

Some Remarks on the “Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta” in 1768

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Introduction

The history of relations between China and Russia from the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1728 to the Treaties of Aigun and Tianjin in 1858 remains something of a lacuna in historical research. This is particularly so for the period after the 1760s, in other words, after the Qing's conquest of the Jëgün-γar (Jungar) and its annexation of Eastern Turkestan, and it seems to be due to a perception that the system of bilateral relations based on the Treaty of Kiakhta was maintained without any substantial change during this period and that almost nothing important happened.

However, it goes without saying that not only the international environment surrounding the two countries, but also their national strength and diplomatic attitudes at the time of the Treaties of Aigun and Tianjin were fundamentally different from those of the time of the Treaty of Kiakhta. Since it would be impossible for such great changes to occur within a short time, it would seem best to turn our attention to this period as well in order to clarify the process behind the formation of the new framework of relations between the two countries.

By the end of the eighteenth century, both countries had twice supplemented the Treaty of Kiakhta. The first supplement was the Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta (*Dopolnitel'naia stat'ia k Kiakhtinskomu traktatu*) concluded in 1768, which is the main subject of the present article. There have been few specialist articles on this Addendum up to now, though general histories sometimes refer to it briefly.¹⁾ Although the Addendum contributed to the normalization of bilateral relations, which had become strained since the second half of the 1750s, the provision itself was concerned only with rather minor matters. This seems to be one of the reasons why the Addendum tends to be ignored by historians.

However, when examining the process of negotiations between the

two countries regarding this Addendum, we find that the fundamental structure of the contemporary relationship between them is directly revealed in an intriguing fashion. Thus in the present article I shall first present a general survey of the background to the deterioration of bilateral relations on the basis of earlier research (Section 1), then give a brief description of the process of negotiations up to the conclusion of the Addendum, making use of archival documents of both sides (Section 2), and lastly undertake an examination of certain features of contemporary relations between the two countries (Section 3).

Before proceeding to the main subject, it would seem helpful to give a brief account of the historical sources. On the Russian side, many relevant document files are kept in the group (fond) "Relations of Russia with China" (No. 62) of the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Empire (*Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii*, abbreviated to AVPRI below) in Moscow. A file of special importance is the journal of I. I. Kropotov, who was the plenipotentiary of the Russian side (Catalogue no. 62/1, 1768, file 2). Besides this, there are also a document file that includes the instructions to Kropotov (62/2, 1762-1769, 8) and the original letters sent to Kropotov by the Qing representatives during the negotiations (62/2, 1768, 17). As for the Qing side, we can find a considerable number of documents in the *Lufu zouzhe* 錄副奏摺 (Copied Palace Memorials) in the *Junjichu* 軍機處 (Council of State) group held at the First Historical Archives of China (中國第一歷史檔案館) in Beijing. The *Eluosi dang* 俄羅斯檔 (Archives on Russia, catalogue no. 193/3-47-2) in the same group also includes many copies of official letters between both sides from that period.²⁾ Furthermore, the National Central Archives (*Ündüsün-ü töb arkiw*, abbreviated to ÜTA below) in Ulan-bator, Mongolia, hold documents of the office of the Administrative Ministers of Küriy-e (庫倫辦事大臣, group M-1), which include correspondence of the Qing representatives with various offices (Catalogue no. 1/vol. 2, file 2931),³⁾ a document file with copies of letters between the Qing representatives and the Russian delegation (1/1, 265), and another file with copies of memorials and imperial edicts of that period (1/1, 267). Generally speaking, archival materials concerning the Addendum are in such a good state that we can reconstruct the process of the negotiations from the points of view of both sides.

It should be noted that when dates of the lunar and Western calendars are written together in the present paper, the lunar date is given first with the Western date added in parentheses according to the Julian cal-

endar, which was in use in Russia at the time. If the dates found in the historical records of both sides do not tally with each other, the date recorded by the Qing side is adopted for convenience with a question mark.

1. Tension in Sino-Russian Relations from the Second Half of the 1750s

Origins: Amursanay-a

Sino-Russian relations, which had remained comparatively peaceful after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, suddenly became strained late in the 1750s. The transformation of the political order in the eastern part of Inner Asia caused by the Qing’s conquest of the J̄egün-γar was behind this change. The main matter of contention between the two countries was how to treat Amursanay-a, a J̄egün-γar chief who had previously surrendered to the Qing but had later rebelled and fled.⁴⁾ In an official letter sent to the Russian Senate in the fourth month of Qianlong 乾隆 22 (1757), the Lifanyuan 理藩院 (Court of Colonial Affairs) requested that Amursanay-a be repatriated in the event that he entered Russia. But the Senate answered that there was no reason to send him back because the J̄egün-γar people had never been under Qing rule before the recent conquest, although Russia was ready to take an irregular measure for the sake of friendship between the two countries.⁵⁾ It is said that the emperor Qianlong was enraged by this answer.⁶⁾ At about that very same time, Amursanay-a actually appeared near Semipalatinsk and asked for Russian protection in July 1757. The local government transferred him to Tobol’sk, but soon after he died there of illness. The Russian side informed the Qing side of this news, and stated that they would allow Qing representatives to examine his body on the border. Although the inquest was carried out the following year, the Qing side obstinately continued to require delivery of the body itself and the repatriation of other J̄egün-γar chiefs who had fled into Russia.

Around this time, Russia dispatched V. F. Bratishchev to China. His mission was not directly connected with the problem of Amursanay-a, but was to ask the Qing government to dispatch an envoy to Russia and to allow Russian ships to navigate the Amur River. He arrived in Beijing in August 1757 and presented an official letter from the Senate to the Lifanyuan. But Qianlong was displeased at the Russian request regarding navigation along the Amur. Moreover, the above-mentioned reply from

the Senate regarding Amursanaγ-a was delivered by another channel during Bratishchev's sojourn in Beijing. Consequently, the Qing government rejected all the Russian proposals.⁷⁾

Border and Trade Problems

At the same time, other issues concerning the border and the Kiakhta trade came to the surface as if in response to the problem regarding Amursanaγ-a. They had various elements when considered in detail, but the main issues can be summarized as follows.

The first was the problem of the border stakes (R. *nadolba*, Ma. *hashan*) installed by the Russians on the east and west sides of Kiakhta in 1747 for the purpose of preventing people from crossing the border for theft or plunder. The Qing side insisted that these stakes enclosed land that ought to belong to the Qing and cut off the patrol routes (Ma. *kaici jugūn*) of guards on both sides of Kiakhta.

