

CHAPTER 2

Political Power and Caravan Merchants at the Oasis Towns in Central Asia: The Case of Altishahr in the 17th and 18th Centuries

ONUMA Takahiro

Considering the historical role of Central Asia,¹ the importance of long-distance trade in connecting the various regions of Eurasia hardly needs to be pointed out. Since ancient times, trade networks between oases have been developed, and the distribution of goods was maintained by large-scale caravans. The caravaneers provided each oasis, separated by desert and mountains, with a channel to the outside world and brought prosperity to the oasis inhabitants; furthermore, they often influenced the political powers based in these oases. Therefore, the oasis ruler conserved traffic and trade and took great efforts to treat the caravans comprising merchants, envoys, pilgrims, and travelers well and to guarantee their status.² The role of the caravan was not limited only to trade. Their activities, which involved the movement of men and things, also strengthened the ties of each region and group in Eurasia and developed the circulation of knowledge and interchange of cultures.

During the period from the 18th to the 19th centuries, Central Asia was at a major turning point. From the late 17th century, the Junghar nomadic nation based in the grasslands to the north of the Tianshan Mountains (Jungharia, northern Xinjiang) came to be a preeminent force in Central Asia. However, in 1755, a Qing dynasty expedition successfully overthrew the Junghars. Then, in 1759, the Qing conquered the oasis towns along the Tarim Basin, known as “Altishahr,”³ in which the Turkic-

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¹ In this chapter, the word “Central Asia” refers to “historic Central Asia,” which is approximately equivalent to the area covering the northern part of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the five republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizstan, and PRC Xinjiang.

² M. Arakawa, *Yūrashia no kōtsū kōeki to Tō teikoku* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2010): 102–7.

³ Following Rian Thum’s proposal, this chapter uses the term “Altishahr,” or “Six Cities,” for the region and calls the Turkic-speaking Muslims living there “Altishahri” (people of Altishahr), who are known as the Uyghurs at present. See R. Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2014): 2–7.

speaking Muslims lived. The result of this campaign was that the eastern part of Central Asia, east of the Pamir Mountains, was incorporated into Qing territory, and then the Russian Empire annexed the western part in the 19th century. The Central Asian world, which lost its independent status, started to evolve into “frontier” regions of the Qing and Russian Empires.

What kind of influence did this process of historical change have on the caravan trade in Central Asia? As mentioned above, caravans played a significant role in Central Asia and maintaining their existence was of considerable concern to oasis rulers. The answer to this question is important for tracing the transformations of Central Asia. At the same time, to understand the structures of the Qing and Russian Empires, it is valid to ask how those imperial powers faced the existing systems and networks in local society and what kind of relationship, including factors of confrontation and coexistence, was constructed between the two. This chapter focuses on the Altishahr region, which came under Qing rule in the middle of the 18th century, and clarifies the development of trade activities of the Altishahris.⁴

For the caravan trade in Central Asia around the time of the Qing expedition, Saguchi Tōru gives an outline that, although the main artery of international trade shifted to maritime routes, the land route itself did not completely decline; rather, it became brisk following the expansion of Russia, the Junghars, and the Qing.⁵ However, as discussed later, we can point out a problem that earlier studies do not clarify the activities of Altishahris. It is also not obvious how the political powers, for example the Qing *amban* (agent) and Turkic *beg*-officials, in the oases under the Qing rule were involved with caravan trade. Taking the interaction between political powers and merchants into consideration, this chapter examines the transformations of commerce activities of Altishahris in the 17th and 18th centuries.⁶

⁴ The situation of the western part of Central Asia, which was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 19th century, is spatially and temporally different from that treated in this chapter. However, it can provide a measure for comparison. Although it is not a case of an oasis region, Noda Jin’s argument over the changes of trade structure in the Kazakh steppe following the Russian advance serves as a good reference. See J. Noda, *The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016): 215–59.

⁵ T. Saguchi, *Roshia to Ajia sōgen* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1966).

⁶ The term “merchant” used in this chapter mainly refers to the “caravan merchant,” who was engaged in long-distance trade and dealt in high-profit luxury goods; the “bazaar merchant” to deal in daily commodities inside each oasis is not covered.

1. Trade and Merchants in the Oases

1.1. *The Development of the Caravan Trade*

In this section, we outline the traditional systems of caravan trade in Central Asia, especially the Altishahr region. The main source used here is the travel records of a Portuguese member of the Jesuits, Bento de Goës (1561?–1607), who left Agra, the capital of the Mughal Empire, for Beijing, the capital of the Ming dynasty, in 1602, arrived at Suzhou in Gansu in 1605 via Lahore, Kabul, and Yarkand, and died there before he could achieve his goal.⁷ Goës was not originally a merchant but had served the imperial court of Akbar (r. 1556–1605). However, he was proficient in Persian and was familiar with Islamic customs; he pretended to be an Armenian merchant under an assumed name “Abdullah Isái” and traveled as a member of caravans almost throughout his entire journey.⁸ His records have attracted scholars’ attention as a valuable source that provides a true picture of the early 17th century’s caravan trade in Central Asia.⁹ The rough schedule of his journey is as follows:

1602/10/29	departure from Agra.
1602/12/8	arrival in Lahore.
1603/1–2	departure from Lahore.
1603/4–5 (?)	arrival in Kabul; stay for eight months [eight weeks?] ¹⁰

⁷ This chapter uses the English translation by H. Yule in his *Cathay and the Way Thither: Being a Collection of Medieval Notices of China* 2 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1866): 549–91.

⁸ As background, we can point out that the Armenian “trading diaspora” existed in major cities across Eurasia. Goës also employed as his companion an Armenian named “Issac” living in Lahore. Afterward, after many Armenians were forced to move to Isfahan as a result of the 1603 expedition to the Caucasus by the Safavid Shah Abbas I (r. 1587–1629), their commercial activities further developed. See L. Khatchikian, “The Ledger of the Merchant Hovhannes Joughayetsi,” *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (4th series)* 8.3 (1966): 153–86; V. Gregorian, “Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587–1722,” *Iranian Studies* 7.3/4 (1974): 652–80; and S. Chaudhury, “Trading Networks in a Traditional Diaspora: Armenians in India, c. 1600–1800,” in *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries of History*, eds. I. McCabe et al. (Oxford: Berg, 2005): 51–72.

⁹ For example, see C. Wessels, *Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia, 1603–1721* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1924): 1–42; K. Enoki, *Shiruku rōdo no rekishi kara* (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppansha, 1979): 41–61; M. Sawada, “16 seiki zengo no Chūō Ajia ni okeru tsūshō nettowāku,” in *Kai’iki sekai no nettowāku to jūshōsei*, eds. T. Kawamura et al. (Toyama: Katsura shobō, 2008): 63–6; and H. Hayakawa, “Mogūru Urusu kōki no kōtsū to sono shōaku: Shukueki to tsūkōshō no kanten kara.” *Isuramu sekai* 86 (2016), and Rian Thum’s chapter of this volume.

¹⁰ Goës’s description, actually compiled by Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), says that he stayed in Kabul for eight months. However, judging from the context, this is unlikely. Here, I provisionally assume that this is a misunderstanding for eight weeks.

1603/5–6 (?)	departure from Kabul.
1603/11	arrival in Yarkand; stay for one year.
1604/11/14	departure from Yarkand.
1605/3–4	arrival in Chalish; stay for three months.
1605/6–7	departure from Chalish
1605/12	arrival in Suzhou
1607/4/11	death in Suzhou

The first noteworthy point is that Goës did not travel from Agra to Suzhou in a single caravan. The caravan that he joined in Agra dissolved after arriving in Kabul, where a new caravan heading for Yarkand was formed. This then dissolved in Yarkand, where a new one to Cathay (Ming China) was organized again. Although the last caravan did not dissolve in Chalish (Qarashahr), more merchants were gathered during his three-month stay there. This suggests that a number of trading areas with a scale similar to Kabul and Yarkand had been formed in Central Asia and that there were regional and specific merchants who moved within the area in each region.¹¹ Stated differently, the above cities, which were sites to form and dissolve caravans, were hubs connecting the area; specifically, they were crossroads of intermediate trade.

