibukan* (Personnel records of feudal lords and shogunate vassals), the only reason given was that Miyagi: "neglected his duties."<sup>18</sup> Another reason given in the *Nagasaki bugyō rekidai ryakufu* (The concise chronicle of the governors of Nagasaki) was "Capital punishment was carried out in Nagasaki without the *rōjū* being consulted in Edo,"<sup>19</sup> while in the *Kansei chōshū shokafu*, it reads: "There was carelessness in executing several people without first consulting Edo. Not only that, he adopted poor measures in Kyoto and was not favored upon, so he was dismissed."<sup>20</sup>

Oscar Nachod argues that the reason for Miyagi's dismissal comes from his execution of Dutch and Japanese nationals in 1686, who were involved in the trade smuggling incident discovered one year earlier.<sup>21</sup> Nachod bases his conclusion on Engelbert Kaempfer's *The History of Japan*. In it, Kaempfer writes:

About this time we had news from Yedo of the death of Kinmotsama, formerly governor of Nagasaki, and the fame, who in the year 1680, Dr. Cleyer being then director of our affairs, caused eighteen Japanese to be executed for smuggling, some of whom were beheaded, others hung on the cross. This he did of his own accord, without laying the case before the council of state at Yedo, or waiting for orders from thence, and was for this reason depriv'd of his office, and condemn'd to an arrest in his own house, under which he died.<sup>22</sup>

This is in fact a misunderstanding. According to the *Hankachō*, trade smuggling between Chinese and Japanese merchants was discovered in January 1686, while the incident of smuggling which involved the Dutch merchant occurred afterwards in June of the same year. Also, the *Hankachō* states, "The investigation concluded the case on the right involved eighteen persons who met secretly with the Dutch

<sup>17</sup> Yamawaki, 23, 169; Shimizu, "Nukeni kō," 21.

<sup>18</sup> "Ruidaibukan [Personnel records of feudal lords and shogunate vassals]," in *Tsūkō Ichiran*, vol. 4, 59.

<sup>19</sup> "Nagasaki bugyō rekidai ryakufu [The concise chronicle of the governors of Nagasaki]," in *Nagasaki ryakushi*, vol. 1, 540.

<sup>20</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōshū shokafu*, vol. 10, 323.

<sup>21</sup> Oskar Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig: Rob. Friese Sep.-Cto, 1897), 395.

<sup>22</sup> Engelbert Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, trans. J. G. Scheuchzer (London, 1727), 563.

traders to smuggle raw silk and textiles. This information was passed on to Edo.”<sup>23</sup> Concerning this smuggling case with the Dutch traders, it seems Miyagi treated this case as “foreign crime” and sent the details to Edo for instruction. Therefore, it seems impossible that he was fired for this reason. This incident resulted in the expulsion of the Dutch head of trading by Edo, thereby marking it as a significant event for Japan-Dutch trading.<sup>24</sup> Concerning this, the Dutch had a very strong impression.

### 1.3. The Three-Man Nagasaki Governorship System

When Ogasawara Ichian became the governor of Nagasaki at the beginning of the Edo period, there was a one-man governorship system in place. Although the title of this governorship came to be known as Nagasaki-*bugyō* around 1615, the governor was generally called Nagasaki-*daikan* or magistrate.<sup>25</sup> In reality, this “*daikan*” title referred to a representative who would carry out the orders of an absolute ruler, such as Tokugawa Ieyasu, in Nagasaki. The chain of command was the same for policies pertaining to both trade and Christianity. Following, as a representative of an absolute ruler, this one-man governorship system was not a problem. However, during Takenaka Uneme no Kami Shigeyoshi’s term as governor, various scandals and foul play were detected, resulting in his dismissal in 1634.<sup>26</sup> Afterwards, the governorship became a two-man system with Soga Matazaemon Hisasuke and Imamura Denshirō Masanaga both serving as governor.<sup>27</sup> At the beginning of

<sup>23</sup> *Hankachō*, vol. 1, 55.

<sup>24</sup> Fujita Kayoko, “Jōdakasei to Nagasaki shōkanchō A. Kuraiā tsuihō jiken [The taxation trade system and the deportation of the chief of the Dutch factory at Nagasaki A. Cleijer],” in *Kinsei kindai no chiiki to kenryoku* [Regional society and political power in early modern and modern Japan], ed. Department of Japanese History, Faculty of Letters, Osaka University (Osaka: Seibundō, 1998): 299–323.

<sup>25</sup> Shimizu Hirokazu, “Kinsei shotō Nagasaki bugyō no ichi kōsatsu [A study on the governor of Nagasaki in the beginning of early modern Japan],” *Chūō shigaku* 1 (1977): 27–29.