The second was the problem of customs duties imposed at Kiakhta. The Russian government had imposed duties on its own merchants who were engaged in trade at Kiakhta. The Qing side pointed out that the Kiakhta trade should be duty-free according to the Treaty of Kiakhta and claimed that Chinese merchants were suffering great losses because Russian merchants added the amount of the customs duties to the prices of their goods.

The third problem was how to settle cases of theft and plunder which occurred frequently at the time. Although each side often demanded rigorous investigations and compensation from the other side, most cases ended without any settlement being reached.⁸⁾

In order to discuss these problems, V. Iakobi, the commandant of Selenginsk, held three conferences with the ministers of Yeke Kūriy-e (庫倫, called Urga by the Russians) in December 1756, June-July 1759 and May-June 1762, but they ended without any result because both sides stuck to their own position. In response to these fruitless conferences, the Lifanyuan sent an official letter to the Senate (dated the eighth day of the sixth month of Qianlong 27) in which it strongly demanded the removal of the stakes and the abolition of customs duties at Kiakhta, as well as hinting that trade would be banned if the Russian side continued to impose customs duties.⁹⁾

Kropotov's First Mission

As relations with the Qing became increasingly strained, Russia dis-

patched Kropotov, a lieutenant of the Imperial-Guards, to Beijing in 1762.¹⁰⁾ Besides delivering an official letter from the Senate which advised of Catherine II's accession to the throne, he was also ordered to convey orally that Russia was preparing to dispatch an envoy of a higher level and to request the Qing side to send a similar envoy to Russia. He entered the territory of the Qing empire on 30 April 1763, and then after a brief meeting with Qianlong, who was on his way to the Summer Palace at Rehe 熱河, went to Beijing. But there the delegation was placed under strict surveillance and could hardly trade the goods brought from Russia. According to information which Kropotov acquired from Jesuits, the Qing side was taking this attitude because Qianlong had been angered by the term “Her Imperial Majesty” (*eia imperatorskoe velichestvo*) for the Russian empress contained in another letter from the Senate delivered just before his arrival in Beijing. Previously this term had been translated rather vaguely, but this time a literal translation had come to the emperor's notice. Kropotov left Beijing on 12 August without receiving a reply to the Senate's letter presented by him, and it was sent separately. In the reply (dated the thirteenth day of the sixth month of Qianlong 28) the Qing government blamed Iakobi for his inflexible attitude at the recent conferences, reiterated its view on the stakes and customs duties, and expressed a negative stance regarding the dispatch of a mission to Russia.¹¹⁾

Cessation of the Kiakhta Trade

The following year, the Qing government took a more decisive step, namely, banning trade at Kiakhta and withdrawing all merchants. According to a report by Iakobi to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, it was in April 1764 that merchants actually left Kiakhta, although signs of this had been observed since the previous year.¹²⁾ The government of Kūriy-e explained in a letter to Iakobi (dated the third day of the fourth month of Qianlong 29) that trade had been terminated because Chinese merchants had been suffering great losses on account of Russian customs duties.¹³⁾ Soon afterwards the Lifanyuan sent a long letter (dated the eighteenth day of the sixth month of Qianlong 29) to the Senate, which was sent in response to the Senate's reply to the above-mentioned letter of the sixth month of Qianlong 28.¹⁴⁾ In this new letter, the Qing side, besides refuting the Russian views on the stakes, customs duties and other issues, reacted strongly to the statement that “the territory of our empire occupies almost half of the earth” included in the letter from the Senate,

and retorted by asking, “How can the Russian empress be compared with His Holy Majesty?” On receiving this letter, the Senate, appalled at the impoliteness of its wording, decided not to reply. The following year, the Lifanyuan sent another letter (dated the twenty-second day of the seventh month of Qianlong 30), but the Russians again did not reply.¹⁵⁾

In 1767, another problem occurred on the border. A cossack hunting near the border was arrested by Mongolian guards, and soon after the Russian side retaliated by kidnapping two guards. Then the Qing side, in its turn, took a countermeasure by attacking the Ulukhun watch-post (R. *Ulukhunskii karaul*, Ma. *ulhūn karun*) and kidnapping twelve soldiers. Each side blamed the other, saying that the other side should assume full responsibility for the affair, and demanded the return of those who had been kidnapped.¹⁶⁾

Notwithstanding this course of events, the Qing side never completely abandoned its hopes of an improvement of relations with Russia. For example, Čenggünjab, the left vice-general for pacifying frontiers (定邊左副將軍), submitted a memorial to the emperor at the end of Qianlong 32 which contained the following paragraph:

Now our Uriyanghais and Mongols, living in the vicinity of the Russians, need Russian felt and cowhide. Although we, your slaves, strictly prohibit them from trading, it would affect our reputation if some day in the future ignorant people were to carry out contraband trade. Therefore, I wish Your Holy Majesty to consider taking the opportunity to restore friendship [with Russia] as before next time the Russians make a request for something, according to your principle of treating people with mercy without discriminating between natives and foreigners.¹⁷⁾

In other words, Čenggünjab wished Qianlong to reopen trade next time the Russian side made some approach. In response, Qianlong gave a vermilion endorsement as follows: “Of course! I am simply waiting for the opportunity.” The cessation of trade, which had formerly been used as a means of pressuring Russia at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, was again used as a trump card for urging Russia to take some action.

2. The Negotiations Leading to the Conclusion of the Addendum

Kropotov’s Mission

It was on 31 January 1767 that the instructions ordering Kropotov, who had returned from Beijing, to set out again for negotiations as a plenipotentiary commissioner were signed by Catherine II.¹⁸⁾ These instructions, which consist of a preface and twenty items, clearly show the basic attitude of Russia towards the negotiations. In short, they allowed Kropotov to reach a compromise with the Qing side about all pending issues. As regards the stakes on the border, the second item says that even though the stakes do not occupy Chinese territory, so long as Russia suffers no substantial loss by their removal, he may meet the requirements of the Qing side. Concerning theft and plunder, the third item allows him to accept the Qing proposal for forgetting all past cases, though the Qing side would have to pay far more compensation than the Russian side if the amount were calculated accurately. As for customs duties at Kiakhta, the seventh through to the eleventh items say that the custom-house should be removed out of sight of the Qing side though it is impossible to stop the imposition itself.

In exchange for these concessions, Kropotov had to try to gain the resumption of the Kiakhta trade above all else (item 6). It is said that the amount of trade at Kiakhta (sum total of exports and imports) was 1,358,000 rubles in 1760, which corresponded to 7.3% of the total trade of all Russia.¹⁹⁾ Thus, the termination of the Kiakhta trade had been such an enormous blow for Russia that she had to recover it at any cost.