Of course, a person who was not a member of the regional and specific merchants could also join a caravan or advance beyond the range of each trading area. In addition, because the forming and dissolving of caravans was repeated in each region, the members of caravan were supposed to be consisted of multifarious people. Thus, there is little chance that it was organized by some particular group. The fact that the “Armenian merchant,” Goës, could join the caravan formed mainly by Muslims proves these points.

Second, we should notice the slow pace of Goës’s travels. On the basis of records in the 16th century, the journey from Kashgar to Aqsu took fifteen days; twenty days from Aqsu to Chalish; ten days from Chalish to Turfan; and fifteen days from Turfan to Barsköl (Barkul).¹² However, Goës took more than two years from his arrival at Yarkand to his arrival at Suzhou. This came about not from the slowness of his actual moving speed but from the length of his stay in each oasis. In particular, he was stranded for one year in Yarkand. The reason is as follows:

At this capital [i.e. Yarkand], the caravan of Kabul merchants reaches its terminus; and a new one is formed for the journey to Cathay.... A twelve month passed away however before the new company was formed, for the

¹¹ Sawada, “16 seiki zengo”: 65–6.

¹² Mirza Haydar Dughlat, *Mirza Haydar Dughlat’s Tarikh-i Rashidi: A History of the Khans of Moghulistan*, ed. W. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996): 227.

way is long and perilous, and the caravan is not formed every year, but only when a large number arrange to join it, and when it is known that they will be allowed to enter Cathay.¹³

The caravan dispatched from Yarkand to Ming China had a voluminous capacity, which was not formed frequently. This was in no way peculiar to Yarkand. According to Goës, in Lahore, the caravan proceeding to Yarkand consisted of five hundred people once a year,¹⁴ and the merchants “all take the road together, either for the sake of mutual comfort or for protection against robbers.”¹⁵ The caravan trade to go to distant places was carried out at a slow pace and involved substantial risk; at the same time, it suggests that a large profit could be gained at a single journey.

Naturally enough, merchants contrived means to keep out of danger. The enlargement of caravan size is one such example. Besides, because the regional rulers needed to secure sufficient profit, they dispatched troops for the safeguard of merchants to danger zones such as mountain passes, in which robbers thrived.¹⁶ Moreover, the effective item to ensure a safe journey is the credentials issued by the regional ruler. The status of those carrying it was guaranteed within the range of the issuer’s power and one could enjoy various services and privileges in each place, such as use of facilities and tax exemptions. A representative example is a letter issued by the king of Gaochang/*Qocho* (Turfan) to the famous Buddhist monk and traveler, Xuanzang (602–64), which was addressed to Tong Yabghu Khaghan (?–628) of the Western Turks, who ruled the entire oasis region of Central Asia at that time. In the letter, the king requested the Khaghan’s support and permission to allow Xuanzang to use post horses and to pass through the territory of Western Turks.¹⁷ Thus, when he met the Khaghan in Suyab, Xuanzang was accorded a hearty welcome. Then, receiving new credentials from the Khaghan, Xuanzang could safely travel with an interpreter to Gandara.¹⁸ Similarly, owing to the credentials (Pe. *farmān*) from the Mughal emperor Akbar, Goës could receive various services during his journey to Kabul, the extreme northwest town of the Mughal Empire at that time. However, moving ahead from Kabul, the credentials immediately lost their validity,¹⁹ and he experienced hardships before arriving at Yarkand. On his arrival there, Goës

¹³ Yule, *Cathay*: 563–4.

¹⁴ The pace of making a round trip once a year is also observed in the case of Sogd merchants in the 7th and 8th centuries. See Y. Yoshida, “Sogudo jin to Sogudo no rekishi,” in *Sogudo no bijutsu to gengo*, eds. H. Sofukawa and Y. Yoshida (Kyoto: Rinsen shoten, 2011): 11, 64.

¹⁵ Yule, *Cathay*: 553.

¹⁶ Yule, *Cathay*: 555.

¹⁷ Hui Li and Yan Cong, *Da ci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan*, j. 1 (668); Repr. Sun Yutang et al, eds. *Da ci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan; Shijia fangzhi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000): 21.

¹⁸ Hui, *Da ci’ensi*, j. 2; Sun, *Da ci’ensi*: 29.

¹⁹ Yule, *Cathay*: 557.

received a “royal passport” to go as far as Chalish from Muhammad Khan (r. 1590–1606²⁰), who ruled over Altishahr,²¹ and he again received courteous welcomes in each oasis town under the control of Muhammad Khan’s brothers and sons known as *sulṭāns*.

1.2. Yarkand in the Early 17th Century

Subsequently, as in the case of Yarkand that Goës visited in the early 17th century, we will trace the interactions of the political powers in oases with trade and merchants. At that time, Yarkand was the capital of the Moghul regime, whose royal family was descended from Chaghatay, the second son of Chinggis Qan. The Moghuls had originally been nomads ranging over the steppe of northern Central Asia. During the period from the late 15th century to the early 16th century, the newly risen nomad groups such as the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Oyirads (*Qalmaq*) gradually occupied the Moghul’s pasturelands. After Sa‘id Khan (r. 1514–37/38) moved south and established his capital in Yarkand, this regime is commonly known as the “Yarkand Khanate.” Thereafter, the khanate often attempted to recapture the northern pasturelands but every attack ended in failure. In the reign of the third Khan, ‘Abd al-Karim (r. 1559/60–91), the khanate was confined to the Altishahr oasis region south of the Tianshan Mountains.²²

The period 1603–4, during which Goës stayed in Yarkand, occurred during the reign of the fourth Khan, Muhammad. Although the Uzbeks of Shaybanid Bukhara invaded Altishahr in 1594, Muhammad Khan managed to drive them back. Afterward, he ruled the region from Turfan in the east to Badakhshan in the west.²³ Goës describes the capital Yarkand as “a mart of much note, both for the great concourse of merchants, and for the variety of wares,”²⁴ and, as mentioned above, large-scale caravans arrived from, and departed to, Kabul and Ming China once a year or every few years. Goës makes the following comment on the trade with the Ming:

The command of this caravan [to Cathay] is sold by the king, who invests the chiefs with a kind of royal authority over the merchants for the whole journey.²⁵

²⁰ For the year of Muhammad Khan’s death, see H. Kim, “Eastern Turki Decrees of the 17th Century in the Jarring Collection,” in *Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17–20th Centuries*, eds. J. Millward et al (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2010): 63–4.

²¹ Yule, *Cathay*: 563–4.

²² O. Akimushkin, “K voprosu o vneshnepoliticheskikh sviazakh mogol’skogo gosudarstva s uzbekami i kazakhami v 30-kh godakh XVI v.–60-kh godakh XVII v.” *Palestinskii sbornik* 21.4 (1970): 237–41.

²³ Shah Maḥmud Churas, *Khronika*, ed. O. Akimushkin (Moscow: Nauka, 1976): 31.

²⁴ Yule, *Cathay*: 566.

²⁵ Yule, *Cathay*: 533.

Namely, when merchants formed their caravans to go to the Ming, they could not do it of their own accord but had to buy the status of caravan leader (*kārvān bashi*) from the Khan. In addition, according to the *Khiṭāy nāma*, written in 1516, “the people going [to Ming China] overland, [particularly] the people from Islamic countries, must always enter after introducing themselves as an envoy.”²⁶ An old Muslim merchant with experience entering the Ming under the character of an envoy from the “Kashgar King” explained to the Mughal emperor Akbar as follows:

On arriving at the [Ming] frontier he was detained by the local governor, who after inspecting the seals of the letter which he carried, sent off a dispatch to the king by swift horse-post.²⁷

Hence, the caravan leader was assured his status by a document issued by the Khan. Like this, parties regarded as “tribute missions” (Ch. *gongshi*) from the Sino-centric perspective were, in many cases, the caravans led by the head traders entrusted with a political role.