<sup>26</sup> “Kanmei nikki [Diaries of the Tokugawa shogunate during the Kan’ei and Meireki eras],” in *Genkan nikki, Kanmei nikki* [*Genkan nikki* and *Kanmei nikki*], ed. Shiseki Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Shiseki Kenkyūkai, 1986), 458; *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 4, 57–59; Suzuki Yasuko, “Nagasaki bugyō Takenaka Uneme no kami Shigeyoshi no shūbun [The scandal of the governor of Nagasaki Takenaka Uneme no kami Shigeyoshi],” *Hanazono shigaku* 25 (2004): 12.

<sup>27</sup> Niwa Kankichi and Morinaga Taneo, eds., *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei* [The compendium of veritable records of Nagasaki], vol. 1 (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunkensha, 1973), 2; “Richō betsureku [Supplement to *Richō*],” in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū* [The second sequel to *Gunsho ruijū*], ed. Kokusho Kankōkai, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1907), 68.

implementation of this two-man system, both men stayed in Edo except during the trading period from spring to autumn. However, after the Shimabara Conflict in 1637, it was decided that starting the following year one Nagasaki governor would stay permanently in Nagasaki and the other in Edo.<sup>28</sup> The next change seen in the two-man system would be in the Jōkyō era (1684–1687).

Approximately three months after the writing of the letter admonishing Miyagi Kenmotsu for acting out of line, the *bakufu* decided, along with one governor residing in Edo, two governors should reside permanently in Nagasaki, a decision that was relayed to Miyagi while he was still governor. According to the *Nagasaki oyakushodome*, the change to the three-man governorship was to prevent one person from passing judgment unilaterally in Nagasaki, and have the governors supervise each other. In addition, after the *gojōdaka* system was introduced, it was expected that the locally based Nagasaki governor's supervision duties on trade and crime would dramatically increase. Therefore in order to deal with these responsibilities, it was hoped personnel would increase as well.

After the implementation of the three-man governorship system, there was a change also in salary. During Soga and Imamura's term in 1633, the governorship wage was decided to be 1,500 *hyō* for each governor per year.<sup>29</sup> However in 1686, after the three-man system, it became a total of 4,400 *hyō* for all three.<sup>30</sup>

In terms of police personnel, in 1638, there were a total of five *yoriki* and twenty *dōshin*,<sup>31</sup> and in the year 1665, a further five *yoriki* and ten *dōshin* were added.<sup>32</sup> However, in 1686, this system was abolished and personnel directly under the governor filled these roles. According to the *Nagasaki oyakushodome*, on August 25, 1686, Kawaguchi Genzaemon and Miyagi Kenmotsu received notice of this abolishment from the *rōjū* starting from the newly appointed Nagasaki governor Osawa Sabē. The apparent reason for the abolishment was that *yoriki* and *dōshin* were behaving like *gokenin* (Edo vassals), which were making governing more difficult. For this reason, Nagasaki governors were asked to hire their personnel using funds from their increased salaries. In this way, after the *gojōdaka* system was implemented, there appeared more factors that complicated the situation in Nagasaki which lead to reform in the governorship system.

<sup>28</sup> "Richō betsureoku," in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū*, vol. 7, 329.

<sup>29</sup> "Richō betsureoku," in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū*, vol. 7, 68.

<sup>30</sup> "Richō betsureoku," in *Zoku zoku gunsho ruijū*, vol. 7, 68.

<sup>31</sup> *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 12; Kyūshū Bunkashi Kenkyūjo Shiryōshū Kankōkai, ed., *Nagasaki jikki nendairoku* [Chronological records of the true account of Nagasaki] (Fukuoka: Kyūshū Bunkashi Kenkyūjo Shiryōshū Kankōkai, 1999), 37.

<sup>32</sup> *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 13; *Nagasaki jikki nendairoku*, 84.

## 2. The Trade Policies of Kawaguchi Genzaemon

After serving as *shoinban* (bodyguard for the *shōgun*) and *kachigashira* (unit commander of officers responsible for guarding the Edo castle and the *shōgun*), Kawaguchi Genzaemon took over the Nagasaki governorship from Okano Magokurō in 1680, serving fourteen years as governor until 1693.<sup>33</sup> This period has received very little scholarly attention, with only one study having been conducted one of the Nagasaki governorship. This study, by Wakamatsu Masashi argues that Kawaguchi, despite being governor, was not involved in the *gojōdaka* system but rather the system was decided by the *rōjū* and a special envoy sent to deal with trade issues in the previous year.<sup>34</sup> However, it is odd that ignoring the Nagasaki governorship system would lead to trade reform. The Nagasaki governor was not only the head of Nagasaki residents but was directly under *bakufu* command, more specifically the *rōjū*. The governor was a representative of Edo, responsible for taking measures regarding trade and other affairs in Nagasaki. Therefore, it is unlikely that any decision of weight would be made without the involvement of the Nagasaki governor. As mentioned later, the leading figure behind the establishment of the *gojōdaka* system was Kawaguchi Genzaemon.