After sending a letter to Kūriy-e and offering to enter into negotiations on 9 May 1768, Kropotov arrived at Kiakhta on 12 June and started conducting a land survey and collecting information.²⁰⁾ Thus, “the opportunity” for which Qianlong had been waiting finally arrived. It is also worth noting that A. L. Leont’ev, who had studied Manchu and Chinese in Beijing from 1743 to 1755 and had gained a position in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs after returning home, joined the delegation as a secretary.

The First Stage of the Negotiations

Hearing of Kropotov’s arrival, Qianlong issued two edicts on the twenty-seventh day of the fourth month (31 May), which ordered staff of the Kūriy-e government to go to Kiakhta immediately for discussions. In accordance with these instructions, they sent a letter to Kropotov and

stated their readiness for negotiations. The representatives of the Qing side who left for Kiakhta were Hüturingga, a *beise* prince of the Qaračin and a supernumerary vice-minister of the Lifanyuan (喀喇沁固山貝子·理藩院額外侍郎), Kinggui, a vice-minister of the Lifanyuan (理藩院侍郎) and a Manchu bannerman, Čedendorĵi, the Tüsiy-e-tü Qan and a vice-general of Qalq-a (土謝圖汗·喀爾喀副將軍), and Sandubdorĵi, the vice-head of the Tüsiy-e-tü Qan's League (土謝圖汗部副盟長).²¹ They arrived at Kiakhta on the sixth day of the sixth month (8 July).

One of the two above-mentioned edicts dated the twenty-seventh day of the fourth month can be regarded as detailed instructions on how the representatives ought to behave during the negotiations. According to these instructions, the representatives had to insist on the removal of the stakes, the termination of customs duties at Kiakhta, and the forgetting of past cases of theft and plunder, as the Qing side had consistently advocated. They were also instructed to state that they would petition the emperor for reopening trade after the removal of the stakes and other steps had been carried out. The most noteworthy passage, found in the final section of the edict, was: "In general, Hüturingga and his colleagues must drive the commissioner [Kropotov] into a corner by arguing logically at discussions with him. Never concede, never waver at all."²²

The first conference between both sides was held on the tenth day of the sixth month (12 July). Then in the following three conferences held on the twelfth (14 July), thirteenth (15) and fifteenth (17) (?) and in documents exchanged in between, the Qing side presented three demands in accordance with the above instructions. Kropotov stated that he was ready to accept these demands on the condition that both sides went together to survey the present stakes and established a detailed procedure for dealing with future cases of theft and plunder, and he asked for the resumption of trade in return. At the same time, the Russian side demanded the release of the staff of Ulukhun watch-post, who were being held by the Qing. But the Qing representatives insisted that punishment of the head of the watch-post, who had been responsible for kidnapping the Qing guards, was a precondition for doing so. The next conference was held on the twenty-third day of the sixth month (25 July), and the people concerned were interrogated. As a result, Kropotov agreed to punish the head of the watch-post, who was whipped on the twenty-fifth day (27 July) (?). The Qing side then released the twelve captive Russian guards in return.²³

At about the same time, Kropotov sent a document in which, sum-

marizing the content of the negotiations up until then, he listed three demands on the Qing side and thirteen demands on the Russian side.²⁴⁾ The thirteen demands of the Russian side, besides the resumption of trade and establishment of regulations about theft and plunder, also included other matters concerning Russian caravans to Beijing, Russians staying in Beijing, the use of more polite language in correspondence, the repatriation of former Russian deserters now living in China, and so on. Subsequently, the Russian side began removing the border stakes to the west of Kiakhta on the twenty-seventh day of the sixth month (29 July). After having ascertained this, Hüturingga and the other representatives submitted a memorial to the emperor, asking him to make a decision on the thirteen Russian demands.²⁵⁾ Reading the memorial, Qianlong seems to have recognized that the negotiations had essentially been brought to a conclusion. Accordingly, he on the one hand ordered the Lifanyuan to discuss the thirteen demands, and on the other he issued an edict to Hüturingga and his colleagues on the seventh day of the seventh month, in which he said that the thirteen items were now under discussion and a positive conclusion would probably be reached.²⁶⁾ Soon after, in anticipation of a conclusion to the negotiations, Yinglian 英廉, a minister of the Imperial Household Department (内務府大臣) submitted a memorial about the dispatch of a caravan, which included Muslim merchants, to Kiakhta.²⁷⁾

However, before the submission of Yinglian’s memorial, the Lifanyuan had already reported to the emperor on the twelfth day of the seventh month that the thirteen items included some matters that were difficult to accept. Namely, the fourth item, in which the Russian side requested permission for Russian caravans to trade their goods freely in towns en route to Beijing, the ninth item, concerning the usage of the term “*imperatritsa*” for the Russian empress, and the twelfth item, concerning the repatriation of former Russian deserters, had to be categorically refused. Qianlong then issued another edict on the same day, in which he ordered his representatives to make sure whether Kropotov would accept the rejection of these three items and not to reopen trade until his answer had been received.²⁸⁾

Drafts of the Addendum

Meanwhile, in Kiakhta the removal of the stakes had been completed by the sixteenth day of the seventh month (16 August). On the twenty-fifth day, the Qing representatives sent a copy of the Lifanyuan’s re-

port to Kropotov and inquired whether he would accept it. We may assume that negotiations now entered their second stage. During this stage, because Kropotov had fallen ill, mutual communication took place in the form of comings and goings by Leont'ev and secretaries on the Qing side as well as through the exchange of documents. In the course of these negotiations, the Russians, while stating that they would accept the Lifanyuan's report without attaching any conditions, prepared and sent to the Qing side a draft of an addendum to the Kiakhta treaty, which included regulations about theft and plunder. As a result of repeated negotiations about revisions to the draft, both sides reached an agreement in principle on the fourteenth day of the eighth month (13 September).²⁹⁾ Then Hüturingga and his colleagues submitted the draft to the emperor for ratification. Qianlong gave his sanction on the twenty-fourth to confirm the text of the addendum according to the given draft and to exchange documents.³⁰⁾ Negotiations then entered their final stage, with only the confirmation of the text and format remaining.

Having been informed by a memorial from Hüturingga and his colleagues dated the fourth day of the eighth month that the Russian side was ready to accept the Lifanyuan's report, Qianlong issued an edict on the twelfth day in which he sanctioned the reopening of the Kiakhta trade. In a subsequent edict dated the seventeenth, he ordered his representatives to oversee merchants strictly so that they would not compete for Russian goods and raise their prices in the reopened market of Kiakhta.³¹⁾ Qianlong had already decided that negotiations would be concluded and trade reopened.