The most important item for trade with the Ming was the jade stone (Tu. *qash*, Ch. *yushi*). The place of production was the bed of the Khotan River and the “Can Sanghi Çasio” (< *Kān-i sang-i qash*, or “Jade Stone Mountain”).²⁸ The latter was located on the south side of Yarkand; the quality and value of the former was superior.²⁹ The mining right of *Kān-i sang-i qash* was also sold at a high price by the Khan to some merchant, without whose license no other speculators could dig there.³⁰ In short, both the rights to dispatch caravans and to mine jade related to the Yarkand Khanate’s trade with the Ming were in the Khan’s hands, and he gained a high profit by selling them to merchants. The profit from caravan trade was an important financial basis of support for the powers of the oasis ruler.³¹

²⁶ Ī. Afshār, ed. *Khiṭāy-nāma: Sharḥ-i mushāhadāt-i Sayyid ‘Alī Akbar Khiṭā’ī, mu‘āšir-i Shāh Ismā‘īl Ṣafavī dar Chīn* (Tīhrān: Markaz-i Asnād-i Farhang-i Āsiyā, 1979): 143.

²⁷ Yule, *Cathay*: 564.

²⁸ The *Kān-i sang-i qash* was known as the Mirtai Mountain (Ch. *Mi’ertai shan*) during the Qing period, the mining of which was managed by the Qing government.

²⁹ The difference between river and mountain jade was recognized in China proper during the Ming and Qing periods. See Y. Cheng, “Gudai Hetianyu xiang neidi shuru zonglüe.” *Xiyu yanjiu* 3 (1996): 40; L. Hua, “Shindai no gyokuseki kōeki to Shinkyō shakai,” in *Higashi Ajia no kokka to shakai: rekishi to genzai*, ed. H. Takizawa (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2004): 163.

³⁰ Yule, *Cathay*: 564–5.

³¹ Prior to his accession to the throne, Muhammad Khan came to strongly believe in Khoja Muhammad Ishaq Wali, the founder of the Sufi order known as Ishaqiyya, who was on a tour to preach through Altishahr. Then, after his enthronement, Muhammad Khan welcomed the son of Ishaq, Khoja Muhammad Yahya, into the court. Yahya, after that, was involved in the

I believe that such a relationship between political powers and merchants in the oases was not limited in the case of external trade at the state level. Going back in time, before the 1594 invasion, the Yarkand Khanate had maintained a good relationship with Shaybanid Bukhara. The caravans from Altishahr conveyed to Western Turkistan silver coins, fabrics, pottery, Kashmir shawls, perfume, agricultural goods, Chinese cloth, porcelain, jade, and so on. We can also confirm the sending of envoys on several occasions and more than twenty letters to Bukhara; the addressors of the letters include the *sulṭāns* of ruling provincial oasis towns as well as the khan.³² Because there is a sufficient possibility that these envoys to Bukhara were caravan leaders in actual fact, we can safely state that the caravans, although differing in size, were also dispatched from the regional oasis rulers. Although there is no particular evidence, the situation wherein political powers took hold of the rights related to the caravan trade probably existed in each oasis in Central Asia.

1.3. Links with Nomad Nations

When a nomadic nation came to rule over wide territories in the northern grasslands and incorporated the oasis region under its control, the activities of oasis merchants dramatically developed in tandem with the mighty powers of the nomadic nation. Since this issue has been examined based on the case of the Junghars,³³ I will here touch briefly on the chief points.

In 1680, the Junghars conquered Yarkand and assumed control over Altishahr. Some Muslim merchants, who used to immigrate to Ili mainly from Altishahr were called *bederge[n]* (< Pe. *bāzārgān*, or “merchants”) within the Junghar system, and they were organized into an *otoy*, a foundational unit directly belonging to the Junghar ruler. The Junghars traded with the Russians in Western Siberia to the north, with the Chinese to the west if there was no war, and with the Tibetans to the south; besides, many merchants usually proceeded to India and Western Turkistan. It seems

enthronement and dethronement of the seven Khans and eroded the powers of the khanate. See Sawada, “Hōja Isuhākuha no keisei: 17 seiki zenhan no Tarimu bonchi seihen o chūshin ni.” *Seinan Ajia kenkyū* 45 (1996). Interestingly, although the reason is unclear, Muḥammad Khan turned over *Kān-i sang-i qash* to Yahya. See Shāh Maḥmūd ibn Mīrẓā Fāzil Churās, *Anīs al-ṭālibīn* (Ms. Bodleian Library, Ind. Inst. Pers. 45): 96a. I believe that the loss of an important financial basis for the khanate’s powers was one of the causes leading to the decline of the Chaghatay clan and the extension of Yahya’s influence.

³² G. Sultonova, “Trade Relation between Bukhara and Yarkend Khanates in the 16–Earlier 17 Centuries.” *Bulletin of IICAS* 11 (2010): 44; Sultonova, “The Dynamics of Interrelations Bukhara and Yarkand Khanates: Inter and External Factors,” in *Central Eurasian Studies: Past, Present and Future*, eds. H. Komatsu et al (Istanbul: Maltepe University, 2011): 351–3.

³³ T. Onuma, “The Development of the Junghars and the Role of Bukharan Merchants.” *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies* 2 (2010): 83–100.

possible that this wide market was opened up and maintained by the ingenious network of oasis merchants, with the support of the Junghars' power. For example, in the 1680s just after the conquest of Altishahr, the number of tribute missions from the Junghars to the Qing rapidly increased, some of which were headed by men with Muslim names. In addition, Muslim merchants had joined the Junghars' trade with Tibet known as *aocha* (lit. Boiled Tea)³⁴ and a caravan formed of the "Muslims of the Junghar" (Ma. *jun gar i hoise*) had been engaged in trade in Ladakh, south of Yarkand.³⁵

The next section traces how the conditions of caravan trade in Altishahr oases, as seen in this section, changed after the Qing conquest.

2. Qing Restrictions on External Trade

2.1. The Qing Conquest and Rule

The Qing successfully overthrew the Junghars in 1755 and then conquered Altishahr in 1759. The Qing's new territory north and south to the Tianshan Mountains, acquired through these military campaigns, came to be called "Xinjiang," or "New Dominion." After the campaign, the Qing established the post of the Military Governor (Ch. *jiangjun*) in Ili to supervise all of Xinjiang, and several garrisons along with their families were moved to Ili and Ürümchi to form military camps. In Altishahr, a new fortress, containing the Qing *yamen* (government office), was built in each main oasis town. In the fortress within or nearby the Muslim towns, called in Chinese *Mancheng* (or "Manchu Town"), *Xincheng* (or "New Town"), and in later years *Hancheng* (or "Han-Chinese Town"), the Qing officials and troops headed by the *amban* were stationed. However, the number was much fewer than that of the native Muslims in Altishahr. The Qing authorities avoided interfering in any matters within local communities as much as possible unless a serious incident such as a revolt came up. The task of governing Altishahr was almost totally entrusted to the local Muslim governors known as *begs*. The Qing prohibited both the influx of

³⁴ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, ed. *Qingdai jinjichu manwen aochadang (Manja fuifure baita i dangse)* (QMAD) 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2010): 503, 515. For further details on the Junghar's *aocha/mang ja* missions, see W. Lü and R. Zhang, "Qianlong nianjian Menggu Zhunga'er bu diyici jinzang aocha kao." *Neimenggu shifan daxue xuebao (Zhaxue shehui kexue ban)* 39.4 (2010): 39–48; 59; Lü, "Qianlong ba nian Menggu Zhunga'er bu jinzang aocha shimo," in *Ming Qing luncong* 12, eds. Ch. Zhu and T. Wang (Beijing: Gugong chubanshe, 2012): 269–81; Lü, "Qianlong shi'er nian Zhunga'er ruzang aocha shimo." *Xibu Menggu luntan* 2 (2013): 3–15; and K. Taku, "Dai'ichiji gōcha shisetsu to Shinchō Jūngaru kōwa: Kenryū 6 nen ni okeru gōcha shisetsu chūto kikan heno Shinchō no taiō wo chūshin ni." *Shakai bunka shigaku* 57 (2014): 1–30.

³⁵ QMAD 1: 568, 571.

peasant immigrants to Altishahr from China proper and free communication between Muslim and Manchu towns.