Engelbert Kaempfer, who arrived in Japan in 1690, in his work, *The History of Japan* describes Kawaguchi as following:

the Governors of Nagasaki, who was then at Yedo, being Genseimon, who for great care in regulating the affairs of foreign trade, in the year 1685, to the advantage of his country, and the entire satisfaction of the Emperor, was by him honour'd with the title and character of Sino Cami.<sup>35</sup>

According to Kaempfer, the *gojōdaka* system was a trade measure devised by Kawaguchi. Although this information was probably heard through a Japanese interpreter, and no real motive exists for any deception on the Dutch side, the authenticity of this information is fairly certain. And considering Kawaguchi was governor for a long fourteen years, it seems likely that the *gojōdaka* system was highly regarded by the *rōjū* and, thus, any policies introduced thereafter were the doing of Kawaguchi.

It is worth noting at this stage that Qing 清 Dynasty China had prohibited foreign trade in 1661<sup>36</sup> and would take a passive approach thereafter until 1684. In that year, the *Zhan hai ling* 展海令 proclamation marked a resurrection of active

<sup>33</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōushū shokafu*, vol. 9, 384.

<sup>34</sup> Wakamatsu, 100–101.

<sup>35</sup> Kaempfer, 525.

<sup>36</sup> Ren, 99–100.

foreign trade.<sup>37</sup> After this policy shift, it was expected a great number of Chinese boats would enter Japan. Therefore, it became necessary for Japan to quickly create prudent trade policies that would limit Chinese turnover. In reality, some twenty–thirty Chinese ships per year had already been arriving in Nagasaki until 1684, but as table 1 shows, there was a dramatic increase thereafter.

After the *gojōdaka* system, several reforms were implemented, particularly in the years of 1688 and 1689. First, in 1688, a security post was built at Koseto bay to prevent trade smuggling and to tighten security around those foreign ships which were coming to and from Nagasaki.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, in August of the same year, it was decided the maximum annual Chinese ship arrival number would be seventy from the following year.<sup>39</sup> Following, the number of *tōmiban* (personnel employed on the security post) also increased.<sup>40</sup> In 1687, a letter<sup>41</sup> arrived for the governors in Nagasaki from Governor Kawaguchi in Edo, ordering the construction of housing for Chinese merchants in Jūzenji, Nagasaki. This construction began in 1688 (and was eventually completed in 1689).<sup>42</sup> Up to that point, Chinese merchants had been free to lodge and move anywhere in Nagasaki city. From 1689, however, Chinese merchants were restricted to board in buildings called *Tōjin-yashiki* (Chinese ghetto), in a similar arrangement to that adopted by the Dutch, and accommodation at other places was prohibited. Movement around Nagasaki by Chinese merchants was kept under careful surveillance. Enforcement of these rules was carried out by *Tōjin-ban* (warder of the Chinese) guards, many of who worked as guards at the *Tōjin-yashiki*. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say the 1680s were dominated by policies targeted at controlling Chinese trade in Nagasaki.<sup>43</sup>

In this way, the Shogunate government gradually increased its controls over trade in Nagasaki. Governor Kawaguchi meanwhile kept an unyielding attitude toward the Dutch, despite their petitions for trade reform.<sup>44</sup> When the 1691 trade smuggling incident between the Dutch and Japanese was uncovered, Kawaguchi laid down a severe sentence.<sup>45</sup> Kaempfer described Kawaguchi in the following way:

<sup>37</sup> Ren, 124, 144.

<sup>38</sup> *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 38–40.

<sup>39</sup> The Historiographical Institute, The University of Tokyo, ed., *Tōtsūji kaisho nichiroku* [Journals of the Nagasaki office of the Chinese interpreters], vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1955), 197.

<sup>40</sup> *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 38, 76.

<sup>41</sup> *Tōtsūji kashiho nichiroku*, vol. 1, 209.

<sup>42</sup> *Tōtsūji kashiho nichiroku*, vol. 1, 243; *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 247, 351.

<sup>43</sup> *Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei*, vol. 1, 248.

<sup>44</sup> Nachod, 397–398.

<sup>45</sup> *Hankachō*, vol.1, 53–55; Kaempfer, 372, 373, 565–567.

The first is Kawagutz Gensejemon, or according to his present title, [wherein he hath retain'd the name of his family], Kawaguts Tsino Cami. The yearly revenue of his own estate amounts to 4700 koks. He is a handsome well shap'd person, about fifty years of age, a cunning but malicious man, a great enemy to the Dutch, an unjust and severe judge, but an agreeable, liberal and happy courtier.<sup>46</sup>

Kaempfer's appraisal is indeed harsh, but we must not forget that this description comes from the Dutch perspective. Considering the strict policies imposed on Nagasaki trade by the governor, it is not surprising that the Dutch and Chinese assessed Kawaguchi in such a way.