The Final Dispute and Its Settlement

However, a fresh dispute broke out in this final stage. Having received the above edict of the twenty-fourth day of the eighth month, the Qing representatives prepared final drafts in Manchu and Mongolian and sent them to Kropotov on the fourth day of the ninth month (3 October) with the request that a similar draft be prepared on the Russian side. In reply, Leont'ev brought a draft on the eighth day (7), but it differed in a few points from those of the Qing side. Firstly, in the introduction the names and titles of the Russian representatives were written before those of the Qing side. Secondly, honorific terms such as "*dulimbai gurun*" (Central State) and "*Kiyan cing men*" (< *Qianqingmen* 乾清門) were not raised above the line. Accordingly, the Qing representatives sent a letter to Kropotov on the eleventh day (10) and demanded of him in a

quite forceful manner that these points be corrected, threatening to abandon the negotiations and leave Kiakhtha if he did not meet these requirements.³²⁾

Although archival documents on each side describe in slightly different terms the subsequent series of negotiations,³³⁾ it can at any rate be ascertained that a new draft sent by the Russian side to the Qing side on the eighteenth day of the ninth month (17 October) finally gained the approval of the latter, and both sides agreed to exchange texts on the following day. On the nineteenth day (18), the texts, signed and sealed by representatives of both sides, were exchanged at an intermediate point on the border. The Qing side handed over texts in Manchu and Mongolian, while the Russian side handed over texts in Manchu and Russian. Since Kropotov himself was not able to attend the meeting on account of illness, the Qing representatives also did not attend in person, and the exchange of documents was performed by Solin, the vice-director of the Lifanyuan (理藩院員外郎), and others from the Qing side and by Major S. Vlasov with Leont'ev from the Russian side.³⁴⁾

The exchanged “Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhtha” consists of two parts, an introduction and the text. The introduction, after mentioning the removal of the border stakes, the cessation of customs duties at Kiakhtha and Tsurukhaitu, as well as the forgetting of past cases of border crossings, says that the tenth article of the Treaty of Kiakhtha is to be replaced by a new one. This is followed by the new text of the tenth article, which provides for procedures and the assessment of penalties in cases of border crossings, classifying them into armed robbery, theft without the use of arms, simply losing one's way, and so forth.

After the exchange of the Addendum, Kropotov sent two reports dated 27 October to Catherine II and the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, as well as occupying himself with remaining business until his death through illness in March 1769.³⁵⁾ Hüturingga and his colleagues sent the exchanged Addendum to Beijing on the twentieth day of the ninth month (19 October) with a memorial that included a draft of internal rules for trade in two provisions made out according to an imperial edict of the seventeenth day of the eighth month, asking for the emperor's sanction for both.³⁶⁾ Soon afterwards merchants from the Qing side began to arrive at Kiakhtha one after another in response to the reopening of trade, but it was only in the fourth month of the following year that trade was resumed on a large scale.³⁷⁾ In this way, a provisional end was put to the confusion in relations between the two countries, which had lasted

for more than ten years.

3. Some Features of Contemporary Sino-Russian Relations to Be Observed in the Negotiation Process

The Strong Stance of the Qing Side

What leaves a stronger impression than anything else in the process of the negotiations is the high-handed attitude of the Qing side. At the very start of the negotiations, in his edict to his own representatives the emperor Qianlong said that they should not make any concessions and were to abandon talks immediately if the Russians attempted the slightest deceit. This stance was basically maintained to the very end. For instance, on the occasion of the dispute over the raising of certain terms above the line, which occurred in the final stage of the negotiations, Qianlong, seeing a passage in Hüturingga's memorial which described how he and his colleagues had torn up and thrown away a draft of the Addendum brought by the Russian side, added the vermilion endorsement "So it should be!" The representatives, in response to such an attitude on the part of Qianlong, basically maintained a hard-line stance and often intimidated the Russian side, saying that negotiations would be terminated immediately if they did not accept the demands of the Qing side. For example, in a letter about the problem regarding wording, which was sent to Kropotov on the eleventh day of the ninth month (10 October), they wrote:

Formerly the Russian general [Iakobi] had several meetings with us, the ministers, and discussed many matters, but was unable to reach any conclusion because he was not only old and senile, but also had little good sense. Since this time you, the commissioner [Kropotov], had agreed to our proposals, we regarded you as a person of wisdom capable of achieving your own objectives. That is the reason why we have stayed here for a long time and had many meetings with you to deal with problems. To our surprise, now when talks are approaching the goal, you, the commissioner, suddenly rewrote at your own discretion the text that both sides had already checked and decided on.... We will leave for home this evening or tomorrow and report all this to His Holy Majesty. We will not only cancel the opening of trade at Kiakhta and Tsurukhaitu, but also cancel the permission for trade in the capital next year, which you requested and the Court

[Lifanyuan] discussed, and was confirmed by His Majesty.³⁸⁾

An official letter from the Lifanyuan to the Senate (dated the eighteenth day of the fifth month of Yongzheng 雍正7), carried by the Qing’s first mission to Russia, had contained the following passage: “According to our Chinese custom, if envoys are sent abroad, letters [from His Majesty] carried by them must include the phrase ‘issued an imperial edict.’ Since our country and Russia are equals, it is not appropriate to ‘issue an edict’ to you. Accordingly, this time we are only dispatching envoys without any [imperial] letter.”³⁹⁾ In this passage, which expresses maximum consideration for the position of Russia, we can see an effort on the part of the Qing to reconcile its self-identification as “the dynasty of heaven” with the realities of diplomatic relations with Russia based on equality. The fact that the two missions to Russia performed the ritual “kneeling once and bowing to the ground three times” (一跪三叩頭) in front of the Russian empress (Anna Ioannovna)⁴⁰⁾ is also an expression of the Qing’s diplomatic attitude of that period. In contrast, we can detect an apparent radicalization in the attitude of the Qing side towards Kropotov, and Nomiyama Atsushi once pointed out that the fact that most Chinese historical records make no reference to missions dispatched to Russia in the Yongzheng period can be explained by the increasing rigidity of the Qing’s diplomatic stance during the Qianlong era.⁴¹⁾

However, it is not necessarily proper to regard the stance of the Qing side in this period as simple fundamentalism. First of all, it is evident from Qianlong’s comment added to Čenggünjab’s memorial quoted in the first section of the present article that the Qing side had a clear intention to find an opportunity to improve relations with Russia. After the start of negotiations, as we have already seen, the Lifanyuan submitted a report that proposed sanctioning most of Kropotov’s requests, and Qianlong himself also gave an official order to reopen trade before the text of the Addendum had been verified and exchanged. In short, even though the Qing side assumed an extremely hard-line stance, they had no intention of breaking off negotiations. There remained some room for compromise.