Most past studies relating to the trade in Qing Xinjiang mainly make note of the following three points. The first is the advancement of Chinese merchants (including Hui Muslims) from China proper. The Qing prohibited them free access to Altishahr. However, to enable them to manage the distribution of goods, the Qing issued them a “passport” (Ch. *zhaopiao*) for control and to partly permit their trade activities on the condition that they avoided permanent settlement with their families and kept away from the local Muslims. Later, as the Qing regulations gradually loosened over time, the activities of merchants from China proper were firmly established and developed in Altishahr.³⁶ The second is the growing influence of the Khoqandian merchants.³⁷ They were from the Khoqand Khanate established in the Ferghana Basin, and their existence in Altishahr can be observed at the time when the Qing conquered this region. In the early 19th century, they developed their trade activities with the expansion of the khanate’s power and began to monopolize the international trade around the Pamir area and to erode the economy of Altishahr.³⁸ The third is the Silk-Horse trade between the Qing and the Kazakhs in northern Xinjiang. Making contact with the Kazakhs after its conquest of the Junghars, the Qing promoted a government-managed trade in Ili and Tarbaghatai to gain livestock.³⁹

These studies pay close attention to the new factors that occurred after the Qing conquest and each one has produced satisfactory results. However, they make few remarks about an existing factor in Altishahr, namely, the caravan trade by the Altishahr Muslims. Below, we will discuss the changes of their trade activities under the Qing economic and frontier policy, while considering their interactions with the three new factors.

³⁶ Hua, “Qian Jia shiqi Xinjiang nanbacheng neidi shangmin,” in *Xiyu kaocha yu yanjiu*. eds. D. Ma et al. (Ürümchi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1994): 373–90; Hua, “Shindai no Tenzan Nanro ni shinshutsu suru naichi shōmin: Jinkō idō to henkyō chiiki tonō shiten kara.” *Chiiki to shakai* 2 (1999): 123–44; J. Millward, *Beyond the Pass, Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

³⁷ In this chapter, merchants from the Ferghana Basin oases such as Khoqand, Andijan, Marghilan, and Namangan under the Khoqand Khanate are collectively called “Khoqandian merchants”; merchants from Khoqand town are called “Khoqandi merchants.” Some of the Qing records use the term *Anjiyan shangren* (lit. “Andijan merchants”) to refer to not only the merchants from Andijan but also to “Khoqandian merchants” in general.

³⁸ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963): 345–530; L. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005); and T. Onuma, Y. Shinmen, and Y. Kawahara, “Kokuritsu Kōkyū Hakubutsuin shoō 1848 nen Kōkando monjo saikō.” *Tōhoku gakuin daigaku ronshū: Rekishi to bunka* 49 (2013): 1–24.

³⁹ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki*: 303–44; Y. Lin and X. Wang, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyishi* (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1991): 131–430.

2.2. Qing Trade Policies

After completing the conquest, the Qing government established a network of horse-posts (Ch. *yizhan*, Ma. *giyamun*; also in Chinese known as *juntai*, or “military station”) for connecting the oasis towns in Altishahr. This route was connected with the route extending from China proper via Jiayuguan in Gansu, through which the merchants from China proper transferred. On the other hand, we can rarely observe in sources that the Altishahri merchants traveled east of Jiayuguan as in the Junghar period.⁴⁰ Jade mining and trading was also managed by the Qing government and private trade was banned until the end of the 18th century. The main actors in the jade business changed to Chinese merchants such as those from Shanxi. The high demand for, and profit from, jade led to smuggling in a conspiracy between Qing agents and Chinese merchants, for example, the “Gaopu Jade Affair” exposed in 1778.⁴¹



Figure 2. 1. The Ruins of Karuns at Yäqä Äriq in Yarkand (2004)⁴²

The Qing government, at the same time, established *karuns* (guard-posts) on the routes or passes in western Altishahr to monitor traffic, which hindered the

⁴⁰ Millward, *Beyond the Pass*: 159–60; A. Yanagisawa, “Kyafuta ni okeru Shinchō no ‘kan’ei taishō’ ni tsuite: ‘bederge kaishi’ no katsudō.” *Shūteki* 36 (2014): 26–47.

⁴¹ Hua, “Shindai no gyokuseki kōeki.”

⁴² For the basic information on the *karuns*, see A. Turan, *Qāshqārdiki qādimiy izlar* (Ürümchi: Shinjang khālq nāshiriyati, 2001): 137.

movement of Altishahris to Western Turkistan to the west and to Ladakh and Kashmir to the south. In Kashgar, when the native Muslim inhabitants passed a *karun* on their way to trade, the following administrative procedures were needed:

When the Kashgar Muslims, Andijan Muslims, and Kirghiz [living in Kashgar] would go to trade from Kashgar to the Khoqand, Andijan, and Kirghiz regions, the Military Governor and Agent, in any case, issue them a certificate to pass the *karun* with an official seal according to the regulation decided heretofore. After arriving at a *karun*, let the officials of the *karun* check whether [the merchants] match [the contents of] the certificate and then let them pass the *karun*. However, we do not let them carry the certificate onward, but store it at the *karun*. When they come back after completing their trade, we finally return to them the certificate at the *karun* and [the merchants then] return it to the Seals Office.⁴³

In this way, the merchants needed to gain a “certificate to pass the *karun*” (Ma. *karun tucire temgetu bithe*, hereinafter “*karun*-pass”) from the Qing authorities and then had to submit to investigations before passing the *karun*. It is likely that the *karun*-pass was valid for one time only, and the merchants had to apply each time. In fact, the Altishahri merchants could not freely travel even across the oasis towns in Altishahr.

As for [the merchants] going to a certain town to trade, we will also send a document to the *ambans* of that town. When they have finished trading, we make them return after the *amban* of the town gave a certificate [to them]. No Muslims are able to go to other towns freely.⁴⁴

A complicated procedure was required for the Altishahri merchants living under Qing rule when they traveled between the oases.

After the conquest, in consideration of the decrease in merchants coming to Altishahr, the Qing government adopted a preferential policy for foreign merchants. At the beginning of 1760, they decided on a regulation to collect 1/30th (it had earlier been 1/20th) of the commodity value of items from foreign merchants entering Altishahr and 1/20th (it had earlier been 1/10th) from Altishahri merchants returning from the outside.⁴⁵ At the end of the same year, accepting a request from the ruler of

⁴³ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan and Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, eds. *Qingdai Xinjiang manwen dang’an huibian* (hereinafter XMD) (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2012), 87: 65, QL33/1/22 [Mar. 10, 1768], memorial from Iletu.

⁴⁴ XMD 67: 335–6, QL29/3/13 [Apr. 13, 1764], memorial from Elgingge.

⁴⁵ Lin and Wang, *Qingdai xibei*: 513–4. According to a Kashmiri, Mir Izzet Ullah, who

the Khoqand Khanate, Irdana Bi, the Qing issued a regulation that the goods of merchants who accompanied the envoys dispatched by foreign rulers to the Qing should be tax-free.⁴⁶

The above points suggest that the Qing policies obviously had a tendency to restrict the mobility of Altishahris. Compared to the Junghar period, they had no choice but to reduce their sphere of commercial activities. On the other hand, alien merchants from areas around Altishahr, including China proper, were provided with conditions to expand their market share. Then, when a new trade opportunity presented itself to the Altishahris, how did the Qing government deal with it? Below, we will examine the issue by giving the example of the Qing-Kazakh trade.

2.3. *The Prohibition on Trade with the Kazakhs*

In the 16th century, the Kazakhs seized pasturelands from the Moghuls and gradually came to intervene in the politics of Altishahr. In the late 17th century, the Junghars' power expanded, and the Kazakhs were compelled to move away to the west under pressure from the Junghars. In the late 1690s, when the conflict between the Afaqi Khojas in Kashgar and Ishaqi Khojas in Yarkand became serious, Hashim Sultan of the Kazakhs was invited to Yarkand and was temporally recommended as Khan.⁴⁷ For a while after that, we cannot observe the Kazakhs' obvious footsteps in Altishahr.

After the Junghars' annihilation by the Qing, some Kazakh tribes began to migrate toward the east to recover their old pasturelands. The Qing established trade relationships with the Kazakhs at Ürümchi in 1758, at Ili in 1761, and at Tarbaghatai in 1764.⁴⁸ After the trade at Ürümchi was stopped in 1765,⁴⁹ the two traded at Ili and Tarbaghatai regularly every year, through which the Qing gained livestock such as

visited Yarkand via the Karakoram Pass in 1812, at the customhouse in *Aurtang*, south of Yarkand town, the officials collected 1/40th of the commodity value of items as a form of tax payment from the Kashmiri merchants and 1/30th from the others. See Mir Izzet Ullah, "Travels beyond the Himalaya, by Mir Izzet Ullah. Republished from the Calcutta Oriental Quarterly Magazine, 1825." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 7.2 (1843): 301. It is unclear why the tax rate for the Kashmiris was lower than that for others.