### 3. Rank and Seating Order of the Nagasaki Governorship

#### 3.1. *The Rank of Nagasaki Governor*

As mentioned earlier, Kawaguchi Genzaemon made a big impact in Nagasaki trade. In recognition, the *bakufu* raised his stipend to 2,700 *koku* in 1686, a raise of 500 *koku*.<sup>47</sup> In 1690, Kawaguchi received the rank, known as *jūgoige* (lower-fifth), and took the name Settsu no Kami.<sup>48</sup> Before the Shimabara Rebellion in 1637, when the governorship system had yet to be settled, there had been several vassals who held the *jūgoige* title appointed Nagasaki governor, namely—Mizuno Kawachi no Kami Morinobu (1626), Sakakibara Hida no Kami Motonao (1634), Sengoku Yamato no Kami Hisataka (1635), to name but a few. However, after the appointment of Baba Saburōzaemon Toshishige to the governorship in 1636, no person of *jūgoige* rank became Nagasaki governor, nor did anyone receive the rank after becoming governor. After Baba, the first governor to be given the *jūgoige* rank was Kawaguchi. The reason given for this promotion was his outstanding performance as Nagasaki governor. According to the *Oyakunin daidaiki* (Chronological records of the officials):

After Kawaguchi returned to Edo in 1688, his salary was increased 500 *koku* for his distinguished service. Kawaguchi was also promoted to the rank of *jūgoige* and gained the name of Settsu no Kami. The fact that he received such

<sup>46</sup> Kaempfer, 268.

<sup>47</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōshū shokafu*, vol. 9, 384–385; Kuroita Katsumi, ed., *Tokugawa jikki* [The official chronicles of the Tokugawa shogunate], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1981), 581.

<sup>48</sup> *Tokugawa jikki*, vol. 6, 93.

a raise without a change in occupation is exceptional. And Kawaguchi was the first Nagasaki governor to be so invested with the *jūgoige* rank. There is rumor that Kawaguchi received such favors because of his old friend, Makino Bingo no Kami, the *sobayōnin* (secretary) of the fifth *shōgun* Tsunayoshi. In 1691, Nagasaki governor Yamaoka Jūbē was also promoted to *jūgoige* and received the name, Tsushima no Kami. Thereafter, all men promoted to Nagasaki governor also received the *jūgoige* rank.<sup>49</sup>

It was quite rare to receive a salary increase without changing occupation. According to Kaempfer, the reason Kawaguchi received the rank *jūgoige*, Settsu no Kami was because of his establishment of the *gojōdaka* system.<sup>50</sup> This reason for Kawaguchi's promotion is also given in the *Nagasaki ryakushi* in 1660, when the head priest of Suwa Shrine in Nagasaki received the rank of *shōrokuige* (higher-sixth).<sup>51</sup> As a result, the governor of Nagasaki's rank became lower than that of the priest of Suwa Shrine, which created a hierarchical complexity. Therefore, after 1690, the Nagasaki governor received the *jūgoige* rank, making him higher than *shōrokuige*. So Kaempfer's reading is mostly likely correct. In the *Oyakunin daidaiki* noted earlier, another reason given was that Kawaguchi was an old friend of Makino Bingo no Kami, who, along with Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, wielded great political power as the shogunate's *sobayōnin*. However, if that were indeed the case, then surely the preferential treatment would have ended with Kawaguchi. Instead, all Nagasaki governors after Kawaguchi also received the rank *jūgoige*.

However, there is some debate over which governor was the first to receive the *jūgoige* rank. First, similar to Kawaguchi, governors Yamaoka Jūbē Kagesuke became Tsushima no Kami in December 1691,<sup>52</sup> then Miyagi Tonomo no Kami Masazumi became *jūgoige* Echizen no Kami in December 1692,<sup>53</sup> thereafter in 1694, Kondō Mochiakira received the *jūgoige* rank Bitchū no Kami immediately after becoming Nagasaki governor.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, there are some official records that state the Nagasaki governor officially received the *jūgoige* rank from 1694, starting from Kondō.<sup>55</sup> One interpretation is Kawaguchi, Yamaoka and Miyagi were

<sup>49</sup> "Oyakunin daidaiki [Chronological records of the officials]," in *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō* [Financial and economic materials of Japan], ed. Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Zaisei Keizai Gakkai, 1924), 513–514.

<sup>50</sup> Kaempfer, 525.

<sup>51</sup> *Nagasaki ryakushi*, vol. 2, 95–96; Araki Shūdō, *Zōho teisei bakufu jidai no Nagasaki* [Enlarged and revised edition: Nagasaki under the Tokugawa shogunate] (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1973), 167.

<sup>52</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōushū shokafu*, vol. 17, 353; *Tokugawa jikki*, vol. 6, 129

<sup>53</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōushū shokafu*, vol. 10, 320; *Tokugawa jikki*, vol. 6, 158.