Such flexibility was expressed quite clearly on the occasion of the exchange of the texts of the Addendum. After some dispute about the treatment of some terms, as mentioned above, the Qing side was at last satisfied with the draft sent by Kropotov on the eighteenth day of the ninth

month (17 October), and both sides agreed to exchange official texts on the next day. However, Kropotov writes in his journal that his draft was not completely identical to that which the Qing side had previously shown him as a model. That is to say, he made the following corrections to the model sent by the Qing side:

- 1) While the Qing side wrote in their own draft the term “His Great Holy Majesty” (*velikii sviashchennyi gosudar*) raised above the line, Kropotov corrected it to “His Huangdi Majesty” (*gosudar' khuandii*), also raised above the line.
- 2) While in the Qing’s draft the term “the empress” (*katun khan*) was not raised above the line, he corrected it to “Her Imperial Majesty” (*gosudarynia imperatritsa*) raised above the line.
- 3) Whereas in the Qing’s draft only the term “Central State” (*Sredinnoe gosudarstvo*) was raised above the line but “Russian State” (*Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*) was not, he raised “Russian State” as well.

On receiving Kropotov’s draft, the Qing representatives “said, looking at the term ‘Russian State’ raised above the line,... ‘We shall not dispute it. You may write the two states as being equal in this way.’”⁴²⁾

Such an attitude can be confirmed, at least partially, in some records of the Qing side. For instance, a memorial (anonymous, date unknown) which reports the results of a check of the texts of the exchanged Addendum says:

The document handed over by the commissioner this time is written in Manchu and Russian.... In the Manchu text, words such as “*amba ejen*” (Great Monarch), “*dulimbai gurun*,” “*gocika*” (aide-de-camp) and “*kiyan qing men*” are raised above the line, and their “*katun han*” and “*Oros gurun*” (Russian state) are raised too. In the sealed document which Hüturingga and others handed to the commissioner only the words of our side that need to be raised were raised, and words such as “*katun han*,” etc., were not raised.⁴³⁾

According to this account, we can ascertain that the Qing side received without any reservations the text in which words such as “Russian state” had been raised. They seem to have taken a flexible stance such that they would not interfere in the writing style of the Russian side so long as the text handed to the Russian side was written according to their

own formula.⁴⁴⁾

Such flexibility blended with a high-handed attitude can also be seen, for instance, in their treatment of G. Macartney, the famous British envoy who arrived in China in 1793. In his case, although initially the Qing side obstinately demanded that he performed the ritual "kneeling three times and bowing to the ground nine times" in front of the emperor Qianlong, at the last moment it conceded the point. In the subsequent Jiaqing 嘉慶 era, Iu. A. Golovkin, the Russian ambassador who had arrived at Kūriy-e in January 1806, was asked to rehearse kneeling and bowing there, and was not allowed to set out for Beijing as a result of his refusal to do so.⁴⁵⁾ It is also well-known that Earl Amherst, the second British envoy who visited Beijing in 1816, was obliged to return home without an audience with Jiaqing because of disagreement regarding this ritual. Of course, each case had its own context, but, generally speaking, we find a certain realism in the diplomatic attitude of the Qianlong court in comparison with the more rigid stance of the Jiaqing era.

Disparities in the Ability to Collect and Analyze Information

In contrast to its overbearing stance in the negotiations, the Qing side was much less capable than the Russian side with respect to the collection and analysis of information, which would serve as the basis of any decision-making. There is no evidence to indicate that the Qing representatives made any active attempts to collect inside information about their rival. At least we cannot find a single trace of any such efforts in their memorials, and Qianlong also did not give any such orders in his edicts. Their intimidation was, to put it in extreme terms, little more than guesswork that was not supported by an analysis of available information.

The situation on the Russian side presents a striking contrast. For instance, Kropotov often secretly acquired copies of inside documents of the Qing side. These documents, according to his journal, were bought by a Russian merchant from an old friend, a Mongolian junior official. Just from what is mentioned in his journal, we learn that the imperial edict dated the twelfth day of the seventh month about the Lifanyuan's deliberations about the thirteenth items presented by the Russian side, the two memorials dated the sixteenth day of the eighth month about the preparation of drafts of the Addendum, and the edict issued on the twenty-fourth day of the eighth month (incorrectly dated the fourth day of the eighth month in his journal) in response to the last memorials, etc., came

into his possession. Having a certain understanding of the Qing's internal affairs from these sources, Kropotov could to some extent predict the next moves of his rivals in the course of the negotiations. There is no indication that the Qing side was aware of these leaks. Moreover, even the Tüsiy-e-tü Qan Čedendorġi, one of the Qing representatives, leaked some information to the Russian side. According to Kropotov, the Tüsiy-e-tü Qan made secret contact with him immediately after the first meeting and "became a good friend of mine through frequent correspondence and exchange of gifts." Later, on the fifteenth day of the ninth month, in the midst of the dispute about wording, the Tüsiy-e-tü Qan dispatched a subordinate to Kropotov and informed him that there was some division of opinion among the representatives concerning the draft handed over by the Russian side, namely, that he himself, Hüturingga and Sandubdorġi were somewhat sympathetic to Russia, while Kinggui maintained an opposing stance.⁴⁶⁾ Although such dissension among the representatives is not supported by Chinese sources, it would seem quite natural that Hüturingga, who was from Inner Mongolia, and the two from Qalq-a (Outer Mongolia) should be rather compromising, while Kinggui, who belonged to a Manchu banner, should take a firm line.