⁴⁶ T. Onuma, Y. Kawahara, and A. Shioya, "An Encounter between the Qing Dynasty and Khoqand in 1759–1760: Central Asia in the Mid-Eighteenth Century." *Frontiers of History in China* 9.3 (2014): 395–6.

⁴⁷ Muḥammad Šādiq Kāshgharī, *Tazkira-yi khwājagān* (Institut vostochnykh rukopisei D126, Saint Petersburg): 20b–22a.

⁴⁸ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki*: 303–6. Interestingly, a Russian document says that, in 1758, the Altishahris in opposition to the Qing asked the Middle-Zhuz Kazakhs not to exchange their horses with the Qing in order to prevent the reinforcement of the Qing army. See B. Gurevich and G. Kim, eds. *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii, XVII–XVIII vv.: dokumenty i materialy* 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1989): 143.

⁴⁹ Lin and Wang, *Qingdai xibei*: 160.

horses, while the Kazakhs mainly gained silk fabrics and cotton cloth. The trade was managed in the presence of the Qing officials, and free and private trade was prohibited.

However, the Kazakhs continually attempted to enlarge their pastureland.⁵⁰ Accordingly, some Kazakhs reappeared in Altishahr to request trade with the Altishahr residents. Regarding this subject, Saguchi has already discussed how the Qing government dealt with it and pointed out that the direct trade between the Kazakhs and the Altishahr residents was fully prohibited by 1767.⁵¹ However, because his arguments contain some inaccuracies, the process is detailed below based on the Qing archives.

In 1763, a group of Kazakhs arriving in Kashgar and Ush (Uch-Turpan) requesting permission from the Qing authorities to exchange their livestock with items that could be obtained at the oasis, such as slaves, iron products, weapons, silk fabrics, cotton cloth, and so on.⁵² At this stage, the local Qing *ambans* did not refuse the request but, rather, evinced a favorable attitude towards such trade.⁵³ As background, there was a chronic shortage of livestock in Altishahr at that time. Actually, the market price there was much higher than the official price in northern Xinjiang.⁵⁴

The Qing central government expressed its disapproval of the measures taken by the local *ambans*. One of the reasons was a precaution against the Kazakhs moving east; another was apprehension of a shortage of livestock in northern Xinjiang, because the formation of Qing military camps in northern Xinjiang was then being carried out in earnest.⁵⁵ Because it was far from China proper, the supply of livestock for military use, cultivation, and food was almost completely dependent on trade with the Kazakhs. In order to ensure a stable and continuous supply, the Qing government set the official price, for instance, 3–4 silver taels per horse on average, at almost half the price in China proper.⁵⁶ Considering these circumstances, an imperial edict was issued in September 1763.

Afterwards, if the Kazakhs come to the Muslim Region [i.e. Altishahr] with horses and other animals to trade, you should prohibit them from trading with the Muslims. Officially purchase all the livestock, and be sure to let [the Muslims] buy at a lower price than that in Ili and Ürümchi. You must not make

⁵⁰ Onuma, *Shin to Chūō Ajia sōgen: Yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e* (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2014): 192–203, 220–4.

⁵¹ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki*: 308–12.

⁵² XMD 62: 445–6, QL28/6/4 [Jul. 14, 1763], memorial from Yunggui; XMD 63: 186–8, QL28/6/25 [Aug. 4, 1763], memorial from Suceng.

⁵³ XMD 63: 304–6, QL28/7/5 [Aug. 13, 1763], memorial from Yunggui.

⁵⁴ XMD 65: 35–7, QL28/9/25 [Oct. 31, 1763], memorial from Nasitun.

⁵⁵ Onuma, *Shin to Chūō Ajia sōgen*: 124–36.

⁵⁶ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki*: 325–6.

[the Kazakhs] gain even a slight profit. If they say, “Because it is not a good price, please return [the animals to us],” you should immediately return them. Even then, when the Kazakhs still come, you should explain, “Until now, you have traded in Ili and Ürümchi but have never been to the Muslim Region. Our place does not need horse and other animals at all. In addition, we are doing a lot of trade with the regions of Badakhshan, Andijan, and Kirghiz and gain livestock. Your horses and other animals are no longer needed. Afterwards, when you trade, you should go to Ili and Ürümchi as usual. If you come here, you cannot gain any profit,” and make them understand this. The Kazakhs will naturally stop coming if you have prevented them from gaining a profit.⁵⁷

Thus, the Qing controlled the livestock price to inflict a loss on the Kazakhs coming to Altishahr. In February 1764, a Kazakh, Aytu, visited Kashgar to seek permission for trade. The Qing *amban* of Kashgar, Nasitun (Ch. *Nashitong*), told him, “There is no use in coming to Kashgar to trade,” and commanded the *hākim beg* of Kashgar, Gaday Muhammad, not to permit Aytu freely to trade with the Kashgaris in accordance with the prescribed policies. The Qing authorities finally bought “for 3 taels per horse, for 2.5 taels per cattle, and for 0.5 taels per sheep, cheaper than the prices in Ili and Ürümchi.”⁵⁸

Subsequently, the private/contraband trade carried out by oasis dwellers in Altishahr with the Kazakhs gave rise to a question. In 1764, a Qing patrol dispatched from Ili met thirty of the “Andijan merchants” resident in Kashgar, who had just finished trade with the Kazakhs and were on their return journey, travelling with three Kazakh escorts. According to the caravan leader, Anjubay, in September in the previous year, they had gone through the formal procedures to exit the *karun* and trade with the Sayak tribes of the Kirghiz. However, because this venture ended in failure, they had headed north to trade with the Kazakhs.⁵⁹ Nasitun, receiving the report in Kashgar, handled this matter as follows:

Formerly, when Your Servants [i.e. Nasitun et al.] first strictly prohibited the Muslims of Kashgar from going to the land of Kazakhs to trade, we did not issue a certificate also to the Andijan Muslims to go to trade with the Kazakhs. The Andijan Muslims, Anjubay and others, went to the land of Buruts [i.e. Kirghiz] to trade and, seeking further profit, secretly went from there to [the land of] the Kazakhs; this is very wrong. However, because Anjubay really is in awe of [imperial power] and a person from the outer tribes, Your Servants

⁵⁷ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan, ed. *Qianlong chao manwen jixindang yibian* (hereinafter QMJD) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2011) 4: 344–5, QL28/8/9 [Sep. 15, 1763].

⁵⁸ XMD 66: 446–9, QL29/1/26 [Feb. 27, 1764], memorial from Nasitun.

⁵⁹ XMD 67: 237–8, QL29/2/26 [Mar. 28, 1764], memorial from Nasitun.

entrusted the *gong* holder and *hākīm beg*, Gaday Muhammad, and other [*begs*] sternly to admonish Anjubay and the rest. In addition, we said to Gaday Muhammad, “Afterward, if any Muslims from any region secretly goes to trade with the Kazakhs, we will be sure to punish them severely,” and entrusted him strictly to prohibit this.⁶⁰

From these excerpts, it is clear that the prohibition against trade with the Kazakhs applied to all Muslim merchants living in Qing Altishahr regardless of their place of origin. However, this time the Qing authorities did not severely punish Anjubay but only warned him sternly. Here, we notice a certain concession to the “person from the outer tribes” (*Ma. tulergi aiman i niyalma*).