<sup>54</sup> *Shintei Kansei chōushū shokafu*.

<sup>55</sup> Konakamura Kiyonori, *Kanshoku seido enkakushi* [History of the system of government employees in Japan] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1976), 323.

conferred temporary titles, while the Nagasaki *jūgoige* system became officially established from Kondō onwards. But it is my conclusion that the initial force behind the Nagasaki governor receiving the rank *jūgoige* in this period came from Kawaguchi Genzaemon (Settsu no Kami).

At the same time, another important motivation was the growing recognition of the importance of foreign relations and trade by the *bakufu*, despite its despise towards other countries. Drastic changes would take place that would make Nagasaki the center of this action, a city controlled by the Nagasaki governor.

### 3.2. *Changes in the Nagasaki Governor's Seating Order in Edo Castle and the Bakufu's Attitude towards Foreign Countries*

The Nagasaki governor's office in Edo castle was called the *fuyō* (cotton rosemallow), a chamber he shared with other governors and officials, all within a decided hierarchy. Research into samurai ranks and seating orders within Edo castle have been focused almost exclusively on feudal lords,<sup>56</sup> while the study of shogunate vassals has lagged behind. Therefore, the seating order of the Nagasaki governors within the *fuyō* chamber has been rarely studied. Concerning the seating order of the Nagasaki governor in the *fuyō* chamber in the late seventeenth century, the *Oyakunin daidaiki* contains some interesting comments:

The Nagasaki governor in Edo was based in Edo castle's *fuyō* chamber. There, there were many *ongoku* governors, many of whom had the rank of *jūgoige*. The governor for Nagasaki, however, held the lowest seat called *masseki*. It was repeatedly requested that the Nagasaki governor receive the same title as the *ongoku* governors and be allowed to wear the same garments, called *daimon*, but that request was not granted. While Ushigome Chūzaemon was Nagasaki governor, Matsudaira Jinzaburō, who came from a distinguished

<sup>56</sup> Fujii Jōji, "Nihon kinsei shakai niokeru buke no kan'i [The honorary ranking system for military houses in early modern Japanese society]," in *Kokka: Rinen to seido* [State: Idea and system], ed. Nakamura Kenjirō (Kyoto: Institute of Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, 1989), 227–262; Hashimoto Masanori, *Kinsei buke kan'i no kenkyū* [A study of the honorary ranking system for military houses in early modern Japan] (Tokyo: Zoku Gunshoruijū Kanseikai, 1999); Matsuo Mieko, "Daimyō no denseki to kakaku [Rank and seating order of military houses in Edo castle]," *Tokugawa rinseishi kenkyūjo kenkyū kiyō* (1981): 301–328; Hori Arata, "Kinsei bukan'i no seiritsu to tenkai [The founding and development of posts of early modern military/naval officers]," in *Atarashii kinseishi* [A new history of early modern Japan], ed. Yamamoto Hirofumi (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1996), 185–231.

family, met *Rōjū* Kuze Yamato no Kami, and asked that the Nagasaki governor be given the same title as other *ongoku* governors, since having garments of a lower rank (*hoi*) gives the appearance of a lower position. Kuze, who had a sympathetic disposition, brought this issue up to the *rōjū* council. The head *rōjū* (called *tairō*) at the time, Sakaki Uta no Kami Tadakiyo, decided that request be declined. The reasoning was that the governor of Nagasaki deals with trade with foreigners. Giving the Nagasaki governor a lower rank than other *ongoku* governors was an intentional gesture of despise towards foreigners. Also, it was decided that, if the Nagasaki governor has a lower rank, foreigners will more effectively feel the power of the *bakufu*. For this reason, the governor of Nagasaki would have a lower rank than other *ongoku* governors, and the status quo up to then would be maintained. During his time in the *fuyō* chamber, the governor of Nagasaki would have the rank of *masseki*. Since this has been the case in the past, the proposal was rejected by *Tairō* Sakai Uta no Kami. Kuze Yamato no Kami and the other *rōjū* had no choice but to agree.<sup>57</sup>

This record clearly demonstrates that the *bakufu*'s contempt for other countries and foreigners in the early Edo period.

Since Ushigome Chūzaemon just became Nagasaki governor, and Kuze Yamato no Kami Hiroyuki was *rōjū*, this puts the period in which Matsudaira Jinzaburō Takami<sup>58</sup> approached Kuze to be between 1671 and 1676. Therefore, one can say anti-foreign sentiment existed from the early Edo period to the 1670s. This is further corroborated by the fact that the Nagasaki governor, who was responsible for the dealings of foreign traders, occupied the lowest seat in the *fuyō* chamber and wore *hoi* garments, while the other members held *jūgoige* rank and wore the higher *daimon*. As noted earlier, it was not until the early 1690s, due to the efforts of Kawaguchi Genzaemon in previous decade that the status of the Nagasaki governor was raised to *jūgoige* and he finally could wear *daimon*.