Russian superiority in collecting and analyzing information was not a short-term phenomenon. S. L. Vladislavich, the Russian plenipotentiary on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, in response to secret instructions from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, wrote a voluminous report entitled "A secret report about the military power and general conditions of China" in addition to the official report on his mission.⁴⁷⁾ Clergymen and students staying in Beijing were also important sources of information. It is quite well-known that I. K. Rossokhin (who returned to Russia in 1741) and Leont'ev, who had studied in Beijing for more than ten years, translated not only diplomatic documents but also many works mainly from Manchu. Making use of such various kinds of information, the Russians had improved the accuracy of their analyses of the Qing's political conditions and national power.⁴⁸⁾ Consequently, they began to take a great many options into consideration when facing diplomatic problems. For instance, when some Qalq-a princes wished to immigrate to Russia in 1756-1757, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs ordered the local authorities to accept them, risking a violation of the treaty, if they crossed the border en masse.⁴⁹⁾ In 1763, the Academician G. F. Miller, a famous historian, wrote a detailed report about the strategy that should be adopted if "the Russian side cannot put up with repeated insults by

Chinese and tries to retaliate by force.”⁵⁰⁾

Of course, the ability to collect and analyze information was closely linked to the linguistic environment on each side. Since the first contacts between the two countries in the seventeenth century, the languages that had supported mutual communication had been mainly Mongolian and Latin. Later, from about 1683 (Kangxi 康熙 22), the Qing side began to attach Russian translations to official letters dispatched to Russia, which were translated by prisoners of war from Amur and their descendants. In 1708 (Kangxi 47), the Qing government established a Russian language school called *Ehuosi Wenguan* 俄羅斯文館 under the Grand Secretariat (*Neige* 內閣)⁵¹⁾ in order to train their own translators to work on the diplomatic front. However, this proved to be no easy matter. A. Zholobov, the vice-governor of Irkutsk, reported to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs in 1731 that he had received an official letter from the Lifanyuan written in three languages, Manchu, Latin and Russian, but the Russian text was incomprehensible and he had had to translate the Latin text into Russian.⁵²⁾ The fact that official letters from the Qing of that period found in the document files of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, which are now held at the archives in Moscow, usually have Russian translations from Latin in addition to the original Russian texts shows the indispensability of Latin as a tool of communication. But in the document files after 1742, the year following Rossokhin’s return home, we can find Russian texts translated directly from Manchu. Thereafter, some of the students who had studied Manchu in Beijing, such as Leont’ev, began to work in central or local government,⁵³⁾ and consequently the role of Manchu in bilateral communications rapidly increased. The negotiations in 1768 were performed under such conditions, and so communication at meetings as well as correspondence was conducted mostly in Manchu through Leont’ev. On the occasion of the exchanging of the texts of the Addendum, as mentioned above, the Russian side prepared Russian and Manchu versions, while the Qing side prepared Manchu and Mongolian versions, and so it was only the Manchu texts that Leont’ev and the Qing representatives collated on the day before the final exchange. We can therefore regard the Manchu texts as the official texts, though the texts themselves make no reference to the priority of any language. When one considers that this increasing importance of Manchu as a means of communication was brought about by the one-sided advances on the Russian side in knowledge of this language, the importance of Manchu was inseparable from Russian superiority in the collection and analysis of informa-

tion.⁵⁴⁾

Conclusion and Remaining Problems

In the preceding sections we have considered the following points. 1) The Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhtha in 1768 was to all appearances concluded as a result of Russian concessions to the Qing side, which maintained an overbearing attitude. 2) In contrast to such appearances, Russia enjoyed overwhelming superiority in its ability to collect and analyze information, which served as the basis of diplomatic decision-making. 3) This situation reflected the general character of contemporary Sino-Russian relations. This has been described by Yoshida Kin'ichi as "China's pretense of superiority," which, according to him, would begin to collapse with the conclusion of the Tianjin Treaty in 1858,⁵⁵⁾ and it can already be detected at this point in time.

But it is also true that some factors preventing this "pretense of superiority" from immediate collapse still existed at this time. The most fundamental element was probably that Russia had to maintain a policy of compromise towards the East because she was engaged in struggles with Turkey and in Western affairs. In addition, as discussed above, we cannot overlook the fact that the Qing's diplomacy in the Qianlong era was still informed with a certain flexible realism. It was precisely because these factors preserved a delicate balance that the two countries were able to maintain the "Kiakhtha Treaty system," going back to 1728, for another ninety years by revising it in accordance with prevailing circumstances.

While the above is the main conclusion of the present article, it seems worthwhile now to refer to some additional issues detected in the historical materials concerning the Addendum, even though they are not closely connected to its contents.

The first is the question of the new framework of trade at Kiakhtha introduced together with the Addendum. As mentioned in the second section of this article, the Qing side established an internal regulation with two provisions, the main point of which was to introduce a kind of price cartel. Although some scholars state on the basis of a reference found in volume 37 of the *Shuofang beisheng* 朔方備乘 that this regulation was established in Qianlong 24 (1759),⁵⁶⁾ there seems plenty of scope for further examination of this question. Moreover, since market control by means of a price cartel reminds us of the role of patent companies in

Guangdong 廣東, we can regard this regulation as valuable material for the comparative study of the so-called Guangdong system and the Kiakhta trade.

The second is the question of the position of Qalq-a princes at this time. The above-mentioned secret links between Čedendorji and the Russian side are not likely to have been a simple individual deviation, but seem to have been caused by the same undercurrent that had led some Qalq-a princes to make approaches to Russia in 1756–57. It would seem to be of some significance to undertake a more detailed investigation into the temporal and spatial extent of this undercurrent in order to cast new light on the position of Mongols placed on the border between two vast empires. I hope to take up this issue, together with the first, sometime in the future.

Notes

- 1) O. A. Glushkova, “Pozitsiia rossiiskogo pravitel’stva v otnoshenii tsinskogo Kitaia v 60-kh g. XVIII v. (Peregovory I. I. Kropotova v Kiakhte v 1768 g.),” *XV nauchnaia konferentsiia «Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v Kitae»*, part. 2 (Moskva, 1984), 188–194 is to the best of my knowledge about the only such study, and it mainly analyzes the basic position of the Russian government at the time.
- 2) For an outline of the *Eluosi dang* in the *Junjichu* group, see Yanagisawa Akira 柳澤明, “Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōankan shozō no Roshia kankei manbun tōan ni tsuite” 中國第一歷史檔案館所藏のロシア關係滿文檔案について (Manchu archival materials concerning Russia held at the First Historical Archives of China), *Manzokushi kenkyū tsūshin* 滿族史研究通信 (*Journal of Manchu and Qing Studies*) 10 (2001), 38–57.
- 3) This is a group of documents which are not bound. Many of them are copies, while some are the original letters received at Kūriy-e.
- 4) On negotiations between the two countries concerning Amursanaγ-a, see Morikawa Tetsuo 森川哲雄, “Amurusana wo meguru Ro-Shin kōshō shimatsu” アムルサナをめぐる露清交渉始末 (Sino-Russian relation on the problem of “Amursana”), *Rekishigaku-chirigaku nenpō* 歴史學・地理學年報 (*Annals of Historical and Geographical Studies*, College of General Education, Kyushu University) 7 (1983), 75–105.
- 5) The facsimile text of this letter is published in *Gugong Ewen shiliao: Qing Kang-Qian jian Eguo laiwen yuandang* 故宮俄文史料：清康乾間俄國來文原檔 (Documents in Russian preserved in the National Palace Museum of Pei-p’ing: The K’ang-hsi–Ch’ien-lung period) (Beiping, 1936), 107–120. The transcribed text is found on 177–188.
- 6) V. F. Bratishchev, who was staying in Beijing at the time, heard about this from Russian clergymen living there. See also the following note.