A great concern related to the trade with Kazakhs emerged at the beginning of 1767 when the number of Kazakhs visiting Ili for trade decreased. The result of inspections revealed that many Muslim merchants from Kashgar had come to the Kazakh pasturelands to buy livestock. The Military Governor of Ili, Agūi (Ch. *Agui*), made a proposal to ban access of the Altishahris’ caravans to the Kazakhs and, if found out, the caravaneers were to be transferred to Ili and severely punished.⁶¹ The *amban* of Kashgar, Cokto (Ch. *Chuokete*), who was asked to cooperate by Agūi, provided a different opinion. According to him, the trade with Kazakhs should be prohibited; however, prohibiting the import of livestock from Khoqand and the Kirghiz would interfere with daily life in Kashgar. This was because the inhabitants of Kashgar, who earned their living through agriculture and trade, were not good at stockbreeding.⁶² The Qianlong emperor also pointed out that Agūi’s measure would go too far and stated, “It is better if the Muslims visit [the land of] the Kazakhs than if the Kazakhs enter the Muslim Region one after another without permission.”⁶³ However, Cokto stretched the meaning of Qianlong’s statement to mean that it was not necessary to interfere in the trade of the local Muslims with the Kazakhs. Although the emperor recognized that the interpretation of Cokto was incorrect, he admitted their direct trade on condition that the precise price did not exceed that of northern Xinjiang.⁶⁴ Thus, Cokto held counsel with the *hākīm beg*, Gaday Muhammad, and the *ishik-āgā beg*, Toqa, on the purchase price. Here, the *beg*-officials submitted the unexpected response that the trade with the Kazakhs was unnecessary (for further details, see the next section).⁶⁵ At this point, Cokto started the negotiations all over again and asked for a temporary delay in the lifting of the

⁶⁰ XMD 67: 238–9.

⁶¹ XMD 82: 303–6, QL/31/12/29 [Jan. 29, 1767], memorial from Agūi.

⁶² XMD 83: 15, QL32/2/1 [Feb. 28, 1767], memorial from Cokto.

⁶³ Qinggui et al., comp. *Daqing Gaozong chun huangdi shilu* (hereinafter GZSL) (1807; repr. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964), j. 777: 13a–b, QL32/1/jichou [Feb. 22, 1767].

⁶⁴ QMJD 7: 298–301, QL32/4/6 [Jul. 22, 1767].

⁶⁵ XMD 84: 14–6, QL 32/5/22 [Jun. 17, 1767].

embargo; as a result, he incurred the emperor's wrath and was demoted to a lower *amban* post in Ili.⁶⁶ Finally, it was decided to issue a regulation to permit the Altishahris to visit and trade only in Khoqand and the Kirghiz as usual⁶⁷ and to completely forbid direct trade with the Kazakhs.⁶⁸

We will examine the application of this regulation from an incident that occurred in 1768.⁶⁹ At the beginning of the year, an influential Kazakh leader, Ablai, sent a mission led by Tilash to Kashgar. According to Tilash, a merchant from Kashgar, Ruzi Sufi, arrived at the pasturelands of the Kazakhs in the previous year. At that time, the amount of cotton cloth by way of compensation for the livestock purchased from some Kazakhs was not enough. Ruzi Sufi promised that he would return to Kashgar and come back again to pay the amount of the shortfall; Tilash became a guarantor (Pe. *kafil*) for it. However, because he did not fulfill his promise, Ablai sent Tilash to collect the payment. Thus, the *amban* of Kashgar, Iletu (Ch. *Yiletu*), entrusted Toqa with finding Ruzi Sufi and questioning him. In the words of Ruzi Sufi, after returning to Kashgar, "I have not recklessly gone to meet Tilash because the trade with the Kazakhs was prohibited." Iletu made Ruzi Sufi pay the shortfall amount and punished him by putting him in the pillory in the bazaar for one month.

At the same time, Tilash had brought one hundred horses, six hundred sheep, and ten cattle, and wished to trade with people in Kashgar. The letter from Ablai brought by Tilash also said, "Please send merchants to us, otherwise please permit me [to travel on the] route [to Kashgar]. We shall enter and trade" (Tu. *Bizgä saudāgir ibärsün*.⁷⁰ *Bolmasa, bizgä yol bersün. Kirip saudā qilghali.*). Therefore, it was quite obvious that the actual purpose of dispatching the mission was to conduct trade in Kashgar. Although Iletu at first refused this request, he permitted it because of Tilash's pleas. However, the Qing authorities set the purchase price very low (1 tael per horse, 0.2 tael per sheep). Moreover, the trade was limited to the *beg*-officials

⁶⁶ QMJD 7: 460–3, QL 32/8/17 [Oct. 9, 1767].

⁶⁷ This regulation was decided upon with the conditions in oases such as Kashgar and Ush in the northwestern Tarim Basin in mind. At Yarkand in the southwestern region, trade relationships with the Pamir Mountain area including Ladakh, Kashmir, and Badakhshan had been permitted. See J. Fewkes, *Trade and Contemporary Society along the Silk Road: An Ethno-history of Ladakh* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2009); D. Brophy, "High Asia and the High Qing: A Selection of Persian Letters from the Beijing Archives," in *No Tapping around Philology: A Festschrift in Honor of Wheeler McIntosh Thackston Jr.'s 70th Birthday*, eds. A. Korangy and D. Sheffield (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014): 325–67.

⁶⁸ QMJD 7: 384–7, QL32/6/27 [Feb. 22, 1767].

⁶⁹ The following description is based on the memorial from Iletu and the Turkic letter from Ablai included in *Junjichu manwen lufu zouzhe* (the First Historical Archives of China, Beijing), no. 03-0183-2261-031, QL33/2/13 [Mar. 30, 1768].

⁷⁰ Although the form of this word is unclear due to the document being damaged, based on the context and the Manchu translation I assume that it corresponds to *ibärsün*.

and the “head merchant” (Ma. *hūdai da*) of the local Muslims, who were informed of these circumstances in advance. Tilash finally gave up selling. After that, Kazakh requests to trade with the Altishahris ceased.⁷¹

As argued in this section, after Qing rule began, the trade activities of the Altishahris were gradually limited. It is not difficult to imagine that their playing space in the arena of the international market across Central Eurasia became increasingly narrow. This is suggested by the fact that, during the trade with Kazakhs (1763–7), the main merchants connecting Altishahr with the Kazakh pasturelands were Khoqandian merchants. In particular, the merchants like Anjubay based on their “trading diaspora” formed at Kashgar attract our notice. A caravan that consisted of ninety-three persons divided into twelve parties arrived at Ush with 252 horses, 487 cattle, and 8,330 sheep in 1767. It was originally formed from the Muslim merchants from Khoqand, Andijan, Tashkent, and Namangan, and they had often previously been to Kashgar to sell livestock. This time, they left Kashgar for the pasturelands of Kirghiz and Kazakhs to gain livestock. Then, half of the caravan returned to Kashgar;⁷² the other half, ninety-three people, arrived at Ush. However, according to them, out of the ninety-three persons, the Khoqandian merchants made up only forty-three; the other fifty people were wranglers of animals employed at Kashgar and on the way, including twenty-five Khoqandis and Andijanis, twenty Kashgaris, one Kirghiz, and four Kazakhs. It is a traditional style of caravan trade to recruit new entrants in each waypoint and, as a result, the caravan expanded and became a mixed group. The *amban* of Ush, Yunggui (Ch. *Yonggui*), had the suspicion that the merchants of Kashgar joined as “wranglers of animals.” Although the investigation revealed that only a person called Sadat gained livestock by trading with the Kazakhs, Yunggui overlooked him because the quantity was very small.⁷³ After the Qing conquest, it became difficult for the Altishahris to demonstrate their abilities as caravan traders.

3. *Beg*-officials and Caravan Trade

Another important point about caravan trade after the Qing conquest was the relationship with the political powers in the oases. As described above, the two political powers coexisted in each oasis town in Qing Altishahr, namely, the Qing

⁷¹ In 1808, the third son of Ablai, Adil Sultan, sent a mission to Kashgar for trade. The Qing authorities of Kashgar, following the “old regulation of the Qianlong reign,” made them give up. See Cao Zhenyong et al., comp. *Daqing Renzhong rui huangdi shilu* (1824; repr. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964), j. 199: 11a–12a, JQ13/7/*jiashen* [Sep. 10, 1808].

⁷² A caravan formed of eleven parties, which was perhaps the other half that did not go to Ush, arrived at Kashgar. XMD 83: 149, QL32/3/1 [Mar. 30, 1767], memorial from Cokto.