Furthermore, changes within the seating order in the *fuyō* chamber also became apparent, with the Nagasaki governor seat being dramatically promoted. Table 2 shows the changes in the seating order in the *fuyō* chamber from 1659 to 1836, with seat one having the highest rank. According to the *Nagasaki oyakushodome*, on October 10, 1699, *Rōjū* Ogasawara Sado no Kami gave an order regarding a new seating order for the *fuyō* chamber. In this new seating order, it was decided that the Nagasaki governor's status would be raised above the governors of Kyoto

<sup>57</sup> "Oyakunin daidaiki," in *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō*, vol. 4, 515–516.

<sup>58</sup> *Shintei kansei chōushū shokafu*, vol. 1, 233. Matsudaira served as Nagasaki governor from 1666 to 1670.

Table 2. Seating Order in the *Fuyō* Chamber, Edo Castle, 1659–1836

Seating Order Rank	1659	1699	1744	1836
1	<i>sōjabanshū</i>	<i>orusui</i>	<i>sōjaban</i>	<i>sōjaban</i>
2	<i>orusuishū</i>	<i>ōmetsuke</i>	<i>jisha bugyō</i>	<i>jisha bugyō</i>
3	<i>kōri bugyō</i>	<i>machi bugyō</i>	Osaka-jōban	Osaka-jōban
4	<i>machi bugyō</i>	<i>kanjō bugyō</i>	Fushimi-bugyō	Fushimi-bugyō
5	<i>sakuji bugyō</i>	<i>sakuji bugyō</i>	Sunpu-jōdai	Sunpu-jōdai
6	Mizuno Iwami no Kami	<i>fushin bugyō</i>	<i>orusui</i>	<i>orusui</i>
7	Osaka-machi bugyō	<u>Nagasaki-bugyō</u>	<i>ōmetsuke</i>	<i>ōmetsuke</i>
8	<i>kinchūkata</i>	Kyoto-machi bugyō	<i>machi bugyō</i>	<i>machi bugyō</i>
9	Gomi Bizen no Kami	Osaka-machi bugyō	<i>kanjō bugyō</i>	<i>kanjō bugyō</i>
10	<i>kanjō kashira</i>	<i>kinrizuki</i>	<i>sakuji bugyō</i>	<i>sakuji bugyō</i>
11	Ishikawa Tosa no Kami	<i>goshozuki</i>	<i>fushin bugyō</i>	<i>fushin bugyō</i>
12	Yagi Tajima no Kami	Ise-bugyō	Kōfū-kinbangashira	Kōfū-kinbangashira
13	Nakabō Mimasaka no Kami	Nara-bugyō	<u>Nagasaki-bugyō</u>	<u>Nagasaki-bugyō</u>
14	<u>Nagasaki-bugyō</u>		Kyoto-machi bugyō	Kyoto-machi bugyō
15	Sado-bugyō		Osaka-machi bugyō	Osaka-machi bugyō
16			Sunpu-jōban	Sunpu-jōban
17			<i>kinrizuki</i>	<i>kinrizuki</i>
18			Yamada-bugyō	<i>sentozuki</i>
19			Nikkō-bugyō	Yamada-bugyō
20			Nara-bugyō	Nikkō-bugyō
21			Sakai-bugyō	Nara-bugyō
22			Sunpu-machi bugyō	Sakai-bugyō
23			Sado-bugyō	Sunpu-machi bugyō
24			Uraga-bugyō	Sado-bugyō
25				Uraga-bugyō

Sources: *Ofuregaki Kanpō shūsei*, 25, 29; *Ofuregaki Tenpō shūsei*, 4–5; “Nagasaki oyakushodome.”

and Osaka-machi. The new order was as following:

- Orusui
- Ōmetsuke
- (Edo) Machi Governor
- Kanjō Governor
- Sakuji Governor
- Fushin Governor
- Nagasaki Governor
- Kyoto-machi Governor
- Osaka-machi Governor
- Kinrizuki
- Ise Governor
- Nara Governor

Accordingly, the order states that of the thirteen members in the *fu-yō* chamber at the end of the seventeenth century, the Nagasaki governor, who once had the *masseki* rank, now was promoted to the seventh seat above the Kyoto-machi governor. The Edo period was a time when people's position in society was permanently fixed, and thus such a large promotion was rare. According to the *Oyakunin daidaiki*:

From the Genroku era (1688–1703), the Nagasaki governor was raised to *jūgoige* rank. The reason given was that the Nagasaki governorship was an important occupation, one known by other countries, thus needed to be given higher status. This marks a clear shift from the attitude of Sakai Uta no Kami. Furthermore, from the Hōei era (1708–1710), the status of the Nagasaki governor while in the *fu-yō* chamber also was revised in recognition of the importance of his position as negotiator with foreign countries, making him the highest-ranking *ongoku* governor. And while the Kyoto-machi governor held a high position because the Emperor resided there, the Nagasaki governorship, being responsible for foreign policies, was deemed to be a more important position. No doubt many believed at this time it was strange the *bakufu* would put more weight on foreign countries than Kyoto, the residence of the Japanese Emperor.<sup>59</sup>

However the Nagasaki governor's promotion above the Kyoto-machi governor occurred in the Genroku period, not in the Hōei period. Furthermore, from this document, we know there was a significant shift in the *bakufu*'s attitude towards

<sup>59</sup> “Oyakunin daidaiki,” in *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō*, vol. 4, 516.

foreign trade compared to the time of Sakai Uta no Kami in 1670s. The Nagasaki governor was promoted to the highest rank of the *ongoku* governors, above Kyoto, in recognition of the importance of foreign diplomacy and trade. No doubt, many thought this promotion was suspicious.

We can see the changes of the seating order of the *fuyō* chamber by some documents from the 1650s to the 1830s. In Table 2, the seating order prior to 1699 is recorded in the *Ofuregaki shūsei* (Collections of the shogunate proclamations) in 1659. This is noted as “the seating order record” of *Shingoten* (The new palace), recorded after the rebuilding of Edo castle after its destruction in the great fire of 1657.<sup>60</sup> Although it is difficult to distinguish individual names and official titles in this record, it is clear that the seating order at this time was temporary. Moreover, there is a mistake in the *Ofuregaki shūsei*. It lists the Sado governor as holding the lowest seat *masseki*, however we know from other documents that the Sado governor entered the *fuyō* chamber in 1712, in the Shōtoku period. The Sado governor, in fact, was based in the *tsutsuji* (azalea) chamber before the time.<sup>61</sup> This means that the only governor who held the *masseki* rank in the *fuyō* chamber before 1699 was the Nagasaki governor.

*Fuyō* chamber members gradually increased until the Bakumatsu period. However, the only governorship that saw dramatic promotion was that of Nagasaki. This high seating rank gained by the Nagasaki governor in 1699, and making him higher than the Kyoto-machi governor, was maintained until the Bakumatsu period. In short, this tells us the Bakufu regarded the Nagasaki governor with increasing esteem, beginning in the Genroku period, and lasting until the Bakumatsu period.

### 3.3. The Nagasaki Governorship System in the 1690s

In September 1698, Suwa Shimousa no Kami Yorikage was dismissed as governor. According to the *Jōkan zatsuroku* (Various reports of the shogunate government), the main reason for this was his implication in a trade smuggling scandal involving his subordinates.<sup>62</sup> This incident, also recorded in the *Hankachō*, occurred on May 25, 1698, when the trading of smuggled goods was discovered between Japanese traders and those from the ninth Chinese ship.<sup>63</sup> Arrested were the five ringleaders were one guard from the *Tōjin-yashiki* and three of Suwa’s subordinates, but

<sup>60</sup> Takayanagi Shinzō and Ishii Ryōsuke, eds., *Ofuregaki Kanpō shūsei* [Collections of the shogunate proclamations during the Kanpō era] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1934), 25.

<sup>61</sup> “Oyakunin daidaiki,” in *Nihon zaisei keizai shiryō*, vol. 4, 491.

<sup>62</sup> “Jōkan zatsuroku (or Shotomegaki) [Various reports of the shogunate government, 1652–1742],” in *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 4, 59; *Tokugawa jikki*, vol. 6, 345.

<sup>63</sup> *Hankachō*, vol. 1, 83–84.

the incident also involved many local Nagasaki residents. As a result, Suwa's *karō* (chief retainer), Tateishi Kiemon committed suicide immediately after the incident was discovered.<sup>64</sup> Suwa was summoned to Edo and left Nagasaki on August 23.<sup>65</sup> Three days later on August 26, 13 people were executed in Nagasaki, including the three subordinates of Suwa. After 1686, when the three-man governorship system was implemented, the *bakufu* supplied funds to Suwa to employ his subordinates as *yoriki* and *dōshin*, thereby giving them official positions.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, in future cases of wrongdoing by subordinates when the governor is innocent (as with Suwa's case), clear punishment can be given directly to only those involved. Furthermore, one year earlier in 1697, the *bakufu* had confirmed protocol for the Nagasaki governor on trade management and judgment.<sup>67</sup> No doubt the *bakufu* were disappointed and irritated when the trade smuggling incident occurred so soon thereafter.

In following year 1699, the Nagasaki governorship system was modified to include four men. According to the *Nagasaki oyakushodome*, the system would be four men, two residing in Nagasaki and two in Edo, with one man rotating at a time. In addition a financial officer was also sent that year, in order to investigate the financial situation in Nagasaki.