- 7) N. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del mezhdru Rossiiskim i Kitaiskim gosudarstvami s 1629 po 1792-i god* (Kazan', 1882), 276-279; G. I. Sarkisova, "V. F. Bratishchev i ego missiia v Pekine v 1757 g.," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1993: no. 3, 135-147.
- 8) There are so many documents on these problems that it is difficult to mention them singly. An overview is given by Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 291-298.
- 9) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 272-273, 291-292, 311-313.
- 10) On Kropotov's mission, see G. I. Sarkisova, "Missiia Rossiiskogo kur'era I. I. Kropotova v Pekin v 1762-1763 gg. (arkhivnye materialy)," *Vostok-Rossia-Zapad: Istoricheskie i kul'turologicheskie issledovaniia* (Moskva, 2001), 94-111.
- 11) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 316-317.
- 12) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 317; Sychevskii (Soobshchaet V. N. Basnin), *Istoricheskaia zapiska o Kitaiskoi granitse* (Moskva, 1875), 258-260.
- 13) AVPRI, 62/2, 1762-1765, 7, leaf 302-302r. This Russian text has been translated from Mongolian.
- 14) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 318-319. A copy of the Manchu text is found in the *Eluosi dang*, file 1619: 5, 1-36. The originals in Russian and Latin as well as Russian translations from Manchu and Latin are found in AVPRI, 62/2, 1762-1765, 7, but the Manchu original is missing.
- 15) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 322-323; *Eluosi dang*, 1619: 5, 89-98. In addition, in this same year Sanj'ayidorji, the Vice-General of Qalq-a, and his associates were punished for contraband trade with Russians. However, this affair does not seem to have had any great effect on further negotiations between the two countries. See Oka Hiroki 岡洋樹, "Kenryū sanjūnen no Sanzaidoruji ra ni yoru tai Roshia mitsubōeki jiken ni tsuite" 乾隆三〇年のサンザイドルジ等による對ロシア密貿易事件について (On an incident involving contraband trade with Russia by Sangj'ayidorji and others in Qianlong 30), in Ishibashi Hideo 石橋秀雄, ed., *Shindai Chūgoku no shomondai* 清代中國の諸問題 (Various problems concerning China under the Qing) (Tokyo, 1995), 365-382.
- 16) The authorities on both sides held a meeting near Kiakhta to discuss this affair in April 1768, but it ended without result. See Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 325.
- 17) *Lufu zouzhe*, file 2251, no. 52, dated the 4th day of the 12th month of Qianlong 32. The vermilion endorsement was given on the 15th day of the same month.
- 18) AVPRI, 62/2, 1762-1769, 8, 164-186. The text of the instructions is also found in Sychevskii (1875), 260-271. Kropotov was given the rank of colonel before departing on the mission.
- 19) M. I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.)* (Moskva, 1974), 154.
- 20) AVPRI, 62/1, 1768, 2 (hereafter referred to as *Journal of Kropotov*), 3-32r.
- 21) Hūtingga and Kinggui were the so-called Administrative Ministers of Kūriy-e (庫倫辦事大臣). The former was dispatched to Kūriy-e for the pur-

- pose of investigating contraband trade in Qianlong 30 and remained there to manage local affairs, while the latter arrived in Qianlong 32. Čedendorji was ordered to learn management skills under the supervision of Hüturingga, and Sandubdorji had been assisting ministers in matters concerning Russia as the Associate of the Vice-General since Qianlong 23. See Oka Hiroki, “‘Kūron benji daijin’ ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu” 「庫倫弁事大臣」に關する一考察 (A consideration of the “Administrative Ministers of Kūriy-e”), in *Shinchō to higashi Ajia* 清朝と東アジア (The Qing dynasty and East Asia) (Tokyo, 1992), 197–214.
- 22) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 38 (=1/2, 2931, 99).
 - 23) *Journal of Kropotov*, 32r.-60r. Among the historical records of the Qing side, a memorial by Hüturingga *et al.* dated the 29th day of the 6th month of Qianlong 33 (ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 59) gives a full description of this stage in the negotiations.
 - 24) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 265, 47 (=1/2, 2931, 52); *Journal of Kropotov*, 60r.-62.
 - 25) *Lufu zouzhe*, 2273, 2 and 12; ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 59.
 - 26) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 84. However, Qianlong insisted in the edict that it was categorically impossible to use the title “*imperaterits’a*” (R. *imperatritsa*) for the Russian empress.
 - 27) *Lufu zouzhe*, 2273, 31, dated the 16th day of the 7th month. We can learn from this memorial that similar caravans had been sent to Kiakhtha every year from Qianlong 25 to Qianlong 28.
 - 28) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 87. *Gaozong shilu* 高宗實錄, vol. 814, 35b-36b (12th day of 7th month of Qianlong 33) has only the memorial of the Lifanyuan, while the edict is found on 37b-38a (13th) in a much abbreviated form.
 - 29) *Journal of Kropotov*, 71–93r. Some memorials of Hüturingga *et al.* (*Lufu zouzhe*, 2276, 6 and 8, both dated 21st day of 7th month; 2276, 26, dated 4th day of 8th month; ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 111, dated 16th day of 8th month) also give details of this stage of the negotiations.
 - 30) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 123 (=1/2, 2931, 48).
 - 31) ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 119 (=1/2, 2931, 7); 1/1, 267, 120. The edict of the 17th is also found in *Gaozong shilu*, vol. 817, 2b-3a (17th day of 8th month of Qianlong 33).
 - 32) The original of the letter is found in AVPRI, 62/1, 1768, 17, 15.
 - 33) Besides differences in the dates, in general, the records of the Qing side tend to stress that the Qing representatives maintained a high-handed attitude from beginning to end. For example, a memorial by Hüturingga *et al.* (ÜTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 125[=1/2, 2931, 63]) dated the 20th day of the 9th month says that the Russians brought a new draft on the 17th day of the 9th month (16 October), but because it was not revised according to their requirements, they tore it up and threw it away. The journal of Kropotov makes no reference to this incident at all. See also note 44.
 - 34) On the final steps of negotiations leading to the exchange of the Addendum, see the memorial of Hüturingga *et al.* of the 20th day of the 9th month (see preceding note) and *Journal of Kropotov*, 101–105r. Solin was the