⁷³ XMD 83: 8–11, QL32/2/1 [Feb. 28, 1767], memorial from Yunggui.

officials and soldiers headed by the *amban* and the local *beg*-officials headed by the *hākim beg*. Although there was no fixed boundary in the exercise of power between the two, broadly speaking, the former ran the military administration in the oases, while the latter managed the civil administration. For example, in 1807, the *hākim beg* of Yengisar applied for the repair of a horse-post and reclamation within the district. The Qing authorities bore government expenses for the repair of the horse-post that was built and managed by themselves. However, they made the native Muslims bear the burden of reclamation because it was a “matter of the duties of Muslims” (Ma. *hoise sei teisu dorgi baita*).⁷⁴ The dealings with the trade requests from the Kazakhs make it clear that, when facing issues that should be resolved, both the Qing authorities and the *beg*-officials undertook the tasks cooperatively with each other. However, there was a difference in the sphere of administration, which can also reflect a sharing of roles.⁷⁵

Let us then consider the next question as to how the “management of trade” (Ch. *maoyi shiwu*, Ma. *hūdašara baita*) was handled in Altishahr. Through the process to deal with the trade with the Kazakhs, apparently, the Qing *ambans* at the oasis towns took an active role in it, but their prime motive was to block the Kazakhs’ moving eastward, to secure the supply of livestock in northern Xinjiang, and to maintain order along the frontier. They had had little interest in the commercial transactions of the native Muslims.⁷⁶

On the other hand, how were the *beg*-officials involved with caravan trade? First, we will reexamine the process of conveying the imperial edict issued to the Altishahri Muslims in September 1763, which was the first step towards the prohibition of trade with Kazakhs. After this edict reached the *amban* of Yarkand, Sinju (Ch. *Xinzhu*), copies were made and sent to the *ambans* of Kashgar, Ush, and Aqsu.⁷⁷ It is interesting that the three *ambans* of Yarkand, Ush, and Aqsu entrusted the *hākim beg* at each oasis town to proclaim the edict to the local Muslims.⁷⁸ In Kashgar, we can find no direct evidence in records to show that the *amban* Yunggui entrusted the task to Gaday Muhammad. However, when the Kazakh Aytu asked permission for trade in February 1764, the successor to the post of Yunggui, Nasitun,

⁷⁴ S. Hori, “Kaikyō shakai keizaishi kenkyū to Manjugo shiryō: Saguchi Tōru shi shozō no ichimonjo no shōkai.” *Manzokushi kenkyū tsūshin* 10 (2001): 108–9.

⁷⁵ In order to avoid misunderstandings, the basic line of my thinking is that these two power constructions should not be regarded as two different things, but should be understood as a component of the political and social system of the Altishahr oasis community under the Qing rule.

⁷⁶ Such a stance of the Qing government was not limited to the case of Altishahr. As is well known from the Qing trade restrictions in Canton and Khyakhta, external trade in the Qing view was often recognized as one of the “benefits” granted by the Qing emperor to foreigners.

⁷⁷ XMD 64: 395–6, QL28/9/14 [Oct. 14, 1763], memorial from Sinju.

⁷⁸ XMD 64: 437–9, QL28/9/22 [Oct. 28, 1763], memorial from Haiming; XMD 65: 96–8, QL28/10/8 [Nov. 12, 1763], memorial from Suceng.

said, “Following the edict, I correctly explained to the *hākīm beg*, Gaday Muhammad, to make [the native Muslims] not purchase [Aytu’s livestock].”⁷⁹ Therefore, it can be assumed that, in Kashgar too, similar instructions had been given to the *hākīm beg*.

Table 2. 1. Process to Convey the 1763 Edict to the Altishahr Oases

Oasis town	Qing <i>amban</i>	<i>hākīm beg</i>
Yarkand	Sinju	→ Hadi
Aqsu	Haiming	→ Satip Aldi
Ush	Suceng	→ ‘Abdullah (Qumul/Hami <i>junwang</i>)
Kashgar	Yunggui	[→ Gaday Muhammad]

In Altishahr, dissemination of regulations was certainly done in the Turkic language; the mediation of *hākīm begs* must therefore be expected. At least in this case, the Qing *ambans* did not directly intervene in the local social matters.

The next noteworthy point is the procedure for dispatching caravans of the Altishahr. As explained in the last section, they needed to possess the *karun*-pass issued from the Qing *amban* in each oasis to go beyond the *karuns*. However, the *karun*-pass itself probably had no validity as a certificate of external trade. In this regard, Gaday Muhammad’s remarks on the matter of Anjubay in 1764 deserves our attention:

The thirty people led by Anjubay who went to trade with the Kazakhs were Andijani Muslims living in Kashgar. Last June, they told me that they would go to the land of the Sayak tribe of the Kirghiz to trade. I, that is Gaday Muhammad, provided a certificate with my seal [to Anjubay] and the Councilor [*hebe-i amban*] gave them a *karun*-pass, and we then sent them off.⁸⁰

Before gaining the *karun*-pass, Anjubay asked the *hākīm beg* to permit the trade and received the certificate. The *amban* of Yarkand, Elgingge (Ch. *E’erjing’e*), who received a report of this matter, explained the regulations in Yarkand as follows:

When Muslims of Yarkand go to another place to trade, the *hākīm beg*, Hadi, investigates the names and the number of Muslim merchants and the numbers of their livestock and items, makes a document, and affixes the seal on it. He submits [the document] to the officials who deal with a certificate to pass [the *karuns*], they repeatedly check whether there are false matters in it, and then they are made to submit it to Your Servants [i.e. Elgingge et al.]. When we

⁷⁹ XMD 66: 448.

⁸⁰ XMD 67: 238.

look it over and dispatching is possible, we list in a certificate the names and the number of Muslim merchants and the number of their livestock and items, give it [to the merchants], and send them to trade.⁸¹

Also in Yarkand, as well as Kashgar, for sending caravans beyond the *karuns*, the Muslim merchants needed first to seek permission for trade from the *hākim beg* and then to gain a *karun*-pass and the final approval from the Qing authorities. This two-step process can be recognized in the framework of role-sharing: the Qing *ambans* supervised the control of *karuns* related to frontier defense and the *hākim begs* exercised jurisdiction over the “trading management” of native people.

The rights related to caravan trade, as shown in the verified example of Muhammad Khan, were a financial resource to support the political powers at oases,⁸² which the rulers thus attempted to seize. When considering the conditions after the Qing conquest, it must be noted that all of the *hākim begs* at the major oasis towns west of Aqsu, namely, Hadi, Satip Aldi, ‘Abdulla, and Gaday Muhammad, were from the towns east of Kucha, who earlier submitted to the Qing dynasty and cooperated in the campaign into Altishahr. To borrow Sanada Yasushi’s description, they are regarded as “non-native *begs*” who, by borrowing authority from the conquering Qing, secured their positions as newly emergent chieftains based in oasis towns (*shahr*). Therefore, they “had a tendency to build and seize a new local society as their own power base.”⁸³ The confrontation between these and the “native *begs*” based in agricultural communities around townships, which often appeared in western Altishahr just after the Qing conquest, is one such specific phenomenon.⁸⁴

Taking Sanada’s remarks into consideration, it can be easily imagined that the newly appointed *hākim begs*’ eyes fell on the rights related to caravan trade. Although, regrettably, I still have not concretely clarified this process, the fact that in 1764, five years after the Qing conquest, the *hākim begs* gave merchants permission for trade suggests that their object was achieved relatively quickly. Moreover, from the case of issuing of a certificate of trade to Anjubay, we know that the Khoqandian merchants settling in Kashgar were also included in the objective. According to a record in 1821, the *hākim beg* of Kashgar had right to appoint the *khudayda* (< Ma. *hūdai da*, or “head merchant”) who supervised the Khoqandian merchants in Kashgar.⁸⁵ This can be recognized within the same context. With regard to the issue

⁸¹ XMD 67: 335.

⁸² Although there are no concrete grounds, I believe that certificates for trade issued by the *hākim beg* in the Qing period were also sold to merchants.

⁸³ Y. Sanada, “Sōsetsuki Shin Bekusei kara mita Kashugaria oashisu shakai,” in *Nairiku Ajia, Nishi Ajia no shakai to bunka*, ed. M. Mori (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1983): 451.

⁸⁴ Sanada, “Kenryū 25 nen Kashugaru hanran: Chūō Ajia oashisu shakai no kenryoku kōzō no kyūmei ni mukete.” *Chūō daigaku Ajiashi kenkyū* 38 (2014): 1–37.