## Conclusion

Research in the field has focused on the changes in Nagasaki trade systems, resulting from the *gojōdaka* system established in 1685. However, this study has attempted to look at Nagasaki trade in relation to the political changes at the time. As this study has illustrated, the Nagasaki governorship had a strong influence on Nagasaki trade, particularly the *gojōdaka* system.

The rise in status of the Nagasaki governor can also be attributed to the change in attitude of the *bakufu* towards Nagasaki trade in the 1690s. In the early Edo period, the *bakufu*'s attitude towards foreign trade was one of indifference. This attitude is apparent in the stance of the head *rōjū* Sakai Uta no Kami, who rejected the request for a rank promotion of the Nagasaki governor. More precisely, Sakai felt the Nagasaki governor, who handled dealings with foreigners, was inherently a low status position. However, at the same time, Nagasaki trade was beginning to have a positive effect on the nation's finances. While the production of key commodities such as silver, copper, and *koban* was in decline, their export was increasing at the same time. First, production of silver decreased from the 1650s

<sup>64</sup> "Kanpō nikki," in *Kanpō nikki to Hankachō*, 343.

<sup>65</sup> *Nagasaki jikki nendairoku*, 131; "Kanpō nikki," in *Kanpō nikki to Hankachō*, 345.

<sup>66</sup> "Nagasaki oyakushodome."

<sup>67</sup> "Nagasaki omote oshioki no gi gechi," in *Tokugawa kinreikō*, vol. 4, 87–88.

and by the end of the seventeenth century, production at copper mines was also indicating a clear decline. As a result, domestic circulation of currency and raw materials decreased, and so, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the *bakufu* turned to more attention to Nagasaki trade; particularly, after the establishment of the *shihō kamotsu shihō* in 1672 lead to tighter controls.

The *bakufu* control on trade was further enforced in 1685 with the implementation of the *gojōdaka* system, and the figure at its controls was the Nagasaki governor at the time, Kawaguchi Genzaemon. Thereafter, the *bakufu* gradually came to see the importance of foreign trade. As a result of this new attitude, the Nagasaki governor, who was most involved in foreign trade, enjoyed a rise in status. In 1699, the Nagasaki governor, who once had the lowest seat of *masseki* in the *fuyō* chamber in Edo castle, was now promoted to above even the governor of Kyoto-machi. This kind of promotion was exceptional when we consider that the Edo period was a time when social positions were permanently fixed.

Furthermore in 1699, one more governor was added to the three-man Nagasaki governor system, a reform that only lasted until 1712. After the establishment of the Nagasaki-*kaisho* in 1698, *kanjō* governor, the head of *bakufu* financial affairs, Ogiwara Ōmi no Kami Shigehide visited Nagasaki to oversee trade with Dutch and Chinese merchants. As result, *unjōkin* (special tariffs) were levied on Nagasaki city by the *bakufu*. With the implementation of these tariffs, financial officers were dispatched to Nagasaki for a period of stay.

Therefore we can see how, from around 1699, a close relationship was formed between Nagasaki and the *bakufu*'s financial affairs office. One can say the deep-seated contempt of foreigners and Nagasaki trade in the *bakufu*, exemplified by *Tairō* Sakai Uta no Kami's attitude in the 1670s, was being swept aside by the 1690s. As the *bakufu* fell on tough economic times, a system was arranged to maximize new profits from trade in Nagasaki. Nagasaki then became not only the diplomatic arm of the *bakufu*, but also an essential part of its economy. It was at this time that the Nagasaki governor became more than an *ongoku* governor; he took the role similar to a senior financial officer.

Murata Michihito writes, "The reforms to the *ongoku* governor system that took place from January to April 1696 represent a shift in policy that cannot be overlooked."<sup>68</sup> However, as seen thus far, one cannot say this statement applies for the Nagasaki governorship system. Reforms in the Nagasaki governorship system had already begun from 1686 with the implementation of the three-man system. Furthermore, in 1689 Kawaguchi was promoted to *jūgoige* rank, and the governorship system experienced further transformation with the introduction of

<sup>68</sup> Murata, 9, 11.

the four-man system in 1699. It was also at this time that the Nagasaki governor was promoted to a higher seat than the Kyoto-machi governor in the *fuwō* chamber, making him the highest of the *ongoku* governors. In short, from 1686–1699, we can see these three significant changes to the Nagasaki governorship system. Murata's conclusion, therefore, can apply only to the *ongoku* governors in the Kansai provinces, not to the *ongoku* governorship system overall. From this perspective, it is clear that, the *bakufu* regarded Nagasaki as a location that was more important and significant than the Kansai provinces, thereby embarking on reforms in Nagasaki first.

From studying the changes in the Nagasaki governorship system, one can say this period is important as it marks a major shift in the *bakufu*'s stance toward not only Nagasaki trade but also to foreign countries.

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