- former Minister of Kūriy-e, who had been demoted because of his implication in contraband, and was engaged in the management of the watchposts.
- 35) AVPRI, 62/2, 1762-1769, 8, 281-283 and 312-315r.; Sychevskii (1875), 290-292.
 - 36) ŪTA, M-1, 1/1, 267, 134 (=1/2, 2931, 62). In addition, M-1, 1/2, 2931, 55 and 57 also have copies of the sanctioned regulations, which were made on the occasion of their dispatch from Kūriy-e to various local offices.
 - 37) *Lufu zouzhe*, 2317, 30, memorial of Kimboo, dated the 13th day of the 4th month of Qianlong 34.
 - 38) See note 32.
 - 39) The original Manchu text is found in AVPRI, 62/1, 1731, 2, 23-25. A copy is found in *Manwen Eluosi dang* 滿文俄羅斯檔 (Manchu Archives on Russia) in the *Neige* 內閣 (Grand Secretariat) group of the First Historical Archives of China, a Chinese translation of which is contained in *Qingdai Zhong-E guanxi dang'an shiliao xuanbian* 清代中俄關係檔案史料選編, vol. 1 (Beijing, 1981), 527-528 (No. 224).
 - 40) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 175-176. *Yuezhe dang* 月摺檔 (Monthly Files of Memorials) in the *Junjichu* group of the First Historical Archives of China, 6(2), 331-337 (memorial of Desin, dated 7th day of 2nd month of Yongzheng 11) clearly states that the second mission performed the ritual in this manner.
 - 41) Nomiyama Atsushi 野見山温, "Shin Yōseichō tai Ro kenshi kō" 清雍正朝對露遣使考 (On missions sent to Russia during the reign of Yongzheng of the Qing), in *Ro-Shin gaikō no kenkyū* 露清外交の研究 (A study of Sino-Russian diplomacy) (Tokyo, 1977), 103-147.
 - 42) *Journal of Kropotov*, 104r-105.
 - 43) *Lufu zouzhe*, 2272, 020. *Qindai bianjiang manwen dang'an mulu* 清代邊疆滿文檔案目錄 (Guilin, 1999), vol. 4, 396 lists this memorial in parentheses as one from the 6th month of Qianlong 33, but this dating seems to be incorrect.
 - 44) This way of thinking is already hinted at in a passage in an imperial edict dated the 7th day of the 7th month (see note 26), which says: "You Russians may write your own *katun han* in various ways raised above the line. But it is unreasonable that we too should write it similarly raised." As for the title of the Russian emperor, while Kropotov says that the Russian side wrote "*gosudarynia imperatritsa*" in its own text, the memorial mentions "*katun han*." Although it is difficult to determine the truth without checking the original, we can suppose that Kropotov's journal may be contrived in this regard. In addition, it is somewhat strange that *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaem: 1669-1881* (SPb., 1889), a collection of treaties published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which includes the Russian and Manchu texts of the Addendum, has "*imperaterits'a*" in its Manchu text. Considering that Kropotov states that the Qing side wrote "*katun han*" in its own text, we have to assume that the Manchu text in this collection is not

- based on the original that was handed over by the Qing side, but is based on the Manchu text of the Russian side.
- 45) On the subject of Golovkin’s mission, many materials can be found in the following collection: *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XIX veke: Materialy i dokumenty*, vol. 1, 1803–1807 (Moskva, 1995).
 - 46) *Journal of Kropotov*, 36r, 95r-97, 103–103r.
 - 47) “Sekretnaia informatsiia o sile i sostoianii Kitaiskogo gosudarstva.” This secret report was first submitted in 1728 and later published with revisions in *Russkii Vestnik* in 1842. The original is found in AVPRI, 62/1, 1730, 5, which I have not inspected. See P. E. Skachkov, *Ocherki istorii russkogo kitaevdeniia* (Moskva, 1977), 39.
 - 48) However, A. Lukin has pointed out that European influence was still so overwhelming in the 18th century that the Russian government and society paid much more attention to what was said about China by French philosophers and writers. See A. Lukin, *The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century* (Armonk & London, 2003), 10.
 - 49) Morikawa Tetsuo, “Soto-Mongoru no Roshia kizoku undō to dainidai Jebutsundamuba=Hotokuto” 外モンゴルのロシア歸屬運動と第二代ジェブツンダムバ=ホトクト (Joining movement to Russia taken place in Outer Mongolia and the Second Jebtsundamba Khutukht), *Rekishigaku-chirigaku nenpoh* 9 (1985), 1–40.
 - 50) Bantysh-Kamenskii (1882), 378–393.
 - 51) E. Widmer, *The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking during the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., & London, 1976), 103–112; Yanagisawa Akira, “Naikaku Orosu bunkan no setsuritsu ni tsuite” 内閣俄羅斯文館の設立について (On the establishment of the Neige Eluosi Wenguan), *Waseda daigaku daigakuin bungaku kenkyūka kiyō* 早稲田大學大学院文學研究科紀要 (*Bulletin of the Graduate Division of Literature of Waseda University*), special issue no. 16 (1990), 75–86.
 - 52) AVPRI, 62/1, 1731, 6, 133–134r.
 - 53) We may mention, for example, A. M. Vladykin, who gained a position in the Frontier Regiment of Yakutsk after his return home and later returned to Beijing in command of a government caravan, and E. Sakhnovskii, who obtained a position in the Customhouse of Kiakhta. See Skachkov (1977), 63, 65–66.
 - 54) On advances in Manchu literacy on the Russian side in this period, see also Shibuya Kōichi 澁谷浩一, “Kyafuta jōyaku teiketsu katei no kenkyū – kokkyō bōeki jōkō no seiritsu to Shin-gawa Roshia-bun jōyaku–” キャフタ條約締結過程の研究 —國境貿易條項の成立と清側ロシア文條約— (The process of negotiations for the Treaty of Kyakhta: Concerning the article on frontier trade and the treaty written in Russian language by the Qing side), *Jinbun kagaku ronshū* 人文科學論集 (*Studies in Humanities*, Bulletin of the College of Humanities, Ibaraki University) 40 (2003), 57–75.
 - 55) Yoshida Kin’ichi 吉田金一, *Kindai Ro-Shin kankei shi* 近代露清關係史 (The

- history of Sino-Russian relations in the modern period) (Tokyo, 1974), 231.
- 56) Wu Jianyong 吳建雍, *Shiba shiji de Zhongguo yu shijie: Duiwai guanxi juan* 18世紀的中國與世界：對外關係卷 (China and the world in the eighteenth century: Foreign relations) (Shenyang, 1998), 193–194.