⁸⁵ Saguchi, *18–19 seiki*: 381.

of jade, the ringleader of the 1778 scandal, Gaopu, explained that he became interested in jade because, on reaching Yarkand in 1776, he witnessed the wealthy life led by Hadi (Ch. *Edui*), who reaped enormous profits through the illegal mining and sale of jade.⁸⁶ While the Qing government strengthened its control over the jade trade, Hadi secretly proceeded to secure his interests in it, which formed an important part of his personal economic base. In short, the caravan trade of Altishahris was gradually restricted under the Qing rule; at the same time, new Muslim chieftains, who were appointed to the post of high-ranking *beg*-officials, obtained vested rights to trade at oases, and increased their own powers based on these rights.

With this in mind, a baffling problem arose, which is that the high-ranking *beg*-officials of Kashgar reacted negatively to the idea of direct trade with Kazakhs, when it was permitted in 1767. Cokto reported that the inhabitants of Kashgar were very glad to hear the news.⁸⁷ Although his account is somewhat overdrawn, yet since the local people were under the strict restriction of trade, it must have been an eagerly awaited new business opportunity. Why did the *beg*-officials object to the trade expansion? A key to the solution to the question is the *amban* Cokto's instruction that was issued on his own judgment before consulting with the *beg*-officials.

Because I conveyed the benevolent edict of the Great Master [i.e. Qing emperor] to the Muslims from Khoqand and Andijan under inspection just now and then instructed them not to sell their horses, cattle, and sheep at the official prices but to trade freely, every Muslim from Khoqand and Andijan was surprised and praised [the emperor].⁸⁸

This meant the abolition of the Qing-determined official price and an approval of free trade by Khoqandian merchants. On this issue, the Qianlong emperor instructed that the purchase prices in Kashgar must not exceed that in northern Xinjiang, and Cokto finally summoned Gaday Muhammad and other *begs* to ask their opinions. The reason why Gaday Muhammad was opposed to it is as follows:

Because, since conquering the region of the Muslims, [the Qing] has never prohibited them from freely going to trade with Khoqand, Andijan, Badakhshan, and the Kirghiz as usual, our living standards have been gradually improved and the price of livestock in Kashgar has also gradually gone down. Now, if we let the Muslims trade with the Kazakhs, we shall strictly admonish them [to trade] at the same price as that in Ili and Yar [i.e. Tarbaghatai]. After all, the pasturelands of Kazakhs are very far from Kashgar. It is not much of a

⁸⁶ Hua, "Shindai no gyokuseki kōeki": 172.

⁸⁷ XMD 83: 151–2, QL32/3/1 [Mar. 30, 1767], memorial from Cokto.

⁸⁸ XMD 83: 152.

problem that they have to pass through [the lands of] the Kirghiz tribes, which is far in its own way, and to drive the animals on their journey, and they cannot avoid losing the animals. However, after passing *karun*, the distance from me, that is Gaday Muhammad, becomes very long. Nobody controls them and, the place [where the Muslims go] is not near the Military Governor and *ambans* of Ili and Yar.⁸⁹

Although it is questionable that the Altishahris at large were “freely going to trade,” in Gaday Muhammad’s view, the livestock was already sufficient and, also, he worried about trade activities in a place beyond his control. He was obviously opposed to any changes to the present conditions of trade system. As mentioned above, the *hākim begs* including Gaday Muhammad were trying to gain control of the merchants and the trade networks at the oases they ruled, in which the Khoqandian merchants were also included. Although ordinary people welcomed the opportunity to conduct free trade, from the viewpoint of the high-ranking “non-native *begs*,” it was a factor capable of undermining their economic base, which they gained with considerable effort.

According to Cišii (Ch. *Qishiyi*),⁹⁰ the Altishahris “are afraid that the merchants from Andijan and Kashmir will go away. If they go away, the goods will be scarcely circulated there and the Muslims will have nothing to live on.”⁹¹ From this situation around 1775, we can understand the development of alien traders in Altishahr. However, viewed from the opposite side, the high dependence on goods obtained from them suggests that the trade activities of Altishahris was declining. On the other hand, Cišii explains that a ruler of Shighnan, Shāh Wanjī, captured the “Muslim trader of Hadi” (Ch. *Edui zhi maoyi huizi*) within his territory in 1776.⁹² This “Muslim trader of Hadi” probably means the caravan dispatched by Hadi as its patron. That is to say, although the channel to the outside world itself became narrow, the *hākim begs* put it under their own control and successfully managed caravan trade. The primary target of high-ranking *beg*-officials, who had just come to power, was not the reckless opening and expansion of the economy at the oasis but gaining the rights of trade. In this sense, the Qing’s restriction on external trade was rather convenient for them.

⁸⁹ XMD 84: 15.

⁹⁰ Cišii, with a courtesy name (Ch. *zi*) of Chunyuan, had experience working in the Seals Office of Kucha from 1773 to 1778. See Matthew Mosca’s chapter in this volume.

⁹¹ *Qishiyi, Xiyu wenjian lu* (1777; repr, Shanghai: Guji shudian, the year of reprint is unknown), j. 3: 4b.

⁹² *Qishiyi, Xiyu wenjian lu*, j. 3: 13a–b.

Conclusion

Yarkand flourished as the capital of the Yarkand Khanate and a hub of trade, whence large-scale caravans began their journeys toward remote regions once a year or every few years. The Khan sold the rights and certifications for sending caravans to the caravan leader and charged a large sum for the rights for mining jade, the most important product traded with Ming China. Profits from caravan trade were directly connected to the revenue of political powers established at oasis towns in Central Asia. In addition, the trading activities of Altishahris developed dramatically when operating in tandem with the wider-ranging powers of the Junghars.

After the Altishahr region became a new northwestern frontier of the Qing, the Altishahri merchants faded from the international trade scene over time due to trade restrictions imposed by the Qing. The Qing set *karuns* along the route to monitor traffic and, to pass through *karuns*, merchants needed permission from the Qing authorities. After the Qing established a government-managed trade relationship with the Kazakhs in northern Xinjiang, to stabilize their sourcing of livestock from the Kazakhs, they prohibited the Kazakhs from reaching the Altishahr towns for direct trade and the Altishahris from dispatching their caravans across the Kazakh pastureland. The Qing government did not have a management strategy to make active use of the Altishahri merchants and gradually limited their mobility.

The Qing imposed restrictions on external trade in Altishahr primarily to maintain the frontier order. Closely tracing the process, the new Muslim chieftains, who cooperated in the Qing's conquest and held the position of high-ranking *beg*-officials such as *hākīm beg*, acquired vested rights to trade. For dispatching caravans, it was first necessary to seek permission to form and dispatch caravans from the *hākīm beg*; the Qing *amban* then issued certificates to pass the *karun*. The restriction of trade at the oasis level was promoted not only by the Qing *amban* but also by the high-ranking *beg*-officials. The Qing's intention to limit caravan trade was very profitable for the new Muslim chieftains, who were trying to hold the rights to trade.

As described in the beginning, it is hard to grasp the situation of the native merchants and the *hākīm begs* in the Altishahr oases after the Qing conquest. Although this paper effectively used Qing archives to trace it, several viewpoints are drawn from these assumptions. One reason, again, is that it is conceivable that, because the involvement of Qing authorities in the "trading management" at oases was indirect, this matter was not easily reflected in the memorials addressed by the *ambans* to the emperor.⁹³ Conversely, one might say that, at least until the end of the 18th century, the "trading management" system was entrusted to the *beg*-officials as a space that the Qing authorities did not directly engage in.

⁹³ The *hākīm beg* could only submit reports to the Qing *amban*, and had no right to send memorials directly to the Qing emperor.

However, overall, the external trade activities of Altishahris dimmed day by day. After the mid-1780s, Sarimsaq, a descendant of the Makhdumzada Khojas who had been raised in Western Turkistan, began to cause disturbances, which made the Qing authorities tense. In response to this, in 1794, the Qing established a new regulation to restrict the Altishahris' trade with the Kirghiz beyond the *karun*.⁹⁴ Their withdrawal from the international trade networks paved a way for the Khoqandian merchants to progress remarkably in the trade across Central Asia in the early 19th century, and the right to appoint the *khudayda*, originally seized by the *hākim beg* of Kashgar, was also finally taken by the ruler of the Khoqand Khanate.

⁹⁴ XMD 202: 41–50, QL59/10/6 [Oct. 29, 1794], memorial from Yungboo; GZSL j. 1464: 1a–3a, QL59/11/*yiyou* [Nov. 23, 1794].